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T h is d is s e r t a t io n h a s been
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m ic r o f ilm e d e x a c t ly a s r e c e iv e d

MORAN, John H en ry, 1 9 3 0 -

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LUDWIG W ITTGENSTEIN'S PHILOSOPHICAL
THERAPY.

F o r d h a m U n iv e r s it y , P h .D ., 19G2
P h ilo s o p h y
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U n iv e r s it y M icrofilm s, Inc., A n n A r b o r . M ic h i ru m
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Copyright by
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John Henry Moran
1963
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 LUDWIG- WITTGENSTEIN'S
PHILOSOPHICAL THERAPY

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IE BY

JOHN H.' MORAN

B.S., University of Scranton, '52

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M.A., Fordham University, *55
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DISSERTATION
SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE DEPARTMENT
OF PHILOSOPHY AT FORDHAM UNIVERSITY

NEW YORK
1962
 FORDHAM UNIVERSITY

G r a d u a t e S c h o o l of A r t s a n d S ciences

_____________ May_______ 1962

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This dissertation prepared under my direction by
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___________________________ John H. Moran _ __

entitled Ludwig Wittgenstein*s Philosophical Therapy

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has been accepted in partial fulfilment o f the requirements for the

Degree o f Doct o r o f P h ilo so p h y ..................... ...................................

J. Quentin Lauer, S.J.. Ph.D

(Fatuity Advistr)
 Hi

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

P R E F A C E ............................................ iv

BIOGRAPHICAL PREFACE .............................. xi

INTRODUCTION ...................................... 1

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PART I. THE TRACTATUS

Chapter
I.

II.
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'THE, NATURE OF PROPOSITION..................

RELATIONS AMONG PROPOSITIONS .............

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46
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III. WHAT CANNOT BE S A I D ........................ 6l

PART II. THE LATER Y/ORK

IV. T R A N S I T I O N ................................ 108

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V. CONTRA TRACTATUM .......................... 123

VI. DIAGNOSIS.................................. 156

VII. TREATMENT.................................. 202

VIII. THE MIND-BODY P R O B L E M ...................... 248

IX. PRIVATE L A N G U A G E .......................... 316

X. SOME ANSWERS TO THE CHALLENGE.............. 339

XI. EVALUATION OF THE "ANSWERS"................ 357

B I B L I O G R A P H Y ...................................... 4o6
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LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN'S
PHILOSOPHICAL THERAPY
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r n

PREFACE

The mature work of Ludwig Wittgenstein is an extra­

ordinarily serious and original challenge to traditional

philosophy. Our aim here is to seek a clear understanding

of that challenge as it appears in the major work of his

later period, Philosophical Investigations.1

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Wittgenstein's intellectual career is divided much

more definitely than most into two distinct major periods.

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The first is represented by his Tractatu s Loglco-Phlloso-

phicus^ which he completed before he was thirty years old.

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The major historical significance of this book relative to

the movements of Logical Positivism and "Linguistic Analy­

sis" is weir known. However, though we include a lengthy

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exposition and "interpretation" of the Tractatus. it conoerns

us mainly as the contrasting background to the later work.3

^Trans. G-. E. M. Anscombe, with German on facing

pages, (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1953).
^Flrst published in Ostwald's Annalen der Natur-
phllosophle (1921) as "Logisch-Philosophlsche Abhandlung."
The first English edition, trans. C. K. Ogden, intro, by
Bertrand Russel (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1922)
has the German on facing pages.

3Three full-length commentaries on the Tractatus

have been published in English. They are: G. E. M. Ans-
oombe1s An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus
(London: Hutchinson & Co., 1959); Erik Stenius' Wittgenstein* s
'Tractatus' (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, i960); Alexander Mas-
low' s A Study in Wittgenstein1s Tractatus (Berkeley and Los
Angeles: University of California Press, 1961). The last
i- j
iv
 Partly because of failure to appreciate this con­

trast, some commentators have radically misconstrued

Wittgenstein's later work.

Our treatment of the Tractatus exhibits that work

as a synthesis of the picture theory of language, which is
fundamentally a correspondence theory of meaning, and the

theory that all propositions are truth-functlons of elemen­

tary propositions. From this synthesis arises the doctrine

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of "what cannot be said."

named was written in 1933. The works of Anscombe and of

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Maslow are both very useful guides to the Tractatus. Miss
Anscombe's work is especially helpful in relating the
thoughts of Wittgenstein to those of Frege, Russell and
Ramsey, and in elucidating some of the more technical parts
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of the Tractatus. Although he professedly tries to inter­
pret the Tractatus mainly from a Logical Positivist view­
point (which he later abandoned) Maslow's exposition and
interpretation are far less constrained, far more balanced,
than this might suggest. He makes no attempt to disguise
the metaphysical character of the Tractatus. but rather
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brings this side of it into relief. Of the three, Maslow's

work sheds the most light on the specifically philosophical
phases of the Tractatus. He is also helpful in clarifying
the relations between some ideas of the Tractatus and those
of Russell. His inclination to emphasize epistemologioal
considerations can be misleading, however. For example, he
seems to think that an interpretation of Wittgenstein's
"objects" as "sense-data" somehow makes them more meaningful.
(He is quite tentative on this point.) Both Maslow and
Stenius emphasize similarities between the doctrines of the
Tractatus and the critical philosophy of Kant. Stenius
tends to recast the theories of the Tractatus into his own
rather esoteric Jargon, with the result that his commentary
is often as cryptic, and frequently dryer than the Trao-
tatus itself. On the whole, his book is useful only to
someone who is already very familiar with the Tractatus
and its setting. For most people, the best reading order
of these three books would be Anscombe, Maslow, Stenius.

v
 The Tractatus is basically a metaphysical work

whose metaphysical theories paradoxically involve that meta­

physics is Impossible: an attemot to say what cannot be said.

It also contains novel doctrines on the nature of logic,

mathematics, probability, inference in general, "dispositi­

onal propositions" or "propositional attitudes," and value

statements, all of which are treated in relation to the

central theory of meaning.

Theoretical constructs of a purely formal nature,

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e.g. "object," "elementary (or 'atomic') fact," "fact,"

"name," "elementary proposition," " proposition," "function,"

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and "truth-function," play a crucial role in the Tractatus.

It is in its vigorous opposition to theory-mongering

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and definition-making, with their attendant generation of

paradoxes, that Wittgenstein's later work most sharply con­

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trasts with the Tractatus. He repeatedly urges in the

Investigations that philosophers characteristically make

reforms of language which they take for insights into

necessary states of affairs, and from which they frequently

draw paradoxical conclusions.

The special kind of language reform which he treats

most extensively in the later work, and which he illustrates

most frequently, includes (l) the assumption that words have

their meanings, which accompany the words into every verbal

and circumstantial context in which the words occur (thus,

that language functions as an exact calculus); and (2) the

g-ssumption that the words have their meanings by virtue of j

vi
irhat they refer to; that the sole basic function of language

is to refer. That assumption probably has never been more

explicitly and elaborately expressed than in the Tractatus.

A second major factor in the development of paradoxes, is

the specifically modal character of many philosophic state­

ments. The mods.lity of its statements also plays an

obviously crucial role in the Tractatus.

In his later writings, Wittgenstein employs what is

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often called a "therapeutic" method. The significance of

this metaphor Includes his concern with stamping out what

oeople to philosophize.
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he considers a "disease" or group of diseases which incline

It also suggests the important fact

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that even the investigative aspects of his own later work

are practical rather than theoretic. In the Investigations,

he completely avoids the imposition of patterns and the con­

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struction of general theories which characterized the

Tractatus.
After the exposition of the Tractatus. we describe

briefly the transition of Wittgenstein's thinking from his

earlier, theoretic attitude, to the later, more pragmatic

attitude. In addition, we discuss there several Important

circumstances of the transition.

The following chapter discusses Wittgenstein1s oppo­

sition specifically to views he expressed in the Tractatus.

Next we consider his description of the philosophic "malady,"

after which we consider in a general way his manner of treat­

ing that malady. This is followed by an examination of how

vii
the treatment applies to a specific case: the mlnd-body pro­

blem. The next topic is his treatment of the notion of

"private language": how it relates to his treatment of the

mind-body problem, and how it is apparently illustrated in

some recent philosophical developments.

The next chapter is a composite study of character­

istic critical commentary on Wittgenstein's later work. Among

the charges examined are: (l) that he makes philosophic

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statements in arguing that all philosophic statements are

nonsense; (2 ) the claim that his purported conclusion (in the

later work) as to the impossibility of metaphysics is based
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on a behavioristic theory of meaning; (3 ) that he advocates

a twofold confinement of linguistic practice, due to his

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failure to (a) recognize the unity of language and (b) recog­

nize the principle of growth of language. Also outlined are

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several efforts to demonstrate, ostensibly as against Witt­

genstein, that non-therapeutlc, speculative philosophy is

possible. In addition, we consider the suggestion that Witt­

genstein was not anti-metaphysical, nor a philosopher by

default or ambivalence, but a straightforward metaphysician.

Against these critics, we argue that it is irrelevant

to assess Wittgenstein's later work in terms of definitive

theoretic results, then "refute" his arguments by demonstrat­

ing absurdities in his positions, or by convicting him of

internal Inconsistency. The claim of behaviorism is a

special case of such irrelevancies. The same is true of

viii
attempts to demonstrate the possibility of philosophy, sup­

posedly as against Wittgenstein. In brief, the irrelevancy

of these arguments derives largely from the false assumption

that Wittgenstein sought in his later works to articulate

a W eltanschauung, or other theoretic structure. And, they

seem to miss completely the significance of Wittgenstein's

main themes, especially in relation to the "referential

fallacy," of which they themselves contain obvious examples.

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Curiously, the proposal that Wittgenstein is a

straightforward metaphysician seems crucially to Involve

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much of the same kind of misunderstanding as the contrary

claims.
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Our conclusion is briefly that Wittgenstein1s later

work continues to be a serious, vital challenge to the ways

of traditional philosophy. However, it is not the sort of

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challenge against which theoretic refutations will work.

Just as academic refutation of dialectical materialism, no

matter how skillful, will not lessen the danger and serious­

ness of Soviet opposition to the West, so to it seems that

such efforts leave Wittgenstein untouched. They are even

less effective than in the case of the Soviet, because in

Wittgenstein there is no parallel to dialectical materialism

to be "refuted."

This does not mean, of course, that Wittgenstein's

challenge to philosophy is Itself a threat, even a small

threat, to e.g., western civilization.

l Because Wittgenstein lived so recently, and since j

f • — .

his personal involvement in his work was so deep, we include

a biographical preface which reveals something of the inten­

sity, severity and austerity of his personality.1 His most

outstanding prevalent attitude toward dress, living quarters,

food, the arts, as well as philosophy, was an ascetical

desire for simplicity and honesty. He seemed obsessed with

purity in every aspect of his life and work.

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3-Tw o excellent, brief biographical works on Wittgen-

stein are readily available. One is by G-. H. von Wright,
one of his three literary executors. (The other two are
G. E. M. Anscombe and R. Rhees.) First published in The
Philosophical Revlev; LXIV (1955), pp. 527-^5, von Wright’s
work is called "Ludwig Wittgenstein, a Biographical Sketch.11
The second is Norman Malcolm's Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir
(London: Oxford University Press, 1958). It Includes a
reprint of von Wright's sketch. Malcolm met Wittgenstein in
1938 when he went to Cambridge as a student. Their friend­
ship continued until Wittgenstein's death. Shortly before
he died, Wittgenstein made his only trip to America; he
stayed at Malcolm's home in Ithaca, N. Y.
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BIOGRAPHICAL PREFACE

Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein, who died at

Cambridge on April 29, 1951, was born April 26, 1889, in

Vienna. He was the youngest of five brothers and three

sisters, all of whom were Intellectually and artistically

gifted. The family was mainly of Jewish descent, though

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Wittgenstein's mother was Catholic, and he had been bap­

tized in the Church. His father, an engineer, was a wealthy

IE
and prominent figure in the Austrian steel industry.

Wittgenstein was educated at home until he was

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Ik years old, when he went for three years to the Technlsche

Hochsohule at Berlin-Charlottenburg. In the spring of 1908

he went to England where he spent the summer experimenting

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with kites at the Kite-Flying Upper Atmosphere Station at

Derbyshire. In the fall of the same year he went to the

University of Manchester as a reeearch student in engineer­

ing. He remained there until 1911. At that time he was

keenly interested in aeronautics, by then having designed

and constructed a Jet reaction propeller.

It was reportedly his work on this project which

awakened his interest in mathematics. This in turn led to

Interest in problems of the foundations of mathematics. He

apparently became acquainted around this time with the work

of Bertrand Russell and that of Gottlob Frege. He visited

the latter at Jena and was advised by him to go to Cambridge1

and study with Russell. This he did early in 1912, beginning

as an undergraduate and shortly afterward becoming an "ad­

vanced student." There he spent the three terms of 1912-13.

In 1913 he went to Norway where he lived for a year in a hut

he built near Bergen.

With the outbreak of war, he Joined the Austrian Army

although he was exempted because of a hernia. After officer

training, he served until his canture and imprisonment by

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the Italians in November, 1918. He was released the follow­

ing August. IE
When captured, he had with him the manuscript of the

Tractatus. He apparently worked on it during furloughs,

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leaves and whatever free time his duties allowed. From

prison at Monte Cassino, he sent copies of the manuscript to

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Russell and Frege. In 1919, he met Russell in Holland to

discus8 the manuscript, after which Russell arranged for

oublicatlon.
In 1919-20, having abandoned philosophy, Wittgen­

stein underwent teacher-training in Vienna, in preparation

for an elementary school post. From 1920 to 1926, he taught

in remote villages of lower Austria; he also published a

German glossary for elementary schools. He enjoyed the rela­

tive seclusion, but apparently was often at odds with the

people around him.

He gave up elementary school teaching to take a Job

^.s a gardener1s assistant for an order of monks at Hutteldorjj*

xli
near Vienna. Several times he considered Joining a monas­

tery but did not do so, in part because he felt that he did

not fulfill the inner conditions for monastic life.

In the fall of 1926 he began designing a mansion for

his sister in Vienna, to which he devoted two full years. It

is, according to Von Wright, "his work down to the smallest

detail and is highly characteristic of its creator . . . free

from all decoration . . . marked by a severe exactitude in

measure and proportion."! The materials used were concrete,

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glass and steel; the roofs were horizontal.

In 1923 and again in 1924, Wittgenstein was visited

IE
by Frank Ramsey who tried to persuade him to return to Eng­

land, which he did, briefly, in the summer of 1925. But he

EV

had given up philosophy because he did not believe he could

do any further creative work in it, and he did not propose

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to return to it unless he felt he could again be creative.

It was not until 1929 that he returned to Cambridge to stay.

Presumably he felt then that he might again do creative work

in philosophy. One of the apparently significant circum­

stances of his decision was that he had attended a lecture

on the foundations of mathematics by the intultionist

Luitzen E. J. Brouwer, in Vienna in 1928.

Upon returning to Cambridge he enrolled at first as

a research student. But in the same year he was awarded a

PhD degree. The Tractatus was accepted as his dissertation,

!Von Wright, Sketch, p. 11.

xiii
While his previous stay at Cambridge was accepted as satis-”1

faction of the residence reauirements. The following year

he was made a fellow of Trinity College.

From 1929 until his death he lived mostly in England.

At the time of the Anschluss he became a British subject,

when the choice was between England and Germa.ny. He general­

ly disliked English ways however, and he found Cambridge life

especially dista.steful, mainly for what he considered its

artificiality and. shallowness.

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In 1936 he went for a year to his hut in Norway where

he began work on Phllosophlce-1 Investigations.

IE In 1937 he

returned to Cambridge and two years later he succeeded G. E.

Moore to the chair of philosophy. Eefore assuming the chair,

EV
he usually held his lectures in the college rooms of a friend.

Thereafter he held them in hie own rooms in Whewell's Court.

PR

He used no notes or manuscript but

thought before the class . . . The exposition

usually led to a question, to which the audience
were supposed to suggest an answer. The answers
in turn became starting points for new thoughts
leading to new questions.1
At the start of World War II, Wittgenstein again left

Cambridge, this time to serve as a porter at Guy's Hospital

in London. Later he worked as a laboratory assistant at

Newcastle.

In the Easter term of 19^7 he gave his last lectures

at Cambridge. The Winter of 19^-8 he spent on an Irish farm,

IVon Wright, ibid., p. 17.

'then he moved for a while to a hut on the Galway coast. n

When the solitary life there became too strenuous, he moved

to a Dublin hotel.

It was discovered in the fall of 19^-9, when he was

visiting Cambridge after his trip to America, that he had

cancer. His last days he spent with friends in Cambridge

and Oxford, except for a brief trip to Ilorway late in 1950.

When Wittgenstein’s father died in 1912, he had left

Wittgenstein a "great fortune." Soon after his release at

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the end of the war, he disposed entirely of his inheritance,

mostly through anonymous grants for promotion of literature.

IE
Prominent among those he aided were George Trakl and Rainer

Maria Rilke. He later came to dislike the latter1s poetry,

EV

which he considered artificial.

Having disposed of his money, Wittgenstein lived the

PR

rest of his life very siraoly, even frugally. He never wore

a necktie or a hat, his quarters were very austerely fur­

nished. At Cambridge he had only a canvas cot, some canvas

chairs, one wooden chair and a card table at which he wrote.

He kept his person and quarters entirely free of ornament

or adornment.

He was deeply disturbed by a kind of sectarianism

among those of his students who became his disciples. He

thought that his influence was "on the whole harmful to the

development of independent minds in his disciples." And,

says Von Wright, "I am afraid that he was right."1

llbld.. p. 19. j

xv
 Wittgenstein was not an erudite man, nor was he a

cool, objective scholar. For him, according to Von Wright

knowledge was intimately connected with doing.

... He had a knowledge of mathematics and
physics not derived from extensive reading, but
from a working familiarity with mathematical and
experimental techniques. His many artistic
interests had the same active and living charac­
ter. He could design a house, make a sculpture,
or conduct an orchestra.1

He was also a talented clarinetist and somewhat of a virtu­

oso whistler of symphonic themes.

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He did no systematic reading in the classics of phi­

losophy, but while still very young he carefully read

Schopenhauer.
IE
He is said to have gotten occasional glimpses
of understanding from Spinoza, Hume and Kant. Says Von
EV
Wright, "I do not think that he could have enjoyed Aristotle

or Leibniz. . . . But it is significant that he did read

and enjoy Plato."2

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In general, he was more profoundly impressed by such

writers as St. Augustine, Kierkegaard, Dostoievsky and Tol­

stoy, than by the technical philosophers in a narrower,

professional sense.
Malcolm's description of Wittgenstein's personality

is fairly summarized in the following:

It was always a strain to be with Wittgenstein.

Not only were the intellectual demands of his con­
versation very great, but there was also his
severity, his ruthless Judgments, his tendency
to be censorious, and his depression.3

llbid., p. 20. 2lbld.. p. 21.

3Malcolm, Memoir, p. 62.

xv i
 He tells us that Wittgenstein worked extremely hard

at his classes, using no notes, but working before the class

and manifesting extreme concentration, ruthless honesty, in­

tegrity and severity, as well as extreme mental exertion and

exercise of will. He was usually dissatisfied and exhausted

after his lectures, and would often ask a friend in the group

"Could you go to a flick?" He would sit in the first row at

the film, munching a bun or cold pork pie, and letting him­

W
self be absorbed completely in the most trivial, contrived

pictures. He generally detested British pictures, prefer­

IE
ring those from America, especially when Betty Hutton or

Carmen Miranda appeared in them.

EV
Anyone who would agree to attend regularly was wel­

come at his lectures. But they were closed to anyone who

merely wanted to drop in. "My lectures are not for tourists'."
PR

he would say. Intensely serious about his work,

He had an abhorrence of academic life in general

and of the life of a professional philosopher in
particular. He believed that a normal human
being could not be a university teacher and also
an honest and serious person. . . . [he] could
not stand the society of academic colleagues.!
As a fellow of Trinity he did not exercise his right to dine

at Hall, since having tried it, he was revolted by the arti­

ficiality of the conversation.

As he had commonly done with other students, he tried

on several occasions to dissuade Malcolm from becoming a

teacher of philosophy. He had suggested Instead a manual

llbld.. p. 30.
xvii
job, perhaps on a ranch or fa.rm, since Malcolm was a Kansan.”1

Yet he made it possible for Malcolm to remain at Cambridge

for six months after his financial resources had been ex­

hausted, by giving him money each month, for a total of about

eighty pounds. He Justified this by saying that 11 . . . he

saw that I was 'charmed' by Cambridge philosophy and that it

would be a pity if I went away in that condition."1 And,

if he stayed, he might get over the charm, Wittgenstein

thought. He refused to consider repayment.

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He sent congratulations to Malcolm upon receipt of

the PhD, adding IE

And now: may you make good use of iti By that I
mean: may you not cheat yourself or your students.
Because unless I'm very much mistaken, that's what
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will be expected from you. And it will be very
difficult not to do it, & perhaps impossible; &
in this case: may you have the strength to quit.
This ends today's sermon. I wish you good, not
necessarily clever thoughts, & decency that won't
PR

come out in the wash.2

When he learned of Malcolm's instructorship at Prin­

ceton, he wrote
I wish you good luck; in particular with your work
at the university. The temptation for you to cheat
yourself will be overwhelming (though I don't mean
more for you than for anyone else in your position).
Only by a miracle will you be able to do decent
work in tea.ching philosophy.3

When he learned that Malcolm might go into the Army

and would not be reappointed for more than one year at Prin­

ceton, Wittgenstein expressed sorrow, mainly that he might

be leaving the university for the "wrong reason." He added

1Ibid., p. 30. 2Ibld.. p. 36. 3lbia.. p. 37.

xvlii
'.that his opinion of teaching had not changed. Though he

thought Malcolm would be a good soldier, he said he wished

he would not have to be one, but "could live quietly, In a

sense, & be in a position to be kind & understanding to all

sorts of human beings who need iti Because we all need

that sort of thing very badly."!

In a letter to Malcolm in 19^, Wittgenstein re­

called that they had clashed some years earlier, over a

reference by Malcolm to 11the English national character"

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(which he had thought was Incompatible with an English
attempt on Hitler's life). Said Wittgenstein
IE
I then thought: what is the use of studying philo­
sophy if all that it does for you is to enable you
to talk with some plausibility about eome abstruse
EV
questions of logic, etc., & if it does not improve
your thinking about the important questions of
everyday life, if it does not make you more consci­
entious than any . . . Journalist in the use of the
dangerous phrases such people use for their own
PR

ends. You see, I know that it's difficult to think

well about 'certainty,''probability,' 'perception,'
etc. But it is, if possible, still more difficult
to think, or try to think, really honestly about
your life and other people's lives. And the trou­
ble is that thinking about these things is not
thrilling, but often downright nasty. And when it's
nasty, then it's most Important.— Let me stop
preaching.2

The following year, having learned thatMalcolm was

about to be discharged from the Navy, he expressed a hope

that he would "come to Cambridge before I make up my mind

to resign the absurd Job of a prof. of philosophy. It is

a kind of living death."3

!L o c . clt. 2Ibid.. p. 39. 3lbld.. p. ^3.

xix
 Wittgenstein enjoyed reading detective stories.

Since they were scarce in England during the war, Malcolm

frequently sent him some. Once, referring to these, he said

in a letter "If I read your magB I often wonder how anyone

can read 'Mind' with all its impotence and bankruptcy when

they could read Street & Smith mags. Well, everyone to his

own taste."-*- Two years later he reiterated this contrast,

saying in a letter

W
Your mags are wonderful. How people can read Mind
if they could read Street and Smith beats me. If
philosophy has anything to do with wisdom there's
certainly not a grain of that in Mind, & quite of­
IE
ten a grain in the detective stories.2

He was usually somber, with fev; light-hearted moments,

EV
and he was constantly depressed at the impossibility of arriv­

ing at understanding in philosophy, according to Malcolm.

But he was even more distressed by the "stupidity and heart­

PR

lessness that present themselves daily in the world in forms

that command resoect."3 A few light-hearted moments are

described. Wittgenstein enjoyed walking, which he did very

energetically, sometimes engaging in serious conversation

the while, and often taking along sugar and bread for horses

he would meet on the way.

One report of a walk, with Malcolm and the latter'e

wife, is rather striking. The three were strolling in a

large meadow; they had been talking of the movements of the

solar system. So Wittgenstein suggested that the three of

1Ibid., p. 36. ^Loc. clt. 3lbld. , p. 32.

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xx
'them should represent the movements of the sun, moon and '1

earth relative to each other. Malcolm's wife walked in a

straight line, as the sun, while Malcolm circled her at a

trot, as the earth; and Wittgenstein, representing the moon,

ran around Malcolm, shouting directions for the whole per­

formance. This continued until Wittgenstein "became dizzy

and breathless. He was then 57 years old.

He very much enjoyed the fairs which came to Cam­

bridge, and would often roll pennies for prizes, keeping

W
hie eyes closed to leave everything to chance. He persua.-

ded Malcolm to throw balls at a target, and very excitedly,

IE
he highly praised Malcolm's rather modest "arm."

When he first met Malcolm's wife at Cambridge after

EV
the war, Wittgenstein characteristically seemed very suspi­

cious of her, but apparently they soon became close friends.

PR

When he went to their home for dinner, he insisted on help­

ing to wash the dishes in the bath tub where there was a

more plentiful flow of hot water; and he gave Malcolm's wife

a dish mop which he considered more efficient than a cloth.

Wittgenstein could rebuke his friends harshly, ac­

cording to Malcolm, and he tended to be susolcioue of motives

and character, eometimes making precipitous, erroneous Judg­

ments. But largely, says Malcolm, he formed acute, realistic

estimates of his friends.

Apparently, he was sometimes rather morbid about his

personal relationships. Malcolm says that he told him he

gave away a fortune in his youth so that no one would be j

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