Law of

noncontradiction

In classical logic, the law of non-

contradiction (LNC) (also known as the
law of contradiction, principle of non-
contradiction (PNC), or the principle of
contradiction) states that contradictory
statements cannot both be true in the
same sense at the same time, e.g. the
two propositions "A is B" and "A is not B"
are mutually exclusive. It is the second of
the three classic laws of thought.

The principle was stated as a theorem of

propositional logic by Russell and
Whitehead in Principia Mathematica as:

[1]

The law of non-contradiction, along with

its complement, the law of excluded
middle (the third of the three classic laws
of thought) and the law of identity (the
first of the three classic laws of thought),
partitions its logical Universe into exactly
two parts; it creates a dichotomy wherein
the two parts are "mutually exclusive"
and "jointly exhaustive". The law of non-
contradiction is merely an expression of
the mutually exclusive aspect of that
dichotomy, and the law of excluded
middle, an expression of its jointly
exhaustive aspect.

Interpretations
One difficulty in applying the law of non-
contradiction is ambiguity in the
propositions. For instance, if time is not
explicitly specified as part of the
propositions A and B, then A may be B at
one time, and not at another. A and B
may in some cases be made to sound
mutually exclusive linguistically even
though A may be partly B and partly not B
at the same time. However, it is
impossible to predicate of the same
thing, at the same time, and in the same
sense, the absence and the presence of
the same fixed quality.

Heraclitus

According to both Plato and Aristotle,[2]

Heraclitus was said to have denied the
law of non-contradiction. This is quite
likely[3] if, as Plato pointed out, the law of
non-contradiction does not hold for
changing things in the world. If a
philosophy of Becoming is not possible
without change, then (the potential of)
what is to become must already exist in
the present object. In "We step and do not
step into the same rivers; we are and we
are not", both Heraclitus's and Plato's
object simultaneously must, in some
sense, be both what it now is and have
the potential (dynamic) of what it might
become.[4]

Unfortunately, so little remains of

Heraclitus' aphorisms that not much
about his philosophy can be said with
certainty. He seems to have held that
strife of opposites is universal both
within and without, therefore both
opposite existents or qualities must
simultaneously exist, although in some
instances in different respects. "The road
up and down are one and the same"
implies either the road leads both ways,
or there can be no road at all. This is the
logical complement of the law of non-
contradiction. According to Heraclitus,
change, and the constant conflict of
opposites is the universal logos of
nature.

Protagoras

Personal subjective perceptions or

judgments can only be said to be true at
the same time in the same respect, in
which case, the law of non-contradiction
must be applicable to personal
judgments. The most famous saying of
Protagoras is: "Man is the measure of all
things: of things which are, that they are,
and of things which are not, that they are
not".[5] However, Protagoras was referring
to things that are used by or in some way
related to humans. This makes a great
difference in the meaning of his
aphorism. Properties, social entities,
ideas, feelings, judgments, etc. originate
in the human mind. However, Protagoras
has never suggested that man must be
the measure of stars or the motion of the
stars.

Parmenides
Parmenides employed an ontological
version of the law of non-contradiction to
prove that being is and to deny the void,
change, and motion. He also similarly
disproved contrary propositions. In his
poem On Nature, he said,

the only routes of inquiry there

are for thinking:

the one that [it] is and that [it]

cannot not be
is the path of Persuasion (for it
attends upon truth)
the other, that [it] is not and
that it is right that [it] not be,
 this I point out to you is a path
wholly inscrutable
for you could not know what is
not (for it is not to be
accomplished)
nor could you point it out… For
the same thing is for thinking
and for being

The nature of the ‘is’ or what-is in

Parmenides is a highly contentious
subject. Some have taken it to be
whatever exists, some to be whatever is
or can be the object of scientific
inquiry.[6]
Socrates

In Plato's early dialogues, Socrates uses

the elenctic method to investigate the
nature or definition of ethical concepts
such as justice or virtue. Elenctic
refutation depends on a dichotomous
thesis, one that may be divided into
exactly two mutually exclusive parts, only
one of which may be true. Then Socrates
goes on to demonstrate the contrary of
the commonly accepted part using the
law of non-contradiction. According to
Gregory Vlastos,[7] the method has the
following steps:
1. Socrates' interlocutor asserts a thesis,
for example, "Courage is endurance of
the soul", which Socrates considers false
and targets for refutation.
2. Socrates secures his interlocutor's
agreement to further premises, for
example, "Courage is a fine thing" and
"Ignorant endurance is not a fine thing".
3. Socrates then argues, and the
interlocutor agrees, that these further
premises imply the contrary of the
original thesis, in this case, it leads to:
"courage is not endurance of the soul".
4. Socrates then claims that he has
shown that his interlocutor's thesis is
false and that its negation is true.
Plato's synthesis

Plato's version of the law of non-

contradiction states that "The same thing
clearly cannot act or be acted upon in the
same part or in relation to the same thing
at the same time, in contrary ways" (The
Republic (436b)). In this, Plato carefully
phrases three axiomatic restrictions on
action or reaction: 1) in the same part, 2)
in the same relation, 3) at the same time.
The effect is to momentarily create a
frozen, timeless state, somewhat like
figures frozen in action on the frieze of
the Parthenon.[8]

This way, he accomplishes two essential

goals for his philosophy. First, he
logically separates the Platonic world of
constant change[9] from the formally
knowable world of momentarily fixed
physical objects.[10][11] Second, he
provides the conditions for the dialectic
method to be used in finding definitions,
as for example in the Sophist. So Plato's
law of non-contradiction is the
empirically derived necessary starting
point for all else he has to say.[12]

In contrast, Aristotle reverses Plato's

order of derivation. Rather than starting
with experience, Aristotle begins a priori
with the law of non-contradiction as the
fundamental axiom of an analytic
philosophical system.[13] This axiom then
necessitates the fixed, realist model.
Now, he starts with much stronger logical
foundations than Plato's non-contrariety
of action in reaction to conflicting
demands from the three parts of the
soul.

Aristotle's contribution

The traditional source of the law of non-

contradiction is Aristotle's Metaphysics
where he gives three different
versions.[14]

1. ontological: "It is impossible that the

same thing belong and not belong to the
same thing at the same time and in the
same respect." (1005b19-20)
2. psychological: "No one can believe
that the same thing can (at the same
time) be and not be." (1005b23-24)[15]
3. logical: "The most certain of all basic
principles is that contradictory
propositions are not true simultaneously."
(1011b13-14)

Aristotle attempts several proofs of this

law. He first argues that every expression
has a single meaning (otherwise we
could not communicate with one
another). This rules out the possibility
that by "to be a man", "not to be a man" is
meant. But "man" means "two-footed
animal" (for example), and so if anything
is a man, it is necessary (by virtue of the
meaning of "man") that it must be a two-
footed animal, and so it is impossible at
the same time for it not to be a two-
footed animal. Thus "it is not possible to
say truly at the same time that the same
thing is and is not a man" (Metaphysics
1006b 35). Another argument is that
anyone who believes something cannot
believe its contradiction (1008b).

Why does he not just get up first thing

and walk into a well or, if he finds one,
over a cliff? In fact, he seems rather
careful about cliffs and wells.[16]

Avicenna
Avicenna's commentary on the
Metaphysics illustrates the common view
that the law of non-contradiction "and
their like are among the things that do
not require our elaboration." Avicenna’s
words for "the obdurate" are quite
facetious: "he must be subjected to the
conflagration of fire, since 'fire' and 'not
fire' are one. Pain must be inflicted on
him through beating, since 'pain' and 'no
pain' are one. And he must be denied
food and drink, since eating and drinking
and the abstention from both are one
[and the same]."[17]

Eastern philosophy
The law of non-contradiction is found in
ancient Indian logic as a meta-rule in the
Shrauta Sutras, the grammar of Pāṇini,[18]
and the Brahma Sutras attributed to
Vyasa. It was later elaborated on by
medieval commentators such as
Madhvacharya.[19]

Leibniz and Kant

Leibniz and Kant adopted a different

statement, by which the law assumes an
essentially different meaning. Their
formula is A is not not-A; in other words it
is impossible to predicate of a thing a
quality which is its contradictory. Unlike
Aristotle's law this law deals with the
necessary relation between subject and
predicate in a single judgment. For
example, in Gottlob Ernst Schulze's
Aenesidemus, it is asserted, "… nothing
supposed capable of being thought may
contain contradictory characteristics."
Whereas Aristotle states that one or
other of two contradictory propositions
must be false, the Kantian law states that
a particular kind of proposition is in itself
necessarily false. On the other hand,
there is a real connection between the
two laws. The denial of the statement A
is not-A presupposes some knowledge of
what A is, i.e. the statement A is A. In
other words, a judgment about A is
implied.
Kant's analytical judgments of
propositions depend on presupposed
concepts which are the same for all
people. His statement, regarded as a
logical principle purely and apart from
material facts, does not therefore
amount to more than that of Aristotle,
which deals simply with the significance
of negation.

Dialetheism

Graham Priest advocates the view that

under some conditions, some statements
can be both true and false
simultaneously, or may be true and false
at different times. Dialetheism arises
from formal logical paradoxes, such as
the Liar's paradox and Russell's
paradox.[20]

Alleged impossibility of its

proof or denial
As is true of all axioms of logic, the law
of non-contradiction is alleged to be
neither verifiable nor falsifiable, on the
grounds that any proof or disproof must
use the law itself prior to reaching the
conclusion. In other words, in order to
verify or falsify the laws of logic one
must resort to logic as a weapon, an act
which would essentially be self-
defeating.[21] Since the early 20th century,
certain logicians have proposed logics
that deny the validity of the law.
Collectively, these logics are known as
"paraconsistent" or "inconsistency-
tolerant" logics. But not all
paraconsistent logics deny the law, since
they are not necessarily completely
agnostic to inconsistencies in general.
Graham Priest advances the strongest
thesis of this sort, which he calls
"dialetheism".

In several axiomatic derivations of

logic,[22] this is effectively resolved by
showing that (P ∨ ¬P) and its negation
are constants, and simply defining TRUE
as (P ∨ ¬P) and FALSE as ¬(P ∨ ¬P),
without taking a position as to the
principle of bivalence or the law of
excluded middle.

Some, such as David Lewis, have

objected to paraconsistent logic on the
ground that it is simply impossible for a
statement and its negation to be jointly
true.[23] A related objection that is that
"negation" in paraconsistent logic is not
really negation; it is merely a subcontrary-
forming operator.[24][25]

In popular culture
The Fargo episode "The Law of Non-
Contradiction", which takes its name
from the law, was noted for its several
elements relating to the law of non-
contradiction, as the episode's main
character faces several paradoxes. For
example, she is still the acting chief of
police while having been demoted from
the position, and tries to investigate a
man that both was and was not named
Ennis Stussy, and who both was and was
not her stepfather. It also features the
story of a robot who, after having spent
million of years unable to help humanity,
is told that he greatly helped mankind all
along by observing history.[26]

See also
Contradiction
 First principle
Identity (philosophy)
Law of excluded middle
Law of identity
Laws of thought
Liar's Paradox
Peirce's law
Principle of bivalence
Principle of explosion
Principle of sufficient reason
Reductio ad absurdum
Oxymoron

References
1. Alfred North Whitehead, Bertrand
Russell (1910), Principia Mathematica,
Cambridge, pp. 116–117[1]
2. Aristotle, Metaphysics (IV,1005b), “to
suppose that the same thing is and is not,
as some imagine that Heraclitus says”
3. Heraclitus, Fragments 36,57,59
(Bywater)
4. Cornford, F.M., Plato's Theory of
Knowledge, p. 234
5. (80B1 DK). According to Plato's
Theaetetus, section 152a. [2]
6. Curd, Patricia, "Presocratic Philosophy",
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(Summer 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta
(ed.), URL =
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum20
11/entries/presocratics/
7. Gregory Vlastos, 'The Socratic
Elenchus', Oxford Studies in Ancient
Philosophy I, Oxford 1983, 27–58.
8. James Danaher, The Laws of Thought
"The restrictions Plato places on the laws
of thought (i.e., "in the same respect," and
"at the same time,") are an attempt to
isolate the object of thought by removing
it from all other time but the present and
all respects but one."
9. Plato's Divided Line describes the four
Platonic worlds
10. Cratylus, starting at 439e
11. "A thing which is F at one time, or in
one way, or in one relation, or from one
point of view, will be all too often not-F, at
another time, in another way"
("Metaphysical Paradox" in Gregory
Vlastos, Platonic Studies, p.50)
12. "Two Principles of Noncontradiction"
in Samuel Scolnicov, Plato's Parmenides,
pp.12-16
13. Similarly, Kant remarked that Newton
"by no means dared to prove this law a
priori, and therefore appealed rather to
experience" (Metaphysical Foundations,
4:449)
14. Łukasiewicz (1971) p.487
15. Whitaker, CWA Aristotle's De
Interpretatione: Contradiction and
Dialectic page 184
16. 1008b, trans. Lawson-Tancred
17. Avicenna, Metaphysics, I.8 53.13–15
(sect. 12 [p. 43] in ed. Michael Marmura);
commenting on Aristotle, Topics
I.11.105a4–5. The editorial addition
(brackets) is present in Marmura's
translation.
18. Frits Staal (1988), Universals: Studies
in Indian Logic and Linguistics, Chicago,
pp. 109–28 (cf. Bull, Malcolm (1999),
Seeing Things Hidden, Verso, p. 53,
ISBN 1-85984-263-1)
19. Dasgupta, Surendranath (1991), A
History of Indian Philosophy, Motilal
Banarsidass, p. 110, ISBN 81-208-0415-5
20. Graham Priest; Francesco Berto
(2013). "Dialetheism" , (Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
21. S.M. Cohen, Aristotle on the Principle
of Non-Contradiction "Aristotle's solution
in the Posterior Analytics is to distinguish
between episteme (scientific knowledge)
and nous (intuitive intellect). First
principles, such as PNC, are not objects of
scientific knowledge - since they are not
demonstrable - but are still known, since
they are grasped by nous".
22. Steven Wolfram, A New Kind Of
Science, ISBN 1-57955-008-8
23. See Lewis (1982), p.
24. See Slater (1995), p.
25. Béziau (2000), p.
26. "Is 'Fargo' Still 'Fargo' If It's In Los
Angeles? You Betcha!" . Uproxx. May 3,
2017. Retrieved May 6, 2017.

Bibliography
Aristotle (1998). Lawson-Tancred, H.,
ed. Aristotle's Metaphysics. Penguin.
Béziau (2000).
Lewis (1982).
Łukasiewicz, Jan (1971) [1910 in
Polish], "On the Principle of
Contradiction in Aristotle", Review of
Metaphysics, 24: 485–509
Slater (1995).

Further reading
 Benardete, Seth (1989). Socrates'
Second Sailing: On Plato’s Republic.
University of Chicago Press.

External links
S. M. Cohen, "Aristotle on the Principle
of Non-Contradiction ", Canadian
Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 16, No. 3
James Danaher (2004), "The Laws of
Thought ", The Philosopher, Vol.
LXXXXII No. 1
Paula Gottlieb, "Aristotle on Non-
contradiction " (Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy)
Laurence Horn, "Contradiction "
(Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
 Graham Priest and Francesco Berto,
"Dialetheism " (Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy)
Graham Priest and Koji Tanaka,
"Paraconsistent logic " (Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Peter Suber, "Non-Contradiction and
Excluded Middle ", Earlham College

Retrieved from
"https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?
title=Law_of_noncontradiction&oldid=841258906
"

Last edited 2 months ago by Depre…

Content is available under CC BY-SA 3.0 unless
otherwise noted.