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Angara vs The Electoral Commission, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel the source of all authority.

That the Electoral Commission is an


Castillo, and Dionisio Mayor 63 Phil. 139 – Political Law – independent constitutional creation with specific powers and
Judicial Review – Electoral Commission functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of
FACTS: In the elections of Sept 17, 1935, Angara, and the classification to the legislative than to any of the other two
respondents, Pedro Ynsua et al. were candidates voted for the departments of the government. That the Electoral Commission is
position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
the Province of Tayabas. On Oct 7, 1935, Angara was proclaimed as qualifications of members of the National Assembly.
member-elect of the NA for the said district. On November 15, 1935, AQUINO vs ENRILE
he took his oath of office. On Dec 3, 1935, the NA in session G.R. No. L-35546 September 17, 1974
assembled, passed Resolution No. 8 confirming the election of the
FACTS: The petitioners having been arrested and held pursuant to
members of the National Assembly against whom no protest had
General Order No. 2 of the President (September 22, 1972), "for
thus far been filed. On Dec 8, 1935, Ynsua, filed before the Electoral being participants or for having given aid and comfort in the
Commission a “Motion of Protest” against the election of Angara. On conspiracy to seize political and state power in the country and to
Dec 9, 1935, the EC adopted a resolution, par. 6 of which fixed said take over the Government by force ...", filed the petitions for habeas
date as the last day for the filing of protests against the election, corpus. General Order No. 2 was issued by the President in the
returns and qualifications of members of the NA, notwithstanding exercise of the powers he assumed by virtue of Proclamation No.
the previous confirmation made by the NA. Angara filed a Motion to 1081 (September 21, 1972) placing the entire country under martial
law.
Dismiss arguing that by virtue of the NA proclamation, Ynsua can no
longer protest. Ynsua argued back by claiming that EC proclamation ISSUE: Whether or not the validity of Proclamation No. 1081 is
governs and that the EC can take cognizance of the election protest subject to judicial inquiry
and that the EC cannot be subject to a writ of prohibition from the
SC. HELD: Justices Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, Fernandez and Aquino
ISSUES: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over such matter. held that the question is political and should not be determined by
Whether or not EC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in taking court. Justice Barredo, on the other hand, believes that political
questions are not per se
cognizance of the election protest.
beyond the Court's jurisdiction, the judicial power vested in it by the
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Angara. The SC emphasized that in Constitution being plenary and all-embracing, but that as a matter of
cases of conflict between the several departments and among the policy implicit in the Constitution itself the Court should abstain from
agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the SC as the final arbiter, is the interfering with the Executive's Proclamation, dealing as it does with
only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict national security, for which the responsibility is vested by the charter
and allocate constitutional boundaries. That judicial supremacy is but in him alone. Justice Esguerra maintains that the findings of the
President on the existence of the grounds for the declaration of
the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and
martial law are final and conclusive upon the Courts. Justice Antonio,
controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch finds that there is no dispute as to the existence of a state of
or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, which is

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rebellion in the country, and on that premise emphasizes the factor Meanwhile, one member of the HRET, Congressman Juanito
of Camasura, Jr. who was a member of LDP confessed to Rep. Jose
necessity for the exercise by the President of his power under the Cojuangco (LDP’s leader) that he voted for Bondoc even though
Constitution to declare martial law, holding that the decision as to Bondoc was a member of the NP. He confessed that he believed in
whether or not there is such necessity is wholly his conscience that Bondoc truly won the election. This resulted to
confided to him and therefore is not subject to judicial inquiry, his Camasura’s expulsion from the LDP. Pineda then moved that they
responsibility being directly to the people. withdraw Camasura from the HRET. They further prayed that a new
election be held and that the new LDP representative be
appointed in the HRET. This new representative will be voting for
Pineda in the reopening of the election contest. Camasura was then
removed by HRET’s chairwoman Justice Ameurfina Herrera.
Enrile (then Minister of National Defense), pursuant to the order of
Naturally, Bondoc questioned such action before the Supreme Court
Marcos issued and ordered the arrest of a number of individuals
(SC).
including Benigno Aquino Jr even without any charge against them.
Hence, Aquino and some others filed for habeas corpus against Juan
Ponce Enrile. Enrile’s answer contained a common and special Pineda contends that the issue is already outside the jurisdiction of
affirmative defense that the arrest is valid pursuant to Marcos’ the Supreme Court because Camasura’s removal is an official act of
declaration of Martial Law. Congress and by virtue of the doctrine of separation of powers, the
judiciary may not interfere.
ISSUE: Whether or not Aquino’s detention is legal in accordance to
the declaration of Martial Law. ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court may inquire upon the
validity of the said act of the HRET without violating the doctrine of
separation of powers.
HELD: The Constitution provides that in case of invasion,
insurrection or rebellion, or imminent danger against the state, when
public safety requires it, the President may suspend the privilege of HELD: Yes. The SC can settle the controversy in the case at bar
the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part therein without encroaching upon the function of the legislature particularly
under Martial Law. In the case at bar, the state of rebellion plaguing a part thereof, HRET. The issue here is a judicial question. It must
the country has not yet disappeared, therefore, there is a clear and be noted that what is being complained of is the act of HRET not the
imminent danger against the state. The arrest is then a valid act of Congress. In here, when Camasura was rescinded by the
exercise pursuant to the President’s order. tribunal, a decision has already been made, members of the tribunal
have already voted regarding the electoral contest involving Pineda
and Bondoc wherein Bondoc won. The LDP cannot withdraw their
Emigdio Bondoc and Marciano Pineda were rivals for a Congressional
representative from the HRET after the tribunal has already reached
seat in the 4th District of Pampanga. Pineda was a member of the
a decision. They cannot hold the same election since the issue has
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP). While Bondoc was a
already become moot and academic. LDP is merely changing their
member of the Nacionalista Party (NP). Pineda won in that election.
representative to change the outcome of the election. Camasura
However, Bondoc contested the result in the HRET (House of
should be reinstated because his removal was not due to a lawful or
Representatives Electoral Tribunal). Bondoc won in the protest and
valid cause. Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for termination of
he was subsequently declared as the winner by the HRET.

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membership in the HRET. Expulsion of Camasura violates his right to - Bondoc filed for petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
security of tenure. to HRET from its resolution.

**HRET is composed of 9 members. 3 members coming from the ISSUE:


SC. 5 coming from the majority party (LDP). And 1 coming from the W/N THE HOUSE OF REP. EMPOWERED TO INTERFERE WITH THE
minority. DISPOSITION OF AN ELECTION CONTEST IN THE HRET BY
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each REORGANIZING THE REPRESENTATION IN THE TRIBUNAL OF THE
have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all MAJORITY PARTY?
W/N HRET RESOLUTION TO ORDER CAMASURA TO WITHDRAW
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their
AND RESCIND HIS NOMINATION IS VALID
respective members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of
nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court HELD:
to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be NO! COURT SAID THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR ANY POLITICAL
members of the Senate or House of Representatives, as the case PARTY TO CONTROL VOTING IN THE TRIBUNAL . THE TRIBUNAL
may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional HAS THE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION AS JUDGE TO CONTESTS
representation from the political parties and the parties or RELATING TO ELECTION, RETURNS AND QUALIFICATIONS OF THE
MEMS OF THE HOUSE OF REP.
organizations registered under the party list system represented
HRET RESOLUTION IS NULL AND VOID. ACTION OF HRET IS
therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its VIOLATIVE OF CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE BECAUSE:
Chairman. 1. IT IS A CLEAR IMPAIRMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PREROGATIVE OF THE HRET TO BE THE SOLE JUDGE OF THE
ELECTION CONTEST BET. PINEDA AND BONDOC. TO SANCTION
BONDOC V PINEDA INTERFERENCE BY THE HOUSE OF REP. WOULD REDUCE TRIBUNAL
FACTS: AS TOOL FOR THE AGGRANDIZEMENT OF THE PARTY IN POWER
- Pineda, member of Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and (LDP)
Bondoc, member of Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival candidates for 2. MEMBERS OF THE TRIBUNAL MUST BE NON-PARTISAN.
Representative for 4TH district of Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed CAMASURA WAS DISCHARGING HIS FUNCTIONS WITH COMPLETE
winner. Bondoc filed a protest at the House of Rep Electoral Tribunal DETACHMENT, IMPARTIALITY AND INDEPENDENCE. DISLOYALTY
(HRET) TO PARTY AND BREACH OF PARTY DISCIPLINE -> NOT VALID
- After review, HRET decided that Bondoc won by 107 votes. GROUND FOR EXPULSION OF MEMBER OF THE TRIBUNAL
- Cong. Camasura revealed to Cong. Cojuangco (LDP Sec. Gen) 3. IT VIOLATES CAMASURA’S RIGHT TO SECURITY OF TENURE.
that he voted for Bondoc because he was ‘consistent with truth, MEMBERS OF HRET ARE ENTITLED TO SECURITY OF TENURE.
justice and self-respect’ and that they would abide by the results of MEMBERSHIP MAY NOT BE TERMINATED W/O UNDUE CAUSE SUCH
the recounted votes where Bondoc was leading. AS: EXPIRATION OF TERM OF OFFICE, DEATH, PERMANENT
- Cong. Camasura was then expelled from his party (LDP) because DISABILITY, RESIGNATION FROM POLITICAL PARTY, FORMAL
it was a complete betrayal to his party when he decided for Bondoc. AFFILIATION WITH ANOTHER PARTY. DISLOYALTY IS NOT A VALID
- HRET then ordered Camasura to withdraw and rescind his CAUSE!
nomination from the tribunal.

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There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever
carabaos (EO 626). To strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A warranted, subject only to review by the highest tribunal. 6 We have
which not only banned the movement of carabaos from jurisdiction under the Constitution to "review, revise, reverse, modify
interprovinces but as well as the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may
1984, Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to provide," final judgments and orders of lower courts in, among
Iloilo. He was then charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred others, all cases involving the constitutionality of certain measures. 7
EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard or This simply means that the resolution of such cases may be made in
his right to due process. He said that the authority provided by EO the first instance by these lower courts.
626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even without being heard is
unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the
EO is a valid exercise of police power in order to promote general
welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos. Stated otherwise, courts should not follow the path of least
resistance by simply presuming the constitutionality of a law when it
ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid. is questioned. On the contrary, they should probe the issue more
deeply, to relieve the abscess, paraphrasing another distinguished
Who may exercise the power ? jurist, 9 and so heal the wound or excise the affliction.

Judicial power authorizes this; and when the exercise is demanded,


there should be no shirking of the task for fear of retaliation, or loss
Held: yes. Sa EO is unconstitutional. of favor, or popular censure, or any other similar inhibition unworthy
of the bench, especially this Court.

The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of Police power


because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not
reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is
unduly oppressive. To justify the State in the imposition of its
authority in behalf of the public, it must be:
1) The interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those of
a particular class, require such interference; ONGSUCO V. MALONES
2) that the means employed are reasonably necessary for the EVELYN ONGSUCO, ET AL. vs. MARIANO M. MALONESEVELYN ONGSUCO and
accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon ANTONIA SALAYA, vs. HON. MARIANO M. MALONES, both in his private and
individuals. official capacity asMayor of the Municipality of Maasin, Iloilo.[G.R. No. 182065.
October 27, 2009.]

Facts:
This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a
becoming modesty in examining constitutional questions, they are

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Petitioners are stall holders at the Maasin Public Market. After a acontroversy, the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an
meeting with the stall holders, Sangguniang Bayan of Maasin administrative body of special competence.
approvedMunicipal Ordinance No. 98-01, entitled "The Municipal
Revised Revenue Code."The Code contained a provision for Thus, a case where theissue raised is a purely legal question, well
increased rentals for the stalls and the imposition of goodwill fees in within the competence; and the jurisdiction of the court and not the
the amount of P20,000.00 andP15,000.00 for stalls located on the administrative agency,would clearly constitute an exception.There is
first and second floors of the municipal public market, respectively. no dispute herein that the notices sent to petitioners and other stall
The same Code authorizedrespondent to enter into lease contracts holders at the municipal public market were sent out,informing th
over the said market stalls, and incorporated a standard contract of them of the supposed "public hearing" to be held on 11 August
lease for the stall holders at themunicipal public market.Sangguniang 1998. Even assuming that petitioners received their notice,
Bayan of Maasin approved Resolution No. 68, series of 1998, moving the"public hearing" was already scheduled, and actually conducted,
to have the meeting declared inoperative as a publichearing, only five days later.
because majority of the persons affected by the imposition of the
goodwill fee failed to agree to the said measure. However,Resolution This contravenes Article 277 (b) (3) of the Implementing Rules and
No. 68, series of 1998, of the Sangguniang Bayan of Maasin was Regulations of the Local Government Code which requires that
vetoed by respondent on 30 September 1998. Respondentwrote a the public hearing be held no less than ten days from the time the
letter to petitioners informing them that they were occupying stalls notices were sent out, posted, or published.When the Sangguniang
in the newly renovated municipal public market without anylease Bayan of Maasin sought to correct this procedural defect through
contract, as a consequence of which, the stalls were considered Resolution No. 68, series of 1998 vetoed thesaid resolution.
vacant and open for qualified and interested applicants.Petitioners Although the Sangguniang Bayan may have had the power to
filed a Petition for Prohibition/Mandamus, with Prayer for Issuance of override respondent's veto, it no longer did so.
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, The defect in the enactment of Municipal Ordinance No. 98 was not
against respondent. The RTC found that petitioners could not avail cured when another public hearing was held on 22 January
themselves of the remedy of mandamus or prohibition. Because 1999,after the questioned ordinance was passed by the Sangguniang
they failed to show a clear legal right to the use of the market stalls Bayan and approved by respondent on 17 August 1998.
without paying the goodwill fees and also on theground of non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies. This decision was affirmed by Section 186 of theLocal Government Code prescribes that the public
the Court of Appeals. hearing be held prior to the enactment by a local government unit of
an ordinancelevying taxes, fees, and charges
Issues:
W/N there was a need for the exhaustion of administrative .Since no public hearing had been duly conducted prior to the
remedies- NOW/N the imposition of the goodwill fees is valid- NO, it enactment of Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01, said ordinance is void
is defective due to lack of public hearings andcannot be given any effect. Consequently, a void and ineffective
ordinance could not have conferred upon respondent the jurisdiction
Held/Ratio: toorder petitioners' stalls at the municipal public market vacant
The rule on the exhaustion of administrative remedies is intended to
preclude a court from arrogating unto itself the authority to resolve
SALONGA vs PAÑO

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G.R. No. L-59524 February 18, 1985 he (Pano) issued a resolution ordering the filing of an information for
violation of the Revised Anti-Subversion Act, as amended, against 40
Facts: The petitioner invokes the constitutionally protected right to people, including Salonga. The resolutions of the said judge dated 2
life and liberty guaranteed by the due process clause, alleging that December 1981 and 4 January 1982 are the subject of the present
no prima facie case has been established to warrant the filing of an petition for certiorari. It is the contention of Salonga that no prima
information for subversion against him. Petitioner asks the Court to facie case has been established by the prosecution to justify the
prohibit and prevent the respondents from using the iron arm of the filing of an information against him. He states that to sanction his
law to harass, oppress, and persecute him, a member of the further prosecution despite the lack of evidence against him would
democratic opposition in the Philippines. be to admit that no rule of law exists in the Philippines today.
The case roots backs to the rash of bombings which occurred in the Issues:
Metro Manila area in the months of August, September and October 1. Whether the above case still falls under an actual case
of 1980. Victor Burns Lovely, Jr, one of the victims of the bombing, 2. Whether the above case dropped by the lower court still deserves
implicated petitioner Salonga as one of those responsible. a decision from the Supreme Court
On December 10, 1980, the Judge Advocate General sent the Held: 1. No. The Court had already deliberated on this case, a
petitioner a “Notice of Preliminary Investigation” in People v. consensus on the Court’s judgment had been arrived at, and a
Benigno Aquino, Jr., et al. (which included petitioner as a co- draft ponencia was circulating for concurrences and separate
accused), stating that “the preliminary investigation of the above- opinions, if any, when on January 18, 1985, respondent Judge
entitled case has been set at 2:30 o’clock p.m. on December 12, Rodolfo Ortiz granted the motion of respondent City Fiscal Sergio
1980” and that petitioner was given ten (10) days from receipt of Apostol to drop the subversion case against the petitioner. Pursuant
the charge sheet and the supporting evidence within which to file his to instructions of the Minister of Justice, the prosecution restudied its
counter-evidence. The petitioner states that up to the time martial evidence and decided to seek the exclusion of petitioner Jovito
law was lifted on January 17, 1981, and despite assurance to the Salonga as one of the accused in the information filed under the
contrary, he has not received any copies of the charges against him questioned resolution.
nor any copies of the so-called supporting evidence. The court is constrained by this action of the prosecution and the
The counsel for Salonga was furnished a copy of an amended respondent Judge to withdraw the draft ponencia from circulating for
complaint signed by Gen. Prospero Olivas, dated 12 March 1981, concurrences and signatures and to place it once again in the Court’s
charging Salonga, along with 39 other accused with the violation of crowded agenda for further deliberations.
RA 1700, as amended by PD 885, BP 31 and PD 1736. On 15 Insofar as the absence of a prima facie case to warrant the filing of
October 1981, the counsel for Salonga filed a motion to dismiss the subversion charges is concerned, this decision has been rendered
charges against Salonga for failure of the prosecution to establish a moot and academic by the action of the prosecution.
prima facie case against him. On 2 December 1981, Judge Ernani 2. Yes. Despite the SC’s dismissal of the petition due to the case’s
Cruz Pano (Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, moot and academic nature, it has on several occasions rendered
Branch XVIII, Quezon City) denied the motion. On 4 January 1982,

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elaborate decisions in similar cases where mootness was clearly vs.
apparent.
The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling COURT OF APPEALS and RODOLFO PINEDA, respondents.
constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the
symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of The Antecedent Facts
protection given by constitutional guarantees.
Petitioners relate the antecedent facts of this case as follows: 3
In dela Camara vs Enage (41 SCRA 1), the court ruled that:
“The fact that the case is moot and academic should not preclude
Sometime in the last quarter of 1995, the National
this Tribunal from setting forth in language clear and unmistakable,
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) conducted an
the obligation of fidelity on the part of lower court judges to the investigation on the alleged participation and
unequivocal command of the Constitution that excessive bail shall involvement of national and local government
not be required.” officials in "jueteng" and other forms of illegal
In Gonzales v. Marcos (65 SCRA 624) whether or not the Cultural gambling.
Center of the Philippines could validly be created through an
executive order was mooted by Presidential Decree No. 15, the The case was also the subject of a legislative
inquiry/investigation by both the Senate and the
Center’s new charter pursuant to the President’s legislative powers
House of Representatives.
under martial law. Nevertheless, the Court discussed the
constitutional mandate on the preservation and development of In November 1995, one Potenciano Roque, claiming
Filipino culture for national Identity. (Article XV, Section 9, Paragraph to be an eyewitness to the networking of . . .
2 of the Constitution). national and local politicians and gambling lords,
In the habeas corpus case of Aquino, Jr., v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183), sought admission into the Government's "Witness
the fact that the petition was moot and academic did not prevent Protection, Security and Benefit Program." Allegedly,
this Court in the exercise of its symbolic function from promulgating he gained first-hand information in his capacity as
Chairman of the Task Force Anti-Gambling (TFAG)
one of the most voluminous decisions ever printed in the Reports.
during the term of former President Corazon C.
Aquino until his resignation in 1989. He also
revealed that he and members of his family were in
Guingona V. CA danger of being liquidated, facing as he did the
formidable world of corruption with a well-
G.R. No. 125532 July 10, 1998 entrenched hold on Philippine social, political and
economic systems.
SECRETARY TEOFISTO GUINGONA, JR.; STATE PROSECUTORS
JUDE ROMANO, LEAH ARMAMENTO, MANUEL TORREVILLAS, After a thorough evaluation of his qualifications,
JOAQUIN ESCOVAR, MENRADO CORPUS; the NATIONAL BUREAU OF convinced of his compliance with the requirements
INVESTIGATION; and POTENCIANO ROQUE, petitioners, of Republic Act No. 6981, otherwise known as the

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"Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act," the and on March 14, 1996 in the Regional Trial Court,
Department of Justice admitted Roque to the Branch 168, of Pasig City, presided by Judge
program, providing him a monthly allowance, Benjamin Pelayo.
temporary shelter and personal and security
protection during witness duty. On March 19, 1996, the Court of Appeals came up
with a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining both
On November 30, 1995, Roque executed a sworn trial courts from hearing the criminal actions in the
statement before NBI Agents Sixto M. Burgos, Jr. meantime.
and Nelson M. Bartolome, alleging that during his
stint as Chairman of the Task Force Anti-Gambling The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
(TFAG), several gambling lords, including private
respondent Rodolfo Pineda, and certain politicians In its Decision, Respondent Court addressed mainly the issue of
offered him money and other valuable whether the secretary of justice acted in excess of his jurisdiction (a)
considerations, which he accepted, upon his in admitting Petitioner Roque into the Program and (b) in excluding
agreement to cease conducting raids on their him from the Informations filed against private respondent. Private
respective gambling operations (Annex "B"). respondent contended that Roque's admission was illegal on two
grounds: first, his testimony could not be substantially corroborated
On the basis of Roque's sworn statement, the sworn in its material points; and second, he appeared to be the most guilty
statement and supplemental affidavit of one Angelito or at least more guilty than private respondent, insofar as the crimes
H. Sanchez, and the sworn statement of Gen. charged in the Informations were concerned.
Lorenzo Mateo (Annexes "C," "D" and "E"), then NBI
Director Mariano M. Mison forwarded the result of Respondent Court also ruled that RA 6981 contemplates two kinds of
their investigation on the "jueteng" scam to the witnesses: (a) a witness who has perceived or has knowledge of, or
Department of Justice (DOJ), recommending the information on, the commission of a crime under Section 3; and (b)
filing of the following charges against Pineda and a particeps criminis or a participant in the crime under Section 10.
other persons . . . .
The Issue
In the meantime, petitioner-prosecutors proceeded
with their preliminary investigation, and on February
The lone issue raised by this petition is worded as follows:
2, 1996, they issued a resolution finding probable
cause to charge private respondent Pineda with
several offenses (Annex "K"). On February 5, 1996, Whether or not a witness' testimony requires prior
three (3) Informations for corruption of public or simultaneous corroboration at the time he is
officials were filed against him in the Manila and admitted into the witness protection, security and
Pasig City Trial Courts (Annexes "L," "M" and "N"). benefit program. 5
He was subsequently arraigned on February 28,
1996 in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7 of the As noted earlier, this petition is unusual and unique. Despite ruling in
City of Manila presided by Judge Enrico Lanzanes, their favor, Respondent Court is assailed by petitioners for opining

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that admission to the Program requires prior or simultaneous precedent to the exercise of judicial power, an actual controversy
corroboration of the material points in the witness' testimony. between litigants must first exist. 13

Respondent Court and private respondent are of the opinion that An actual case or controversy exists when there is a conflict of legal
Sections 3 (b) & 10 (d) of RA 6981 expressly require that rights or an assertion of opposite legal claims, which can be resolved
corroboration must already exist at the time of the witness' on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. A justiciable
application as a prerequisite to admission into the Program controversy is distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract
difference or dispute, in that the former involves a definite and
The Court's Ruling concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of parties having
adverse legal interests. A justiciable controversy admits of specific
The petition must fail, because the facts and the issue raised by relief through a decree that is conclusive in character, whereas an
petitioners do not warrant the exercise of judicial power. opinion only advises what the law would be upon a hypothetical
state of facts. 14
No Actual Controversy
Thus, no actual controversy was found in Abbas vs. Commission on
Elections 15 regarding the provision in the Organic Act, which
Without going into the merits of the case, the Court finds the
mandates that should there be any conflict between national law and
petition fundamentally defective. The Constitution provides that
Islamic Law, the Shari'ah courts should apply the former. In that
judicial power "includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
case, the petitioner maintained that since the Islamic Law (Shari'ah)
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
was derived from the Koran, which makes it part of divine law, the
and enforceable." 6 According to Fr. Joaquin Bernas, a noted
Shari'ah may not be subjected to any "man-made" national law. This
constitutionalist, courts are mandated to settle disputes between real
Court dismissed petitioner's argument because, as enshrined in the
conflicting parties through the application of the law. 7 Judicial
Constitution, judicial power includes the duty to settle actual
review, which is merely an aspect of judicial power, demands the
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
following: (1) there must be an actual case calling for the exercise of
enforceable. No actual controversy between real litigants existed,
judicial power; (2) the question must be ripe for adjudication; 8 and
because no conflicting claims involving the application of national
(3) the person challenging must have "standing"; that is, he has
law were presented. This being so, the Supreme Court refused to
personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has
rule on a merely perceived potential conflict between the provisions
sustained or will sustain direct injury. 9
of the Muslim Code and those of the national law.
The first requisite is that there must be before a court an actual case
The doctrine of separation of powers calls for each branch of
calling for the exercise of judicial power. Courts have no authority to
government to be left alone to discharge its duties as it sees fit.
pass upon issues through advisory opinions or to resolve
Being one such branch, the judiciary, Justice Laurel asserted, "will
hypothetical or feigned problems 10 or friendly suits collusively
neither direct nor restrain executive [or legislative action] . . . ." 19
arranged between parties without real adverse interests. 11 Courts
The legislative and the executive branches are not allowed to seek
do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly
its advice on what to do or not to do; thus, judicial inquiry has to be
interest, however intellectually challenging. 12 As a condition
postponed in the meantime. Before a court may enter the picture, a
prerequisite is that something has been accomplished or performed

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by either branch. Then may it pass on the validity of what has been abstraction that can only lead to barren legal dialectics and sterile
done but, then again, only "when . . . properly challenged in an conclusions unrelated to actualities. 22
appropriate legal proceeding." 20
Finally, an accurate reading of the assailed Decision will further
In the case at bar, it is at once apparent that petitioners are not enlighten petitioners as to its true message. Respondent Court did
requesting that this Court reverse the ruling of the appellate court sustain Roque's admission into the Program — even as it held that
and disallow the admission in evidence of Respondent Roque's the first contention of petitioners was untenable — based on the
testimony, inasmuch as the assailed Decision does not appear to be latter's alternative argument that Roque's testimony was sufficiently
in conflict with any of their present claims. Petitioners filed this suit corroborated by that of General Mateo. While Respondent Court
out of fear that the assailed Decision would frustrate the purpose of insisted that corroboration must exist prior to or simultaneous with
said law, which is to encourage witnesses to come out and testify. Roque's admission into the Program, it sanctioned subsequent
But their apprehension is neither justified nor exemplified by this compliance to cure this defect. The reason for this is found in the
particular case. A mere apprehension does not give rise to a penultimate paragraph of the Decision, in which Respondent Court
justiciable controversy. categorically stated that it found no manifest abuse of discretion in
the petitioners' action. There is no quarrel with this point. Until a
After finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the more opportune occasion involving a concrete violation of RA 6981
government prosecutors, Respondent Court allowed the admission of arises, the Court has no jurisdiction to rule on the issue raised by
Roque into the Program. In fact, Roque had already testified in court petitioners.
against the private respondent. Thus, the propriety of Roque's
admission to the Program is already a moot and academic issue that WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
clearly does not warrant judicial review.

Manifestly, this petition involves neither any right that was violated
nor any claims that conflict. In fact, no affirmative relief is being John Hay People’s Alternative Coalition VS. Lim
sought in this case. The Court concurs with the opinion of counsel G.R. No. 119775
for private respondent that this action is a "purely academic
October 24, 2003
exercise," which has no relevance to the criminal cases against
Respondent Pineda. After the assailed Decision had been rendered,
trial in those cases proceeded in earnest, and Roque testified in all of Facts: During March 13, 1992, Republic Act 7227 were enacted. The
them. Said counsel filed his Memorandum only to satisfy his R.A. 7227 is also known as “ Bases Conversion and Development Act
"academic interest on how the State machinery will deal with of 1992” . This grants Subic SEZ incentives which provides tax and
witnesses who are admittedly guilty of the crimes but are discharged duty free importations, exemption of business therein from local and
to testify against their co-accused." 21 national taxes, to other hallmarks of liberated financial and bhsiness
climate. This also gave authority to the President to create through
Petitioners failed not only to present an actual controversy, but also
executive proclamation, subject to the concurrence of local
to show a case ripe for adjudication. Hence, any resolution that this
Court might make in this case would constitute an attempt at government units directly affected, other Special Economic Zones in

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the areas covered respectively by the Clark Military reservation, the of tax exemption and other privileges to the John Hay SEZ is VOID
Wallace Air Station in San Fernando, La Union and Camp John Hay. for being violative of the Constitution.
July 5, 1994, President Ramos issued proclamation no. 420 which
established a SEZ on a portion of Camp John Hay.
In maintaning the validity of proclamation no. 420, respondents
contend that by extending the John Hay SEZ economic incentives
similar to those enjoyed by the Subic SEZ, which was established
under R.A. 7227, the proclamation is merely implementing the
legislative intent of said law to turb the U.S. Military bases into hubs
of business activity or investment.

Issue: Whether Proclamation no. 420 is constitutional by providing


for national and local tax exemption within and granting other
economic incentives to the John Hay SEZ?

Held/Ruling: No. It is settled that when questions of constituional


signifance are raised, the court can exercise its power of judicial
review only if the following requisites are present: (1) existence of
actual and appropriate case; (2) person challenging the act must
have the standing to question or have personal/substantial interest
in the case; (3) question of constitutionality must be raised at
earliest opportunit; (4) issue of constitutionality must be the very lis G.R. No. L-35474 March 29, 1982
mota of the case. There is none that have been mentioned in R.A
7227, a grant of tax exemption to SEZ yet to be established in base HONORATO C. PEREZ, petitioner,
areas, unlike the grant under Section 12 which provides for tax vs.
exemption to the established Subic SEZ. The tax exemption grant to PROVINCIAL BOARD OF NUEVA ECIJA, HON. EDUARDO L.
John Hay SEZ contravenes Articles VI, Section 28 (4) of the 1987 JOSON, in his capacity as Governor of Nueva Ecija, and
constitution which provides that “No law granting any tax exemption VALENTIN C. ESCUADRO, in his capacity as Provincial
shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the Treasurer of Nueva Ecija, respondents.
members of Congress. Furthermore, it is the Legislature, unless
limited by a provision has the full power to exempt any person or
corporation or class of property from taxation, its powerto exempt ESCOLIN, J.:
being as broad as its powerto tax. Thegrant by Proclamation No. 420

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This is an original action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to On June 7, 1972, or during the sixth special session of Congress,
annul Resolution No. 228 of the respondent Provincial Board of petitioner was nominated anew for appointment to the office in
Nueva Ecija, dated August 21, 1972; to enjoin respondents from question; 7 but the same was likewise by-passed upon adjournment
enforcing and implementing said Resolution; and to compel of Congress on June 22, 1972. 8
respondents to recognize petitioner Honorato Perez as acting
provincial fiscal of Nueva Ecija. On August 11, 1972, petitioner took his oath of office as acting
provincial fiscal 9 pursuant to the designation extended by the
The factual antecedents which gave rise to this petition are not President on May 19, 1972; and on August 14, 1972, he formally
disputed. When former provincial fiscal of Nueva Ecija Celestino Juan assumed formally assumed office. 10
was appointed judge of the Court of First Instance of Quezon, the
Secretary of Justice, in Administrative Order No. 388, dated On August 21, 1972, respondent Provincial Board passed Resolution
September 9, 1971, designated first assistant fiscal Emilio Cecilio of No. 228, ordering respondent Provincial Treasurer to stop payment
Nueva Ecija as acting provincial fiscal. 1 of petitioner's salaries as acting provincial fiscal. 11

On May 10, 1972, President Ferdinand Marcos nominated petitioner The dispute came to a head on August 28, 1972, when respondent
Honorato Perez for appointment to the position of Provincial Fiscal of treasurer disapproved petitioner's requisition for various office
Nueva Ecija. 2 It appears, however, that the nomination which was supplies. His salary vouchers were likewise disapproved by the
submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation was respondent Governor.
by-passed upon adjournment sine die of Congress on May 18, 1972.
On the following day, May 19, President Marcos designated Hence, the instant petition, petitioner raising the following legal
petitioner as acting provincial fiscal. 3 questions:

Reacting to the said designation, respondent Provincial Board 1) Whether or not respondent Provincial Board has
enacted Resolution No. 146 addressed to the Commission on the power to pass and enact a resolution not
Appointments, manifesting its opposition to the confirmation of recognizing herein petitioner as acting provincial
petitioner's appointment. 4 Respondent Governor Joson also filed a fiscal despite the fact that the latter has assumed
formal protest with the Committee on Justice of the Commission on such office pursuant to a designation lawfully
Appointments, making known his strong and emphatic opposition to extended to him by the President of the Philippines.
the confirmation. 5 After submission of the evidence in support of
the opposition, the said Committee resolved not to recommend the 2) Whether or not respondent Provincial Board has
confirmation of petitioner's appointment. 6 the power to defy and/or pass judgment on the
validity of the said designation and assumption.

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We deem it unnecessary to pass upon the issues raised, this petition Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the
having become moot and academic. We take cognizance of the fact “rebellion” were thereafter effected. Petitioner filed for prohibition,
that petitioner Perez filed his certificate of candidacy for the office of injunction, mandamus and habeas corpus with an application for the
issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
mayor of Cabanatuan City in the local elections of January 30, 1980.
12 injunction. Petitioners assail the declaration of Proc. No. 38 and the
The mere filing of a certificate of candidacy constitutes forfeiture warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof. Petitioners
of his right to the controverted office under Section 29 of the furthermore pray that the appropriate court, wherein the information
Election Code of 1978 which provides: against them were filed, would desist arraignment and trial until this
instant petition is resolved. They also contend that they are allegedly
SEC. 29. Candidates holding appointive office or faced with impending warrantless arrests and unlawful restraint
position.— Every person holding a public appointive being that hold departure orders were issued against them.
ISSUES: Whether or not Proclamation No. 38 is valid, along with
office or position, including active members of the
the warrantless arrests and hold departure orders allegedly effected
Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and by the same.
employees in government-owned or controlled RULING:
corporations, shall ipso facto cease in his office or President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of Proc. No. 38 on
position on the date he files his certificate of May 6, 2006, accordingly the instant petition has been rendered
candidacy. Members of the Cabinet shall continue in moot and academic. Respondents have declared that the Justice
the offices they presently hold notwithstanding the Department and the police authorities intend to obtain regular
filing of certificate of candidacy, subject to the warrants of arrests from the courts for all acts committed prior to
pleasure of the President of the Philippines. and until May 1, 2001. Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of
(Emphasis supplied). Court, authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons
suspected of rebellion in suppressing the rebellion if the
A petition instituted to establish petitioner's right to an appointive circumstances so warrant, thus the warrantless arrests are not based
office is rendered moot and academic where his right to said office on Proc. No. 38. Petitioner’s prayer for mandamus and prohibition is
has been forfeited by his filing of a certificate of candidacy to an improper at this time because an individual warrantlessly arrested
elective office. has adequate remedies in law: Rule 112 of the Rules of Court,
providing for preliminary investigation, Article 125 of the Revised
ACCORDINGLY, this petition is hereby dismissed. No costs. Penal Code, providing for the period in which a warrantlessly
arrested person must be delivered to the proper judicial authorities,
SO ORDERED. otherwise the officer responsible for such may be penalized for the
LACSON V. PEREZ delay of the same. If the detention should have no legal ground, the
FACTS: arresting officer can be charged with arbitrary detention, not
President Macapagal-Arroyo declared a State of Rebellion prejudicial to claim of damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code.
(Proclamation No. 38) on May 1, 2001 as well as General Order No. Petitioners were neither assailing the validity of the subject hold
1 ordering the AFP and the PNP to suppress the rebellion in the NCR.

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departure orders, nor were they expressing any intention to leave
the country in the near future. To declare the hold departure orders David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches
null and void ab initio must be made in the proper proceedings on the emergency powers of Congress; (2) it is a subterfuge to avoid
the constitutional requirements for the imposition of martial law; and
initiated for that purpose. Petitioners’ prayer for relief regarding their
(3) it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press,
alleged impending warrantless arrests is premature being that no of speech and of assembly. They alleged “direct injury” resulting
complaints have been filed against them for any crime, furthermore, from “illegal arrest” and “unlawful search” committed by police
the writ of habeas corpus is uncalled for since its purpose is to operatives pursuant to PP 1017.
relieve unlawful restraint which Petitioners are not subjected to.
During the hearing, the Solicitor General argued that the issuance of
DAVID VS MACAPAGAL - ARROYO PP 1017 and GO 5 have factual basis, and contended that the intent
G.R. No. 171396, May 3 2006 of the Constitution is to give full discretionary powers to the
[Legislative Department - Power to Declare War and President in determining the necessity of calling out the armed
Delegate Emergency Power] forces. The petitioners did not contend the facts stated b the
Solicitor General.
FACTS:
On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP No. 1017 ISSUE:
declaring a state of emergency, thus: Whether or not the PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is constitutional.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the RULING:
Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, [calling-out power] by virtue of the powers The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three
vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution important provisions, thus:
which states that: “The President. . . whenever it becomes
necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or First provision: “by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section
suppress. . .rebellion. . .,” and in my capacity as their 18, Artilce VII … do hereby command the Armed Forces of the
Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines,
Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well any act of
prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act insurrection or rebellion”
of insurrection or rebellion ["take care" power] and to enforce Second provision: “and to enforce obedience to all the laws and
obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and [power to personally or upon my direction;”
take over] as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do Third provision: “as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the
hereby declare a State of National Emergency. Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.”
On the same day, PGMA issued G.O. No. 5 implementing PP1017, PP 1017 is partially constitutional insofar as provided by the first
directing the members of the AFP and PNP "to immediately carry out provision of the decree.
the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress First Provision: Calling Out Power.
and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence."

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The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that emergency can justify President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative
“whenever it becomes necessary,” the President may call the armed power by issuing decrees.
forces “to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion.” (Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora)
President Arroyo’s declaration of a “state of rebellion” was merely an Third Provision: The Power to Take Over
act declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, a Distinction must be drawn between the President’s authority
declaration allowed under Section 4, Chap 2, Bk II of the Revised to declare“a state of national emergency” and to exercise emergency
Administration Code. Such declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is powers. To the first, Section 18, Article VII grants the President
harmless, without legal significance, and deemed not written. In such power, hence, no legitimate constitutional objection can be
these cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In declaring a state of raised. But to the second, manifold constitutional issues arise.
national emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is
18, Article VII of the Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. She also delegate such powers to the President. Certainly, a body cannot
relied on Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the State’s delegate a power not reposed upon it. However, knowing that
extraordinary power to take over privately-owned public utility and during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for
business affected with public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of our
exercise of an awesome power. Obviously, such Proclamation Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency
cannot be deemed harmless. powers to the President, subject to certain conditions, thus:
To clarify, PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely (1) There must be a war or other emergency.
an exercise of President Arroyo’s calling-out power for the armed (2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
forces to assist her in preventing or suppressing lawless violence. (3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the
Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a
Second Provision: The "Take Care" Power. national policy declared by Congress.
The second provision pertains to the power of the President to Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. This is based on Section emergency powers clause. The taking over of private business
17, Article VII which reads: affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency
SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17
departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be states that the “the State may, during the emergency and under
faithfully executed. reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the
This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected
as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate with public interest,” it refers to Congress, not the President. Now,
“decrees.” Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the whether or not the President may exercise such power is dependent
Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states that “[t]he on whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law
legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines prescribing the reasonable terms thereof.
which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.” To Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by
be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of President Arroyo in issuing PP 1017, this Court rules that such
Proclamation does not authorize her during the emergency to

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temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned were lifted, and Proclamation No. 435, declaring the Cessation of the
public utility or business affected with public interest without State of Rebellion was issued.
authority from Congress.
Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed: (1)
state of national emergency, however, without legislation, he has no SANLAKAS AND PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA VS. EXECUTIVE
power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected SECRETARY, petitioners contending that Sec. 18 Article VII of the
with public interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional Constitution does not require the declaration of a state of rebellion
circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the to call out the AFP, and that there is no factual basis for such
President has no power to point out the types of businesses affected proclamation. (2)SJS Officers/Members v. Hon. Executive Secretary,
with public interest that should be taken over. In short, the et al, petitioners contending that the proclamation is a circumvention
President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the of the report requirement under the same Section 18, Article VII,
State under Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an emergency commanding the President to submit a report to Congress within 48
powers act passed by Congress. hours from the proclamation of martial law. Finally, they contend
that the presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of
As of G.O. No. 5, it is constitutional since it provides a standard by emergency powers as Congress has not delegated any such power
which the AFP and the PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever to the President. (3) Rep. Suplico et al. v. President Macapagal-
is “necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and Arroyo and Executive Secretary Romulo, petitioners contending that
prevent acts of lawless violence.” Considering that “acts of there was usurpation of the power of Congress granted by Section
terrorism” have not yet been defined and made punishable by the 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution. (4) Pimentel v. Romulo, et al,
Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared unconstitutional. petitioner fears that the declaration of a state of rebellion "opens the
door to the unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests"
for the crime of rebellion.
SANLAKAS Vs. Executive Secretary
421 SCRA 656 G.R. No. 159085 Issue:
February 3, 2004
Whether or Not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are
Facts: During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred constitutional?
junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP, acting upon instigation,
command and direction of known and unknown leaders have seized Whether or Not the petitioners have a legal standing or locus standi
the Oakwood Building in Makati. Publicly, they complained of the to bring suit?
corruption in the AFP and declared their withdrawal of support for
the government, demanding the resignation of the President, Held: The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No. 427
Secretary of Defense and the PNP Chief. These acts constitute a and General Order No. 4 are constitutional. Section 18, Article VII
violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, and by virtue of does not expressly prohibit declaring state or rebellion. The
Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, the Philippines was President in addition to its Commander-in-Chief Powers is conferred
declared under the State of Rebellion. Negotiations took place and by the Constitution executive powers. It is not disputed that the
the officers went back to their barracks in the evening of the same President has full discretionary power to call out the armed forces
day. On August 1, 2003, both the Proclamation and General Orders and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. While

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the Court may examine whether the power was exercised within Facts: The petitioner invokes the constitutionally protected right to
constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of life and liberty guaranteed by the due process clause, alleging that
discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way of proof, no prima facie case has been established to warrant the filing of an
supported their assertion that the President acted without factual information for subversion against him. Petitioner asks the Court to
basis. The issue of the circumvention of the report is of no merit as prohibit and prevent the respondents from using the iron arm of the
there was no indication that military tribunals have replaced civil law to harass, oppress, and persecute him, a member of the
courts or that military authorities have taken over the functions of democratic opposition in the Philippines.
Civil Courts. The issue of usurpation of the legislative power of the The case roots backs to the rash of bombings which occurred in the
Congress is of no moment since the President, in declaring a state of Metro Manila area in the months of August, September and October
rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising of 1980. Victor Burns Lovely, Jr, one of the victims of the bombing,
a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. implicated petitioner Salonga as one of those responsible.
These are purely executive powers, vested on the President by On December 10, 1980, the Judge Advocate General sent the
Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated petitioner a “Notice of Preliminary Investigation” in People v.
legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI. The Benigno Aquino, Jr., et al. (which included petitioner as a co-
fear on warrantless arrest is unreasonable, since any person may be accused), stating that “the preliminary investigation of the above-
subject to this whether there is rebellion or not as this is a crime entitled case has been set at 2:30 o’clock p.m. on December 12,
punishable under the Revised Penal Code, and as long as a valid 1980” and that petitioner was given ten (10) days from receipt of
warrantless arrest is present. the charge sheet and the supporting evidence within which to file his
counter-evidence. The petitioner states that up to the time martial
Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and law was lifted on January 17, 1981, and despite assurance to the
substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or contrary, he has not received any copies of the charges against him
will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is nor any copies of the so-called supporting evidence.
being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a The counsel for Salonga was furnished a copy of an amended
party alleges "such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy complaint signed by Gen. Prospero Olivas, dated 12 March 1981,
as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the charging Salonga, along with 39 other accused with the violation of
presentation of Issue upon which the court depends for illumination RA 1700, as amended by PD 885, BP 31 and PD 1736. On 15
of difficult constitutional questions. Based on the foregoing, October 1981, the counsel for Salonga filed a motion to dismiss the
petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJS Officers/Members have no charges against Salonga for failure of the prosecution to establish a
legal standing to sue. Only petitioners Rep. Suplico et al. and Sen. prima facie case against him. On 2 December 1981, Judge Ernani
Pimentel, as Members of Congress, have standing to challenge the Cruz Pano (Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
subject issuances. It sustained its decision in Philippine Constitution Branch XVIII, Quezon City) denied the motion. On 4 January 1982,
Association v. Enriquez, that the extent the powers of Congress are he (Pano) issued a resolution ordering the filing of an information for
impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office violation of the Revised Anti-Subversion Act, as amended, against 40
confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that people, including Salonga. The resolutions of the said judge dated 2
institution. December 1981 and 4 January 1982 are the subject of the present
petition for certiorari. It is the contention of Salonga that no prima
SALONGA vs PAÑO facie case has been established by the prosecution to justify the
G.R. No. L-59524 February 18, 1985 filing of an information against him. He states that to sanction his

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further prosecution despite the lack of evidence against him would executive order was mooted by Presidential Decree No. 15, the
be to admit that no rule of law exists in the Philippines today. Center’s new charter pursuant to the President’s legislative powers
Issues: 1. Whether the above case still falls under an actual case under martial law. Nevertheless, the Court discussed the
2. Whether the above case dropped by the lower court still deserves constitutional mandate on the preservation and development of
a decision from the Supreme Court Filipino culture for national Identity. (Article XV, Section 9, Paragraph
Held: 1. No. The Court had already deliberated on this case, a 2 of the Constitution).
consensus on the Court’s judgment had been arrived at, and a In the habeas corpus case of Aquino, Jr., v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183),
draft ponencia was circulating for concurrences and separate the fact that the petition was moot and academic did not prevent
opinions, if any, when on January 18, 1985, respondent Judge this Court in the exercise of its symbolic function from promulgating
Rodolfo Ortiz granted the motion of respondent City Fiscal Sergio one of the most voluminous decisions ever printed in the Reports.
Apostol to drop the subversion case against the petitioner. Pursuant
to instructions of the Minister of Justice, the prosecution restudied its TANADA v. ANGARA
evidence and decided to seek the exclusion of petitioner Jovito 272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997
Salonga as one of the accused in the information filed under the
Facts: This is a petition seeking to nullify the Philippine ratification
questioned resolution.
The court is constrained by this action of the prosecution and the of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement. Petitioners
respondent Judge to withdraw the draft ponencia from circulating for question the concurrence of herein respondents acting in their
concurrences and signatures and to place it once again in the Court’s capacities as Senators via signing the said agreement.
crowded agenda for further deliberations. The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major
Insofar as the absence of a prima facie case to warrant the filing of trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports,
subversion charges is concerned, this decision has been rendered particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides new
moot and academic by the action of the prosecution.
opportunities for the service sector cost and uncertainty associated
2. Yes. Despite the SC’s dismissal of the petition due to the case’s
moot and academic nature, it has on several occasions rendered with exporting and more investment in the country. These are the
elaborate decisions in similar cases where mootness was clearly predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and as viewed by
apparent. the signatory Senators, a “free market” espoused by WTO.
The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as one
constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the that limits, restricts and impair Philippine economic sovereignty and
symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of legislative power. That the Filipino First policy of the Constitution
protection given by constitutional guarantees.
was taken for granted as it gives foreign trading intervention.
In dela Camara vs Enage (41 SCRA 1), the court ruled that:
“The fact that the case is moot and academic should not preclude
this Tribunal from setting forth in language clear and unmistakable, Issue : Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
the obligation of fidelity on the part of lower court judges to the amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Senate
unequivocal command of the Constitution that excessive bail shall in giving its concurrence of the said WTO agreement.
not be required.” Held: In its Declaration of Principles and state policies, the
In Gonzales v. Marcos (65 SCRA 624) whether or not the Cultural
Constitution “adopts the generally accepted principles of
Center of the Philippines could validly be created through an
international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the

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policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity , of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office.
with all nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is The IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another
bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which request by petitioner allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The
are considered automatically part of our own laws. Pacta sunt City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place
servanda – international agreements must be performed in good Cu Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act
faith. A treaty is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally No. 4221 which provides that the act of Legislature granting
binding obligation on the parties. provincial boards the power to provide a system of probation to
Through WTO the sovereignty of the state cannot in fact and reality convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is
be considered as absolute because it is a regulation of commercial applicable to a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein
relations among nations. Such as when Philippines joined the United that only provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the
Nations (UN) it consented to restrict its sovereignty right under the law it is unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution
“concept of sovereignty as autolimitation.” What Senate did was a provides equal protection of laws. The said law provides absolute
valid exercise of authority. As to determine whether such exercise is discretion to provincial boards and this also constitutes undue
wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and delegation of power. Further, the said probation law may be an
review. The act of signing the said agreement is not a legislative encroachment of the power of the executive to provide pardon
restriction as WTO allows withdrawal of membership should this be because providing probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in
the political desire of a member. Also, it should not be viewed as a pardon.
limitation of economic sovereignty. WTO remains as the only viable
structure for multilateral trading and the veritable forum for the Issues:
development of international trade law. Its alternative is isolation, Whether or not Act No. 4221 constituted an undue delegation of
stagnation if not economic self-destruction. Thus, the people be legislative power
allowed, through their duly elected officers, make their free choice. Whether or not the said act denies the equal protection of the laws
Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
PEOPLE v. VERA Discussions: An act of the legislature is incomplete and hence
65 Phil 56, November 16, 1937 invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which
UNDUE DELEGATION OF POWER; EQUAL PROTECTION OF the administrative officer or board may be guided in the exercise of
THE LAW the discretionary powers delegated to it. The probation Act does not,
Facts: Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in by the force of any of its provisions, fix and impose upon the
Manila. He filed for reconsideration and four motions for new trial provincial boards any standard or guide in the exercise of their
but all were denied. He then elevated to the Supreme Court and the discretionary power. What is granted, as mentioned by Justice
Supreme Court remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new Cardozo in the recent case of Schecter, supra, is a “roving
trial. While awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation alleging commission” which enables the provincial boards to exercise
that the he is innocent of the crime he was convicted of. The Judge arbitrary discretion. By section 11 if the Act, the legislature does not

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seemingly on its own authority extend the benefits of the Probation equal protection of the laws. The resultant inequality may be said to
Act to the provinces but in reality leaves the entire matter for the flow from the unwarranted delegation of legislative power, although
various provincial boards to determine. perhaps this is not necessarily the result in every case. Adopting the
The equal protection of laws is a pledge of the protection of equal example given by one of the counsel for the petitioners in the course
laws. The classification of equal protection, to be reasonable, must of his oral argument, one province may appropriate the necessary
be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; it fund to defray the salary of a probation officer, while another
must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited province may refuse or fail to do so. In such a case, the Probation
to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member Act would be in operation in the former province but not in the
of the class. latter. This means that a person otherwise coming within the
Rulings: The Court concludes that section 11 of Act No. 4221 purview of the law would be liable to enjoy the benefits of probation
constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of legislative in one province while another person similarly situated in another
authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason, province would be denied those same benefits. This is obnoxious
unconstitutional and void. There is no set standard provided by discrimination. Contrariwise, it is also possible for all the provincial
Congress on how provincial boards must act in carrying out a system boards to appropriate the necessary funds for the salaries of the
of probation. The provincial boards are given absolute discretion probation officers in their respective provinces, in which case no
which is violative of the constitution and the doctrine of the non inequality would result for the obvious reason that probation would
delegation of power. Further, it is a violation of equity so protected be in operation in each and every province by the affirmative action
by the constitution. The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in of appropriation by all the provincial boards.
section 11 which reads as follows: This Act shall apply only in those SENATE v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for 495 SCRA 170 – Constitutionality of E.O. 464
the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North
provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be Rail Project as well as the Garci tapes surfaced. This prompted the
Senate to conduct a public hearing to investigate the said anomalies
appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the
particularly the alleged overpricing in the NRP. The investigating
direction of the Probation Office. Senate committee issued invitations to certain department heads
The provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for and military officials to speak before the committee as resource
themselves, whether the Probation Law shall apply to their provinces persons. Ermita submitted that he and some of the department
or not at all. The applicability and application of the Probation Act heads cannot attend the said hearing due to pressing matters that
are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the need immediate attention. AFP Chief of Staff Senga likewise sent a
provincial board does not wish to have the Act applied in its similar letter. Drilon, the senate president, excepted the said
requests for they were sent belatedly and arrangements were
province, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed
already made and scheduled. Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464
amount for the salary of a probation officer. which took effect immediately.
It is also contended that the Probation Act violates the provisions of EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of
our Bill of Rights which prohibits the denial to any person of the executive departments who in the judgment of the department

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heads are covered by the executive privilege; Generals and flag which is not infrequently true – recourse must be had to others who
officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other do possess it.
officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour. The
executive privilege; Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with Question Hour is closely related with the legislative power, and it is
rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other officers who in precisely as a complement to or a supplement of the Legislative
the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive Inquiry. The appearance of the members of Cabinet would be very,
privilege; Senior national security officials who in the judgment of very essential not only in the application of check and balance but
the National Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; also, in effect, in aid of legislation. Section 22 refers only to Question
and Such other officers as may be determined by the President, from Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid
appearing in such hearings conducted by Congress without first of legislation, under which anybody for that matter, may be
securing the president’s approval. summoned and if he refuses, he can be held in contempt of the
The department heads and the military officers who were invited by House. A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of
the Senate committee then invoked EO 464 to except themselves. legislation and the question hour. While attendance was meant to
Despite EO 464, the scheduled hearing proceeded with only 2 be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries
military personnel attending. For defying President Arroyo’s order in aid of legislation. Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely
barring military personnel from testifying before legislative inquiries related and complementary to each other, should not be considered
without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically
relieved from their military posts and were made to face court relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim
martial proceedings. EO 464’s constitutionality was assailed for it is of which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation,
alleged that it infringes on the rights and duties of Congress to while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour,
conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’
functions in the implementation of laws. oversight function. Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional. appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it
HELD: The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of
determine the validity of the provisions of EO 464, the SC sought to powers.
distinguish Section 21 from Section 22 of Art 6 of the 1987 While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it
Constitution. The Congress’ power of inquiry is expressly recognized cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to
in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. Although there is no comply with its demands for information. When Congress exercises
provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt
Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not
the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one
effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function executive official may be exempted from this power — the President
as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry – with on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of
process to enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on
legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due
effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is
which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the sanctioned by a long-standing custom. The requirement then to
legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information – secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to

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appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under branches and all its personnel including the executive labor arbiters
Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of and labor arbiters was transferred from the NLRC Chairperson to the
department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part. Secretary of Labor and Employment. In support of their position, the
Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department
Unions argue that the NLRC -- created by Presidential Decree 442,
heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such
instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in otherwise known as the Labor Code, during Martial Law – was an
such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, integral part of the Department (then Ministry) of Labor and
either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary. Employment (DOLE) under the administrative supervision of the
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department Secretary of Justice.
heads are implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to
such information is not as imperative as that of the President to During the time of President Corazon C. Aquino, and while she was
whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a
endowed with legislative functions after EDSA I, Executive Order 292
report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances,
Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that was issued whereby the NLRC became an agency attached to the
Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the DOLE for policy and program coordination and for administrative
inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is ‘in aid of supervision. On 2 March 1989, Article 213 of the Labor Code was
legislation’ under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the expressly amended by Republic Act 6715 declaring that the NLRC
same reasons stated in Arnault. was to be attached to the DOLE for program and policy coordination
NOTES: The SC ruled that Section 1 and Section 2a are only while the administrative supervision over the NLRC, its regional
valid. The rest invalid.
branches and personnel, was turned over to the NLRC Chairman.
On March 6, 2008, President Arroyo issued Memorandum Circular
No. 151, revoking Executive Order No. 464 and Memorandum The subject EO 185, in authorizing the Secretary of Labor to exercise
Circular No. 108. She advised executive officials and employees to administrative supervision over the NLRC, its regional branches and
follow and abide by the Constitution, existing laws and personnel, allegedly reverted to the pre-RA 6715 set-up, amending
jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate v. the latter law which only Congress can do. Alberto Romulo (in his
Ermita when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of capacity as Executive Secretary) and Patricia Sto. Tomas (in her
legislation.
capacity as Secretary of Labor and Employment), as represented by
AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY WORKERS ALLIANCE v. ROMULO
the Office of the Solicitor General, opposed the petition on
FACTS: Automotive Industry Workers Alliance (AIWA) and its
procedural and substantive grounds.
affiliated unions call upon the Supreme Court to exercise its power of
judicial review to declare as unconstitutional an executive order
ISSUE: Whether the Unions -- which contend that they are suing for
assailed to be in derogation of the constitutional doctrine of
and in behalf of their members (more or less 50,000 workers) –--
separation of powers. In an original action for certiorari, they invoke
has the requisite standing.
their status as labor unions and as taxpayers whose rights and
interests are allegedly violated and prejudiced by Executive Order
HELD: NO. Legal standing or locus standi is defined as a “personal
185 dated 10 March 2003 whereby administrative supervision over
and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), its regional

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or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is interest. However, the issue posed in the present petition did not
being challenged.” For a citizen to have standing, he must establish meet the exacting standard required for the Court to take the liberal
that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of approach and recognize the standing of the Unions.
the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly
traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be The subject matter of EO 185 is the grant of authority by the
redressed by a favorable action. Herein, the Unions have not shown President to the Secretary of Labor to exercise administrative
that they have sustained or are in danger of sustaining any personal supervision over the NLRC, its regional branches and all its
injury attributable to the enactment of EO 185. personnel, including the Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor Arbiters.
Its impact, sans the challenge to its constitutionality, is thereby
As labor unions representing their members, it cannot be said that limited to the departments to which it is addressed. Considering that
EO 185 will prejudice their rights and interests considering that the the governmental act being questioned has a limited reach, its
scope of the authority conferred upon the Secretary of Labor does impact confined to corridors of the executive department, this is not
not extend to the power to review, reverse, revise or modify the one of those exceptional occasions where the Court is justified in
decisions of the NLRC in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. sweeping aside a critical procedural requirement, rooted as it is in
Thus, only NLRC personnel who may find themselves the subject of the constitutionally enshrined principle of separation of powers
the Secretary of Labor’s disciplinary authority, conferred by Section
1(d) of the subject executive order, may be said to have a direct and KILOSBAYAN v. GUINGONA
specific interest in raising the substantive issue herein. Moreover, Facts: This is a special civil action for prohibition and injunction,
and if at all, only Congress, and not the Unions herein, can claim any with a prayer for a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injury from the alleged executive encroachment of the legislative injunction which seeks to prohibit and restrain the implementation of
function to amend, modify and/or repeal laws. Neither can standing the Contract of Lease executed by the PCSO and the Philippine
be conferred on the Unions as taxpayers since they have not Gaming Management Corporation in connection with the on-line
established disbursement of public funds in contravention of law or lottery system, also know as lotto.
the Constitution. A taxpayer’s suit is properly brought only when
there is an exercise of the spending or taxing power of Congress. EO Petitioners strongly opposed the setting up of the on-line lottery
185 does not even require for its implementation additional system on the basis of serious moral and ethical considerations. It
appropriation. All told, if the Court was to follow the strict rule on submitted that said contract of lease violated Section 1 of R. A. No.
locus standi, the petition should be forthwith dismissed on that 1169, as amended by B. P. Blg. 42.
score. The rule on standing, however, is a matter of procedure,
hence, can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary Respondents contended, among others, that, the contract does not
citizens, taxpayers and legislators when the public interest so violate the Foreign Investment Act of 1991; that the issues of
requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, wisdom, morality and propriety of acts of the executive department
of overarching significance to society, or of paramount public are beyond the ambit of judicial reviews; and that the petitioners

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have no standing to maintain the instant suit. 384 SCRA 152
FACTS: The Public Estates Authority (PEA) is the central
ISSUES: implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation projects
nationwide. It took over the leasing and selling functions of the
1. Whether or not petitioners have the legal standing to file the
DENR (Department of Environmental and Natural Resources) insofar
instant petition. as reclaimed or about to be reclaimed foreshore lands are
2. Whether or not the contract of lease is legal and valid. concerned.
PEA sought the transfer to the Amari Coastal Bay and Development
RULING: As to the preliminary issue, the Court resolved to set aside Corporation, a private corporation, of the ownership of 77.34
the procedural technicality in view of the importance of the issues hectares of the Freedom Islands. PEA also sought to have 290.156
raised. The Court adopted the liberal policy on locus standi to allow hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay to Amari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer is valid.
the ordinary taxpayers, members of Congress, and even association
HELD: No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public
of planters, and non-profit civic organizations to initiate and domain to be transferred to Amari as private lands will sanction a
prosecute actions to question the validity or constitutionality of laws, gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from
acts, decisions, or rulings of various government agencies or acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
instrumentalities. The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of reclaimed
lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of
As to the substantive issue, the Court agrees with the petitioners title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain.
The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain
whether the contract in question is one of lease or whether the
inalienable natural resources of the public domain. The transfer (as
PGMC is merely an independent contractor should not be decided on embodied in a joint venture agreement) to AMARI, a private
the basis of the title or designation of the contract but by the intent corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands, is
of the parties, which may be gathered from the provisions of the void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
contract itself. Animus homini est anima scripti. The intention of the Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any
party is the soul of the instrument. kind of alienable land of the public domain. Furthermore, since the
Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to Amari ownership of 290.156
hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void
Therefore the instant petition is granted and the challenged Contract for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
of Lease is hereby declared contrary to law and invalid. which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than
agricultural lands of the public domain.

MATIBAG v BENIPAYO
FACTS: On February 2, 1999, the COMELEC en banc appointed
petitioner as "Acting Director IV" of the EID. On February 15, 2000,
FRACISCO CHAVEZ v. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and then Chairperson Harriet O. Demetriou renewed the appointment of
AMARI petitioner as Director IV of EID in a "Temporary" capacity. On March

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22, 2001, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo appointed, ad interim, 001, and other pertinent administrative and civil service laws, rules
Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman together with other commisioners and regulations.
in an ad interim appointment.
During the pendency of her complaint before the Law Department,
In his capacity as COMELEC Chairman, Benipayo issued a petitioner filed the instant petition questioning the appointment and
Memorandum dated April 11, 2001 addressed to petitioner as the right to remain in office of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as
Director IV of the EID and to Cinco as Director III also of the EID, Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC, respectively.
designating Cinco Officer-in-Charge of the EID and reassigning Petitioner claims that the ad interim appointments of Benipayo,
petitioner to the Law Department. COMELEC EID Commissioner-in- Borra and Tuason violate the constitutional provisions on the
Charge Mehol K. Sadain objected to petitioner’s reassignment in a independence of the COMELEC.
Memorandum dated April 14, 2001 addressed to the COMELEC en
banc. Specifically, Commissioner Sadain questioned Benipayo’s ISSUES: Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo,
failure to consult the Commissioner-in-Charge of the EID in the Borra and Tuason on the basis of the ad interim appointments issued
reassignment of petitioner. by the President amounts to a temporary appointment prohibited by
Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.
Petitioner requested Benipayo to reconsider her relief as Director IV
of the EID and her reassignment to the Law Department. RULING: We find petitioner’s argument without merit. An ad
interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes
Petitioner cited Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 7 effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President
dated April 10, 2001, reminding heads of government offices that once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is
"transfer and detail of employees are prohibited during the election subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does
period beginning January 2 until June 13, 2001." Benipayo denied not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an
her request for reconsideration on April 18, 2001, citing COMELEC ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it
Resolution No. 3300 dated November 6, 2000, Exempting the effective until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or
Comelec from the coverage of the said memo circular. until the next adjournment of Congress.

Petitioner appealed the denial of her request for reconsideration to ESTARIJA v. RANADA
the COMELEC en banc in a Memorandum dated April 23, 2001. FACTS: Respondent, On August 10, 1998, respondent Edward F.
Petitioner also filed an administrative and criminal complaint with the Ranada, a member of the Davao Pilots Association, Inc. (DPAI) and
Law Department against Benipayo, alleging that her reassignment Davao Tugboat and Allied Services, Inc., (DTASI) filed an
violated Section 261 (h) of the Omnibus Election Code, COMELEC administrative complaint for Gross Misconduct before the Office of
Resolution No. 3258, Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 07, s. the Ombudsman-Mindanao, against petitioner Captain Edgardo V.
Estarija, Harbor Master of the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA), Port

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of Davao, Sasa, Davao City. The complaint alleged that Estarija, who misconduct. Estarija seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration.
as Harbor Master issues the necessary berthing permit for all ships Estarija claimed that dismissal was unconstitutional since the
that dock in the DavaoPort, had been demanding money ranging Ombudsman did not have direct and immediate power to remove
from P200 to P2000 for the approval and issuance of berthing government officials, whether elective or appointive, who are not
permits, and P5000 as monthly contribution from the DPAI. The removable by impeachment. He maintains that under the 1987
complaint alleged that prior to August 6, 1998, in order to stop the Constitution, the Ombudsman’s administrative authority is merely
mulcting and extortion activities of Estarija, the association reported recommendatory, and that Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known
Estarija’s activities to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). On as "The Ombudsman Act of 1989", is unconstitutional because it
August 6, 1998, the NBI caught Estarija in possession of the P5,000 gives the Office of the Ombudsman additional powers that are not
marked money used by the NBI to entrap Estarija. Consequently, the provided for in the Constitution. The Ombudsman denied the motion
Ombudsman ordered petitioner’s preventive suspension and directed for reconsideration in an Order dated October 31, 2000. Thus,
him to answer the complaint. The Ombudsman filed a criminal case Estarija filed a Petition for Review with urgent prayer for the
against Estarija for violation of Republic Act No. 3019, The Anti-Graft issuance of a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary
and Corrupt Practices Act ,before the Regional Trial Court of Davao prohibitory injunction before the Court of Appeals. The Court of
City, Branch No. 8.In his counter-affidavit and supplemental counter- Appeals, on February 12, 2003, dismissed the petition and affirmed
affidavit, petitioner denied demanding sums of money for the Ombudsman’s decision. In his petition for review on certiorari,
the approval of berthing permits. He claimed that Adrian Cagata, an Estarija contends that he cannot be liable for grave misconduct
employee of the DPAI, called to inform him that the DPAI had because he did not commit extortion as he was merely prodded by
payables to the PPA, and although he went to the association’s Adrian Cagata, an employee of the DPAI, to receive the money and
office, he was hesitant to get the P5,000 from Cagata because the that it makes no sense why he would extort money in consideration
association had no pending transaction with the PPA. Estarija of the issuance of berthing permits since the signing of berthing
claimed that Cagata made him believe that the money was a partial permits is only ministerial on his part. He also maintains that Rep.
remittance to the PPA of the pilotage fee for July 1998 representing Act No. 6770 is unconstitutional because the Ombudsman has only
10% of the monthly gross revenue of their association. Nonetheless, the powers enumerated under Section 13, Article XI of the
he received the money but assured Cagata that he would send an Constitution, which powers do not include the power to directly
official receipt the following day. He claimed that the entrapment remove, suspend,
and the subsequent filing of the complaint were part of a conspiracy demote, fine, or censure a government official. According to him, the
to exact personal vengeance against him on account of Ranada’s Ombudsman’s power is merely to recommend the action to the
business losses occasioned by the cancellation of the latter’s sub- officer concerned. The Solicitor General maintains otherwise, arguing
agency agreement with Asia Pacific Chartering Phil., Inc., which was that the framers of the 1987 Constitution did not intend to spell out,
eventually awarded to a shipping agency managed by Estarija’s son. restrictively, each act which the Ombudsman may or may not do,
On August 31, 2000, the Ombudsman rendered a decision in the since the purpose of the Constitution is to provide simplya
administrative case, finding Estarija guilty of dishonesty and grave framework within which to build the institution.

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Issue No.1: Whether or not there is substantial evidence to hold suspend any officer under his authority pending an investigation
Estarija liable for dishonesty and grave misconduct when the case so warrants. He was likewise given disciplinary
The petition is DENIED. Estarija is liable for dishonesty and grave authority over all elective and appointive officials of the government
misconduct. Estarija did not deny that he went to the DPAI office to and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies except members
collect, and that he actually received, the money which he of Congress and the Judiciary (Ledesma v. Court of Appeals)
demanded from the DPAI as monthly contribution. Since there was The Constitution does not restrict the powers of the Ombudsman in
no pending transaction between the PPA and the DPAI, he had no Section 13, Article XI of the 1987Constitution, but allows the
reason to go to the latter’s office to collect any money. Even if he Legislature to enact a law that would spell out the powers of the
was authorized to assist in the collection of money due the agency, Ombudsman. Through the enactment of Rep. Act No.
he should have issued an official receipt for the transaction, but he 6770,specifically Section 15, par. 3, the lawmakers gave the
did not do so. Patently, petitioner had been dishonest about Ombudsman such powers to sanction erring officials and employees,
accepting money from DPAI. Misconduct is a transgression of some except members of Congress, and the Judiciary. Sections 15, 21, 22
established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful and 25 of Republic Act No. 6770 are constitutionally sound. The
behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. And when the powers of the Ombudsman are not merely recommendatory. His
elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant office was given teeth to render this constitutional body not merely
disregard of established rule are manifest, the public officer shall be functional but also effective. Thus, we hold that under Republic Act
liable for grave misconduct. No. 6770 and the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman has the
Issue No.2: Whether or not the power of the Ombudsman to constitutional power to directly remove from government service an
directly remove, suspend, demote, fine, or censure erring officials is erring public official other than a member of Congress and the
constitutional Rep. Act No. 6770 provides for the functional and Judiciary.
structural organization of the Office of the Ombudsman. In passing
Rep. Act No.6770, Congress deliberately endowed the Ombudsman PLANTERS PRODUCTS v. FERTIPHIL CORPORATION
with the power to prosecute offenses committed by public officers Lessons Applicable: Bet. private and public suit, easier to file public
and employees to make him a more active and effective agent of the suit, Apply real party in interest test for private suit and direct injury
people in ensuring accountability in public office. Moreover, the test for public suit, Validity test varies depending on which inherent
legislature has vested the Ombudsman with broad powers to enable power
him to implement his own actions.
Rep. Act No. 6770 is consistent with the intent of the framers of the FACTS:
1987 Constitution. They gave Congress the discretion to give the President Ferdinand Marcos, exercising his legislative powers, issued
Ombudsman powers that are not merely persuasive in character. LOI No. 1465 which provided, among others, for the imposition of a
Thus, in addition to the power of the Ombudsman to prosecute and capital recovery component (CRC) on the domestic sale of all grades
conduct investigations, the lawmakers intended to provide the of fertilizers which resulted in having Fertiphil paying P 10/bag sold
Ombudsman with the power to punish for contempt and preventively to the Fertilizer and Perticide Authority (FPA).

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that locus standi may be waived in the public interest such as cases
FPA remits its collection to Far East Bank and Trust Company who of transcendental importance or with far-reaching implications
applies to the payment of corporate debts of Planters Products Inc. whether private or public suit, Fertiphil has locus standi.
(PPI) 2. As a seller, it bore the ultimate burden of paying the levy which
made its products more expensive and harm its business. It is also
After the Edsa Revolution, FPA voluntarily stopped the imposition of of paramount public importance since it involves the constitutionality
the P10 levy. Upon return of democracy, Fertiphil demanded a of a tax law and use of taxes for public purpose.
refund but PPI refused. Fertiphil filed a complaint for collection and 3. Yes. Police power and the power of taxation are inherent powers
damages against FPA and PPI with the RTC on the ground that LOI of the state but distinct and have different tests for validity. Police
No. 1465 is unjust, unreaonable oppressive, invalid and unlawful power is the power of the state to enact the legislation that may
resulting to denial of due process of law. interfere with personal liberty on property in order to promote
FPA answered that it is a valid exercise of the police power of the general welfare. While, the power of taxation is the power to levy
state in ensuring the stability of the fertilizing industry in the country taxes as to be used for public purpose. The main purpose of police
and that Fertiphil did NOT sustain damages since the burden power is the regulation of a behavior or conduct, while taxation is
imposed fell on the ultimate consumers. revenue generation. The lawful subjects and lawful means tests are
RTC and CA favored Fertiphil holding that it is an exercise of the used to determine the validity of a law enacted under the police
power of taxation ad is as such because it is NOT for public purpose power. The power of taxation, on the other hand, is circumscribed
as PPI is a private corporation. by inherent and constitutional limitations.
In this case, it is for purpose of revenue. But it is a robbery for the
ISSUE: State to tax the citizen and use the funds generation for a private
1.W/N Fertiphil has locus standi purpose. Public purpose does NOT only pertain to those purpose
2. W/N LOI No. 1465 is an invalid exercise of the power of taxation which are traditionally viewed as essentially governmental function
rather the police power such as building roads and delivery of basic services, but also
includes those purposes designed to promote social justice. Thus,
Held: public money may now be used for the relocation of illegal settlers,
1. Yes. In private suits, locus standi requires a litigant to be a "real low-cost housing and urban or agrarian reform.
party in interest" or party who stands to be benefited or injured by
the judgment in the suit. In public suits, there is the right of the
ordinary citizen to petition the courts to be freed from unlawful TARROSA v SINGSON
government intrusion and illegal official action subject to the direct Appointing Power, Commission on
injury test or where there must be personal and substantial interest Appointments, Confirmation Power
in the case such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as
a result. Being a mere procedural technicality, it has also been held

Constitutional Law 1 Case digest Compiled by: Justice “merzy” Page 28


FACTS: Gabriel C. Singson was appointed Governor of the Bangko
Sentral by President Fidel V. Ramos in 1993. Jesus Armando Tarrosa,
as a "taxpayer", filed a petition for prohibition questioning the
appointment of Singson for not having been confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments as required by the provisions of
Section 6 of R.A. No. 7653, which established the Bangko Sentral as
the Central Monetary Authority of the Philippines. The Secretary of
Budget and Management was impleaded for disbursing public funds
in payment of the salaries and emoluments of respondent
Singson. In their comment, respondents claim that Congress
exceeded its legislative powers in requiring the confirmation by the
CA of the appointment of the Governor of the Bangko Sentral. They
contend that an appointment to the said position is not among the
appointments which have to be confirmed by the CA, citing Section
16 of Article VI of the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Governor of the BSP is subject to COA’s


confirmation.

HELD: No. Congress exceeded its legislative powers in requiring the


confirmation by the COA of the appointment of the Governor of the
BSP. An appointment to the said position is not among the
appointments which have to be confirmed by the COA under Section
16 of Article 7 of the Constitution. Congress cannot by law expand
the confirmation powers of the Commission on Appointments and
require confirmation of appointment of other government officials
not expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article
7 of the Constitution.

Constitutional Law 1 Case digest Compiled by: Justice “merzy” Page 29