THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 151212. September 10, 2003]

TEN FORTY REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., Represented by its President, VERONICA G.
LORENZANA, petitioner, vs. MARINA CRUZ, respondent.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

In an ejectment suit, the question of ownership may be provisionally ruled upon for the sole purpose of
determining who is entitled to possession de facto. In the present case, both parties base their alleged right to
possess on their right to own. Hence, the Court of Appeals did not err in passing upon the question of ownership to
be able to decide who was entitled to physical possession of the disputed land.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the August 31, 2001
Decision[2] and December 19, 2001 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA- GR SP No. 64861. The
dispositive portion of the assailed Decision is as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the Decision dated May 4, 2001 is
hereby AFFIRMED.[4]

The assailed Resolution denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.

The Facts

The facts of the case are narrated by the CA as follows:

A complaint for ejectment was filed by [Petitioner Ten Forty Realty and Development Corporation] against x x
x [Respondent Marina Cruz] before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Olongapo City, docketed as Civil
Case 4269, which alleged that: petitioner is the true and absolute owner of a parcel of lot and residential house
situated in #71 18th Street, E.B.B. Olongapo City, particularly described as:

A parcel of residential house and lot situated in the above-mentioned address containing an area of 324 square
meters more or less bounded on the Northeast by 041 (Lot 255, Ts-308); on the Southeast by 044 (Lot 255, Ts-
308); on the Southwest by 043 (Lot 226-A & 18th street) and on the Northwest by 045 (Lot 227, Ts-308) and
declared for taxation purposes in the name of [petitioner] under T.D. No. 002-4595-R and 002-4596.

having acquired the same on December 5, 1996 from Barbara Galino by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale; the sale
was acknowledged by said Barbara Galino through a 'Katunayan'; payment of the capital gains tax for the transfer of
the property was evidenced by a Certification Authorizing Registration issued by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue; petitioner came to know that Barbara Galino sold the same property on April 24, 1998 to Cruz, who
immediately occupied the property and which occupation was merely tolerated by petitioner; on October 16, 1998, a
complaint for ejectment was filed with the Barangay East Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo City but for failure to arrive at an
amicable settlement, a Certificate to File Action was issued; on April 12, 1999 a demand letter was sent to
[respondent] to vacate and pay reasonable amount for the use and occupation of the same, but was ignored by the
latter; and due to the refusal of [respondent] to vacate the premises, petitioner was constrained to secure the
services of a counsel for an agreed fee of P5,000.00 as attorneys fee and P500.00 as appearance fee and incurred
an expense of P5,000.00 for litigation.

In respondents Answer with Counterclaim, it was alleged that: petitioner is not qualified to own the residential lot in
dispute, being a public land; according to Barbara Galino, she did not sell her house and lot to petitioner but merely
obtained a loan from Veronica Lorenzana; the payment of the capital gains tax does not necessarily show that the
Deed of Absolute Sale was at that time already in existence; the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter
because the complaint was filed beyond the one (1) year period after the alleged unlawful deprivation of possession;
there is no allegation that petitioner had been in prior possession of the premises and the same was lost thru force,
stealth or violence; evidence will show that it was Barbara Galino who was in possession at the time of the sale and
vacated the property in favor of respondent; never was there an occasion when petitioner occupied a portion of the
premises, before respondent occupied the lot in April 1998, she caused the cancellation of the tax declaration in the
name of Barbara Galino and a new one issued in respondents name; petitioner obtained its tax declaration over the
same property on November 3, 1998, seven (7) months [after] the respondent [obtained hers]; at the time the house
and lot [were] bought by respondent, the house was not habitable, the power and water connections were
disconnected; being a public land, respondent filed a miscellaneous sales application with the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office in Olongapo City; and the action for ejectment cannot succeed where it
appears that respondent had been in possession of the property prior to the petitioner.[5]

In a Decision[6] dated October 30, 2000, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) ordered respondent to
vacate the property and surrender to petitioner possession thereof. It also directed her to pay, as damages for its
continued unlawful use, P500 a month from April 24, 1999 until the property was vacated, P5,000 as attorneys fees,
and the costs of the suit.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court[7] (RTC) of Olongapo City (Branch 72) reversed the MTCC. The RTC ruled
as follows: 1) respondents entry into the property was not by mere tolerance of petitioner, but by virtue of a Waiver
and Transfer of Possessory Rights and Deed of Sale in her favor; 2) the execution of the Deed of Sale without
actual transfer of the physical possession did not have the effect of making petitioner the owner of the property,
because there was no delivery of the object of the sale as provided for in Article 1428 of the Civil Code; and 3) being
a corporation, petitioner was disqualified from acquiring the property, which was public land.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Sustaining the RTC, the CA held that petitioner had failed to make a case for unlawful detainer, because no
contract -- express or implied -- had been entered into by the parties with regard to possession of the property. It
ruled that the action should have been for forcible entry, in which prior physical possession was indispensable -- a
circumstance petitioner had not shown either.
The appellate court also held that petitioner had challenged the RTCs ruling on the question of ownership for
the purpose of compensating for the latters failure to counter such ruling. The RTC had held that, as a corporation,
petitioner had no right to acquire the property which was alienable public land.
Hence, this Petition.[8]

Issues

Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:

1. The Honorable Court of Appeals had clearly erred in not holding that [r]espondents occupation or
possession of the property in question was merely through the tolerance or permission of the herein
[p]etitioner;

[2.] The Honorable Court of Appeals had likewise erred in holding that the ejectment case should have
been a forcible entry case where prior physical possession is indispensable; and

[3.] The Honorable Court of Appeals had also erred when it ruled that the herein [r]espondents possession
or occupation of the said property is in the nature of an exercise of ownership which should put the
herein [p]etitioner on guard.[9]

The Courts Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

First Issue:
Alleged Occupation by Tolerance

Petitioner faults the CA for not holding that the former merely tolerated respondents occupation of the subject
property. By raising this issue, petitioner is in effect asking this Court to reassess factual findings. As a general rule,
this kind of reassessment cannot be done through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, because this Court is not a trier of facts; it reviews only questions of law. [10] Petitioner has not given us ample
reasons to depart from the general rule.
 On the basis of the facts found by the CA and the RTC, we find that petitioner failed to substantiate its case for
unlawful detainer. Admittedly, no express contract existed between the parties. Not shown either was the
corporations alleged tolerance of respondents possession.
While possession by tolerance may initially be lawful, it ceases to be so upon the owners demand that the
possessor by tolerance vacate the property.[11] To justify an action for unlawful detainer, the permission or tolerance
must have been present at the beginning of the possession.[12] Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful from the
start, an action for unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy. Sarona v. Villegas[13] elucidates thus:

A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word tolerance confirms our view heretofore expressed that
such tolerance must be present right from the start of possession sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of
action as one of unlawful detainer not of forcible entry. Indeed, to hold otherwise would espouse a dangerous
doctrine. And for two reasons.First. Forcible entry into the land is an open challenge to the right of the
possessor. Violation of that right authorizes the speedy redress in the inferior court provided for in the rules. If one
year from the forcible entry is allowed to lapse before suit is filed, then the remedy ceases to be speedy; and the
possessor is deemed to have waived his right to seek relief in the inferior court. Second, if a forcible entry action in
the inferior court is allowed after the lapse of a number of years, then the result may well be that no action for
forcible entry can really prescribe. No matter how long such defendant is in physical possession, plaintiff will merely
make a demand, bring suit in the inferior court upon a plea of tolerance to prevent prescription to set in and
summarily throw him out of the land. Such a conclusion is unreasonable. Especially if we bear in mind the
postulates that proceedings of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary in nature, and that the one year
time bar to suit is but in pursuance of the summary nature of the action.[14]

In this case, the Complaint and the other pleadings do not recite any averment of fact that would substantiate
the claim of petitioner that it permitted or tolerated the occupation of the property by Respondent Cruz. The
Complaint contains only bare allegations that 1) respondent immediately occupied the subject property after its sale
to her, an action merely tolerated by petitioner;[15] and 2) her allegedly illegal occupation of the premises was by
mere tolerance.[16]
These allegations contradict, rather than support, petitioners theory that its cause of action is for unlawful
detainer. First, these arguments advance the view that respondents occupation of the property was unlawful at its
inception. Second, they counter the essential requirement in unlawful detainer cases that petitioners supposed act
of sufferance or tolerance must be present right from the start of a possession that is later sought to be
recovered.[17]
As the bare allegation of petitioners tolerance of respondents occupation of the premises has not been proven,
the possession should be deemed illegal from the beginning. Thus, the CA correctly ruled that the ejectment case
should have been for forcible entry -- an action that had already prescribed, however, when the Complaint was filed
on May 12, 1999. The prescriptive period of one year for forcible entry cases is reckoned from the date of
respondents actual entry into the land, which in this case was on April 24, 1998.

Second Issue:
Nature of the Case

Much of the difficulty in the present controversy stems from the legal characterization of the ejectment
Complaint filed by petitioner. Specifically, was it for unlawful detainer or for forcible entry?
The answer is given in Section 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, which we reproduce as follows:

SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. - Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a
person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a
lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld
after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the
legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1)
year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court
against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming
under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs.

While both causes of action deal only with the sole issue of physical or de facto possession,[18] the two cases
are really separate and distinct, as explained below:

x x x. In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of land or building by means of force, intimidation,
threat, strategy, or stealth. In unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the expiration or
termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. In forcible entry, the possession is
illegal from the beginning and the basic inquiry centers on who has the prior possession de facto. In unlawful
detainer, the possession was originally lawful but became unlawful by the expiration or termination of the right to
possess, hence the issue of rightful possession is decisive for, in such action, the defendant is in actual possession
and the plaintiffs cause of action is the termination of the defendants right to continue in possession.
What determines the cause of action is the nature of defendants entry into the land. If the entry is illegal, then the
action which may be filed against the intruder within one year therefrom is forcible entry. If, on the other hand, the
entry is legal but the possession thereafter became illegal, the case is one of unlawful detainer which must be filed
within one year from the date of the last demand.[19]

It is axiomatic that what determines the nature of an action as well as which court has jurisdiction over it are the
allegations in the complaint[20] and the character of the relief sought.[21]
In its Complaint, petitioner alleged that, having acquired the subject property from Barbara Galino on December
5, 1996,[22] it was the true and absolute owner[23]thereof; that Galino had sold the property to Respondent Cruz on
April 24, 1998;[24] that after the sale, the latter immediately occupied the property, an action that was merely
tolerated by petitioner;[25] and that, in a letter given to respondent on April 12, 1999,[26] petitioner had demanded that
the former vacate the property, but that she refused to do so.[27] Petitioner thereupon prayed for judgment ordering
her to vacate the property and to pay reasonable rentals for the use of the premises, attorneys fees and the costs of
the suit.[28]
The above allegations appeared to show the elements of unlawful detainer. They also conferred initiatory
jurisdiction on the MTCC, because the case was filed a month after the last demand to vacate -- hence, within the
one-year prescriptive period.
However, what was actually proven by petitioner was that possession by respondent had been illegal from the
beginning. While the Complaint was crafted to be an unlawful detainer suit, petitioners real cause of action was for
forcible entry, which had already prescribed. Consequently, the MTCC had no more jurisdiction over the action.
The appellate court, therefore, did not err when it ruled that petitioners Complaint for unlawful detainer was a
mere subterfuge or a disguised substitute action for forcible entry, which had already prescribed. To repeat, to
maintain a viable action for forcible entry, plaintiff must have been in prior physical possession of the property; this is
an essential element of the suit.[29]

Third Issue:
Alleged Acts of Ownership

Petitioner next questions the CAs pronouncement that respondents occupation of the property was an exercise
of a right flowing from a claim of ownership. It submits that the appellate court should not have passed upon the
issue of ownership, because the only question for resolution in an ejectment suit is that of possession de facto.
Clearly, each of the parties claimed the right to possess the disputed property because of alleged ownership of
it. Hence, no error could have been imputed to the appellate court when it passed upon the issue of ownership only
for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession de facto.[30] The CAs holding is moreover in accord with
jurisprudence and the law.

Execution of a Deed of Sale

Not Sufficient as Delivery

In a contract of sale, the buyer acquires the thing sold only upon its delivery in any of the ways specified in
Articles 1497 to 1501, or in any other manner signifying an agreement that the possession is transferred from the
vendor to the vendee.[31] With respect to incorporeal property, Article 1498 lays down the general rule: the execution
of a public instrument shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing that is the object of the contract if, from the
deed, the contrary does not appear or cannot be clearly inferred.
However, ownership is transferred not by contract but by tradition or delivery.[32] Nowhere in the Civil Code is it
provided that the execution of a Deed of Sale is a conclusive presumption of delivery of possession of a piece of
real estate.[33]
This Court has held that the execution of a public instrument gives rise only to a prima facie presumption of
delivery. Such presumption is destroyed when the delivery is not effected because of a legal impediment.[34] Pasagui
v. Villablanca[35] had earlier ruled that such constructive or symbolic delivery, being merely presumptive, was
deemed negated by the failure of the vendee to take actual possession of the land sold.
It is undisputed that petitioner did not occupy the property from the time it was allegedly sold to it on December
5, 1996 or at any time thereafter. Nonetheless, it maintains that Galinos continued stay in the premises from the
time of the sale up to the time respondents occupation of the same on April 24, 1998, was possession held on its
behalf and had the effect of delivery under the law.[36]
Both the RTC and the CA disagreed. According to the RTC, petitioner did not gain control and possession of
the property, because Galino had continued to exercise ownership rights over the realty. That is, she had remained
in possession, continued to declare it as her property for tax purposes and sold it to respondent in 1998.
For its part, the CA found it highly unbelievable that petitioner -- which claims to be the owner of the disputed
property -- would tolerate possession of the property by respondent from April 24, 1998 up to October 16,
1998. How could it have been so tolerant despite its knowledge that the property had been sold to her, and that it
was by virtue of that sale that she had undertaken major repairs and improvements on it?
Petitioner should have likewise been put on guard by respondents declaration of the property for tax purposes
on April 23, 1998,[37] as annotated in the tax certificate filed seven months later.[38] Verily, the tax declaration
represented an adverse claim over the unregistered property and was inimical to the right of petitioner.
Indeed, the above circumstances derogated its claim of control and possession of the property.

Order of Preference in Double

Sale of Immovable Property

The ownership of immovable property sold to two different buyers at different times is governed by Article 1544
of the Civil Code, which reads as follows:

Article 1544. x x x

Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first
recorded it in the Registry of Property.

Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in possession;
and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.

Galino allegedly sold the property in question to petitioner on December 5, 1996 and, subsequently, to
respondent on April 24, 1998. Petitioner thus argues that being the first buyer, it has a better right to own the
realty. However, it has not been able to establish that its Deed of Sale was recorded in the Registry of Deeds of
Olongapo City.[39] Its claim of an unattested and unverified notation on its Deed of Absolute Sale [40] is not equivalent
to registration. It admits that, indeed, the sale has not been recorded in the Registry of Deeds.[41]
In the absence of the required inscription, the law gives preferential right to the buyer who in good faith is first in
possession. In determining the question of who isfirst in possession, certain basic parameters have been
established by jurisprudence.
First, the possession mentioned in Article 1544 includes not only material but also symbolic
possession.[42] Second, possessors in good faith are those who are not aware of any flaw in their title or mode of
acquisition.[43] Third, buyers of real property that is in the possession of persons other than the seller must be wary --
they must investigate the rights of the possessors.[44] Fourth, good faith is always presumed; upon those who allege
bad faith on the part of the possessors rests the burden of proof.[45]
Earlier, we ruled that the subject property had not been delivered to petitioner; hence, it did not acquire
possession either materially or symbolically. As between the two buyers, therefore, respondent was first in actual
possession of the property.
Petitioner has not proven that respondent was aware that her mode of acquiring the property was defective at
the time she acquired it from Galino. At the time, the property -- which was public land -- had not been registered in
the name of Galino; thus, respondent relied on the tax declarations thereon. As shown, the formers name appeared
on the tax declarations for the property until its sale to the latter in 1998. Galino was in fact occupying the realty
when respondent took over possession. Thus, there was no circumstance that could have placed the latter upon
inquiry or required her to further investigate petitioners right of ownership.

Disqualification from Ownership

of Alienable Public Land

Private corporations are disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain, as provided under Section 3 of
Article XII of the Constitution, which we quote:

Sec. 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national
parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by law according to the uses to which they
may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or
associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding
twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines may not lease not
more than five hundred hectares, or acquire not more than twelve hectares thereof by purchase, homestead, or
grant. x x x. (Italics supplied)

While corporations cannot acquire land of the public domain, they can however acquire private land.[46] Hence,
the next issue that needs to be resolved is the determination of whether the disputed property is private land or of
the public domain.
 According to the certification by the City Planning and Development Office of Olongapo City, the contested
property in this case is alienable and disposable public land.[47] It was for this reason that respondent filed a
miscellaneous sales application to acquire it.[48]
On the other hand, petitioner has not presented proof that, at the time it purchased the property from Galino,
the property had ceased to be of the public domain and was already private land. The established rule is that
alienable and disposable land of the public domain held and occupied by a possessor -- personally or through
predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously, and exclusively for 30 years -- is ipso jure converted to private
property by the mere lapse of time.[49]
In view of the foregoing, we affirm the appellate courts ruling that respondent is entitled to possession de
facto. This determination, however, is only provisional in nature.[50] Well-settled is the rule that an award of
possession de facto over a piece of property does not constitute res judicata as to the issue of its ownership.[51]
WHEREFORE, this Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 117384. October 21, 1998]

HEIRS OF TEODORO DELA CRUZ represented by EDRONEL DELA CRUZ, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, PACIFICO MARQUEZ,FILOMENO and GREGORIO, both surnamed MADRID, respondents.

DECISION
ROMERO, J.:

Petitioners seek the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals,[1] in CA G.R. No. 25339 dated September
27, 1994 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Isabela in Civil Case No. 19-219 dated October 9,
1989 which adjudicated lot Nos. 7036-A-10-A, 7036-A-10-B and 7036-A-10-C to herein private respondents.[2]
The following facts, concisely related in the petition[3] are not in dispute.
On November 20, 1986, petitioners filed an action for reconveyance with damages[4] against private
respondents involving a parcel of land situated in Poblacion, San Mateo, Isabela with a total area of 3,277 square
meters. In their complaint, petitioners assert that the subject land was bought by their predecessor-in-interest from
the private respondents, Madrid brothers, for P4,000.00 in a deed of sale executed on May 18, 1959, and since then
they have been in actual, physical, continuous and open possession of the property. However, sometime in October
1986, much to their dismay and surprise, private respondents managed to obtain a Torrens Title over the said land.
On the other hand, the Madrids denied having executed the said deed of sale and assuming that said
document exists, the same is fictitious and falsified. Moreover, while they admit petitioners possession of the land,
they assert that this possession is in defiance of their repeated demands that the former relinquish the
same. Meanwhile, Pacifico Marquez contends that he is an innocent purchaser for value of the property having
bought the same from the Madrid brothers in 1976.[5]
During the trial, petitioners were unable to present the original deed of sale since it was
lost. Consequently, they were constrained to offer, as Exhibit A, a photo copy of the purported original carbon copy
of the deed of sale in an effort to prove the transaction.
However, in disposing of the case, the trial court ruled that Exhibit A was inadmissible in evidence, thus:

Since at the time of the execution of Teodoro dela Cruz affidavit or on June 14, 1966, a duplicate original carbon
copy of the alleged sale was still in his possession, the plaintiffs must have to account for it. No proof was adduced
that this remaining copy was lost or destroyed. Furthermore, no attempt was done to produce the copies retained by
the notary public although there is a possibility that the same still exist (sic). Neither was there any proof that the
copy sent to the court as required by the notarial law is unavailable. Under these (sic) state of facts, the Court
believes that the xerox copy of a certified true copy of the original issued by the notary public cannot be admitted in
evidence to prove the conveyance of the land in question.

Accordingly, the trial court dismissed petitioners complaint, the dispositive portion of the decision of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Dismissing the complaint;

2. Declaring the defendants the lawful owners of the land in question insofar as the portion thereof falling or found in
their respective titles are concerned; and

3. Ordering the plaintiffs, their agents, representatives or any person or persons deriving their title, ownership or
possession from the plaintiffs, to vacate the portions of Lots 7036-A-10-A, 70360A-10-B and 7036-A-10-C, occupied
by them and to deliver the possession thereof to the defendants;

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Evidently aggrieved by the decision, petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that the trial court
erred in holding that: (1) Exhibit A was inadmissible in evidence to prove the transaction; (2) there was no valid sale
of the land in question; (3) that they (petitioners) are not entitled to the improvements they had introduced in the
land.
 On September 27, 1994, the Court of Appeals rendered its judgment which ruled that Exhibit A was admissible
in evidence for failure of the private respondents to object when it was offered during the trial, thus:

It is therefore evident that defendants-appellees never put in issue the inadmissible nature of Exh. A as a mere
secondary evidence and that the trial judge did not exclude the same when it was formally offered, only to ultimately
exclude it in its decision. It is true that the originals of Exh. A were never produced or accounted for by plaintiffs. Yet,
notwithstanding this omission, the defense did not object to its not being the best evidence when it was formally
offered. Had the defendants interposed an objection to Exh. A on the ground of its incompetency for not complying
with the best evidence rule, it would have been properly excluded by the trial court. Defendants omission to object
on the proper ground operated as a waiver, as this was a matter resting on their discretion.

Unfortunately, petitioners victory was shortlived. For the Court of Appeals, while ruling that Exhibit A was
admissible, concluded that the same had no probative value to support the allegation of the petitioners that the
disputed land was sold to them in 1959, viz.:

The lone fact that Atty. Tabangay asserted that he recognized his signature on the copy shown by Teodoro when
the loss of the originals was just made known to him, does not render Exh. A trustworthy as to the actual execution
of the alleged deed of sale. Exh. A does not even contain a reproduction of the alleged signatures of the Madrid
brothers for comparison purposes. The surviving witness to the alleged execution, Constantino Balmoja was not
presented to corroborate Atty. Tabangays testimony, hinged as the latter was on secondary evidence.

Hence, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the trial court dated October 9, 1989 is
hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that the case be remanded to the court a quo to conduct the proper
proceedings to determine the value of the useful improvements introduced by appellants for reimbursement by
appellees.

SO ORDERED.

Failing in their bid to reconsider the decision, the petitioners have filed the present petition.
Petitioners maintain that even if Exhibit A were a mere photo copy of the original carbon copy, they had
presented other substantial evidence during the trial to prove the existence of the sale.[6] First, the testimony of the
notary public, Atty. Tabangay, who acknowledged the due execution of the deed of sale. Second, their long
possession of the land in question, bolstered by the construction of various improvements gives rise to the
disputable presumption of ownership.
While we concur with the Court of Appeals finding that Exhibit A does not prove that the sale of the land indeed
occurred, still we are constrained to reverse its decision in view of the circumstances present in this case.
To begin with, Atty. Sevillano Tabangay, the notary public who notarized the deed of sale, testified that the
document has about five (5) copies.[7] Hence, it is imperative that all the originals must be accounted for before
secondary evidence can be presented.[8] These petitioners failed to do. Moreover, records show that none of these
five copies was even presented during the trial. Petitioners explanation that these copies were lost or could not be
found in the National Archives was not even supported by any certification from the said office.
It is a well-settled principle that before secondary evidence can be presented, all duplicates and/or counterparts
must be accounted for, and no excuse for the non-production of the original document itself can be regarded as
established until all its parts are unavailable.[9]
Notwithstanding this procedural lapse, when Exhibit A was presented private respondents failed, not only to
object, but even to cross-examine the notary public, Atty. Tabangay, regarding its execution.[10] Forthwith, upon
private respondents failure to object to Exhibit A when it was presented, the same becomes primary evidence.[11] To
be sure, even if Exhibit A is admitted in evidence, we agree with the Court of Appeals that its probative value must
still meet the various tests by which its reliability is to be determined. Its tendency to convince and persuade must be
considered for admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its probative value.[12]
As earlier stated, Exhibit A was merely a photocopy lifted from the carbon copy of the alleged deed of sale. [13] A
cursory glance will immediately reveal that it was unsigned by any of the parties and undated as to when it was
executed. Worse, when Atty. Tabangay typed Exhibit A, the contents were based on an alleged carbon original
which petitioners predecessor-in-interest presented to him, without bothering to check his own files to verify the
correctness of the contents of the document he was copying. In other words, Atty. Tabangays failure to determine
the accuracy of the carbon copy requested by the petitioners predecessor-in-interest renders Exhibit A unreliable.
However, despite our prescinding discussion, all is not lost for the petitioner.
The records show that the disputed property has been in the possession of the petitioners since 1959. They
have since been introducing several improvements on the land which certainly could not have escaped the attention
of the Madrids. Furthermore, during all this time, the land was enclosed, thus signifying petitioners exclusive claim of
ownership. The construction of various infrastructure on the land - rice mill, storage house, garage, pavements and
other buildings - was undoubtedly a clear exercise of ownership which the Madrids could not ignore. Oddly, not one
of them protested.
 We cannot accept the Madrids explanation that they did not demand the petitioners to vacate the land due to
the unexplained killings within the area.[14] Not a single shred of evidence was presented to show that these killings
were perpetrated by the petitioners. All told, their remonstration and fears are nothing but pure speculation. To make
matters worse, the record is bereft of any documentary evidence that the Madrids sent a written demand to the
petitioners ordering them to vacate the land. Their failure to raise a restraining arm or a shout of dissent to the
petitioners possession of the subject land in a span of almost thirty (30) years is simply contrary to their claim of
ownership.
Next, the Madrids argue that neither prescription nor laches can operate against them because their title to the
property is registered under the Torrens system and therefore imprescriptable.[15] The principles raised, while
admittedly correct, are not without exception. The fact that the Madrids were able to secure TCT No. 167250, and
Marquez, TCT Nos. 167220 and 167256, did not operate to vest upon them ownership of the property. The Torrens
system does not create or vest title. It has never been recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership,[16] especially
considering the fact that both the Madrids and Marquezes obtained their respective TCTs only in October 1986,
twenty-seven long (27) years after petitioners first took possession of the land. If the Madrids and Marquezes
wished to assert their ownership, they should have filed a judicial action for recovery of possession and not merely
to have the land registered under their respective names. For as earlier mentioned, Certificates of Title do not
establish ownership.[17]
Even if we were to rule that the Certificates of Title to the private respondents would ripen into ownership of
the land, and therefore, the defense of prescription would be unavailing, still, the petitioners would have acquired
title to it by virtue of the equitable principle of laches. The Madrids long inaction or passivity in asserting their rights
over disputed property will preclude them from recovering the same.[18]
The above ruling was stressed in the following cases:

Miguel v. Catalino[19] declared:

Notwithstanding the errors aforementioned in the appealed decision, we are of the opinion that the judgment in favor
of defendant-appellee Florencio Catalino must be sustained. For despite the invalidity of his sale to Catalino
Agyapao, father of defendant-appellee, the vendor Bacaquio suffered the latter to enter, possess and enjoy the land
in question without protest, from 1928 to 1943, when the seller died; and the appellants, in turn, while succeeding
the deceased, also remained inactive, without taking any step to reinvindicate the lot from 1944 to 1962, when the
present suit was commenced in court. Even granting appellants proposition that no prescription lies against their
fathers recorded title, their passivity and inaction for more than 34 years (1928-1962) justifies the defendant-
appellee in setting up the equitable defense of laches in his own behalf. As a result, the action of plaintiffs-appellants
must be considered barred and the Court below correctly so held. Courts can not look with favor at parties who, by
their silence, delay and inaction, knowingly induce another to spend time, effort and expense in cultivating the land,
paying taxes and making improvements thereon for 30 long years, only to spring from ambush and claim title when
the possessors efforts and the rise of land values offer an opportunity to make easy profit at his expense. x x x.

Pabalete v. Echarri[20] stated:

Upon a careful consideration of the facts and circumstances, we are constrained to find, however, that while no legal
defense to the action lies, an equitable one lies in favor of the defendant and that is, the equitable defense of
laches. We hold that the defense of prescription or adverse possession in derogation of the title of the registered
owner Domingo Mejia does not lie, but that of the equitable defense of laches. Otherwise stated, we hold that while
defendant may not be considered as having acquired title by virtue of his and his predecessors long continued
possession for 37 years, the original owners right to recover back the possession of the property and the title thereto
from the defendant has, by the long period of 37 years and by patentees inaction and neglect been converted into a
stale demand. (Quoting Mejia de Lucas v. Gamponia, 100 Phil. 277).

xxxxxxxxx

This defense is an equitable one and does not concern itself with the character of the defendants title, but only with
whether or not by reason of the plaintiffs long inaction or inexcusable neglect he should be barred from asserting
this claim at all, because to allow him to do so would be inequitable and unjust to the defendant. x x x.

Lastly, Marquez claim that he is a purchaser in good faith and for value does not inspire any merit. In his
testimony, he admitted that he knew the land in question.[21] Curiously, in his Answer[22] to the complaint filed by the
petitioners, he stated that he has been aware that the former were in possession of the land since 1959. Where a
purchaser was fully aware of another persons possession of the lot he purchased, he cannot successfully pretend
later to be an innocent purchaser for value.[23] Moreover, one who buys without checking the vendors title takes all
the risks and losses consequent to such failure.[24]
In fact, it would have been expected that in the normal course of daily life, both the Madrids and Marquezes
talked about the status of the property. This being so, it would be difficult to imagine that the latter were not made
aware of the petitioners possession of the land. Armed with such information, they should have acted with the
diligence of a prudent man in determining the circumstances surrounding the property. Otherwise, the law does not
give him the benefit afforded to an innocent purchaser for value.[25]
 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated September 24, 1994 in CA -
G.R. No. 25339 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.Instead, petitioners are hereby declared as the legal owners
of the subject land. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, Purisima, and Pardo, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-21231 July 30, 1975

CONCORDIA LALUAN, et al., petitioners,

vs.
APOLINARIO MALPAYA, MELECIO TAMBOT, BERNARDINO JASMIN, et al., respondents.

Primicias, Regino and Macaraeg for petitioners.

Saturnino D. Bautista for respondents.

CASTRO, J.:

In 1950 the Laluans,1 the Laguits2 and the Sorianos3 (hereinafter referred to as the petitioners) filed with the Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan a complaint against Apolinario Malpaya, Melecio Tambot and Bernardino Jasmin
(hereinafter referred to as the respondents) for recovery of ownership and possession of two parcels of land. The
petitioners seek a declaration that they are the owners pro indiviso of

A PARCEL OF RICELAND, situated in the barrio of Inoman, Pozorrubio, Pangasinan, Philippines ...
containing an area of 1 hectare nine hundred seventy one (10,971) square meters, more or less;
bounded on the N. by Nicolas Estares; on the E. by Zanja; on the S. by Estero Inoman and on W. by
Aniceta Marquez; ...,

and the owners pro indiviso of one-half of

A PARCEL OF RICELAND AND CORNLAND, situated in the barrio of Inoman, Pozorrubio,

Pangasinan, ... containing an area of (31,548) square meters, more or less, bounded on N. by
Rosendo Serran; E. by Esteban Malpaya; S. by Creek and W. by Creek that surround it; ....

They base their claim on their alleged right to inherit, by legal succession, from Marciana Laluan (the respondent
Malpaya's wife) who died intestate on July 17, 1948 and without any children.

The first parcel of land they allege as paraphernal property of the late Marciana Laluan. They claim that the
respondent Malpaya, taking advantage of the senility of his wife, sold the land to the respondent Tambot, as
evidenced by the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property" dated June 26, 1948. The second parcel of land they
allege as conjugal property of the spouses Malpaya and Laluan, and charge that the respondent Malpaya, with right
to sell only one-half thereof, sold the whole property, four days after the death of his wife, to the respondents
Tambot and Jasmin, as evidenced by the "Absolute Deed of Sale" dated July 21, 1948.

The respondents filed their answer,4 denying the allegations of the complaint and claiming that the parcels of land
belonged to the respondent Malpaya as his exclusive property. The respondents Tambot and Jasmin further aver
that the respondent Malpaya had the "perfect legal right" to dispose of the said parcels of land and that they bought
the properties in good faith, unaware of any flaw in the title of their vendor.

To expedite the proceedings, the parties entered into a partial stipulation of facts at the hearings of August 31 and
October 25, 1950. The petitioners then proceeded to adduce their evidence.

Several postponements of the scheduled hearings followed. Then, at the hearing scheduled on August 1, 1957
neither the respondents nor their counsel appeared, notwithstanding due and proper notice served on them. Nor did
they file any motion for postponement. The petitioners thus moved for leave to continue with the presentation of their
evidence. This the court a quo granted, allowing the petitioners to adduce their evidence before the clerk of court.

On September 23, 1957 the court a quo rendered judgment declaring null and void the "Deed of Absolute Sale of
Real Property" dated June 26, 1948 as well the "Absolute Deed of Sale" dated July 21, 1948, except as regards the
one-half portion of the land described in the latter document which belonged to the respondent Malpaya. With
respect to the parcel of land covered by the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property," the court a quo declared the
petitioners owners pro indiviso of the entirety thereof and ordered the respondent Tambot not only to deliver the
possession of the land to them but also to pay them, by way of damages, the amount of P750 — the value of the
crops which the petitioners failed to realize for the last nine years from the land — plus P500 annually from date until
possession thereof shall have been delivered to them. With respect to the parcel of land subject of the "Absolute
Deed of Sale," the court a quo likewise declared the petitioners owners pro indiviso of one-half thereof and ordered
the respondents Tambot and Jasmin to deliver the possession of the half-portion to the petitioners, as well as to pay
them, in damages, the sum of P1,343.75 — the value of the produce which the petitioners failed to realize for the
last nine years from the half-portion of the land - plus P687.50 annually from date until possession thereof shall have
been delivered to them.

On October 7, 1957 the respondents Tambot and Jasmin filed their Mocion de Reconsideracion. On October 18,
1957 the court a quo, finding the grounds invoked by the respondents in their motion without merit, denied the
same.

The respondents then appealed to the Court of Appeals (hereinafter referred to as the respondent Court). On
January 31, 1963 the respondent Court rendered judgment setting aside the appealed decision and entered another
remanding the case to the court a quo for further proceedings. The respondent Court voided the procedure
whereby, at the continuation of the hearing of the case on August 1, 1957, the court a quo, in the absence of the
respondents and their counsel, allowed the petitioners to present their evidence before the clerk of court.

In due time, the petitioners, through a motion for reconsideration, asked the respondent Court to re-examine its
decision. This motion, however, the respondent Court denied.

In the instant petition for certiorari, the petitioners pray for the reversal of the decision of the respondent Court as
well its resolution denying their motion for reconsideration, and ask that judgment be rendered affirming in toto the
decision of the court a quo dated September 23, 1957.

The petitioners and the respondents point to what they believe is the sole question for resolution; whether or not the
reception by the clerk of court of the petitioners' evidence, in the absence of the respondents and their counsel,
constitutes a prejudicial error that vitiated the proceedings.

The petitioners argue that a trial court has authority to designate its clerk of court to receive the evidence of the
party present when the other party fails to appear. In receiving evidence, the petitioners continue, the clerk of court
merely performs a ministerial task. The ministerial nature of such a task allows the clerk of court to dispense with the
procedural steps5 prescribed by Rule 33 of the Rules of Court.

The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the court a quo arrogated unto itself the power, otherwise denied
it, to designate its clerk of court to receive the petitioners' evidence. No provision of the Rules of Court, according to
them, empowers a trial court to authorize its clerk of court to receive the evidence of a party litigant; only when the
clerk of court becomes a commissioner, by appointment pursuant to Rule 33, has he the authority to so receive the
evidence of a party litigant, and even in such a situation Rule 33 requires the clerk of court to observe the
procedural steps therein prescribed.

The provisions of Rule 33 of the Rules of Court invoked by both parties properly relate to the reference by a court of
any or all of the issues in a case to a person so commissioned to act or report thereon. These provisions explicitly
spell out the rules governing the conduct of the court, the commissioner, and the parties before, during, and after the
reference proceedings. Compliance with these rules of conduct becomes imperative only when the court formally
orders a reference of the case to a commissioner. Strictly speaking then, the provisions of Rule 33 find no
application to the case at bar where the court a quo merely directed the clerk of court to take down the testimony of
the witnesses6 presented and to mark the documentary evidence7 proffered on a date previously set for hearing.

No provision of law or principle of public policy prohibits a court from authorizing its clerk of court to receive the
evidence of a party litigant. After all, the reception of evidence by the clerk of court constitutes but a ministerial task
— the taking down of the testimony of the witnesses and the marking of the pieces of documentary evidence, if any,
adduced by the party present. This task of receiving evidence precludes, on the part of the clerk of court, the
exercise of judicial discretion usually called for when the other party who is present objects to questions propounded
and to the admission of the documentary evidence proffered.8 More importantly, the duty to render judgment on the
merits of the case still rests with the judge who is obliged to personally and directly prepare the decision based upon
the evidence reported. 9

But where the proceedings before the clerk of court and the concomitant result thereof, i.e., the judgment rendered
by the court based on the evidence presented in such limited proceedings, prejudice the substantial rights of the
aggrieved party, then there exists sufficient justification to grant the latter complete opportunity to thresh out his case
in court.

1. Anent the parcel of land subject of the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property," the court a quo, in its decision
dated September 23, 1957, declared it as the paraphernal property of the deceased Marciana Laluan. In so doing,
the court a quo relied mainly on the documents — the deed of donation propter nuptias and the translation thereof in
English — presented by the petitioners before the clerk of court at the hearing on August 1, 1957. However, the
respondents contend — and this the respondent court took significant note of in its resolution dated March 30, 1963
— that the land described in the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property" is not any of those set forth in the deed of
donation.
The "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property" describes the land subject thereof as follows:

A parcel of riceland, together with all the improvements existing thereon situated in the Barrio of
Inoman, Pozorrubio, Pangasinan, Philippines, ... containing an area of 1 hectare nine hundred
seventy one (10,971) square meters, more or less; bounded on the N. by Nicolas Estaris; on the E.
by Zanja; on the east by Estero Inoman and on the W. by Aniceta Marquez; the boundaries consists
of visible dikes that surround it; declared under Tax No. 20006 in the name of the Vendor and
assessed at P330.00 of the current year of Pozorrubio, Pangasinan; said land is not registered
under Act No. 496 nor under the Spanish Mortgage Law. 10

On the other hand, the deed of donation propter nuptias treats of three parcels of land in this manner.

First: A parcel of riceland situated in Paldit, municipality of Pozorrubio, Pangasinan, the

measurement and boundaries on all sides could be seen from the sketch at the back hereof, this
parcel of land is given in lieu of jewelry, whose value is TEN (P10.00) PESOS.

Second: Another parcel of riceland situated in the same place mentioned above, also its
measurements and boundaries on all sides could be seen from the sketch at the back hereof, and
valued at THIRTY (P30.00) PESOS.

... a parcel of riceland ... situated in Inmatotong, this municipality, its measurements in brazes and
boundaries on all sides could be seen on the sketch herein below, and this said parcel of land is
valued at TEN (P10.00) PESOS.

The sketch appearing on the deed of donation covers three parcels of land: the first parcel, 63 X
52 brazas, 11bounded on the north by Jacinto Malpaya, on the west by a payas, and on the south and east by Pedro
Malpaya; the second parcel, 30 X 63 brazas, bounded on the north by Tomas Tollao, on the west by Jacinto Laluan,
on the south by a colos, and on the east by Pedro Malpaya; and the third parcel, 52 X 23 brazas, bounded on the
north and west by Pedro Malpaya, on the south by Roman Gramata, and on the east by Eustaquio Marquez. All of
these three parcels have stated metes and bounds quite different from those of the land covered by the "Deed of
Absolute Sale of Real Property," the location too of the latter land differs from those of the parcels described in the
deed of donation. While the land subject of the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property" lies in Inoman, Pozorrubio,
Pangasinan, the parcels included in the deed of donation lie either in Paldit or in Inmatotong, both also in
Pozorrubio, Pangasinan. At first sight also appears the marked variance between the respective areas of those
parcels described in the deed of donation and the parcel subject of the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property."

Indeed, there arises the possibility that in the interim of fifty six years from February 15, 1892 (the date of the deed
of donation propter nuptias) to June 26, 1948 (the date of the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property"), the parcels
of land contiguous to those described in the deed of donation passed in ownership from one hand to another, or
changes in the man-made or natural boundaries used to indicate the confines of the parcels set forth in the said
document occurred. This could very well explain the discrepancies between the names of the boundary owners of
the piece of land described in the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property" and the names of the adjacent owners
of the parcels subject of the deed of donation as well as the absence of any mention of the payas and colos in the
later "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property." In addition, the variance between the location of the land described
in the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property" and those of the parcels set forth in the deed of donation could
reasonably be due to the creation of new barrios in the municipality of Pozorrubio Pangasinan, or the alteration of
the boundaries of the barrios therein.

However, the apparent difference between the area of the land described in the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real
Property" and the areas of the parcels included in the deed of donation propter nuptias should be fully and properly
explained. The record shows that the petitioners neither offered nor attempted to offer any evidence indicating that
the land sold by the respondent Malpaya to his co-respondent Tambot corresponds with any of the three parcels
described in the deed of donation. The petitioners failed to specify precisely which of the three parcels — its
location, area, and contiguous owners — subject of the deed of donation constitutes the very land delimited in the
"Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property."

All these give rise to a grave doubt as to the specific identity of one of the parcels of land in dispute which the
court a quo neither noticed nor considered notwithstanding the obvious fact that the location, area and boundaries of
the land covered by the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property" do not coincide with those of any of the parcels
described in the deed of donation propter nuptias.

The invariable applicable rule 12 is to the effect that in order to maintain an action to recover ownership, the person
who claims that he has a better right to the property must prove not only his ownership of the property claimed but
also the identity thereof. The party who desires to recover must fix the identity of the land he claims. 13 And where
doubt and uncertainty exist as to the identity of the land claimed, a court should resolve the question by recourse to
the pleadings and the record as well as to extrinsic evidence, oral or written.

Absent, therefore, any indicium in the record to show and identify with absolute certainty any of the three parcels of
land included in the deed of donation propter nuptias as the land described in the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real
Property," the prudent course open obviously consists in an investigation by the court a quo, either in the form of a
hearing or an ocular inspection, or both, to enable it to know positively the land in litigation. If, indeed, the "Deed of
Absolute Sale of Real Property" treats of a piece of land entirely different and distinct from the parcels described in
the deed of donation propter nuptias, and considering that the court a quo, in its decision dated September 23,
1957, relied mainly on the said deed of donation in declaring the land subject of the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real
Property" as the paraphernal property of the late Marciana Laluan and in nullifying the latter document, then there
exists sufficient ground to remand the case to the court a quo for a new trial on the matter.

2. Anent the parcel of land subject of the "Absolute Deed of Sale," the court a quo, in its decision dated September
23, 1957, found and declared it as the conjugal property of the spouses Laluan and Malpaya. In so doing, the courta
quo relied heavily on the presumption established by article 1407 14 of the Civil Code of 1889 that "[a] 11 the
property of the spouses shall be deemed partnership property in the absence of proof that it belongs exclusively to
the husband or to the wife."

It needs no emphasis to point out that the court a quo committed no error in declaring that the parcel of land subject
of the "Absolute Deed of Sale" belongs to the conjugal partnership of the spouses Laluan and Malpaya. Indeed, the
spouses Laluan and Malpaya acquired the said parcel of land from Eustaquio Marquez "sometime in 1912" or,
specifically, during the marriage. Following the rule then that proof of acquisition of the property in dispute during the
marriage suffices to render the statutory presumption operative, 15 it seems clear enough that the parcel covered by
the "Absolute Deed of Sale" pertains to the conjugal partnership of the spouses Laluan and Malpaya.

Likewise, the court a quo committed no error in declaring the "Absolute Deed of Sale" null and void as to the one-
half portion of the land described therein which belonged to Laluan, spouse of the respondent Malpaya; in declaring
the petitioners the owners pro indiviso of one-half of the land subject of the said "Absolute Deed of Sale;" and in
ordering the respondents Tambot and Jasmin to deliver the possession of the said half-portion to the petitioners.
The court a quo also correctly cited and applied the provisions of articles 953 16 and 837 17 of the Civil Code of 1889
which, pursuant to article 2263 18 of the new Civil Code, govern the rights of the petitioners and the respondent
Malpaya to the property left by Marciana Laluan who died on July 17, 1948 or before the effectivity of the new code.
Consequently, the court a quo correctly ordered the respondents Tambot and Jasmin to pay to the petitioners, by
way of damages, the amount of P1,343.75 which is the value of the produce which the said petitioners failed to
realize for nine years from the half-portion of the land subject of the "Absolute Deed of Sale" — plus the sum of
P687.50 annually from September 23, 1957 until possession of the said half-portion of land shall have been
delivered to them.

ACCORDINGLY, (1) the judgment of the Court of Appeals dated January 31, 1963 and its resolution dated March
30, 1963 are set aside; (2) the judgment of the court a quo dated September 23, 1957, insofar as it pertains to the
"Absolute Deed of Sale," is hereby affirmed; and (3) the judgment of the court a quo of the same date, insofar as it
relates to the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property," is set aside, and the case (civil case 11219) is hereby
remanded to the court a quo for a new trial, to the end that the identities of the parcels of land in dispute may be
specifically established. At the new trial, it will not be necessary to retake evidence already taken, but the parties
shall be afforded opportunity to present such evidence as they may deem relevant to the particular question raised
herein. No costs.

Makasiar, Esguerra, Muñoz Palma and Martin, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., is on leave.

 [G.R. No. 149679. May 30, 2003]

HEIRS OF CLEMENTE ERMAC, namely: IRENEA E. SENO, LIBRADA E. MALINAO, INES E. MIOZA, SOLEDAD
E. CENIZA, RODULFO ERMAC and AMELITA E. BASUBAS, petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF VICENTE
ERMAC, namely: BENJAMIN, VIRGINIA, PRECIOSA, DANILO, as HEIRS OF URBANO ADOLFO;
BERNARDINO, CLIMACO, CESAR, ELSA, FLORAME and FE, all surnamed ERMAC, as HEIRS OF CLIMACO
ERMAC, ESTELITA ERMAC, ESTANESLAO DIONSON, VICENTE DIONSON, EUFEMIA LIGARAY, EMIGDIO
BUSTILLO and LIZA PARAJELE, LUISA DEL CASTILLO,* respondents.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Ownership should not be confused with a certificate of title. Registering land under the Torrens System does
not create or vest title, because registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A certificate of title is merely an
evidence of ownership or title over the particular property described therein.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the February 16,
2001 Decision[2] and the August 6, 2001 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals[4] (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 59564. The
dispositive part of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED, and the assailed [D]ecision of the
Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City is hereby AFFIRMED.[5]

The assailed Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

The Facts

The factual antecedents of the case are summarized by the CA as follows:

In their Complaint, [respondents] claim that they are the owners of the various parcels of real property that form part
of Lot No. 666, (plan II-5121 Amd.2) situated in Mandaue City, Cebu, which lot allegedly belonged originally to
Claudio Ermac. Upon the latters death, the said Lot No. 666 was inherited and partitioned by his children, namely,
Esteban, Pedro and Balbina. Siblings Pedro and Balbina requested their brother Esteban to have their title over the
property registered. Esteban, however, was unable to do so, and the task of registration fell to his son,
Clemente. Clemente applied for registration of the title, but did so in his own name, and did not include his fathers
brother and sister, nor his cousins. Despite having registered the lot in his name, Clemente did not disturb or claim
ownership over those portions occupied by his uncle, aunt and cousins even up to the time of his death. Among the
occupants of Lot No. 666 are the [respondents] in this case. [Respondents]-heirs of Vicente Ermac claim ownership
over the portions of Lot No. 666 now occupied by them by right of succession as direct descendants of the original
owner, Claudio Ermac. [Respondents] Luisa Del Castillo and Estaneslao Dionson allegedly derived their title by
purchase from the children of Claudio Ermac. [Respondent] Vicente Dionson, on the other hand, bought his land
from the heirs of Pedro Ermac, while [Respondents] Emigdio Bustillo and Liza Parajele derived their ownership from
the Heirs of Balbina Ermac-Dabon. [respondents] ownership and possession had been peaceful and undisturbed,
until recently when the [petitioners]-heirs of Clemente Ermac filed an action for ejectment against them. The filing of
the said ejectment caused a cloud of doubt upon the [respondents] ownership over their respective parcels of land,
prompting them to file this action for quieting of title.

[Petitioners], on the other hand, denied the material allegations of the [respondents], and claimed that the
[respondents] have no cause of action against them. It is essentially claimed that it was Clemente Ermac and not his
grandfather Claudio Ermac who is the original claimant of dominion over Lot No. 666. During his lifetime, Clemente
Ermac was in actual, peaceful, adverse and continuous possession in the concept of an owner of the entire Lot No.
666. With the help of his children, he cultivated the said lot, and planted corn, peanuts, cassava and fruit
products. Clemente also effected the registration of the subject lot in his name. Upon Clementes death, [petitioners]
inherited Lot No. 666, and they constructed their residential houses thereon. [Petitioners] claim that [respondents]
recent occupation of some portions of Lot No. 666 was only tolerated by Clemente Ermac and the
[petitioners].[Petitioners] in fact had never surrendered ownership or possession of the property to the
[respondents]. [Petitioners] also set up the defense of prescription and laches.

xxxxxxxxx
After trial, the lower [court] rendered its [D]ecision, finding that the original owner of the lot in question was Claudio
Ermac, and therefore, the property was inherited upon his death by his children Esteban, Balbina and Pedro. All the
heirs of Claudio Ermac, therefore, should share in the ownership over Lot No. 666, by right of succession. The ruling
[was] supported by the admissions of Irene[a] Seno, witness for the [petitioners] and daughter of Clemente Ermac,
establishing facts which show that [petitioners] and their predecessor Clemente did not own the entire property, but
that the other heirs of Claudio Ermac are entitled to two-thirds (2/3) of the lot. Since the entire lot is now registered in
the name of Clemente Ermac, the shares belonging to the other heirs of Claudio Ermac, some of which have
already been purchased by some of the [respondents], are being held in trust by the [petitioners] in favor of their
actual occupants.[6]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA held that the factual finding of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) [7] should not be disturbed on appeal. The
latter found that Lot No. 666 was originally owned by Claudio Ermac and, after his death, was inherited by his
children -- Esteban, Balbina and Pedro. It ruled that respondents were able to prove consistently and corroboratively
that they -- as well as their predecessors-in-interests -- had been in open, continuous and undisturbed possession
and occupation thereof in the concept of owners.
According to the appellate court, [t]he fact that [petitioners] have in their possession certificates of title which
apparently bear out that it [was] Clemente Ermac alone who claimed the entire property described therein [has] no
discrediting effect upon plaintiffs claim, it appearing that such titles were acquired in derogation of the existing valid
and adverse interests of the plaintiffs whose title by succession were effectively disregarded.[8]
Hence, this Petition.[9]

The Issues

In their Memorandum,[10] petitioners raise the following issues for our consideration:

I. The validity of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated February 5, 1996 issued by the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 28, directing the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, to cease and desist from
conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No. 2401[;]

II. Whether or not O.C.T. No. RO-752 issued in the names of [Spouses] Clemente Ermac [and]
Anunciacion Suyco is indefeasible and incontrovertible under the Torrens System[;]

III. Whether or not the alleged tax declarations and tax receipts are sufficient to defeat the title over the
property in the names of petitioners predecessors-in-interest [Spouses] Clemente Ermac and Anunciacion
Suyco[;]

[IV]. Whether or not laches ha[s] set in on the claims by the respondents on portions of Lot No. 666[.][11]

The Courts Ruling

The Petition is unmeritorious.

First Issue:
Preliminary Injunction

Petitioners assail the validity of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by the RTC to restrain the ejectment
proceedings they had filed earlier.
This question is not only late, but also moot. If petitioners truly believed that the issuance of the Writ was tainted
with grave abuse of discretion, they should have challenged it by a special civil action for certiorari within the
reglementary period. Any ruling by the Court at this point would be moot and academic, as the resolution of the
issue would not involve the merits of the case, which this appeal -- as it is now -- touches upon.

Second Issue:
Indefeasibility and Incontrovertibility of Title
 Petitioners posit that pursuant to Section 32 of PD 1529 (the Property Registration Decree), the certificate of
title issued in favor of their predecessor-in-interest, Clemente Ermac, became incontrovertible after the lapse of one
year from its issuance. Hence, it can no longer be challenged.
We clarify. While it is true that Section 32[12] of PD 1529 provides that the decree of registration becomes
incontrovertible after a year, it does not altogether deprive an aggrieved party of a remedy[13] in law.[14] The
acceptability of the Torrens System would be impaired, if it is utilized to perpetuate fraud against the real owners.[15]
Furthermore, ownership is not the same as a certificate of title. Registering a piece of land under the Torrens
System does not create or vest title, because registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership.[16] A certificate of
title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the particular property described therein. [17] Its issuance in favor
of a particular person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be co-owned with persons not
named in the certificate, or that it may be held in trust for another person by the registered owner.[18]

Third Issue:
Ownership of the Disputed Lot

Petitioners claim that the CA erred in relying on the hearsay and unsubstantiated testimony of respondents, as
well as on tax declarations and realty tax receipts, in order to support its ruling that the land was owned by Claudio
Ermac.
We are not persuaded. The credence given to the testimony of the witnesses for respondents is a factual issue
already passed upon and resolved by the trial and the appellate courts. It is a hornbook doctrine that only questions
of law are entertained in appeals by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The trial courts findings of fact,
which the CA affirmed, are generally conclusive and binding upon this Court.[19]
Moreover, while tax declarations and realty tax receipts do not conclusively prove ownership, they may
constitute strong evidence of ownership when accompanied by possession for a period sufficient for
prescription.[20] Considering that respondents have been in possession of the property for a long period of time,
there is legal basis for their use of tax declarations and realty tax receipts as additional evidence to support their
claim of ownership.

Fourth Issue:
Prescription and Laches

Petitioners assert that the ownership claimed by respondents is barred by prescription and laches, because it
took the latter 57 years to bring the present action.We disagree.
When a party uses fraud or concealment to obtain a certificate of title to property, a constructive trust is created
in favor of the defrauded party.[21] Since Claudio Ermac has already been established in the present case as the
original owner of the land, the registration in the name of Clemente Ermac meant that the latter held the land in trust
for all the heirs of the former. Since respondents were in actual possession of the property, the action to enforce the
trust, and recover the property, and thereby quiet title thereto, does not prescribe.[22]
Because laches is an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable considerations. [23] It cannot be
used to defeat justice or to perpetuate fraud and injustice.[24] Its application should not prevent the rightful owners of
a property to recover what has been fraudulently registered in the name of another.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Corona, JJ., on leave.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 76217 September 14, 1989

GERMAN MANAGEMENT & SERVICES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ERNESTO VILLEZA, respondents.

G.R. No. L-76216 September 14, 1989

GERMAN MANAGEMENT & SERVICES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ORLANDO GERNALE, respondents.

Alam, Verano & Associates for petitioner.

Francisco D. Lozano for private respondents.

FERNAN, C.J.:

Spouses Cynthia Cuyegkeng Jose and Manuel Rene Jose, residents of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA are the
owners of a parcel of land situated in Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal, with an area of 232,942 square
meters and covered by TCT No. 50023 of the Register of Deeds of the province of Rizal issued on September 11,
1980 which canceled TCT No. 56762/ T-560. The land was originally registered on August 5, 1948 in the Office of
the Register of Deeds of Rizal as OCT No. 19, pursuant to a Homestead Patent granted by the President of the
Philippines on July 27, 1948, under Act No. 141.

On February 26, 1982, the spouses Jose executed a special power of attorney authorizing petitioner German
Management Services to develop their property covered by TCT No. 50023 into a residential subdivision.
Consequently, petitioner on February 9,1983 obtained Development Permit No. 00424 from the Human Settlements
Regulatory Commission for said development. Finding that part of the property was occupied by private respondents
and twenty other persons, petitioner advised the occupants to vacate the premises but the latter refused.
Nevertheless, petitioner proceeded with the development of the subject property which included the portions
occupied and cultivated by private respondents.

Private respondents filed an action for forcible entry against petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo,
Rizal, alleging that they are mountainside farmers of Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal and members of the
Concerned Citizens of Farmer's Association; that they have occupied and tilled their farmholdings some twelve to
fifteen years prior to the promulgation of P.D. No. 27; that during the first week of August 1983, petitioner, under a
permit from the Office of the Provincial Governor of Rizal, was allowed to improve the Barangay Road at Sitio
Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal at its expense, subject to the condition that it shag secure the needed right of
way from the owners of the lot to be affected; that on August 15, 1983 and thereafter, petitioner deprived private
respondents of their property without due process of law by: (1) forcibly removing and destroying the barbed wire
fence enclosing their farmholdings without notice; (2) bulldozing the rice, corn fruit bearing trees and other crops of
private respondents by means of force, violence and intimidation, in violation of P.D. 1038 and (3) trespassing,
coercing and threatening to harass, remove and eject private respondents from their respective farmholdings in
violation of P.D. Nos. 316, 583, 815, and 1028. 1

On January 7,1985, the Municipal Trial Court dismissed private respondents' complaint for forcible entry. 2 On
appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch LXXI sustained the dismissal by the Municipal Trial
Court. 3

Private respondents then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. On July 24,1986, said court gave due
course to their petition and reversed the decisions of the Municipal Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court. 4

The Appellate Court held that since private respondents were in actual possession of the property at the time they
were forcibly ejected by petitioner, private respondents have a right to commence an action for forcible entry
regardless of the legality or illegality of possession. 5 Petitioner moved to reconsider but the same was denied by the
Appellate Court in its resolution dated September 26, 1986. 6

Hence, this recourse.

The issue in this case is whether or not the Court of Appeals denied due process to petitioner when it reversed the
decision of the court a quo without giving petitioner the opportunity to file its answer and whether or not private
respondents are entitled to file a forcible entry case against petitioner. 7

We affirm. The Court of Appeals need not require petitioner to file an answer for due process to exist. The comment
filed by petitioner on February 26, 1986 has sufficiently addressed the issues presented in the petition for review
filed by private respondents before the Court of Appeals. Having heard both parties, the Appellate Court need not
await or require any other additional pleading. Moreover, the fact that petitioner was heard by the Court of Appeals
on its motion for reconsideration negates any violation of due process.

Notwithstanding petitioner's claim that it was duly authorized by the owners to develop the subject property, private
respondents, as actual possessors, can commence a forcible entry case against petitioner because ownership is not
in issue. Forcible entry is merely a quieting process and never determines the actual title to an estate. Title is not
involved. 8

In the case at bar, it is undisputed that at the time petitioner entered the property, private respondents were already
in possession thereof . There is no evidence that the spouses Jose were ever in possession of the subject property.
On the contrary, private respondents' peaceable possession was manifested by the fact that they even planted rice,
corn and fruit bearing trees twelve to fifteen years prior to petitioner's act of destroying their crops.

Although admittedly petitioner may validly claim ownership based on the muniments of title it presented, such
evidence does not responsively address the issue of prior actual possession raised in a forcible entry case. It must
be stated that regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession
shall not be turned out by a strong hand, violence or terror. 9 Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can
recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his prior possession, if
he has in his favor priority in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully
ejected by a person having a better right by accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. 10

Both the Municipal Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court have rationalized petitioner's drastic action of bulldozing
and destroying the crops of private respondents on the basis of the doctrine of self-help enunciated in Article 429 of
the New Civil Code. 11 Such justification is unavailing because the doctrine of self-help can only be exercised at the
time of actual or threatened dispossession which is absent in the case at bar. When possession has already been
lost, the owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of property. This is clear from Article 536 of the Civil
Code which states, "(I)n no case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation as long as there is a
possessor who objects thereto. He who believes that he has an action or right to deprive another of the holding of a
thing, must invoke the aid of the competent court, if the holder should refuse to deliver the thing."

WHEREFORE, the Court resolved to DENY the instant petition. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated July
24,1986 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

ANECO REALTY AND G.R. No. 165952

DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Present:
Petitioner,
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus - CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.

LANDEX DEVELOPMENT Promulgated:

CORPORATION,
Respondent. July 28, 2008

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

THIS is a simple case of a neighbor seeking to restrain the landowner from fencing his own property. The right to
fence flows from the right of ownership.Absent a clear legal and enforceable right, We will not unduly restrain the
landowner from exercising an inherent proprietary right.

Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming the
Order[2]
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissing the complaint for injunction filed by petitioner Aneco Realty and
Development Corporation (Aneco) against respondent LandexDevelopment Corporation (Landex).

Facts

Fernandez Hermanos Development, Inc. (FHDI) is the original owner of a tract of land in San Francisco Del
Monte, Quezon City. FHDI subdivided the land into thirty-nine (39) lots.[3] It later sold twenty-two (22) lots to
petitioner Aneco and the remaining seventeen (17) lots to respondent Landex.[4]

The dispute arose when Landex started the construction of a concrete wall on one of its lots. To restrain
construction of the wall, Aneco filed a complaint for injunction[5] with the RTC in Quezon City. Aneco later filed two
(2) supplemental complaints seeking to demolish the newly-built wall and to hold Landexliable for two million pesos
in damages.[6]

Landex filed its Answer[7] alleging, among others, that Aneco was not deprived access to its lots due to the
construction of the concrete wall. Landex claimed that Aneco has its own entrance to its property along Miller
Street, Resthaven Street, and San Francisco del Monte Street. The Resthaven access, however, was rendered
inaccessible when Aneco constructed a building on said street. Landex also claimed that FHDI sold ordinary lots,
not subdivision lots, to Anecobased on the express stipulation in the deed of sale that FHDI was not interested in
pursuing its own subdivision project.

RTC Disposition

On June 19, 1996, the RTC rendered a Decision[8] granting the complaint for injunction, disposing as follows:

Wherefore, premises considered, and in the light aforecited decision of the Supreme Court
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and the defendant is hereby ordered:

1. To stop the completion of the concrete wall and excavation of the road lot in
question and if the same is already completed, to remove the same and to
return the lot to its original situation;
 2. To pay actual and compensatory damage to the plaintiff in the total amount
of P50,000.00;

3. To pay attorneys fees in the amount of P20,000.00;

4. To pay the cost.

SO ORDERED.[9]

Landex moved for reconsideration.[10] Records reveal that Landex failed to include a notice of hearing in its motion
for reconsideration as required under Section 5, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Realizing the
defect, Landex later filed a motion[11] setting a hearing for its motion for reconsideration. Aneco countered with a
motion for execution[12] claiming that the RTC decision is already final and executory.

Acting on the motion of Landex, the RTC set a hearing on the motion for reconsideration on August 28,
1996. Aneco failed to attend the slated hearing.The RTC gave Aneco additional time to file a comment on the
motion for reconsideration.[13]

On March 13, 1997, the RTC issued an order[14] denying the motion for execution of Aneco.

On March 31, 1997, the RTC issued an order granting the motion for reconsideration of Landex and
dismissing the complaint of Aneco. In granting reconsideration, the RTC stated:

In previously ruling for the plaintiff, this Court anchored its decision on the ruling of the
Supreme Court in the case of White Plains Association vs. Legaspi, 193 SCRA 765, wherein the
issue involved was the ownership of a road lot, in an existing, fully developed and authorized
subdivision, which after a second look, is apparently inapplicable to the instant case at bar, simply
because the property in question never did exist as a subdivision. Since, the property in question
never did exist as a subdivision, the limitations imposed by Section 1 of Republic Act No. 440, that
no portion of a subdivision road lot shall be closed without the approval of the Court is clearly in
appropriate to the case at bar.

The records show that the plaintiffs property has access to a public road as it has its own
ingress and egress along Miller St.; That plaintiffs property is not isolated as it is bounded by Miller
St. and Resthaven St. in San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City; that plaintiff could easily make an
access to a public road within the bounds and limits of its own property; and that the defendant has
not yet been indemnified whatsoever for the use of his property, as mandated by the Bill of
rights. The foregoing circumstances, negates the alleged plaintiffs right of way.[15]

Aneco appealed to the CA.[16]

CA Disposition

On March 31, 2003, the CA rendered a Decision[17] affirming the RTC order, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing, the instant appeal is

perforce dismissed. Accordingly, the order dated 31 March 1996 is hereby affirmed.

SO ORDERED.[18]

In affirming the RTC dismissal of the complaint for injunction, the CA held that Aneco knew at the time of the
sale that the lots sold by FHDI were not subdivision units based on the express stipulation in the deed of sale that
FHDI, the seller, was no longer interested in pursuing its subdivision project, thus:

The subject property ceased to be a road lot when its former owner (Fernandez Hermanos,
Inc.) sold it to appellant Aneco not as subdivision lots and without the intention of pursuing the
subdivision project. The law in point is Article 624 of the New Civil Code, which provides:

Art. 624. The existence of an apparent sign of easement between two

estates, established or maintained by the owner of both, shall be considered, should
either of them be alienated, as a title in order that the easement may continue
actively and passively, unless, at the time the ownership of the two estates is divided,
the contrary should be provided in the title of conveyance of either of them, or the
sign aforesaid should be removed before the execution of the deed. This provision
shall also apply in case of the division of a thing owned in common by two or more
persons.

Viewed from the aforesaid law, there is no question that the law allows the continued use of
an apparent easement should the owner alienate the property to different persons. It is noteworthy to
emphasize that the lot in question was provided by the previous owner (Fernandez Hermanos, Inc.)
 as a road lot because of its intention to convert it into a subdivision project. The previous owner even
applied for a development permit over the subject property. However, when the twenty-two (22) lots
were sold to appellant Aneco, it was very clear from the sellers deed of sale that the lots sold ceased
to be subdivision lots. The seller even warranted that it shall undertake to extend all the necessary
assistance for the consolidation of the subdivided lots, including the execution of the requisite
manifestation before the appropriate government agencies that the seller is no longer interested in
pursuing the subdivision project. In fine, appellant Aneco knew from the very start that at the time of
the sale, the 22 lots sold to it were not intended as subdivision units, although the titles to the
different lots have yet to be consolidated. Consequently, the easement that used to exist on the
subject lot ceased when appellant Aneco and the former owner agreed that the lots would be
consolidated and would no longer be intended as a subdivision project.

Appellant Aneco insists that it has the intention of continuing the subdivision project earlier
commenced by the former owner. It also holds on to the previous development permit granted to
Fernandez Hermanos, Inc. The insistence is futile. Appellant Aneco did not acquire any right from
the said previous owner since the latter itself expressly stated in their agreement that it has no more
intention of continuing the subdivision project. If appellant desires to convert its property into a
subdivision project, it has to apply in its own name, and must have its own provisions for a road
lot.[19]

Anent the issue of compulsory easement of right of way, the CA held that Aneco failed to prove the essential
requisites to avail of such right, thus:

An easement involves an abnormal restriction on the property of the servient owner and is
regarded as a charge or encumbrance on the servient owner and is regarded as a charge or
encumbrance on the servient estate (Cristobal v. CA, 291 SCRA 122). The essential requisites to be
entitled to a compulsory easement of way are: 1) that the dominant estate is surrounded by
other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; 2) that proper indemnity has
been paid; 3) that the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; 4) that
the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate and in so far as consistent
with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest
(Cristobal v. Court of Appeals, 291 SCRA 122).

An in depth examination of the evidence adduced and offered by appellant Aneco, showed
that it had failed to prove the existence of the aforementioned requisites, as the burden thereof lies
upon the appellant Aneco.[20]

Aneco moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied.[21] Hence, the present petition or appeal
by certiorari under Rule 45.

Issues

Petitioner Aneco assigns quadruple errors to the CA in the following tenor:

A.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DISMISSING PETITIONERS
APPEAL AND SUSTAINING THE TRIAL COURTS ORDER DATED 31 MARCH 1997 GRANTING
RESPONDENTS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WHICH IS FATALLY DEFECTIVE FOR
LACK OF NOTICE OF HEARING.

B.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
COURTS ORDER WHICH GAVE FULL WEIGHT AND CREDIT TO THE
MISLEADING AND ERRONEOUS CERTIFICATION ISSUED BY GILDA E. ESTILO WHICH SHE
LATER EXPRESSLY AND CATEGORICALLY RECANTED BY WAY OF HER AFFIDAVIT.

C.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING THE LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION OF
THE RULES IN ORDER TO SUSTAIN THE TRIAL COURTS ORDER DATED 31 MARCH 1997.

D.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
COURTS ORDER THAT MADE NO PRONOUNCEMENTS AS TO COSTS, AND IN
DISREGARDING THE MERIT OF THE PETITIONERS CAUSE OF ACTION.[22]

Our Ruling

The petition is without merit.

Essentially, two (2) issues are raised in this petition. The first is the procedural issue of whether or not
the RTC and the CA erred in liberally applying the rule on notice of hearing under Section 5, Rule 15 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. The second is the substantive issue of whether or not Aneco may enjoin Landex from
constructing a concrete wall on its own property.

We shall discuss the twin issues sequentially.

Strict vs. Liberal Construction of Procedural Rules; Defective

motion was cured when Aneco was given an opportunity to
comment on the motion for reconsideration.

Section 5, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure[23] requires a notice of hearing for a contested
motion filed in court. Records disclose that the motion for reconsideration filed by Landex of the RTC decision did
not contain a notice of hearing. There is no dispute that the motion for reconsideration is defective. The RTC and the
CA ignored the procedural defect and ruled on the substantive issues raised by Landex in its motion for
reconsideration. The issue before Us is whether or not the RTC and the CA correctly exercised its discretion in
ignoring the procedural defect. Simply put, the issue is whether or not the requirement of notice of hearing should be
strictly or liberally applied under the circumstances.

Aneco bats for strict construction. It cites a litany of cases which held that notice of hearing is mandatory. A
motion without the required notice of hearing is a mere scrap of paper. It does not toll the running of the period to file
an appeal or a motion for reconsideration. It is argued that the original RTCdecision is already final and executory
because of the defective motion.[24]

Landex counters for liberal construction. It similarly cites a catena of cases which held that procedural rules
may be relaxed in the interest of substantial justice. Landex asserts that the procedural defect was cured when it
filed a motion setting a hearing for its motion for reconsideration. It is claimed that Anecowas properly informed of
the pending motion for reconsideration and it was not deprived of an opportunity to be heard.[25]

It is true that appeals are mere statutory privileges which should be exercised only in the manner required by
law. Procedural rules serve a vital function in our judicial system. They promote the orderly resolution of
cases. Without procedure, there will be chaos. It thus behooves upon a litigant to follow basic procedural rules. Dire
consequences may flow from procedural lapses.

Nonetheless, it is also true that procedural rules are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice. Their strict and rigid application should be relaxed when they hinder rather than promote substantial
justice. Public policy dictates that court cases should, as much as possible, be resolved on the merits not on mere
technicalities. Substantive justice trumps procedural rules. In Barnes v. Padilla,[26] this Court held:

Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be
eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflect this principle.The power to suspend or even disregard
rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself has already
declared to be final x x x.

The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities. Time and again, this Court has consistently held that rules must not be applied rigidly
so as not to override substantial justice.[27]

Here, We find that the RTC and the CA soundly exercised their discretion in opting for a liberal rather than a strict
application of the rules on notice of hearing. It must be stressed that there are no vested right to technicalities. It is
within the courts sound discretion to relax procedural rules in order to fully adjudicate the merits of a case. This
Court will not interfere with the exercise of that discretion absent grave abuse or palpable error. Section 6, Rule 1 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure even mandates a liberal construction of the rules to promote their objectives of
securing a just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.

To be sure, the requirement of a notice of hearing in every contested motion is part of due process of law. The
notice alerts the opposing party of a pending motion in court and gives him an opportunity to oppose it. What the
rule forbids is not the mere absence of a notice of hearing in a contested motion but the unfair surprise caused by
the lack of notice. It is the dire consequences which flow from the procedural error which is proscribed. If the
opposing party is given a sufficient opportunity to oppose a defective motion, the procedural lapse is deemed cured
and the intent of the rule is substantially complied. In E & L Mercantile, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[28] this
Court held:

Procedural due process is not based solely on a mechanistic and literal application of a rule
such that any deviation is inexorably fatal. Rules of procedure, and this includes the three (3) days
notice requirement, are liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in
obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding (Section 2,
Rule 1, Rules of Court). In Case and Nantz v. Jugo (77 Phil. 517), this Court made it clear that
lapses in the literal observance of a rule of procedure may be overlooked when they have not
prejudiced the adverse party and have not deprived the court of its authority.
 A party cannot ignore a more than sufficient opportunity to exercise its right to be heard and
once the court performs its duty and the outcome happens to be against that negligent party,
suddenly interpose a procedural violation already cured, insisting that everybody should again go
back to square one. Dilatory tactics cannot be the guiding principle.

The rule in De Borja v. Tan (93 Phil. 167), that what the law prohibits is not the absence of
previous notice, but the absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard, is the
applicable doctrine. (See also Aguilar v. Tan, 31 SCRA 205; Omico v. Vallejos, 63 SCRA
285; Sumadchat v. Court of Appeals, 111 SCRA 488.) x x x[29]

We also find that the procedural lapse committed by Landex was sufficiently cured when it filed another motion
setting a hearing for its defective motion for reconsideration. Records reveal that the RTC set a hearing for the
motion for reconsideration but Anecos counsel failed to appear. The RTC then gave Anecoadditional time to file
comment on the motion for reconsideration.[30]

Aneco was afforded procedural due process when it was given an opportunity to oppose the motion for
reconsideration. It cannot argue unfair surprise because it was afforded ample time to file a comment, as it did
comment, on the motion for reconsideration. There being no substantial injury or unfair prejudice, the RTC and the
CA correctly ignored the procedural defect.

The RTC and the CA did not err in dismissing the complaint for
injunction; factual findings and conclusions of law of
the RTC and the CA are afforded great weight and respect.

Anent the substantive issue, We agree with the RTC and the CA that the complaint for injunction
against Landex should be dismissed for lack of merit. What is involved here is an undue interference on the property
rights of a landowner to build a concrete wall on his own property. It is a simple case of a neighbor, petitioner Aneco,
seeking to restrain a landowner, respondent Landex, from fencing his own land.

Article 430 of the Civil Code gives every owner the right to enclose or fence his land or tenement by means
of walls, ditches, hedges or any other means. The right to fence flows from the right of ownership. As owner of the
land, Landex may fence his property subject only to the limitations and restrictions provided by law. Absent a clear
legal and enforceable right, as here, We will not interfere with the exercise of an essential attribute of ownership.

Well-settled is the rule that factual findings and conclusions of law of the trial court when affirmed by the CA are
accorded great weight and respect. Here, Wefind no cogent reason to deviate from the factual findings and
conclusion of law of the trial court and the appellate court. We have meticulously reviewed the records and agree
that Aneco failed to prove any clear legal right to prevent, much less restrain, Landex from fencing its own property.

Aneco cannot rely on the road lot under the old subdivision project of FHDI because it knew at the time of the sale
that it was buying ordinary lots, not subdivision lots, from FHDI. This is clear from the deed of sale between FHDI
and Aneco where FHDI manifested that it was no longer interested in pursuing its own subdivision
project. If Aneco wants to transform its own lots into a subdivision project, it must make its own provision for road
lots. It certainly cannot piggy back on the road lot of the defunct subdivision project of FHDI to the detriment of the
new owner Landex. The RTC and the CA correctly dismissed the complaint for injunction of Aneco for lack of merit.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the appealed Decision AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

G.R. No. L-26374 December 31, 1926

NICANOR JACINTO, Petitioner, vs. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, Respondent.

Araneta & Zaragoza for petitioner.

Attorney-General Jaranilla for respondent.

OSTRAND, J.:

This is a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the Director of Lands to execute a deed of conveyance in favor
of the petitioner for lots Nos. 670, 690, 691, 695, 696, 697 698, 699, 700, 701, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956,
957, and 1050 of the Tala Friar Lans Estate, located at the barrio of Novaliches, municipality of Caloocan, Province
of Rizal.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It appears from the record that, during the period from 1911 to 1913, sales certificates were issued by the Bureau of
Lands to Frank W. Carpenter for more than 100 lots of the Tala and Piedad Friar Lands Estates including the lots
enumerated above, the total area of the land covered by the sales certificates being over 1,490 hectares and the
purchase price amounting to about P56,600. of which amount Carpenter up to the year 1923, had paid in
installments the sum of P16,272.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Under a judgment rendered against Carpenter in civil No. 24607 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, execution
was levied upon all of his right, title and interest in the lots purchase together with the improvements thereon, and on
November 16, 1923, the sheriff of Rizal sold the property to the petitioner herein, Nicanor Jacinto. The sheriff's sale
was registered in the Bureau of Lands, assignments of the Bureau of Lands' sales certificates were duly recorded,
and certificates of assignment were issued and delivered to Nicanor Jacinto in September,
1924.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On March 31, 1925, the Metropolitan Water District instituted proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Rizal for
the condemnation of certain parcels of land situated in the municipality of Caloocan for the construction of an earth
am and a first-class highway three kilometers long, in connection with the so-called Angat Water Works Project, and
on the same date the Court of First Instance of Rizal issued an order authorizing the Metropolitan Water District to
take possession of said parcels of land upon deposit with the provincial treasurer of the sum of P3,000 as the
provisional value, fixed by the court, of the parcels so to be condemned. By virtue of this order, the Metropolitan
Water District entered into occupation of the land and began the construction of permanent improvements thereon.
Copies of the complaint as well as of the order of March 31, 1925, were filed with the register of deeds of the
Province of Rizal on February 11, 1926, to be recorded as notices of lis
pendens.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The lots hereinbefore enumerated in the first paragraph of this decision were included in the land sought to be
expropriated and the herein petitioner, Nicanor Jacinto, was made a party defendant in the proceedings. He
admitted the existence of the right of condemnation and the necessity for the expropriation, but demanded the sum
of P64,839.33 as indemnity for the expropriation. As the actual purchase price to be paid by the purchaser from the
Government only amounts P13,725, including interest, the Metropolitan Water District considered the petitioner's
demand excessive and declined to pay the claim.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In the month of July, 1926, the applicant tendered payment to the Director of Lands of the sum of P4,650 to cover
the remaining balance of the sales price of the lots in question and demanded a corresponding deed of conveyance
for said lots. The Director of Lands, upon the advice of the Attorney-General, rejected the tender and refused to
execute and deliver the instrument of conveyance demanded from him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library

The present action was thereupon brought, the petitioner insisting that, under Act No. 1120 as amended, he is
entitled to a conveyance of the land upon payment of the purchase price to the Government, and that, upon such
payment, the execution of the document of conveyance becomes a ministerial act which the Director of Lands is
bound to perform, and, in regard to which, he has no discretion. The respondent's contention seems to be that
before the petitioner's tender of final payment was made, the land in question had already to all intents and
purposes been expropriated and the Metropolitan Water District, the plaintiff in expropriation proceedings, placed in
possession; that the petitioner had admitted the necessity and the right of the plaintiff to expropriate the lands and
that the only thing lacking to complete the condemnation was the appraisal of the value of the petitioner's interest in
the land and the payment to him of the amount of such value, and that, therefore, the execution of a deed of
conveyance for the land to the petitioner is not only useless, but also
improper.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

We find but little merit in this contention; the proprietary rights, except the right of occupation, are not affected by the
condemnation proceedings until the title has passed to the plaintiff and that does not occur until the award of
compensation or damages has been satisfied. But there are other reason why the petition for a writ of mandamus to
compel a conveyance must be denied. In the first place, mandamus is not the proper remedy to enforce purely
contract rights such as that here sought to be enforced. (18 R. C. L., 121; Quiogue vs. Romualdez, 46 Phil.,
337.) chanrobles virtual law library

In the second place, the writ cannot issue in this case unless it appears that the respondent "unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station." (Section
222, Code of Civil Procedure.) The land in question is private or patrimonial property of the Philippine Government
and we can find no law specially enjoining upon the Director of Lands the duty to execute deeds of conveyance to
purchasers of such lands; on the contrary, that duty, under section 567 of the Administrative Code, appears to
devolve upon the Governor-General.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

By section 14 of Act No. 1120 the Director of Lands is, however, charged with the duty of receiving the purchase
money payable under that Act and may therefore be compelled by mandamus to receive, as a purely ministerial act,
such purchase money when tendered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The respondent is, therefore, hereby ordered to receive the balance of the purchase money for any or all of the by
the petitioner. The petition is denied as to the execution of deeds of conveyance. Without costs. So ordered.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-26053 February 21, 1967

CITY OF MANILA, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GERARDO GARCIA — CARMENCITA VILLANUEVA, MODESTA PARAYNO — NARCISO PARAYNO, JUAN
ASPERAS, MARIA TABIA — SIMEON DILIMAN, AQUILINO BARRIOS — LEONORA RUIZ, LAUREANO DIZO,
BERNABE AYUDA — LEOGARDA DE LOS SANTOS, ISABELO OBAOB — ANDREA RIPARIP, JOSE
BARRIENTOS, URBANO RAMOS,1 ELENA RAMOS, ESTEFANIA NEPACINA, MODESTA SANCHEZ, MARCIAL
LAZARO, MARCIANA ALANO, HONORIO BERIÑO — SEDORA ORAYLE, GLORIA VELASCO, WILARICO
RICAMATA, BENEDICTO DIAZ, ANA DEQUIZ — (MRS.) ALUNAN, LORENZO CARANDANG, JUAN PECAYO,
FELICIDAD MIRANDA — EMIGDIO EGIPTO, defendants-appellants.

Mauricio Z. Alunan for defendants-appellants.

City Fiscal's Office for plaintiff-appellee.

SANCHEZ, J.:

Plaintiff City of Manila is owner of parcels of land, forming one compact area, bordering Kansas, Vermont and
Singalong streets in Malate, Manila, and covered by Torrens Titles Nos. 49763, 37082 and 37558. Shortly after
liberation from 1945 to 1947, defendants entered upon these premises without plaintiff's knowledge and consent.
They built houses of second-class materials, again without plaintiff's knowledge and consent, and without the
necessary building permits from the city. There they lived thru the years to the present.

In November, 1947, the presence of defendants having previously been discovered, defendants Felicidad Miranda
(Emigdio Egipto), Modesta C. Parayno, Benedicto Diaz, Laureano Dizo, Jose Barrientos, Elena Ramos, Estefania
Nepacina, Modesta Sanchez, Honorio Beriño, Gloria Velasco, Ana Dequis Alunan and Benedicto Ofiaza
(predecessor of defendant Carandang) were given by Mayor Valeriano E. Fugoso written permits — each labeled
"lease contract" — to occupy specific areas in the property upon conditions therein set forth. Defendants Isabelo
Obaob and Gerardo Garcia (in the name of Marta A. Villanueva) received their permits from Mayor Manuel de la
Fuente on January 29 and March 18, respectively, both of 1948. The rest of the 23 defendants exhibited none.

For their occupancy, defendants were charged nominal rentals.1äwphï1.ñët

Following are the rentals due as of February, 1962:

Amt. due from

Area Monthly
NAME date of delinquency
in sq.m. Rental
to Feb. 1962

1. Gerardo Garcia 66.00 P7.92 P1,628.97

2. Modesta C. Parayno 87.75 10.53 379.08

3. Juan Asperas 39.00 4.68 9.36

4. Maria Tabia 35.20 5.76 570.24

5. Aquilino Barrios
54.00 4.32 99.36
(Leonora Ruiz)

6. Laureano Dizo 35.00 2.80 22.40

7. Bernabe Ayuda 39.60 3.17 323.34

8. Isabelo Obaob 75.52 9.06 208.38

9. Jose Barrientos 39.53 4.74 744.18

10. Cecilia Manzano in Paid up to

lieu of Urbano Ramos (deceased) 46.65 5.60 Feb. 1962.

11. Elena Ramos 34.80 2.78 186.26

 12. Estefania Nepacina 41.80 3.34 504.34

13. Modesta Sanchez 33.48 2.68 444.88

14. Marcial Lazaro 22.40 1.79 688.32

15. Marciana Alano 25.80 2.06 255.44

16. Honorio Beriño 24.00 1.92 188.16

17. Gloria Velasco 32.40 2.59 56.98

18. Wilarico Ricamata 45.83 3.67 739.68

Paid up to
19. Benedicto Diaz 40.20 4.82
March 1962.

20. Ana Dequis Alunan 64.26 7.71 30.84

21. Lorenzo Carandang 45.03 5.40 437.40

22. Juan N. Pecayo 25.52 3.06 30.60

23. Felicidad Miranda 48.02 5.76 132.48

P7,580.69

Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School is close, though not contiguous, to the property. Came the need for this
school's expansion; it became pressing. On September 14, 1961, plaintiff's City Engineer, pursuant to the Mayor's
directive to clear squatters' houses on city property, gave each of defendants thirty (30) days to vacate and remove
his construction or improvement on the premises. This was followed by the City Treasurer's demand on each
defendant, made in February and March, 1962, for the payment of the amount due by reason of the occupancy and
to vacate in fifteen (15) days. Defendants refused. Hence, this suit to recover possession.2

The judgment below directed defendants to vacate the premises; to pay the amounts heretofore indicated opposite
their respective names; and to pay their monthly rentals from March, 1962, until they vacate the said premises, and
the costs. Defendants appealed.

1. We are called upon to rule on the forefront question of whether the trial court properly found that the city
needs the premises for school purposes.

The city's evidence on this point is Exhibit E, the certification of the Chairman, Committee on Appropriations
of the Municipal Board. That document recites that the amount of P100,000.00 had been set aside in
Ordinance 4566, the 1962-1963 Manila City Budget, for the construction of an additional building of the
Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School. It is indeed correct to say that the court below, at the hearing,
ruled out the admissibility of said document. But then, in the decision under review, the trial judge obviously
revised his views. He there declared that there was need for defendants to vacate the premises for school
expansion; he cited the very document, Exhibit E, aforesaid.

It is beyond debate that a court of justice may alter its ruling while the case is within its power, to make it
conformable to law and justice.3 Such was done here. Defendants' remedy was to bring to the attention of
the court its contradictory stance. Not having done so, this Court will not reopen the case solely for this
purpose.4

Anyway, elimination of the certification, Exhibit E, as evidence, would not profit defendants. For, in reversing
his stand, the trial judge could well have taken — because the was duty bound to take — judicial notice5 of
Ordinance 4566. The reason being that the city charter of Manila requires all courts sitting therein to take
judicial notice of all ordinances passed by the municipal board of Manila.6 And, Ordinance 4566 itself
confirms the certification aforesaid that an appropriation of P100,000.00 was set aside for the "construction
of additional building" of the Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School.

Furthermore, defendants' position is vulnerable to assault from a third direction. Defendants have absolutely
no right to remain in the premises. The excuse that they have permits from the mayor is at best flimsy. The
permits to occupy are recoverable on thirty days' notice. They have been asked to leave; they refused to
heed. It is in this factual background that we say that the city's need for the premises is unimportant. The
city's right to throw defendants out of the area cannot be gainsaid. The city's dominical right to possession is
paramount. If error there was in the finding that the city needs the land, such error is harmless and will not
justify reversal of the judgment below.7
2. But defendants insist that they have acquired the legal status of tenants. They are wrong.

They entered the land, built houses of second-class materials thereon without the knowledge and consent of
the city. Their homes were erected without city permits.

These constructions are illegal. In a language familiar to all, defendants are squatters:

Since the last global war, squatting on another's property in this country has become a widespread vice. It
was and is a blight. Squatters' areas pose problems of health, sanitation. They are breeding places for
crime. They constitute proof that respect for the law and the rights of others, even those of the government,
are being flouted. Knowingly, squatters have embarked on the pernicious act of occupying property
whenever and wherever convenient to their interests — without as much as leave, and even against the will,
of the owner. They are emboldened seemingly because of their belief that they could violate the law with
impunity. The pugnaciousness of some of them has tied up the hands of legitimate owners. The latter are
thus prevented from recovering possession by peaceful means. Government lands have not been spared by
them. They know, of course, that intrusion into property, government or private, is wrong. But, then, the mills
of justice grind slow, mainly because of lawyers who, by means, fair or foul, are quite often successful in
procuring delay of the day of reckoning. Rampancy of forcible entry into government lands particularly, is
abetted by the apathy of some public officials to enforce the government's rights. Obstinacy of these
squatters is difficult to explain unless it is spawned by official tolerance, if not outright encouragement or
protection. Said squatters have become insensible to the difference between right and wrong. To them,
violation of law means nothing. With the result that squatting still exists, much to the detriment of public
interest. It is high time that, in this aspect, sanity and the rule of law be restored. It is in this environment that
we look into the validity of the permits granted defendants herein.

These permits, erroneously labeled "lease" contracts, were issued by the mayors in 1947 and 1948 when
the effects of the war had simmered down and when these defendants could have very well adjusted
themselves. Two decades have now elapsed since the unlawful entry. Defendants could have, if they
wanted to, located permanent premises for their abode. And yet, usurpers that they are, they preferred to
remain on city property.

Defendants' entry as aforesaid was illegal. Their constructions are as illegal, without permits.8 The city
charter enjoins the mayor to "safeguard all the lands" of the City of Manila.9

Surely enough, the permits granted did not "safeguard" the city's land in question. It is our considered view
that the Mayor of the City of Manila cannot legalize forcible entry into public property by the simple expedient
of giving permits, or, for that matter, executing leases.

Squatting is unlawful and no amount of acquiescence on the part of the city officials will elevate it into a
lawful act. In principle, a compound of illegal entry and official permit to stay is obnoxious to our concept of
proper official norm of conduct. Because, such permit does not serve social justice; it fosters moral
decadence. It does not promote public welfare; it abets disrespect for the law. It has its roots in vice; so it is
an infected bargain. Official approval of squatting should not, therefore, be permitted to obtain in this country
where there is an orderly form of government.

We, accordingly, rule that the Manila mayors did not have authority to give permits, written or oral, to
defendants, and that the permits herein granted are null and void.

3. Let us look into the houses and constructions planted by defendants on the premises. They clearly hinder
and impair the use of that property for school purposes. The courts may well take judicial notice of the fact
that housing school children in the elementary grades has been and still is a perennial problem in the city.
The selfish interests of defendants must have to yield to the general good. The public purpose of
constructing the school building annex is paramount.10

In the situation thus obtaining, the houses and constructions aforesaid constitute public nuisance per se.
And this, for the reason that they hinder and impair the use of the property for a badly needed school
building, to the prejudice of the education of the youth of the land.11 They shackle the hands of the
government and thus obstruct performance of its constitutionally ordained obligation to establish and
maintain a complete and adequate system of public education, and more, to "provide at least free public
primary instruction".12

Reason dictates that no further delay should be countenanced. The public nuisance could well have been
summarily abated by the city authorities themselves, even without the aid of the courts.13

4. Defendants challenge the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Manila. They say that the case
should have been started in the municipal court. They prop up their position by the averment that notice for
them to vacate was only served in September, 1961, and suit was started in July, 1962. Their legal ground is
Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. We have reached the conclusion that their forcible entry dates back
to the period from 1945 to 1947. That entry was not legalized by the permits. Their possession continued to
 remain illegal from incipiency. Suit was filed long after the one-year limitation set forth in Section 1 of Rule
70. And the Manila Court of First Instance has jurisdiction.14

Upon the premises, we vote to affirm the judgment under review. Costs against defendants-appellants. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Castro, JJ., concur.