A.M. No. 2026-CFI December 19, 1981
On January 13,
NENITA DE VERA SUROZA, complainant, vs. JUDGE REYNALDO P.
HONRADO of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch 25
and EVANGELINE S. YUIPCO, Deputy Clerk of Court, respondents.
AQUINO, J.:
 Spouses Mauro Suroza and Marcelina Salvador reared a boy
named Agapito (not legally adopted) who used the surname
Suroza and who considered them as his parents.
 Later on, Agapito, who was a soldier, became disabled and
his wife Nenita was appointed as his guardian in 1953 when
he was declared an incompetent.
 Arsenia de la Cruz (apparently a girl friend of Agapito)
wanted also to be his guardian. Arsenia tried to prove that
Nenita was living separately from Agapito and that Nenita
admitted to Marcelina that she was unfaithful to Agapito.
Such allegations were however dismissed by the court, who
upheld Nenita's appointment as guardian of Agapito.
 A child named Marilyn Sy, who, when a few days old, was
entrusted to Arsenia de la Cruz was later delivered to
Marcelina Salvador Suroza who brought her up as a
supposed daughter of Agapito and as her granddaughter.
Marilyn used the surname Suroza. She stayed with
Marcelina but was not legally adopted by Agapito.
 Marcelina supposedly executed a notarial will. That will
which is in English was thumbmarked by her. She was
illiterate. In that will, Marcelina bequeathed all her estate to
her supposed granddaughter Marilyn.
 Marcelina died on November 15, 1974.
1975, Marina Paje, alleged to be a laundrywoman of
Marcelina and the executrix in her will (the alternate
executrix was Juanita Macaraeg, mother of Oscar, Marilyn's
husband), filed a petition for the probate of Marcelina's
alleged will. The case was assigned to Judge Honrado.
 Judge Honrado then appointed Marina as administratrix. On
the following day, Judge Honrado directed the Merchants
Banking Corporation and the Bank of America to allow
Marina to withdraw P10,000 from the savings accounts of
Marcelina Suroza and Marilyn Suroza.
 He likewise ordered for the ejectment of the occupants of
the testatrix's house, among whom was Nenita, and to
place Marina in possession thereof.
 Such order alerted Nenita to the existence of the
testamentary proceeding for the settlement of Marcelina's
estate. She and the other occupants of the decedent's
house subsequently filed a motion to set aside the
ejectment order. They alleged mainly that the decedent's
son Agapito was the sole heir of the deceased, that he has a
daughter named Lilia, that Nenita was Agapito's guardian
and that Marilyn was not Agapito's daughter nor the
decedent's granddaughter.
 In spite of the fact that Judge Honrado was already apprised
that persons, other than Marilyn, were claiming Marcelina's
estate, he nonetheless issued an order probating
Marcelina’s supposed will wherein Marilyn was the
instituted heiress.
 Nenita opposed the probate of the will , reiterating her
previous claims and adding further that:
 1. The will was not duly executed and attested
2. That it was procured by means of undue influence
employed by Marina and Marilyn
3. that the thumbmarks of Marcelina were procured by
fraud or trick and
4. That Marina was not qualified to act as executrix.
 Nenita further presented Marcelina's niece as witness, who
swore that Marcelina never executed a will. Domingo
Aquino, who notarized the will, also testified that the
testatrix and the three attesting witnesses did not appear
before him and that he notarized the will "just to
accommodate a brother lawyer on the condition" that said
lawyer would bring to the notary the testatrix and the
witnesses but the lawyer never complied with his
commitment.
 Judge Honrado ultimately "denied" the various incidents
"raised" by Nenita. He subsequently closed the
testamentary proceeding.
 Nenita thus filed a complaint (with the SC) against Judge
Honrado charging him with having probated the alleged will
of Marcelina despite the patent appearance of fraud. The
complainant reiterated her contention that the testatrix
was illiterate as shown by the fact that she affixed her
thumbmark to the will and that she did not know English,
the language in which the win was written. (In the decree of
probate Judge Honrado did not make any finding that the
will was written in a language known to the testatrix.)
 Further, in spite of Honrado’s knowledge that Marcelina
had a son who was preterited in the will, he did not take
into account the consequences of such a preterition.
ISSUE: WON Judge Honrado should be held administratively liable.
HELD: YES
 The decedent's legal heirs and not the instituted heiress in
the void will should have inherited the decedent's estate.
 Judge Honrado, on perusing the will and noting that it was
written in English and was thumbmarked by an obviously
illiterate testatrix, could have readily perceived that the will
is void. In the opening paragraph of the will, it was stated
that English was a language "understood and known" to the
testatrix. But in its concluding paragraph, it was stated that
the will was read to the testatrix "and translated into
Filipino language". That could only mean that the will was
written in a language not known to the illiterate testatrix
and, therefore, it is void because of the mandatory
provision of article 804 of the Civil Code that every will must
be executed in a language or dialect known to the testator.
 It was also apparent that the will was hastily prepared.
(Marcelina Salvador Suroza is repeatedly referred to as the
"testator" instead of "testatrix” therein)
 There was something wrong in instituting the supposed
granddaughter as sole heiress and giving nothing at all to
her supposed father who was still alive.
 NOTE: Judge Honrado was found guilty of inexcusable
negligence and dereliction of duty. (Fine equivalent to his
salary for one month is imposed on respondent judge as his
compulsory retirement falls on December 25, 1981.
 NOTE: A judge may be held administratively and criminally
liable
  NOTE: Nenita likewise denounced Evangeline Yuipco, the
deputy clerk of court, for not giving her access to the record
of the probate case by alleging that it was useless for Nenita
to oppose the probate since Judge Honrado would not
change his decision. Nenita also said that Yupico insinuated
that if Nenita had P10K, the case might be decided in her
favor.
 NOTE: The case against respondent Yuipco has become
moot and academic because she is no longer employed in
the judiciary. Since September 1, 1980 she has been
assistant city fiscal of Surigao City.
G.R. No. 42258 September 5, 1936
In re Will of the deceased Leoncia Tolentino. VICTORIO PAYAD,
petitioner-appellant, vs. AQUILINA TOLENTINO, oppositor-
appellant.
Victorio Payad filed a petition for the probate of the will of the
decedent Leoncia Tolentino. This was opposed by Aquilina
Tolentino, averring that said Will was made only after the death of
the testatrix. The lower court denied the probate of the will on the
ground that the attestation clause was not in conformity with the
requirements of the law since it was not stated therein that the
testatrix caused Atty. Almario to write her name at her express
direction. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON it necessary that the attestation clause state that the
testatrix caused Atty. Almario to write her name at her express
direction.
HELD:
The evidence of record establishes the fact the Leoncia Tolentino,
assisted by Attorney Almario, placed her thumb mark on each and
every page of the questioned will and that said attorney merely
wrote her name to indicate the place where she placed said thumb
mark. In other words Attorney Almario did not sign for the testatrix.
She signed by placing her thumb mark on each and every page
thereof. “A statute requiring a will to be ‘signed’ is satisfied if the
signature is made by the testator’s mark.” It is clear, therefore, that
it was not necessary that the attestation clause in question should
state that the testatrix requested Attorney Almario to sign her name
inasmuch as the testatrix signed the will in question in accordance
with law.
G.R. No. L-4067 November 29, 1951
In the Matter of the will of ANTERO MERCADO, deceased.
ROSARIO GARCIA, petitioner, vs. JULIANA LACUESTA, ET AL.,
respondents.
A will was executed by Antero Mercado wherein it appears that it
was signed by Atty. Florentino Javiwe who wrote the name of
Antero. The testator was alleged to have written a cross
immediately after his name. The Court of First Instance found that
the will was valid but the Court of Appeals reversed the lower
court’s decision holding that the attestation clause failed: 1) to
certify that the will was signed on all the left margins of the three
pages and at the end of the will by Atty. Javier at the express
request of the testator in the presence of the testator and each and
every one of the witnesses; 2) to certify that after the signing of the
name of the testator by Atty. Javier at the former’s request said
testator has written a cross at the end of his name and on the left
margin of the three pages of which the will consists and at the end
thereof 3) to certify that the witnesses signed the will in all the
pages thereon in the presence of the testator and of each other.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the attestation clause is valid.
HELD:
Antero Mercado caused Atty. Javier to write the testator’s name
under his express direction, as required by section 168 of the Code
of Civil Procedure. It is not here pretended that the cross appearing
on the will is the usual signature of Antero Mercado or even one of
the ways by which he signed his name. After mature reflection, the
SC is not prepared to liken the mere sign of the cross to a
thumbmark and the reason is obvious. The cross cannot and does
not have the trustworthiness of a thumbmark.
G.R. No. L-6285 February 15, 1912
PEDRO BARUT, petitioner-appellant, vs. FAUSTINO CABACUNGAN,
ET AL., opponents-appellees.
Pedro Barut applied for the probate of the will of Maria Salomon. It
is alleged in the petition that testatrix died on Nov. 1908 in Sinait,
Ilocos Sur leaving the will dated March 3, 1907. The said will was
witnessed by 3 persons. From the terms it appears that the
petitioner received a larger part of decedent’s property. After this
disposition, the testatrix revoked all other wills and stated that since
she is unable to read nor write, the will was read to her and that she
has instructed Severino Agapan, one of the witnesses to sign her
name in her behalf.
The lower court ruled that the will is not entitled to probate on the
sole ground that the handwriting of the person who signed the
name of the testatrix does not appear to be that of Agapan but that
of another witness.
ISSUE: WON a will’s validity is affected when the person instructed
by a testator to write his name did not sign his name
HELD:
o, it is immaterial who wrote the name of the testator provided it is
written at her request and in her present, and in the presence of the
witnesses. This is the only requirement under Sec. 618 of the Civil
Code of procedure at that time.
G.R. No. L-5971 February 27, 1911
BEATRIZ NERA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. NARCISA RIMANDO,
defendant-appellant.
At the time the will was executed, in a large room connecting with a
smaller room by a doorway where a curtain hangs across, one of the
witnesses was in the outside room when the other witnesses were
attaching their signatures to the instrument.
The trial court did not consider the determination of the issue as to
the position of the witness as of vital importance in determining the
case. It agreed with the ruling in the case of Jaboneta v. Gustillo that
the alleged fact being that one of the subscribing witnesses was in
the outer room while the signing occurred in the inner room, would
not be sufficient to invalidate the execution of the will. The CA,
however, deemed the will valid.
ISSUE: WON the subscribing witness was able to see the testator
and other witnesses in the act of affixing their signatures.
HELD:
YES. The Court is unanimous in its opinion that had the witnesses
been proven to be in the outer room when the testator and other
witnesses signed the will in the inner room, it would have
invalidated the will since the attaching of the signatures under the
circumstances was not done ‘in the presence’ of the witnesses in
the outer room. The line of vision of the witness to the testator and
other witnesses was blocked by the curtain separating the rooms.
The position of the parties must be such that with relation to each
other at the moment of the attaching the signatures, they may see
each other sign if they chose to.
In the Jaboneta case, the true test of presence is not whether or not
they actualy saw each other sign but whether they might have seen
each other sign if they chose to doso considering their physical,
mental condition and position in relation to each other at the
moment of the inscription of the signature.
G.R. No. L-7179 June 30, 1955
Testate Estate of the Late Apolinaria Ledesma. FELICIDAD
JAVELLANA, petitioner-appellee, vs. DOÑA MATEA LEDESMA,
oppositor-appellant.
The CFI of Iloilo admitted to probate a will and codicil executed by
the deceased Apolinaria Ledesma in July 1953. This testament was
deemed executed on May 1950 and May 1952. The contestant was
the sister and nearest surviving relative of the deceased. She
appealed from this decision alleging that the will were not executed
in accordance with law.
The testament was executed at the house of the testatrix. One the
other hand, the codicil was executed after the enactment of the
New Civil Code (NCC), and therefore had to be acknowledged
before a notary public. Now, the contestant, who happens to be
one of the instrumental witnesses asserted that after the codicil
was signed and attested at the San Pablo hospital, that Gimotea
(the notary) signed and sealed it on the same occasion. Gimotea,
however, said that he did not do so, and that the act of signing and
sealing was done afterwards.
One of the allegations was that the certificate of acknowledgement
to the codicil was signed somewhere else or in the office of the
notary. The ix and the witnesses at the hospital, was signed and
sealed by the notary only when he brought it in his office.
ISSUE: WON the signing and sealing of the will or codicil in the
absence of the testator and witnesses affects the validity of the will
HELD:
No. Unlike in the Old Civil Code of 1899, the NCC does not require
that the signing of the testator, the witnesses and the notary be
accomplished in one single act. All that is required is that every will
must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and
witnesses. The subsequent signing and sealing is not part of the
acknowledgement itself nor of the testamentary act. Their separate
execution out of the presence of the testator and the witnesses
cannot be a violation of the rule that testaments should be
completed without interruption.
G.R. No. L-32213 November 26, 1973
AGAPITA N. CRUZ, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE GUILLERMO P.
VILLASOR, Presiding Judge of Branch I, Court of First Instance of
Cebu, and MANUEL B. LUGAY, respondents.
The CFI of Cebu allowed the probate of the last will and testament
of the late Valenti Cruz. However, the petitioner opposed the
allowance of the will alleging that it was executed through fraud,
deceit, misrepresentation, and undue influence. He further alleged
that the instrument was executed without the testator having been
informed of its contents and finally, that it was not executed in
accordance with law.
One of the witnesses, Angel Tevel Jr. was also the notary before
whom the will was acknowledged. Despite the objection, the lower
court admitted the will to probate on the ground that there is
substantial compliance with the legal requirements of having at
least 3 witnesses even if the notary public was one of them.
ISSUE: WON the will is valid in accordance with Art. 805 and 806 of
the NCC.
HELD:
No. The will is not valid. The notary public cannot be considered as
the third instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge before
himself his having signed the said will. An acknowledging officer
cannot serve as witness at the same time.
To acknowledge before means to avow, or to own as genuine, to
assent, admit, and ‘before’ means in front of or preceding in space
or ahead of. The notary cannot split his personality into two so that
one will appear before the other to acknowledge his participation
int he making of the will. To permit such situation would be absurd.
Finally, the function of a notary among others is to guard against
any illegal or immoral arrangements, a function defeated if he were
to be one of the attesting or instrumental witnesses. He would be
interested in sustaining the validity of the will as it directly involves
himself and the validity of his own act. he would be in an
inconsistent position, thwarting the very purpose of the
acknowledgment, which is to minimize fraud.
GARCIA V. VASQUEZ (READ FURTHER)
 1. Gliceria del Rosario executed 2 wills, one in June 1956,
written in Spanish, a language she knew an spoke. The
other will was executed in December 1960 consisting of
only one page, and written in Tagalog. The witnesses to the
1960 will declared that the will was first read 'silently' by
the testatrix before signing it. The probate court admitted
the will.
 2. The oppositors alleged that the as of December 1960, the
eyesight of the deceased was so poor and defective that she
could not have read the provisions contrary to the
testimony of the witnesses.
 Issue: Whether or not the will is valid
 RULING: The will is not valid. If the testator is blind, Art. 808
of the New Civil Code (NCC) should apply.If the testator is
blind or incapable of reading, he must be apprised of the
 contents of the will for him to be able to have the Rino, a lawyer, drafted the eight-page document and read the same
opportunityto object if the provisions therein are not in aloud before the testator, the three instrumental witnesses and the
accordance with his wishes. notary public, the latter four following the reading with their own
 The testimony of her opthalmologist established that respective copies previously furnished them.
notwithstanding an operation to remove her cataract and
Thereafter, a codicil entitled “Kasulatan ng Pagbabago ng Ilang
being fitted with the lenses, this did not improve her vision.
Pagpapasiya na Nasasaad sa Huling Habilin na May Petsa
Her vision remained mainly for viewing distant objects and
Nobiembre 5, 1977 ni Brigido Alvarado” was executed changing
not for reading. There was no evidence that her vision
some dispositions in the notarial will to generate cash for the
improved at the time of the execution of the 2nd will.
testator’s eye operation.
Hence, she was incapable of reading her own will. The
admission of the will to probate is therefor erroneous. Said codicil was likewise not read by Brigido Alvarado and was read
in the same manner as with the previously executed will.
G.R. No. 74695 September 14, 1993
When the notarial will was submitted to the court for probate,
In the Matter of the Probate of the Last Will and Testament of the
Cesar Alvarado filed his opposition as he said that the will was not
Deceased Brigido Alvarado, CESAR ALVARADO, petitioner, vs.
executed and attested as required by law; that the testator was
HON. RAMON G. GAVIOLA, JR., Presiding Justice, HON. MA.
insane or mentally incapacitated due to senility and old age; that
ROSARIO QUETULIO LOSA and HON. LEONOR INES LUCIANO,
the will was executed under duress, or influence of fear or threats;
Associate Justices, Intermediate Appellate Court, First Division
that it was procured by undue pressure and influence on the part of
(Civil Cases), and BAYANI MA. RINO, respondents.
the beneficiary; and that the signature of the testator was procured
On 5 November 1977, 79-year old Brigido Alvarado executed a by fraud or trick.
notarial will entitled “Huling Habilin” wherein he disinherited an
ISSUE: WON notarial will of Brigido Alvarado should be admitted to
illegitimate son, petitioner Cesar Alvarado, and expressly revoked a
probate despite allegations of defects in the execution and
previously executed holographic will at the time awaiting probate
attestation thereof as testator was allegedly blind at the time of
before the RTC of Laguna.
execution and the double-reading requirement under Art. 808 of
According to Bayani Ma. Rino, private respondent, he was present the NCC was not complied with.
when the said notarial will was executed, together with three
HELD:
instrumental witnesses and the notary public, where the testator
did not read the will himself, suffering as he did from glaucoma.
YES. The spirit behind the law was served though the letter was not.
Although there should be strict compliance with the substantial
requirements of law in order to insure the authenticity of the will,
the formal imperfections should be brushed aside when they do not
affect its purpose and which, when taken into account, may only
defeat the testator’s will.
Cesar Alvardo was correct in asserting that his father was not totally
blind (of counting fingers at 3 feet) when the will and codicil were
executed, but he can be so considered for purposes of Art. 808.
That Art. 808 was not followed strictly is beyond cavil.
However, in the case at bar, there was substantial compliance
where the purpose of the law has been satisfied: that of making the
provisions known to the testator who is blind or incapable of
reading the will himself (as when he is illiterate) and enabling him to
object if they do not accord with his wishes.
concluded that the testator was reasonably assured that what was
read to him were the terms actually appearing on the typewritten
documents.
The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to the
testator if he is blind or incapable of reading the will to himself (as
when he is illiterate), is to make the provisions thereof known to
him, so that he may be able to object if they are not in accordance
with his wishes.
Although there should be strict compliance with the substantial
requirements of law in order to insure the authenticity of the will,
the formal imperfections should be brushed aside when they do not
affect its purpose and which, when taken into account, may only
defeat the testator’s will.

Rino read the testator’s will and codicil aloud in the presence of the
testator, his three instrumental witnesses, and the notary public.

Prior and subsequent thereto, the testator affirmed, upon being

asked, that the contents read corresponded with his instructions.

Only then did the signing and acknowledgment take place.

There is no evidence that the contents of the will and the codicil
were not sufficiently made known and communicated to the
testator.

With four persons, mostly known to the testator, following the

reading word for word with their own copies, it can be safely
G.R. No. L-28040 August 18, 1972
TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSEFA TANGCO, vs. TASIANA VDA. DE BORJA,
Special Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Francisco de Borja,
appellant.
Of these cases, the first, numbered L-28040 is an appeal by Tasiana
Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, special administratrix of the testate
estate of Francisco de Borja,1 from the approval of a compromise
agreement by the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch I, in its
Special Proceeding No. R-7866, entitled, "Testate Estate of Josefa
Tangco, Jose de Borja, Administrator".
Case No. L-28568 is an appeal by administrator Jose Borja from the
disapproval of the same compromise agreement by the Court of
First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch II, in its Special Proceeding No.
832, entitled, "Testate Estate of Francisco de Borja, Tasiana O. Vda.
de de Borja, Special Administratrix".
And Case No. L-28611 is an appeal by administrator Jose de Borja
from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch X, in
its Civil Case No. 7452, declaring the Hacienda Jalajala Poblacion,
which is the main object of the aforesaid compromise agreement,
as the separate and exclusive property of the late Francisco de Borja
and not a conjugal asset of the community with his first wife, Josefa
Tangco, and that said hacienda pertains exclusively to his testate
estate, which is under administrator in Special Proceeding No. 832
of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch II.
It is uncontested that Francisco de Borja, upon the death of his wife
Josefa Tangco on 6 October 1940, filed a petition for the probate of
her will which was docketed as Special Proceeding No. R-7866 of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch I. The will was probated on 2
April 1941. In 1946, Francisco de Borja was appointed executor and
administrator: in 1952, their son, Jose de Borja, was appointed co-
administrator. When Francisco died, on 14 April 1954, Jose became
the sole administrator of the testate estate of his mother, Josefa
Tangco. While a widower Francisco de Borja allegedly took unto
himself a second wife, Tasiana Ongsingco. Upon Francisco's death,
Tasiana instituted testate proceedings in the Court of First Instance
of Nueva Ecija, where, in 1955, she was appointed special
administratrix. The validity of Tasiana's marriage to Francisco was
questioned in said proceeding.
The relationship between the children of the first marriage and
Tasiana Ongsingco has been plagued with several court suits and
counter-suits; including the three cases at bar, some eighteen (18)
cases remain pending determination in the courts. The testate
estate of Josefa Tangco alone has been unsettled for more than a
quarter of a century. In order to put an end to all these litigations, a
compromise agreement was entered into on 12 October 1963,2 by
and between "[T]he heir and son of Francisco de Borja by his first
marriage, namely, Jose de Borja personally and as administrator of
the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco," and "[T]he heir and surviving
spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana
Ongsingco Vda. de Borja, assisted by her lawyer, Atty. Luis
Panaguiton Jr." The terms and conditions of the compromise
agreement are as follows:
THIS AGREEMENT made and entered into by and between
The heir and son of Francisco de Borja by his first marriage, namely,
Jose de Borja personally and as administrator of the Testate Estate
of Josefa Tangco,
AND
The heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second
marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja, assisted by her lawyer,
Atty. Luis Panaguiton Jr.
WITNESSETH
THAT it is the mutual desire of all the parties herein terminate and
settle, with finality, the various court litigations, controversies,
claims, counterclaims, etc., between them in connection with the
administration, settlement, partition, adjudication and distribution
of the assets as well as liabilities of the estates of Francisco de Borja
and Josefa Tangco, first spouse of Francisco de Borja.
THAT with this end in view, the parties herein have agreed
voluntarily and without any reservations to enter into and execute
this agreement under the following terms and conditions:
1. That the parties agree to sell the Poblacion portion of the
Jalajala properties situated in Jalajala, Rizal, presently under
administration in the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco (Sp. Proc. No.
7866, Rizal), with a segregated area of approximately 1,313 hectares
at the amount of P0.30 per square meter.
2. That Jose de Borja agrees and obligates himself to pay
Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja the total amount of Eight
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P800,000) Philippine Currency, in cash,
which represent P200,000 as his share in the payment and P600,000
as pro-rata shares of the heirs Crisanto, Cayetano and Matilde, all
surnamed de Borja and this shall be considered as full and complete
payment and settlement of her hereditary share in the estate of the
late Francisco de Borja as well as the estate of Josefa Tangco, Sp.
Proc. No. 832-Nueva Ecija and Sp. Proc. No. 7866-Rizal, respectively,
and to any properties bequeathed or devised in her favor by the
late Francisco de Borja by Last Will and Testament or by Donation
Inter Vivos or Mortis Causa or purportedly conveyed to her for
consideration or otherwise. The funds for this payment shall be
taken from and shall depend upon the receipt of full payment of the
proceeds of the sale of Jalajala, "Poblacion."
3. That Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja hereby assumes
payment of that particular obligation incurred by the late Francisco
de Borja in favor of the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, now
Development Bank of the Philippines, amounting to approximately
P30,000.00 and also assumes payment of her 1/5 share of the
Estate and Inheritance taxes on the Estate of the late Francisco de
Borja or the sum of P3,500.00, more or less, which shall be
deducted by the buyer of Jalajala, "Poblacion" from the payment to
be made to Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja under paragraph 2 of
this Agreement and paid directly to the Development Bank of the
Philippines and the heirs-children of Francisco de Borja.
4. Thereafter, the buyer of Jalajala "Poblacion" is hereby
authorized to pay directly to Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja the
balance of the payment due her under paragraph 2 of this
Agreement (approximately P766,500.00) and issue in the name of
Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, corresponding certified
checks/treasury warrants, who, in turn, will issue the corresponding
receipt to Jose de Borja.
5. In consideration of above payment to Tasiana Ongsingco
Vda. de de Borja, Jose de Borja personally and as administrator of
the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco, and Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de
de Borja, for themselves and for their heirs, successors, executors,
administrators, and assigns, hereby forever mutually renounce,
withdraw, waive, remise, release and discharge any and all manner
of action or actions, cause or causes of action, suits, debts, sum or
sums of money, accounts, damages, claims and demands
whatsoever, in law or in equity, which they ever had, or now have
or may have against each other, more specifically Sp. Proceedings
Nos. 7866 and 1955, CFI-Rizal, and Sp. Proc. No. 832-Nueva Ecija,
Civil Case No. 3033, CFI Nueva Ecija and Civil Case No. 7452-CFI,
Rizal, as well as the case filed against Manuel Quijal for perjury with
the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, the intention being to completely,
absolutely and finally release each other, their heirs, successors,
and assigns, from any and all liability, arising wholly or partially,
directly or indirectly, from the administration, settlement, and
distribution of the assets as well as liabilities of the estates of
Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco, first spouse of Francisco de
Borja, and lastly, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja expressly and
specifically renounce absolutely her rights as heir over any
hereditary share in the estate of Francisco de Borja.
6. That Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, upon receipt of
the payment under paragraph 4 hereof, shall deliver to the heir Jose
de Borja all the papers, titles and documents belonging to Francisco
de Borja which are in her possession and said heir Jose de Borja
shall issue in turn the corresponding receive thereof.
7. That this agreement shall take effect only upon the
fulfillment of the sale of the properties mentioned under paragraph
1 of this agreement and upon receipt of the total and full payment
of the proceeds of the sale of the Jalajala property "Poblacion",
otherwise, the non-fulfillment of the said sale will render this
instrument NULL AND VOID AND WITHOUT EFFECT THEREAFTER.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have her unto set their
hands in the City of Manila, Philippines, the 12th of October, 1963.
On 16 May 1966, Jose de Borja submitted for Court approval the
agreement of 12 October 1963 to the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, in Special Proceeding No. R-7866; and again, on 8 August
1966, to the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, in Special
Proceeding No. 832. Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja opposed in
both instances. The Rizal court approved the compromise
agreement, but the Nueva Ecija court declared it void and
unenforceable. Special administratrix Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de
Borja appealed the Rizal Court's order of approval (now Supreme
Court G.R. case No. L-28040), while administrator Jose de Borja
appealed the order of disapproval (G.R. case No. L-28568) by the
Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija.
The genuineness and due execution of the compromised agreement
of 12 October 1963 is not disputed, but its validity is, nevertheless,
attacked by Tasiana Ongsingco on the ground that: (1) the heirs
cannot enter into such kind of agreement without first probating
the will of Francisco de Borja; (2) that the same involves a
compromise on the validity of the marriage between Francisco de
Borja and Tasiana Ongsingco; and (3) that even if it were valid, it has
ceased to have force and effect.
In assailing the validity of the agreement of 12 October 1963,
Tasiana Ongsingco and the Probate Court of Nueva Ecija rely on this
Court's decision in Guevara vs. Guevara. 74 Phil. 479, wherein the
Court's majority held the view that the presentation of a will for
probate is mandatory and that the settlement and distribution of an
estate on the basis of intestacy when the decedent left a will, is
against the law and public policy. It is likewise pointed out by
appellant Tasiana Ongsingco that Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Revised
Rules explicitly conditions the validity of an extrajudicial settlement
of a decedent's estate by agreement between heirs, upon the facts
that "(if) the decedent left no will and no debts, and the heirs are all
of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial and legal
representatives ..." The will of Francisco de Borja having been
submitted to the Nueva Ecija Court and still pending probate when
the 1963 agreement was made, those circumstances, it is argued,
bar the validity of the agreement.
Upon the other hand, in claiming the validity of the compromise
agreement, Jose de Borja stresses that at the time it was entered
into, on 12 October 1963, the governing provision was Section 1,
Rule 74 of the original Rules of Court of 1940, which allowed the
extrajudicial settlement of the estate of a deceased person
regardless of whether he left a will or not. He also relies on the
dissenting opinion of Justice Moran, in Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil.
479, wherein was expressed the view that if the parties have
already divided the estate in accordance with a decedent's will, the
probate of the will is a useless ceremony; and if they have divided
the estate in a different manner, the probate of the will is worse
than useless.
The doctrine of Guevara vs. Guevara, ante, is not applicable to the
case at bar. This is apparent from an examination of the terms of
the agreement between Jose de Borja and Tasiana Ongsingco.
Paragraph 2 of said agreement specifically stipulates that the sum of
P800,000 payable to Tasiana Ongsingco —
shall be considered as full — complete payment — settlement of
her hereditary share in the estate of the late Francisco de Borja as
well as the estate of Josefa Tangco, ... and to any properties
bequeathed or devised in her favor by the late Francisco de Borja by
Last Will and Testament or by Donation Inter Vivos or Mortis Causa
or purportedly conveyed to her for consideration or otherwise.
This provision evidences beyond doubt that the ruling in the
Guevara case is not applicable to the cases at bar. There was here
no attempt to settle or distribute the estate of Francisco de Borja
among the heirs thereto before the probate of his will. The clear
object of the contract was merely the conveyance by Tasiana
Ongsingco of any and all her individual share and interest, actual or
eventual in the estate of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco.
There is no stipulation as to any other claimant, creditor or legatee.
And as a hereditary share in a decedent's estate is transmitted or
vested immediately from the moment of the death of such causante
or predecessor in interest (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 777)3
there is no legal bar to a successor (with requisite contracting
capacity) disposing of her or his hereditary share immediately after
such death, even if the actual extent of such share is not
determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate.4 Of
course, the effect of such alienation is to be deemed limited to what
is ultimately adjudicated to the vendor heir. However, the aleatory
character of the contract does not affect the validity of the
transaction; neither does the coetaneous agreement that the
numerous litigations between the parties (the approving order of
the Rizal Court enumerates fourteen of them, Rec. App. pp. 79-82)
are to be considered settled and should be dismissed, although such
stipulation, as noted by the Rizal Court, gives the contract the
character of a compromise that the law favors, for obvious reasons,
if only because it serves to avoid a multiplicity of suits.
It is likewise worthy of note in this connection that as the surviving
spouse of Francisco de Borja, Tasiana Ongsingco was his compulsory
heir under article 995 et seq. of the present Civil Code. Wherefore,
barring unworthiness or valid disinheritance, her successional
interest existed independent of Francisco de Borja's last will and
testament and would exist even if such will were not probated at
all. Thus, the prerequisite of a previous probate of the will, as
established in the Guevara and analogous cases, can not apply to
the case of Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja.
Since the compromise contract Annex A was entered into by and
between "Jose de Borja personally and as administrator of the
Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco" on the one hand, and on the other,
"the heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second
marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja", it is clear that the
transaction was binding on both in their individual capacities, upon
the perfection of the contract, even without previous authority of
the Court to enter into the same. The only difference between an
extrajudicial compromise and one that is submitted and approved
by the Court, is that the latter can be enforced by execution
proceedings. Art. 2037 of the Civil Code is explicit on the point:
8. Art. 2037. A compromise has upon the parties the effect
and authority of res judicata; but there shall be no execution except
in compliance with a judicial compromise.
It is argued by Tasiana Ongsingco that while the agreement Annex A
expressed no definite period for its performance, the same was
intended to have a resolutory period of 60 days for its effectiveness.
In support of such contention, it is averred that such a limit was
expressly stipulated in an agreement in similar terms entered into
by said Ongsingco with the brothers and sister of Jose de Borja, to
wit, Crisanto, Matilde and Cayetano, all surnamed de Borja, except
that the consideration was fixed at P600,000 (Opposition,
Annex/Rec. of Appeal, L-28040, pp. 39- 46) and which contained the
following clause:
III. That this agreement shall take effect only upon the
consummation of the sale of the property mentioned herein and
upon receipt of the total and full payment of the proceeds of the
sale by the herein owner heirs-children of Francisco de Borja,
namely, Crisanto, Cayetano and Matilde, all surnamed de Borja;
Provided that if no sale of the said property mentioned herein is
consummated, or the non-receipt of the purchase price thereof by
the said owners within the period of sixty (60) days from the date
hereof, this agreement will become null and void and of no further
effect.
Ongsingco's argument loses validity when it is considered that Jose
de Borja was not a party to this particular contract (Annex 1), and
that the same appears not to have been finalized, since it bears no
date, the day being left blank "this — day of October 1963"; and
while signed by the parties, it was not notarized, although plainly
intended to be so done, since it carries a proposed notarial
ratification clause. Furthermore, the compromise contract with Jose
de Borja (Annex A), provides in its par. 2 heretofore transcribed that
of the total consideration of P800, 000 to be paid to Ongsingco,
P600,000 represent the "prorata share of the heirs Crisanto,
Cayetano and Matilde all surnamed de Borja" which corresponds to
the consideration of P600,000 recited in Annex 1, and that
circumstance is proof that the duly notarized contract entered into
wit Jose de Borja under date 12 October 1963 (Annex A), was
designed to absorb and supersede the separate unformalize
agreement with the other three Borja heirs. Hence, the 60 days
resolutory term in the contract with the latter (Annex 1) not being
repeated in Annex A, can not apply to the formal compromise with
Jose de Borja. It is moreover manifest that the stipulation that the
sale of the Hacienda de Jalajala was to be made within sixty days
from the date of the agreement with Jose de Borja's co-heirs (Annex
1) was plainly omitted in Annex A as improper and ineffective, since
the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) that was to be sold to raise the
P800,000 to be paid to Ongsingco for her share formed part of the
estate of Francisco de Borja and could not be sold until authorized
by the Probate Court. The Court of First Instance of Rizal so
understood it, and in approving the compromise it fixed a term of
120 days counted from the finality of the order now under appeal,
for the carrying out by the parties for the terms of the contract.
This brings us to the plea that the Court of First Instance of Rizal had
no jurisdiction to approve the compromise with Jose de Borja
(Annex A) because Tasiana Ongsingco was not an heir in the estate
of Josefa Tangco pending settlement in the Rizal Court, but she was
an heir of Francisco de Borja, whose estate was the object of Special
Proceeding No. 832 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija.
This circumstance is irrelevant, since what was sold by Tasiana
Ongsingco was only her eventual share in the estate of her late
husband, not the estate itself; and as already shown, that eventual
share she owned from the time of Francisco's death and the Court
of Nueva Ecija could not bar her selling it. As owner of her undivided
hereditary share, Tasiana could dispose of it in favor of whomsoever
she chose. Such alienation is expressly recognized and provided for
by article 1088 of the present Civil Code:
Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a
stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be
subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for
the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one
month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale of the
vendor.
If a sale of a hereditary right can be made to a stranger, then a
fortiori sale thereof to a coheir could not be forbidden.
Tasiana Ongsingco further argues that her contract with Jose de
Borja (Annex "A") is void because it amounts to a compromise as to
her status and marriage with the late Francisco de Borja. The point
is without merit, for the very opening paragraph of the agreement
with Jose de Borja (Annex "A") describes her as "the heir and
surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage,
Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja", which is in itself definite
admission of her civil status. There is nothing in the text of the
agreement that would show that this recognition of Ongsingco's
status as the surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja was only made
in consideration of the cession of her hereditary rights.
It is finally charged by appellant Ongsingco, as well as by the Court
of First Instance of Nueva Ecija in its order of 21 September 1964, in
Special Proceedings No. 832 (Amended Record on Appeal in L-
28568, page 157), that the compromise agreement of 13 October
1963 (Annex "A") had been abandoned, as shown by the fact that,
after its execution, the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, in its
order of 21 September 1964, had declared that "no amicable
settlement had been arrived at by the parties", and that Jose de
Borja himself, in a motion of 17 June 1964, had stated that the
proposed amicable settlement "had failed to materialize".
It is difficult to believe, however, that the amicable settlement
referred to in the order and motion above-mentioned was the
compromise agreement of 13 October 1963, which already had
been formally signed and executed by the parties and duly
notarized. What the record discloses is that some time after its
formalization, Ongsingco had unilaterally attempted to back out
from the compromise agreement, pleading various reasons restated
in the opposition to the Court's approval of Annex "A" (Record on
Appeal, L-20840, page 23): that the same was invalid because of the
lapse of the allegedly intended resolutory period of 60 days and
because the contract was not preceded by the probate of Francisco
de Borja's will, as required by this Court's Guevarra vs. Guevara
ruling; that Annex "A" involved a compromise affecting Ongsingco's
status as wife and widow of Francisco de Borja, etc., all of which
objections have been already discussed. It was natural that in view
of the widow's attitude, Jose de Borja should attempt to reach a
new settlement or novatory agreement before seeking judicial
sanction and enforcement of Annex "A", since the latter step might
ultimately entail a longer delay in attaining final remedy. That the
attempt to reach another settlement failed is apparent from the
letter of Ongsingco's counsel to Jose de Borja quoted in pages 35-36
of the brief for appellant Ongsingco in G.R. No. 28040; and it is more
than probable that the order of 21 September 1964 and the motion
of 17 June 1964 referred to the failure of the parties' quest for a
more satisfactory compromise. But the inability to reach a novatory
accord can not invalidate the original compromise (Annex "A") and
justifies the act of Jose de Borja in finally seeking a court order for
its approval and enforcement from the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, which, as heretofore described, decreed that the agreement
be ultimately performed within 120 days from the finality of the
order, now under appeal.
We conclude that in so doing, the Rizal court acted in accordance
with law, and, therefore, its order should be upheld, while the
contrary resolution of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija
should be, and is, reversed.
In her brief, Tasiana Ongsingco also pleads that the time elapsed in
the appeal has affected her unfavorably, in that while the
purchasing power of the agreed price of P800,000 has diminished,
the value of the Jalajala property has increased. But the fact is that
her delay in receiving the payment of the agreed price for her
hereditary interest was primarily due to her attempts to nullify the
agreement (Annex "A") she had formally entered into with the
advice of her counsel, Attorney Panaguiton. And as to the
devaluation de facto of our currency, what We said in Dizon Rivera
vs. Dizon, L-24561, 30 June 1970, 33 SCRA 554, that "estates would
never be settled if there were to be a revaluation with every
subsequent fluctuation in the values of currency and properties of
the estate", is particularly opposite in the present case.
Coming now to Case G.R. No. L-28611, the issue is whether the
Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion), concededly acquired by Francisco
de Borja during his marriage to his first wife, Josefa Tangco, is the
husband's private property (as contended by his second spouse,
Tasiana Ongsingco), or whether it forms part of the conjugal
(ganancial) partnership with Josefa Tangco. The Court of First
Instance of Rizal (Judge Herminio Mariano, presiding) declared that
there was adequate evidence to overcome the presumption in favor
of its conjugal character established by Article 160 of the Civil Code.
We are of the opinion that this question as between Tasiana
Ongsingco and Jose de Borja has become moot and academic, in
view of the conclusion reached by this Court in the two preceding
cases (G.R. No. L-28568), upholding as valid the cession of Tasiana
Ongsingco's eventual share in the estate of her late husband,
Francisco de Borja, for the sum of P800,000 with the accompanying
reciprocal quit-claims between the parties. But as the question may
affect the rights of possible creditors and legatees, its resolution is
still imperative.
It is undisputed that the Hacienda Jalajala, of around 4,363
hectares, had been originally acquired jointly by Francisco de Borja,
Bernardo de Borja and Marcelo de Borja and their title thereto was
duly registered in their names as co-owners in Land Registration
Case No. 528 of the province of Rizal, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 26403 (De
Barjo vs. Jugo, 54 Phil. 465). Subsequently, in 1931, the Hacienda
was partitioned among the co-owners: the Punta section went to
Marcelo de Borja; the Bagombong section to Bernardo de Borja, and
the part in Jalajala proper (Poblacion) corresponded to Francisco de
Borja (V. De Borja vs. De Borja 101 Phil. 911, 932).
The lot allotted to Francisco was described as —
Una Parcela de terreno en Poblacion, Jalajala: N. Puang River; E.
Hermogena Romero; S. Heirs of Marcelo de Borja O. Laguna de Bay;
containing an area of 13,488,870 sq. m. more or less, assessed at
P297,410.
On 20 November 1962, Tasiana O. Vda. de Borja, as Administratrix
of the Testate Estate of Francisco de Borja, instituted a complaint in
the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Civil Case No. 7452) against Jose
de Borja, in his capacity as Administrator of Josefa Tangco (Francisco
de Borja's first wife), seeking to have the Hacienda above described
declared exclusive private property of Francisco, while in his answer
defendant (now appellant) Jose de Borja claimed that it was
conjugal property of his parents (Francisco de Borja and Josefa
Tangco), conformably to the presumption established by Article 160
of the Philippine Civil Code (reproducing Article 1407 of the Civil
Code of 1889), to the effect that:
Art. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively
to the husband or to the wife.
Defendant Jose de Borja further counterclaimed for damages,
compensatory, moral and exemplary, as well as for attorney's fees.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, per Judge Herminio
Mariano, held that the plaintiff had adduced sufficient evidence to
rebut the presumption, and declared the Hacienda de Jalajala
(Poblacion) to be the exclusive private property of the late Francisco
de Borja, and his Administratrix, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja, to
be entitled to its possession. Defendant Jose de Borja then appealed
to this Court.
The evidence reveals, and the appealed order admits, that the
character of the Hacienda in question as owned by the conjugal
partnership De Borja-Tangco was solemnly admitted by the late
Francisco de Borja no less than two times: first, in the Reamended
Inventory that, as executor of the estate of his deceased wife Josefa
Tangco, he filed in the Special Proceedings No. 7866 of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal on 23 July 1953 (Exhibit "2"); and again, in the
Reamended Accounting of the same date, also filed in the
proceedings aforesaid (Exhibit "7"). Similarly, the plaintiff Tasiana O.
Vda. de Borja, herself, as oppositor in the Estate of Josefa Tangco,
submitted therein an inventory dated 7 September 1954 (Exhibit
"3") listing the Jalajala property among the "Conjugal Properties of
the Spouses Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco". And once more,
Tasiana Ongsingco, as administratrix of the Estate of Francisco de
Borja, in Special Proceedings No. 832 of the Court of First Instance
of Nueva Ecija, submitted therein in December, 1955, an inventory
wherein she listed the Jalajala Hacienda under the heading
"Conjugal Property of the Deceased Spouses Francisco de Borja and
Josefa Tangco, which are in the possession of the Administrator of
the Testate Estate of the Deceased Josefa Tangco in Special
Proceedings No. 7866 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal."
Notwithstanding the four statements aforesaid, and the fact that
they are plain admissions against interest made by both Francisco
de Borja and the Administratrix of his estate, in the course of
judicial proceedings in the Rizal and Nueva Ecija Courts, supporting
the legal presumption in favor of the conjugal community, the Court
below declared that the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) was not
conjugal property, but the private exclusive property of the late
Francisco de Borja. It did so on the strength of the following
evidences: (a) the sworn statement by Francis de Borja on 6 August
1951 (Exhibit "F") that —
He tomado possession del pedazo de terreno ya delimitado
(equivalente a 1/4 parte, 337 hectareas) adjunto a mi terreno
personal y exclusivo (Poblacion de Jalajala, Rizal).
and (b) the testimony of Gregorio de Borja, son of Bernardo de
Borja, that the entire Hacienda had been bought at a foreclosure
sale for P40,100.00, of which amount P25,100 was contributed by
Bernardo de Borja and P15,000. by Marcelo de Borja; that upon
receipt of a subsequent demand from the provincial treasurer for
realty taxes the sum of P17,000, Marcelo told his brother Bernardo
that Francisco (son of Marcelo) wanted also to be a co-owner, and
upon Bernardo's assent to the proposal, Marcelo issue a check for
P17,000.00 to pay the back taxes and said that the amount would
represent Francisco's contribution in the purchase of the Hacienda.
The witness further testified that —
Marcelo de Borja said that that money was entrusted to him by
Francisco de Borja when he was still a bachelor and which he
derived from his business transactions.
The Court below, reasoning that not only Francisco's sworn
statement overweighed the admissions in the inventories relied
upon by defendant-appellant Jose de Borja since probate courts can
not finally determine questions of ownership of inventoried
property, but that the testimony of Gregorio de Borja showed that
Francisco de Borja acquired his share of the original Hacienda with
his private funds, for which reason that share can not be regarded
as conjugal partnership property, but as exclusive property of the
buyer, pursuant to Article 1396(4) of Civil Code of 1889 and Article
148(4) of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The following shall be the exclusive property of each spouse:
(4) That which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or
of the husband.
We find the conclusions of the lower court to be untenable. In the
first place, witness Gregorio de Borja's testimony as to the source of
the money paid by Francisco for his share was plain hearsay, hence
inadmissible and of no probative value, since he was merely
repeating what Marcelo de Borja had told him (Gregorio). There is
no way of ascertaining the truth of the statement, since both
Marcelo and Francisco de Borja were already dead when Gregorio
testified. In addition, the statement itself is improbable, since there
was no need or occasion for Marcelo de Borja to explain to Gregorio
how and when Francisco de Borja had earned the P17,000.00
entrusted to Marcelo. A ring of artificiality is clearly discernible in
this portion of Gregorio's testimony.
As to Francisco de Borja's affidavit, Exhibit "F", the quoted portion
thereof (ante, page 14) does not clearly demonstrate that the "mi
terreno personal y exclusivo (Poblacion de Jalajala, Rizal) " refers
precisely to the Hacienda in question. The inventories (Exhibits 3
and 4) disclose that there were two real properties in Jalajala owned
by Francisco de Borja, one of 72.038 sq. m., assessed at P44,600,
and a much bigger one of 1,357.260.70 sq. m., which is evidently
the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion). To which of these lands did the
affidavit of Francisco de Borja (Exhibit "F") refer to? In addition,
Francisco's characterization of the land as "mi terreno personal y
exclusivo" is plainly self-serving, and not admissible in the absence
of cross examination.
It may be true that the inventories relied upon by defendant-
appellant (Exhibits "2", "3", "4" and "7") are not conclusive on the
conjugal character of the property in question; but as already noted,
they are clear admissions against the pecuniary interest of the
declarants, Francisco de Borja and his executor-widow, Tasiana
Ongsingco, and as such of much greater probative weight than the
self-serving statement of Francisco (Exhibit "F"). Plainly, the legal
presumption in favor of the conjugal character of the Hacienda de
Jalajala (Poblacion) now in dispute has not been rebutted but
actually confirmed by proof. Hence, the appealed order should be
reversed and the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) declared property
of the conjugal partnership of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco.
No error having been assigned against the ruling of the lower court
that claims for damages should be ventilated in the corresponding
special proceedings for the settlement of the estates of the
deceased, the same requires no pro announcement from this Court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed order of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal in Case No. L-28040 is hereby affirmed; while
those involved in Cases Nos. L-28568 and L-28611 are reversed and
set aside. Costs against the appellant Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de
Borja in all three (3) cases.