GR Nos.

138874-75, Feb 03, 2004 ]
PEOPLE v. FRANCISCO JUAN LARRANÑ AGA +
DECISION
466 Phil. 324
PER CURIAM:
For most of the Cebuanos, the proceedings in these cases will always be
remembered as the "trial of the century." A reading of the voluminous
records readily explains why the unraveling of the facts during the
hearing before the court below proved transfixing and horrifying and
why it resulted in unusual media coverage.
another, with deliberate intent, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously kidnap or deprive one Jacqueline Chiongof her liberty,
thereby detaining her until the present.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."
On separate arraignments, state witness Davison Rusia and appellants
Rowen Adlawan, Josman Aznar, Ariel Balansag, Alberto Canñ o, James
Andrew and James Anthony Uy pleaded not guilty.[5] Appellant
Francisco Juan Larranñ aga refused to plead, hence, the trial court
entered for him the plea of "not guilty." [6] Thereafter, trial on the merits
ensued.

These cases involve the kidnapping and illegal detention of a college
beauty queen along with her comely and courageous sister. An
intriguing tale of ribaldry and gang-rape was followed by the murder of
the beauty queen. She was thrown off a cliff into a deep forested ravine
where she was left to die. Her sister was subjected to heartless
indignities before she was also gang-raped. In the aftermath of the
kidnapping and rape, the sister was made to disappear. Where she is
and what further crimes were inflicted upon her remain unknown and
unsolved up to the present.
Before us in an appeal from the Decision[1] dated May 5, 1999 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Cebu City in Criminal Cases Nos. CBU
45303-45304, finding Rowen Adlawan alias "Wesley," Josman Aznar,
Ariel Balansag, Alberto Canñ o alias "Allan Pahak," Francisco Juan
Larranñ aga alias "Paco," James Andrew Uy alias "MM," and James
Anthony Uy alias "Wang Wang," appellants herein, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention and sentencing each of them to suffer the penalties of "two
(2)reclusiones perpetua" and to indemnify the heirs of the victims,
sisters Marijoy and Jacqueline Chiong, jointly and severally, the amount
of P200,000.00 as actual damages and P5,000,000.00 as moral and
exemplary damages.
The Fourth Amended Informations [2] for kidnapping and illegal
detention dated May 12, 1998 filed against appellants and Davidson
Rusia alias "Tisoy Tagalog," the discharged state witness, read as
follows:
1) For Criminal Case No. CBU-45303.[3]
"xxx
"That on the 16th day of July, 1997, at about 10:00 o'clock more or less
in the evening, in the City of Cebu, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, all private
individuals, conniving, confederating and mutually helping with one
another, with deliberate intent, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously kidnap or deprive one Marijoy Chiong, of her liberty
and on the occasion thereof, and in connection, accused, with
deliberate intent, did then and there have carnal knowledge of said
Marijoy against her will with the use of force and intimidation and
subsequent thereto and on the occasion thereof, accused with intent to
kill, did then and there inflict physical injuries on said Marijoy Chiong
throwing her into a deep ravine and as a consequence of which, Marijoy
Chiong died.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."
2) For Criminal Case CBU-45304:[4]
"xxx
"That on the 16th day of July, 1997, at about 10:00 o'clock more or less
in the evening, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, all private
individuals, conniving, confederating and mutually helping with one
1
In the main, the prosecution evidence centered on the testimony of
Rusia.[7] Twenty-one witnesses[8] corroborated his testimony on major
points. For the defense, appellants James Anthony Uy and Alberto Canñ o
took the witness stand. Appellant Francisco Juan Larranñ aga was
supposed to testify on his defense of alibi but the prosecution and the
defense, through a stipulation approved by the trial court, dispensed
with his testimony. Nineteen witnesses testified for the appellants,
corroborating their respective defenses of alibi.
The version of the prosecution is narrated as follows:
On the night of July 16, 1997, sisters Marijoy and Jacqueline Chiong,
who lived in Cebu City, failed to come home on the expected time. It
was raining hard and Mrs. Thelma Chiong thought her daughters were
simply having difficulty getting a ride. Thus, she instructed her sons,
Bruce and Dennis, to fetch their sisters. They returned home without
Marijoy and Jacqueline. Mrs. Chiong was not able to sleep that night.
Immediately, at 5:00 o'clock in the morning, her entire family started
the search for her daughters, but there was no trace of them. Thus, the
family sought the assistance of the police who continued the search.
But still, they could not find Marijoy and Jacqueline.[9]
Meanwhile, in the morning of July 18, 1997, a certain Rudy Lasaga
reported to the police that a young woman was found dead at the foot
of a cliff in Tan-awan, Carcar, Cebu.[10] Officer-in-Charge Arturo Unabia
and three other policemen proceeded to Tan-awan and there, they
found a dead woman lying on the ground. Attached to her left wrist was
a handcuff.[11] Her pants were torn, her orange t-shirt was raised up to
her breast and her bra was pulled down. Her face and neck were
covered with masking tape.[12]
On July 19, 1996, upon hearing the news about the dead woman, Mrs.
Chiong's son Dennis and other relatives proceeded to the Tupaz
Funeral Parlor at Carcar, Cebu to see the body. It was Marijoy dressed in
the same orange shirt and maong pants she wore when she left home
on July 16, 1997. Upon learning of the tragic reality, Mrs. Chiong
became frantic and hysterical. She could not accept that her daughter
would meet such a gruesome fate.[13]
On May 8, 1998, or after almost ten months, the mystery that engulfed
the disappearance of Marijoy and Jacqueline was resolved. Rusia,
bothered by his conscience and recurrent nightmares,[14] admitted
before the police having participated in the abduction of the sisters.
[15]
He agreed to re-enact the commission of the crimes. [16]
On August 12, 1998, Rusia testified before the trial court how the
crimes were committed and identified all the appellants as the
perpetrators. He declared that his conduit to Francisco Juan Larranñ aga
was Rowen Adlawan whom he met together with brothers James
Anthony and James Andrew Uy five months before the commission of
the crimes charged.[17] He has known Josman Aznar since 1991. He met
Alberto Canñ o and Ariel Balansag only in the evening of July 16, 1997.
Or, July 15, 1997, while Rusia was loafing around at the Cebu Plaza
Hotel, Cebu City, Rowen approached him and arranged that they meet
the following day at around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon.[18] When they
saw each other the next day, Rowen told him to stay put at the Ayala
Mall because they would have a "big happening" in the evening. All the
while, he thought that Rowen's "big happening" meant group partying
or scrounging. He thus lingered at the Ayala Mall until the appointed
time came.[19]
At 10:30 in the evening, Rowen returned with Josman. They met
Rusia at the back exit of the Ayala Mall and told him to ride with
them in a white car. Rusia noticed that a red car was following them.
Upon reaching Archbishop Reyes Avenue, same city, he saw two women
standing at the waiting shed.[20] Rusia did not know yet that their names
were Marijoy and Jacqueline.
Josman stopped the white car in front of the waiting shed and he and
Rowen approached and invited Marijoy and Jacqueline to join them.
[21]
But the sisters declined. Irked by the rejection, Rowen grabbed
Marijoy while Josman held Jacqueline and forced both girls to ride in
the car.[22] Marijoy was the first one to get inside, followed by Rowen.
Meanwhile, Josman pushed Jacqueline inside and immediately drove
the white car. Rusia sat on the front seat beside Josman.
Fourteen (14) meters from the waiting shed, Jacqueline managed to get
out of the car. Josman chased her and brought her back into the car. Not
taking anymore chances, Rowen elbowed Jacqueline on the chest and
punched Marijoy on the stomach, causing both girls to faint. [23] Rowen
asked Rusia for the packaging tape under the latter's seat and placed it
on the girls' mouths. Rowen also handcuffed them jointly. The white
and red cars then proceeded to Fuente Osmenñ a, Cebu City.
At Fuente Osmenñ a, Josman parked the car near a Mercury Drug Store
and urged Rusia to inquire if a van that was parked nearby was for hire.
A man who was around replied "no" so the group immediately left. The
two cars stopped again near Park Place Hotel where Rusia negotiated
to hire a van. But no van was available. Thus, the cars sped to a house in
Guadalupe, Cebu City known as the safehouse of the "Jozman Aznar
Group" Thereupon, Larranñ aga, James Anthony and James Andrew got
out of the red car.
Larranñ aga, James Anthony and Rowen brought Marijoy to one of the
rooms, while Rusia and Josman led Jacqueline to another room. Josman
then told Rusia to step out so Rusia stayed at the living room with
James Andrew. They remained in the house for fifteen (15) to twenty
(20) minutes. At that time, Rusia could hear Larranñ aga, James Anthony,
and Rowen giggling inside the room.
Thereafter, the group brought Marijoy and Jacqueline back to the white
car. Then the two cars headed to the South Bus Terminal where they
were able to hire a white van driven by Alberto. Ariel was the
conductor. James Andrew drove the white car, while the rest of the
group boarded the van. They traveled towards south of Cebu City,
leaving the red car at the South Bus Terminal.
Inside the van, Marijoy and Jacqueline were slowly gaining strength.
James Anthony taped their mouths anew and Rowen handcuffed them-
together. Along the way, the van and the white car stopped by a
barbeque store. Rowen got off the van and bought barbeque and
Tanduay rhum. They proceeded to Tan-awan.[24] Then they parked their
vehicles near a precipice[25] where they drank and had a pot session.
Later, they pulled Jacqueline out of the van and told her to dance as
they encircled her. She was pushed from one end of the circle to the
other, ripping her clothes in the process. Meanwhile, Josman told
Larranñ aga to start raping Marijoy who was left inside the van. The
latter did as told and after fifteen minutes emerged from the van saying,
"who wants next?" Rowen went in, followed by James Anthony, Alberto,
the driver, and Ariel, the conductor. Each spent a few minutes inside the
van and afterwards came out smiling.[26]
Then they carried Marijoy out of the van, after which Josman brought
Jacqueline inside the vehicle. Josman came out from the van after ten
minutes, saying, "whoever wants next go ahead and hurry up." Rusia
2
went inside the van and raped Jacqueline, followed by James Andrew.
At this instance, Marijoy was to breathe her last for upon Josman's
instruction, Rowen and Ariel led her to the cliff and mercilessly pushed
her into the ravine[27] which was almost 150 meters deep.[28]
As for Jacqueline, she was pulled out of the van and thrown to the
ground. Able to gather a bit of strength, she tried to run towards the
road. The group boarded the van, followed her and made fun of her by
screaming, "run some more" There was a tricycle passing by. The group
brought Jacqueline inside the van. Rowen beat her until she passed out.
The group then headed back to Cebu City with James Andrew driving
the white car. Rusia got off from the van somewhere near the Ayala
Center.[29]
There were other people who saw snippets of what Rusia had
witnessed. Sheila Singson,[30] Analie Konahap[31] and Williard
Redobles[32] testified that Marijoy and Jacqueline were talking to
Larranñ aga and Josman before they were abducted. Roland Dacillo [33]saw
Jacqueline alighting and running away from a white car and that
Josman went after her and grabbed her back to the car. Alfredo
Duarte[34] testified that he was at the barbeque stand when Rowen
bought barbeque; that Rowen asked where he could buy Tanduay; that
he saw a white van and he heard therefrom voices of a male and female
who seemed to be quarreling; that he also heard a cry of a woman
which he could not understand because "it was as if the voice was being
controlled;" and that after Rowen got his order, he boarded the white
van which he recognized to be previously driven by Alberto Canñ o.
Meanwhile, Mario Minñ oza,[35] a tricycle driver plying the route of
Carcar-Mantalongon, saw Jacqueline running towards Mantalongon.
Her blouse was torn and her hair was disheveled. Trailing her was a
white van where a very loud rock music could be heard. Manuel
Camingao[36] recounted that on July 17, 1997, at about 5:00 o'clock in
the morning, he saw a white van near a cliff at Tan-awan. Thinking that
the passenger of the white van was throwing garbage at the cliff, he
wrote its plate number (GGC-491) on the side of his tricycle. [37]
Still, there were other witnesses[38] presented by the prosecution who
gave details which, when pieced together, corroborated well Rusia's
testimony on what transpired at the Ayala Center all the way to Carcar.
Against the foregoing facts and circumstances, the appellants raised the
defense of alibi, thus:
Larranñ aga, through his witnesses, sought to establish that on July 16,
1997, he was in Quezon City taking his mid-term examinations at the
Center for Culinary Arts. In the evening of that day until 3:00 o'clock in
the morning of July 17, 1997, he was with his friends at the R & R Bar
and Restaurant, same city. Fifteen witnesses testified that they were
either with Larranñ aga or saw him in Quezon City at the time the crimes
were committed. His friends, Lourdes Montalvan, [39] Charmaine Flores,
[40]
Richard Antonio,[41] Jheanessa Fonacier,[42]Maharlika Shulze,
[43]
Sebastian Seno,[44] Francisco Jarque,[45] Raymond Garcia,[46] Cristina
Del Gallego,[47] Mona Lisa Del Gallego,[48] Paolo Celso[49] and Paolo
Manguerra[50] testified that they were with him at the R & R Bar on the
night of July 16, 1997. The celebration was a "despedida" for him as he
was leaving the next day for Cebu and a "bienvenida" for another friend.
Larranñ aga's classmate Carmina Esguerra[51] testified that he was in
school on July 16, 1997 taking his mid-term examinations. His teacher
Rowena Bautista,[52] on the other hand, testified that he attended her
lecture in Applied Mathematics. Also, some of his neighbors at the
Loyola Heights Condominium, Quezon City, including the security
guard, Salvador Boton, testified that he was in his condo unit in the
evening of July 16, 1997. Representatives of the four airline companies
plying the route of Manila-Cebu-Manila presented proofs showing that
the name Francisco Juan Larranñ aga does not appear in the list of pre-
flight and post-flight manifests from July 15, 1997 to about noontime of
July 17, 1997.
Meanwhile, James Anthony Uy testified that on July 16, 1997, he and his
brother James Andrew were at home in Cebu City because it was their
father's 50th birthday and they were celebrating the occasion with a
small party which ended at 11:30 in the evening.[53] He only left his
house the next day, July 17, 1997 at about 7:00 o'clock in the morning
to go to school.[54] The boys' mother, Marlyn Uy, corroborated his
testimony and declared that when she woke up at 2:00 o'clock in the
morning to check on her sons, she found them sleeping in their
bedrooms. They went to school the next day at about 7:00 o'clock in the
morning.[55]
Clotilde Soterol testified for Alberto and Ariel. She narrated that on July
16, 1997, at around 7:00 o'clock in the evening, Alberto brought the
white Toyota van with Plate No. GGC-491 to her shop to have its aircon
repaired. Alberto was accompanied by his wife Gina Canñ o, co-appellant
Ariel, and spouses Catalina and Simplicio Paghinayan, owners of the
vehicle. Since her (Clotildes') husband was not yet around, Alberto just
left the vehicle and promised to return the next morning. Her husband
arrived at 8:30 in the evening and started to repair the aircon at 9:00
o'clock of the same evening. He finished the work at 10:00 o'clock the
following morning. At 11:00 o'clock, Alberto and his wife Gina, Ariel
and Catalina returned to the shop to retrieve the vehicle. [56] Alberto,
[57]
Gina[58] and Catalina[59] corroborated Clotilde's testimony.
To lend support to Josman's alibi, Michael Dizon recounted, that on July
16, 1997, at about 8:00 o'clock in the evening, he and several friends
were at Josman's house in Cebu. They ate their dinner there and
afterwards drank "Blue Label." They stayed at Josman's house until
11:00 o'clock in the evening. Thereafter, they proceeded to BAI Disco
where they drank beer and socialized with old friends. They stayed
there until 1:30 in the morning of July 17, 1997. Thereafter, they
transferred to DTM Bar. They went home together at about 3:00
o'clock in the morning. Their friend, Jonas Dy Pico, dropped Josman at
his house.[60]
Concerning state witness Rusia, on August 7, 1998, when the
prosecution moved that he be discharged as an accused for the purpose
of utilizing him as a state witness,[61] Larranñ aga and brothers James
Anthony and James Andrew opposed the motion on the ground that he
does not qualify as a state witness under Section 9, Rule 119 of the
Revised Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure.[62] On August 12, 1998,
the trial court allowed the prosecution to present Rusia as its witness
but deferred resolving its motion to discharge until it has completely
presented its evidence.[63] On the same date, the prosecution finished
conducting Rusia's direct examination.[64] The defense lawyers cross-
examined him on August 13, 17, and 20, 1998.[65] On the last date, Judge
Ocampo provisionally terminated the cross-examination due to the
report that there was an attempt to bribe him and because of his
deteriorating health.[66]
Resenting the trial court's termination of Rusia's cross-examination, the
defense lawyers moved for the inhibition of Judge Ocampo. [67]When he
informed the defense lawyers that he would not inhibit himself since he
found no "just and valid reasons" therefor, the defense lawyers
withdrew en masse as counsel for the appellants declaring that they
would no longer attend the trial. Judge Ocampo held them-guilty-of
direct contempt of court. Thus, defense lawyers Raymundo Armovit,
Edgar Gica, Fidel Gonzales, Ramon Teleron, Alfonso de la Cerna and
Lorenzo Paylado were ordered jailed.
In the Order dated August 25, 1998, the trial court denied the motion
for inhibition of the defense lawyers and ordered them to continue
representing their respective clients so that the cases may undergo the
mandatory continuous trial. The trial court likewise denied their
motion to withdraw as appellants' counsel because of their failure to
secure a prior written consent from their clients. On August 26, 1998,
appellants filed their written consent to the withdrawal of their
counsel.
Thereafter, Larranñ aga, Josman and brothers James Anthony and James
3
Andrew moved for the postponement of the hearing for several weeks
to enable them to hire the services of new counsel. [68] On August 31,
1998, the trial court denied appellants' motions on the ground that it
could no longer delay the hearing of the cases. On September 2, 1998,
the trial court directed the Public Attorney's Office (PAO) to act as
counsel de oficio for all the appellants.[69]
Trial resumed on September 3, 1998 with a team of PAO lawyers
assisting appellants. Larranñ aga objected to the continuation of the
direct examination of the prosecution witnesses as he was not
represented by his counsel de parte. The trial court overruled his
objection. The prosecution witnesses testified continuously from
September 3, 1998 to September 24, 1998. Meanwhile, the cross-
examination of said witnesses was deferred until the appellants were
able to secure counsel of their choice. On the same date, September 24,
1998, Atty. Eric C. Villarmia entered his appearance as counsel for
Larranñ aga, while Atty. Eric S. Carin appeared as counsel for brothers
James Anthony and James Andrew.
Thereafter, or on October 1, 1998, the defense lawyers started cross-
examining Rusia. The cross-examination continued on October 5, 6, 12
and 13, 1998.
Eventually, acting on the prosecution's motion to discharge Rusia to be
a state witness, the trial court required the "opposing parties to submit
their respective memoranda. On November 12, 1998, the trial court
issued an omnibus order granting the prosecution's motion
discharging Rusia as an accused and according him the status of a
state witness.
On May 5, 1999, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, all the accused Francisco Juan Larranñ aga, Josman Aznar,
James Andrew Uy, James Anthony Uy, Rowen Adlawan, Alberto Canñ o,
and Ariel Balansag are hereby found Guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of two crimes of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention and are
hereby sentenced to imprisonment of Two (2) Reclusiones
Perpetua each which penalties, however, may be served by
them simultaneously (Article 70, Revised Penal Code). Further, said
accused are hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of the two (2)
victims in these cases, jointly and severally, in the amount of
P200,000.00 in actual damages and P5,000,000.00 by way of moral and
exemplary damages.
"SO ORDERED."
Hence, the instant separate appeals. Appellants Rowen, Alberto and
Ariel ascribe to the trial court the following errors:
"I
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
UNTRUSTWORTHY, INCONSISTENT, CONTRADICTORY AND
INCREDULOUS TESTIMONY OF (DAVIDSON) VALIENTE RUSIA.
"II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ADMITTING THE TESTIMONY OF THE
PROSECUTION WITNESSES, NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE
DEFENDANTS WERE NOT DULY REPRESENTED BY COUNSELS OF
THEIR OWN CHOICE DURING THE TIME THESE WITNESSES WERE
PRESENTED.
"III
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS
CONSPIRACY IN THE CASE AT BAR.
"IV
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
"V
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN DISPLAYING MANIFEST ANIMOSITY
TOWARDS THE DEFENSE'S WITNESSES WHICH CLEARLY SHOWED ITS
PREJUDICE AND BIAS IN DECIDING THE CASE.
"VI
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING SOME DEFENSE
WITNESSES TO TESTIFY.
"VII
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONSIDERING ROWEN ADLAWAN TO
HAVE WAIVED PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE IN HIS BEHALF."
For his part, Josman raises the following assignments of error:
"I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DISCHARGING DAVID
VALIENTE RUSIA AS STATE WITNESS IN GROSS AND BLATANT
DISREGARD OF THE RULES ON DISCHARGE OF STATE WITNESS.
"II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO RUSIA'S
TESTIMONY DESPITE CLEAR SHOWING THAT HIS CRIMINAL RECORD
AS AN EX-CONVlCT, DRUG ADDICT AND GANGSTER AND HIS SUICIDAL
TENDENCIES SERIOUSLY IMPAIR HIS CREDIBILITY AND INNATE
CAPACITY FOR TRUTH, HONESTY AND INTEGRITY.
"III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN LENDING CREDENCE TO
RUSIA'S TESTIMONY REPLETE AS IT WAS WITH INCONSISTENCIES,
FALSEHOODS AND LIES.
"IV
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN LENDING CREDENCE TO THE
CORROBORATIVE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
"V
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT AZNAR
HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND IN DEPRIVING HIM OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF AN ACCUSED.
"VI
4
THE TRIAL JUDGE VIOLATED AZNAR'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS WHEN
THE TRIAL JUDGE REFUSED TO INHIBIT HIMSELF AND PROCEEDED
WITH THE TRIAL DESPITE GLARING BADGES OF HIS PARTIALITY AND
BIAS FOR THE PROSECUTION.
"VII
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DISCREDITING AND
DISREGARDING THE DEFENSE OF APPELLANT AZNAR.
"VIII
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT
AZNAR ON THE BASIS OF PROSECUTING EVIDENCE MAINLY
ANCHORED ON RUSIA'S TESTIMONY WHICH FAILED TO EVINCE
PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF APPELLANT AZNAR'S
CRIMINAL LIABILITY."
In his 145-page appellant's brief, Larranñ aga alleges that the trial court
committed the following errors:
"6.1 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IGNORING AND VIOLATING DUE
PROCESS RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED.
6.2 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE DISCHARGE OF
ACCUSED DAVIDSON RUSIA.
6.3 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING PARTIAL CREDIBILITY TO
THE TESTIMONY OF DAVIDSON RUSIA.
6.4 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE TESTIMONIES
OF THE OTHER WITNESSES.
6.5 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
TESTIMONIES OF OTHER WITNESSES.
6.6 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION
HAS OVERCOME THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF
INNOCENCE.
6.7 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING AND REJECTING,
EVEN AT DIRECT TESTIMONY STAGE, THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S
DEFENSE OF ALIBI."
For their part, brothers James Anthony and James Andrew, in their 147-
page appellants' brief, bid for an acquittal on the following grounds:
"A) THE TRIAL COURT BELOW GRIEVOUSLY FAILED TO OBSERVE,
AND THUS DENIED ACCUSED JAMES ANTHONY S. UY AND JAMES
ANDREW S. UY THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF
LAW, TO BE PRESUMED INNOCENT, TO HAVE COUNSEL OF THEIR
OWN CHOICE, TO HAVE AN IMPARTIAL JUDGE, TO MEET WITNESSES
FACE TO FACE, AND TO PRODUCE EVIDENCE ON THEIR BEHALF;
B) THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE HAS ABSOLUTELY NOTHING TO
SUPPORT THE CONVICTION OF ACCUSED JAMES ANTHONY S. UY AND
JAMES ANDREW S. UY IN THESE CASES THUS THE TRIAL COURT
BELOW SERIOUSLY AND GRIEVOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT RENDERED
THE 5 MAY 1999 JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION AGAINST THEM." [70]
Appellants' assignments of error converge on four points, thus: (1)
violation of their right to due process; (2) the improper discharge of
Rusia as an accused to be a state witness; (3) the insufficiency of the
evidence of the prosecution; and (4) the trial court's disregard and
rejection of the evidence for the defense.
The appeal is bereft of merit.

I. Violation of Appellants' Right to Due Process
Due process of law is the primary and indispensable foundation of
individual freedoms; it is the basic and essential term in the social
compact which defines the rights of the individual and delimits the
powers which the State may exercise.[71] In evaluating a due process
claim, the court must determine whether life, liberty or property
interest exists, and if so, what procedures are constitutionally required
to protect that right.[72] Otherwise stated, the due process clause calls
for two separate inquiries in evaluating an alleged violation: did the
plaintiff lose something that fits into one of the three protected
categories of life, liberty, or property?; and, if so, did the plaintiff receive
the minimum measure of procedural protection warranted under the
circumstances?[73]
For our determination, therefore, is whether the minimum
requirements of due process were accorded to appellants during the
trial of these cases.
Section 14, Article III of our Constitution catalogues the essentials of
due process in a criminal prosecution, thus:
"SEC. 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense
without due process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be
heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him, to have a speedy,impartial, and
public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the
production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment,
trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided
that he has been notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable."
Rule 115 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure casts the foregoing
provision in a more detailed manner, thus:
"SECTION 1. Rights of accused at the trial. In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall be entitled to the following rights:
(a) To be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond
reasonable doubt.
(b) To be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him.
(c) To be present and defend in person and by counsel at every
stage of the proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of the
judgment. The accused may, however, waive his presence at the trial
pursuant to the stipulations set forth in his bail, unless his presence is
specifically ordered by the court for purposes of identification. The
absence of the accused without justifiable cause at the trial of which he
had notice shall be considered a waiver of his right to be present
thereat. When an accused under custody escapes, he shall be deemed to
have waived his right to be present on all subsequent trial dates until
custody over him is regained. Upon motion, the accused may be
allowed to defend himself in person when it sufficiently appears to the
court that he can properly protect his rights without the assistance of
counsel.
(d) To testify as a witness in his own behalf but subject to cross-
examination on matters covered by direct examination. His silence shall
not in any manner prejudice him.
(e) To be exempt from being compelled to be a witness against
himself.
5
(f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at
the trial. Either party may utilize as part of its evidence the
testimony of a witness who is deceased, out of or cannot with due
diligence be found in the Philippines, unavailable, or otherwise
unable to testify, given in another case or proceeding, judicial or
administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, the
adverse party having the opportunity to cross-examine him.
(g) To have compulsory process issued to secure the attendance of
witnesses and production of other evidence in his behalf.
(h) To have speedy, impartial and public trial.
(i) To appeal in all cases allowed and in the manner prescribed by
law."
Of the foregoing rights, what appellants obviously claim as having been
trampled upon by the trial court are their: (a) right to be assisted by
counsel at every stage of the proceedings; (b) right to confront and
cross-examine the prosecution witnesses; (c) right to produce evidence
on their behalf; and (d) right to an impartial trial.
A. Right to Counsel
Anent the right to counsel, appellants fault the trial court: first, for
appointing counsel de oficio despite their insistence to be assisted by
counsel of their own choice; and second, for refusing to suspend trial
until they shall have secured the services of new counsel.
Appellants cannot feign denial of their right to counsel. We have held
that there is no denial of the right to counsel where a counsel de
oficio was appointed during the absence of the accused's counsel de
parte, pursuant to the court's desire to finish the case as early as
practicable under the continuous trial system.[74]
Indisputably, it was the strategic machinations of appellants and their
counsel de parte which prompted the trial court to appoint counsel de
oficio. The unceremonious withdrawal of appellants' counsel de
parte during the proceedings of August 24, 1998, as well as their
stubborn refusal to return to the court for trial undermines the
continuity of the proceedings. Considering that the case had already
been dragging on a lethargic course, it behooved the trial court to
prevent any further dilatory maneuvers on the part of the defense
counsel. Accordingly, it was proper for the trial court to appoint
counsel de oficio to represent appellants during the remaining phases
of the proceedings.
At any rate, the appointment of counsel de oficio under such
circumstances is not proscribed by the Constitution. An examination of
its provisions concerning the right to counsel shows that the
"preference in the choice of counsel" pertains more aptly and
specifically to a person under investigation[75] rather than an accused in
a criminal prosecution.[76] And even if we are to extend the "application
of the concept of "preference in the choice of counsel" to an accused in
a criminal prosecution, such preferential discretion is not absolute as
would enable him to choose a particular counsel to the exclusion of
others equally capable. We stated the reason for this ruling in an earlier
case:
"Withal, the word 'preferably' under Section 12 (1), Article 3 of the
1987 Constitution does not convey the message that the choice of a
lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other
equally competent and independent attorneys from handling his
defense. If the rule were otherwise, then, the tempo of a custodial
investigation, will be solely in the hands of the accused who can
impede, nay, obstruct the progress of the interrogation by simply
selecting a lawyer, who for one reason or another, is not available
to protect his interest. This absurd scenario could not have been
contemplated by the framers of the charter."[77]
In the same breath, the choice of counsel by the accused in a criminal
prosecution is not a plenary one. If the chosen counsel deliberately
makes himself scarce, the court is not precluded from appointing
a de oficio counsel whom it considers competent and independent
to enable the trial to proceed until the counsel of choice enters his
appearance. Otherwise, the pace of a criminal prosecution will be
entirely dictated by the accused to the detriment of the eventual
resolution of the case.[78]
Neither is there a violation of appellants' right to counsel just because
the trial court did not grant their request for suspension of the hearing
pending their search for new counsel. An application for a continuance
in order to secure the services of counsel is ordinarily addressed to the
discretion of the court, and the denial thereof is not ordinarily an
infringement of the accused's right to counsel. [79] The right of the
accused to select his own counsel must be exercised in a
reasonable time and in a reasonable manner.[80]
In the present case, appellants requested either one (1) month or three
(3) weeks to look for new counsel. Such periods are unreasonable.
Appellants could have hired new lawyers at a shorter time had they
wanted to. They should have been diligent in procuring new counsel.
[81]
Constitutional guaranty of right to representation by counsel
does not mean that accused may avoid trial by neglecting or
refusing to secure assistance of counsel and by refusing to
participate in his trial.[82] It has been held that where the accused
declined the court's offer to appoint counsel and elected to defend
himself, the denial of his motion made toward the end of the trial for a
continuance so that he could obtain counsel of his own choice was not
an infringement of his constitutional rights. [83] While the accused has
the right to discharge or change his counsel at any time, this right is to
some extent subject to supervision by the trial court, particularly after
the trial has commenced. The court may deny accused's application
to discharge his counsel where it appears that such application is
not made in good faith but is made for purposes of delay.[84]
Significantly, parallel to the hearing at the trial court were also
petitions and motions involving several incidents in these cases filed
with the Court of Appeals and this Court. The appellants, particularly
Larranñ aga, were represented there by the same counsel de parte.
[85]
Certainly, it is wrong for these lawyers to abandon appellants in the
proceeding before the trial court and unceasingly represent them in the
appellate courts. Indeed, in doing so, they made a mockery of judicial
process and certainly delayed the hearing before the court below. In
Lacambra vs. Ramos,[86] we ruled:
"The Court cannot help but note the series of legal maneuvers resorted
to and repeated importunings of the accused or his counsel, which
resulted in the protracted trial of the case, thus making a mockery of
the judicial process, not to mention the injustice caused by the delay to
the victim's family."
Furthermore, appellants' counsel de parte ought to know that until
their withdrawal shall have been approved by the appellants, they still
remain the counsel of record and as such, they must do what is
expected of them, that is, to protect their interests. [87] They cannot walk
out from a case simply because they do not agree with the ruling of the
judge. Being officers of the court whose duty is to assist in
administering justice, they may not withdraw or be permitted to
withdraw as counsel in a case if such withdrawal will work injustice to
a client or frustrate the ends of justice.[88]
B. Right to Confront and Cross-
Examine the Prosecution
Witnesses.
Appellants also fault the trial court for depriving them of the right to
6
cross-examine Rusia and the other prosecution witnesses. Appellants'
assertion has no factual and legal anchorage. For one, it is not true that
they were not given sufficient opportunity to cross-examine Rusia. All
of appellants' counsel de parte had a fair share of time in grilling Rusia
concerning his background to the kidnapping of Marijoy and
Jacqueline. The records reveal the following dates of his cross-
examination:
Lawyers Dates of Cross-examination
1. Armovit (for Larranñ aga) August 13 and 17, 1998
2. Gonzales (for Larranñ aga) August 20, 1998
3. Gica (for Josman) August 20, 1998
4. Paylado (for James Anthony and
August 20, 1998
James Andrew)
5. De la Cerna (for Rowen, Alberto
August 20, 1998
and Ariel)
October 1, 1998
6. Villarmia (for Larranñ aga)
7. Andales (for Josman) October 5 and 6, 1998
8. Carin (for James Andrew and
October, 5, 1998
James Anthony)
9 Debalucos (for Rowen, Canñ o and
October 12, 1998
Balansag)
10. De Jesus (for Rowen, Alberto
October 12, 1998
and Ariel)
11. Ypil (for Rowen, Alberto and
October 12, 1998[89]
Ariel)
That the trial court imposed limitation on the length of time counsel for
appellants may cross-examine Rusia cannot be labeled as a violation of
the latter's constitutional right. Considering that appellants had several
lawyers, it was just imperative for the trial court to impose a time limit
on their cross-examination so as not to waste its time on repetitive and
prolix questioning.
Indeed, it is the right and duty of the trial court to control the cross-
examination of witnesses, both for the purpose of conserving its time
and protecting the witnesses from prolonged and needless
examination.[90] Where several accused are being tried jointly for the
same offense, the order in which counsel for the several defendants
shall cross-examine the state's witnesses may be regulated by the
court[91]and one of them may even be denied the right to cross-examine
separately where he had arranged with the others that counsel of one
of them should cross-examine for all.[92] In People vs. Gorospe,[93] we
ruled:
"While cross-examination is a right available to the adverse party, it is
not absolute in the sense that a cross-examiner could determine for
himself the length and scope of his cross-examination of a witness. The
court has always the discretion to limit the cross-examination and
to consider it terminated if it would serve the ends of justice."
The transcript of stenographic notes covering Rusia's cross-
examination shows that appellants' counsel had ample chance to test
his credibility.
Records show that the failure of the PAO lawyers to cross-examine
some of the prosecution witnesses was due to appellants' obstinate
refusal. In its Order[94] dated September 8, 1998, the trial court deferred
the cross-examination in view of appellants' insistence that their new
counsel de parte will conduct the cross-examination. So as not to
unduly delay the hearing, the trial court warned the appellants that if
by September 24, 1998, they are not yet represented by their new
counsel de parte, then it will order their counsel de oficio to conduct
the cross-examination. Lamentably, on September 24, 1998, appellants'
counsel de parte entered their appearances merely to seek another
postponement of the trial. Thus, in exasperation, Judge Ocampo
remarked:
"Every time a defense counsel decides to withdraw, must an accused be
granted one (1) month suspension of trial to look for such new counsel
to study the records and transcripts? Shall the pace of the trial of these
cases be thus left to the will or dictation of the accused - whose
defense counsels would just suddenly withdraw and cause such long
suspensions of the trial while accused allegedly shop around for new
counsels and upon hiring new counsels ask for another one month trial
suspension for their new lawyers to study the records? While all the
time such defense counsels (who allegedly have already withdrawn)
openly continue to 'advise' their accused-clients and even file
'Manifestations' before this Court and Petitions for Certiorari,
Injunction and Inhibition on behalf of accused before the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court?
"What inanity is this that the accused and their lawyers are foisting
upon this Court? In open defiance of the provisions of SC A.O. No. 104-
96 that these heinous crimes cases shall undergo 'mandatory
continuous trial and shall be terminated within sixty (60) days'?"
Still, in its Order dated October 8, 1998, the trial court gave appellants'
new counsel de parte a period until October 12, 1998 to manifest
whether they are refusing to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses
concerned; if so, then the court shall consider them to have waived
their right to cross-examine those witnesses. During the hearing on
October 12, 1998, Larranñ aga's new counsel de parte, Atty. Villarmia,
manifested that he would not cross-examine the prosecution witnesses
who testified on direct examination when Larranñ aga was assisted by
counsel de officio only. The next day, the counsel de parte of Josman,
and brothers James Anthony and James Andrew adopted Atty.
Villarmia's manifestation. Counsel for Rowen, Alberto and Ariel
likewise refused to cross-examine the same witnesses. Thus, in its
Order dated October 14, 1998, the trial court deemed appellants to
have waived their right to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses.
It appears therefore, that if some of the prosecution witnesses were not
subjected to cross-examination, it was not because appellants were not
given the opportunity to do so. The fact remains that their new
counsel de parte refused to cross-examine them. Thus, appellants
waived their right "to confront and cross examine the witnesses"
against them.
C. Right to Impartial
Trial
Appellants imputes bias and partiality to Judge Ocampo when he asked
questions and made comments when the defense witnesses were
testifying.
Canon 14 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics states that a judge may
properly intervene during trial to promote expeditious proceeding,
prevent unnecessary waste of time and dilly-dallying of counsel or clear
up obscurities. The test is whether the intervention of the judge
tends to prevent the proper presentation of a cause or the
ascertainment of the truth in the matter where he interposes his
questions or comments.
Records show that the intervention by way of comment of Judge
Ocampo during the hearing was not only appropriate but was
necessary. One good illustration is his explanation on alibi. Seeing that
the appellants' counsel were about to present additional witnesses
whose testimonies would not establish the impossibility of appellants'
presence in the scene of the crime, Judge Ocampo intervened and
reminded appellants' counsel of the requisites of alibi, thus:
"Well, I'm not saying that there is positive identification. I'm only saying
that in proving your alibi you must stick by what the Supreme Court said
that it was impossible if they are telling the truth, di ba? Now with these
other witnesses na hindi naman ganoon to that effect it does not prove
that it was impossible, e, what is the relevance on that? What is the
7
materiality? lyon ang point ko. We are wasting our time with that
testimony. Ilang witnesses and epe-present to that effect. Wala rin
namang epekto. It will not prove that it was not impossible for him to go
to Cebu at 10:30 P.M., of July 16, e, papano yan? We are being criticized
by the public already for taking so long a time of the trial of these cases
which is supposed to be finished within 60 days. Now from August,
September, October, November, December and January, magse-six
months na, wala pa and you want to present so many immaterial
witnesses."
Surely, we cannot fault Judge Ocampo for exhaustively reminding
appellants' counsel of the parameters of alibi to ensure that there will
be an orderly and expeditious presentation of defense witnesses and
that there will be no time wasted by dispensing with the testimonies of
witnesses which are not relevant. Remarks which merely manifest a
desire to confine the proceedings to the real point in issue and to
expedite the trial do not constitute a rebuke of counsel. [95]
Appellants also decry the supposed harshness of Judge Ocampo
towards the witnesses for the defense, namely: Lourdes Montalvan,
Michael Dizon, Rebecca Seno, Clotilde Soterol, Salvador Boton, Catalina
Paghinayan and Paolo Celso.
With respect to Lourdes Montalvan, Judge Ocampo expressed surprise
on "how a 17-year-old girl could go to a man's apartment all alone." He
said that such conduct "does not seem to be a reasonable or a proper
behavior for a 17-year-old girl to do." These statements do not really
indicate bias or prejudice against the defense witnesses. The transcript
of stenographic notes reveals that Judge Ocampo uttered them, not to
cast doubt on the moral character of Lourdes Montalvan, but merely to
determine the credibility of her story, thus:
"x x x But what I wanted to point out is the question of credibility. That
is what we are here for. We want to determine if it is credible for a 17-
year-old college student of the Ateneo who belongs to a good family,
whose father is a lawyer and who could afford to live by herself in a
Condominium Unit in Quezon City and that she would go to the
Condominium Unit of a man whom he just met the previous month, all
alone by herself, at night and specifically on the very night July 16,
1997. x x x That is the question that I would like you to consider, x x x I
assure you I have no doubts at all about her moral character and I have
the highest respect for Miss Montalvan. x x x."
Strong indication of Judge Ocampo's lack of predilection was his
acquiescence for Lourdes Montalvan to clarify during redirect
examination why she found nothing wrong with being alone at
Larranñ aga's unit. We quote the proceedings of November 19, 1998,
thus:
ATTY. VILLARMIA:
When you went up you said you were alone. What was your
Q
feeling of going up to that room alone or that unit alone?
PROS. GALANIDA
We object, not proper for re-direct. That was not touched
during the cross. That should have been asked during the
direct-examination of this witness, Your Honor.
ATTY. VILLARMIA:
We want to clarify why she went there alone.
COURT:
Precisely, I made that observation that does not affect or
may affect the credibility of witness the fact that she went
there alone. And so, it is proper to ask her, di ba?
xxx
COURT:
What was your purpose? Ask her now - what was your
 purpose?
/to the witness:
Will you answer the question of the Court/ What was your
Q
purpose or intention in going in Paco's room that night alone?
WTNESS:
My purpose for going there was to meet Richard, sir, and to
A follow-up whether we will go out later that night or not. The
purpose as to going there alone, sir, I felt, I trusted Paco.
PROS. DUYONGCO:
May we ask the witness not to elaborate, Your Honor.
ATTY. VILLARMIA:
That is her feeling.
COURT:
That was her purpose. It is proper."[96]
Appellants consider as violation of their right to due process Judge
Ocampo's remarks labeling Rebecca Seno's and Catalina Paghinayan's
testimony as "incredible"[97] Clotilde Soterol as a "totally confused
person who appears to be mentally imbalanced;"[98] and Salvador Boton
and Paulo Celso as "liars."[99]
Suffice it to state that after going over the pertinent transcript of
stenographic notes, we are convinced that Judge Ocampo's comments
were just honest observations intended to warn the witnesses to be
candid to the court. He made it clear that he merely wanted to ascertain
the veracity of their testimonies in order to determine the truth of the
matter in controversy.[100] That such was his purpose is evident from his
probing questions which gave them the chance to correct or clarify
their contradictory statements. Even appellants' counsel de
parte acknowledged that Judge Ocampo's statements were mere
"honest observations"[101] If Judge Ocampo uttered harsh words against
those defense witnesses, it was because they made a mockery of the
court's proceedings by their deliberate lies. The frequency with which
they changed their answers to Judge Ocampo's clarificatory questions
was indeed a challenge to his patience.
A trial judge is not a wallflower during trial. It is proper for him to
caution and admonish witnesses when necessary and he may
rebuke a witness for levity or for other improper conduct.[102] This
is because he is called upon to ascertain the truth of the controversy
before him.[103]
It bears stressing at this point that the perceived harshness and
impatience exhibited by Judge Ocampo did not at all prevent the
defense from presenting adequately its side of the cases.
D. Right to Produce Evidence
Appellants assail the trial court's exclusion of the testimonies of four
(4) airlines personnel[104] which were intended to prove that Larranñ aga
did not travel to Cebu from Manila or from Cebu to Manila on July 16,
1997. The trial court's exclusion of the testimonies is justified. By
an alibi, Larranñ aga attempted to prove that he was at a place (Quezon
City) so distant that his participation in the crime was impossible. To
prove that he was not in the pre-flight and post-flight of the four (4)
major airlines flying the route of Cebu to Manila and Manila to Cebu on
July 15 and 16, 1997 would not prove the legal requirement of
"physical impossibility" because he could have taken the flight from
Manila to Cebu prior to that date, such as July 14, 1997. According to
Judge Ocampo, it was imperative for appellants' counsel to prove that
Larranñ aga did not take a flight to Cebu before July 16, 1997.
In the same way, we cannot fault the trial court for not allowing the
defense to continue with the" tedious process of presenting additional
8
witnesses to prove Larranñ aga's enrollment at the Center for Culinary
Arts, located at Quezon City, from June 18, 1997 to July 30, 1997
considering that it would not also prove that he was not in Cebu on July
16 to 17, 1997. It is a known practice of students who are temporarily
residing in Metro Manila to return to their provinces once in a while to
spend time with their families. To prove that Larranñ aga was enrolled
during a certain period of time does not negate the possibility that he
went home to Cebu City sometime in July 1997 and stayed there for a
while.
Due process of law is not denied by the exclusion of irrelevant,
immaterial, or incompetent evidence, or testimony of an
incompetent witness.[105] It is not error to refuse evidence which
although admissible for certain purposes, is not admissible for the
purpose which counsel states as the ground for offering it. [106]
To repeat, due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded a fair
and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the
controversy.[107] In the present case, there is no showing of violation of
due process which justifies the reversal or setting aside of the trial
court's findings.
II. The Improper Discharge of Rusia as an Accused
to be a State Witness
Appellants argue that Rusia is not qualified to be a state witness under
paragraphs (d) and (e) of Section 9, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, which reads:
"Sec. 9. Discharge of the accused to be state witness. When two or more
persons are jointly charged with the commission of any offense, upon
motion of the prosecution before resting its case, the court may direct
one or more of the accused to be discharged with their consent so that
they may be witness for the state when after requiring the prosecution
to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state
witness at a hearing in support of the discharge, the court is satisfied
that:
xxx
(d) Said accused does not appear to be most guilty;
(e) Said accused has not at anytime been convicted of any offense
involving moral turpitude.
xxx"
Appellants claim that Rusia was the "most guilty of both the charges of
rape and kidnapping" having admitted in open court that he raped
Jacqueline. Furthermore, Rusia admitted having been previously
convicted in the United States of third degree burglary.
It bears stressing that appellants were charged with kidnapping and
illegal detention, Thus, Rusia's admission that he raped Jacqueline does
not make him the "most guilty" of the crimes charged. Moreover, far
from being the mastermind, his participation, as shown by the
chronology of events, was limited to that of an oblivious follower who
simply "joined the ride" as the commission of the crimes progressed. It
may be recalled that he joined the group upon Rowen's promise that
there would be a "big happening" on the night of July 16, 1997. All
along, he thought the "big happening" was just another "group partying
or scrounging." In other words, he had no inkling then of appellants'
plan to kidnap and detain the Chiong sisters. Rusia retained his passive
stance as Rowen and Josman grabbed Marijoy and Jacqueline at the
waiting shed of Ayala Center. He just remained seated beside the
driver's seat, not aiding Rowen and Josman in abducting the Chiong
sisters. When Jacqueline attempted to escape 14 meters away from the
waiting shed, it was Josman who chased her and not Rusia. Inside the
car, it was Rowen who punched and handcuffed the Chiong sisters. At
the safehouse of the "Josman Aznar Group," Rusia stayed at the living
room while Larranñ aga, James Anthony, Rowen, and Josman molested
Marijoy and Jacqueline on separate rooms. At Tan-awan, it was Josman
who ordered Rowen and Ariel to pushed Marijoy into the deep ravine.
And Rusia did not even know what ultimately happened to Jacqueline
as he was the first to leave the group. Clearly, the extent of Rusia's
participation in the crimes charged does not make him the "most
guilty."
The fact that Rusia was convicted of third degree burglary in
Minessotta does not render his testimony inadmissible. [108] In People vs.
De Guzman[109] we held that although the trial court may have erred in
discharging the accused, such error would not affect the competency
and the quality of the testimony of the defendant. In Mangubat vs.
Sandiganbayan,[110] we ruled:
"Anent the contention that Delia Preagido should not have been
discharged as a state witness because of a 'previous final
conviction' of crimes involving moral turpitude, suffice it to say
that 'this Court has time and again declared that even if the
discharged state witness should lack some of the qualifications
enumerated by Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, his
testimony will not, for that reason alone, be discarded or
disregarded. In the discharge of a co-defendant, the court may
reasonably be expected to err; but such error in discharging an accused
has been held not to be a reversible one. This is upon the principle
that such error of the court does not affect the competency and the
quality of the testimony of the discharged defendant."
Furthermore, it may be recalled that Rusia was extremely bothered by
his conscience and was having nightmares about the Chiong sisters,
hence, he decided to come out in the open. [111] Such fact alone is a badge
of truth of his testimony.
But, more importantly, what makes Rusia's testimony worthy of belief
is the marked compatibility between such testimony and the physical
evidence. Physical evidence is an evidence of the highest order. It
speaks eloquently than a hundred witnesses. [112] The presence of
Marijoy's ravished body in a deep ravine at Tan-awan, Carcar with tape
on her mouth and handcuffs on her wrists certainly bolstered Rusia's
testimony on what actually took place from Ayala Center to Tan-awan.
Indeed, the details he supplied to the trial court were of such nature
and quality that only a witness who actually saw the commission of the
crimes could furnish. What is more, his testimony was corroborated by
several other witnesses who saw incidents of what he narrated,
thus: (1) Rolando Dacillo and Mario Minoza saw Jacqueline's two failed
attempts to escape from appellants; (2) Alfredo Duarte saw Rowen
when he bought barbeque and Tanduay at Nene's Store while the white
van, driven by Alfredo Canñ o, was waiting on the side of the road and he
heard voices of "quarreling male and female" emanating from the
van; (3) Manuel Camingao testified on the presence of Larranñ aga and
Josman at Tan-awan, Carcar at dawn of July 17, 1997; and
lastly, (4) Benjamin Molina and Miguel Vergara recognized Rowen as
the person who inquired from them where he could find a vehicle for
hire, on the evening of July 16, 1997. All these bits and pieces of story
form part of Rusia's narration. With such strong anchorage on the
testimonies of disinterested witnesses, how can we brush aside Rusia's
testimony?
Rusia's discharge has the effect of an acquittal.[113] We are not inclined
to recall such discharge lest he will be placed in double jeopardy.
Parenthetically, the order for his discharge may only be recalled in one
instance, which is when he subsequently failed to testify against his co-
accused. The fact that not all the requisites for his discharge are
present is not a ground to recall the discharge order. Unless and until
it is shown that the he failed or refused to testify against his co-
9
accused, subsequent proof showing that any or all of the
conditions listed in Sec. 9 of Rule 119 were not fulfilled would not
wipe away the resulting acquittal.[114]
III. Appreciation of the Evidence for the
Prosecution and the Defen
Settled is the rule that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses is
left largely to the trial court because of its opportunity, not available to
the appellate court, to see the witnesses on the stand and determine by
their demeanor whether they are testifying truthfully or lying through
their teeth. Its evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is well-nigh
conclusive on this Court, barring arbitrariness in arriving at his
conclusions.[115]
We reviewed the records exhaustively and found no compelling reason
why we should deviate from the findings of fact and conclusion of law
of the trial court. Rusia's detailed narration of the circumstances
leading to the horrible death and disappearance of Jacqueline has all
the earmarks of truth. Despite the rigid cross-examination conducted
by the defense counsel, Rusia remained steadfast in his testimony. The
other witnesses presented by the prosecution corroborated his
narration as to its material points which reinforced its veracity.
Appellants proffered the defense of denial and alibi. As between their
mere denial and the positive identification and testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, we are convinced that the trial court did not err
in according weight to the latter. For the defense of alibi to prosper, the
accused must show that he was in another place at such a period of
time that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the place
where the crime was committed at the time of its commission.
[116]
These requirements of time and place must be strictly met.
[117]
A thorough examination of the evidence for the defense shows that
the appellants failed to meet these settled requirements. They failed to
establish by clear and convincing evidence that it was physically
impossible for them to be at the Ayala Center, Cebu City when the
Chiong sisters were abducted. What is clear from the evidence is that
Rowen, Josman, Ariel, Alberto, James Anthony and James Andrew were
all within the vicinity of Cebu City on July 16, 1997.
Not even Larranñ aga who claimed to be in Quezon City satisfied the
required proof of physical impossibility. During the hearing, it was
established that it takes only one (1) hour to travel by plane from
Manila to Cebu and that there are four (4) airline companies
plying the route. One of the defense witnesses admitted that there are
several flights from Manila to Cebu each morning, afternoon and
evening. Taking into account the mode and speed of transportation, it is
therefore within the realm of possibility for Larranñ aga to be in Cebu
City prior to or exactly on July 16, 1997. Larranñ aga's mother, Margarita
Gonzales-Larranñ aga, testified that his son was scheduled to take a flight
from Manila to Cebu on July 17, 1997 at 7:00 o'clock in the evening, but
he was able to take an earlier flight at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon.
Margarita therefore claimed that his son was in Cebu City at around
6:00 o'clock in the evening of July 17, 1997 or the day after the
commission of the crime. However, while Larranñ aga endeavored to
prove that he went home to Cebu City from Manila only in the
afternoon of July 17, 1997, he did not produce any evidence to show
the last time he went to Manila from Cebu prior to such crucial
date. If he has a ticket of his flight to Cebu City on July 17, 1997,
certainly, he should also have a ticket of his last flight to Manila prior
thereto. If it was lost, evidence to that effect should have been
presented before the trial court.
Indeed, Larranñ aga's presence in Cebu City on July 16, 1997 proved to be
not only a possibility but a reality. No less than four (4) witnesses for
the prosecution identified him as one of the two men talking to Marijoy
and Jacqueline on the night of July 16, 1997. Shiela Singsontestified
that on July 16, 1997, at around 7:20 in the evening, she saw
Larranñ aga approach Marijoy and Jacqueline at the West Entry of
Ayala Center. The incident reminded her of Jacqueline's prior story
that he was Marijoy's admirer. She (Shiela) confirmed that she knows
Larranñ aga since she had seen him on five (5) occasions. Analie
Konahap also testified that on the same evening of July 16, 1997, at
about 8:00 o'clock, she saw Marijoy and Jacqueline talking to two
(2) men at the West Entry of Ayala Center. She recognized them as
Larranñ aga and Josman, having seen them several times at Glicos, a
game zone, located across her office at the third level of Ayala
Center. Williard Redobles, the security guard then assigned at Ayala
Center, corroborated the foregoing testimonies of Shiela and Analie. In
addition, Rosendo Rio, a businessman from Cogon, Carcar, declared
that he saw Larranñ aga at Tan-awan at about 3:30 in the morning of July
17, 1997. The latter was leaning against the hood of a white van. [118]
Taking the individual testimonies of the above witnesses and that of
Rusia, it is reasonable to conclude that Larranñ aga was indeed in Cebu
City at the time of the commission of the crimes and was one of the
principal perpetrators.
Of course, we have also weighed the testimonial and documentary
evidence presented by appellants in support of their respective alibi.
However, they proved to be wanting and incredible.
Salvador Boton, the security guard assigned at the lobby of Loyola
Heights Condominium, testified on the entry of Larranñ aga's name in the
Condominium's logbook to prove that he was in Quezon City on the
night of July 16, 1997. However, a cursory glance of the entry readily
shows that it was written at the uppermost portion of the logbook and
was not following the chronological order of the entries. Larranñ aga's
10:15 entry was written before the 10:05 entry which, in turn, was
followed by a 10:25 entry. Not only that, the last entry at the prior page
was 10:05. This renders the authenticity of the entries doubtful. It gives
rise to the possibility that the 10:15 entry was written on a later date
when all the spaces in the logbook were already filled up and thus, the
only remaining spot was the uppermost portion. Surprisingly, the
alleged arrival of Larranñ aga and his friend Richard Antonio at the
Loyola Heights Condominium in the early evening of July 16, 1997 was
not recorded in the logbook.
Rowena Bautista, a teacher at the Center for Culinary Arts, Quezon
City, testified that Larranñ aga attended her lecture on Applied
Mathematics on July 16, 1997 from 8:00 o'clock to 11:30 in the
morning.[119] This runs counter to Larranñ aga's affidavit[120] stating that
on the said date, he took his mid-term examinations in the subject
Fundamentals of Cookery from 8:00 o'clock in the morning to 3:30
o'clock in the afternoon.
With respect to Larranñ aga's friends, the contradictions in their
testimonies, painstakingly outlined by the Solicitor General in the
appellee's brief, reveal their unreliability. To our mind, while it may be
possible that Larranñ aga took the mid-term examinations in
Fundamentals of Cookery and that he and his friends attended a party
at the R and R Bar and Restaurant, also in Quezon City, however it could
be that those events occurred on a date other than July 16, 1997.
Clotilde Soterol, in defense of Ariel and Alberto (the driver and the
conductor of the van) attempted to discredit Rusia's testimony by
testifying that the white van with plate no. GGC-491 could not have
been used in the commission of the crimes on the night of July 16, 1997
because it was parked in her shop from 7:00 o'clock in the evening of
the same date until 11:00 o'clock in the morning of July 17, 1997. What
makes Soterol's testimony doubtful is her contradicting affidavits. In
the first affidavit dated July 28, 1997, or twelve (12) days from the
occurrence of the crime, she stated that Alberto took the van from
her shop at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of July 16, 1997 and
returned it for repair only on July 22, 1997.[121] But in her second
affidavit dated October 1, 1997, she declared that Alberto left the van in
10
her shop at 7:00 o'clock in the evening of July 16, 1997 until 11:00
o'clock in the morning of July 17, 1997.[122]Surely, we cannot simply
brush aside the discrepancy and accept the second affidavit as gospel
truth.
Appellants attempted to establish their defense of alibi through the
testimonies of relatives and friends who obviously wanted them
exculpated of the crimes charged. Naturally, we cannot but cast an eye
of suspicion on their testimonies. In People vs. Ching,[123] we ruled that it
is but natural, although morally unfair, for a close relative to give weight
to blood ties and close relationship in times of dire needs especially
when a criminal case is involved.
Rusia positively identified the appellants. The settled rule is that
positive identification of an accused by credible witnesses as the
perpetrator of the crime demolishes alibi, the much abused sanctuary
of felons.[124] Rusia's testimony was corroborated by several
disinterested witnesses who also identified the appellants. Most of
them are neither friends, relatives nor acquaintances of the victims'
family. As we reviewed closely the transcript of stenographic notes, we
could not discern any motive on their part why they should testify
falsely against the appellants. In the same vein, it is improbable that the
prosecution would tirelessly go through the rigors of litigation just to
destroy innocent lives.
Meanwhile, appellants argue that the prosecution failed to prove that
the body found at the foot of a deep ravine in Tan-awan, Carcar was that
of Marijoy. We are not convinced. Rusia testified that Josman instructed
Rowen "to get rid" of Marijoy and that following such instruction,
Rowen and Ariel pushed her into the deep ravine. Furthermore,
Inspector Edgardo Lenizo,[125] a fingerprint expert, testified that the
fingerprints of the corpse matched those of Marijoy.[126] The packaging
tape and the handcuff found on the dead body were the same items
placed on Marijoy and Jacqueline while they were being detained.
[127]
The body had the same clothes worn by Marijoy on the day she was
abducted.[128] The members of the Chiong family personally identified
the corpse to be that of Marijoy[129] which they eventually buried. They
erected commemorative markers at the ravine, cemetery and every
place which mattered to Marijoy. Indeed, there is overwhelming and
convincing evidence that it was the body of Marijoy that was found in
the ravine.
Appellants were charged with the crime of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention in two (2) Informations and were convicted thereof.
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 8 of R.A.
7659, reads:
"Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Any private
individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner
deprive him of liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death;
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three
days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the
person kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been
made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when
the accused is any of the parents, female or a public officer.
"The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was
committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any
other person, even if none of the circumstances above mentioned were
present in the commission of the offense.
"When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or
is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum
penalty shall be imposed
The elements of the crime defined in Art. 267 above are: (a) the
accused is a private individual; (b) he kidnaps or detains another, or in
any manner deprives the latter of his liberty;
(c) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (d) in the
commission of the offense, any of the four (4) circumstances mentioned
above is present.[130]
There is clear and overwhelming evidence that appellants, who are
private individuals, forcibly dragged Marijoy and Jacqueline into the
white car, beat them so they would not be able to resist, and held them
captive against their will. In fact, Jacqueline attempted to free herself
twice from the clutches of appellants the first was near the Ayala
Center and the second was in Tan-awan, Carcar but both attempts
failed. Marijoy was thrown to a deep ravine, resulting to her death.
Jacqueline, on the other hand, has remained missing until now.
Article 267 states that if the victim is killed or died as a consequence of
the detention, or is raped or subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts,
the maximum penalty shall be imposed. In People vs. Ramos,
[131]
citing Parulan vs. Rodas,[132] and People vs. Mercado,[133] we held
that this provision given rise to a special complex crime, thus:
"Prior to 31 December 1993, the date of effectivity of RA No. 7659, the
rule was that where the kidnapped victim was subsequently killed by
his abductor, the crime committed would either be a complex crime of
kidnapping with murder under Art 48 of the Revised Penal Code, or
two (2) separate crimes of kidnapping and murder. Thus, where the
accused kidnapped the victim for the purpose of killing him, and he
was in fact killed by his abductor, the crime committed was the complex
crime of kidnapping with murder under Art. 48 of the Revised Penal
Code, as the kidnapping of the victim was a necessary means of
committing the murder. On the other hand, where the victim was
kidnapped not for the purpose of killing him but was subsequently
slain as an afterthought, two (2) separate crimes of kidnapping and
murder were committed.
However, RA No. 7659 amended Art. 267 of The Revised Penal
Code by adding thereto a last paragraph which provides
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, or
is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum
penalty shall be imposed.
This amendment introduced in our criminal statutes, the concept
of 'special complex crime' of kidnapping with murder or homicide.
It effectively eliminated the distinction drawn by the courts between
those cases where the killing of the kidnapped victim was purposely
sought by the accused, and those where the killing of the victim was not
deliberately resorted to but was merely an afterthought. Consequently,
the rule now is: Where the person kidnapped is killed in the
course of the detention, regardless of whether the killing was
purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, the kidnapping
and murder or homicide can no longer be complexed under Art.
48, nor be treated as separate crimes, but shall be punished as a
special complex crime under the last paragraph of Art. 267, as
amended by RA No. 7659."
The prosecution was able to prove that Marijoy was pushed to a ravine
and died. Both girls were raped by the gang. In committing the crimes,
appellants subjected them to dehumanizing acts. Dehumanization
means deprivation of human qualities, such as compassion. [134] From
our review of the evidence presented, we found the following
dehumanizing acts committed by appellants: (1) Marijoy and
Jacqueline were handcuffed and their mouths mercilessly
taped; (2) they were beaten to severe weakness during their
detention; (3)Jacqueline was made to dance amidst the rough manners
and lewd suggestions of the appellants; (4) she was taunted to run and
forcibly dragged to the van; and 5) until now, Jacqueline remains
missing which aggravates the Chiong family's pain. All told, considering
11
that the victims were raped, that Marijoy was killed and that both
victims were subjected to dehumanizing acts, the imposition of the
death penalty on the appellants is in order.
Thus, we hold that all the appellants are guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention with homicide and rape in Criminal Case No. CBU-45303
wherein Marijoy is the victim; and simple kidnapping and serious
illegal detention in Criminal Case No. CBU-45304 wherein Jacqueline is
the victim.
A discussion on the nature of special complex crime is imperative.
Where the law provides a single penalty for two or more component
offenses, the resulting crime is called a special complex crime. Some of
the special complex crimes under the Revised Penal Code
are (1)robbery with homicide,[135] (2) robbery with rape,
[136]
(3) kidnapping with serious physical injuries,[137] (4) kidnapping
with murder or homicide,[138] and (5) rape with homicide.[139] In a
special complex crime, the prosecution must necessarily prove
each of the component offenses with the same precision that
would be necessary if they were made the subject of separate
complaints. As earlier mentioned, R.A. No. 7659 amended Article 267
of the Revised Penal Code by adding thereto this provision: "When the
victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, or is
raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the
maximum penalty shall be imposed; and that this provision gives
rise to a special complex crime. In the cases at bar, particularly Criminal
Case No. CBU-45303, the Information specifically alleges that the victim
Marijoy was raped "on the occasion and in connection" with her
detention and was killed "subsequent thereto and on the occasion
thereof." Considering that the prosecution was able to prove each of
the component offenses, appellants should be convicted of the special
complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with
homicide and rape. It appearing from the overwhelming evidence of
the prosecution that there is a "direct relation, and intimate
connection"[140] between the kidnapping, killing and raping of Marijoy,
rape cannot be considered merely as an aggravating circumstance but
as a component offense forming part of the herein special complex
crime. It bears reiterating that in People vs. Ramos, [141] and People vs.
Mercado,[142] interpreting Article 267, we ruled that "where the person
killed in the course of the detention, regardless of whether the
killing was purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, the
kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be complexed under
Article 48, nor be treated as separate crimes, but shall be punished as
a special complex crime under the last paragraph of Article 267."
The same principle applies here. The kidnapping and serious
illegal detention can no longer be complexed under Article 48, nor
be treated as separate crime but shall be punished as a special
complex crime. At any rate, the technical designation of the crime
is of no consequence in the imposition of the penalty considering
that kidnapping and serious illegal detention if complexed with
either homicide or rape, still, the maximum penalty of death shall
be imposed.
Anent Criminal Case No. CBU-45304 wherein Jacqueline is the victim,
the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon appellants
considering that the above-mentioned component offenses were not
alleged in the Information as required under Sections 8 and 9, [143]Rule
110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Consistent with
appellants' right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, these attendant circumstances or component
offenses must be specifically pleaded or alleged with certainty in the
information and proven during the trial. Otherwise, they cannot give
rise to a special complex crime, as in this case. Hence, the crime
committed is only simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention.
From the evidence of the prosecution, there is no doubt that all the
appellants conspired in the commission of the crimes charged. Their
concerted actions point to their joint purpose and community of intent.
Well settled is the rule that in conspiracy, direct proof of a previous
agreement to commit a crime is not necessary. It may be deduced from
the mode and manner by which the offense was perpetrated, or
inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when such point to a
joint design and community of interest.[144]Otherwise stated, it may be
shown by the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the
commission of the crime.[145] Appellants' actions showed that they have
the same objective to kidnap and detain the Chiong sisters. Rowen and
Josman grabbed Marijoy and Jacqueline from the vicinity of Ayala
Center. Larranñ aga, James Andrew and James Anthony who were riding
a red car served as back-up of Rowen and Josman. Together in a convoy,
they proceeded to Fuente Osmenñ a to hire a van, and thereafter, to the
safehouse of the "Jozman Aznar Group" in Guadalupe, Cebu where they
initially molested Marijoy and Jacqueline. They headed to the South Bus
Terminal where they hired the white van driven by Alberto, with Ariel
as the conductor. Except for James Andrew who drove the white car, all
appellants boarded the white van where they held Marijoy and
Jacqueline captive. In the van, James Anthony taped their mouths and
Rowen handcuffed them together. They drank and had a pot session at
Tan-awan. They encircled Jacqueline and ordered her to dance, pushing
her and ripping her clothes in the process. Meanwhile, Larranñ aga raped
Marijoy, followed by Rowen, James Anthony, Alberto, and Ariel. On
other hand, Josman and James Andrew raped Jacqueline. Upon
Josman's order, Rowen and Ariel led Marijoy to the cliff and pushed her.
After leaving Tan-awan, they taunted Jacqueline to run for her life. And
when Rusia got off from the van near Ayala Center, the appellants
jointly headed back to Cebu City.
Clearly, the argument of Rowen, Ariel and Alberto that they were not
part of the "conspiracy" as they were merely present during the
perpetration of the crimes charged but not participants therein, is
bereft of merit. To hold an accused guilty as co-principal by reason of
conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in
pursuance or furtherance of the complicity.[146] There must be
intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the
furtherance of the common design and purpose.[147] Responsibility of a
conspirator is not confined to the accomplishment of a particular
purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and offenses
incident to and growing out of the purpose intended.[148] As shown by
the evidence for the prosecution, Rowen, Ariel and Alberto were not
merely present at the scene of the crime.
Indeed, all appellants, except James Anthony who was 16 years old
when the crimes charged were committed, share the same degree of
responsibility for their criminal acts. Under Article 68 [149] of the Revised
Penal Code, the imposable penalty on James Anthony, by reason of his
minority, is one degree lower than the statutory penalty. This means
that he stands to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in Criminal
Case No. CBU-45303 and twelve (12) years of prision mayor in its
maximum period, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion
temporal in its medium period, as maximum, in Criminal Case No. CBU-
45304. The penalty for the special complex crime of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention with homicide and rape, being death, one
degree lower therefrom is reclusion perpetua.[150] On the other hand, the
penalty for simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention is reclusion
perpetua to death. One degree lower from the said penalty is reclusion
temporal.[151] There being no aggravating and mitigating
circumstance, the penalty to be imposed on James Anthony is reclusion
temporal in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, he should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of twelve (12) years
of prision mayor in its maximum period, as minimum, to seventeen (17)
years of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum.[152]
As for the rest of the appellants, the foregoing established facts call for
the imposition on them of the death penalty in Criminal Case No. CBU-
45303 and reclusion perpetua in Criminal Case No. CBU-45304. It is
therefore clear that the trial court erred in merely imposing "two
(2) Reclusiones Perpetua," rationalizing that justice must be tempered
with mercy. We must be reminded that justice is not ours to give
12
according to our sentiments or emotions. It is in the law which we must
faithfully implement.
At times we may show compassion and mercy but not at the expense of
the broader interest of fair play and justice. While we also find it
difficult to mete out the penalty of death especially on young men who
could have led productive and promising lives if only they were given
enough guidance, however, we can never go against what is laid down
in our statute books and established jurisprudence.
In keeping with the current jurisprudence, the heirs of Marijoy and
Jacqueline are entitled to the amount of P100,000.00 in each case by
way of civil indemnity ex delicto.[153] As regards the actual damages, it
appears that the award of P200,000.00 is not supported by evidence.
To be entitled to actual damages, it is necessary to prove the actual
amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon
competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable to the injured
party.[154] Thus, in light of the recent case of People vs. Abrazaldo,
[155] we grant the award of P25,000.00 as temperate damages in each
case, in lieu of actual damages. There being proofs that the victims'
heirs suffered wounded feelings, mental anguish, anxiety and similar
injury, we award an equitable amount of P150,000.00 as moral
damages, also in each case. Exemplary damages is pegged at
P100,000.00 in each case[156] to serve as a deterrent to serious
wrongdoings and as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton
invasion of the rights of the victims and as punishment for those guilty
of outrageous conduct.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Cebu
City in Criminal Cases Nos. CBU-45303 and 45304 is AFFIRMED with
the following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, appellants FRANCISCO JUAN
LARRAׁAGA alias "PACO;" JOSMAN AZNAR; ROWEN ADLAWAN
alias "WESLEY;" ALBERTO CAׁO alias "ALLAN PAHAK;" ARIEL
BALANSAG; and JAMES ANDREW UYalias "MM," are found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping
and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape and are sentenced
to suffer the penalty of DEATH by lethal injection;
(2) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45304, appellants FRANCISCO JUAN
LARRAׁAGA alias "PACO;" JOSMAN AZNAR; ROWEN
ADLAWAN alias "WESLEY;" ALBERTO CAׁO alias "ALLAN
PAHAK;" ARIEL BALANSAG; and JAMES ANDREW UY alias "MM," are
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple kidnapping and
serious illegal detention and are sentenced to suffer penalty
of RECLUSION PERPETUA;
(3) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, appellant JAMES ANTHONY UY,
who was a minor at the time the crime was committed, is likewise
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape and is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA; in
Criminal Case No. CBU-45304, he is declared guilty of simple
kidnapping and serious illegal detention and is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor in its maximum period, as
MINIMUM, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal in its medium
period, as MAXIMUM.
(4) Appellants are ordered to pay jointly and severally the heirs of
Marijoy and Jacqueline, in each case, the amounts of (a) P100,000.00 as
civil indemnity, (b) P25,000.00 as temperate damages, (c) P150,000.00
as moral damages, and (d) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Three (3) Justices of the Court maintain their position that RA 7659 is
unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty;
nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is
constitutional and the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the
case at bar.
In accordance with Article 83 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Section 25 of RA No. 7659, upon the finality of this Decision let the
records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the
President for the possible exercise of Her Excellency's pardoning
power.

SO ORDERED.

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