1 SPEC PRO
Rule 65
G.R. No. 164561 August 30, 2006
CATHAY PACIFIC STEEL CORPORATION, BENJAMIN
CHUA JR., VIRGILIO AGERO, and LEONARDO VISORRO,
JR., Petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, CAPASCO UNION OF
SUPERVISORY EMPLOYEES (CUSE) and ENRIQUE
TAMONDONG III, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a special civil action for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court seeking to annul and set aside, on the ground
of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, (1) the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 57179 dated 28 October 2003 which annulled the
Decision 2 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
in NLRC Case No. 017822-99 dated 25 August 1999, thereby,
reinstating the Decision 3 of Acting Executive Labor Arbiter
Pedro C. Ramos dated 7 August 1998; and (2) the
Resolution 4 of the same court, dated 3 June 2004, which
denied the petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.
Herein petitioners are Cathay Pacific Steel Corporation
(CAPASCO), a domestic corporation engaged in the business
of manufacturing steel products; Benjamin Chua, Jr. (now
deceased), the former CAPASCO President; Virgilio Agerro,
CAPASCO’s Vice-President; and Leonardo Visorro, Jr.,
CAPASCO’s Administrative-Personnel Manager. Herein
private respondents are Enrique Tamondong III, the Personnel
Superintendent of CAPASCO who was previously assigned at
the petitioners’ Cainta Plant, and CAPASCO Union of
Supervisory Employees (CUSE), a duly registered union of
CAPASCO.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Four former employees of CAPASCO originally filed this labor
case before the NLRC, namely: Fidel Lacambra, Armando
Dayson, Reynaldo Vacalares, and Enrique Tamondong III.
However, in the course of the proceedings, Fidel
Lacambra 5 and Armando Dayson 6 executed a Release and
Quitclaim, thus, waiving and abandoning any and all claims
that they may have against petitioner CAPASCO. On 3
November 1999, Reynaldo Vacalares also signed a
Quitclaim/Release/Waiver. 7 Hence, this Petition shall focus
solely on issues affecting private respondent Tamondong.
Petitioner CAPASCO, hired private respondent Tamondong as
Assistant to the Personnel Manager for its Cainta Plant on 16
February 1990. Thereafter, he was promoted to the position of
Personnel/Administrative Officer, and later to that of Personnel
Superintendent. Sometime in June 1996, the supervisory
personnel of CAPASCO launched a move to organize a union
among their ranks, later known as private respondent CUSE.
Private respondent Tamondong actively involved himself in the
formation of the union and was even elected as one of its
officers after its creation. Consequently, petitioner CAPASCO
sent a memo 8 dated 3 February 1997, to private respondent
Tamondong requiring him to explain and to discontinue from
his union activities, with a warning that a continuance thereof
shall adversely affect his employment in the company. Private
respondent Tamondong ignored said warning and made a
reply letter 9 on 5 February 1997, invoking his right as a
supervisory employee to join and organize a labor union. In
view of that, on 6 February 1997, petitioner CAPASCO through
a memo 10terminated the employment of private respondent
Tamondong on the ground of loss of trust and confidence,
citing his union activities as acts constituting serious disloyalty
to the company.
Private respondent Tamondong challenged his dismissal for
being illegal and as an act involving unfair labor practice by
filing a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal and Unfair Labor
Practice before the NLRC, Regional Arbitration Branch IV.
According to him, there was no just cause for his dismissal and
it was anchored solely on his involvement and active
participation in the organization of the union of supervisory
personnel in CAPASCO. Though private respondent
Tamondong admitted his active role in the formation of a union
composed of supervisory personnel in the company, he
claimed that such was not a valid ground to terminate his
employment because it was a legitimate exercise of his
constitutionally guaranteed right to self-organization.
In contrast, petitioner CAPASCO contended that by virtue of
private respondent Tamondong’s position as Personnel
Superintendent and the functions actually performed by him in
the company, he was considered as a managerial employee,
thus, under the law he was prohibited from joining a union as
well as from being elected as one of its officers. Accordingly,
petitioners maintained their argument that the dismissal of
private respondent Tamondong was perfectly valid based on
loss of trust and confidence because of the latter’s active
participation in the affairs of the union.
On 7 August 1998, Acting Executive Labor Arbiter Pedro C.
Ramos rendered a Decision in favor of private respondent
Tamondong, decreeing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered finding [petitioner CAPASCO] guilty of unfair labor
practice and illegal dismissal. Concomitantly, [petitioner
CAPASCO] is hereby ordered:
1. To cease and desist from further committing acts of unfair
labor practice, as charged;
2. To reinstate [private respondent Tamondong] to his former
position without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and
his full backwages inclusive of allowances, and to his other
benefits or their monetary equivalent, computed from the time
his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his
actual reinstatement, and herein partially computed as follows:
a) P167,076.00 - backwages from February 7, 1997 to August
7, 1998;
b) P18,564.00 - 13th month pay for 1997 and 1998;
c) P4,284.00 - Holiday pay for 12 days;

d) P3,570.00 - Service Incentive Leave for 1997 and 1998.
P 193,494.00 - Total partial backwages and benefits. 11
Aggrieved, petitioners appealed the afore-quoted Decision to
the NLRC. On 25 August 1999, the NLRC rendered its
Decision modifying the Decision of the Acting Executive Labor
Arbiter Pedro C. Ramos, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises all considered, the decision appealed
from is hereby MODIFIED:
a) Dismissing the Complaint for Illegal Dismissal filed by
[private respondent Tamondong] for utter lack of merit;
b) Dismissing the Complaint for Unfair Labor Practice for lack
of factual basis;
c) Deleting the awards to [private respondent Tamondong] of
backwages, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s
fees;
d) Affirming the awards to [private respondent Tamondong],
representing 13th month pay for 1997 and 1998, holiday pay
for 12 days, and service incentive leave for 1997
totaling P26,418.00; and
e) Ordering the payment of backwages to [private respondent
Tamondong] reckoned from 16 September 1998 up to the date
of this Decision. 12
Petitioners filed a Motion for Clarification and Partial
Reconsideration, while, private respondent Tamondong filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the said NLRC Decision, but the
NLRC affirmed its original Decision in its Resolution 13 dated
25 November 1999.
Dissatisfied with the above-mentioned Decision of the NLRC,
private respondents Tamondong and CUSE filed a Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the Court
of Appeals, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the NLRC. Then, the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated 28
October 2003, granted the said Petition. The dispositive of
which states that:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for
Certiorari is GRANTED and the herein assailed Decision dated
August 25, 1999 of the NLRC, Third Division is ANNULLED
and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Decision dated August 7,
1998 of NLRC, RAB IV Acting Executive Labor Arbiter Pedro
C. Ramos, insofar as [private respondent Tamondong] is
concerned is hereby REINSTATED. 14
Consequently, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
the aforesaid Decision of the Court of Appeals. Nonetheless,
the Court of Appeals denied the said Motion for
Reconsideration for want of convincing and compelling reason
to warrant a reversal of its judgment.
Hence, this present Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
15
In the Memorandum filed by petitioners, they aver that
private respondent Tamondong as Personnel Superintendent
of CAPASCO was performing functions of a managerial
employee because he was the one laying down major
management policies on personnel relations such as: issuing
memos on company rules and regulations, imposing
disciplinary sanctions such as warnings and suspensions, and
executing the same with full power and discretion. They claim
that no further approval or review is necessary for private
respondent Tamondong to execute these functions, and the
notations "NOTED BY" of petitioner Agerro, the Vice-President
of petitioner CAPASCO, on the aforesaid memos are nothing
but mere notice that petitioner Agerro was aware of such
company actions performed by private respondent
Tamondong. Additionally, private respondent Tamondong was
not only a managerial employee but also a confidential
employee having knowledge of confidential information
involving company policies on personnel relations. Hence, the
Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it held that
private respondent Tamondong was not a managerial
employee but a mere supervisory employee, therefore, making
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him eligible to participate in the union activities of private
respondent CUSE.
Petitioners further argue that they are not guilty of illegal
dismissal and unfair labor practice because private respondent
Tamondong was validly dismissed and the reason for
preventing him to join a labor union was the nature of his
position and functions as Personnel Superintendent, which
position was incompatible and in conflict with his union
activities. Consequently, it was grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the Court of Appeals to rule that petitioner
CAPASCO was guilty of illegal dismissal and unfair labor
practice.
Lastly, petitioners maintain that the Court of Appeals gravely
abused its discretion when it reinstated the Decision of
Executive Labor Arbiter Pedro C. Ramos holding CAPASCO
liable for backwages, 13th month pay, service incentive leave,
moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.
On the other hand, private respondents, assert that the
assailed Decision being a final disposition of the Court of
Appeals is appealable to this Court by a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and not under
Rule 65 thereof. They also claim that petitioners new ground
that private respondent Tamondong was a confidential
employee of CAPASCO, thus, prohibited from participating in
union activities, is not a valid ground to be raised in this
Petition for Certiorari seeking the reversal of the assailed
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Now, given the foregoing arguments raise by both parties, the
threshold issue that must first be resolved is whether or not the
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure is the proper remedy for the petitioners, to warrant
the reversal of the Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals dated 28 October 2003 and 3 June 2004, respectively.
The petition must fail.
The special civil action for Certiorari is intended for the
correction of errors of jurisdiction only or grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Its

principal office is only to keep the inferior court within the
parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing
such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. 16
The essential requisites for a Petition for Certiorari under Rule
65 are: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board, or an
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function; (2) such
tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. 17 Excess of jurisdiction as distinguished from absence of
jurisdiction means that an act, though within the general power
of a tribunal, board or officer is not authorized, and invalid with
respect to the particular proceeding, because the conditions
which alone authorize the exercise of the general power in
respect of it are wanting. 18 Without jurisdiction means lack or
want of legal power, right or authority to hear and determine a
cause or causes, considered either in general or with reference
to a particular matter. It means lack of power to exercise
authority.19 Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction or, in other words, where the power is exercised in
an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or
personal hostility, and it must be so patent or gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of
law. 20
In the case before this Court, petitioners fail to meet the third
requisite for the proper invocation of Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65, to wit: that there is no appeal or any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
They simply alleged that the Court of Appeals gravely abuse its
discretion which amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
rendering the assailed Decision and Resolution. They did not
bother to explain why an appeal cannot possibly cure the
errors committed by the appellate court. It must be noted that
the questioned Decision of the Court of Appeals was already a
disposition on the merits; this Court has no remaining issues to
resolve, hence, the proper remedy available to the petitioners
is to file Petition for Review under Rule 45 not under Rule 65.
Additionally, the general rule is that a writ of certiorari will not
issue where the remedy of appeal is available to the aggrieved
party. The remedies of appeal in the ordinary course of law
and that of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court are mutually exclusive and not alternative or
cumulative. 21 Time and again this Court reminded members of
the bench and bar that the special civil action of Certiorari
cannot be used as a substitute for a lost appeal 22 where the
latter remedy is available. Such a remedy will not be a cure for
failure to timely file a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45. Nor can it be availed of as a substitute for the lost
remedy of an ordinary appeal, especially if such loss or lapse
was occasioned by one’s own negligence or error in the choice
of remedies. 23
In the case at bar, petitioners received on 9 June 2004 the
Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 3 June 2004 denying
their Motion for Reconsideration. Upon receipt of the said
Resolution, they had 15 days or until 24 June 2004 within
which to file an appeal by way of Petition for Review under
Rule 45, but instead of doing so, they just allowed the 15 day
period to lapse, and then on the 61st day from receipt of the
Resolution denying their Motion for Reconsideration, they filed
this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 alleging grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the appellate court. Admittedly, this
Court, in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules
of Court and in the interest of justice, has the discretion to treat
a Petition for Certiorari as a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45, especially if filed within the reglementary period
for filing a Petition for Review. 24However, in the present case,
this Court finds no compelling reason to justify a liberal
application of the rules, as this Court did in the case of Delsan
Transport Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals. 25 In the said case,
this Court treated the Petition for Certiorari filed by the
petitioner therein as having been filed under Rule 45 because
said Petition was filed within the 15-day reglementary period
for filing a Petition for Review on Certiorari. Petitioner’s counsel
therein received the Court of Appeals Resolution denying their
Motion for Reconsideration on 26 October 1993 and filed the
Petition for Certiorari on 8 November 1993, which was within
the 15-day reglementary period for filing a Petition for Review
on Certiorari. It cannot therefore be claimed that the Petition
was used, as a substitute for appeal after that remedy has
been lost through the fault of the petitioner. 26 Conversely, such
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was not the situation in the present case. Hence, this Court
finds no reason to justify a liberal application of the rules.
Accordingly, where the issue or question involves or affects the
wisdom or legal soundness of the decision, and not the
jurisdiction of the court to render said decision, the same is
beyond the province of a petition for certiorari. 27 It is obvious in
this case that the arguments raised by the petitioners delved
into the wisdom or legal soundness of the Decision of the
Court of Appeals, therefore, the proper remedy is a Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. Consequently, it is
incumbent upon this Court to dismiss this Petition.
In any event, granting arguendo, that the present petition is
proper, still it is dismissible. The Court of Appeals cannot be
said to have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in annulling the Decision of the
NLRC because the findings of the Court of Appeals that private
respondent Tamondong was indeed a supervisory employee
and not a managerial employee, thus, eligible to join or
participate in the union activities of private respondent CUSE,
were supported by evidence on record. In the Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 28 October 2003, it made reference to
the Memorandum 28 dated 12 September 1996, which required
private respondent Tamondong to observe fixed daily working
hours from 8:00 am to 12:00 noon and from 1:00 pm to 5:00
pm. This imposition upon private respondent Tamondong,
according to the Court of Appeals, is very uncharacteristic of a
managerial employee. To support such a conclusion, the Court
of Appeals cited the case of Engineering Equipment, Inc. v.
NLRC 29 where this Court held that one of the essential
characteristics 30 of an employee holding a managerial rank is
that he is not subjected to the rigid observance of regular office
hours or maximum hours of work.
Moreover, the Court of Appeals also held that upon careful
examination of the documents submitted before it, it found out
that:
[Private respondent] Tamondong may have possessed
enormous powers and was performing important functions that
goes with the position of Personnel Superintendent,
nevertheless, there was no clear showing that he is at liberty,
 4 SPEC PRO

5
by using his own discretion and disposition, to lay down and given the foregoing findings of the Court of Appeals that private Id. at 50.
execute major business and operational policies for and in respondent is a supervisory employee, it is indeed an unfair
behalf of CAPASCO. [Petitioner] CAPASCO miserably failed to labor practice 34 on the part of petitioner CAPASCO to dismiss 6 Id. at 51.
establish that [private respondent] Tamondong was authorized him on account of his union activities, thereby curtailing his
to act in the interest of the company using his independent constitutionally guaranteed right to self-organization. 35 7
judgment. x x x. Withal, [private respondent] Tamondong may Id. at 52.
have been exercising certain important powers, such as control With regard to the allegation that private respondent
and supervision over erring rank-and-file employees, however, 8
Tamondong was not only a managerial employee but also a Id. at 73.
x x x he does not possess the power to hire, transfer, confidential employee, the same cannot be validly raised in this
terminate, or discipline erring employees of the company. At Petition for Certiorari. It is settled that an issue which was not 9 Id. at 74-75.
the most, the record merely showed that [private respondent] raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on
Tamondong informed and warned rank-and-file employees appeal. This principle applies to a special civil action for 10
with respect to their violations of CAPASCO’s rules and Id. at 94-95.
certiorari under Rule 65. 36 In addition, petitioners failed to
regulations. x x x. [Also, the functions performed by private adduced evidence which will prove that, indeed, private
respondent such as] issuance of warning 31 to employees with respondent was also a confidential employee.
11 Id. at 149-150.
irregular attendance and unauthorized leave of absences and
requiring employees to explain regarding charges of 12
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is Id. at 160-161.
abandonment of work, are normally performed by a mere
supervisor, and not by a manager. 32 DISMISSED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals dated 28 October 2003 and 3 June 2004, respectively, 13 Id. at 163-164.
in CA-G.R. SP No. 57179, which annulled the Decision of the
Accordingly, Article 212(m) of the Labor Code, as amended, NLRC in NLRC Case No. 017822-99 dated 25 August 1999, 14
differentiates supervisory employees from managerial Id. at 34.
thereby, reinstating the Decision of Acting Executive Labor
employees, to wit: supervisory employees are those who, in Arbiter Pedro C. Ramos dated 7 August 1998, is hereby
the interest of the employer, effectively recommend such AFFIRMED. With costs against petitioners.
15 Id. at 241-260.
managerial actions, if the exercise of such authority is not
merely routinary or clerical in nature but requires the use of 16
SO ORDERED. People v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142051, 24
independent judgment; whereas, managerial employees are
February 2004, 423 SCRA 605, 612.
those who are vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down
and execute management policies and/or hire, transfer, Footnotes
17
suspend, lay off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline Rivera v. Espiritu, 425 Phil. 169, 179-180 (2002).
employees. Thus, from the foregoing provision of the Labor 1Penned by Associate Justice Rosmari D. Carandang
Code, it can be clearly inferred that private respondent with Associate Justices Mercedes Gozo- Dadole and
18Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,
Tamondong was just a supervisory employee. Private Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., concurring; rollo, pp. 27-35. 456 Phil. 755, 785 (2003).
respondent Tamondong did not perform any of the functions of
a managerial employee as stated in the definition given to it by 19
the Code. Hence, the Labor Code 33 provisions regarding
2Penned by Commissioner Ireneo B. Bernardo with Id.
disqualification of a managerial employee from joining, Presiding Commissioner Lourdes C. Javier and
assisting or forming any labor organization does not apply to Commissioner Tito F. Genilo, concurring; id. at 151- 20 Id. at 481.
herein private respondent Tamondong. Being a supervisory 161.
employee of CAPASCO, he cannot be prohibited from joining 21 Id. at 480.
or participating in the union activities of private respondent 3Penned by Acting Executive Labor Arbiter Pedro C.
CUSE, and in making such a conclusion, the Court of Appeals Ramos, id. at 128-150. 22
did not act whimsically, capriciously or in a despotic manner, Land Bank of the Philippines v. Continental
rather, it was guided by the evidence submitted before it. Thus, Watchman Agency Incorporated, G.R. No. 136114,
4 Id. at 36-37. 22 January 2004, 420 SCRA 624, 630.

23
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,
supra note 21.
24
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Continental
Watchman Agency Incorporated, supra note 22.
25
335 Phil. 1066 (1997).
26 Id.
27 A.F. Sanchez Brokerage, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 147079, 21 December 2004, 447 SCRA
427, 436, citing Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court
of Appeals, supra note 18 at 482.
28 Rollo, p. 103.
29
218 Phil. 719, 726 (1984).
30
Among the characteristics of the managerial rank
are: (1) he is not subject to the rigid observance of
regular office hours; (2) his work requires the
consistent exercise of discretion and judgment in its
performance; (3) the output produced or the result
accomplished cannot be standardized in relation to a
given period of time; (4) he manages a customarily
recognized department or subdivision of the
establishment, customarily and regularly directing the
work of other employees therein; (5) he either has the
authority to hire or discharge other employees or his
suggestions and recommendations as to hiring and
discharging, advancement and promotion or other
change of status of other employees are given
particular weight; and (6) as a rule, he is not paid
hourly wages nor subjected to maximum hours of
work.
31 Rollo, pp. 97-99; p. 102.
32 Id. at 32-33.
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33
Article 245. Ineligibility of Managerial Employees to
join any labor organization; Right of Supervisory
Employees. – Managerial employees are not eligible
to join, assist or form any labor organization.
Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for
membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-
file employees but may join, assist or form separate
labor organizations of their own.
34 Aricle 248(a) of the Labor Code as amended.
35Article 13, Section 3 of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution.
G.R. No. 132703 June 23, 2000
36 Buñag v. Court of Appeals, 363 Phil. 216 (1999).
BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS and MORTGAGE
BANK, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. EDGAR D. GUSTILO,
Presiding Judge, Branch 28, Regional Trial Court, Iloilo
City, TALA REALTY SERVICES CORPORATION, NANCY L.
TY, PEDRO B. AGUIRRE, REMEDIOS A. DUPASQUIER,
PILAR D. ONGKING, ELIZABETH H. PALMA, DOLLY W.
LIM, RUBENCITO M. DEL MUNDO, ADD INTERNATIONAL
SERVICES, INC., respondents.
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a special civil action for certiorari to set aside and
annul the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated December
18, 1996, which sustained the dismissal2 of the complaint of
petitioner Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank
(hereafter, Banco Filipino) for recovery of real properties filed
against Tala Realty Services Corporation (hereafter, Tala
Realty) on the grounds of litis pendentia and forum-shopping.
The antecedent facts are the following:
The General Banking Act3 regulates the number of branches
that a bank may operate. Under the said law, a bank is allowed
to own the land and the improvements thereon used as branch

sites but only up to a maximum of fifty percent (50%) of the
bank's net worth.
In 1979, Banco Filipino had reached the allowable limit in
branch site holdings but contemplated further expansion of its
operations. Consequently, it unloaded some of its holdings to
Tala Realty. Banco Filipino thereafter leased the same branch
sites from Tala Realty which was conceived and organized
precisely as a transferee corporation by the major
stockholders4 of Banco Filipino. On March 26, 1979, the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued Tala
Realty's certificate of registration.5
Shortly thereafter, the board of directors of Banco Filipino
authorized negotiations for the sale of some of its branch sites,
through a Board Resolution6 dated April 17, 1979 (hereafter,
Board Resolution).
On August 25, 1981, respondent Banco Filipino sold the above
branch sites to Tala Realty under separate deeds of sale for
each branch site.1avvphi1 On the same date, Tala Realty
leased the same branch sites to Banco Filipino under separate
instruments for each branch site.7
The instant case originated from the sale by Banco Filipino to
Tala Realty of four (4) lots in Iloilo City, covered and described
in the aforementioned TCT Nos. 62273 and 62274, for two
million one hundred ten thousand pesos
(P2,110,000.00).8 Tala Realty then leased them back to Banco
Filipino for a monthly rental of twenty one thousand pesos
(P21,000.00) /for a period of twenty (20) years and renewable
for another twenty (20) years.9The lease contracts of the other
branch sites sold to Tala Realty have substantially similar
terms and conditions, except for the amount of the rent.
Banco Filipino alleges that a trust was created by virtue of the
above transactions. Tala Realty was allegedly established to
serve as a corporate medium to warehouse the legal title of the
said properties for the beneficial interest of Banco Filipino and
to purchase properties to be held in trust for the latter. 10
However, sometime in August 1992, Tala Realty demanded
payment of increased rentals, deposits and goodwill from
Banco Filipino, with a threat of ejectment in case of failure to
comply thereto. On April 20, 1994, some stockholders of
Banco Filipino filed a derivative suit against Tala Realty before
the SEC for the reconveyance of the properties sold by the
former to the latter. However, on March 6, 1995, the SEC
dismissed the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. 11
Due to Banco Filipino's failure to comply with Tala Realty's
terms, the latter carried out its threat by filing numerous
ejectment suits against Banco Filipino. 12 This prompted Banco
Filipino to file, on August 16, 1995, an action for recovery of
real properties 1 before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo,
Branch 28, on the ground of breach of trust. Incidentally, during
the period from August to September 1995, Banco Filipino also
filed sixteen (16) other complaints for recovery of real
properties which it had previously sold to Tala Realty. 14 These
complaints, including the one filed in the Regional Trial Court
of Iloilo City, Branch 28, were uniformly worded in their
material allegations. 15
As regards Banco Filipino's complaint in the Regional Trial
Court of Iloilo City, Tala Realty filed on October 9, 1995 a
motion to dismiss on the following grounds: (1) forum-
shopping; (2) litis pendentia; (3) pari delicto; (4) failure to
implead indispensable parties; and (5) failure to state a cause
of action. 16 On the same date, private repondents Pilar D.
Ongking, Elizabeth H. Palma, Dolly W. Lim and Rubencito del
Mundo filed a separate motion to dismiss in the same case on
the following grounds: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter; (2) litis pendentia; and (3) failure to state a cause of
action. 17 Likewise, on November 10, 1995, private respondent
Nancy L. Ty filed a separate motion to dismiss, alleging the
same grounds as those invoked by private respondents
Ongking, et. al. 18
These motions to dismiss alleged, among others, that aside
from the said suit before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City,
Branch 28, other suits involving certain Quezon City, Lucena
City, Malolos and Manila branches of Banco Filipino are also
pending in other Regional Trial Courts.
Banco Filipino filed separate oppositions, dated October 14,
1995, October 31, 1995 and November 21, 1995 respectively,
6 SPEC PRO
to the motions to dismiss. 19 After a protracted exchange of
pleadings, the trial court dismissed the complaint on April 22,
1996 in this wise: 20
A thorough and careful perusal was made by the
undersigned Presiding Judge of the arguments of
opposing counsels, ventilated in their respective
memoranda. Opposing counsels cited the pertinent
Supreme Court Circulars, provisions of the Rules of
Court and related Decisions of the Supreme Court in
support of their arguments.
After weighing the foregoing, this Court is of the
opinion and so holds that the contention of the
defendants in their motions to dismiss, etc., is
meritorious.
Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, the defendants
separate motions to dismiss are hereby granted.
Therefore, let this case be, as it is hereby Dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
On June 27, 1996, the trial court denied Banco Filipino's
motion for reconsideration. 21 Banco Filipino received a copy of
said order of denial on July 5, 1996 but instead of filing an
appeal, it filed, on July 24, 1996, a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals. 22 Banco Filipino alleged
in its petition that the trial court's decision was issued with
grave abuse of discretion because it did not comply with the
constitutional mandate on the form of decisions.
However, the Court of Appeals dismissed Banco Filipino's
petition on the ground, among others, that the "[p]etitioner's
recourse to Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court is patently
malapropos." 2 It reiterated the rule that a special civil action
for certiorari may be resorted to only when there is no appeal,
nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. Banco Filipino's failure to appeal by writ of error
within the reglementary period and its belated recourse to a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was interpreted by the

Court of Appeals as a desperate attempt by Banco Filipino to
resurrect what was otherwise already a lost
appeal. 24 Furthermore, the Court of Appeals debunked Banco
Filipino's theory that the assailed order of the RTC did not
comply with the substantive requirements of the Constitution,
and was thus, rendered with grave abuse of discretion.
On December 28, 1996, Banco Filipino received a copy of the
Court of Appeals' decision dismissing its petition thereby
prompting the latter to file a motion for reconsideration on
January 10, 1997. The Court of Appeals denied the said
motion for reconsideration on December 19, 1997 in a
resolution, a copy of which was received by Banco Filipino on
January 7, 1998. 25 Banco Filipino then filed with this Court its
subject petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court on March 9, 1998. 26
Petitioner advances the following arguments:
I. RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN FAILING TO CORRECT BY
CERTIORARI THE DISMISSAL ORDER BY THE
RTC WHICH PATENTLY DISREGARDED THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PRESCRIPTION AS TO FORM
AND JUDGMENT, AND EFFECTIVELY DENIED
PETITIONER DUE PROCESS OF LAW; 27
II. BANCO FILIPINO WAS DENIED THE
OPPORTUNITY TO PROVE ITS CAUSE OF ACTION
OF AN IMPLIED TRUST; 28
III. RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
RULING THAT A WRIT OF ERROR SHOULD BE
THE PROPER REMEDY INSTEAD OF A PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE
65; 29
IV. RESPONDENT CA GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT BANCO FILIPINO
IS GUILTY OF SPLITTING CAUSES OF ACTION
MERELY ON THE BASIS OF THE PLEADINGS
THUS FILED. 30
Without need of delving into the merits of the case, this Court
hereby dismisses the instant petition. For in filing a special civil
action for certiorari instead of an ordinary appeal before this
Court, Banco Filipino violated basic tenets of remedial law that
merited the dismissal of its petition.
First. Banco Filipino's proper remedy from the adverse
resolutions of the Court of Appeals is an ordinary appeal to this
Court via a petition for review under Rule 45 and not a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is proper if a tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions
has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. 31
We have said time and again that for the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari to lie by reason of grave abuse of discretion, the
abuse of discretion, must be so patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of a positive duty, or a virtual refusal to perform
the duty enjoined or act in contemplation of law, or where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion and personal hostility. 32
Nothing in the record of this case supports Banco Filipino's
bare assertion that the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed
resolutions with grave abuse of discretion. On the contrary,
Banco Filipino even admitted that the Court of Appeals
painstakingly "labored to defend in thirty-three (33) [single
spaced] pages" 3 the rationale behind its decision, clearly
setting forth therein the applicable provisions of law and
jurisprudence. In other words, there being no grave abuse of
discretion on its part, the Court of Appeals rendered the
assailed resolutions in the proper exercise of its jurisdiction.
Hence, even if erroneous, the Court of Appeals' resolutions
can only be assailed by means of a petition for review. The
distinction is clear: a petition for certiorari seeks to correct
errors of jurisdiction while a petition for review seeks to correct
errors of judgment committed by the court. Errors of judgment
include errors of procedure or mistakes in the court's
findings. 34 Where a court has jurisdiction over the person and
7 SPEC PRO
the subject matter, the decision on all other questions arising in
the case is an exercise of that jurisdiction. Consequently, all
errors committed in the exercise of such jurisdiction are merely
errors of judgment. 35
Second. The availability to Banco Filipino of the remedy of a
petition for review from the decision of the Court of Appeals
effectively foreclosed its right to resort to a petition
for certiorari. This Court has often enough reminded members
of the bench and bar that a special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 lies only when there is no appeal
nor plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law. Certiorari is not allowed when a party to a case fails to
appeal a judgment despite the availability of that remedy. The
remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and
not alternative or successive. 36
The antithetic character of the remedies of appeal
and certiorari has been generally observed by this Court save
only in those rare instances where appeal is satisfactorily
shown to be an inadequate remedy. In the case at bar, Banco
Filipino has failed to show any valid reason why the issues
raised in its petition for certiorari could not have been raised on
appeal. To justify its resort to a special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65, it erroneously claims that an
appeal is not a speedy and adequate remedy because further
delay in the disposition of this case would effectively deprive
Banco Filipino of the full use and enjoyment of its
properties. 37 However, the further delay that would
inadvertently result from the dismissal of the instant petition is
one purely of Banco Filipino's own doing. We cannot
countenance an intentional departure from established rules of
procedure simply to accommodate a case that has long been
pending in the courts of law because of the party's own fault or
negligence.
Third. Certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for the lapsed
or lost remedy of appeal.lawphi1 Banco Filipino's recourse to a
special civil action for certiorari was borne not out of the
conviction that grave abuse of discretion attended the
resolution of its petition before the Court of Appeals but simply
because of its failure to file a timely appeal to this Court. This
observation is shared by the Court of Appeals which was quick
to point out that when Banco Filipino filed its petition

for certiorari assailing the RTC order, the reglementary period
for filing a petition for review before the Court of Appeals had
already lapsed.
It is true that this Court may treat a petition for certiorari as
having been filed under Rule 45 to serve the higher interest of
justice, but not when the petition is filed well beyond the
reglementary period for filing a petition for review and without
offering any reason therefor.
Concomitant to a liberal application of the rules of procedure
should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to
at least explain its failure to comply with the rules. In the case
at bar, Banco Filipino's petition is bereft of any valid reason or
explanation as to why it failed to properly observe the rules of
procedure. The record shows that Banco Filipino failed, not
once but twice, and for an unreasonable length of time, to file
an appeal within the period required by law. From the order of
the RTC, it filed its petition for certiorari some fourteen (14)
days after the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal to the
Court of Appeals. Likewise, when Banco Filipino filed its
petition for certiorari before this Court, forty five (45) days have
already passed since the end of the fifteen (15) day
reglementary period for filing an appeal to the Supreme Court.
Allowing appeals, although filed late in some rare cases, may
not be applied to Banco Filipino in the case at bar for this rule
is qualified by the requirement that there must be exceptional
circumstances to justify the relaxation of the rules. 38 We
cannot find any such exceptional circumstances in this case
and neither has Banco Filipino endeavored to prove the
existence of any. This being so, another elementary rule of
procedure applies and that is the doctrine that perfection of an
appeal within the reglementary period is not only mandatory
but also jurisdictional so that failure to do so renders the
questioned decision final and executory, and deprives the
appellate court of jurisdiction to alter the final judgment, much
less to entertain the appeal. 39
As a final word, we quote herein our relevant pronouncement
in the case of Bank of America, NT and SA v. Gerochi, Jr. that:
8 SPEC PRO
The case at bench, given its own factual settings xxx xxx xxx
cannot come close to those extraordinary
circumstances that have indeed justified a deviation Sec. 34. Savings and mortgage bank may
from an otherwise stringent rule. Let it not be purchase, hold and convey real estate under
overlooked that the timeliness of an appeal is a the same conditions as those governing
jurisdictional caveat that not even this Court can trifle commercial banks as specified in Section
with. 40 (Emphasis provided.) twenty-five of this Act.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby 4Antonio Tiu, Tomas B. Aguirre, Nancy Ty and Pedro
DISMISSED. B. Aguirre.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED. 5 Rollo, p. 115.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing and Buena, JJ., concur. 6
RESOLVED, that the President, or in his absence
the Executive Vice President be authorized to
negotiate and come into agreement with any and all
liable persons or corporations for the purpose of
selling the following branch sites of Banco Filipino at
Footnotes terms hereinafter set forth. The branch sites covered
by said authority with their corresponding selling
1
prices are:
Penned by Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo and
concurred in by Associate Justices Gloria C. Paras
and Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., Rollo, pp. 35-67. C.M. RECTO — P 3,550,000.00
2By the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, in a R. HIDALGO — 1,690,000.00
decision penned by Judge Edgar D. Gustilo dated
April 22, 1996, in Civil Case No. 22493, Rollo, pp. MARIKINA — 910,000.00
272-273.
PARANAQUE — 1,460,000.00
3
Republic Act No. 337: "Sec. 25. Any commercial
bank may purchase, hold and convey real estate for LAS PINAS — 755,000.00
the following purposes:
DAVAO — 1,450,000.00
(a) such as shall be necessary for its
immediate accomodation in the transaction
of its business: Provided, however, that the ILOILO — 1,460,000.00
total investment in such real estate and
improvements thereof, including bank LA UNION — 845,000.00
equipment, shall not exceed fifty percent
(50%) of net worth: . . . . LUCENA — 1,550,000.00
 9 SPEC PRO

URDANETA — 620,000.00 16 Rollo, pp.151-160.

5. 95- 75214 Manila 126730

6. 545-M-95 Bulacan 261375 17

xxx xxx x x x(Rollo, pp. 112- Rollo, pp. 161-166.
114) 39663
18 Rollo, pp.167-174.
7 7. 4521 Batangas City 510
Petitioner's Complaint in Civil Case No. 22493, p.
8, Rollo, p. 101. 8. U- 6026 Urdaneta, 124643 19 Rollo, pp. 175-194.
Pangasinan
8 Rollo, p. 135. 20 Rollo, pp. 272-273.
9. 28,821-95 Davao City 35418
9 35419
Rollo, p. 147. 21 Rollo, p. 288.
10. 95-170- Marikina 69147
10Petitioner's Complaint in Civil Case No. 22493, MK 22Petition, pp. 12-13, Rollo, pp. 14-15; see also Rollo,
p.7, Rollo, p. 100. pp. 289-320.
11. 3026 Cotabato City 15954
11 15955
Decision of the Court of Appeals, pp. 5-6, Rollo, pp. 23 Rollo, p. 50.
39-40. 12. 4992 La Union 23655
24
12
Rollo, p. 51.
Petition, pp. 27-28, Rollo pp. 29-30; The ponente in 13. 2176 Cabanatuan City 28354
this case is also the ponente of G.R. No. 129987, 25
entitled Tala Realty Services Corp. v. Banco Filipino 14. 2506 Malabon 28001 Rollo, p. 7.
Savings and Mortgage Bank, which originated from 28002
the ejectment suit filed by Tala Realty against Banco 28003 26 Rollo, p. 3.
Filipino concerning the Urdaneta branch site.
15. 95-0230 Paranaque 439665 27
439666 Rollo, p. 16.
13 Docketed as Civil Case No. 22493. 439667
439668 28 Rollo, p. 19.
14 439669
Decision of the Court of Appeals, pp. 7-8, Rollo,
pp.41-42: 439670 29 Rollo, p. 22.
439671
439672
30
Civil Case 439673 Rollo, p. 25.
Venue TCT No.
No. 439674
439273 311997 Rules on Civil Procedure, sec. 1; Manila
1. 95-127 Lucena City 26037 439274 Midtown Hotel and Land Corp. vs. National Labor
Relations Commission, 288 SCRA 259, 264 (1998).
2. 95-24830 Quezon City 288850 16. 96- Las Pinas S-90620
2888914 0036-LP 32Dominador Sanchez vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No.
3. 95-75212 Manila 109823 124348, August 19, 1999; Toyota Autoparts Phil. vs.
15Respondent Ty's Comment, pp.2-3, Rollo, pp. 439- Director of Bureau of Labor Relations, G.R. No.
4. 95- 75213 Manila 189468 440. 131047, March 2, 1999.

33 Rollo, p. 19.
34 GSIS vs. Olisa, G.R. No. 126874, March 10, 1999.
35
Toyota Autoparts Phil. vs. Director of Bureau of
Labor Relations, supra.
36Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals, 275 SCRA 423, 426
(1997).
37
Rollo, p. 8.
38Bank of America, NT & SA vs. Gerochi, Jr., 230
SCRA 9 (1994) citing Alto Sales Corp. vs. IAC, 197
SCRA 618 (1991), Falcon Mfg. vs. NLRC, 199 SCRA
814 (1991), Kabushi Kaisha Isetan vs. IAC, 203
SCRA 583 (1991).
39The Republic of the Philippines through the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports vs.
Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 132425, August 31,
1999; Pedrosa vs. Hill, 257 SCRA 373, 375 (1996).
40
Bank of America, NT & SA vs. Gerochi, Jr., supra at
p. 16.
G.R. No.173861 July 14, 2014
JAY CANDELARIA and ERIC BASIT, Petitioners,
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 42, CITY OF SAN
FERNANDO; (Pampanga) represented by its Presiding
Judge HON. MARIA AMIFAITH S. FIDER-REYES, OFFICE
OF THE PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR, CITY OF SAN
FERNANDO, PAMPANGA and ALLIED DOMECQ
PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
In this Petition for Certiorari with Application for Preliminary
Injunction1 filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, petitioners
Jay Candelaria and Eric Basit (petitioners) seek to nullify and
set aside two Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
42, City of San Fernando, Pampanga, to wit: Order dated
October 12, 20052 denying their Motion to Suppress/Exclude
Evidence3 and Order dated July 14, 20064 denying their Motion
for Reconsideration5 thereto.
Factual Antecedents
During an alleged buy-bust operation conducted in the evening
of June 22, 2001, petitioners werearrested at the corner of
Gueco St. and MacArthur Highway, Balibago, Angeles City for
delivering, with the intention to sell, five cases of counterfeit
FundadorBrandy. On the strength of the Joint Affidavit6 of the
police operatives, petitioners were formally charged in an
Information7 dated July 6, 2004 with violation of Section 155 in
relation to Section 170 of Republic Act No. 8293, otherwise
known as the IntellectualProperty Code of the Philippines. After
they were arraigned and had pleaded not guilty to the charge
on May 31, 2005,8 petitioners filed on June 17, 2005 a Motion
to Suppress/Exclude Evidence9 based on inadmissibility of
evidence. They contended that the evidence the prosecution
intended to present were obtained in violation of their
constitutional right against unreasonable searches and
seizures. This is considering that at the time the alleged
counterfeit productswere seized, they were neither committing
nor attempting to commit a crime in the presence of the
arresting officers as to justify the conduct of search and seizure
following their unlawful arrest.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On October 12, 2005, the RTC issued the first assailed
Order10 denying the Motion to Suppress/Exclude Evidence.
Observing that the motion was anchored on petitioners’ alleged
illegal arrest, it cited jurisprudence11wherein it was held that
any objection to an arrest must be made before an accused
10 SPEC PRO
enters his plea on arraignment. Having failed to move for the
quashal of the information before the arraignment, an accused
is estopped from questioning the legality of his arrest.
Notwithstanding this reference, the RTC based its denial of the
subject motion on its examination of the Joint Affidavit of the
arresting officers. According to the said court, since it appears
from the said affidavit that the search and seizure was
incidental to a valid warrantless arrest of the accused who
were caught in flagrante delicto, any evidence obtained during
such search and seizure is admissible in evidence.
Not satisfied, petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration,12 which the RTC denied in its assailed
Order13 of July 14, 2006.
Issue
Hence, the present recourse under Rule65 of the Rules
ofCourt, anchored on the sole ground of:
WHETHER X X X THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH
42 OF THE CITY OF SAN FERNANDO, PAMPANGA
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
DENYING THE MOTION OF THE PETITIONERS TO SET
THE CASE FOR SUPPRESSION HEARING.14
The Petition is bereft of merit.
Petitioners failed to allege that there is
no appeal nor any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law.
It is to be stressed that in every special civil action underRule
65, a party seeking the writ whether for certiorari, prohibition or
mandamus, must be able to show that his or her resort to such
extraordinary remedy is justified by the absence of an appeal
or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. "[H]e must allege in his petition and establish
facts to show that any other existing remedy is not speedy or

adequate x x x."15As held in Visca v. Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources:16
x x x [I]t is incumbent upon an applicant for a writ of certiorarito
allege with certainty in his verified petition facts showing that
"there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law," because this is an
indispensable ingredient of a valid petition for certiorari. "Being
a special civil action, petitioner-appellant must allege and
prove that he has no other speedy and adequate remedy."
"Where the existence of a remedy by appeal or some other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy precludes the granting of
the writ, the petitioner must allegefacts showing that any
existing remedy is impossible or unavailing, or that excuse
petitioner for not having availed himself of such remedy. A
petition for certiorari which does not comply with the
requirements of the rules may be dismissed.17
Pursuant to the foregoing, the instant Petition for Certiorariis
dismissible for failure to allege that there is no appeal, nor any
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
oflaw as to justify resort to certiorari.
Assuming the assailed October 12, 2005
Order to be erroneous, the mistake is an
error in judgment which is beyond the
ambit of certiorari.
In Triplex Enterprises, Inc. v. PNB-Republic Bank,18 the Court
held that:
The writ of certiorari is restricted to truly extraordinary cases
wherein the act of the lower court or quasi-judicial body is
wholly void. Moreover, it is designed to correct errors of
jurisdiction and not errors in judgment. The rationale of this rule
is that, when a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error
committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the
jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed.
Otherwise, every mistake made by a court will deprive it of its
jurisdiction and every erroneousjudgment will be a void
judgment.
When the court has jurisdiction over the case and person of
the defendant, any mistake in the application of the law and the
appreciation of evidence committed by a court may
becorrected only by appeal. The determination made by the
trial court regarding the admissibility of evidence is but an
exercise of its jurisdiction and whatever fault it may have
perpetrated in making such a determination is an error in
judgment, not of jurisdiction. Hence, settled is the rule that
rulings of the trial court on procedural questions and on
admissibility of evidence during the course of a trial are
interlocutory in nature and may not be the subject of a
separate appeal or review on certiorari. They must be assigned
as errors and reviewed in the appeal properly taken from the
decision rendered by the trial court on the merits of the case. 19
Here, it is undisputed that the RTC had jurisdiction over the
case and the person of the petitioners. As such, any perceived
error in its interpretation of the law and its assessment of
evidence is correctibleby appeal, not certiorari, as the same
would only be considered an error ofjudgment and not of
jurisdiction. In particular, the RTC’s denial of the Motion to
Suppress/Exclude Evidence based on its assessment that the
evidence sought to be suppressed/excluded isadmissible, was
done in the proper exercise of its jurisdiction. Assuming that
the RTC’s determination is erroneous, the mistake is clearly
not anerror of jurisdiction but of judgment which is not
correctible by certiorari.
No grave abuse of discretion.
Even assuming that petitioners’ resort of certiorariis proper, the
Petition must still be dismissed for their failure toshow that the
RTC acted in grave abuse of discretion as to amount to lack of
jurisdiction. "Grave abuse of discretion is the capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment on the part of the public officer
concerned which is equivalentto an excess or lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be sopatent and
gross as to amountto an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
hostility."20
11 SPEC PRO
In this case, petitionersmiserably failed to show how the RTC
supposedly abused its discretion.1a\^/phi1 In fact, we note that
the main issue raised by petitioners in their Petition is when is
the proper timeto file a motion to suppress/exclude
evidence.21 They even conceded that this is a pure question of
law.22
In any case, our perusal of the records shows that the RTC did
not abuse, much more, gravely abuse its discretion. The RTC
thoroughly considered the pleadings submitted by the parties,
to wit: Motion to Suppress/Exclude Evidence; Opposition (to
the Motion to Suppress Evidence); Reply; Rejoinder; and
SurRejoinder; as well as the Joint affidavit submitted by the
arresting officers. Only after a careful analysis of the
submissions of the parties did the RTC render its judgment.
Petitioners violated the principle
of hierarchy of courts.
It also did not escape our attention that from the RTC,
petitioners made a direct recourse to this Court. This is against
the well-settled principle dictating that a petition for
certiorariassailing the interlocutory orders of the RTC should
be filed with the Court of Appeals and not directly with the
Supreme Court. It was held in Rayos v. City of Manila23 that:
Indeed, this Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial
Courts exercise concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas
corpus and injunction. However, such concurrence in
jurisdiction does not give petitioners unbridled freedom of
choice of court forum. In Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor,
citing People v. Cuaresma, the Court held:
This Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not
exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts
and with the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction
is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking
any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of
the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is
after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of
the venue of appeals, and also serves as a general
determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the
 12 SPEC PRO

17
extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial That on or about the 22nd day of June, Id. at 216-217; italics in the original; citations
hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the 2001, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and omitted.
issuance of extraordinary writs against fiq;t level ("inferior") within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those Court, the above-namedaccused, conspiring 18 527 Phil. 685 (2006).
against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation and confederating together and mutually
of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs aiding [and] abetting one another, did then 19
should be allowed only when there are special and important and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously Id. at 690-691.
reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. use in commerce, without the consent of
This is [an] established policy. It is a policy necessary to Pedro Domecq, S.A., the owner of duly 20Singian, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 195011-
prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's time and registered FUNDADOR trademark, a 19, September 30, 2013. Citation omitted.
attention which are better devoted to those matters within its reproduction, copy, counterfeit, or colorable
exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of imitation of said FUNDADOR trademark in 21 Rollo, p. 11.
the Court's docket.24 connection with [their] sale and/or offering for
sale of the following counterfeit FUNDADOR
22
products: five (5) cases (each case Id.
Clearly, a direct invocation of this Court's original jurisdiction
may only be allowed if there are special and important reasons containing 12 bottles) of counterfeit
clearly and specifically set out in the petition which, however, Fundador Brandy worth P2,160.00 per case 23G.R. No. 196063, December 14, 2011, 662 SCRA
are not obtaining in this case. and which use is likely to cause confusion or 684.
to cause mistake or deceive the consuming
public, to the damage and prejudice of 24
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari Id. at 689; emphasis and italics in the original;
PEDRO DOMECQ, S.A.
is DISMISSED. citations omitted.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
Footnotes
8 Id. at 108.
* Per Special Order No. 1712 dated June 23, 2014.
9
1
Id. at 118-127.
Rollo, pp. 3-21.
10
2
Id. at 183-185.
Records, Vol. I, pp. 183-185; penned by Acting
Judge Divina Luz P. Aquino-Simbulan. 11 People v. Tampis, 455 Phil. 371, 382 (2003).
3 Id. at 118-127. 12 Records, Vol. 1, pp. 239-247.
4
Id. at 303-306; penned by Presiding Judge Maria 13
Amifaith S. Fider-Reyes. Id. at 303-306.

14
5 Id. at 239-247. Rollo, p. 10.

15
6 Id. at 35-36. Lee v. People, 483 Phil. 684, 699 (2004).

16
7 Id. at 1-2. The accusatory part reads: 255 Phil. 213 (1989).

G.R. No. 175723 February 4, 2014
THE CITY OF MANILA, represented by MAYOR JOSE L.
ATIENZA, JR., and MS. LIBERTY M. TOLEDO, in her
capacity as the City Treasurer of Manila, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. CARIDAD H. GRECIA-CUERDO, in her capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 112,
Pasay City; SM MART, INC.; SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC.;
STAR APPLIANCES CENTER; SUPERVALUE, INC.; ACE
HARDWARE PHILIPPINES, INC.; WATSON PERSONAL
CARE STORES, PHILS., INC.; JOLLIMART PHILS., CORP.;
SURPLUS MARKETING CORPORATION and SIGNATURE
LINES, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside
the Resolutions1 dated April 6, 2006 and November 29, 2006
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 87948.
The antecedents of the case, as summarized by the CA, are as
follows:
The record shows that petitioner City of Manila, through its
treasurer, petitioner Liberty Toledo, assessed taxes for the
taxable period from January to December 2002 against private
respondents SM Mart, Inc., SM Prime Holdings, Inc., Star
Appliances Center, Supervalue, Inc., Ace Hardware
Philippines, Inc., Watsons Personal Care Stores Phils., Inc.,
Jollimart Philippines Corp., Surplus Marketing Corp. and
Signature Lines. In addition to the taxes purportedly due from
private respondents pursuant to Section 14, 15, 16, 17 of the
Revised Revenue Code of Manila (RRCM), said assessment
covered the local business taxes petitioners were authorized to
collect under Section 21 of the same Code. Because payment
of the taxes assessed was a precondition for the issuance of
their business permits, private respondents were constrained
to pay the P19,316,458.77 assessment under protest.
On January 24, 2004, private respondents filed [with the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City] the complaint denominated
as one for "Refund or Recovery of Illegally and/or Erroneously-
Collected Local Business Tax, Prohibition with Prayer to Issue
TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction"
which was docketed as Civil Case No. 04-0019-CFM before
public respondent's sala [at Branch 112]. In the amended
complaint they filed on February 16, 2004, private respondents
alleged that, in relation to Section 21 thereof, Sections 14, 15,
16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 of the RRCM were violative of the
limitations and guidelines under Section 143 (h) of Republic
Act. No. 7160 [Local Government Code] on double taxation.
They further averred that petitioner city's Ordinance No. 8011
which amended pertinent portions of the RRCM had already
been declared to be illegal and unconstitutional by the
Department of Justice.2
In its Order3 dated July 9, 2004, the RTC granted private
respondents' application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration4 but the RTC
denied it in its Order5 dated October 15, 2004.
Petitioners then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the
CA assailing the July 9, 2004 and October 15, 2004 Orders of
the RTC.6
In its Resolution promulgated on April 6, 2006, the CA
dismissed petitioners' petition for certiorari holding that it has
no jurisdiction over the said petition. The CA ruled that since
appellate jurisdiction over private respondents' complaint for
tax refund, which was filed with the RTC, is vested in the Court
of Tax Appeals (CTA), pursuant to its expanded jurisdiction
under Republic Act No. 9282 (RA 9282), it follows that a
petition for certiorari seeking nullification of an interlocutory
order issued in the said case should, likewise, be filed with the
CTA.
13 SPEC PRO
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,7 but the CA
denied it in its Resolution dated November 29, 2006.
Hence, the present petition raising the following issues:
I- Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals
gravely erred in dismissing the case for lack of
jurisdiction.
II- Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court
gravely abuse[d] its discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in enjoining by issuing a Writ of
Injunction the petitioners, their agents and/or
authorized representatives from implementing Section
21 of the Revised Revenue Code of Manila, as
amended, against private respondents.
III- Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court
gravely abuse[d] its discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in issuing the Writ of Injunction
despite failure of private respondents to make a
written claim for tax credit or refund with the City
Treasurer of Manila.
IV- Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court
gravely abuse[d] its discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction considering that under Section
21 of the Manila Revenue Code, as amended, they
are mere collecting agents of the City Government.
V- Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court
gravely abuse[d] its discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in issuing the Writ of Injunction
because petitioner City of Manila and its constituents
would result to greater damage and prejudice thereof.
(sic)8
Without first resolving the above issues, this Court finds that
the instant petition should be denied for being moot and
academic.

Upon perusal of the original records of the instant case, this SO ORDERED.10
Court discovered that a Decision9 in the main case had already
been rendered by the RTC on August 13, 2007, the dispositive The parties did not inform the Court but based on the records,
portion of which reads as follows: the above Decision had already become final and executory
per the Certificate of Finality11 issued by the same trial court on
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court hereby October 20, 2008. In fact, a Writ of Execution12 was issued by
renders JUDGMENT in favor of the plaintiff and against the the RTC on November 25, 2009. In view of the foregoing, it
defendant to grant a tax refund or credit for taxes paid clearly appears that the issues raised in the present petition,
pursuant to Section 21 of the Revenue Code of the City of which merely involve the incident on the preliminary injunction
Manila as amended for the year 2002 in the following amounts: issued by the RTC, have already become moot and academic
considering that the trial court, in its decision on the merits in
the main case, has already ruled in favor of respondents and
P that the same decision is now final and executory. Well
To plaintiff SM Mart, Inc. -
11,462,525.02 entrenched is the rule that where the issues have become
moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, thereby
To plaintiff SM Prime Holdings, rendering the resolution of the same of no practical use or
- 3,118,104.63
Inc. value.13
To plaintiff Star Appliances
- 2,152,316.54 In any case, the Court finds it necessary to resolve the issue
Center
on jurisdiction raised by petitioners owing to its significance
and for future guidance of both bench and bar. It is a settled
To plaintiff Supervalue, Inc. - 1,362,750.34
principle that courts will decide a question otherwise moot and
To plaintiff Ace Hardware Phils., academic if it is capable of repetition, yet evading review.14
- 419,689.04
Inc.
However, before proceeding, to resolve the question on
To plaintiff Watsons Personal
- 231,453.62 jurisdiction, the Court deems it proper to likewise address a
Care Health
procedural error which petitioners committed.
Stores Phils., Inc.
Petitioners availed of the wrong remedy when they filed the
To plaintiff Jollimart Phils., Corp. - 140,908.54 instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court in assailing the Resolutions of the CA which
To plaintiff Surplus Marketing dismissed their petition filed with the said court and their
- 220,204.70
Corp. motion for reconsideration of such dismissal. There is no
dispute that the assailed Resolutions of the CA are in the
To plaintiff Signature Mktg. nature of a final order as they disposed of the petition
- 94,906.34
Corp. completely. It is settled that in cases where an assailed
judgment or order is considered final, the remedy of the
P
TOTAL: - aggrieved party is appeal. Hence, in the instant case, petitioner
19,316,458.77
should have filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45, which is a continuation of the appellate process over the
Defendants are further enjoined from collecting taxes under original case.15
Section 21, Revenue Code of Manila from herein plaintiff.
14 SPEC PRO
Petitioners should be reminded of the equally-settled rule that
a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is an original
or independent action based on grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and it will lie only if
there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.16 As such, it cannot be a
substitute for a lost appeal.17
Nonetheless, in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the
Rules of Court and in the interest of substantial justice, this
Court has, before, treated a petition for certiorari as a petition
for review on certiorari, particularly (1) if the petition for
certiorari was filed within the reglementary period within which
to file a petition for review on certiorari; (2) when errors of
judgment are averred; and (3) when there is sufficient reason
to justify the relaxation of the rules.18 Considering that the
present petition was filed within the 15-day reglementary
period for filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45,
that an error of judgment is averred, and because of the
significance of the issue on jurisdiction, the Court deems it
proper and justified to relax the rules and, thus, treat the
instant petition for certiorari as a petition for review on
certiorari.
Having disposed of the procedural aspect, we now turn to the
central issue in this case. The basic question posed before this
Court is whether or not the CTA has jurisdiction over a special
civil action for certiorari assailing an interlocutory order issued
by the RTC in a local tax case.
This Court rules in the affirmative.
On June 16, 1954, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 1125
(RA 1125) creating the CTA and giving to the said court
jurisdiction over the following:
(1) Decisions of the Collector of Internal Revenue in
cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of
internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges,
penalties imposed in relation thereto, or other matters
arising under the National Internal Revenue Code or
other law or part of law administered by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue;

(2) Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in
cases involving liability for customs duties, fees or
other money charges; seizure, detention or release of
property affected fines, forfeitures or other penalties
imposed in relation thereto; or other matters arising
under the Customs Law or other law or part of law
administered by the Bureau of Customs; and
(3) Decisions of provincial or City Boards of
Assessment Appeals in cases involving the
assessment and taxation of real property or other
matters arising under the Assessment Law, including
rules and regulations relative thereto.
On March 30, 2004, the Legislature passed into law Republic
Act No. 9282 (RA 9282) amending RA 1125 by expanding the
jurisdiction of the CTA, enlarging its membership and elevating
its rank to the level of a collegiate court with special
jurisdiction. Pertinent portions of the amendatory act provides
thus:
Sec. 7. Jurisdiction. - The CTA shall exercise:
a. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as
herein provided:
1. Decisions of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue in cases involving disputed
assessments, refunds of internal revenue
taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in
relation thereto, or other matters arising
under the National Internal Revenue or other
laws administered by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue;
2. Inaction by the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue in cases involving disputed
assessments, refunds of internal revenue
taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in
relations thereto, or other matters arising
under the National Internal Revenue Code or
other laws administered by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, where the National
Internal Revenue Code provides a specific
period of action, in which case the inaction
shall be deemed a denial;
3. Decisions, orders or resolutions of the
Regional Trial Courts in local tax cases
originally decided or resolved by them in the
exercise of their original or appellate
jurisdiction;
4. Decisions of the Commissioner of
Customs in cases involving liability for
customs duties, fees or other money
charges, seizure, detention or release of
property affected, fines, forfeitures or other
penalties in relation thereto, or other matters
arising under the Customs Law or other laws
administered by the Bureau of Customs;
5. Decisions of the Central Board of
Assessment Appeals in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction over cases involving
the assessment and taxation of real property
originally decided by the provincial or city
board of assessment appeals;
6. Decisions of the Secretary of Finance on
customs cases elevated to him automatically
for review from decisions of the
Commissioner of Customs which are
adverse to the Government under Section
2315 of the Tariff and Customs Code;
7. Decisions of the Secretary of Trade and
Industry, in the case of nonagricultural
product, commodity or article, and the
Secretary of Agriculture in the case of
agricultural product, commodity or article,
involving dumping and countervailing duties
under Section 301 and 302, respectively, of
the Tariff and Customs Code, and safeguard
measures under Republic Act No. 8800,
15 SPEC PRO
where either party may appeal the decision
to impose or not to impose said duties.
b. Jurisdiction over cases involving criminal offenses as herein
provided:
1. Exclusive original jurisdiction over all
criminal offenses arising from violations of
the National Internal Revenue Code or Tariff
and Customs Code and other laws
administered by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue or the Bureau of Customs:
Provided, however, That offenses or felonies
mentioned in this paragraph where the
principal amount of taxes and fees, exclusive
of charges and penalties, claimed is less
than One million pesos (P1,000,000.00) or
where there is no specified amount claimed
shall be tried by the regular Courts and the
jurisdiction of the CTA shall be appellate.
Any provision of law or the Rules of Court to
the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal
action and the corresponding civil action for
the recovery of civil liability for taxes and
penalties shall at all times be simultaneously
instituted with, and jointly determined in the
same proceeding by the CTA, the filing of
the criminal action being deemed to
necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil
action, and no right to reserve the filing of
such civil action separately from the criminal
action will be recognized.
2. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction in criminal
offenses:
a. Over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders of
the Regional Trial Courts in tax cases originally decided by
them, in their respected territorial jurisdiction.
b. Over petitions for review of the judgments, resolutions or
orders of the Regional Trial Courts in the exercise of their
appellate jurisdiction over tax cases originally decided by the

Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in their respective jurisdiction.
c. Jurisdiction over tax collection cases as herein provided:
1. Exclusive original jurisdiction in tax
collection cases involving final and executory
assessments for taxes, fees, charges and
penalties: Provides, however, that collection
cases where the principal amount of taxes
and fees, exclusive of charges and penalties,
claimed is less than One million pesos
(P1,000,000.00) shall be tried by the proper
Municipal Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial
Court and Regional Trial Court.
2. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction in tax
collection cases:
a. Over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders of
the Regional Trial Courts in tax collection cases originally
decided by them, in their respective territorial jurisdiction.
b. Over petitions for review of the judgments, resolutions or
orders of the Regional Trial Courts in the Exercise of their
appellate jurisdiction over tax collection cases originally
decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, in their respective
jurisdiction.19
A perusal of the above provisions would show that, while it is
clearly stated that the CTA has exclusive appellate jurisdiction
over decisions, orders or resolutions of the RTCs in local tax
cases originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of
their original or appellate jurisdiction, there is no categorical
statement under RA 1125 as well as the amendatory RA 9282,
which provides that th e CTA has jurisdiction over petitions for
certiorari assailing interlocutory orders issued by the RTC in
local tax cases filed before it.
The prevailing doctrine is that the authority to issue writs of
certiorari involves the exercise of original jurisdiction which
must be expressly conferred by the Constitution or by law and
cannot be implied from the mere existence of appellate
jurisdiction.20 Thus, in the cases of Pimentel v.
COMELEC,21 Garcia v. De Jesus,22 Veloria v.
COMELEC,23 Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board v. Lubrica,24 and Garcia v. Sandiganbayan,25 this Court
has ruled against the jurisdiction of courts or tribunals over
petitions for certiorari on the ground that there is no law which
expressly gives these tribunals such power.26 It must be
observed, however, that with the exception of Garcia v.
Sandiganbayan,27 these rulings pertain not to regular courts
but to tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers. With respect
to the Sandiganbayan, Republic Act No. 824928 now provides
that the special criminal court has exclusive original jurisdiction
over petitions for the issuance of the writs of mandamus,
prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other
ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
In the same manner, Section 5 (1), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution grants power to the Supreme Court, in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction, to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus. With respect to the Court of
Appeals, Section 9 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP 129)
gives the appellate court, also in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction, the power to issue, among others, a writ of
certiorari,whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. As to
Regional Trial Courts, the power to issue a writ of certiorari, in
the exercise of their original jurisdiction, is provided under
Section 21 of BP 129.
The foregoing notwithstanding, while there is no express grant
of such power, with respect to the CTA, Section 1, Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution provides, nonetheless, that judicial
power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law and that judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
On the strength of the above constitutional provisions, it can be
fairly interpreted that the power of the CTA includes that of
16 SPEC PRO
determining whether or not there has been grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of the RTC in issuing an interlocutory order in cases falling
within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the tax court. It,
thus, follows that the CTA, by constitutional mandate, is vested
with jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in these cases.
Indeed, in order for any appellate court to effectively exercise
its appellate jurisdiction, it must have the authority to issue,
among others, a writ of certiorari. In transferring exclusive
jurisdiction over appealed tax cases to the CTA, it can
reasonably be assumed that the law intended to transfer also
such power as is deemed necessary, if not indispensable, in
aid of such appellate jurisdiction. There is no perceivable
reason why the transfer should only be considered as partial,
not total.
Consistent with the above pronouncement, this Court has held
as early as the case of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Jaramillo, et
al.29 that "if a case may be appealed to a particular court or
judicial tribunal or body, then said court or judicial tribunal or
body has jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari,
in aid of its appellate jurisdiction."30 This principle was affirmed
in De Jesus v. Court of Appeals,31 where the Court stated that
"a court may issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction if said court has jurisdiction to review, by appeal or
writ of error, the final orders or decisions of the lower
court."32 The rulings in J.M. Tuason and De Jesus were
reiterated in the more recent cases of Galang, Jr. v.
Geronimo33 and Bulilis v. Nuez.34
Furthermore, Section 6, Rule 135 of the present Rules of Court
provides that when by law, jurisdiction is conferred on a court
or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means
necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court
or officer.
If this Court were to sustain petitioners' contention that
jurisdiction over their certiorari petition lies with the CA, this
Court would be confirming the exercise by two judicial bodies,
the CA and the CTA, of jurisdiction over basically the same
subject matter – precisely the split-jurisdiction situation which is
anathema to the orderly administration of justice.35 The Court

cannot accept that such was the legislative motive, especially
considering that the law expressly confers on the CTA, the
tribunal with the specialized competence over tax and tariff
matters, the role of judicial review over local tax cases without
mention of any other court that may exercise such power.
Thus, the Court agrees with the ruling of the CA that since
appellate jurisdiction over private respondents' complaint for
tax refund is vested in the CTA, it follows that a petition for
certiorari seeking nullification of an interlocutory order issued in
the said case should, likewise, be filed with the same court. To
rule otherwise would lead to an absurd situation where one
court decides an appeal in the main case while another court
rules on an incident in the very same case.
Stated differently, it would be somewhat incongruent with the
pronounced judicial abhorrence to split jurisdiction to conclude
that the intention of the law is to divide the authority over a
local tax case filed with the RTC by giving to the CA or this
Court jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari against
interlocutory orders of the RTC but giving to the CTA the
jurisdiction over the appeal from the decision of the trial court
in the same case. It is more in consonance with logic and legal
soundness to conclude that the grant of appellate jurisdiction to
the CTA over tax cases filed in and decided by the RTC carries
with it the power to issue a writ of certiorari when necessary in
aid of such appellate jurisdiction. The supervisory power or
jurisdiction of the CTA to issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction should co-exist with, and be a
complement to, its appellate jurisdiction to review, by appeal,
the final orders and decisions of the RTC, in order to have
complete supervision over the acts of the latter.36
A grant of appellate jurisdiction implies that there is included in
it the power necessary to exercise it effectively, to make all
orders that will preserve the subject of the action, and to give
effect to the final determination of the appeal. It carries with it
the power to protect that jurisdiction and to make the decisions
of the court thereunder effective. The court, in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction, has authority to control all auxiliary and
incidental matters necessary to the efficient and proper
exercise of that jurisdiction.1âwphi1 For this purpose, it may,
when necessary, prohibit or restrain the performance of any
act which might interfere with the proper exercise of its rightful
jurisdiction in cases pending before it.37
17 SPEC PRO
Lastly, it would not be amiss to point out that a court which is petitions for certiorari questioning interlocutory orders issued
endowed with a particular jurisdiction should have powers by the RTC in a local tax case is included in the powers
which are necessary to enable it to act effectively within such granted by the Constitution as well as inherent in the exercise
jurisdiction. These should be regarded as powers which are of its appellate jurisdiction.
inherent in its jurisdiction and the court must possess them in
order to enforce its rules of practice and to suppress any Finally, it would bear to point out that this Court is not
abuses of its process and to defeat any attempted thwarting of abandoning the rule that, insofar as quasi-judicial tribunals are
such process. concerned, the authority to issue writs of certiorari must still be
expressly conferred by the Constitution or by law and cannot
In this regard, Section 1 of RA 9282 states that the CTA shall be implied from the mere existence of their appellate
be of the same level as the CA and shall possess all the jurisdiction. This doctrine remains as it applies only to quasi-
inherent powers of a court of justice. judicial bodies.
Indeed, courts possess certain inherent powers which may be WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
said to be implied from a general grant of jurisdiction, in
addition to those expressly conferred on them. These inherent
SO ORDERED.
powers are such powers as are necessary for the ordinary and
efficient exercise of jurisdiction; or are essential to the
existence, dignity and functions of the courts, as well as to the Footnotes
due administration of justice; or are directly appropriate,
convenient and suitable to the execution of their granted * No part.
powers; and include the power to maintain the court's
jurisdiction and render it effective in behalf of the litigants. 38 1
Penned by Associate Justice Rebecca de Guia-
Salvador, with Associate Justices Ruben T. Reyes
Thus, this Court has held that "while a court may be expressly (now a retired member of this Court) and Aurora
granted the incidental powers necessary to effectuate its Santiago-Lagman, concurring; Annexes "A" and "B,"
jurisdiction, a grant of jurisdiction, in the absence of prohibitive rollo, pp. 43-48; 49-51.
legislation, implies the necessary and usual incidental powers
essential to effectuate it, and, subject to existing laws and 2 Rollo, p. 44. (Italics and emphasis in the original;
constitutional provisions, every regularly constituted court has citations omitted)
power to do all things that are reasonably necessary for the
administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction and
for the enforcement of its judgments and mandates."39 Hence,
3 Records, vol. II, pp. 476-480.
demands, matters or questions ancillary or incidental to, or
growing out of, the main action, and coming within the above 4 Id. at 481-490.
principles, may be taken cognizance of by the court and
determined, since such jurisdiction is in aid of its authority over 5
Id. at 513.
the principal matter, even though the court may thus be called
on to consider and decide matters which, as original causes of
action, would not be within its cognizance.40
6 CA rollo, pp. 2-31.
7
Based on the foregoing disquisitions, it can be reasonably Id. at 321-326.
concluded that the authority of the CTA to take cognizance of
 18 SPEC PRO

8 21
Rollo, p. 20. (Emphasis in the original)
9 Records, vol. II, pp. 761-762.
10 Id. at 762. (Emphasis in the original)
11 Id. at 822.
12
Id. at 837.
13
Garcia v. COMELEC, 328 Phil. 288, 292 (1996).
14Caneland Sugar Corporation v. Alon, G.R. No.
142896, September 12, 2007, 533 SCRA 28, 33.
15
Republic of the Philippines, represented by
Abusama M. Alid, Officer-in-Charge, Department of
Agriculture-Regional Field Unit XII (DA-RFU-XII) v.
Abdulwahab A. Bayao, et al., G. R . No. 179492, June
5, 2013.
16Mendez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 174937,
June 13, 2012, 672 SCRA 200, 207.
17 Id.
18 Tagle v. Equitable PCI Bank, G.R. No. 172299,
April 22, 2008, 552 SCRA 424, 444, citing Oaminal v.
Castillo, 459 Phil. 542, 556 (2003); Republic v. Court
of Appeals, 379 Phil. 92, 98 (2000); Delsan Transport
Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 1066, 1075
(1997); Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v.
Court of Appeals, 389 Phil. 644, 655 (2000).
19 Emphasis supplied.
20 Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
v. Lubrica, 497 Phil. 313, 322 (2005); Veloria v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 94771, July 29, 1992, 211
SCRA 907, 915.
35
189 Phil. 581 (1980). Southern Cross Cement Corporation v. Philippine
Cement Manufacturers Corp., 478 Phil. 85, 125
22G.R. Nos. 88158 and 97108-09, March 4, 1992, (2004).
206 SCRA 779.
36
Breslin v. Luzon Stevedoring Company, 84 Phil.
23 Supra note 20. 618, 623 (1949).
37
24 Supra note 20. 4 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error, §5, p. 536; 2 Am
Jur, Appeal and Error, §9, 850.
25G..R. No. 114135, October 7, 1994, 237 SCRA 38
552. Santiago v. Vasquez, G.R. Nos. 99289-90, January
27, 1993, 217 SCRA 633, 648.
26
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board 39
v. Lubrica, supra note 20; Veloria v. COMELEC, Treasurer-Assessor v. University of the Philippines,
148 Phil. 526, 539 (1971); Amalgamated Laborers'
supra note 20; Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, id. at 563-
564; Garcia v. De Jesus, supra note 22, at 787-788; Association v. Court of Industrial Relations, 131 Phil.
374, 380 (1968); Philippine Airlines Employees'
Pimentel v. COMELEC, supra note 21, at 587.
Association v. Philippine Airlines, Inc. 120 Phil. 383,
27
390 (1964). (Citations omitted).
Supra note 25.
40 Id.
28An Act Further Defining the Jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, Amending for the Purpose
Presidential Decree No. 1606, As Amended,
Providing Funds Therefor, And for Other Purposes.
29 118 Phil. 1022 (1963).
30
J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Jaramillo, et al., supra,
at 1026.
31
G.R. No. 101630, August 24, 1992, 212 SCRA 823.
32
De Jesus v. Court of Appeals, supra, at 827-828.
33G.R. No. 192793, February 22, 2011, 643 SCRA
631, 635-636.
34G.R. No. 195953, August 9, 2011, 655 SCRA 241,
246-247.

G.R. No. 129846 January 18, 2000
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TRADERS ROYAL
BANK, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition, for certiorari seeking to set aside the
resolution,1 dated March 17, 1997, of the Court of Appeals
dismissing petitioner's appeal from an order of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 19, Manila, which dismissed petitioner's
complaint. The appellate court threw out petitioner's appeal on
the ground that its notice of appeal had been filed out of time.
Petitioner urges a relaxation of the rules in applying the period
for filing appeals. But even its appeal to this Court from the
resolution of the appellate court is late. Hence, the dismissal of
the present petition is called for.1âwphi1.nêt
The procedural antecedents are as follows:
On two occasions in January 1986, the Office of the President
issued four type "B" Treasury Warrants drawn against the
Bureau of Treasury in the aggregate amount of
P151,645,000.00. The treasury warrants were deposited in
private respondent Traders Royal Bank for collection.
On January 7, 1986, private respondent presented the
warrants to the Bureau of Treasury for clearing. The warrants
were cleared and private respondent credited the amounts to
the designated payees' accounts.2Petitioner subsequently
discovered on April 3, 1986 that the payees' indorsements on
the warrants had been forged. It demanded reimbursement
from private respondent of the amounts paid on the warrants
but the latter refused to pay.
On October 13, 1987, petitioner, through the Bureau of
Treasury, filed Civil Case No. 87-42752 for collection against
private respondent before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19,
Manila. Trial then ensued. After petitioner had rested its case,
private respondent, with prior leave of court, filed a Demurrer
to Evidence on January 12, 1994. Among others, it was
contended:
. . . The plaintiff does not claim nor alleged that
because of the alleged forgery of the indorsements of
the payees, it (the plaintiff) had to replace the treasury
warrants in question and thus pay the payees all over
again. Does not the cause of action or right to relief,
then, if any, properly pertain to the payees whose
endorsements were allegedly forged? And is not such
a cause of action or right to relief properly against the
forger/s or perpetrator of the forgery?
In an order dated September 30, 1994, the trial court denied
the demurrer to evidence. However, on motion of private
respondent, the trial court, on January 30, 1995, reconsidered
its order and dismissed petitioner's complaint. Petitioner
received the order of dismissal on February 7, 1995. Hence, it
had up to February 22, 1995 within which to appeal.
On February 20, 1995, two days before the last day to file an
appeal, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order
of dismissal which interrupted the running of the period of
appeal.
On May 23, 1995, the trial court denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration. The order was received by petitioner on June
2, 1995, so that it had until June 4, 1995 within which to file the
notice of appeal. However, petitioner filed its notice of appeal
19 SPEC PRO
only on June 16, 1995, 12 days beyond the 15-day
reglementary period. As a consequence, the dismissal became
final. For some reason, this fact was not immediately noticed,
so that the records of the case were elevated to the Court of
Appeals and petitioner was required to file its appellant's brief.
When it came to its turn to file its brief as an appellee, private
respondent asked for an extension of time. Its motion was
granted, but instead of filing its brief, private respondent asked
the appellate court to dismiss petitioner's appeal on the ground
that it was filed out of time. Its motion was granted and
petitioner's appeal was dismissed. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, but its motion was denied. Petitioner received
the appellate court's resolution denying its motion on June 5,
1997, so that it had until June 20, 1997 within which to appeal
to this Court by filing a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45. Instead, petitioner filed on August 4, 1997, 45 days
after the last day to file an appeal, the present petition
for certiorari under Rule 65, contending that the Court of
Appeals gravely abused its discretion in dismissing its appeal
from the order of the RTC which dismissed its complaint
against private respondent.
As earlier stated, this petition should be dismissed.
First. Petitioner's remedy was to appeal to this Court from the
resolutions, dated March 17, 1997 and May 20, 1997, of the
appellate court by filing a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45. Instead, it filed this petition for certiorari under Rule 65
only on August 4, 1997. Apparently, petitioner resorted to this
special civil action because it had failed to take an appeal
within the 15-day reglementary period which expired on June
20, 1997. This, of course, cannot be done. The special civil
action of certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal
which petitioner has lost. Nor can it be contended that the only
question raised in this case is a jurisdictional
question. Certiorari lies only where there is no appeal nor any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. There is no reason why the question being raised by
petitioner, i.e., whether the appellate court committed a grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing petitions, could not have been
raised by it on appeal.
In Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals,3 we dismissed a Rule 65
petition on the ground that the proper remedy for petitioner

therein should have been an appeal under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, viz.:
At the outset, this Court notes that the proper remedy
of Petitioner Bernardo should have been an appeal
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. We have time
and again reminded members of the bench and bar
that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65
lies only when "there is no appeal nor plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law." Certiorari can not be allowed when a party to a
case fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability
of that remedy, certiorari not being a substitute for lost
appeal. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are
mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive. .
. .4
Admittedly, this Court, in accordance with the liberal spirit
pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of justice, has
the discretion to treat a petition for certiorari as having been
filed under Rule 45, especially if filed within the reglementary
period for filing a petition for review.5 In this case, however, we
find no reason to justify a liberal application of the rules. The
petition was filed well beyond the reglementary period for filing
a petition for review without any reason therefor.
Second. Even on the grounds invoked by petitioner we think
the present petition should be dismissed. Time and again, we
have emphasized that the perfection of appeals in the manner
and within the period permitted by law is not only mandatory
but jurisdictional, and that the failure to perfect an appeal
renders the decision of the trial court final and executory. 6 This
rule is founded upon the principle that the right to appeal is not
part of due process of law but is a mere statutory privilege to
be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the
provisions of the law.7 In this case, we find no reason to depart
from this rule.
Petitioner invokes the judicial policy of allowing appeals,
although filed late, when the interest of justice so requires.
Citing Bank of America, NT & SA v. Gerochi, Jr.,8 it contends
that this Court, in meritorious instances, has allowed the rules
on the periods for perfecting appeals to be
relaxed.9 Unfortunately for petitioner, even a cursory reading of
the very case upon which it relies for support shows that the
policy invoked is qualified by the requirement that there must
be exceptional circumstances to justify the relaxation of the
rules. The case cited, which involved an appeal made five days
late, illustrates how questions of this nature have been
resolved by this Court:
True, in few highly exceptional instances, we have
allowed the relaxing of the rules on the application of
the reglementary periods of appeal. We cite a few
typical examples: In Ramos vs. Bagasao, 96 SCRA
395, we excused the delay of four days in the filing of
a notice of appeal because the questioned decision of
the trial court was served upon appellant Ramos at a
time when her counsel of record was already dead.
Her new counsel could only file the appeal four days
after the prescribed reglementary period was over.
In Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 83 SCRA 453, we
allowed the perfection of an appeal by the Republic
despite the delay of six days to prevent a gross
miscarriage of justice since the Republic stands to
lose hundreds of hectares of land already titled in its
name and had since then been devoted for
educational purposes. In Olacao vs. National Labor
Relations Commission, 577 SCRA 38, 41, we
accepted a tardy appeal considering that the subject
matter in issue had theretofore been judicially
settled, with finality, in another case. The dismissal of
the appeal would have had the effect of the appellant
being ordered twice to make the same reparation to
the appellee.
The case at bench, given its own settings, can not
come close to those extraordinary circumstances that
have indeed justified a deviation from an otherwise
stringent rule. Let it not be overlooked that the
timeliness of an appeal is a jurisdictional caveat that
not even this Court can trifle with.10
As in Bank of America, there is no showing in this case of a
factual setting which approximates any of the extraordinary
circumstances which may justify a deviation from the rule on
timely filing of appeals. Anyone seeking exemption from the
20 SPEC PRO
application of this rule has the burden of proving that
exceptionally meritorious instances exist which warrant such
departure. In this case, petitioner failed to discharge this
burden. It offered no explanation at all for the 12-day delay in
filing its notice of appeal. What was said in Videogram
Regulatory Board v. Court of Appeals11 applies with equal
force to this case, as petitioner is likewise represented by the
Office of the Solicitor General, viz.:
And, while we understand the OSG's predicament, its
oft-repeated excuse of being saddled with a huge
caseload, which is resorted to almost everytime it
applies for extension of time for appeal and filing of
comments/replies/briefs, has already lost its flavor, if
not gone stale entirely. Certainly, by this time the
OSG must have already developed a system for
keeping crack of all its deadlines and monitoring the
progress of work being done on the cases it is
handling. After all, government service really entails
hard work and perennial unceasing pressure to meet
deadlines. Most assuredly, this is not a ground for the
liberal interpretation of the rules. Only in exceptionally
meritorious cases should the rules be relaxed. Such
has not been shown to be the situation in this case.
After its case was dismissed by the trial court, all that the OSG
had to do was to file a notice of appeal, which is just a brief
statement of petitioner's intention to appeal from the court's
decision. There is no reason why the OSG could not have this
in two days. Unlike a record on appeal, a notice of appeal does
not require the extractions of pleadings and documents from
the records pertinent to the subject of the appeal. In the
absence of any satisfactory explanation, the OSG's failure to
file a timely notice of appeal simply cannot be excused without
defeating private respondent's right, as a party-litigant, to
benefit from a decision that has become final executory.
Nor can petitioner invoke the doctrine that rules of technicality
must yield to the broader interest of substantial justice.12 While
every litigant must be given the amplest opportunity for the
proper and just determination of his cause, free from the
constraints of technicalities,13 the failure to perfect an appeal
within the reglementary period is not a mere technicality. It
raises a jurisdictional problem as it deprives the appellate court
 21 SPEC PRO

of jurisdiction over the appeal.14 The failure to file the notice of
appeal within the reglementary period is akin to the failure to
pay the appeal fee within the prescribed period. In both cases,
the appeal is not perfected in due time. As we held in Pedrosa
v. Hill,15 the requirement of an appeal fee is by no means a
mere technicality of law or procedure, but an essential
requirement without which the decision appealed from would
become final and executory.16 The same can be said about the
late filing of a notice of appeal.
The fact is that petitioner did not only fail to appeal from the
main order of the trial court dismissing its complaint. It did not
only fail to appeal on time from the order denying
reconsideration. Petitioner likewise failed to make a timely
appeal to this Court from the resolution of the appellate court
dismissing its appeal.
The outcome of this petition maybe a bitter lesson for
on 86
petitioner, but one mainly of its own doing. Not only did it file its
notice of appeal well beyond the reglementary period, it
actually failed to appeal from the order dismissing its case 3 275 SCRA 423 (1997).
against private respondent. The inevitable consequence of
such grave inadvertence is to render the trial court's decision 4
dismissing its case final and executory. The Court of Appeals Id., at p. 426.
thus acted properly in dismissing petitioner's
appeal.1âwphi1.nêt 5Delsan Transport Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
268 SCRA 597 (1997).
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
6
Bank of America, NT & SA v. Gerochi, Jr., 230
SO ORDERED. SCRA 9 (1994) citing Alto Sales Corp. v. IAC, 197
SCRA 618 (1991), Falcon Mfg. v. NLRC, 199 SCRA
814 (1991), Kabushi Kaisha Isetan v. IAC, 203 SCRA
Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur. 583 (1991).

7
Nonetheless, it is contended that petitioner has a meritorious Bello v. Fernando, 4 SCRA 135 (1962); Borre v.
claim against private respondent and that it stands to lose Court of Appeals, 158 SCRA 660 (1988); Pedrosa v.
P151,645,000.00 if it cannot appeal from the trial court's order Footnotes Hill, 257 SCRA 373 (1996); People v. Esparas, 260
dismissing its complaint against private respondent. The finality SCRA 539 (1996).
of the trial court's order as a consequence of petitioner's failure 1Per Justice Romeo A. Brawner and concurred in by
to appeal on time, first to the Court of Appeals and, later to this Justices Emeritio C. Cui and Lourdes K. Tayao- 8 230 SCRA 9 (1994).
Court, unfortunately, bars further consideration of its case. Jaguros.
There is simply no explanation offered for such lapses. 9 Petition, p. 10; Rollo, p. 11.
2 The particulars of the warrants are as follows:
Third. There is another reason why review of the trial court's 10
order cannot be made. Petitioner does not dispute the fact that, 230 SCRA at 15-16 (Emphasis added).
as observed by the Court of Appeals, its notice of appeal Dat
referred only to the order of the trial court denying its Motion for TW No. Payee Amount 11 265 SCRA 50, 60 (1996).
e
Reconsideration and not the order of dismissal of its complaint
as well.17 Such failure is fatal. Rule 37, §9 of the Rules of Civil B055295 Leonila 1-6- P33,044,000. 12 Petition, p. 12; Rollo, p. 13.
Procedure provides that an order denying a motion for 11 Sioson 86 00
reconsideration is not appealable, the remedy being an appeal
13
from the judgment or final order. On the other hand, Rule 41, B055295 Leonila 1-6- P17,800,250. De la Rosa v. Court of Appeals, 280 SCRA 444
§1(a) of the same rules also provides that no appeal may be 12 Sioson 86 00 (1997), citing Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals, 68
taken from an order denying a motion for reconsideration. It is SCRA 262 (1975).
true the present Rules of Civil Procedure took effect only on Nancy 1-
B055295 P39,900,250.
July 1, 1997 whereas this case involves an appeal taken in Concepci 11- 14Bank of America, NT & SA v. Gerochi, 230 SCRA 9
15 00
February 1995. But Rule 37, §9 and Rule 41, §1(a) simply on 86 (1994).
codified the rulings in several cases to the effect that an order
denying a motion for reconsideration is interlocutory in B055295 Nancy 1- P40,900,500. 15
26 Concepci 11- 00 257 SCRA 373 (1996).
nature18 and, therefore, is not appealable.19 These rules,
therefore, are not really new.

16 Id., at 379.
17
Rollo, p. 29.
18 Artuyo v. Gonzalves, 137 Phil. 803 (1969).
19
Pagakhan v. Court of Industrial Relations, 39 SCRA
455 (1971), citing the former Section 2, Rule 41,
Rules of Court; People v. Doriques, 24 SCRA 167
(1968); Ramos v. Ardant Trading Corporation, 23
SCRA 947 (1968); Sy v. Dalman, 22 SCRA 834
(1968); Chuatoco v. Aragon, 22 SCRA 346 (1968);
People v. Macandog, 7 SCRA 195 (1963); Bautista v.
De la Cruz, 9 SCRA 725 (1963); Harrison Foundry &
Machinery v. Harrison Foundry Workers Association,
8 SCRA 430 (1963); Phil. Refining Co., Inc. v. Ponce,
99 Phil. 269 (1956); PLDT Employees Union v. PLDT
Co. Free Tel. Workers Union, 97 Phil. 424 (1955);
Sitchon v. Sheriff of Occidental Negros, 80 Phil. 397
(1948).
G.R. No. 112288 February 20, 1997
DELSAN TRANSPORT LINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE
COMPANY, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
The matter of execution of judgment, oftentimes called the fruit
of litigation, is at issue in this case. The facts are as follows:
On December 23, 1980, private respondent American Home
Assurance Company filed an action for sum of money against
petitioner Delsan Transport Lines in the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 39720 and
eventually assigned to Branch 160 of the court.
On July 22, 1991, the RTC rendered a decision 1 ordering
petitioner to pay private respondent the amount of
P1,180,115.77 with legal interest from the time of filing of the
complaint until fully paid, attorney's fees equivalent to 20% of
the principal claim, and costs.
Petitioner received a copy of the decision on August 21, 1991.
On September 9, 1991, through its counsel Atty. Noel L.
Montilla of the Montilla Law Office, petitioner filed a notice of
appeal. On July 13, 1992, however, petitioner moved for the
dismissal of its appeal on the ground that the judgment in Civil
Case No. 39720 had already been fully satisfied. Attached to
its motion was a pleading denominated as "Satisfaction of
Judgment" dated August 26, 1991. 2 The pleading, purporting
to have been filed with the RTC, was signed by Atty. Noel L.
Montilla on behalf of petitioner and by Atty. Manuel N.
Camacho of Camacho and Associates on behalf of private
respondent. It stated that "on August 22, 1991, the
aforementioned judgment [in Civil Case No. 39720] was duly
22 SPEC PRO
satisfied, the debtor [petitioner] having paid the entire amount
adjudged therein against him."
Acting on petitioner's motion, the Court of Appeals, in its
resolution of July 30, 1992, dismissed the appeal. On March
22, 1993, however, private respondent through a new counsel,
filed in the RTC a motion for the execution of the judgment in
its favor. It alleged that contrary to what was stated in the
"Satisfaction of Judgment," no money had actually been
remitted to it and that unless petitioner and its counsel could
show proof of payment of the judgment and name the person
to whom the amount had been paid, it was entitled to the
execution of the judgment which had long become final and
executory.
Petitioner opposed the motion for execution.
On May 26, l993, 3 the RTC granted private respondent's
motion and ordered the issuance of a writ of execution. The
RTC held that, as the judgment had become final and
executory, execution had become a matter of right. The court
held that it was incumbent on petitioner to prove that it had
already paid the judgment, but petitioner failed to do so.
Petitioner through Atty. Patricia Angeles R. Cataquiz of the
Montilla Law Office filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for
preliminary injunction in the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 31256. Atty. Cataquiz alleged that Atty. Noel
Montilla filed an appeal unaware that payment had already
been made to private respondent and that under Rule 131,
§3(p) the presumption was that the "Satisfaction of Judgment"
was regular.
In its comment, private respondent claimed that petitioner's
notice of appeal from the RTC decision was in fact filed late;
that it was improbable that Atty. Montilla, who had allegedly
signed the satisfaction of judgment, did not know about it and
therefore filed a notice of appeal; that petitioner only moved to
dismiss its appeal after more than ten months; and that the
RTC denied that the "Satisfaction of Judgment" had ever been
filed with it and indeed the copy of the document did not show
that it had been filed with the RTC.

The Court of Appeals in its decision dated July 30,
l993 4 dismissed the petition for lack of merit and ordered
petitioner and counsel to pay double costs. It further referred
the case to the Provincial Prosecutor of Pasig, Rizal for
possible criminal prosecution for Falsification of Document of
petitioner and its counsel, Atty. Patricia Angeles R. Cataquiz of
the Montilla Law Office, and others who might have
participated in the execution of the spurious document. The
Court of Appeals found: 5
There is something terribly wrong with the
instant petition as petitioner claims having
fully satisfied the judgment of the respondent
court in the enormous amount of more than
P1.1 Million, and yet could not produce a
small receipt, or even the check evidencing
said payment to private respondent.
Certainly, said huge amount of money
deserved at least, a receipt especially from
private respondent corporation. Yet all the
petitioner could show to the Court as proof of
satisfaction of the judgment of respondent
court in favor of the plaintiff is an uncertified
xerox copy of a pleading entitled
"Satisfaction of Judgment" dated August 26,
1991 allegedly signed bv Atty. Manuel
N. Camacho for plaintiff and Atty. Noel
L. Montilla for defendant (p. 14, Rollo).
The above document purporting to be
satisfaction of judgment appears on its face
as filed with respondent court which court in
its order dated June 10, 1993 repudiated
said document as not being filed at all, in the
said court (pp. 29-30 id). Having realized that
said document was never filed at all with
respondent court, that they could be held
liable by this Court for misrepresentation,
petitioner and counsel filed a manifestation
with this Court on July 16, 1993, that indeed,
they did not file said document with
respondent court (pp. 19-20, id.). But still,
petitioner and counsel insist that payment of
the judgment obligation had been made by
petitioner to private respondent on the basis
of said document.
It is obvious that petitioner and counsel are
simply lying as to their alleged payment of
the obligation. As stated earlier, the
document purporting to be "Satisfaction of
Judgment" was never filed with respondent
court. Private respondent likewise denied
having signed said document, either by itself
or counsel. Moreover, if it were true that said
satisfaction of judgment was made by
petitioner and counsel on August 26, 1991,
said petitioner did not have to file their notice
of appeal on September 9, 1991, or fourteen
days later from the signing of the said
document on satisfaction of judgment.
We do not believe petitioner's arguments
that law firms as a matter of course, would
immediately file their notice of appeal from
adverse judgments to stay the running of the
prescriptive period to appeal. We cannot
agree with such a sweeping statement for
We still believe that law firms file their notice
of appeal taking into consideration the merits
of their case. Besides, as correctly pointed
out by private respondent both document on
satisfaction of judgment, and the notice of
appeal were signed by Atty. Noel L. Montilla
for defendant, so that if defendant, herein
petitioner, had paid the obligation, Atty.
Montilla did not have to file his notice of
appeal, two weeks later. Moreover, Atty.
Montilla could not claim failure of memory of
petitioner's alleged payment as an excuse of
filing his notice of appeal considering the
very big amount involved of more than P1.1
Million, in this case which amount could
hardly slip from one's mind.
The fact that petitioner's appeal with the
Court was dismissed upon motion of
petitioner based on the alleged satisfaction
23 SPEC PRO
of debt, is no evidence that it paid the
judgment obligation. Petitioner as appellant
moving for the dismissal of its own appeal
with the Court would simply get its desired
dismissal being the appealing party.
Besides, said appeal would have been
dismissed just the same for having been filed
out of time considering that the notice of
appeal was filed by petitioner only on
September 9, 1991, or nineteen days after it
received copy of the decision on August 21,
1991.
Petitioner even challenges private
respondent to prove that it (petitioner) has
not paid the said judgment obligation, given
its said document on satisfaction of
judgment. Upon the other hand, all that
petitioner has to do in this case is to present
the receipt of payment or even at least its
check for more than P1.1 Million evidencing
its payment. Petitioner cannot hide behind its
erroneous reference to Sec. 1, Rule 39 of
the Revised Rules of court on execution of
final judgment. We are convinced that
petitioner did not pay yet its judgment
obligation to private respondent.
Even after the decision of the appellate court had been
rendered, Atty. Cataquiz still filed on August 6, 1993 a reply in
which she pointed out that private respondent did not question
the fact that its former counsel, Atty. Camacho, had signed the
"Satisfaction of Judgment." Atty. Cataquiz argued that in view
of the parties' conflicting allegations, the trial court should have
held a hearing for reception of the parties' evidence.
On August 19, 1993, petitioner moved for reconsideration of
the Court of Appeals decision. Private respondent in turn filed
an opposition.
On September 10, 1993 the Court of Appeals required Atty.
Patricia Angeles R. Cataquiz personally to file a reply to private
respondent's opposition to petitioner's motion for

reconsideration, apparently in view of allegation in pleadings
filed by her that the so-called "Satisfaction of Judgment" had
been filed in the RTC when in fact it was not. In fact, as already
noted, in its decision the appellate court said:
The above document purporting to be
satisfaction of judgment appears on its face
as filed with respondent court which court in
its order dated June 10, 1993 repudiated
said document as not being filed at all, in the
said court (pp. 29-30 id). Having realized that
said document was never filed at all with
respondent court, and that they could be
held liable by this Court for
misrepresentation, petitioner and counsel
filed a manifestation with this Court on July
16, 1993, that indeed they did not file said
document with respondent court (pp. 19-
20, id.). But still, petitioner and counsel insist
that payment of the judgment obligation had
been made by petitioner to private
respondent on the basis of said document.
It is obvious that petitioner and counsel are
simply lying as to their alleged payment of
the obligation. As stated earlier, the
document purporting to be Satisfaction of
Judgment" was never filed with respondent
court.
....
Finally, We wish to express alarm by which
petitioner and counsel would like to
hoodwink this Court into believing that
petitioner's judgment obligation of more than
P1.1 Million to private respondent had been
paid as evidenced by a spurious document
on satisfaction of judgment.
However, on October 1, 1993, Atty. Noel Montilla
informed the court that Atty. Cataquiz had resigned
from his law office on September 15, 1993. Instead he
asked for an extension of ten days until October 11,
1993 to file the reply. Filed separately but at the same
time was the manifestation of Atty. Cataquiz that she
was indeed no longer connected with the Montilla Law
Office.
The Court of Appeals therefore proceeded to render its
resolution on October 15, 1993, in effect denying Atty.
Montilla's request for additional time to file a reply and affirmed
its decision for lack of "cogent ground or reason" advanced by
petitioner. Meantime on October 8, 1993, Atty. Evangeline B.
Cabigao entered an appearance in substitution of the Montilla
Law Office and, on October 11, 1993, filed a reply to private
respondent's opposition in which she asked the Court of
Appeals to order Attys. Manuel Camacho and Noel Montilla to
explain why the "Satisfaction of Judgment" had not been filed
in the RTC and to tell the appellate court to whom the money
paid by petitioner had been given. Attached to the reply was an
affidavit, dated October 9, 1993, 6 of petitioner's vice-president
and general manager, Carlos A. Buenafe, claiming that in a
meeting in July 1989 at the Manila Peninsula Hotel private
respondent's counsel, Atty. Manuel N. Camacho, had agreed
to settle private respondent's claim for P100,000.00 and that
pursuant to the said agreement, he (Carlos Buenafe) instructed
that the check be delivered to Atty. Noel Montilla for payment
to Atty. Camacho and that this was evidenced by a Request for
Funds dated August 7, 1989 for Atty. Manuel Camacho and
Associates as settlement fee in Civil Case No. 39720, 7 check
voucher CVK No. 19229 dated August 10, 1989, for
P100,000.00, payable to Atty. Manuel Camacho and
Associates, 8 Prudential Bank check No. 108562, dated August
10, 1989, in the amount of P100,000.00 in favor of Atty.
Manuel Camacho, 9 and a receipt for the same. 10 The Court of
Appeals simply noted the reply in view of its resolution denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition for certiorari. Petitioner alleges that the
Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion, hastily
concluding that the "Satisfaction of Judgment" was spurious
without taking into consideration evidence showing a
"scandalous conspiracy hatched by the parties' former counsel
Atty. Noel Montilla for Delsan and Atty. Manuel Camacho for
private respondent Am Home."
24 SPEC PRO
In its comment, private respondent urges that the petition
for certiorari should be dismissed outright, because what
petitioner should have filed should be a petition for review
under Rule 45 and that, in any case, certiorari does not lie
since there was no grave abuse of its discretion by the Court of
Appeals. Private respondent also charges petitioner with
forum-shopping for bringing the instant petition
for certiorari after losing a similar action it had filed in the Court
of Appeals.
We shall first dispose of private respondent's contention that
the petition in this case should be dismissed outright.
First. Considering that the decision of the Court of Appeals is a
final disposition of the matter before it, private respondent's
contention that the appropriate remedy of petitioner is to file a
petition for review on certiorari is well-taken. However, in
accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court
and in the interest of justice, we have decided to treat the
present petition for certiorari as having been filed under Rule
45, especially considering that it was filed within the
reglementary period for the same. Petitioner's counsel received
the Court of Appeals resolution denying its motion for
reconsideration on October 26, 1993 and filed this petition on
November 8, 1993, which is within the 15-day reglementary
period for filing a petition for review on certiorari. It cannot
therefore be claimed that this petition is being used as a
substitute for appeal after that remedy has been lost through
the fault of petitioner. Moreover, stripped of allegations of
"grave abuse of discretion," the petition actually avers errors of
judgment rather than of jurisdiction, which are the subject of a
petition for review.
Second. It is also contended that, in filing this petition,
petitioner is engaging in forum-shopping, because the case in
the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. SP No.31256), in which
petitioner lost, is also a petition for certiorari questioning the
same order of the trial court. However, considering our
decision to consider the present petition as a petition for
review, which is a form of appeal, this ground for seeking the
dismissal of the petition becomes untenable.

We go now to the merits of the petition. The question is
whether the trial court properly ordered execution of its
decision. Petitioner claims it should have been given the
chance to prove its claim that it had already paid the judgment
against it.
This contention has no merit. In the first place, as the RTC
said, petitioner never asked to be allowed to present evidence
regarding its claim. In the second place, petitioner never
showed the trial court anything to assure the court that its claim
was meritorious and not simply intended to prevent what
otherwise had become a ministerial function of the trial court,
namely, to order execution. For, indeed, besides the xerox
copies of documents attached to its reply filed in the Court of
Appeals, petitioner has not shown — not even here in this
Court — what other documents it has which might prove that it
has paid the amount of the judgment. On the other hand, in
none of the documents (request for funds, check voucher,
check, and acknowledgment receipt), which petitioner has
submitted to show payment, does the name of private
respondent appear as payee. To the contrary, the documents
purport to have been accomplished to pay for the "settlement
fees" of Atty. Camacho. The fact that Atty. Camacho was
private respondent's counsel is the only circumstance linking
private respondent, but then the amount of P100,000.00
purports to be not in payment of private respondent's claim but
Atty. Camacho's fees.
It is insisted that in 1989 the parties agreed to settle their
dispute for P100,000.00, before the rendition of the decision in
Civil Case No. 39720. If that is indeed the case, how come the
document allegedly evidencing it is entitled "Satisfaction of
Judgment"? On the other hand, if the amount was due under a
compromise agreement, why did it state that it was to pay for
"the entire amount as adjudged therein against [petitioner]"?
Moreover, it is improbable that private respondent would agree
to a compromise when the judgment, in its favor is in the
amount of P1.1 million. The amount allegedly paid by
petitioner, P100,000.00, is just a tenth of the P1,180,115.77
award to private respondent and only half of the attorney's fees
it is entitled to collect under the judgment.
In sum, petitioner failed to show enough to convince the trial
court that it was serious so as to justify the court in putting off
performance of a ministerial duty it was being pressed by
private respondent to do. The opinion of the court of Justice
Lourdes Tayao-Jaguros is a well-reasoned exposition which
we could just have adopted by reference.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED.
Let this case be referred to the Bar Confidant for investigation
and possible administrative disciplinary action against
Attorneys Noel L. Montilla, Manuel N. Camacho, and Patricia
Angeles R. Cataquiz.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Romero, Puno and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Per Judge Mariano M. Umali. Petition,
Annex D, Rollo, pp. 29-41.
2 Petition, Annex C, id., p. 28.
3 Id., pp. 48-49.
4 (Sixth Division) per Justice Lourdes M.
Tayao-Jaguros and concurred in by Justices
Nathanael P. De Pano, Jr. and Asaali S.
Isnani, Rollo, pp.21-25.
5 CA Decision, pp. 2-4. id., pp. 22-24.
(Emphasis added).
6 CA Rollo, pp. 87-90; Petition, Annex
N, Rollo, pp. 74-77.
7 CA Rollo, p. 91; Petition, Annex O, id., p.
78.
25 SPEC PRO
8 CA Rollo, p. 92; Petition, Annex P, id., p.
79.
9 CA Rollo, p. 93; Petition, Annex Q, id., p.
80.
10 CA Rollo, p. 94; Petition, Annex R, id., p.
81.
G.R. No. 193978 February 28, 2012
JELBERT B. GALICTO, Petitioner,
vs.
H.E. PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, in his
capacity as President of the Republic of the Philippines;
ATTY. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as
Executive Secretary; and FLORENCIO B. ABAD, in his
capacity as Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
BRION, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with
Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary
Restraining Order,1 seeking to nullify and enjoin the
implementation of Executive Order No. (EO) 7 issued by the
Office of the President on September 8, 2010. Petitioner
Jelbert B. Galicto asserts that EO 7 is unconstitutional for
having been issued beyond the powers of the President and
for being in breach of existing laws.
The petitioner is a Filipino citizen and an employee of the
Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PhilHealth).2He is
currently holding the position of Court Attorney IV and is
assigned at the PhilHealth Regional Office CARAGA.3
 26 SPEC PRO

Respondent Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III is the President of Force information regarding their compensation. Finally, EO 7 REVIEWED BY THE DBM AND APPROVED
the Republic of the Philippines (Pres. Aquino); he issued EO 7 ordered (1) a moratorium on the increases in the salaries and BY THE PRESIDENT BECAUSE P.D. 1597
and has the duty of implementing it. Respondent Paquito N. other forms of compensation, except salary adjustments under REQUIRES ONLY THE GOCCs TO
Ochoa, Jr. is the incumbent Executive Secretary and, as the EO 8011 and EO 900, of all GOCC and GFI employees for an REPORT TO THE OFFICE TO THE
alter ego of Pres. Aquino, is tasked with the implementation of indefinite period to be set by the President,9 and (2) a PRESIDENT THEIR COMPENSATION
EO 7. Respondent Florencio B. Abad is the incumbent suspension of all allowances, bonuses and incentives of PLANS AND RATES BUT THE SAME
Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management members of the Board of Directors/Trustees until December DOES NOT GIVE THE PRESIDENT THE
(DBM) charged with the implementation of EO 7.4 31, 2010.10 POWER OF CONTROL OVER THE FISCAL
POWER OF THE GOCCs.
The Antecedent Facts EO 7 was published on September 10, 2010.11 It took effect on
September 25, 2010 and precluded the Board of Directors, C. J.R. NO. 4, [SERIES] 2009 IS NOT
On July 26, 2010, Pres. Aquino made public in his first State of Trustees and/or Officers of GOCCs from granting and APPLICABLE AS LEGAL BASIS BECAUSE
the Nation Address the alleged excessive allowances, bonuses releasing bonuses and allowances to members of the board of IT HAD NOT RIPENED INTO X X X LAW,
and other benefits of Officers and Members of the Board of directors, and from increasing salary rates of and granting new THE SAME NOT HAVING BEEN
Directors of the Manila Waterworks and Sewerage System – a or additional benefits and allowances to their employees. PUBLISHED.
government owned and controlled corporation (GOCC) which
has been unable to meet its standing The Petition D. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT J.R. NO.
obligations.5 Subsequently, the Senate of the Philippines 1, S. 2004 (sic) AND J.R. 4, S. 2009 ARE
(Senate), through the Senate Committee on Government The petitioner claims that as a PhilHealth employee, he is VALID, STILL THEY ARE NOT
Corporations and Public Enterprises, conducted an inquiry in affected by the implementation of EO 7, which was issued with APPLICABLE AS LEGAL BASIS BECAUSE
aid of legislation on the reported excessive salaries, grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of THEY ARE NOT LAWS WHICH MAY
allowances, and other benefits of GOCCs and government jurisdiction, based on the following arguments: VALIDLY DELEGATE POWER TO THE
financial institutions (GFIs).6 PRESIDENT TO SUSPEND THE POWER
OF THE BOARD TO FIX COMPENSATION.
I.
Based on its findings that "officials and governing boards of
various [GOCCs] and [GFIs] x x x have been granting II.
themselves unwarranted allowances, bonuses, incentives, EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 7 IS NULL AND VOID
stock options, and other benefits [as well as other] irregular FOR LACK OF LEGAL BASIS DUE TO THE
FOLLOWING GROUNDS: EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 7 IS INVALID FOR
and abusive practices,"7 the Senate issued Senate Resolution DIVESTING THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF [THE]
No. 17 "urging the President to order the immediate GOCCS OF THEIR POWER TO FIX THE
suspension of the unusually large and apparently excessive A. P.D. 985 IS NOT APPLICABLE AS BASIS COMPENSATION, A POWER WHICH IS A
allowances, bonuses, incentives and other perks of members FOR EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 7 BECAUSE LEGISLATIVE GRANT AND WHICH COULD NOT
of the governing boards of [GOCCs] and [GFIs]."8 THE GOVERNMENT-OWNED AND BE REVOKED OR MODIFIED BY AN EXECUTIVE
CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS WERE FIAT.
Heeding the call of Congress, Pres. Aquino, on September 8, SUBSEQUENTLY GRANTED THE POWER
2010, issued EO 7, entitled "Directing the Rationalization of the TO FIX COMPENSATION LONG AFTER
SUCH POWER HAS BEEN REVOKED BY III.
Compensation and Position Classification System in the
[GOCCs] and [GFIs], and for Other Purposes." EO 7 provided P.D. 1597 AND R.A. 6758.
for the guiding principles and framework to establish a fixed EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 7 IS BY SUBSTANCE A
compensation and position classification system for GOCCs B. THE GOVERNMENT-OWNED AND LAW, WHICH IS A DEROGATION OF
and GFIs. A Task Force was also created to review all CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS DO NOT CONGRESSIONAL PREROGATIVE AND IS
remunerations of GOCC and GFI employees and officers, NEED TO HAVE ITS COMPENSATION THEREFORE UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
while GOCCs and GFIs were ordered to submit to the Task PLANS, RATES AND POLICIES

IV.
THE ACTS OF SUSPENDING AND IMPOSING
MORATORIUM ARE ULTRA VIRES ACTS
BECAUSE J.R. NO. 4 DOES NOT EXPRESSLY
AUTHORIZE THE PRESIDENT TO EXERCISE
SUCH POWERS.
V.
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 7 IS AN INVALID
ISSUANCE BECAUSE IT HAS NO SUFFICIENT
STANDARDS AND IS THEREFORE ARBITRARY,
UNREASONABLE AND A VIOLATION OF
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS.
VI.
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 7 INVOLVES THE
DETERMINATION AND DISCRETION AS TO WHAT
THE LAW SHALL BE AND IS THEREFORE INVALID
FOR ITS USURPATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.
VII.
CONSISTENT WITH THE DECISION OF THE
SUPREME COURT IN PIMENTEL V. AGUIRRE
CASE, EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 7 IS ONLY
DIRECTORY AND NOT MANDATORY.12
The Case for the Respondents
On December 13, 2010, the respondents filed their Comment.
They pointed out the following procedural defects as grounds
for the petition’s dismissal: (1) the petitioner lacks locus standi;
(2) the petitioner failed to attach a board resolution or
secretary’s certificate authorizing him to question EO 7 in
behalf of PhilHealth; (3) the petitioner’s signature does not
indicate his PTR Number, Mandatory Continuing Legal
Education (MCLE) Compliance Number and Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) Number; (4) the jurat of the Verification
and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping failed to indicate a
valid identification card as provided under A.M. No. 02-8-13-
SC; (5) the President should be dropped as a party respondent
as he is immune from suit; and (6) certiorari is not applicable to
this case.13
The respondents also raised substantive defenses to support
the validity of EO 7. They claim that the President exercises
control over the governing boards of the GOCCs and GFIs;
thus, he can fix their compensation packages. In addition, EO
7 was issued in accordance with law for the purpose of
controlling the grant of excessive salaries, allowances,
incentives and other benefits to GOCC and GFI employees.
They also advocate the validity of Joint Resolution (J.R.) No. 4,
which they point to as the authority for issuing EO 7.14
Meanwhile, on June 6, 2011, Congress enacted Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 10149,15 otherwise known as the "GOCC
Governance Act of 2011." Section 11 of RA 10149 expressly
authorizes the President to fix the compensation framework of
GOCCs and GFIs.
The Court’s Ruling
We resolve to DISMISS the petition for its patent formal and
procedural infirmities, and for having been mooted by
subsequent events.
A. Certiorari is not the proper remedy.
Under the Rules of Court, petitions for Certiorari and
Prohibition are availed of to question judicial, quasi-judicial and
mandatory acts. Since the issuance of an EO is not judicial,
quasi-judicial or a mandatory act, a petition for certiorari and
prohibition is an incorrect remedy; instead a petition for
declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, filed with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), is the proper recourse to assail
the validity of EO 7:
Section 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested under a
deed, will, contract or other written instrument, whose rights
are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation,
ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before
27 SPEC PRO
breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate
Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction
or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties,
thereunder. (Emphases ours.)
Liga ng mga Barangay National v. City Mayor of Manila 16 is a
case in point.17 In Liga, we dismissed the petition for certiorari
to set aside an EO issued by a City Mayor and insisted that a
petition for declaratory relief should have been filed with the
RTC. We painstakingly ruled:
After due deliberation on the pleadings filed, we resolve to
dismiss this petition for certiorari.
First, the respondents neither acted in any judicial or quasi-
judicial capacity nor arrogated unto themselves any judicial or
quasi-judicial prerogatives. A petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is a special civil action
that may be invoked only against a tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
provides:
SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board
or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has
acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging
the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board
or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and
justice may require.
Elsewise stated, for a writ of certiorari to issue, the following
requisites must concur: (1) it must be directed against a
tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or officer must have acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting [to] lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3)

there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law.
A respondent is said to be exercising judicial function where he
has the power to determine what the law is and what the legal
rights of the parties are, and then undertakes to determine
these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties.
Quasi-judicial function, on the other hand, is "a term which
applies to the actions, discretion, etc., of public administrative
officers or bodies … required to investigate facts or ascertain
the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions
from them as a basis for their official action and to exercise
discretion of a judicial nature."
Before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise judicial or
quasi-judicial acts, it is necessary that there be a law that gives
rise to some specific rights of persons or property under which
adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy
ensuing therefrom is brought before a tribunal, board, or officer
clothed with power and authority to determine the law and
adjudicate the respective rights of the contending parties.
The respondents do not fall within the ambit of tribunal, board,
or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. As
correctly pointed out by the respondents, the enactment by the
City Council of Manila of the assailed ordinance and the
issuance by respondent Mayor of the questioned executive
order were done in the exercise of legislative and executive
functions, respectively, and not of judicial or quasi-judicial
functions. On this score alone, certiorari will not lie.
Second, although the instant petition is styled as a petition
for certiorari, in essence, it seeks the declaration by this Court
of the unconstitutionality or illegality of the questioned
ordinance and executive order. It, thus, partakes of the nature
of a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has only
appellate, not original, jurisdiction. Section 5, Article VIII of the
Constitution provides:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and
over petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on
appeal or certiorari as the law or the Rules of Court
may provide, final judgments and orders of lower
courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or
validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, presidential
decree, proclamation, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question. (Italics supplied).
As such, this petition must necessar[ily] fail, as this Court does
not have original jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory
relief even if only questions of law are involved.18
Likewise, in Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc.
v. Anti Terrorism Council,19 we similarly dismissed the petitions
for certiorari and prohibition challenging the constitutionality of
R.A. No. 9372, otherwise known as the "Human Security Act of
2007," since the respondents therein (members of the Anti-
Terrorism Council) did not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial
functions.
While we have recognized in the past that we can exercise the
discretion and rulemaking authority we are granted under the
Constitution,20 and set aside procedural considerations to
permit parties to bring a suit before us at the first instance
through certiorari and/or prohibition,21 this liberal policy
remains to be an exception to the general rule, and thus, has
its limits. In Concepcion v. Commission on Elections
(COMELEC),22 we emphasized the importance of availing of
the proper remedies and cautioned against the wrongful use of
certiorari in order to assail the quasi-legislative acts of the
COMELEC, especially by the wrong party. In ruling that
liberality and the transcendental doctrine cannot trump blatant
disregard of procedural rules, and considering that the
petitioner had other available remedies (such as a petition for
28 SPEC PRO
declaratory relief with the appropriate RTC under the terms of
Rule 63 of the Rules of Court), as in this case, we categorically
ruled:
The petitioner’s unusual approaches and use of Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court do not appear to us to be the result of any error
in reading Rule 65, given the way the petition was crafted.
Rather, it was a backdoor approach to achieve what the
petitioner could not directly do in his individual capacity under
Rule 65. It was, at the very least, an attempted bypass of other
available, albeit lengthier, modes of review that the Rules of
Court provide. While we stop short of concluding that the
petitioner’s approaches constitute an abuse of process through
a manipulative reading and application of the Rules of Court,
we nevertheless resolve that the petition should be dismissed
for its blatant violation of the Rules. The transgressions alleged
in a petition, however weighty they may sound, cannot be
justifications for blatantly disregarding the rules of procedure,
particularly when remedial measures were available under
these same rules to achieve the petitioner’s objectives. For our
part, we cannot and should not – in the name of liberality and
the "transcendental importance" doctrine – entertain these
types of petitions. As we held in the very recent case
of Lozano, et al. vs. Nograles, albeit from a different
perspective, our liberal approach has its limits and should not
be abused.23 [emphasis supplied]
B. Petitioner lacks locus standi.
"Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal
and substantial interest in a case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the
question on standing is whether a party alleges such personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions."24 This requirement of standing
relates to the constitutional mandate that this Court settle only
actual cases or controversies.25
Thus, as a general rule, a party is allowed to "raise a
constitutional question" when (1) he can show that he will

personally suffer some actual or threatened injury because of
the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is
fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is
likely to be redressed by a favorable action.26
Jurisprudence defines interest as "material interest, an interest
in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished
from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere
incidental interest. By real interest is meant a present
substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy
or a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential
interest."27
To support his claim that he has locus standi to file the present
petition, the petitioner contends that as an employee of
PhilHealth, he "stands to be prejudiced by [EO] 7, which
suspends or imposes a moratorium on the grants of salary
increases or new or increased benefits to officers and
employees of GOCC[s] and x x x curtail[s] the prerogative of
those officers who are to fix and determine his
compensation."28 The petitioner also claims that he has
standing as a member of the bar in good standing who has an
interest in ensuring that laws and orders of the Philippine
government are legally and validly issued and implemented.
The respondents meanwhile argue that the petitioner is not a
real party-in-interest since future increases in salaries and
other benefits are merely contingent events or
expectancies.29 The petitioner, too, is not asserting a public
right for which he is entitled to seek judicial protection. Section
9 of EO 7 reads:
Section 9. Moratorium on Increases in Salaries, Allowances,
Incentives and Other Benefits. –Moratorium on increases in the
rates of salaries, and the grant of new increases in the rates of
allowances, incentives and other benefits, except salary
adjustments pursuant to Executive Order No. 8011 dated June
17, 2009 and Executive Order No. 900 dated June 23, 2010,
are hereby imposed until specifically authorized by the
President. [emphasis ours]
In the present case, we are not convinced that the petitioner
has demonstrated that he has a personal stake or material
interest in the outcome of the case because his interest, if any,
is speculative and based on a mere expectancy. In this case,
the curtailment of future increases in his salaries and other
benefits cannot but be characterized as contingent events or
expectancies. To be sure, he has no vested rights to salary
increases and, therefore, the absence of such right deprives
the petitioner of legal standing to assail EO 7.
It has been held that as to the element of injury, such aspect is
not something that just anybody with some grievance or pain
may assert. It has to be direct and substantial to make it worth
the court’s time, as well as the effort of inquiry into the
constitutionality of the acts of another department of
government. If the asserted injury is more imagined than real,
or is merely superficial and insubstantial, then the courts may
end up being importuned to decide a matter that does not
really justify such an excursion into constitutional
adjudication.30 The rationale for this constitutional requirement
of locus standi is by no means trifle. Not only does it assure the
vigorous adversary presentation of the case; more importantly,
it must suffice to warrant the Judiciary’s overruling the
determination of a coordinate, democratically elected organ of
government, such as the President, and the clear approval by
Congress, in this case. Indeed, the rationale goes to the very
essence of representative democracies.31
Neither can the lack of locus standi be cured by the petitioner’s
claim that he is instituting the present petition as a member of
the bar in good standing who has an interest in ensuring that
laws and orders of the Philippine government are legally and
validly issued. This supposed interest has been branded by the
Court in Integrated Bar of the Phils. (IBP) v. Hon.
Zamora,32 "as too general an interest which is shared by other
groups and [by] the whole citizenry."33 Thus, the Court ruled in
IBP that the mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve
the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not
sufficient to clothe it with standing in that case. The Court
made a similar ruling in Prof. David v. Pres. Macapagal-
Arroyo34 and held that the petitioners therein, who are national
officers of the IBP, have no legal standing, having failed to
allege any direct or potential injury which the IBP, as an
institution, or its members may suffer as a consequence of the
issuance of Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 and General
Order No. 5.35
29 SPEC PRO
We note that while the petition raises vital constitutional and
statutory questions concerning the power of the President to fix
the compensation packages of GOCCs and GFIs with possible
implications on their officials and employees, the same cannot
"infuse" or give the petitioner locus standi under the
transcendental importance or paramount public interest
doctrine. In Velarde v. Social Justice Society,36 we held that
even if the Court could have exempted the case from the
stringent locus standi requirement, such heroic effort would be
futile because the transcendental issue could not be resolved
any way, due to procedural infirmities and shortcomings, as in
the present case.37 In other words, giving due course to the
present petition which is saddled with formal and procedural
infirmities explained above in this Resolution, cannot but be an
exercise in futility that does not merit the Court’s liberality. As
we emphasized in Lozano v. Nograles,38 "while the Court has
taken an increasingly liberal approach to the rule of locus
standi, evolving from the stringent requirements of
‘personal injury’ to the broader ‘transcendental
importance’ doctrine, such liberality is not to be
abused."39
Finally, since the petitioner has failed to demonstrate a
material and personal interest in the issue in dispute, he
cannot also be considered to have filed the present case as a
representative of PhilHealth. In this regard, we cannot ignore
or excuse the blatant failure of the petitioner to provide a Board
Resolution or a Secretary’s Certificate from PhilHealth to act as
its representative.
C. The petition has a defective jurat.
The respondents claim that the petition should be dismissed
for failing to comply with Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, which requires the party or the counsel
representing him to sign the pleading and indicate an address
that should not be a post office box. The petition also allegedly
violated the Supreme Court En Banc Resolution dated
November 12, 2001, requiring counsels to indicate in their
pleadings their Roll of Attorneys Number, their PTR Number
and their IBP Official Receipt or Lifetime Member Number;
otherwise, the pleadings would be considered unsigned and
dismissible. Bar Matter No. 1922 likewise states that a counsel
should note down his MCLE Certificate of Compliance or

Certificate of Exemption in the pleading, but the petitioner had
failed to do so.40
We do not see any violation of Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure as the petition bears the petitioner’s
signature and office address. The present suit was brought
before this Court by the petitioner himself as a party litigant
and not through counsel. Therefore, the requirements under
the Supreme Court En Banc Resolution dated November 12,
2001 and Bar Matter No. 1922 do not apply. In Bar Matter No.
1132, April 1, 2003, we clarified that a party who is not a
lawyer is not precluded from signing his own pleadings as this
is allowed by the Rules of Court; the purpose of requiring a
counsel to indicate his IBP Number and PTR Number is merely
to protect the public from bogus lawyers. A similar construction
should be given to Bar Matter No. 1922, which requires
lawyers to indicate their MCLE Certificate of Compliance or
Certificate of Exemption; otherwise, the provision that allows
parties to sign their own pleadings will be negated.
However, the point raised by the respondents regarding the
petitioner’s defective jurat is correct. Indeed, A.M. No. 02-8-13-
SC, dated February 19, 2008, calls for a current identification
document issued by an official agency bearing the photograph
and signature of the individual as competent evidence of
identity. Nevertheless, we hasten to clarify that the defective
jurat in the Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping is
not a fatal defect, as we held in In-N-Out Burger, Inc. v.
Sehwani, Incorporated.41 The verification is only a formal, not a
jurisdictional, requirement that the Court may waive.
D. The petition has been mooted by supervening events.
Because of the transitory nature of EO 7, it has been pointed
out that the present case has already been rendered moot by
these supervening events: (1) the lapse on December 31, 2010
of Section 10 of EO 7 that suspended the allowances and
bonuses of the directors and trustees of GOCCs and GFIs; and
(2) the enactment of R.A. No. 10149 amending the provisions
in the charters of GOCCs and GFIs empowering their board of
directors/trustees to determine their own compensation
system, in favor of the grant of authority to the President to
perform this act.
With the enactment of the GOCC Governance Act of 2011, the
President is now authorized to fix the compensation framework
of GOCCs and GFIs. The pertinent provisions read:
Section 5. Creation of the Governance Commission for
Government-Owned or -Controlled Corporations. — There is
hereby created an advisory, monitoring, and oversight body
with authority to formulate, implement and coordinate policies
to be known as the Governance Commission for Government-
Owned or-Controlled Corporations, hereinafter referred to as
the GCG, which shall be attached to the Office of the
President. The GCG shall have the following powers and
functions:
xxxx
h) Conduct compensation studies, develop and recommend to
the President a competitive compensation and remuneration
system which shall attract and retain talent, at the same time
allowing the GOCC to be financially sound and sustainable;
xxxx
Section 8. Coverage of the Compensation and Position
Classification System. — The GCG, after conducting a
compensation study, shall develop a Compensation and
Position Classification System which shall apply to all officers
and employees of the GOCCs whether under the Salary
Standardization Law or exempt therefrom and shall consist of
classes of positions grouped into such categories as the GCG
may determine, subject to approval of the President.
Section 9. Position Titles and Salary Grades. — All positions in
the Positions Classification System, as determined by the GCG
and as approved by the President, shall be allocated to their
proper position titles and salary grades in accordance with an
Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary
Grades of the Compensation and Position Classification
System, which shall be prepared by the GCG and approved by
the President.
xxxx
30 SPEC PRO
[N]o GOCC shall be exempt from the coverage of the
Compensation and Position Classification System developed
by the GCG under this Act.
As may be gleaned from these provisions, the new law
amended R.A. No. 7875 and other laws that enabled certain
GOCCs and GFIs to fix their own compensation frameworks;
the law now authorizes the President to fix the compensation
and position classification system for all GOCCs and GFIs, as
well as other entities covered by the law. This means that, the
President can now reissue an EO containing these same
provisions without any legal constraints.1âwphi1
A moot case is "one that ceases to present a justiciable
controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a
declaration thereon would be of no practical use or
value."42 "[A]n action is considered ‘moot’ when it no longer
presents a justiciable controversy because the issues involved
have become academic or dead[,] or when the matter in
dispute has already been resolved and hence, one is not
entitled to judicial intervention unless the issue is likely to be
raised again between the parties x x x. Simply stated, there is
nothing for the x x x court to resolve as [its] determination x x x
has been overtaken by subsequent events."43
This is the present situation here. Congress, thru R.A. No.
10149, has expressly empowered the President to establish
the compensation systems of GOCCs and GFIs. For the Court
to still rule upon the supposed unconstitutionality of EO 7 will
merely be an academic exercise. Any further discussion of the
constitutionality of EO 7 serves no useful purpose since such
issue is moot in its face in light of the enactment of R.A. No.
10149. In the words of the eminent constitutional law expert,
Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., "the Court normally [will not] entertain
a petition touching on an issue that has become moot because
x x x there would [be] no longer x x x a ‘flesh and blood’ case
for the Court to resolve."44
All told, in view of the supervening events rendering the
petition moot, as well as its patent formal and procedural
infirmities, we no longer see any reason for the Court to
resolve the other issues raised in the certiorari petition.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
* On Official Leave.
**
On Leave.
1 10
Rollo, pp. 3-72.
2 Section 10. Suspension of All Allowances, Bonuses
Id. at 13.
3 Id. at 83.
4 Id. at 13-14.
5 Id. at 154.
6 Id. at 158-159.
7 public interest involved and the crucial constitutional
The Senate Committee found that: "(a) the
representatives of the Social Security Commission
(SSC) to the Board of Directors of Philex Mining
earned, in addition to their bonuses, some P55 million
by way of stock options; (b) three SSC
representatives in the Board of Directors of the Union
Bank earned P46 million in bonuses in 2009, or
around P15 million each; (c) the MWSS, despite
incurring a loss of P3.5 billion in 2008, declared a
bonus of P5 million to its board chairman in 2009 and
granted 25 bonuses in one year; and (d) GOCCs
have failed to comply with the requirement of R.A. No.
7656 to remit 50% of its net earnings to the national
government." (Id. at 342).
8 Ibid.
9 17
Id. at 18-24. Section 9 of EO 7 states:
Section 9. Moratorium on Increases in Salaries,
Allowances, Incentives and Other Benefits. –
Moratorium on increases in the rates of salaries, and
the grant of new increases in the rates of allowances,
incentives and other benefits, except salary
adjustments pursuant to Executive Order No. 8011
dated June 17, 2009 and Executive Order No. 900
dated June 23, 2010, are hereby imposed until
specifically authorized by the President.
Section 10 of EO 7 provides:
and Incentives for Members of the Board of
Directors/Trustees. – The grant of allowances,
bonuses, incentives, and other perks to members of
the board of directors/trustees of GOCCs and GFIs,
except reasonable per diems, is hereby suspended
until December 31, 2010, pending the issuance of
new policies and guidelines on the compensation of
these board members.
11 Rollo, p. 24.
12 Id. at 10-12.
13 Comment, pp. 39-62.
14
Id. at 63-140.
15AN ACT TO PROMOTE FINANCIAL VIABILITY
AND FISCAL DISCIPLINE IN GOVERNMENT-
OWNED OR -CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS AND
TO STRENGTHEN THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN
ITS GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT TO MAKE
THEM MORE RESPONSIVE TO THE NEEDS OF
PUBLIC INTEREST AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
16 465 Phil. 529 (2004).
31 SPEC PRO
We are aware of our ruling in Pimentel, Jr. v. Hon.
Aguirre, 391 Phil. 84 (2000), where we gave due
course to a petition for certiorari and prohibition to
assail an "Administrative Order issued by the
President." Pimentel, however, has no bearing in the
present case since the propriety of the petition or the
non-observance of the hierarchy-of-courts rule was
not an issue therein.
18
Supra note 16, at 540-542.
19G.R. Nos. 178552, 178554, 178581, 178890,
179157 and 179461, October 5, 2010, 632 SCRA
146.
20
CONSTITUTION, Article VIII, Section 5(5).
21See Pimentel, Jr. v. Hon. Aguirre, supra note 16.
We similarly glossed over the erroneous remedies the
petitioners used in Rivera v. Hon. Espiritu, 425 Phil.
169 (2002), Macalintal v. Commission on Elections,
435 Phil. 586 (2003), and Kapisanan ng mga Kawani
ng Energy Regulatory Board v. Barin, G.R. No.
150974, June 29, 2007, 526 SCRA 1 recognizing that
the procedural errors were overshadowed by the
questions that the Court needed to resolve.
22
G.R. No. 178624, June 30, 2009, 591 SCRA 420.
23 Id. at 437.
24
Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v.
Anti Terrorism Council, supra note 19, at 167, citing
Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. The Executive
Secretary, G.R. No. 166052, August 29, 2007, 531
SCRA 583, 591.
25Lozano v. Nograles, G.R. Nos. 187883 & 187910,
June 16, 2009, 589 SCRA 356, 361.

26Tolentino v. Commission on Elections, 465 Phil.
385, 402 (2004).
27Stefan Tito Miñoza v. Hon. Cesar Tomas Lopez,
etc., et al., G.R. No. 170914, April 13, 2011.
28 Rollo, pp. 15-16.
29
Id. at 179.
30See Rene B. Gorospe, Songs, Singers and
Shadows: Revisiting Locus Standi In Light Of The
People Power Provisions Of The 1987 Constitution,
UST LAW REVIEW, Vol. LI, AY 2006-2007, pp. 15-
16, citing Montecillo v. Civil Service Commission,
G.R. No. 131954, June 28, 2001, 360 SCRA 99, 104;
Tomas Claudio Memorial College, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 124262, October 12, 1999, 316
SCRA 502, 508; and Tañada v. Angara, G.R. No.
118295, May 2, 1997, 272 SCRA 18 , 79.
31Id. at 10-11, citing then Associate Justice Reynato
S. Puno’s Dissenting Opinion in Kilosbayan v.
Guingona, Jr., at 232 SCRA 110 (1994), at 169.
32 392 Phil. 618 (2000).
33 Id. at 633.
34 522 Phil. 705 (2006).
35 Id. at 764. The Court in these two above-cited
cases, however, brushed aside therein petitioners’
lack of locus standi in view of transcendental issues
raised in these cases.
36 G.R. No. 159357, April 28, 2004, 428 SCRA 283.
37
Rene B. Gorospe, Songs, Singers and Shadows:
Revisiting Locus Standi In Light Of The People Power
Provisions Of The 1987 Constitution, UST LAW
REVIEW, supra note 30, at 53, citing Velarde v.
Social Justice Society, id. at 298.
38 Supra note 25.
39
Id. at 362.
40
Rollo, pp. 183-190.
41G.R. No. 179127, December 24, 2008, 575 SCRA
535, 555.
42Funa v. Ermita, G.R. No. 184740, February 11,
2010, 612 SCRA 308, 319.
43
Santiago v. CA, 348 Phil. 792, 800 (1998).
44See J. Brion Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in
Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the
Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral
Domain (GRP), G.R. Nos. 183591, 183752, 183893,
183951, & 183962, October 14, 2008, 568 SCRA 402,
703.
SEPARATE OPINION
CORONA, C.J.:
Most GOCCs are incurring significant financial losses.
Budgetary support to the total government corporate sector
(including government financial institutions, social security
institutions, and GOCCs providing goods and services to the
public) amounted to P80.4 billion during 2000–2004. In
addition, indirect support, in the form of guarantees on GOCC
obligations, is also in the billions of pesos. In the past 5 years,
there has been a noticeable increase in the aggregate deficit of
32 SPEC PRO
the 14 monitored GOCCs1 , bringing their financial viability into
question. While the 14 monitored GOCCs’ current and capital
expenditures fluctuated around 6% of GDP, revenues have
fallen from 5% to 4.1% of GDP over 2000–2004, increasing the
deficit of the monitored GOCCs from 0.6% to 1.8% of GDP
over the same period. In 2004, the monitored GOCCs’
consolidated deficit was P85.4 billion, a more than fourfold
increase from the 2000 level of P19.2 billion. The 2004 deficit
is already about the same size as the potential new revenues
collected through the expanded value-added tax law. There
are various reasons for the ballooning GOCC deficits, including
(i) failure to adjust tariff rates, (ii) large capital requirements,
and (iii) operational and management inefficiencies. 2
Accountability in public office requires rationality and efficiency
in both administrative and financial operations of all
government offices, government-owned and controlled
corporations (GOCCs) included. As a corollary, public funds
must be utilized in a way that will promote transparency,
accountability and prudence.
The nation was recently informed that GOCCs, most of which
enjoyed privileges not afforded to other offices and agencies of
the National Government, suffer from serious fiscal deficit. Yet,
officers and employees of these GOCCs continue to receive
hefty perks and excessive allowances presenting a stark
disconnect and causing the further depletion of limited
resources. In the face of such situation, where the President as
Chief Executive makes a decisive move to stave off the
financial hemorrhage and administrative inefficiency of
government corporations, the Court should not invalidate the
Chief Executive’s action without a clear showing of grave
abuse of discretion on his part.
Factual Antecedents
In his first State of the Nation Address, President Benigno
Simeon C. Aquino III exposed anomalies in the financial
management of the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage
System, the National Power Corporation and the National Food
Authority. These revelations prompted the Senate to conduct
legislative inquiries on the matter of the activities of GOCCs.
Appalled by its findings, the Senate issued Resolution No. 17,

s. 2010, urging the President to order the immediate
suspension of the unusually large and excessive allowances,
bonuses, incentives and other perks of members of the
governing boards of GOCCs and government financial
institutions (GFIs). Thus, on September 8, 2010, President
Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III issued Executive Order No.
73 (EO 7) strengthening the supervision of the compensation
levels of GOCCs and GFIs by controlling the grant of
excessive salaries, allowances, incentives and other benefits.4
EO 7 imposes a moratorium on increases in salaries,
allowances, incentives and other benefits of GOCCs and GFIs,
except salary adjustments pursuant to EO 8011 dated June 17,
2009 and EO 900 dated June 23, 2010.5 It suspended the
allowances, bonuses and other perks enjoyed by the boards of
directors/trustees of GOCCs and GFIs until December 31,
2010, pending the issuance of new policies and guidelines on
the compensation packages of GOCCs and GFIs.6 In addition,
it provides for the creation of a Task Force on Corporate
Compensation (TFCC) to undertake a review of all
remunerations granted to members of the board of directors,
officers and rank-and-file employees, as well as discretionary
funds of GOCCs and GFIs.7 It mandates the submission of
information on all personnel remuneration from all GOCCs and
GFIs to the TFCC.8 Lastly, it establishes guiding principles as
well as a total compensation framework for the rationalization
of the compensation and position classification system in
GOCCs and GFIs.9
The constitutionality of EO 7 is now being challenged by
petitioner Jelbert B. Galicto who brings this petition for
certiorari and prohibition in his capacity as a lawyer and as an
employee of the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation
(PhilHealth) Regional Office–Butuan City. Essentially, he
questions the authority of the President to issue EO 7. He
likewise assails the constitutionality of EO 7 for allegedly
violating his right to property without due process of law.
The ponencia of Justice Arturo D. Brion dismisses the petition
for being replete with formal and procedural defects and for
having been rendered moot by supervening events.
I agree with the ponencia’s thorough discussion and correct
disposition. Nevertheless, I am submitting this opinion to
express my thoughts on matters which I believe to be equally
important considerations in the resolution of this case.
Fundamental considerations governing the exercise of the
power of judicial review require the Court to exercise restraint
in nullifying the act of a co-equal and coordinate branch. Here,
the justiciability doctrines of standing and mootness work
against petitioner.
Moreover, a careful consideration of the respective arguments
of the parties compels sustaining the validity of EO 7. The
President as Chief Executive has the legal authority to issue
EO 7. Furthermore, petitioner failed to show that the President
committed grave abuse of discretion in directing the
rationalization of the compensation and position classification
system in GOCCs and GFIs.
Lack of Standing and Mootness
The power of judicial review is a sword that must be
unsheathed with restraint. To ensure this, certain justiciability
doctrines must be complied with as a prerequisite for the
Court’s exercise of its awesome power to declare the act of a
co-equal branch invalid for being unconstitutional. These
doctrines are important as they are intertwined with the
principle of separation of powers.10 They help define the
judicial role; they determine when it is appropriate for courts to
review (a legal issue) and when it is necessary to defer to the
other branches of government.11
Among the justiciability doctrines are standing and mootness.
Petitioner failed to observe both.
Courts do not decide all kinds of cases dumped on their laps
and do not open their doors to all parties or entities claiming a
grievance.12 Locus standi is intended to assure a vigorous
adversary presentation of the case. More importantly, it
warrants the judiciary’s overruling the determination of a
coordinate, democratically elected organ of government. It thus
goes to the very essence of representative democracies. 13
33 SPEC PRO
Petitioner, for himself, asserts his right to question the
constitutionality of EO 7 on two grounds. First, as an employee
of PhilHealth, he allegedly stands to be prejudiced by EO 7
insofar as it suspends or imposes a moratorium on the grant of
salary increases and other benefits to employees and officials
of GOCCs and GFIs and curtails the prerogatives of the
officers responsible for the fixing and determination of his
compensation. Second, as a lawyer, he claims to have an
interest in making sure that laws and orders by government
officials are legally and validly issued and implemented.
Petitioner cannot sufficiently anchor his standing to bring this
action on account of his employment in PhilHealth, a GOCC
covered by EO 7. He cannot reasonably expect this Court to
symphatize with his lament that the law impedes or threatens
to impede his right to receive future increases as well as the
right of members of the board of directors of Philhealth to
allowances and bonuses.
The irreducible minimum condition for the exercise of judicial
power is a requirement that a party "show he personally has
suffered some actual or threatened injury" to his rights.14 A
party who assails the constitutionality of a statute or an official
act must have a direct and personal interest. He must show not
only that the law or any governmental act is invalid, but also
that he sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some
direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that
he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. He must show that
he has
been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which
he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to
some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act
complained of.15
For this reason, petitioner’s reliance on his status as PhilHealth
employee, without more, is a frail thread that fails to sustain the
burden of locus standi required of anyone who may properly
invoke the Court’s power of judicial review.
EO 7 simply imposes a moratorium on increases in salaries,
allowances and other benefits of officials and employees of
GOCCs and GFIs and directs the suspension of all allowances

bonuses and incentives of GOCC and GFI officials. Moratorium
is defined as an authorized postponement in the performance
of an obligation or a suspension of a specific activity. 16 Section
9 of EO 7 is not a permanent prohibition on petitioner’s
perceived right to receive future increases. Nor is it an absolute
ban on salary increases as it ensures that, like all other officials
and employees of the government, officials and employees of
GOCCs and GFIs will continue to enjoy the salary increases
mandated under EO 8011 dated June 17, 2009 and EO 900
dated June 23, 2010.
While one’s employment is a constitutionally-protected
property right, petitioner does not claim that his employment is
at risk under EO 7. Petitioner is simply concerned about his
entitlement to future salary increases. However, a public officer
has a vested right only to salaries already earned or
accrued.17 Salary increases are a mere expectancy.18 They are
by nature volatile and dependent on numerous variables,
including the company’s fiscal situation, the employee’s future
performance on the job, or the employee’s continued stay in a
position.19Thus, petitioner does not have a "right" to an
increase in salary. There is no vested right to salary
increases.20There must be a lawful decree or order supporting
an employee’s claim.21 In this case, petitioner failed to point to
any lawful decree or order supporting his entitlement to future
increases in salary, as no such decree or order yet exists.
It is, however, contended that petitioner does not claim any
right to any future increase. He merely seeks to remove any
legal impediment to his receiving future increases.1âwphi1 It is
asserted that, without the legal impediment provided under
Section 9 of EO 7, any future increase in petitioner’s
compensation will simply depend on the usual factors
considered by the proper authorities. I fear this view is
misleading and incorrect.
It is misleading because, by re-working the concept of injury, it
diverts the focus from the required right-centric approach to the
concept of injury as an element of locus standi. Injury or threat
of injury, as an element of legal standing, refers to a denial of a
right or privilege. It does not include the denial of a reasonable
expectation.
The argument is likewise incorrect because petitioner’s
reasonable expectation of any future salary increase is subject
to presidential approval. Even without Section 9 of EO 7, the
President may disallow any salary increase in RA 675822 -
exempt entities. Section 9 of Joint Resolution No. 4, Section 59
of the General Provisions of RA 997023 and Section 56 of the
General Provisions of RA 1014724 expressly confer on the
President the authority to approve or disapprove "any grant of
or increase in salaries, allowances, and other fringe benefits" in
entities exempt from the coverage of RA 6758. The approval of
the President, upon the favorable recommendation of the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM), is among the
"usual factors" that will determine any future salary increase
that may be reasonable expected to be received by petitioner.
Petitioner cannot also lay claim to any direct personal injury to
his right or interest arising from the suspension under Section
10 of EO 7 of allowances and bonuses enjoyed by the board of
directors/trustees of GOCCs and GFIs. He is not a member of
the board of directors of Philhealth.
Neither can petitioner rely on his membership in the Philippine
Bar to support his legal standing. Mere interest as a member of
the Bar25 and an empty invocation of a duty in "making sure
that laws and orders by officials of the Philippine government
are legally issued and implemented" does not suffice to clothe
one with standing.26
It is clear from the foregoing that petitioner failed to satisfy the
irreducible minimum condition that will trigger the exercise of
judicial power. Lacking a leg on which he may base his
personality to bring this action, petitioner’s claim of sufficient
standing should fail.
Even assuming that petitioner had standing at the time he
commenced this petition, subsequent events have rendered
his petition moot.
For one, the effectivity of the suspension of allowances and
bonuses enjoyed by the board of directors/trustees of GOCCs
and GFIs under Section 10 of EO 7 already lapsed on
December 31, 2010.27 Thus, a review of the constitutionality of
that provision is no longer necessary and its invalidation
34 SPEC PRO
improper. The unnecessary invalidation of Section 10 of EO 7
might not only betray injudiciousness on the part of the Court
but also needlessly put the Chief Executive, the head of a co-
equal branch, in a bad light for issuing an invalid provision.
Thus, the undue disregard of the mootness doctrine in
connection with Section 10 of EO 7 would inflict severe
collateral damage to judicial modesty and inter-branch
courtesy.
Moreover, as the ponencia correctly ruled, the enactment of
RA28 1014929 has rendered the issue as to the validity of EO 7
effectively moot. With RA 10149, Congress affirmed the power
of the President as enunciated in EO 7 to set guidelines and
components of a rationalized compensation and position
classification for all GOCC and GFI employees.
If a case is moot, there is no longer an actual controversy
between adverse litigants.30 Also, if events subsequent to the
initiation of the lawsuit have resolved the matter, then the
decision of the court on that issue is not likely to have any
meaningful effect.31
With the recognition that RA 10149 mooted the challenge to
EO 7, the Court must act with circumspection and prudence,
bearing in mind that due respect for a co-equal branch
necessitates that the presumption of legality and
constitutionality afforded to the said provisions should no
longer be disturbed.
Consistency with Existing Laws
Sections 2 to 6 of EO 7 is an enumeration of the guidelines
and components of a rationalized compensation and position
classification for GOCCs and GFIs that the President intends
to establish. In particular, Section 2 provides the guiding
principles; Section 3 discusses the total compensation
framework; Section 4 pertains to the standard components of
the compensation and position classification system; Section 5
involves the rationalization of indirect compensation and
Section 6 lists the considerations in setting compensation
levels.

Petitioner claims that these provisions are invalid because they
violate existing laws, namely Section 16(n) of RA 7875 32 (the
charter of Philhealth) and Section 9 of Joint Resolution No.
433 of the Senate and the House of Representatives.
Petitioner finds fault in the failure of EO 7 to correctly
distinguish between GOCCs and GFIs that have been
exempted by law from RA 6758, as amended, and those that
are within its coverage.
RA 6758, as amended, vests the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM), which is under the control of the
President, the authority to establish and administer a
compensation and position classification system. On the other
hand, Section 16(n) of RA 7875 gives the board of directors of
Philhealth the authority to appoint its own personnel and to fix
their compensation, with the exception of the Philhealth
president whose appointment and compensation require
approval of the President. For petitioner, EO 7 violates Section
16(n) of RA 7875 by vesting on the DBM and the President the
power to determine the compensation of Philhealth employees.
Joint Resolution No. 4 authorizes the President to modify the
compensation and position classification system under RA
6758 of civilian personnel, among others. Section 9 of Joint
Resolution No. 4 recognizes the distinct character of exempt
entities and provides that such entities shall be governed by
their respective compensation and position classification
system. For petitioner, by using the guidelines, standards and
components of standardized compensation framework
provided under Joint Resolution No. 4 and applying them to all
GOCCs and GFIs, EO 7 contravenes Joint Resolution No. 4
itself. In particular, EO 7 disregards the substantial distinction
made under Section 9 of Joint Resolution No. 4 insofar as the
right of exempt GOCCs to set their own compensation and
position classification systems is concerned.
Petitioner is wrong. EO 7 is consistent with laws, including RA
7875 and Joint Resolution No. 4.
True, Congress carved exceptions to RA 6758, as amended,
when it created GOCCs and GFIs which have been granted
the authority to determine their own compensation and position
classification system. Philhealth, governed by RA 7875, is one
of these RA 6758-exempt entities.
It is likewise true that Section 9 of Joint Resolution No. 4
recognizes the authority granted to exempt entities like
Philhealth to determine their own compensation and position
classification system. Nonetheless, the said provision also
provides that exempt entities "shall observe the policies,
parameters and guidelines governing position classification,
salary rates, categories and rates of allowances, benefits and
incentives prescribed by the President."
For purposes of clarity, Section 9 of Joint Resolution No. 4
provides:
(9) Exempt Entities ― Government agencies which by specific
provision/s of laws are authorized to have their own
compensation and position classification system shall not be
entitled to the salary adjustments provided herein. Exempt
entities shall be governed by their respective Compensation
and Position Classification System: Provided, That such
entities shall observe the policies, parameters and guidelines
governing position classification, salary rates, categories and
rates of allowances, benefits and incentives prescribed by the
President: Provided, further, That any increase in the existing
salary rates thereof shall be subject to the approval by the
President, upon the recommendation of the DBM: Provided,
finally, That exempt entities which still follow the salary rates
for positions covered by [RA 6758], as amended, are entitled to
the salary adjustments due to the implementation of this Joint
Resolution, until such time that they have implemented their
own compensation and position classification system.
(Emphasis supplied)
Provisions of law should be read and understood in their
entirety and all parts thereof should be seen as constituting a
coherent whole. In this context, the recognition under Section 9
of Joint Resolution No. 4 of the authority granted to exempt
entities like Philhealth to determine their own compensation
and position classification system seeks to exclude them from
the salary adjustments provided in Joint Resolution No. 4. This
would have the effect of retaining the existing compensation
levels in the said exempt entities at that time. It would prevent
35 SPEC PRO
both diminution, in case their existing compensation levels are
higher than the salary adjustments, and also increase, which
would have enlarged the pay disparity between those covered
by RA 6758 and exempt entities. To ensure observance of the
distinction between RA 6758-covered and RA 6758-exempt
entities and, at the same time, forestall any unnecessary or
excessive dissimilarity in compensation and position
classification systems may occur as a result of the distinctions,
exempt entities are required to observe the policies,
parameters and guidelines governing position classification,
salary rates, categories and rates of allowances, benefits and
incentives prescribed by the President. This is a recognition by
Congress of the authority of the President to issue policies,
parameters and guidelines that will govern the determination
by exempt entities of their respective compensation and
position classification systems. As a further safeguard against
any abuse or misuse of their exclusion from RA 6758, any
increase in existing salary rates of exempt entities are
mandated to have the imprimatur of the President, upon the
recommendation of the DBM. This second proviso
complements and enhances the first proviso. It gives the
President the opportunity to ascertain whether salary increases
in exempt entities are in accordance with the prescribed
policies, parameters and guidelines on compensation and
position classification system. As a final proviso, exempt
entities which still follow the salary rates for positions covered
by RA 6758 are entitled to the salary adjustments under Joint
Resolution No. 4, until such time as they have implemented
their own compensation and position classification system.
Again, this acknowledges the status of exempt entities and
prevents the effective diminution of their salary rates.
Taken as a cohesive whole, Section 9 of Joint Resolution No. 4
pertains to the effect on and applicability to RA 6758-exempt
entities of the salary adjustments provided under the said Joint
Resolution. It prohibits RA 6758-exempt entities from availing
of the beneficial effects of the salary adjustments provided
therein, unless such entities still follow the salary rates for
positions covered by RA 6758 and only "until such time that
they have implemented their own compensation and position
classification system." However, there is nothing there which
limits or constricts the power of the President as Chief
Executive to prescribe such policies, parameters and
guidelines which in his discretion would best serve public

interest by regulating the compensation and position
classification system of RA 6758-exempt entities. There is
nothing there that prevents or prohibits him from adopting the
same or similar policies, parameters and guidelines provided
for in the said Joint Resolution. Viewed in this light, Sections 2
to 6 of EO 7 cohere with the objectives of Joint Resolution No.
4 and other laws relevant to it.
Petitioner further asserts as invalid insofar as Philhealth is
concerned the second proviso in Section 9 of Joint Resolution
No. 4. The said proviso requires that any increase in the
existing salary rates in RA 6758-exempt entities shall be
subject to the approval by the President, upon the
recommendation of the DBM. For petitioner, this proviso
amends or repeals the grant of authority under RA 7875 to fix
the compensation of Philhealth’s personnel to Philhealth’s
board of directors. Petitioner, however, maintains that a joint
resolution cannot be used to repeal another law simply
because it is not a law.
Under the Rules of both the Senate and the House of
Representatives,34 a joint resolution, like a bill, is required to be
enrolled, examined, undergo three readings and signed by the
presiding officer of each House. A joint resolution, like a bill, is
also presented to the President for approval. There is no real
difference between a bill and a joint resolution.35 A joint
resolution also satisfies the two requisites before a bill
becomes law – approval by both Houses of Congress after
three readings and approval by the President. Thus, a joint
resolution, upon approval by the President, is law. Even the
Rules of the House of Representatives acknowledge this:
SEC. 58. Third Reading. x x x
No bill or joint resolution shall become law unless it passes
three (3) readings on separate days and printed copies thereof
in its final form are distributed to the Members three (3) days
before its passage except when the President certifies to the
necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity
or emergency. (Emphasis supplied)
Joint Resolution No. 4 was approved by both Houses of
Congress after three readings. President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo approved it on June 17, 2009. It was published in the
Manila Times on June 20, 2009 and in Volume 105, No. 34 of
the Official Gazette on August 24, 2009. It is therefore a law.
As law, Joint Resolution No. 4 may therefore amend or
repeal RA 7875, if the second proviso of Section 9 indeed
it modifies RA 7875. However, the said proviso may be
read in a way that does not require it to be seen as an
implied amendment of RA 7875. It can be simply read as a
necessary adjunct of the authority to prescribe policies,
parameters and guidelines on compensation and position
classification system for exempt entities. Without it, the
President would have no way to check if the prescribed
policies, parameters and guidelines are actually observed.
Nevertheless, Section 59 of the General Provisions of RA 9970
and Section 56 of the General Provisions of RA 10147
identically provide:
SEC. 59. Special Compensation and Other Benefits. GOCCs,
including GFIs, who are exempt from, or are legally enjoying
special compensation and other benefits which are subject to
those authorized under R.A. No. 6758, as amended, shall be
governed by such special laws: PROVIDED, That they shall
observe the policies, parameters and guidelines governing
position classification, salary rates, categories and rates of
allowances, benefits, and incentives prescribed by the
President; PROVIDED, FURTHER, That they shall submit their
existing compensation and position classification systems and
their implementation status to the DBM; PROVIDED,
FURTHERMORE, That any grant of or increase in salaries,
allowances, and other fringe benefits shall be subject to the
approval of the President, upon favorable recommendation of
the DBM: PROVIDED, FINALLY, That they shall not be entitled
to benefits accruing to government employees covered by R.A.
No. 6758, as amended, if they are already receiving similar or
equivalent benefits under their own compensation scheme.
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 59 of the General Provisions of RA 9970 and Section
56 of the General Provisions of RA 10147 completely debunk
the conclusion that Sections 2 to 6 violate existing laws.
Specifically with respect to all RA 6758-exempt GOCCs and
36 SPEC PRO
GFIs, they recognize the authority of the President as
exercised in Sections 2 to 6 of EO 7 to prescribe policies,
parameters and guidelines governing position classification,
salary rates, categories and rates of allowances, benefits, and
incentives. Specifically with respect to all RA 6758-exempt
GOCCs and GFIs, they acknowledge the President’s power to
approve or disapprove "any grant of or increase in salaries,
allowances, and other fringe benefits."
Joint Resolution No. 4, Section 59 of the General Provisions of
RA 9970 and Section 56 of the General Provisions of RA
10147 reinforce the rule that "sound management and effective
utilization of financial resources of government are basically
executive functions."36 As a necessary incident thereof, the
President as Chief Executive has the legal competence to
exercise his power of control of all the executive departments,
bureaus and offices,37 including GOCCs and GFIs.38 EO 7 is
simply an exercise by the President of that power of control.
In sum, the guidelines in Sections 2 to 6 of EO 7 are
within the bounds of authority conferred on the President by
the Constitution and various laws. Such regulatory powers
cover all GOCCs and GFIs, regardless of coverage in or
exemption from the salary standardization laws. In issuing EO
7, the President does not encroach on the authority of the
legislature to make laws as he is merely enforcing the law:
While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the
President executes the laws. The executive power is vested in
the President. It is generally defined as the power to enforce
and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying (out) the
laws into practical operation and enforcing their due
observance.39
It is fundamental that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property without due process of law.40 Hence, the premise of
a valid due process claim, whether substantive or procedural,
is the dispossession of life or liberty or property. Where there is
no deprivation of life, liberty or property, no meaningful claim of
denial of due process may be made.

As discussed earlier, the imposition of a moratorium on
increases in salaries, allowances and other benefits of officers
and employees of GOCCs and GFIs, except salary
adjustments under EO 8011 dated June 17, 2009 and EO 900
dated June 23, 2010, does not constitute a deprivation of
property. In fact, it ensures that, like all other officials and
employees of the government, officials and employees of
GOCCs and GFIs will continue to enjoy the salary increases
granted under EO 8011 dated June 17, 2009 and EO 900
dated June 23, 2010.
More importantly, the right of a public officer to receive
compensation can only arise out of the rendition of the public
services related to his or her office.41 The right to
compensation arises out of the performance by the public
officer of his duties.42 Thus, a public officer’s right to salary is
limited only to salaries which he has already earned or accrued
for services rendered.43 Other than that, a public officer does
not have a vested right to salary and his compensation may be
altered, decreased or discontinued, in the absence of a
constitutional prohibition.44
If no vested right to salary generally pertains to a public officer,
there is no cogent reason to support the claim to a right to
future salary increase. The grant of any salary increase in the
future is something that is merely anticipatory of a prospective
benefit, something that is contingent on various factors. That is
why it is a mere expectancy,45 which does not give rise to a
vested right.46
Furthermore, the measure undertaken by the President seeks
to impose a moratorium only on increases which are not
authorized by existing legislation sanctioning salary
adjustments.
On the matter of the suspension of allowances and bonuses
(which is already moot as it was expressly made effective until
December 31, 2010 only),47 its context shows that it was meant
to arrest the questionable practice by members of the board of
directors/trustees of GOCCs and GFIs granting numerous and
excessive allowances, bonuses, incentives and other benefits
to themselves. The President’s action as Chief executive was
simply a decisive response to Senate issued Resolution No.
17, s. 2010 urging him to act on the matter and an exercise of
his control and oversight powers.
More importantly, there could have been no violation of
substantive due process as petitioner, or anybody for that
matter, cannot properly claim a right to receive bonuses. A
bonus is not a demandable and enforceable obligation.48 By
definition, a "bonus" is a gratuity or act of liberality of the giver
which cannot be demanded as a matter of right by the
recipient.49 It is something given in addition to what is
ordinarily received by or strictly due to the recipient. The grant
thereof is basically a management prerogative which cannot be
forced upon the employer who may not be obliged to assume
the onerous burden of granting bonuses or other benefits aside
from the employee’s basic salaries or wages, especially so if it
is incapable of doing so.50 Thus, there can be no oppression to
speak of even if these privileges (bonuses, allowances and
incentives) cease to be given. All the more reason should the
President’s judgment as Chief Executive be
accorded respect if he directs the temporary stoppage of the
grant of bonuses when he deems it to be prejudicial to public
interest or too onerous because of the government’s fiscal
condition.
It is therefore clear that the suspension of the grant of bonuses
and the imposition of a moratorium on salary increases under
EO 7 do not deprive petitioner of any property right. As such,
any declaration that such suspension or moratorium violates
substantive due process cannot be justified.
Moreover, as already discussed, Section 59 of the General
Provisions of RA 9970 and Section 56 of the General
Provisions of RA 10147 expressly recognize the President’s
power to approve or disapprove "any grant of or increase in
salaries, allowances, and other fringe benefits" in all RA 6758-
exempt GOCCs and GFIs, including Philhealth. The power to
approve or disapprove covers the lesser power to suspend the
grant of allowances and bonuses or impose a moratorium on
salary increases.
37 SPEC PRO
All told, the act of the President as Chief Executive in issuing
EO 7 was not oppressive, arbitrary, capricious or whimsical.
No grave abuse of discretion may be imputed to the President.
Thus, as the President’s official act which enjoys the
presumption of constitutionality and regularity, EO 7 should be
accorded due respect and its validity sustained.
A Final Word
Accountability of public office is a safeguard of representative
democracy. All who serve in government must always be
aware that they are exercising a public trust. They must bear in
mind that public funds are scarce resources and should
therefore be used prudently and judiciously. Hence, where
there are findings that government funds are being wasted due
to operational inefficiency and lack of fiscal responsibility in the
executive departments, bureaus, offices or agencies, the
President as Chief Executive should not be deprived of the
authority to control, stop, check or at least manage the
situation. Absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion on
his part, the Court should recognize in the President as Chief
Executive the power and duty to protect and promote public
interest thru the rationalization of the compensation and
position classification system in executive departments,
bureaus, offices and agencies, including GOCCs and GFIs.
Accordingly, I vote that the petition be DISMISSED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1These are Home Guaranty Corporation, Light Rail
Transit Authority, Local Water Utilities Administration,
Manila Waterworks and Sewerage System, National
Development Corporation, National Electrification
Administration, National Food Authority, National
Housing Authority, National Irrigation Authority,
National Power Corporation (by virtue of the Electric
Power Industry Reform Act, the Power Sector Assets
and Liabilities Management Corporation and the
National Transmission Corporation are added to the

list), Philippine Economic Zone Authority, Philippine
National Oil Corporation, Philippine National Railway,
and Philippine Ports Authority. There are 722 more
GOCCs whose operations are barely monitored.
2 Asian Development Bank Technical Assistance
Report, Republic of the Philippines: Government-
Owned and -Controlled Corporations Reform, June
2006. Accessed on 14 July 2011
through http://www.adb.org/documents/tars/phi/39606
-phi-tar.pdf . Emphasis supplied.
3Directing the Rationalization of the Compensation
and Position Classification System in Government-
Owned and Controlled Corporations (GOCCs) and
Government Financial Institutions (GFIs), and for
Other Purposes. It took effect on September 25,
2010.
4 Third Whereas Clause.
5
Sec. 9.
6
Sec. 10.
7 Sec. 7.
8 Sec. 8.
9 Secs. 2 and 3.
10Chemerinsky, Erwin, Constitutional Law: Principles
and Policies, Third Edition (2006), p. 51.
11
Id.
12
Lozano v. Nograles, G.R. No. 187883, June 16,
2009.
13
Id.
38 SPEC PRO
14 29
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United GOCC Governance Act of 2011.
for separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464
(1982). 30 Chemerinsky, supra note 10, p. 114.
15Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. 31 Id.
Anti-Terrorism Council, G.R. No. 178552, October 5,
2010. Emphasis supplied. 32
An Act Instituting a National Health Insurance
Program for All Filipinos and Establishing the
16 Black’s Law Dictionary, Eighth Edition, page 1031. Philippine Health Insurance Corporation for the
Purpose. It is otherwise known as the "National
17 See Fisk v. Jefferson, 116 U.S. 131 (1885). Health Insurance Act of 1995."
18 33
House of Sara Lee v. Rey, G.R. No. 149013, Joint Resolution Authorizing the President of the
August 31, 2006. Philippines to Modify the Compensation and Position
Classification System of Civilian Personnel and the
19 Id. Base Pay Schedule of Military and Uniformed
Personnel in the Government, and for Other
20
Purposes.
Boncodin v. National Power Corporation
Employees consolidated Union (NECU), G.R. No. 34
162716, September 27, 2006. Rules XXI, XXII, XXIII and XXV for the Senate and
Rule X for the House of representative.
21 Id. 35
http://www.senate.gov.ph/about/legpro.asp (last
visited July 13, 2011).
22Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989. 36Blaquera v. Alcala, G.R. No. 109406, 11 September
23
1998, citing Book IV of Executive Order No. 292
General Appropriations Act of FY 2010. whose applicable provisions follow:
24
General Appropriations Act of FY 2011. Section 1. Declaration of Policy. - It is the policy of the
State that the Department of Finance shall be
25 primarily responsible for the sound and efficient
Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No.
160261, November 10, 2003. management of the financial resources of the
Government, its subdivisions, agencies and
26David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May instrumentalities. (Title II)
03, 2006.
Section 1. Declaration of Policy. - The national budget
27 shall be formulated and implemented as an
The suspension was extended until 31 January
2011 by EO 19 dated 30 December 2010. instrument of national development, reflective of
national objectives and plans; supportive of and
consistent with the socio-economic development
28 Republic Act. plans and oriented towards the achievement of

explicit objectives and expected results, to ensure that
the utilization of funds and operations of government
entities are conducted effectively; formulated within
the context of a regionalized governmental structure
and within the totality of revenues and other receipts,
expenditures and borrowings of all levels of
government-owned or controlled corporations; and
prepared within the context of the national long-term
plans and budget programs of the Government. (Title
XVII)
37 Section 17, Article VII: "The President shall have
control of all the executive departments, bureaus and
offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed."
38 NAMARCO v. Arca, 9 SCRA 648 (1969).
39 Ople vs. Torres , 293 SCRA 141 (1998).
40
Section 1, Article III, Constitution.
41
63C AmJur 2d 716, Public Officers and Employees,
Sec. 272.
42 Id.
43 Fisk v. Jefferson, supra note 17.
44Mechem, Floyd, A Treatise on the Law on Public
Offices and Public Officers (1890), p. 577.
45 House of Sara Lee v. Rey, supra note 18.
46
Boncodin v. National Power Corporation
Employees consolidated Union (NECU), supra note
20. Equitable Banking Corporation (now known as
Equitable-PCI Bank) v. Sadac, GR No. 164772, 490
SCRA 380 (2006).
47
As stated earlier, the suspension was extended
until 31 January 2011 by EO 19 dated 30 December
2010. (See note 27.)
48
Lepanto Ceramic, Inc. v. Lepanto Ceramics
Employees Association, 614 SCRA 63 (2010).
49
Manila Banking Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No.
107487. September 29, 1997.
50
Id.
G.R. No. 178552 October 5, 2010
SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK,
INC., on behalf of the South-South Network (SSN) for Non-
State Armed Group Engagement, and ATTY. SOLIMAN M.
SANTOS, JR., Petitioners,
vs.
ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE
SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE SECRETARY OF
NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE SECRETARY OF THE
INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE SECRETARY
OF FINANCE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER, THE
CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, AND THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 178554
KILUSANG MAYO UNO (KMU), represented by its
Chairperson Elmer Labog, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF
LABOR UNIONS-KILUSANG MAYO UNO (NAFLU-KMU),
represented by its National President Joselito V. Ustarez
and Secretary General Antonio C. Pascual, and CENTER
FOR TRADE UNION AND HUMAN RIGHTS, represented by
its Executive Director Daisy Arago, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive
39 SPEC PRO
Secretary, NORBERTO GONZALES, in his capacity as
Acting Secretary of National Defense, HON. RAUL
GONZALES, in his capacity as Secretary of Justice, HON.
RONALDO PUNO, in his capacity as Secretary of the
Interior and Local Government, GEN. HERMOGENES
ESPERON, in his capacity as AFP Chief of Staff, and
DIRECTOR GENERAL OSCAR CALDERON, in his capacity
as PNP Chief of Staff, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 178581
BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN), GENERAL
ALLIANCE BINDING WOMEN FOR REFORMS, INTEGRITY,
EQUALITY, LEADERSHIP AND ACTION (GABRIELA),
KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP),
MOVEMENT OF CONCERNED CITIZENS FOR CIVIL
LIBERTIES (MCCCL), CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY,
RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES (COURAGE), KALIPUNAN NG DAMAYANG
MAHIHIRAP (KADAMAY), SOLIDARITY OF CAVITE
WORKERS, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS),
ANAKBAYAN, PAMBANSANG LAKAS NG KILUSANG
MAMAMALAKAYA (PAMALAKAYA), ALLIANCE OF
CONCERNED TEACHERS (ACT), MIGRANTE, HEALTH
ALLIANCE FOR DEMOCRACY (HEAD), AGHAM, TEOFISTO
GUINGONA, JR., DR. BIENVENIDO LUMBERA, RENATO
CONSTANTINO, JR., SISTER MARY JOHN MANANSAN
OSB, DEAN CONSUELO PAZ, ATTY. JOSEFINA
LICHAUCO, COL. GERRY CUNANAN (ret.), CARLITOS
SIGUION-REYNA, DR. CAROLINA PAGADUAN-ARAULLO,
RENATO REYES, DANILO RAMOS, EMERENCIANA DE
LESUS, RITA BAUA, REY CLARO CASAMBRE, Petitioners,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, in her capacity as
President and Commander-in-Chief, EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE SECRETARY RAUL GONZALES, DEPARTMENT
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO,
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE ACTING
SECRETARY NORBERTO GONZALES, DEPARTMENT OF
INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT SECRETARY
RONALDO PUNO. DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE

SECRETARY MARGARITO TEVES, NATIONAL SECURITY
ADVISER NORBERTO GONZALES, THE NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE COORDINATING AGENCY (NICA), THE
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (NBI), THE
BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, THE OFFICE OF CIVIL
DEFENSE, THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OF THE ARMED
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (ISAFP), THE ANTI-MONEY
LAUNDERING COUNCIL (AMLC), THE PHILIPPINE
CENTER ON TRANSNATIONAL CRIME, THE CHIEF OF
THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE GEN. OSCAR
CALDERON, THE PNP, including its intelligence and
investigative elements, AFP CHIEF GEN. HERMOGENES
ESPERON, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 178890
KARAPATAN, ALLIANCE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF
PEOPLE'S RIGHTS, represented herein by Dr. Edelina de
la Paz, and representing the following organizations:
HUSTISYA, represented by Evangeline Hernandez and
also on her own behalf; DESAPARECIDOS, represented by
Mary Guy Portajada and also on her own behalf,
SAMAHAN NG MGA EX-DETAINEES LABAN SA
DETENSYON AT PARA SA AMNESTIYA (SELDA),
represented by Donato Continente and also on his own
behalf, ECUMENICAL MOVEMENT FOR JUSTICE AND
PEACE (EMJP), represented by Bishop Elmer M. Bolocon,
UCCP, and PROMOTION OF CHURCH PEOPLE'S
RESPONSE, represented by Fr. Gilbert Sabado,
OCARM, Petitioners,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, in her capacity as
President and Commander-in-Chief, EXECUTIVE
SECRETARTY EDUARDO ERMITA, DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE SECRETARY RAUL GONZALEZ, DEPARTMENT
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO,
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE ACTING
SECRETARY NORBERTO GONZALES, DEPARTMENT OF
INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT SECRETARY
RONALDO PUNO, DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE
SECRETARY MARGARITO TEVES, NATIONAL SECURITY
ADVISER NORBERTO GONZALES, THE NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE COORDINATING AGENCY (NICA), THE
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (NBI), THE
BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, THE OFFICE OF CIVIL
DEFENSE, THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OF THE ARMED
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (ISAFP), THE ANTI-MONEY
LAUNDERING COUNCIL (AMLC), THE PHILIPPINE
CENTER ON TRANSNATIONAL CRIME, THE CHIEF OF
THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE GEN. OSCAR
CALDERON, THE PNP, including its intelligence and
investigative elements, AFP CHIEF GEN. HERMOGENES
ESPERON, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 179157
THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP),
represented by Atty. Feliciano M. Bautista, COUNSELS
FOR THE DEFENSE OF LIBERTY (CODAL), SEN. MA. ANA
CONSUELO A.S. MADRIGAL and FORMER SENATORS
SERGIO OSMEÑA III and WIGBERTO E.
TAÑADA, Petitioners,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA AND THE
MEMBERS OF THE ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL
(ATC), Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 179461
BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN-SOUTHERN
TAGALOG (BAYAN-ST), GABRIELA-ST, KATIPUNAN NG
MGA SAMAHYANG MAGSASAKA-TIMOG KATAGALUGAN
(KASAMA-TK), MOVEMENT OF CONCERNED CITIZENS
FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES (MCCCL), PEOPLES MARTYRS,
ANAKBAYAN-ST, PAMALAKAYA-ST, CONFEDERATION
FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OF
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE-ST),
PAGKAKAISA'T UGNAYAN NG MGA MAGBUBUKID SA
LAGUNA (PUMALAG), SAMAHAN NG MGA MAMAMAYAN
SA TABING RILES (SMTR-ST), LEAGUE OF FILIPINO
STUDENTS (LFS), BAYAN MUNA-ST, KONGRESO NG MGA
40 SPEC PRO
MAGBUBUKID PARA SA REPORMANG AGRARYO
KOMPRA, BIGKIS AT LAKAS NG MGA KATUTUBO SA
TIMOG KATAGALUGAN (BALATIK), SAMAHAN AT
UGNAYAN NG MGA MAGSASAKANG KABABAIHAN SA
TIMOG KATAGALUGAN (SUMAMAKA-TK), STARTER,
LOSÑOS RURAL POOR ORGANIZATION FOR PROGRESS
& EQUALITY, CHRISTIAN NIÑO LAJARA, TEODORO
REYES, FRANCESCA B. TOLENTINO, JANNETTE E.
BARRIENTOS, OSCAR T. LAPIDA, JR., DELFIN DE
CLARO, SALLY P. ASTRERA, ARNEL SEGUNE
BELTRAN, Petitioners,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, in her capacity as
President and Commander-in-Chief, EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE SECRETARY RAUL GONZALEZ, DEPARTMENT
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO,
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE ACTING
SECRETARY NORBERTO GONZALES, DEPARTMENT OF
INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMEN T SECRETARY
RONALDO PUNO, DEPARTMENT OF FINCANCE
SECRETARY MARGARITO TEVES, NATIONAL SECURITY
ADVISER NORBERTO GONZALES, THE NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE COORDINATING AGENCY (NICA), THE
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (NBI), THE
BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, THE OFFICE OF CIVIL
DEFENSE, THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OF THE ARMED
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (ISAFP), THE ANTI-MONEY
LAUNDERING COUNCIL (AMLC), THE PHILIPPINE
CENTER ON TRANSNATIONAL CRIME, THE CHIEF OF
THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE GEN. OSCAR
CALDERON, THE PNP, including its intelligence and
investigative elements, AFP CHIEF GEN. HERMOGENES
ESPERON, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Before the Court are six petitions challenging the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9372 (RA 9372), "An Act to
Secure the State and Protect our People from Terrorism,"
otherwise known as the Human Security Act of 2007,1signed
into law on March 6, 2007.

Following the effectivity of RA 9372 on July 15,
2007,2 petitioner Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network,
Inc., a non-government organization, and Atty. Soliman
Santos, Jr., a concerned citizen, taxpayer and lawyer, filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition on July 16, 2007 docketed
as G.R. No. 178552. On even date, petitioners Kilusang Mayo
Uno (KMU), National Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang
Mayo Uno (NAFLU-KMU), and Center for Trade Union and
Human Rights (CTUHR), represented by their respective
officers3 who are also bringing the action in their capacity as
citizens, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed
as G.R. No. 178554.
The following day, July 17, 2007, organizations Bagong
Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN), General Alliance Binding
Women for Reforms, Integrity, Equality, Leadership and Action
(GABRIELA), Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP),
Movement of Concerned Citizens for Civil Liberties (MCCCL),
Confederation for Unity, Recognition and Advancement of
Government Employees (COURAGE), Kalipunan ng
Damayang Mahihirap (KADAMAY), Solidarity of Cavite
Workers (SCW), League of Filipino Students (LFS),
Anakbayan, Pambansang Lakas ng Kilusang Mamamalakaya
(PAMALAKAYA), Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT),
Migrante, Health Alliance for Democracy (HEAD), and Agham,
represented by their respective officers,4 and joined by
concerned citizens and taxpayers Teofisto Guingona, Jr., Dr.
Bienvenido Lumbera, Renato Constantino, Jr., Sister Mary
John Manansan, OSB, Dean Consuelo Paz, Atty. Josefina
Lichauco, Retired Col. Gerry Cunanan, Carlitos Siguion-
Reyna, Dr. Carolina Pagaduan-Araullo, Renato Reyes, Danilo
Ramos, Emerenciana de Jesus, Rita Baua and Rey Claro
Casambre filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed
as G.R. No. 178581.
On August 6, 2007, Karapatan and its alliance member
organizations Hustisya, Desaparecidos, Samahan ng mga Ex-
Detainees Laban sa Detensyon at para sa Amnestiya
(SELDA), Ecumenical Movement for Justice and Peace
(EMJP), and Promotion of Church People’s Response (PCPR),
which were represented by their respective officers 5 who are
also bringing action on their own behalf, filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 178890.
On August 29, 2007, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP), Counsels for the Defense of Liberty (CODAL),6Senator
Ma. Ana Consuelo A.S. Madrigal, Sergio Osmeña III, and
Wigberto E. Tañada filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
docketed as G.R. No. 179157.
Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-Southern Tagalog (BAYAN-
ST), other regional chapters and organizations mostly based in
the Southern Tagalog Region,7 and individuals8 followed suit
by filing on September 19, 2007 a petition for certiorari and
prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 179461 that replicates the
allegations raised in the BAYAN petition in G.R. No. 178581.
Impleaded as respondents in the various petitions are the Anti-
Terrorism Council9 composed of, at the time of the filing of the
petitions, Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita as Chairperson,
Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales as Vice Chairperson, and
Foreign Affairs Secretary Alberto Romulo, Acting Defense
Secretary and National Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales,
Interior and Local Government Secretary Ronaldo Puno, and
Finance Secretary Margarito Teves as members. All the
petitions, except that of the IBP, also impleaded Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Gen. Hermogenes
Esperon and Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief Gen.
Oscar Calderon.
The Karapatan, BAYAN and BAYAN-ST petitions likewise
impleaded President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and the support
agencies for the Anti-Terrorism Council like the National
Intelligence Coordinating Agency, National Bureau of
Investigation, Bureau of Immigration, Office of Civil Defense,
Intelligence Service of the AFP, Anti-Money Laundering
Center, Philippine Center on Transnational Crime, and the
PNP intelligence and investigative elements.
The petitions fail.
Petitioners’ resort to certiorari is improper
Preliminarily, certiorari does not lie against respondents who
do not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Section 1,
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is clear:
41 SPEC PRO
Section 1. Petition for certiorari.—When any tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging
the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board
or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and
justice may require. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Parenthetically, petitioners do not even allege with any
modicum of particularity how respondents acted without or in
excess of their respective jurisdictions, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The impropriety of certiorari as a remedy aside, the petitions
fail just the same.
In constitutional litigations, the power of judicial review is
limited by four exacting requisites, viz: (a) there must be an
actual case or controversy; (b) petitioners must possess locus
standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must
be the lis mota of the case.10
In the present case, the dismal absence of the first two
requisites, which are the most essential, renders the
discussion of the last two superfluous.
Petitioners lack locus standi
Locus standi or legal standing requires a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.11
Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. The Executive
Secretary12 summarized the rule on locus standi, thus:

Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal
and substantial interest in a case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the
question on standing is whether a party alleges such personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.
[A] party who assails the constitutionality of a statute must
have a direct and personal interest. It must show not only that
the law or any governmental act is invalid, but also that it
sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct
injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that it
suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must show that it has
been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which it
is lawfully entitled or that it is about to be subjected to some
burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained
of.
For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional
question, it must show that (1) it has personally suffered some
actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal
conduct of the government, (2) the injury is fairly traceable to
the challenged action, and (3) the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favorable action. (emphasis and underscoring
supplied.)
Petitioner-organizations assert locus standi on the basis of
being suspected "communist fronts" by the government,
especially the military; whereas individual petitioners invariably
invoke the "transcendental importance" doctrine and their
status as citizens and taxpayers.
While Chavez v. PCGG13 holds that transcendental public
importance dispenses with the requirement that petitioner has
experienced or is in actual danger of suffering direct and
personal injury, cases involving the constitutionality of penal
legislation belong to an altogether different genus of
constitutional litigation. Compelling State and societal interests
in the proscription of harmful conduct, as will later be
elucidated, necessitate a closer judicial scrutiny of locus standi.
Petitioners have not presented any personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy. None of them faces any charge
under RA 9372.
KARAPATAN, Hustisya, Desaparecidos, SELDA, EMJP and
PCR, petitioners in G.R. No. 178890, allege that they have
been subjected to "close security surveillance by state security
forces," their members followed by "suspicious persons" and
"vehicles with dark windshields," and their offices monitored by
"men with military build." They likewise claim that they have
been branded as "enemies of the [S]tate."14
Even conceding such gratuitous allegations, the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) correctly points out that petitioners
have yet to show any connection between the
purported "surveillance" and the implementation of RA 9372.
BAYAN, GABRIELA, KMP, MCCCL, COURAGE, KADAMAY,
SCW, LFS, Anakbayan, PAMALAKAYA, ACT, Migrante, HEAD
and Agham, petitioner-organizations in G.R. No. 178581,
would like the Court to take judicial notice of respondents’
alleged action of tagging them as militant organizations fronting
for the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its
armed wing, the National People’s Army (NPA). The tagging,
according to petitioners, is tantamount to the effects of
proscription without following the procedure under the
law.15 The petition of BAYAN-ST, et al. in G.R. No. 179461
pleads the same allegations.
The Court cannot take judicial notice of the alleged "tagging" of
petitioners.
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three
material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and
general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively
settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known
to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The
principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to
be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said
that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public
records and facts of general notoriety. Moreover, a judicially
noticed fact must be one not subject to a reasonable dispute in
that it is either: (1) generally known within the territorial
42 SPEC PRO
jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and
ready determination by resorting to sources whose accuracy
cannot reasonably be questionable.
Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial
matters coming to the knowledge of men generally in the
course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be
matters which are generally accepted by mankind as true and
are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus,
facts which are universally known, and which may be found in
encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially
noticed, provided, they are of such universal notoriety and so
generally understood that they may be regarded as forming
part of the common knowledge of every person. As the
common knowledge of man ranges far and wide, a wide variety
of particular facts have been judicially noticed as being matters
of common knowledge. But a court cannot take judicial notice
of any fact which, in part, is dependent on the existence or
non-existence of a fact of which the court has no constructive
knowledge.16 (emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
No ground was properly established by petitioners for the
taking of judicial notice. Petitioners’ apprehension is insufficient
to substantiate their plea. That no specific charge or
proscription under RA 9372 has been filed against them, three
years after its effectivity, belies any claim of imminence of their
perceived threat emanating from the so-called tagging.
The same is true with petitioners KMU, NAFLU and CTUHR in
G.R. No. 178554, who merely harp as well on their supposed
"link" to the CPP and NPA. They fail to particularize how the
implementation of specific provisions of RA 9372 would result
in direct injury to their organization and members.
While in our jurisdiction there is still no judicially declared
terrorist organization, the United States of America17(US) and
the European Union18 (EU) have both classified the CPP, NPA
and Abu Sayyaf Group as foreign terrorist organizations. The
Court takes note of the joint statement of Executive Secretary
Eduardo Ermita and Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales that the
Arroyo Administration would adopt the US and EU
classification of the CPP and NPA as terrorist
organizations.19 Such statement notwithstanding, there is yet to

be filed before the courts an application to declare the CPP
and NPA organizations as domestic terrorist or outlawed
organizations under RA 9372. Again, RA 9372 has been in
effect for three years now. From July 2007 up to the present,
petitioner-organizations have conducted their activities fully
and freely without any threat of, much less an actual,
prosecution or proscription under RA 9372.
Parenthetically, the Fourteenth Congress, in a resolution
initiated by Party-list Representatives Saturnino Ocampo,
Teodoro Casiño, Rafael Mariano and Luzviminda
Ilagan,20 urged the government to resume peace negotiations
with the NDF by removing the impediments thereto, one of
which is the adoption of designation of the CPP and NPA by
the US and EU as foreign terrorist organizations. Considering
the policy statement of the Aquino Administration21 of resuming
peace talks with the NDF, the government is not imminently
disposed to ask for the judicial proscription of the CPP-NPA
consortium and its allied organizations.
More important, there are other parties not before the Court
with direct and specific interests in the questions being
raised.22 Of recent development is the filing of the first case for
proscription under Section 1723 of RA 9372 by the Department
of Justice before the Basilan Regional Trial Court against the
Abu Sayyaf Group.24 Petitioner-organizations do not in the
least allege any link to the Abu Sayyaf Group.
Some petitioners attempt, in vain though, to show the
imminence of a prosecution under RA 9372 by alluding to past
rebellion charges against them.
In Ladlad v. Velasco,25 the Court ordered the dismissal of
rebellion charges filed in 2006 against then Party-List
Representatives Crispin Beltran and Rafael Mariano of
Anakpawis, Liza Maza of GABRIELA, and Joel Virador,
Teodoro Casiño and Saturnino Ocampo of Bayan Muna. Also
named in the dismissed rebellion charges were petitioners Rey
Claro Casambre, Carolina Pagaduan-Araullo, Renato Reyes,
Rita Baua, Emerencia de Jesus and Danilo Ramos; and
accused of being front organizations for the Communist
movement were petitioner-organizations KMU, BAYAN,
GABRIELA, PAMALAKAYA, KMP, KADAMAY, LFS and
COURAGE.26
The dismissed rebellion charges, however, do not save the day
for petitioners. For one, those charges were filed in 2006, prior
to the enactment of RA 9372, and dismissed by this Court. For
another, rebellion is defined and punished under the Revised
Penal Code. Prosecution for rebellion is not made more
imminent by the enactment of RA 9372, nor does the
enactment thereof make it easier to charge a person with
rebellion, its elements not having been altered.
Conversely, previously filed but dismissed rebellion charges
bear no relation to prospective charges under RA 9372. It
cannot be overemphasized that three years after the
enactment of RA 9372, none of petitioners has been charged.
Petitioners IBP and CODAL in G.R. No. 179157 base their
claim of locus standi on their sworn duty to uphold the
Constitution. The IBP zeroes in on Section 21 of RA 9372
directing it to render assistance to those arrested or detained
under the law.
The mere invocation of the duty to preserve the rule of law
does not, however, suffice to clothe the IBP or any of its
members with standing.27 The IBP failed to sufficiently
demonstrate how its mandate under the assailed statute
revolts against its constitutional rights and duties. Moreover,
both the IBP and CODAL have not pointed to even a single
arrest or detention effected under RA 9372.
Former Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo Madrigal, who claims to
have been the subject of "political surveillance," also lacks
locus standi. Prescinding from the veracity, let alone legal
basis, of the claim of "political surveillance," the Court finds
that she has not shown even the slightest threat of being
charged under RA 9372. Similarly lacking in locus standi are
former Senator Wigberto Tañada and Senator Sergio Osmeña
III, who cite their being respectively a human rights advocate
and an oppositor to the passage of RA 9372. Outside these
gratuitous statements, no concrete injury to them has been
pinpointed.
43 SPEC PRO
Petitioners Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network and
Atty. Soliman Santos Jr. in G.R. No. 178552 also conveniently
state that the issues they raise are of transcendental
importance, "which must be settled early" and are of "far-
reaching implications," without mention of any specific
provision of RA 9372 under which they have been charged, or
may be charged. Mere invocation of human rights advocacy
has nowhere been held sufficient to clothe litigants with locus
standi. Petitioners must show an actual, or immediate danger
of sustaining, direct injury as a result of the law’s enforcement.
To rule otherwise would be to corrupt the settled doctrine of
locus standi, as every worthy cause is an interest shared by
the general public.
Neither can locus standi be conferred upon individual
petitioners as taxpayers and citizens. A taxpayer suit is proper
only when there is an exercise of the spending or taxing power
of Congress,28 whereas citizen standing must rest on direct
and personal interest in the proceeding.29
RA 9372 is a penal statute and does not even provide for any
appropriation from Congress for its implementation, while none
of the individual petitioner-citizens has alleged any direct and
personal interest in the implementation of the law.
It bears to stress that generalized interests, albeit
accompanied by the assertion of a public right, do not establish
locus standi. Evidence of a direct and personal interest is key.
Petitioners fail to present an actual case or controversy
By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there
is an actual case or controversy.
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or

instrumentality of the Government.30(emphasis and
underscoring supplied.)
As early as Angara v. Electoral Commission,31 the Court ruled
that the power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or
controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument
by the parties. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to
dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions
unrelated to actualities.
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or
controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not
conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would
amount to an advisory opinion.32
Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v.
COMELEC33 cannot be more emphatic:
[C]ourts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to
satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging.
The controversy must be justiciable—definite and concrete,
touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal
interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an active
antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a
denial thereof on the other hand; that is, it must concern a real
and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought to
be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific
relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished
from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a
hypothetical state of facts. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Thus, a petition to declare unconstitutional a law converting the
Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City was held to
be premature as it was tacked on uncertain, contingent
events.34 Similarly, a petition that fails to allege that an
application for a license to operate a radio or television station
has been denied or granted by the authorities does not present
a justiciable controversy, and merely wheedles the Court to
rule on a hypothetical problem.35
The Court dismissed the petition in Philippine Press Institute v.
Commission on Elections36 for failure to cite any specific
affirmative action of the Commission on Elections to implement
the assailed resolution. It refused, in Abbas v. Commission on
Elections,37 to rule on the religious freedom claim of the therein
petitioners based merely on a perceived potential conflict
between the provisions of the Muslim Code and those of the
national law, there being no actual controversy between real
litigants.
The list of cases denying claims resting on purely hypothetical
or anticipatory grounds goes on ad infinitum.
The Court is not unaware that a reasonable certainty of the
occurrence of a perceived threat to any constitutional interest
suffices to provide a basis for mounting a constitutional
challenge. This, however, is qualified by the requirement that
there must be sufficient facts to enable the Court to intelligently
adjudicate the issues.38
Very recently, the US Supreme Court, in Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project,39 allowed the pre-enforcement
review of a criminal statute, challenged on vagueness grounds,
since plaintiffs faced a "credible threat of prosecution" and
"should not be required to await and undergo a criminal
prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief."40 The
plaintiffs therein filed an action before a federal court to assail
the constitutionality of the material support statute, 18 U.S.C.
§2339B (a) (1),41 proscribing the provision of material support
to organizations declared by the Secretary of State as foreign
terrorist organizations. They claimed that they intended to
provide support for the humanitarian and political activities of
two such organizations.
Prevailing American jurisprudence allows an adjudication on
the merits when an anticipatory petition clearly shows that the
challenged prohibition forbids the conduct or activity that a
petitioner seeks to do, as there would then be a justiciable
controversy.42
Unlike the plaintiffs in Holder, however, herein petitioners have
failed to show that the challenged provisions of RA 9372 forbid
constitutionally protected conduct or activity that they seek to
do. No demonstrable threat has been established, much less a
real and existing one.
44 SPEC PRO
Petitioners’ obscure allegations of sporadic "surveillance" and
supposedly being tagged as "communist fronts" in no way
approximate a credible threat of prosecution. From these
allegations, the Court is being lured to render an advisory
opinion, which is not its function.43
Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become
pleas for declaratory relief, over which the Court has no
original jurisdiction. Then again, declaratory actions
characterized by "double contingency," where both the activity
the petitioners intend to undertake and the anticipated reaction
to it of a public official are merely theorized, lie beyond judicial
review for lack of ripeness.44
The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA 9372 does
not avail to take the present petitions out of the realm of the
surreal and merely imagined. Such possibility is not peculiar to
RA 9372 since the exercise of any power granted by law may
be abused.45 Allegations of abuse must be anchored on real
events before courts may step in to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable.
A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free
speech cases, wherein certain rules of constitutional
litigation are rightly excepted
Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and
impermissibly broad the definition of the crime of
terrorism46under RA 9372 in that terms like "widespread and
extraordinary fear and panic among the populace" and "coerce
the government to give in to an unlawful demand" are
nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard
to measure the prohibited acts.
Respondents, through the OSG, counter that the doctrines of
void-for-vagueness and overbreadth find no application in the
present case since these doctrines apply only to free speech
cases; and that RA 9372 regulates conduct, not speech.
For a jurisprudentially guided understanding of these doctrines,
it is imperative to outline the schools of thought on whether the

void-for-vagueness and overbreadth doctrines are equally
applicable grounds to assail a penal statute.
Respondents interpret recent jurisprudence as slanting toward
the idea of limiting the application of the two doctrines to free
speech cases. They particularly cite Romualdez v. Hon.
Sandiganbayan47 and Estrada v. Sandiganbayan.48
The Court clarifies.
At issue in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan was whether the
word "intervene" in Section 549 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act was intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad.
The Court stated that "the overbreadth and the vagueness
doctrines have special application only to free-speech cases,"
and are "not appropriate for testing the validity of penal
statutes."50 It added that, at any rate, the challenged provision,
under which the therein petitioner was charged, is not vague.51
While in the subsequent case of Romualdez v. Commission on
Elections,52 the Court stated that a facial invalidation of criminal
statutes is not appropriate, it nonetheless proceeded to
conduct a vagueness analysis, and concluded that the therein
subject election offense53 under the Voter’s Registration Act of
1996, with which the therein petitioners were charged, is
couched in precise language.54
The two Romualdez cases rely heavily on the Separate
Opinion55 of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in the Estrada case,
where the Court found the Anti-Plunder Law (Republic Act No.
7080) clear and free from ambiguity respecting the definition of
the crime of plunder.
The position taken by Justice Mendoza in Estrada relates
these two doctrines to the concept of a "facial" invalidation as
opposed to an "as-applied" challenge. He basically postulated
that allegations that a penal statute is vague and overbroad do
not justify a facial review of its validity. The pertinent portion of
the Concurring Opinion of Justice Mendoza, which was quoted
at length in the main Estrada decision, reads:
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and
to one which is overbroad because of possible "chilling effect"
upon protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes
regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent
construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the
statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all
society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to
justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no
requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate
that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn
with narrow specificity." The possible harm to society in
permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is
outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of
others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester
because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal
statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their
very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this
reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting
laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal
law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special
application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for
testing the validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme
Court put it, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have
not recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited
context of the First Amendment." In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, the
Court ruled that "claims of facial overbreadth have been
entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms,
seek to regulate only spoken words" and, again, that
"overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed
when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to
be applied to protected conduct." For this reason, it has been
held that "a facial challenge to a legislative act is the most
difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger
must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which
the Act would be valid." As for the vagueness doctrine, it is
said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it
is vague in all its possible applications. "A plaintiff who
engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot
complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct
of others."
45 SPEC PRO
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and
vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their
faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in
American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made
to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With
respect to such statute, the established rule is that "one to
whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard
to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also
be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in
which its application might be unconstitutional." As has been
pointed out, "vagueness challenges in the First Amendment
context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial
invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due
process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a
particular defendant." Consequently, there is no basis for
petitioner's claim that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law
on its face and in its entirety.
Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking
them down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to
parties not before the Court whose activities are
constitutionally protected. It constitutes a departure from the
case and controversy requirement of the Constitution and
permits decisions to be made without concrete factual settings
and in sterile abstract contexts. But, as the U.S. Supreme
Court pointed out in Younger v. Harris
[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its
deficiencies, and requiring correction of these deficiencies
before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an
appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the
relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the
legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the
speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line
analysis of detailed statutes, . . . ordinarily results in a kind of
case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional
questions, whichever way they might be decided.
For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has
been described as "manifestly strong medicine," to be
employed "sparingly and only as a last resort," and is generally
disfavored. In determining the constitutionality of a statute,
therefore, its provisions which are alleged to have been
violated in a case must be examined in the light of the conduct

with which the defendant is charged.56 (Underscoring
supplied.)
The confusion apparently stems from the interlocking relation
of the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines as grounds for a
facial or as-applied challenge against a penal statute (under a
claim of violation of due process of law) or a speech regulation
(under a claim of abridgement of the freedom of speech and
cognate rights).
To be sure, the doctrine of vagueness and the doctrine of
overbreadth do not operate on the same plane.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it
lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as
to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two
respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord
persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the
conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle.57 The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a
governmental purpose to control or prevent activities
constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be
achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and
thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.58
As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth
doctrine assumes that individuals will understand what a
statute prohibits and will accordingly refrain from that behavior,
even though some of it is protected.59
A "facial" challenge is likewise different from an "as-applied"
challenge.
Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers
only extant facts affecting real litigants, a facial invalidation is
an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and
defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to the
parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that its very
existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from
constitutionally protected speech or activities.60
Justice Mendoza accurately phrased the subtitle61 in his
concurring opinion that the vagueness and overbreadth
doctrines, as grounds for a facial challenge, are not applicable
to penal laws. A litigant cannot thus successfully mount
a facial challenge against a criminal statute on either
vagueness or overbreadth grounds.
The allowance of a facial challenge in free speech cases is
justified by the aim to avert the "chilling effect" on protected
speech, the exercise of which should not at all times be
abridged.62 As reflected earlier, this rationale is inapplicable to
plain penal statutes that generally bear an "in terrorem effect"
in deterring socially harmful conduct. In fact, the legislature
may even forbid and penalize acts formerly considered
innocent and lawful, so long as it refrains from diminishing or
dissuading the exercise of constitutionally protected rights.63
The Court reiterated that there are "critical limitations by which
a criminal statute may be challenged" and "underscored that
an ‘on-its-face’ invalidation of penal statutes x x x may not be
allowed."64
[T]he rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes on free
speech, religious freedom, and other fundamental rights may
be facially challenged. Under no case may ordinary penal
statutes be subjected to a facial challenge. The rationale is
obvious. If a facial challenge to a penal statute is permitted, the
prosecution of crimes may be hampered. No prosecution
would be possible. A strong criticism against employing a facial
challenge in the case of penal statutes, if the same is allowed,
would effectively go against the grain of the doctrinal
requirement of an existing and concrete controversy before
judicial power may be appropriately exercised. A facial
challenge against a penal statute is, at best, amorphous and
speculative. It would, essentially, force the court to consider
third parties who are not before it. As I have said in my
opposition to the allowance of a facial challenge to attack penal
statutes, such a test will impair the State’s ability to deal with
crime. If warranted, there would be nothing that can hinder an
accused from defeating the State’s power to prosecute on a
mere showing that, as applied to third parties, the penal statute
is vague or overbroad, notwithstanding that the law is clear as
applied to him.65(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
46 SPEC PRO
It is settled, on the other hand, that the application of the
overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial kind of challenge
and, owing to the given rationale of a facial challenge,
applicable only to free speech cases.
By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply
a facial type of invalidation in order to plot areas of protected
speech, inevitably almost always under situations not before
the court, that are impermissibly swept by the substantially
overbroad regulation. Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be
properly analyzed for being substantially overbroad if the court
confines itself only to facts as applied to the litigants.
The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is
that it marks an exception to some of the usual rules of
constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims
that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the
litigant prevails, the courts carve away the unconstitutional
aspects of the law by invalidating its improper applications on a
case to case basis. Moreover, challengers to a law are not
permitted to raise the rights of third parties and can only assert
their own interests. In overbreadth analysis, those rules give
way; challenges are permitted to raise the rights of third
parties; and the court invalidates the entire statute "on its
face," not merely "as applied for" so that the overbroad law
becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized court
construes it more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to
depart from the normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with
the "chilling;" deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on third
parties not courageous enough to bring suit. The Court
assumes that an overbroad law’s "very existence may cause
others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally
protected speech or expression." An overbreadth ruling is
designed to remove that deterrent effect on the speech of
those third parties.66 (Emphasis in the original omitted;
underscoring supplied.)
In restricting the overbreadth doctrine to free speech claims,
the Court, in at least two cases,67 observed that the US
Supreme Court has not recognized an overbreadth doctrine
outside the limited context of the First Amendment, 68 and that
claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases
involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate
only spoken words.69 In Virginia v. Hicks,70 it was held that

rarely, if ever, will an overbreadth challenge succeed against a
law or regulation that is not specifically addressed
to speech or speech-related conduct. Attacks on overly broad
statutes are justified by the "transcendent value to all society of
constitutionally protected expression."71
Since a penal statute may only be assailed for being
vague as applied to petitioners, a limited vagueness analysis
of the definition of "terrorism" in RA 9372 is legally
impermissible absent an actual or imminent charge against
them
While Estrada did not apply the overbreadth doctrine, it did not
preclude the operation of the vagueness test on the Anti-
Plunder Law as applied to the therein petitioner, finding,
however, that there was no basis to review the law "on its face
and in its entirety."72 It stressed that "statutes found vague as a
matter of due process typically are invalidated only 'as applied'
to a particular defendant."73
American jurisprudence74 instructs that "vagueness challenges
that do not involve the First Amendment must be examined in
light of the specific facts of the case at hand and not with
regard to the statute's facial validity."
For more than 125 years, the US Supreme Court has
evaluated defendants’ claims that criminal statutes are
unconstitutionally vague, developing a doctrine hailed as
"among the most important guarantees of liberty under law." 75
In this jurisdiction, the void-for-vagueness doctrine asserted
under the due process clause has been utilized in examining
the constitutionality of criminal statutes. In at least three
cases,76 the Court brought the doctrine into play in analyzing
an ordinance penalizing the non-payment of municipal tax on
fishponds, the crime of illegal recruitment punishable under
Article 132(b) of the Labor Code, and the vagrancy provision
under Article 202 (2) of the Revised Penal Code. Notably, the
petitioners in these three cases, similar to those in the
two Romualdez and Estrada cases, were
actually charged with the therein assailed penal statute, unlike
in the present case.
There is no merit in the claim that RA 9372 regulates speech
so as to permit a facial analysis of its validity
From the definition of the crime of terrorism in the earlier cited
Section 3 of RA 9372, the following elements may be culled:
(1) the offender commits an act punishable under any of the
cited provisions of the Revised Penal Code, or under any of
the enumerated special penal laws; (2) the commission of the
predicate crime sows and creates a condition of widespread
and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace; and (3)
the offender is actuated by the desire to coerce the
government to give in to an unlawful demand.
In insisting on a facial challenge on the invocation that the law
penalizes speech, petitioners contend that the element of
"unlawful demand" in the definition of terrorism77 must
necessarily be transmitted through some form of expression
protected by the free speech clause.
The argument does not persuade. What the law seeks to
penalize is conduct, not speech.
Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA 9372,
there must first be a predicate crime actually committed to
trigger the operation of the key qualifying phrases in the other
elements of the crime, including the coercion of the
government to accede to an "unlawful demand." Given the
presence of the first element, any attempt at singling out or
highlighting the communicative component of the prohibition
cannot recategorize the unprotected conduct into a protected
speech.
Petitioners’ notion on the transmission of message is entirely
inaccurate, as it unduly focuses on just one particle of an
element of the crime. Almost every commission of a crime
entails some mincing of words on the part of the offender like
in declaring to launch overt criminal acts against a victim, in
haggling on the amount of ransom or conditions, or in
negotiating a deceitful transaction. An analogy in one U.S.
case78 illustrated that the fact that the prohibition on
discrimination in hiring on the basis of race will require an
employer to take down a sign reading "White Applicants Only"
47 SPEC PRO
hardly means that the law should be analyzed as one
regulating speech rather than conduct.
Utterances not elemental but inevitably incidental to the doing
of the criminal conduct alter neither the intent of the law to
punish socially harmful conduct nor the essence of the whole
act as conduct and not speech. This holds true a fortiori in the
present case where the expression figures only as an
inevitable incident of making the element of coercion
perceptible.
[I]t is true that the agreements and course of conduct here
were as in most instances brought about through speaking or
writing. But it has never been deemed an abridgement of
freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal
merely because the conduct was, in part, initiated, evidenced,
or carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or
printed. Such an expansive interpretation of the constitutional
guaranties of speech and press would make it practically
impossible ever to enforce laws against agreements in restraint
of trade as well as many other agreements and conspiracies
deemed injurious to society.79 (italics and underscoring
supplied)
Certain kinds of speech have been treated as unprotected
conduct, because they merely evidence a prohibited
conduct.80 Since speech is not involved here, the Court cannot
heed the call for a facial analysis.1avvphi1
IN FINE, Estrada and the other cited authorities engaged in a
vagueness analysis of the therein subject penal statute as
applied to the therein petitioners inasmuch as they were
actually charged with the pertinent crimes challenged on
vagueness grounds. The Court in said cases, however, found
no basis to review the assailed penal statute on its face and in
its entirety.
In Holder, on the other hand, the US Supreme Court allowed
the pre-enforcement review of a criminal statute, challenged on
vagueness grounds, since the therein plaintiffs faced
a "credible threat of prosecution" and "should not be
required to await and undergo a criminal prosecution as the
sole means of seeking relief."

As earlier reflected, petitioners have established neither an
actual charge nor a credible threat of prosecution under RA
9372. Even a limited vagueness analysis of the assailed
definition of "terrorism" is thus legally impermissible. The Court
reminds litigants that judicial power neither contemplates
speculative counseling on a statute’s future effect on
hypothetical scenarios nor allows the courts to be used as an
extension of a failed legislative lobbying in Congress.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED.
Footnotes
1A consolidation of House Bill No. 4839 and Senate
Bill No. 2137.
2
REPUBLIC ACT No. 9372, Sec. 62.
3 Coordinator Bayani Cambronero; Anakbayan-ST by
KMU Chairperson Elmer Labog, NAFLU-KMU
National President Joselito V. Ustarez and NAFLU-
KMU Secretary General Antonio C. Pascual, and
CTUHR Executive Director Daisy Arago.
4 Regional Auditor Aynong Abnay; Kongreso ng mga
BAYAN Chairperson Dr. Carolina Pagaduan-Araullo,
GABRIELA Secretary General Emerenciana de
Jesus, KMP Secretary General Danilo Ramos,
MCCCL Convenor Amado G. Inciong, COURAGE
National President Ferdinand Gaite, KADAMAY Vice
Chairperson Gloria G. Arellano, SCW Chairperson
Merly Grafe, LFS National Chairperson Vencer
Crisostomo, Anakbayan Secretary General Eleanor
de Guzman, PAMALAKAYA Chairperson Fernando
Hicap, ACT Chairperson Antonio Tinio, Migrante
Chairperson Concepcion Bragas-Regalado, HEAD
Deputy Secretary General Dr. Geneve Rivera, and
Agham Chairperson Dr. Giovanni Tapang. Grafe and
Tapang, however, failed to verify the petition.
5 9
Dr. Edelina P. De La Paz for Karapatan, Evangeline
Hernandez for Hustisya, Mary Guy Portajada for
Desaparecidos, Donato Continente for SELDA,
Bishop Elmer M. Bolocon for EMJP and Fr. Gilbert
Sabado for PCPR.
6IBP is represented by Atty. Feliciano M. Bautista,
national president, while CODAL is represented by
Atty. Noel Neri, convenor/member.
7 BAYAN-ST is represented by Secretary General
Arman Albarillo; Katipunan ng mga Magsasaka sa
Timog Katagulagan (KASAMA-TK) by Secretary
General Orly Marcellana; Pagkakaisa ng mga
Manggagawa sa Timog Katagalugan (PAMANTIK-
KMU) by Regional Secretary General Luz Baculo;
GABRIELA-Southern Tagalog by Secretary General
Helen Asdolo; Organized Labor Association in Line
Industries and Agriculture (OLALIA) by Chairperson
Romeo Legaspi; Southern Tagalog Region Transport
Organization (STARTER) by Regional Chairperson
Rolando Mingo; Bayan Muna Partylist-ST by Regional
Regional Chairperson Pedro Santos, Jr.; LFS-ST by
Spokesperson Mark Velasco; PAMALAKAYA-ST by
Vice Chairperson Peter Gonzales, Bigkis at Lakas ng
mga Katutubo sa Timog Katagalugan (BALATIK) by
Magbubukid para sa Repormang Agraryo (Kompra)
represented by member Leng Jucutan; Martir ng
Bayan with no representation; Pagkakaisa at
Ugnayan ng nmga Magbubukid sa Laguna
(PUMALAG) represented by Provincial Secretary
General Darwin Liwag; and Los Baños Rural Poor
Organization for Progress and Equality represented
by Teodoro Reyes.
8
Francesca Tolentino, Jannette Barrientos, Arnel
Segune Beltran, Edgardo Bitara Yap, Oscar Lapida,
Delfin de Claro, Sally Astera, Christian Niño Lajara,
Mario Anicete, and Emmanuel Capulong.
REPUBLIC ACT No. 9372, Sec. 53.
48 SPEC PRO
10
Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No.
160261, November 10, 2003, 415 SCRA 44, 133
(2003).
11Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 392
Phil. 618, 633 (2000), citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186 (1962).
12
G.R. No. 166052, August 29, 2007, 531 SCRA 583,
591-592.
13 360 Phil. 133 (1998).
14
Rollo (G.R. No. 178890), pp. 11-12.
15
Rollo (G.R. No. 178581), p. 17.
16Vide Genesis Transport Service, Inc. v. Unyon ng
Malayang Manggagawa ng Genesis Transport, G.R.
No. 182114, April 5, 2010.
17
<http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm
> (last visited August 13, 2010).
18 <http://eur-
ex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2005/l_314/l_3142
0051130en00410045.pdf> and its recent update
<http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:20
09:023:0037:01:EN:HTM> on the Council Common
Position (last visited August 13, 2010).
19PhilippineDaily Inquirer, July 11, 2007, Page A-1.
Visit also
<http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/nation/vie
w/20070711-75951/Reds_target_of_terror_law> (last
visited August 16, 2010).
20 House Resolution No. 641.

21
In his State of the Nation Address, President
Benigno Aquino III said: "x x x x. Tungkol naman po
sa CPP-NPA-NDF: handa na ba kayong maglaan ng
kongkretong mungkahi, sa halip na pawang batikos
lamang?
Kung kapayapaan din ang hangad ninyo,
handa po kami sa malawakang tigil-putukan.
Mag-usap tayo.
Mahirap magsimula ang usapan habang
mayroon pang amoy ng pulbura sa hangin.
Nananawagan ako: huwag po natin hayaang
masayang ang napakagandang
pagkakataong ito upang magtipon sa ilalim
ng iisang adhikain.
Kapayapaan at katahimikan po ang
pundasyon ng kaunlaran. Habang
nagpapatuloy ang barilan, patuloy din ang
pagkakagapos natin sa kahirapan. x x x x."
See: <http://www.gov.ph/2010/07/26/state-
of-the-nation-address-2010> (last visited
August 25, 2010).
22 In Francisco v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil.
830, 899 (2003), the Court followed the determinants
cited by Mr, Justice Florentino Feliciano in Kilosbayan
v. Guingona for using the transcendental importance
doctrine, to wit: (a) the character of the funds or other
assets involved in the case; (b) the presence of a
clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory
prohibition by the public respondent agency or
instrumentality of the government; and (c) the lack of
any other party with a more direct and specific interest
in the questions being raised.
23
SEC. 17. Proscription of Terrorist Organization,
Association, or Group of Persons. –Any organization,
association, or group of persons organized for the
purpose of engaging in terrorism, or which, although
not organized for that purpose, actually uses acts to
terrorize mentioned in this Act or to sow and create a
condition of widespread fear and panic among the
populace in order to coerce the government to give in
to an unlawful demand shall, upon application of the
Department of Justice before a competent Regional
Trial Court, with due notice and opportunity to be
heard given to the organization, association, or group
of persons concerned, be declared as a terrorist and
outlawed organization, association, or group of
persons by the said Regional Trial Court.
24<http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?articleId=607
149&publicationSubCategoryId=63> (last visited:
September 1, 2010).
25
G.R. Nos. 172070-72, June 1, 2007, 523 SCRA
318.
26
Rollo (G.R. No. 178581), pp. 111-125.
27 Supra note 22 at 896.
28
Gonzales v. Hon. Narvasa, 392 Phil. 518, 525
(2000), citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 US 83, 20 L Ed 2d
947, 88 S Ct 1942.
29
Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of
the Philippines, Inc. v. Comelec, G.R. No. 132922,
April 21, 1998, 289 SCRA 337.
30 Constitution, Article VIII, Section 1.
31 63 Phil. 139, 158 (1936).
32
Republic Telecommunications Holding, Inc. v.
Santiago, G.R. No. 140338, August 7, 2007, 529
SCRA 232, 243.
33
499 Phil. 281, 304-305 (2005).
34Mariano, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 312 Phil.
259 (1995).
49 SPEC PRO
35
Allied Broadcasting Center v. Republic, G.R. No.
91500, October 18, 1990, 190 SCRA 782.
36 314 Phil. 131 (1995).
37
G.R. No. 89651, November 10, 1989, 179 SCRA
287.
38De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No.
191002, March 17, 2010, citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 113-118 (1976) and Regional Rail
Reoganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 138-148
(1974).
39
561 U.S. [unpaginated] (2010). Volume 561 is still
pending completion.
40
Id. citing Babbitt v. Farm Workers, supra.
41§ 2339B. Providing material support or resources to
designated foreign terrorist organizations. (a)
Prohibited Activities.
(1) Unlawful conduct.— Whoever knowingly
provides material support or resources to a
foreign terrorist organization, or attempts or
conspires to do so, shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or
both, and, if the death of any person results,
shall be imprisoned for any term of years or
for life. To violate this paragraph, a person
must have knowledge that the organization
is a designated terrorist organization (as
defined in subsection (g)(6)), that the
organization has engaged or engages in
terrorist activity (as defined in section
212(a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act), or that the organization has
engaged or engages in terrorism (as defined
in section 140(d)(2) of the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and
1989).

42 Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188-189 (1973).
43 Automotive Industry Workers Alliance v. Romulo,
G.R. No. 157509, January 18, 2005, 449 SCRA 1, 10,
citing Allied Broadcasting Center, Inc. v. Republic,
G.R. No. 91500, October 18, 1990, 190 SCRA 782.
44Lawrence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law
Vol. I, p.332 (3rd ed. 2000), citing Steffel v.
Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974) and Ellis v. Dyson,
421 U.S. 426 (1975).
45Vide Garcia v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
111511, October 5, 1993, 227 SCRA 100, 117,
stating that "all powers are susceptible of abuse. The
mere possibility of abuse cannot, however, infirm per
se the grant of power[.]"
46
RA 9372 defines the crime of terrorism as follows:
SEC. 3. Terrorism. – Any person who
commits an act punishable under any of the
following provisions of the Revised Penal
Code:
a. Article 222 (Piracy in
General and Mutiny in the
High Seas or in the
Philippine Waters);
b. Article 134 (Rebellion or
Insurrection);
c. Article 134-a (Coup
d’etat), including acts
committed by private
persons;
d. Article 248 (Murder);
e. Article 267 (Kidnapping
and Serious Illegal
Detention);
f. Article 324 (Crimes
Involving Destruction); or
under
1. Presidential Decree No. 1613
(The Law on Arson);
2. Republic Act No. 6969 (Toxic
Substances and Hazardous and
Nuclear Waste Control Act of
1990);
3. Republic Act No. 5207 (Atomic
Energy Regulatory and Liability Act
of 1968);
4. Republic Act No. 6235 (Anti-
Hijacking Law);
5. Presidential Decree No. 532
(Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway
Robbery Law of 1974); and,
6. Presidential Decree No. 1866, as
amended (Decree Codifying the
Laws on Illegal and Unlawful
Possession, Manufacture, Dealing
in, Acquisition or Disposition of
Firearms, Ammunitions or
Explosives)
thereby sowing and creating a condition of
widespread and extraordinary fear and panic
among the populace, in order to coerce the
government to give in to an unlawful demand
shall be guilty of the crime of terrorism and
shall suffer the penalty of forty (40) years of
imprisonment, without the benefit of parole
50 SPEC PRO
as provided for under Act No. 4103,
otherwise known as the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, as amended.
47
479 Phil. 265 (2004).
48 421 Phil. 290 (2001).
49 Republic Act No. 3019, Sec. 5. Prohibition on
certain relatives. It shall be unlawful for the spouse or
for any relative, by consanguinity or affinity, within the
third civil degree, of the President of the Philippines,
the Vice-President of the Philippines, the President of
the Senate, or the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, to intervene, directly or indirectly, in
any business, transaction, contract or application with
the Government x x x. (Underscoring supplied)
50
Romualdez v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, supra at 281.
51 Id. at 288.
52 G.R. No. 167011, April 30, 2008, 553 SCRA 370.
53Punishable under Section 45(j) in relation to
Section 10(g) or (j) of Republic Act No. 8189.
54
Romualdez v. Commission on Elections, supra at
284.
55
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, supra at 421-450.
56
Id. at 353-356.
57People v. Nazario, No. L-44143, August 31, 1988,
165 SCRA 186, 195.
58Blo Umpar Adiong v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 103956, March 31, 1992, 207 SCRA 712,
719-720.

59
Andrew E. Goldsmith, The Void-for-Vagueness
Doctrine in the Supreme Court, Revisited, 30 Am. J.
Crim. L. 279 (2003), note 39, citing Michael C.
Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes,
46 Stan. L. Rev. 235, 261-262 (1994).
60Vide David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396,
May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160, 239; Romualdez v.
Commission on Elections, supra at 418, note 35.
61
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, supra at 429.
62
Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 4.
63
The power to define crimes and prescribe their
corresponding penalties is legislative in nature and
inherent in the sovereign power of the state to
maintain social order as an aspect of police power.
The legislature may even forbid and penalize acts
formerly considered innocent and lawful provided that
no constitutional rights have been abridged. (People
v. Siton, G.R. No. 169364, September 18, 2009, 600
SCRA 476, 485).
64Romualdez v. Commission on Elections, supra at
643.
65
Id. at 645-646.
66 David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, supra at 238.
67
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, supra; David v.
Macapagal-Arroyo, supra.
68
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, supra at 354.
69
Id.
70 539 U.S. 113, 156 L. Ed. 2d 148 (2003).
51 SPEC PRO
71
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 31 L. Ed 2d 408 engage in an illegal exchange for private profit, and
(1972). may properly be prohibited.
72 Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, supra at 355. 80Vide Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct:
Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of
73 Id. Conduct, "Situation-Altering Utterances," and the
Uncharted Zones, 90 Cornell L. Rev. 1277, 1315
74
(2005).
United States v. Waymer, 55 F.3d 564 (11th Circ.
1995) cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1119, 134 L. Ed. 2d 519
(1996); Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 114
L. Ed 2d 524 (1991); United States v. Powell, 423
U.S. 87, 46 L. Ed. 2d 228 (1975); United States v. CONCURRING OPINION
Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 42 L. Ed 2d 706 (1975).
ABAD, J.:
75
Andrew E. Goldsmith, The Void-for-Vagueness
Doctrine in the Supreme Court, Revisited, 30 Am. J. I concur with the majority opinion in dismissing the various
Crim. L. 279 (2003). petitions filed before this Court challenging the validity of
Republic Act (R.A.) 9372. I feel a need to emphasize, however,
76People v. Nazario, No. L-44143, August 31, 1988, that as the grounds for dismissal are more procedural than
165 SCRA 186; People v. Dela Piedra, G.R. No. substantive, our decision in these consolidated cases does not
121777, January 24, 2001, 350 SCRA 163; People v. definitively uphold the validity of the questioned law. The
Siton, G.R. No. 169364, September 18, 2009, 600 specific questions raised by the petitioners against R.A. 9372
SCRA 476. may be raised in the proper forum if and when an actual
controversy arises and becomes ripe for adjudication.
77 Republic Act No. 9372, Sec. 3, supra.
78
Rumsfield v. Forum for Academic and Institutional
Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 164 L.Ed 2d 156 (2006).
79Giboney v. Empire Storage and Ice Co., 336 U.S.
490, 93 L. Ed. 834, 843-844 (1949); Cf Brown v.
Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 71 L. Ed 2d 732, 742 (1982) G.R. No. 190156 February 12, 2010
that acknowledges: x x x The fact that such an
agreement [to engage in illegal conduct] necessarily
takes the form of words does not confer upon it, or LEONOR DANGAN-CORRAL, Petitioner,
vs.
upon the underlying conduct, the constitutional
immunities that the First Amendment extends to COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ERNESTO ENERO
FERNANDEZ, Respondents.
speech. Finally, while a solicitation to enter into an
agreement arguably crosses the sometimes hazy line
distinguishing conduct from pure speech, such a DECISION
solicitation, even though it may have an impact in the
political arena, remains in essence an invitation to

DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Does the allowance of execution pending appeal of a Decision
of a Regional Trial Court (RTC) in an election protest case
constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when the said RTC Decision does not
contain the specific matters required by the Rules of Procedure
in Election Contests? This is the question directly involved in
the present case.
In the present Petition for Certiorari, petitioner assails the
December 17, 2008 and November 10, 2009 Resolutions of
the Commission on Elections (Comelec) in Comelec Special
Relief Case, SPR No. 51-2008 dismissing petitioner's petition
for certiorari and denying her motion for reconsideration,
respectively. The Comelec found that the RTC substantially
complied with the rules on execution pending appeal and did
not gravely abuse its discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
Antecedents
Petitioner Leonor Dangan-Corral (Corral) and private
respondent Ernesto Enero Fernandez (Fernandez) were
candidates for the position of mayor of the Municipality of El
Nido, Palawan during the May 14, 2007 elections. Corral was
eventually proclaimed the winner with 5,113 votes as against
Fernandez's 3,807. The latter, thereafter, filed an election
protest docketed as Special Proceedings Case No. 1870 which
was raffled to Branch 95 of the RTC of Puerto Princesa City,
Palawan.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On February 22, 2008, the RTC promulgated its Decision,1 the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court rules that, in
view of the invalidation of the ballots judicially declared as
written by one (1) or two (2) persons, the Protestant is hereby
declared the duly elected Mayor of El Nido, Palawan by a vote
of 1,701, x x x winning over protestee whose final tally of votes
after above deduction is 1,236 votes, the Protestant winning by
a margin of 465 votes.2
On the same day that the decision was promulgated, Corral
filed her formal Notice of Appeal simultaneously paying the
required amount of docket/appeal fees. Fernandez, on the
other hand, filed a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal and
set the same for hearing on February 27, 2008.
On the said date of hearing, Corral filed her written opposition
to the motion; nevertheless, the hearing was held. After the
hearing, the RTC judge issued the Order3 granting the motion
for execution of his Decision pending its appeal. The
dispositive part of the Order states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, in view of the
circumstances cited above surrounding the execution of the
above questioned ballots, there exists a cloud of doubt on the
earlier pronouncement of the Board of Election Canvassers
declaring Protestee as winner of the election contest and
should not continue in office as Protestee has no mandate of
the people of El Nido at this point in time and in lieu thereof,
the Court hereby GRANTS the execution pending appeal of its
Decision dated February 22, 2008.
IT IS SO ORDERED.4
On March 5, 2008, Corral filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
the said Order, but the motion was denied. Thus, Corral filed
on March 12, 2008 a petition for certiorari before the Comelec
imputing grave abuse of discretion to the RTC for granting
Fernandez’s motion for execution pending appeal despite the
absence of good and special reasons or superior
circumstances as expressly required by existing rules.
Ruling of the Comelec First Division
The Comelec First Division issued a 60-day Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) on March 26, 2008 enjoining the
enforcement and implementation of the February 27, 2008
Order of the RTC. Thereafter, as the TRO was about to expire,
it issued an order dated May 22, 2008 granting the preliminary
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injunction prayed for by the petitioner. Then on December 17,
2008, it resolved the petition and issued the assailed
Resolution, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition
for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. The orders of the
respondent court dated February 27, 2008 and March 7, 2008
are consequently affirmed.
SO ORDERED.5
Ruling of the Comelec En Banc
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration before the Comelec En
Banc which resolved the matter on November 10, 2009 as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission en banc
RESOVLED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to:
1. DISMISS petitioner LEONOR DANGAN-
CORRAL'S Motion for Reconsideration for lack of
merit;
2. AFFIRM the dismissal of the herein Petition by the
First Division of this Commission, hereby giving way
to the implementation of the execution pending
appeal issued by the court a quo in favor of private
respondent Ernesto Enero Fernandez, and hereby
ordering petitioner Leonor Dangan-Corral to vacate
the position of Municipal Mayor of El Nido, Province of
Palawan; and the Electoral Contests Adjudication
Department is hereby directed to furnish the
Department of Interior and Local Government a copy
of this Resolution for proper implementation;
3. DENY public respondent RTC Judge Bienvenido
Blancaflor's motion to dismiss (addressed to his own
court) the charge of contempt filed against him, and
instead, he is hereby found GUILTY of CONTEMPT
OF THIS COMMISSION and sentenced to pay a fine

in the amount of ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00)
PESOS;
4. DIRECT private respondent Ernesto Enero
Fernandez to explain within ten (10) days from receipt
of this Resolution why he should not be cited for
contempt of this Commission for assuming the herein
controverted position of Municipal Mayor of El Nido,
Province of Palawan, while the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction earlier issued was still in full force and
effect.
SO ORDERED.6
Issues
Hence, this petition, which alleges palpable grave abuse of
discretion, to wit:
The respondent Comelec committed not only a reversible error
but gravely abused its discretion when it ignored the
mandatory requirements of the SUPREME COURT duly
promulgated Rule on the matter of FORM of Decision of trial
court in protest cases.
The respondent Comelec likewise committed grave abuse of
discretion when it disregarded the mandatory requirements of
the SUPREME COURT duly promulgated Rule, specifically
Rule 14, Section 11 of the Rules of Procedure in Election
Contests Before the Courts Involving Elective Municipal and
Barangay Officials by simplistically relying on the dispositive
portion of the decision of the trial court and refusing to examine
the substantial portion of the said grossly defective trial court
decision so as to determine whether the victory of the
protestant and the defeat of protestee was clearly established.
The respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion
when it sustained the validity of the Special Order granting
private respondent's Motion for Execution Pending Appeal
notwithstanding the clear absence of the requisite two [2] good
reasons to support such grant.
The respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion
when it stubbornly insisted on merely applying in this case the
general principles of Certiorari Petitions and refused to apply
and correlate therewith the provisions of the New Rules on
Protest Cases Applicable to the Trial Courts most especially on
the subject of Execution Pending Appeal.
In sum, the issue is whether the Comelec gravely abused its
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
affirming the execution pending appeal of the decision of the
RTC.
Petitioner's Arguments
Petitioner contends that the RTC Decision sought to be
executed pending appeal violates the mandatory required form
of decisions in election cases and thus should not be executed.
She further contends that the determination of whether the
victory of the protestant was clearly established should be
made from the entire decision and not, as what the Comelec
did, merely from the dispositive portion. She insists that the
RTC Decision readily shows the inconclusive, defective and
infirmed nature of protestant's alleged victory. Petitioner also
posits that there was no valid or good reason given for granting
the execution pending appeal.lawphil.net She also contends
that the Comelec refused to apply the new rules on protest
cases and is thus guilty of grave abuse of discretion.
Private Respondent's Arguments
On the other hand, Fernandez contends that the Decision of
the RTC is well grounded based on the evidence presented
and it clearly establishes his victory over Corral by a margin of
465 votes. Fernandez also contends that there are good
reasons to allow execution pending appeal, like giving
substance to the voice of the people of El Nido. Hence, he
maintains that the decision may properly be the subject of a
writ of execution pending appeal.
Our Ruling
53 SPEC PRO
There are clear cut requirements on when RTC decisions may
be executed pending appeal. Rule 14 of the Rules of
Procedure in Election Contests states:
Sec. 11. Execution pending appeal. - On motion of the
prevailing party with notice to the adverse party, the court,
while still in possession of the original records, may, at its
discretion, order the execution of the decision in an election
contest before the expiration of the period to appeal, subject to
the following rules:
(a) There must be a motion by the prevailing party
with three-day notice to the adverse party. Execution
pending appeal shall not issue without prior notice
and hearing. There must be good reasons for the
execution pending appeal. The court, in a special
order, must state the good or special reasons
justifying the execution pending appeal. Such
reasons must:
(1) constitute superior circumstances
demanding urgency that will outweigh the
injury or damage should the losing party
secure a reversal of the judgment on appeal;
and
(2) be manifest, in the decision sought to
be executed, that the defeat of the
protestee or the victory of the protestant
has been clearly established.
(b) If the court grants an execution pending appeal,
an aggrieved party shall have twenty working days
from notice of the special order within which to secure
a restraining order or status quo order from the
Supreme Court or the Commission on Elections. The
corresponding writ of execution shall issue after
twenty days, if no restraining order or status quo order
is issued. During such period, the writ of execution
pending appeal shall be stayed. (Emphasis supplied)
A valid exercise of discretion to allow execution pending
appeal requires that it must be manifest in the decision sought

to be executed that the defeat of the protestee and the victory
of the protestant have been clearly established.7 The Rules of
Procedure in Election Contests now embody this doctrine,
which the Comelec has in the past8 given value to and used in
resolving cases before it, and which has formed part of our
jurisprudence.
We have taken to heart the need to decide election contests
with dispatch; hence, we promulgated A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC9 to
address the matter. Noteworthy is the fact that particular
attention has been given to the decision itself in election
contests. For comparison, in the Rules of Court, Section 1 of
Rule 36 merely states: "A judgment or final order determining
the merits of the case shall be in writing personally and directly
prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts
and the law on which it is based, signed by him, and filed with
the clerk of court." In the Rules of Procedure in Election
Contests, however, Section 2 of Rule 14 states:
Section 2. Form of decision in election protests.-After
termination of the revision of ballots and before rendering its
decision in an election protest that involved such revision, the
court shall examine and appreciate the original ballots. The
court, in its appreciation of the ballots and in rendering rulings
on objections and claims to ballots of the parties, shall observe
the following rules:
(a) On Marked Ballots- The court must specify the
entries in the ballots that clearly indicate that the
intention of the voter is to identify the ballot. The
specific markings in the ballots must be illustrated or
indicated;
(b) On Fake or Spurious Ballots- The court must
specify the COMELEC security markings that are not
found in the ballots that are considered fake or
spurious;
(c) On Stray Ballots- The court must specify and state
in detail why the ballots are considered stray;
(d) On Pair or Group of Ballots Written by One or
Individual Ballots Written by Two- When ballots are
invalidated on the ground of written by one person,
the court must clearly and distinctly specify why the
pair or group of ballots has been written by only one
person. The specific strokes, figures or letters
indicating that the ballots have been written by one
person must be specified. A simple ruling that a
pair or group of ballots has been written by one
person would not suffice. The same is true when
ballots are excluded on the ground of having
been written by two persons. The court must
likewise take into consideration the entries of the
Minutes of Voting and Counting relative to illiterate or
disabled voters, if any, who cast their votes through
assistors, in determining the validity of the ballots
found to be written by one person, whether the ballots
are in pairs or in groups; and
(e) On Claimed Ballots- The court must specify the
exact basis for admitting or crediting claimed votes to
either party. (Emphasis supplied)
Notably, the word "must" is used in the above-quoted rule,
thus, clearly indicating the mandatory -- not merely directory --
nature of the requirement of what the decision should contain.
The specific rules on the contents of decisions in election
contests were formulated so that the decision could, by itself,
be taken as a valuable aid in expeditiously deciding on appeal
incidents peripheral to the main case. In the present case, the
contents of the decision become particularly relevant and
useful in light of the need to decide the case before us with
utmost dispatch, based only on the documents submitted
before us, considering that the records and election materials
are with another tribunal, as a matter of course.1avvphi1
For the limited purpose of determining whether the essential
requisite of a clear showing in the decision of the protestant’s
victory and the protestee’s defeat is present, we have
examined the RTC Decision subject of the present case. It is
glaring and unmistakable that the said Decision does not
conform to the requirements set forth in Section 2 of the Rules.
It does not give the specifics of its findings. The general
statement invalidating 67% of the total votes cast on the
ground that the ballots were written by one person or written by
two persons is grossly infirm. The Decision does not specify
54 SPEC PRO
why the court considered particular groups of ballots to have
been written by one person, and other invalidated ballots to
have been written by two persons. Worse, the Decision does
not state which and how many ballots were written by one
person; and which and how many ballots were written by two
persons. The entire Decision, even the lengthy part
enumerating the exhibits offered by each party, fails to yield
the exact number of and which ballots were written by one
person, and the exact number of and which ballots were
written by two persons. There is also no mention in the
decision of whether or not the RTC took into consideration the
entries of the Minutes of Voting and Counting relative to
illiterate or disabled voters, if any, who cast their votes through
assistors. The Decision merely states that "[a] careful and
cursory examination of these ballots indubitably shows that
these ballots are written either by one (1) or two (2) persons,
given the palpable similarity in the handwritings indicated in
these ballots earlier declared by Protestant's revisors as written
by one (1) and two (2) persons."10 It utterly violates the
mandatory requirement that "the court must clearly and
distinctly specify why the pair or group of ballots has been
written by only one person. The specific figures or letters
indicating that the ballots have been written by one person
must be specified."
In the present case, the victory of the protestant and the defeat
of the protestee were not clearly established in the Decision
because of the RTC’s failure to conform to the prescribed form
of the Decision. Because of said infirmity, there is no certainty,
it not being mentioned in the Decision, on whether the ballots
of those who voted through assistors were also invalidated or
not, in conjunction with the lack of a specific number of ballots
invalidated for being written by one person. The ballots of
those who voted through assistors, if any, could validly be
written by one person. It being unclear from the Decision
whether these ballots, if any, were invalidated, it follows that
the victory of the protestant and defeat of the protestee are
unclear and not manifest therein.
Consequently, to allow the execution of such a grossly infirm
RTC Decision in disregard of established jurisprudence and
clear and straightforward rules is arbitrary and whimsical and
constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.11
 55 SPEC PRO

11
Considering that the execution pending appeal cannot be Information Technology Foundation of the
validly allowed without the above discussed requisite, and Philippines v. Commission on Elections, 464 Phil.
having already found the presence of grave abuse of 173, 323 (2004).
discretion, we find no necessity of addressing the other matters
raised by the petitioner and of still determining the presence or
absence of the other requisites for execution pending appeal.

WHEREFORE the petition is GRANTED. The December 17,

2008 Resolution of the First Division of the Commission on
Elections and November 10, 2009 Resolution of the
Commission on Elections En Banc in Special Relief Case, SPR
No. 51-2008 are declared NULL and VOID.

Footnotes

1Rollo, pp. 88-124; penned by Judge Bievenido C.

Blancaflor.

2 Id. at 124.

3 Id. at 144-146.

4 Id. at 146.

5 Id. at 64.

6 Id. at 86-87.

7Pecson v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.

182856, December 24, 2008, 575 SCRA 634, 649.

8Fermo v. Commission on Elections, 384 Phil. 584,

592 (2000); Istarul v. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 170702, June 16, 2006, 491 SCRA 300, 309.

9Rules of Procedure in Election Contests Before the

Courts Involving Elective Municipal and Barangay
Officials (Rules of Procedure in Election Contests).

10 RTC Decision, p. 37; rollo, p. 124.