TAWANG MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE Petitioner,

vs.
LA TRINIDAD WATER DISTRICT, Respondent.

Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative (TMPC) is a cooperative, registered with the

Cooperative Development Authority, and organized to provide domestic water services in
Barangay Tawang, La Trinidad, Benguet.

La Trinidad Water District (LTWD) is a local water utility created under Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 198, as amended. It is authorized to supply water for domestic, industrial
and commercial purposes within the municipality of La Trinidad, Benguet.

On 9 October 2000, TMPC filed with the National Water Resources Board (NWRB) an
application for a certificate of public convenience (CPC) to operate and maintain a
waterworks system in Barangay Tawang. LTWD opposed TMPC’s application. LTWD
claimed that, under Section 47 of PD No. 198, as amended, its franchise is exclusive.
Section 47 states that:

LTWD appealed to the RTC. RTC granted their petition.

TMPC raises as issue that the RTC erred in holding that Section 47 of PD No. 198, as
amended, is valid.

"What one cannot do directly, he cannot do indirectly."

Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states that:

No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public
utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or
associations organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of
whose capital is owned by such citizens, nor shall such franchise, certificate or
authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. (Emphasis
supplied)

When the law is clear, there is nothing for the courts to do but to apply it. The duty of the
Court is to apply the law the way it is worded

“We cannot see any room for interpretation or construction in the clear and unambiguous
language of the above-quoted provision of law. This Court had steadfastly adhered to
the doctrine that its first and fundamental duty is the application of the law
according to its express terms, interpretation being called for only when such literal
application is impossible. No process of interpretation or construction need be resorted to
where a provision of law peremptorily calls for application. Where a requirement or
condition is made in explicit and unambiguous terms, no discretion is left to the
judiciary. It must see to it that its mandate is obeyed."

Indeed, the President, Congress and the Court cannot create directly franchises that are
exclusive in character. What the President, Congress and the Court cannot legally do
directly they cannot do indirectly. Thus, the President, Congress and the Court cannot
create indirectly franchises that are exclusive in character by allowing the Board of
Directors (BOD) of a water district and the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) to
create franchises that are exclusive in character.
In PD No. 198, as amended, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos)
created indirectly franchises that are exclusive in character by allowing the BOD of LTWD
and the LWUA to create directly franchises that are exclusive in character. Section 47 of
PD No. 198, as amended, allows the BOD and the LWUA to create directly franchises that
are exclusive in character. Section 47 states:

In case of conflict between the Constitution and a statute, the Constitution always prevails
because the Constitution is the basic law to which all other laws must conform to. The
duty of the Court is to uphold the Constitution and to declare void all laws that do not
conform to it.

"The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other
laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be determined
and all public authority administered. Laws that do not conform to the Constitution shall be
stricken down for being unconstitutional."

provision must be deemed void ab initio for being irreconcilable with Article XIV,
Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution which was ratified on January 17, 1973 — the
constitution in force when P.D. 198 was issued on May 25, 1973

The dissenting opinion states two "reasonable and legitimate grounds" for the creation of
exclusive franchise: (1) protection of "the government’s investment,"35 and (2) avoidance
of "a situation where ruinous competition could compromise the supply of public utilities in
poor and remote areas."

Any act, however noble its intentions, is void if it violates the Constitution

Police power does not include the power to violate the Constitution. Police power is the
plenary power vested in Congress to make laws not repugnant to the Constitution.

Petition granted and NWRB decision reinstated.

AURELIO M. UMALI, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JULIUS CESAR V. VERGARA, and THE CITY
GOVERNMENT OF CABANATUAN, Respondents.

On July 11, 2011, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cabanatuan City passed Resolution
No. 183-2011, requesting the President to declare the conversion of Cabanatuan City
from a component city of the province of Nueva Ecija into a highly urbanized city (HUC).
Acceding to the request, the President issued Presidential Proclamation No. 418, Series
of 2012, proclaiming the City of Cabanatuan as an HUC subject to "ratification in a
plebiscite by the qualified voters therein, as provided for in Section 453 of the Local
Government Code of 1991.

Respondent COMELEC, acting on the proclamation, issued the assailed Minute

Resolution

WHEREFORE, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, that for purposes

of the plebiscite for the conversion of Cabanatuan City from component city to
highly-urbanized city, only those registered residents of Cabanatuan City should
participate in the said plebiscite.

In due time, petitioner Aurelio M. Umali, Governor of Nueva Ecija, filed a Verified Motion
for Reconsideration, maintaining that the proposed conversion in question will necessarily
and directly affect the mother province of Nueva Ecija. His main argument is that Section
453 of the LGC should be interpreted in conjunction with Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution.
He argues that while the conversion in question does not involve the creation of a new or
the dissolution of an existing city, the spirit of the Constitutional provision calls for the
people of the local government unit (LGU) directly affected to vote in a plebiscite
whenever there is a material change in their rights and responsibilities. The phrase
"qualified voters therein" used in Sec. 453 of the LGC should then be interpreted to refer
to the qualified voters of the units directly affected by the conversion and not just those in
the component city proposed to be upgraded. Petitioner Umali justified his position by
enumerating the various adverse effects of the Cabanatuan City’s conversion and how it
will cause material change not only in the political and economic rights of the city and its
residents but also of the province as a whole.

To the Verified Motion for Reconsideration, private respondent Julius Cesar Vergara, city
mayor of Cabanatuan, interposed an opposition on the ground that Sec. 10, Art. X does
not apply to conversions, which is the meat of the matter. He likewise argues that a
specific provision of the LGC, Sec. 453, as couched, allows only the qualified voters of
Cabanatuan City to vote in the plebiscite.

COMELEC denied Umali’s motion for reconsideration and scheduled the plebiscite.

public respondent COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General, maintained in its
Comment that Cabanatuan City is merely being converted from a component city into an
HUC and that the political unit directly affected by the conversion will only be the city itself.
It argues that in this instance, no political unit will be created, merged with another, or will
be removed from another LGU, and that no boundaries will be altered.

whether the qualified registered voters of the entire province of Nueva Ecija or only those
in Cabanatuan City can participate in the plebiscite called for the conversion of
Cabanatuan City from a component city into an HUC.

Sec. 453 of the LGC should be interpreted in accordance with Sec. 10, Art. X of the
Constitution

Section 10, Article X. – No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created,

divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance
with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. (emphasis
supplied)

Section 453. Duty to Declare Highly Urbanized Status. – It shall be the duty of the
President to declare a city as highly urbanized within thirty (30) days after it shall have met
the minimum requirements prescribed in the immediately preceding Section, upon proper
application therefor and ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein.
(emphasis supplied)

With the twin criteria of standard and plebiscite satisfied, the delegation to LGUs of the
power to create, divide, merge, abolish or substantially alter boundaries has become a
recognized exception to the doctrine of non-delegation of legislative powers.

True enough, Congress delegated such power to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan or

Sangguniang Panlungsod to create barangays pursuant to Sec. 6 of the LGC, which
provides:

Section 6. Authority to Create Local Government Units. - A local government unit may be
created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundaries substantially altered either by law
enacted by Congress in the case of a province, city, municipality, or any other political
subdivision, or by ordinance passed by the sangguniang panlalawigan or sangguniang
panlungsod concerned in the case of a barangay located within its territorial jurisdiction,
subject to such limitations and requirements prescribed in this Code." (emphasis supplied)

Likewise, legislative power was delegated to the President under Sec. 453 of the LGC
quoted earlier, which states:

Section 453. Duty to Declare Highly Urbanized Status. – It shall be the duty of the
President to declare a city as highly urbanized within thirty (30) days after it shall have met
the minimum requirements prescribed in the immediately preceding Section, upon proper
application therefor and ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein.

Hornbook doctrine is that neither the legislative, the executive, nor the judiciary has the
power to act beyond the Constitution’s mandate. The Constitution is supreme; any
exercise of power beyond what is circumscribed by the Constitution is ultra vires and a
nullity.

Where the assailed legislative or executive act is found by the judiciary to be contrary to
the Constitution, it is null and void. As the new Civil Code puts it: "When the courts declare
a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall
govern." Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when
they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. The above provision of the civil Code
reflects the orthodox view that an unconstitutional act, whether legislative or executive, is
not a law, confers no rights, imposes no duties, and affords no protection.

Applying this orthodox view, a law should be construed in harmony with and not in
violation of the Constitution.

In a long line of cases, the cardinal principle of construction established is that a statute
should be interpreted to assure its being in consonance with, rather than repugnant to,
any constitutional command or prescription. If there is doubt or uncertainty as to the
16

meaning of the legislative, if the words or provisions are obscure or if the enactment is
fairly susceptible of two or more constitution, that interpretation which will avoid the effect
of unconstitutionality will be adopted, even though it may be necessary, for this purpose,
to disregard the more usual or apparent import of the language used

operative fact doctrine―that “the actual existence of a statute prior to such a

determination is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be
erased by a new judicial declaration.”

In cutting the umbilical cord between Cabanatuan City and the province of Nueva Ecija,
the city will be separated from the territorial jurisdiction of the province, as earlier
explained. The provincial government will no longer be responsible for delivering basic
services for the city residents’ benefit.

Respondents’ apprehension that requiring the entire province to participate in the

plebiscite will set a dangerous precedent leading to the failure of cities to convert is
unfounded. Their fear that provinces will always be expected to oppose the conversion in
order to retain the city’s dependence is speculative at best. In any event, any vote of
disapproval cast by those directly affected by the conversion is a valid exercise of their
right to suffrage, and our democratic processes are designed to uphold the decision of the
majority, regardless of the motive behind the vote. It is unfathomable how the province
can be deprived of the opportunity to exercise the right of suffrage in a matter that is
potentially deleterious to its economic viability and could diminish the rights of its
constituents. To limit the plebiscite to only the voters of the areas to be partitioned and
seceded from the province is as absurd and illogical as allowing only the secessionists to
vote for the secession that they demanded against the wishes of the majority and to nullify
the basic principle of majority rule.

Substantially alter territory, economic and political rights

Ordillo v. COMELEC

The question raised in this petition is whether or not the province of Ifugao, being
the only province which voted favorably for the creation of the Cordillera
Autonomous Region can, alone, legally and validly constitute such Region.
The antecedent facts that gave rise to this petition are as follows:
On January 30, 1990, the people of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province,
Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their votes in a
plebiscite held pursuant to Republic Act No. 6766 entitled "An Act Providing for an
Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region."
The official Commission on Elections (COMELEC) results of the plebiscite showed
that the creation of the Region was approved by a majority of 5,889 votes in only
the Ifugao Province and was overwhelmingly rejected by 148,676 votes in the rest
of the provinces and city above-mentioned.
Consequently, the COMELEC, on February 14, 1990, issued Resolution No. 2259
stating that the Organic Act for the Region has been approved and/or ratified by
majority of the votes cast only in the province of Ifugao. On the same date, the
Secretary of Justice issued a memorandum for the President reiterating the
COMELEC resolution and provided:
". . . [A]nd considering the proviso in Sec. 13(A) that only the provinces and city
voting favorably shall be included in the CAR, the province of Ifugao being the only
province which voted favorably — then, alone, legally and validly constitutes the
CAR." (Rollo, p. 7)
As a result of this, on March 8, 1990, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6861
setting the elections in the Cordillera Autonomous Region of Ifugao on the first
Monday of March 1991. : nad

Even before the issuance of the COMELEC resolution, the Executive Secretary on
February 5, 1990 issued a Memorandum granting authority to wind up the affairs of
the Cordillera Executive Board and the Cordillera Regional Assembly created under
Executive Order No. 220.
On March 9, 1990, the petitioner filed a petition with COMELEC to declare the
non-ratification of the Organic Act for the Region. The COMELEC merely noted said
petition.
On March 30, 1990, the President issued Administrative Order No. 160 declaring
among others that the Cordillera Executive Board and Cordillera Regional Assembly
and all the offices created under Executive Order No. 220 were abolished in view of
the ratification of the Organic Act.- nad

The petitioners maintain that there can be no valid Cordillera Autonomous Region in
only one province as the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 require that the
said Region be composed of more than one constituent unit.
The petitioners, then, pray that the Court: (1) declare null and void COMELEC
resolution No. 2259, the memorandum of the Secretary of Justice, the
memorandum of the Executive Secretary, Administrative Order No. 160, and
Republic Act No. 6861 and prohibit and restrain the respondents from implementing
the same and spending public funds for the purpose and (2) declare Executive Order
No. 220 constituting the Cordillera Executive Board and the Cordillera Regional
Assembly and other offices to be still in force and effect until another organic law for
the Autonomous Region shall have been enacted by Congress and the same is duly
ratified by the voters in the constituent units. We treat the Comments of the
respondents as an answer and decide the case.
This petition is meritorious.
The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous
Region.
It is explicit in Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution that:
"Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao
and in the Cordillera consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities and
geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural
heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics
within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as
well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines." (Emphasis
Supplied)
The keywords — provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas connote
that "region" is to be made up of more than one constituent unit. The term "region"
used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces. This is supported by the
fact that the thirteen (13) regions into which the Philippines is divided for
administrative purposes are groupings of contiguous provinces. (Integrated
Reorganization Plan (1972), which was made as part of the law of the land by P.D.
No. 1; P.D. No. 742) Ifugao is a province by itself. To become part of a region, it
must join other provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas. It joins
other units because of their common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage,
economic and social structures and other relevant characteristics. The
Constitutional requirements are not present in this case. - nad

The well-established rule in statutory construction that the language of the

Constitution, as much as possible should be understood in the sense it has in
common use and that the words used in constitutional provisions are to be given
their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed, must then, be
applied in this case. (See Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 757, 770, [1988]; J.M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413, 422-423 [1970]).
Aside from the 1987 Constitution, a reading of the provisions of Republic Act No.
6766 strengthens the petitioner's position that the Region cannot be constituted
from only one province.
Article III, Sections 1 and 2 of the Statute provide that the Cordillera Autonomous
Region is to be administered by the Cordillera government consisting of the
Regional Government and local government units. It further provides that:
"SECTION 2. The Regional Government shall exercise powers and functions
necessary for the proper governance and development of all provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangay or ili within the Autonomous Region . . ."
From these sections, it can be gleaned that Congress never intended that a single
province may constitute the autonomous region. Otherwise, we would be faced with
the absurd situation of having two sets of officials, a set of provincial officials and
another set of regional officials exercising their executive and legislative powers
over exactly the same small area.
Article V, Sections 1 and 4 of Republic Act 6766 vest the legislative power in the
Cordillera Assembly whose members shall be elected from regional assembly
districts apportioned among provinces and the cities composing the Autonomous
Region. cha nrob les vi rtual law lib rary

If we follow the respondent's position, the members of such Cordillera Assembly

shall then be elected only from the province of Ifugao creating an awkward
predicament of having two legislative bodies — the Cordillera Assembly and the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan — exercising their legislative powers over the province
of Ifugao. And since Ifugao is one of the smallest provinces in the Philippines,
population-wise, it would have too many government officials for so few people. :-cralaw

Article XII, Section 10 of the law creates a Regional Planning and Development
Board composed of the Cordillera Governor, all the provincial governors and city
mayors or their representatives, two members of the Cordillera Assembly, and
members representing the private sector. The Board has a counterpart in the
provincial level called the Provincial Planning and Development Coordinator. The
Board's functions (Article XII, Section 10, par. 2, Republic Act No. 6766) are almost
similar to those of the Provincial Coordinator's (Title Four, Chapter 3, Article 10,
Section 220 (4), Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 — Local Government Code). If it takes
only one person in the provincial level to perform such functions while on the other
hand it takes an entire Board to perform almost the same tasks in the regional level,
it could only mean that a larger area must be covered at the regional level. The
respondent's theory of the Autonomous Region being made up of a single province
must, therefore, fail.
Article XXI, Section 13 (B) (c) alloting the huge amount of Ten Million Pesos
(P10,000,000.00) to the Regional Government for its initial organizational
requirements cannot be construed as funding only a lone and small province.
These sections of Republic Act No. 6766 show that a one province Cordillera
Autonomous Region was never contemplated by the law creating it.
The province of Ifugao makes up only 11% of the total population of the areas
enumerated in Article I, Section 2 (b) of Republic Act No. 6766 which include
Benguet, Mountain Province, Abra, Kalinga-Apayao and Baguio City. It has the
second smallest number of inhabitants from among the provinces and city above
mentioned. The Cordillera population is distributed in round figures as follows: Abra,
185,000; Benguet, 486,000; Ifugao, 149,000; Kalinga-Apayao, 214,000; Mountain
Province, 116,000; and Baguio City, 183,000; Total population of these five
provinces and one city; 1,332,000 according to the 1990 Census (Manila Standard,
September 30, 1990, p. 14).
There are other provisions of Republic Act No. 6766 which are either violated or
which cannot be complied with. Section 16 of Article V calls for a Regional
Commission on Appointments with the Speaker as Chairman and are (6) members
coming from different provinces and cities in the Region. Under the respondents'
view, the Commission would have a Chairman and only one member. It would never
have a quorum. Section 3 of Article VI calls for cabinet members, as far as
practicable, to come from various provinces and cities of the Region. Section 1 of
Article VII creates a system of tribal courts for the various indigenous cultural
communities of the Region. Section 9 of Article XV requires the development of a
common regional language based upon the various languages and dialects in the
region which regional language in turn is expected to enrich the national language.
The entirety of Republic Act No. 6766 creating the Cordillera Autonomous Region is
infused with provisions which rule against the sole province of Ifugao constituting
the Region.:-cralaw

To contemplate the situation envisioned by the respondent would not only violate
the letter and intent of the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 but would also be
impractical and illogical.
Our decision in Abbas, et al. v. COMELEC, (G.R. No. 89651, November 10, 1969), is
not applicable in the case at bar contrary to the view of the Secretary of Justice.
The Abbas case laid down the rate on the meaning of majority in the phrase "by
majority of the votes cast by the constituent units called for the purpose" found in
the Constitution, Article X, Section 18. It stated:
x x x
". . . [I]t is thus clear that what is required by the Constitution is simple
majority of votes approving the Organic Act in individual constituent units
and not a double majority of the votes in all constituent units put together,
as well as in the individual constituent units."
This was the pronouncement applied by the Secretary of Justice in arriving at his
conclusion stated in his Memorandum for the President that:
x x x
". . . [i]t is believed that the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region
(CAR) as mandated by R.A. No. 6766 became effective upon its approval by
the majority of the votes cast in the province of Ifugao. And considering the
proviso in Section 13 (a) that only the provinces and city voting favorably
shall be included in the CAR, the province of Ifugao being the only province
which voted favorably — can, alone, legally and validly constitute the CAR."
(Rollo. p. 40).
The plebiscites mandated by the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 for the
Cordillera and Republic Act No. 6734 for the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao determine — (1) whether there shall be an autonomous region in the
Cordillera and in Muslim Mindanao and (2) which provinces and cities, among those
enumerated in the two Republic Acts, shall comprise said Autonomous Regions.
(See III, Record of the Constitutional Commission, 487-492 [1986]).
The Abbas case established the rule to follow on which provinces and cities shall
comprise the autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao which is, consequently, the
same rule to follow with regard to the autonomous region in the Cordillera. However,
there is nothing in the Abbas decision which deals with the issue on whether an
autonomous region, in either Muslim Mindanao or Cordillera could exist despite the
fact that only one province or one city is to constitute it.
chanrob les vi rtual law lib rary

Stated in another way, the issue in this case is whether the sole province of Ifugao
can validly and legally constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region. The issue is not
whether the province of Ifugao is to be included in the Cordillera Autonomous
Region. It is the first issue which the Court answers in the instant case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Resolution No. 2259 of the
Commission on Elections, insofar as it upholds the creation of an autonomous region,
the February 14, 1990 memorandum of the Secretary of Justice, the February 5,
1990 memorandum of the Executive Secretary, Administrative Order No. 160, and
Republic Act No. 6861 are declared null and void while Executive Order No. 220 is
declared to be still in force and effect until properly repealed or amended.
SO ORDERED.