Republic of the Philippines Clause 6th, containing the institution of
SUPREME COURT heirs, reads as follows: .
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No.
L-15737 February 28, 1962
LEONOR VILLAFLOR VDA. DE
VILLANUEVA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
DELFIN N. JUICO, in his capacity as
Judicial Administrator of the testate
estate of FAUSTA NEPOMUCENO,
defendant-appellee.
Amado G. Salazar for plaintiff-appellant.
Sycip, Salazar, Luna and Associates for
defendant-appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Subject to this direct appeal to us on
points of law is the decision of the Court
of First Instance of Rizal, in its Civil
Case No. Q-2809, dismissing
plaintiff-appellant's complaint for the
recovery of certain properties that were
originally owned by the plaintiff's
granduncle, Nicolas Villaflor, and which
he granted to his widow, Doña Fausta
Nepomuceno, bequeathing to her "su
uso y posesion mientras viva y no se
case en segundas nupcias".
The following facts appear of record: On
October 9, 1908, Don Nicolas Villaflor,
a wealthy man of Castillejos, Zambales,
executed a will in Spanish in his own
handwriting, devising and bequeathing
in favor of his wife, Dona Fausta
Nepomuceno, one-half of all his real and
personal properties, giving the other half
to his brother Don Fausto Villaflor.
SEXTO — En virtud de las facultades
que me conceden las leyes, instituyo per
mis unicos y universales herederos de
todos mis derechos y acciones a mi
hermano D. Fausto Villaflor y a mi
esposa Da. Fausta Nepomuceno para
que partan todos mis bienes que me
pertenescan, en iguales partes, para
despues de mi muerte, exceptuando las
donaciones y legados que, abajo mi mas
expontanea voluntad, lo hago en la
forma siguiente: .
SEPTIMO: — Lego para dispues de mi
muerte a mi esposa Da. Fausta
Nepomuceno, en prueba de mi amor y
carino, los bienes, alhajas y muebles que
a continuacion se expresan; .
OCTAVO: — Que estos legades
disfrutaria mi referida esposa Da. Fausta
Nepomuceno su uso y posesion mientras
viva y no se case en segundas nupcias,
de la contrario, pasara a ser propiedad
estos dichos legados de mi sobrina nieta
Leonor Villaflor.
The 12th clause of the will provided,
however, that Clauses 6th and 7th
thereof would be deemed annulled from
the moment he bore any child with Doña
Fausta Nepomuceno. Said Clause 12th
reads as follows: .
DUODECIMO: — Quedan anulados las
parrafos 6.0 y 7.0 de este testamento que
tratan de institucion de herederos y los
legados que se haran despues de mi
muerte a favor de mi esposa, en el
momento que podre tener la dicha de
contrar con hijo y hijos legitimos o
legitimados, pues estos, conforme a ley
seran mis herederos.
Don Nicolas Villaflor died on March 3,
1922, without begetting any child with
his wife Doña Fausta Nepomuceno. The
latter, already a widow, thereupon
instituted Special Proceeding No. 203 of
the Court of First Instance of Zambales,
for the settlement of her husband's estate
and in that proceeding, she was
appointed judicial administratrix. In due
course of administration, she submitted
a project of partition, now Exhibit "E".
In the order of November 24, 1924, now
exhibit "C", the probate court approved
the project of partition and declared the
proceeding closed. As the project of
partition, Exhibit "E", now shows Doña
Fausta Nepomuceno received by virtue
thereof the ownership and possession of
a considerable amount of real and
personal estate. By virtue also of the
said project of partition, she received the
use and possession of all the real and
personal properties mentioned and
referred to in Clause 7th of the will. The
order approving the project of partition
(Exh. "C"), however, expressly provided
that approval thereof was "sin perjuicio
de lo dispuesto en la clausula 8.o del
testamento de Nicolas Villaflor." .
On May 1, 1956, Doña Fausta
Nepomuceno died without having
contracted a second marriage, and
without having begotten any child with
the deceased Nicolas Villaflor. Her
estate is now being settled in Special
Proceeding No. Q-1563 in the lower
court, with the defendant Delfin N. Juico
as the duly appointed and qualified
judicial administrator.
The plaintiff Leonor Villaflor Vda. de
Villanueva is admitted to be the same
Leonor Villaflor mentioned by Don
Nicolas Villaflor in his will as his
"sobrina nieta Leonor Villaflor".
Plaintiff Leonor Villaflor instituted the
present action against the administrator
of the estate of the widow Fausta
Nepomuceno, on February 8, 1958,
contending that upon the widow's death,
said plaintiff became vested with the
ownership of the real and personal
properties bequeathed by the late
Nicolas Villaflor to clause 7 of his will,
pursuant to its eight (8th) clause.
Defendant's position, adopted by the
trial court, is that the title to the
properties aforesaid became absolutely
vested in the widow upon her death, on
account of the fact that she never
remarried.
We agree with appellant that the plain
desire and intent of the testator, as
manifested in clause 8 of his testament,
was to invest his widow with only a
usufruct or life tenure in the properties
described in the seventh clause, subject
to the further condition (admitted by the
appellee) that if the widow remarried,
her rights would thereupon cease, even
during her own lifetime. That the widow
was meant to have no more than a life
interest in those properties, even if she
did not remarry at all, is evident from
the expressions used by the deceased
"uso y posesion mientras viva" (use and
possession while alive) in which the first
half of the phrase "uso y posesion"
instead of "dominio" or "propiedad")
reinforces the second ("mientras viva").
The testator plainly did not give his
widow the full ownership of these
particular properties, but only the right
to their possession and use (or
enjoyment) during her lifetime. This is
in contrast with the remainder of the
estate in which she was instituted
universal heir together with the testator's
brother (clause 6). 1äwphï1.ñët
SEXTO: — En virtud de las facultades
que me conceden las leyes, instituyo por
mis unicos y universales herederos de
todos mis derechos y acciones a mi
hermano D. Fausto Villaflor y a mi
esposa Da. Fausta Nepomuceno para
que parten todos mis bienes que me
pertenescan, en iguales partes, para
despues de mi muerte, exceptuando las
donaciones y legados que, abajo mi mas
expontanea voluntad, lo hago en la
forma siguiente.
The court below, in holding that the
appellant Leonor Villaflor, as
reversionary legatee, could succeed to
the properties bequeathed by clause 7 of
the testament only in the event that the
widow remarried, has unwarrantedly
discarded the expression "mientras
viva," and considered the words "uso y
posesion" as equivalent to "dominio"
(ownership). In so doing, the trial court
violated Article 791 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, as well as section 59 of
Rule 123 of the Rules of Court.
ART. 791. The words of a will are to
receive an interpretation which will give
to every expression some effect, rather
than one which will render any of the
expressions inoperative; and of two
modes of interpreting a will, that one is
to be preferred which will prevent
intestacy." .
SEC. 59. Instrument construed so as to
give effect to all provisions. — In the
construction of an instrument where
there are several provisions or
particulars, such a construction is, if
possible, to be adopted as will give
effect to all." .
Speculation as to the motives of the
testator in imposing the conditions
contained in clause 7 of his testament
should not be allowed to obscure the
clear and unambiguous meaning of his
plain words, which are over the primary
source in ascertaining his intent. It is
well to note that if the testator had
intended to impose as sole condition the
non-remarriage of his widow, the words
"uso y posesion mientras viva" would
have been unnecessary, since the widow
could only remarry during her own
lifetime.
The Civil Code, in Article 790, p. 1
(Article 675 of the Code of 1889),
expressly enjoins the following: .
ART. 790. The words of a will are to be
taken in their ordinary and grammatical
sense, unless a clear intention to use
them in another sense can be gathered,
and that other can be ascertained." .
Technical words in a will are to be taken
in their technical sense, unless the
context clearly indicates a contrary
intention, or unless it satisfactorily
appears that the will was drawn solely
by the testator, and that he was
unacquainted with such technical sense.
(675a)
In consonance with this rule, this
Supreme Court has laid the doctrine in
In re Estate of Calderon, 26 Phil., 233,
that the intention and wishes of the
testator, when clearly expressed in his
will, constitute the fixed law of
interpretation, and all questions raised at
the trial, relative to its execution and
fulfillment, must be settled in
accordance therewith, following the
plain and literal meaning of the testator's
words, unless it clearly appears that his
intention was otherwise. The same rule
is adopted by the Supreme Court of
Spain (TS. Sent. 20 Marzo 1918; 28
Mayo 1918; 30 Abril 1913; 16 Enero
1915; 23 Oct. 1925).
La voluntad del testador, clara, precisa y
constantemente expresada al ordenar su
ultimo voluntad, es ley unica, imperativa
y obligatoria que han de obedecer y
cumplir fieldmente albaceas, legatarios y
heredera, hoy sus sucesores, sin que esa
voluntad patente, que no ha menester de
interpretaciones, pues no ofrece la
menor duda, pueda sustituirse, pues no
ofrece la menor duda, pueda sustituirse
por ningun otro criterio de alguna de los
interesados, ni tampoco por el judicial.
(Tribunal Supremo of Spain, Sent. 20
March 1918) .
The American decisions invoked by
appellee in his brief inapplicable,
because they involve cases where the
only condition imposed on the legatee
was that she should remain a widow. As
already shown, the testament of Don
Nicolas Villaflor clearly and
unmistakably provided that his widow
should have the possession and use of
the legacies while alive and did not
remarry. It necessarily follows that by
the express provisions of the 8th clause
of his will, the legacies should pass to
the testator's "sobrinanieta", appellant
herein, upon the widow's death, even if
the widow never remarried in her
lifetime. Consequently, the widow had
no right to retain or dispose of the
aforesaid properties, and her estate is
accountable to the reversionary legatee
for their return, unless they had been lost
due to fortuitous event, or for their value
should rights of innocent third parties
have intervened.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the
decision appealed from is reversed, and
the appellant Leonor Villaflor Vda. de
VILLANUEVA is declared entitled to
the ownership and fruits of the
properties described in clause 7 of the
will or testament, from the date of the
death of Doña Fausta Nepomuceno. The
records are ordered remanded to the
court of origin for liquidation,
accounting and further proceedings
conformably to this decision. Costs
against the Administrator-appellee.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No.
L-14074 November 7, 1918
In the matter of the probation of the
will of Jose Riosa.
MARCELINO CASAS,
applicant-appellant,
Vicente de Vera for petitioner-appellant.
MALCOLM, J.:
The issue which this appeal presents is
whether in the Philippine Islands the law
existing on the date of the execution of a
will, or the law existing at the death of
the testator, controls.
Jose Riosa died on April 17, 1917. He
left a will made in the month of January,
1908, in which he disposed of an estate
valued at more than P35,000. The will
was duly executed in accordance with
the law then in force, namely, section
618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The
will was not executed in accordance
with Act No. 2645, amendatory of said
section 618, prescribing certain
additional formalities for the signing and
attestation of wills, in force on and after
July 1, 1916. In other words, the will
was in writing, signed by the testator,
and attested and subscribed by three
credible witnesses in the presence of the
testator and of each other; but was not
signed by the testator and the witnesses
on the left margin of each and every
page, nor did the attestation state these
facts. The new law, therefore, went into
effect after the making of the will and
before the death of the testator, without
the testator having left a will that
conforms to the new requirements.
Section 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure reads:
No will, except as provided in the
preceding section, shall be valid to pass
any estate, real or personal, nor charge
or affect the same, unless it be in writing
and signed by the testator, or by the
testator's name written by some other
person in his presence, and by his
express direction, and attested and
subscribed by three or more credible
witnesses in the presence of the testator
and of each other. The attestation shall
state the fact that the testator signed the
will, or caused it to be signed by some
other person, at his express direction, in
the presence of three witnesses, and that
they attested and subscribed it in his
presence and in the presence of each
other. But the absence of such form of
attestation shall not render the will
invalid if it is proven that the will was in
fact signed and attested as in this section
provided.
Act No. 2645 has amended section 618
of the Code of Civil Procedure so as to
make said section read as follows:
SEC. 618. Requisites of will. — No will,
except as provided in the preceding
section, shall be valid to pass any estate,
real or personal, nor charge or affect the
same, unless it be written in the
language or dialect known by the
testator and signed by him, or by the
testator's name written by some other
person in his presence, and by his
express direction, and attested and
subscribed by three or more credible
witnesses in the presence of the testator
and of each other. The testator or the
person requested by him to write his
name and the instrumental witnesses of
the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid,
each, and every page thereof, on the left
margin, and said pages shall be
numbered correlatively in letters placed
on the upper part of each sheet. The
attestation shall state the number of
sheets or pages used, upon which the
will is written, and the fact that the
testator signed the will and every page
thereof, or caused some other person to
write his name, under his express
direction, in the presence of three
witnesses, and the latter witnessed and
signed the will and all pages thereof in
the presence of the testator and of each
other.
This court has heretofore held in a
decision handed down by the Chief
Justice, as to a will made after the date
Act No. 2645 went into effect, that it
must comply with the provisions of this
law. (Caraig vs Tatlonghari, R. G. No.
12558, dated March 23, 1918 [not
published].) The court has further held
in a decision handed down by Justice
Torres, as to will executed by a testator
whose death took place prior to the
operative date of Act No. 2645, that the
amendatory act is inapplicable. (Bona vs.
Briones, [1918], 38 Phil., 276.) The
instant appeal presents an entirely
different question. The will was execute
prior to the enactment of Act No. 2645
and the death occurred after the
enactment of this law.
There is a clear cleavage of authority
among the cases and the text-writers, as
to the effect of a change in the statutes
prescribing the formalities necessary to
be observed in the execution of a will,
when such change is made intermediate
to the execution of a will and the death
of a testator. (See generally 40 Cyc.,
1076. and any textbook on Wills, and
Lane's Appeal from Probate [1889], 57
Conn., 182.) The rule laid down by the
courts in many jurisdictions is that the
statutes in force at the testator's death
are controlling, and that a will not
executed in conformity with such
statutes is invalid, although its execution
was sufficient at the time it was made.
The reasons assigned for applying the
later statute are the following: "As until
the death of the testator the paper
executed by him, expressing his wishes,
is not a will, but a mere inchoate act
which may or may not be a will, the law
in force at the testator's death applies
and controls the proof of the will."
(Sutton vs. Chenault [1855], 18 Ga., 1.)
Were we to accept the foregoing
proposition and the reasons assigned for
it, it would logically result that the will
of Jose Riosa would have to be held
invalid.
The rule prevailing in many other
jurisdictions is that the validity of the
execution of a will must be tested by the
statutes in force at the time of its
execution and that statutes subsequently
enacted have no retrospective effect.
This doctrine is believed to be supported
by the weight of authority. It was the old
English view; in Downs (or Downing)
vs. Townsend (Ambler, 280), Lord
Hardwicke is reported to have said that
"the general rule as to testaments is, that
the time of the testament, and not the
testator's death, is regarded." It is also
the modern view, including among other
decisions one of the Supreme Court of
Vermont from which State many of the
sections of the Code if Civil Procedure
of the Philippine Islands relating to wills
are taken. (Giddings vs. Turgeon [1886],
58 Vt., 103.)
Of the numerous decisions of divergent
tendencies, the opinion by the learned
Justice Sharswood (Taylor vs. Mitchell
[1868], 57 Pa. St., 209) is regarded to be
the best considered. In this opinion is
found the following:
Retrospective laws generally if not
universally work injustice, and ought to
be so construed only when the mandate
of the legislature is imperative. When a
testator makes a will, formally executed
according to the requirements of the law
existing at the time of its execution, it
would unjustly disappoint his lawful
right of disposition to apply to it a rule
subsequently enacted, though before his
death.
While it is true that every one is
presumed to know the law, the maxim in
fact is inapplicable to such a case; for he
would have an equal right to presume
that no new law would affect his past act,
and rest satisfied in security on that
presumption. . . . It is true, that every
will is ambulatory until the death of the
testator, and the disposition made by it
does not actually take effect until then.
General words apply to the property of
which the testator dies possessed, and he
retains the power of revocation as long
as he lives. The act of bequeathing or
devising, however, takes place when the
will is executed, though to go into effect
at a future time.
A third view, somewhat larger in
conception than the preceding one,
finding support in the States of Alabama
and New York, is that statutes relating to
the execution of wills, when they
increase the necessary formalities,
should be construed so as not to impair
the validity of a will already made and,
when they lessen the formalities
required, should be construed so as to
aid wills defectively executed according
to the law in force at the time of their
making (Hoffman vs. Hoffman, [1855],
26 Ala., 535; Price vs. Brown, 1 Bradf.,
Surr. N.Y., 252.)
This court is given the opportunity to
choose between the three rules above
described. Our selection, under such
circumstances, should naturally depend
more on reason than on technicality.
Above all, we cannot lose sight of the
fact that the testator has provided in
detail for the disposition of his property
and that his desires should be respected
by the courts. Justice is a powerful
pleader for the second and third rules on
the subject.
The plausible reasoning of the
authorities which back the first
proposition is, we think, fallacious. The
act of bequeathing or devising is
something more than inchoate or
ambulatory. In reality, it becomes a
completed act when the will is executed
and attested according to the law,
although it does not take effect on the
property until a future time.lawphil.net
It is, of course, a general rule of
statutory construction, as this court has
said, that "all statutes are to be construed
as having only a prospective operation
unless the purpose and intention of the
Legislature to give them a retrospective
effect is expressly declared or is
necessarily implied from the language
used. In every case of doubt, the doubt
must be resolved against the
restrospective effect." (Montilla vs.
Corporacion de PP. Agustinos [1913],
24 Phil., 220. See also Chew Heong vs.
U.S. [1884], 112 U.S., 536; U.S. vs
American Sugar Ref. Co. [1906], 202
U.S., 563.) Statute law, as found in the
Civil Code, is corroborative; article 3
thereof provides that "laws shall not
have a retroactive effect, unless therein
otherwise prescribed." The language of
Act No. 2645 gives no indication of
retrospective effect. Such, likewise, has
been the uniform tendency of the
Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands
on cases having special application to
testamentary succession. (Abello vs.
Kock de Monaterio [1904], 3 Phil., 558;
Timbol vs. Manalo [1906], 6 Phil., 254;
Bona vs. Briones, supra; In the Matter of
the Probation of the Will of Bibiana
Diquiña [1918], R. G. No. 13176, 1
concerning the language of the Will. See
also section 617, Code of Civil
Procedure.)
The strongest argument against our
accepting the first two rules comes out
of section 634 of the Code of Civil
Procedure which, in negative terms,
provides that a will shall be disallowed
in either of five cases, the first being "if
not executed and attested as in this Act
provided." Act No. 2645 has, of course,
become part and parcel of the Code of
Civil Procedure. The will in question is
admittedly not executed and attested as
provided by the Code of Civil Procedure
as amended. Nevertheless, it is proper to
observe that the general principle in the
law of wills inserts itself even within the
provisions of said section 634. Our
statute announces a positive rule for the
transference of property which must be
complied with as completed act at the
time of the execution, so far as the act of
the testator is concerned, as to all
testaments made subsequent to the
enactment of Act No. 2645, but is not
effective as to testaments made
antecedent to that date.
To answer the question with which we
began this decision, we adopt as our
own the second rule, particularly as
established by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania. The will of Jose Riosa is
valid.
The order of the Court of First Instance
for the Province of Albay of December
29, 1917, disallowing the will of Jose
Riosa, is reversed, and the record shall
be returned to the lower court with
direction to admit the said will to
probate, without special findings as to
costs. So ordered.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-7188 August 9,
1954
In re: Will and Testament of the
deceased REVEREND SANCHO
ABADIA.
SEVERINA A. VDA. DE ENRIQUEZ,
ET AL., petitioners-appellees,
vs.
MIGUEL ABADIA, ET AL.,
oppositors-appellants.
Manuel A. Zosa, Luis B. Ladonga,
Mariano A. Zosa and B. G. Advincula
for appellants.
C. de la Victoria for appellees.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
On September 6, 1923, Father Sancho
Abadia, parish priest of Talisay, Cebu,
executed a document purporting to be
his Last Will and Testament now
marked Exhibit "A". Resident of the
City of Cebu, he died on January 14,
1943, in the municipality of Aloguinsan,
Cebu, where he was an evacuee. He left
properties estimated at P8,000 in value.
On October 2, 1946, one Andres
Enriquez, one of the legatees in Exhibit
"A", filed a petition for its probate in the
Court of First Instance of Cebu. Some
cousins and nephews who would inherit
the estate of the deceased if he left no
will, filed opposition.
During the hearing one of the attesting
witnesses, the other two being dead,
testified without contradiction that in his
presence and in the presence of his
co-witnesses, Father Sancho wrote out
in longhand Exhibit "A" in Spanish
which the testator spoke and understood;
that he (testator) signed on he left hand
margin of the front page of each of the
three folios or sheets of which the
document is composed, and numbered
the same with Arabic numerals, and
finally signed his name at the end of his
writing at the last page, all this, in the
presence of the three attesting witnesses
after telling that it was his last will and
that the said three witnesses signed their
names on the last page after the
attestation clause in his presence and in
the presence of each other. The
oppositors did not submit any evidence.
The learned trial court found and
declared Exhibit "A" to be a holographic
will; that it was in the handwriting of the
testator and that although at the time it
was executed and at the time of the
testator's death, holographic wills were
not permitted by law still, because at the
time of the hearing and when the case
was to be decided the new Civil Code
was already in force, which Code
permitted the execution of holographic
wills, under a liberal view, and to carry
out the intention of the testator which
according to the trial court is the
controlling factor and may override any
defect in form, said trial court by order
dated January 24, 1952, admitted to
probate Exhibit "A", as the Last Will
and Testament of Father Sancho Abadia.
The oppositors are appealing from that
decision; and because only questions of
law are involved in the appeal, the case
was certified to us by the Court of
Appeals.
The new Civil Code (Republic Act No.
386) under article 810 thereof provides
that a person may execute a holographic
will which must be entirely written,
dated and signed by the testator himself
and need not be witnessed. It is a fact,
however, that at the time that Exhibit
"A" was executed in 1923 and at the
time that Father Abadia died in 1943,
holographic wills were not permitted,
and the law at the time imposed certain
requirements for the execution of wills,
such as numbering correlatively each
page (not folio or sheet) in letters and
signing on the left hand margin by the
testator and by the three attesting
witnesses, requirements which were not
complied with in Exhibit "A" because
the back pages of the first two folios of
the will were not signed by any one, not
even by the testator and were not
numbered, and as to the three front
pages, they were signed only by the
testator.
Interpreting and applying this
requirement this Court in the case of In
re Estate of Saguinsin, 41 Phil., 875, 879,
referring to the failure of the testator and
his witnesses to sign on the left hand
margin of every page, said:
. . . . This defect is radical and totally
vitiates the testament. It is not enough
that the signatures guaranteeing
authenticity should appear upon two
folios or leaves; three pages having been
written on, the authenticity of all three
of them should be guaranteed by the
signature of the alleged testatrix and her
witnesses.
And in the case of Aspe vs. Prieto, 46
Phil., 700, referring to the same
requirement, this Court declared:
From an examination of the document in
question, it appears that the left margins
of the six pages of the document are
signed only by Ventura Prieto. The
noncompliance with section 2 of Act No.
2645 by the attesting witnesses who
omitted to sign with the testator at the
left margin of each of the five pages of
the document alleged to be the will of
Ventura Prieto, is a fatal defect that
constitutes an obstacle to its probate.
What is the law to apply to the probate
of Exh. "A"? May we apply the
provisions of the new Civil Code which
not allows holographic wills, like
Exhibit "A" which provisions were
invoked by the appellee-petitioner and
applied by the lower court? But article
795 of this same new Civil Code
expressly provides: "The validity of a
will as to its form depends upon the
observance of the law in force at the
time it is made." The above provision is
but an expression or statement of the
weight of authority to the affect that the
validity of a will is to be judged not by
the law enforce at the time of the
testator's death or at the time the
supposed will is presented in court for
probate or when the petition is decided
by the court but at the time the
instrument was executed. One reason in
support of the rule is that although the
will operates upon and after the death of
the testator, the wishes of the testator
about the disposition of his estate among
his heirs and among the legatees is given
solemn expression at the time the will is
executed, and in reality, the legacy or
bequest then becomes a completed act.
This ruling has been laid down by this
court in the case of In re Will of Riosa,
39 Phil., 23. It is a wholesome doctrine
and should be followed.
Of course, there is the view that the
intention of the testator should be the
ruling and controlling factor and that all
adequate remedies and interpretations
should be resorted to in order to carry
out said intention, and that when statutes
passed after the execution of the will and
after the death of the testator lessen the
formalities required by law for the
execution of wills, said subsequent
statutes should be applied so as to
validate wills defectively executed
according to the law in force at the time
of execution. However, we should not
forget that from the day of the death of
the testator, if he leaves a will, the title
of the legatees and devisees under it
becomes a vested right, protected under
the due process clause of the
constitution against a subsequent change
in the statute adding new legal
requirements of execution of wills which
would invalidate such a will. By parity
of reasoning, when one executes a will
which is invalid for failure to observe
and follow the legal requirements at the
time of its execution then upon his death
he should be regarded and declared as
having died intestate, and his heirs will
then inherit by intestate succession, and
no subsequent law with more liberal
requirements or which dispenses with
such requirements as to execution
should be allowed to validate a defective
will and thereby divest the heirs of their
vested rights in the estate by intestate
succession. The general rule is that the
Legislature can not validate void wills
(57 Am. Jur., Wills, Sec. 231, pp.
192-193).
In view of the foregoing, the order
appealed from is reversed, and Exhibit
"A" is denied probate. With costs.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5064 February
27, 1953
BIENVENIDO A. IBARLE,
plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ESPERANZA M. PO,
defendant-appellant.
Quirico del Mar for appellant.
Daniel P. Tumulak and Conchita F.
Miel appellee.
TUASON, J.:
This action commenced in the Court of
First Instance of Cebu to annul a deed of
sale conveying to the defendant, in
consideration of P1,700, one undivided
half of a parcel of land which previously
had been sold, along with the other half,
by the same vendor to the plaintiff's
grantors. judgment was against the
plaintiff.
The case was submitted for decision
upon an agreed statement of facts, the
pertinent parts of which are thus
summarized in the appealed decision:
1st. — That Leonard j. Winstanley and
Catalina Navarro were husband and wife,
the former having died on June 6, 1946
leaving heir the surviving spouse and
some minor children;
2nd. — hat upon the death of L.J.
Winstanley, he left a parcel of land
described under Transfer Certificate of
title No. 2391 of the Registry of Deeds
of the Province of Cebu;
3rd. — That the above mentioned
property was a conjugal property;
4th. — That on April 15, 1946, the
surviving spouse Catalina Navarro Vda.
de Winstanley sold the entire parcel of
land to the spouses Maria Canoy,
alleging among other things, that she
needed money for the support of her
children;
5th. — That on May 24, 1947, the
spouses Maria Canoy and Roberto
Canoy sold the same parcel of land to
the plaintiff in this case named
Bienvenido A. Ebarle;
6th. — That the two deeds of sale
referred to above were not registered
and have never been registered up to the
date;
7th. — That on January 17, 1948
surviving spouse Catalina Navarro Vda.
de Winstanley, after her appointment as
guardian of her children by this court
(Special proceeding no. 212-R) sold
one-half of the land mentioned above to
Esperanza M. Po, defendant in the
instant case, which portion belongs to
the children of the above named
spouses.
As stated by the trial Judge, the sole
question for determination is the validity
of the sale to Esperanza M. Po, the last
purchaser. This question in turn depends
upon the validity of the prior sale to
Maria Canoy and Roberto Canoy.
Article 657 of the old Civil Code
provides: "The rights to the succession
of a person are transmitted from the
moment of his death." in a slightly
different language, this article is
incorporated in the new Civil Code as
article 777.
Manresa, commending on article 657 of
the Civil Code of Spain, says:
The moment of death is the determining
factor when the heirs acquire a definite
right to the inheritance, whether such
right be pure or contingent. It is
immaterial whether a short or long
period of time lapses between the death
of the predecessor and the entry into
possession of the property of the
inheritance because the right is always
deemed to be retroactive from the
moment of death. (5 Manresa, 317.)
The above provision and comment make
it clear that when Catalina Navarro Vda.
de Winstanley sold the entire parcel to
the Canoy spouses, one-half of it already
belonged to the seller's children. No
formal or judicial declaration being
needed to confirm the children's title, it
follows that the first sale was null and
void in so far as it included the
children's share.

On the other hand, the sale to the

defendant having been made by
authority of the competent court was
undeniably legal and effective. The fact
that it has not been recorded is of no
consequence. If registration were
necessary, still the non-registration
would not avail the plaintiff because it
was due to no other cause than his own
opposition.

The decision will be affirmed subject to

the reservation, made in said decision, of
the right of the plaintitff and/or the
Canoy spouses to bring such action
against Catalina Navarro Vda. de
Winstanley as may be appropriate for
such damages as they may have incurred
by reason of the voiding of the sale in
their favor.