Page 1 of 84

petitioners’ moves as vigilance in preserving the rule of law, a careful perusal of their
D. JUDICIARY petitions would reveal that they cannot hurdle the bar of justiciability set by the Court before
it will assume jurisdiction over cases involving constitutional disputes.
The Court’s power of review may be awesome, but it is limited to actual cases and
1. G.R. No. 187883 June 16, 2009
controversies dealing with parties having adversely legal claims, to be exercised after full
ATTY. OLIVER O. LOZANO and ATTY. EVANGELINE J. LOZANO-
opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question
ENDRIANO,Petitioners,
raised or the very lis mota presented. The “case-or-controversy” requirement bans this court
– versus –
from deciding “abstract, hypothetical or contingent questions,” lest the court give opinions in
SPEAKER PROSPERO C. NOGRALES, Representative, Majority, House of
the nature of advice concerning legislative or executive action
Representatives, Respondents
x – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – x
An aspect of the “case-or-controversy” requirement is the requisite of “ripeness.” In the
G.R. No. 187910
United States, courts are centrally concerned with whether a case involves uncertain
LOUIS “BAROK” C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner
contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.
– versus
Another approach is the evaluation of the twofold aspect of ripeness: first, the fitness of the
SPEAKER PROSPERO C. NOGRALES, Speaker of the House of Representatives,
issues for judicial decision; and second, the hardship to the parties entailed by withholding
Congress of the Philippines, Respondents.
court consideration. In our jurisdiction, the issue of ripeness is generally treated in terms of
actual injury to the plaintiff. Hence, a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being
Facts: The two petitions, filed by their respective petitioners in their capacities as concerned
challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. An alternative
citizens and taxpayers, prayed for the nullification of House Resolution No. 1109 entitled “A
road to review similarly taken would be to determine whether an action has already been
Resolution Calling upon the Members of Congress to Convene for the Purpose of
accomplished or performed by a branch of government before the courts may step in.
Considering Proposals to Amend or Revise the Constitution, Upon a Three-fourths Vote of
All the Members of Congress,” convening the Congress into a Constituent Assembly to
In the present case, the fitness of petitioners’ case for the exercise of judicial review is grossly
amend the 1987 Constitution. In essence, both petitions seek to trigger a justiciable
lacking. In the first place, petitioners have not sufficiently proven any adverse injury or
controversy that would warrant a definitive interpretation by this Court of Section 1, Article
hardship from the act complained of. In the second place, House Resolution No. 1109 only
XVII, which provides for the procedure for amending or revising the Constitution. The
resolved that the House of Representatives shall convene at a future time for the purpose of
petitioners contend that the House Resolution contradicts the procedures set forth by the
proposing amendments or revisions to the Constitution. No actual convention has yet
1987 Constitution regarding the amendment or revision of the same as the separate voting of
transpired and no rules of procedure have yet been adopted. More importantly, no proposal
the members of each House (the Senate and the House of Representatives) is deleted and
has yet been made, and hence, no usurpation of power or gross abuse of discretion has yet
substituted with a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of Congress (i.e., ¾ of the
taken place. In short, House Resolution No. 1109 involves a quintessential example of an
“members of Congress” without distinction as to which institution of Congress they belong
uncertain contingent future event that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur
to).
at all. The House has not yet performed a positive act that would warrant an intervention
from this Court.
Issue:
Whether the court has the power to review the case of the validity of House Resolution No.
As in the case of Tan v. Macapagal, as long as any proposed amendment is still unacted on by
1109.
it, there is no room for the interposition of judicial oversight. Only after it has made concrete
Held:
what it intends to submit for ratification may the appropriate case be instituted. Until then,
the courts are devoid of jurisdiction
No. The Supreme Court cannot indulge petitioners’ supplications. While some may interpret

A party will be allowed to litigate only when he can demonstrate that (1) he has personally
suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is
likely to be redressed by the remedy being sought. In the cases at bar, petitioners have not
shown the elemental injury in fact that would endow them with the standing to sue. Locus
standi requires a personal stake in the outcome of a controversy for significant reasons. It
assures adverseness and sharpens the presentation of issues for the illumination of the Court
in resolving difficult constitutional questions. The lack of petitioners’ personal stake in this
case is no more evident than in Lozano’s three-page petition that is devoid of any legal or
jurisprudential basis.
Neither can the lack of locus standi be cured by the claim of petitioners that they are
instituting the cases at bar as taxpayers and concerned citizens. A taxpayer’s suit requires
that the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived
from taxation. It is undisputed that there has been no allocation or disbursement of public
funds in this case as of yet.
The possible consequence of House Resolution No. 1109 is yet unrealized and does not infuse
petitioners with locus standi
The rule on locus standi is not a plain procedural rule but a constitutional requirement
derived from Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, which mandates courts of justice to
settle only “actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable.”
Moreover, while the Court has taken an increasingly liberal approach to the rule of locus
standi, evolving from the stringent requirements of “personal injury” to the broader
“transcendental importance” doctrine, such liberality is not to be abused. It is not an open
invitation for the ignorant and the ignoble to file petitions that prove nothing but their
cerebral deficit.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions are dismissed.
2. JELBERT B. GALICTO v. H.E. PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III,
ATTY. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. and FLORENCIO B. ABAD
G.R. No. 193978, 28 February 2012, EN BANC (Brion, J.)
Page 2 of 84
Pres. Aquino made public in his first State of the Nation Address the alleged excessive
allowances, bonuses and other benefits of Officers and Members of the Board of Directors of
the Manila Waterworks and Sewerage System a government owned and controlled
corporation (GOCC) which has been unable to meet its standing obligations. Subsequently,
the Senate conducted an inquiry in aid of legislation on the reported excessive salaries,
allowances, and other benefits of GOCCs and government financial institutions (GFIs). Based
on its findings, officials and governing boards of various GOCCs and GFIs have been
granting themselves unwarranted allowances, bonuses, incentives, stock options, and other
benefits as well as other irregular and abusive practices. Consequently, the Senate issued
Senate Resolution No. 17 urging the President to order the immediate suspension of the
unusually large and apparently excessive allowances, bonuses, incentives and other perks of
members of the governing boards of GOCCs and GFIs. Heeding the call of Congress, Pres.
Aquino, on September 8, 2010, issued EO 7, entitled Directing the Rationalization of the
Compensation and Position Classification System in the GOCCs and GFIs, and for Other
Purposes. EO 7 provided for the guiding principles and framework to establish a fixed
compensation and position classification system for GOCCs and GFIs.
EO 7 was published and precluded the Board of Directors, Trustees and/or Officers of
GOCCs from granting and releasing bonuses and allowances to members of the board of
directors, and from increasing salary rates of and granting new or additional benefits and
allowances to their employees.
The respondents pointed out the following procedural defects as grounds for the petition's
dismissal: (1) the petitioner lacks locus standi; and (2) certiorari is not applicable to this case.
Meanwhile, on June 6, 2011, Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10149, otherwise
known as the GOCC Governance Act of 2011. Section 11 of RA 10149 expressly authorizes the
President to fix the compensation framework of GOCCs and GFIs.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner has locus standi.
RULING:
 Page 3 of 84

Petition is dismissed. Moldex, then sent Flora a Notarized Notice of Cancellation of Reservation Application and/or
Contract to Sell.9 Flora, on the other hand, filed before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in a
Board (HLURB) Regional Field Office IV a Complaint10 for the annulment of the contract to
case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
sell, recovery of all her payments with interests, damages, and the cancellation of Moldex’s
governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question on standing is whether a
license to sell. Flora alleged that the contract to sell between her and Moldex is void from its
party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
inception. According to Flora, Moldex violated Section 5 of Presidential Decree (PD) No.
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
95711 when it sold the subject lot to her on April 11, 1992 or before it was issued a license to
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
sell on September 8, 1992.12 Flora likewise claimed that Moldex violated Section 17 of the

In the present case, the petitioner has not demonstrated that he has a personal stake or same law because it failed to register the contract to sell in the Registry of Deeds.13In its

material interest in the outcome of the case because his interest, if any, is speculative and defense, Moldex exercised its right under Republic Act (RA) No. 6552,14 or the Maceda Law,

based on a mere expectancy. In this case, the curtailment of future increases in his salaries by cancelling the reservation Agreement/Contract to Sell and forfeiting all payments made.

and other benefits cannot but be characterized as contingent events or expectancies. To be Finally, Moldex alleged that since Flora was at fault, the latter cannot be heard to make an

sure, he has no vested rights to salary increases and, therefore, the absence of such right issue out of Moldex’s lack of license or demand relief from it.

deprives the petitioner of legal standing to assail EO 7.

the HLURB Arbiter declared as void the Contract to Sell entered into by the parties because

The petition has been mooted by supervening events. Moldex lacked the required license to sell at the time of the contract’s perfection, in violation
of Section 5 of PD 957.
Because of the transitory nature of EO 7, it has been pointed out that the present case has
already been rendered moot by the enactment of R.A. No. 10149 amending the provisions in Hence, Moldex was ordered to refund everything Flora had paid, plus legal interest, and to

the charters of GOCCs and GFIs empowering their board of directors/trustees to determine pay attorney’s fees. Moreover, Moldex was ordered to pay a fine for its violation of the above

their own compensation system, in favor of the grant of authority to the President to perform provision of PD 957

this act. With the enactment of the GOCC Governance Act of 2011, the President is now
In its Petition for Review18 before the HLURB Board of Commissioners (HLURB Board),
authorized to fix the compensation framework of GOCCs and GFIs.
Moldex argued that the absence of license at the time of the contract’s perfection does not
render it void
3.G.R. No.176289 April 8, 2013 MOLDEX REALTY, INC., Petitioner, vs. FLORA A.
SABERON, Respondent. the HLURB Board, in a Decision19 dated July 29, 1999, dismissed the petition and affirmed in
toto the Arbiter’s Decision. It held that the law is clear on the prerequisite of a license to sell
Facts: respondent Flora asked Moldex, to reserve the lot for her as shown by a Reservation
before a developer can sell lots. Since Moldex did not have a license to sell at the time it
Application6 Flora opted to pay on installment and began making a periodical payments
contracted to sell the subject lot to Flora, the Board agreed with the Arbiter in declaring the
Moldex sent Flora notices reminding her to update her account. Upon inquiry, however,
contract invalid and in ordering the refund of Flora’s payments. Moldex then appealed to the
Flora was shocked to find out that as of July 1996, she owed Moldex P247,969.10. Moldex
Office of the President (OP).20. the OP affirmed the finding that the contract to sell was a
thus suggested to Flora to execute a written authorization for the sale of the subject lot to a
nullity.
new buyer and a written request for refund so that she can get half of all payments she made.
However, Flora never made a written request for refund.

Moldex thus sought relief with the CA via a Petition for Review.23the CA agreed with the
findings of the tribunals. It ratiocinated that Moldex’s non-observance of the mandatory
provision of Section 5 of PD 957 rendered the contract to sell void, notwithstanding Flora’s
payments and her knowledge that Moldex did not at that time have the requisite license to
sell. It also held that the subsequent issuance by the HLURB of a license to sell in Moldex’s
favor did not cure the defect or result to the ratification of the contract.
Issue
Moldex only raises the matter of the validity of the contract to sell it entered with Flora,
contending that the same remains valid and binding.
Our Ruling
A review of the relevant provisions of P.D. 957 reveals that while the law penalizes the
selling of subdivision lots and condominium units without prior issuance of a Certificate of
Registration and License to Sell by the HLURB, it does not provide that the absence thereof
will automatically render a contract, otherwise validly entered, void. The penalty imposed by
the decree is the general penalty provided for the violation of any of its provisions. It is well-
settled in this jurisdiction that the clear language of the law shall prevail. This principle
particularly enjoins strict compliance with provisions of law which are penal in nature, or
when a penalty is provided for the violation thereof. With regard to P.D. 957, nothing therein
provides for the nullification of a contract to sell in the event that the seller, at the time the
contract was entered into, did not possess a certificate of registration and license to sell.
Absent any specific sanction pertaining to the violation of the questioned provisions (Secs. 4
and 5), the general penalties provided in the law shall be applied. The general penalties for
the violation of any provisions in P.D. 957 are provided for in Sections 38 and 39. As can
clearly be seen in the aforequoted provisions, the same do not include the nullification of
contracts that are otherwise validly entered.28
Thus, the contract to sell entered into between Flora and Moldex remains valid despite the
lack of license to sell on the part of the latter at the time the contract was entered into.
Moreover, Flora claims that the contract she entered into with Moldex is void because of the
latter’s failure to register the contract to sell/document of conveyance with the Register of
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Deeds, in violation of Section 1730 of PD 957. However, just like in Section 5 which did not
penalize the lack of a license to sell with the nullification of the contract, Section 17 similarly
did not mention that the developer’s or Moldex’s failure to register the contract to sell or
deed of conveyance with the Register of Deeds resulted to the nullification or invalidity of
the said contract or deed.
Under the Maceda Law, the defaulting buyer who has paid at least two years of installments
has the right of either to avail of the grace period to pay or, the cash surrender value of the
payments made:
4. ANTONIO M. SERRANO VS. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES, INC. AND
MARLOW NAVIGATION CO., INC.
GR No. 167614 - March 24, 2009 En banc
FACTS:
Petitioner Antonio Serrano was hired by respondents Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and
Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., under a POEA-approved contract of employment for 12
months, as Chief Officer, with the basic monthly salary of US$1,400, plus $700/month
overtime pay, and 7 days paid vacation leave per month.
On March 19, 1998, the date of his departure, Serrano was constrained to accept a
downgraded employment contract for the position of Second Officer with a monthly salary
of US$1,000 upon the assurance and representation of respondents that he would be Chief
Officer by the end of April 1998.
Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make Serrano Chief Officer. Hence, Serrano
refused to stay on as second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines on May 26, 1998,
serving only two (2) months and seven (7) days of his contract, leaving an unexpired portion
of nine (9) months and twenty-three (23) days.
Serrano filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint against respondents for constructive
dismissal and for payment of his money claims in the total amount of US$26,442.73 (based on

the computation of $2590/month from June 1998 to February 199, $413.90 for March 1998, and
$1640 for March 1999) as well as moral and exemplary damages.
The LA declared the petitioner's dismissal illegal and awarded him US$8,770, representing
his salaray for three (3) months of the unexpired portion of the aforesaid contract of
employment, plus $45 for salary differential and for attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the
total amount; however, no compensation for damages as prayed was awarded.
On appeal, the NLRC modified the LA decision and awarded Serrano $4669.50, representing
three (3) months salary at $1400/month, plus 445 salary differential and 10% for attorney's
fees. This decision was based on the provision of RA 8042, which was made into law on July
15, 1995.
Serrano filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he questioned the
constitutionality of the last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of RA 8042, which reads:
Sec. 10. Money Claims. - x x x In case of termination of overseas employment without just,
valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the
full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum,
plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months
for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.
The NLRC denied the Motion; hence, Serrano filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of
Appeals (CA), reiterating the constitutional challenge against the subject clause. The CA
affirmed the NLRC ruling on the reduction of the applicable salary rate, but skirted the
constitutional issue raised by herein petitioner Serrano.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the subject clause violates Section 10, Article III of the Constitution on non-
impairment of contracts;
2. Whether or not the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, and
Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII on labor as a protected sector.
Page 5 of 84
HELD:
On the first issue.
The answer is in the negative. Petitioner's claim that the subject clause unduly interferes with
the stipulations in his contract on the term of his employment and the fixed salary package he
will receive is not tenable.
Section 10, Article III of the Constitution provides: No law impairing the obligation of
contracts shall be passed.
The prohibition is aligned with the general principle that laws newly enacted have only a
prospective operation, and cannot affect acts or contracts already perfected; however, as to
laws already in existence, their provisions are read into contracts and deemed a part thereof.
Thus, the non-impairment clause under Section 10, Article II is limited in application to laws
about to be enacted that would in any way derogate from existing acts or contracts by
enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing the intention of the parties thereto.
As aptly observed by the OSG, the enactment of R.A. No. 8042 in 1995 preceded the
execution of the employment contract between petitioner and respondents in 1998. Hence, it
cannot be argued that R.A. No. 8042, particularly the subject clause, impaired the
employment contract of the parties. Rather, when the parties executed their 1998
employment contract, they were deemed to have incorporated into it all the provisions of
R.A. No. 8042.
But even if the Court were to disregard the timeline, the subject clause may not be declared
unconstitutional on the ground that it impinges on the impairment clause, for the law was
enacted in the exercise of the police power of the State to regulate a business, profession or
calling, particularly the recruitment and deployment of OFWs, with the noble end in view of
ensuring respect for the dignity and well-being of OFWs wherever they may be employed.
Police power legislations adopted by the State to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order, safety, and general welfare of the people are generally applicable not
only to future contracts but even to those already in existence, for all private contracts must
yield to the superior and legitimate measures taken by the State to promote public welfare.
 Page 6 of 84

On the second issue. Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it applies to all OFWs.
However, a closer examination reveals that the subject clause has a discriminatory intent
The answer is in the affirmative.
against, and an invidious impact on, OFWs at two levels:

Section 1, Article III of the Constitution guarantees: No person shall be deprived of life,
First, OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis-à-vis OFWs with
liberty, or property without due process of law nor shall any person be denied the equal
employment contracts of one year or more;
protection of the law.
Second, among OFWs with employment contracts of more than one year; and Third, OFWs
Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII accord all members of the labor sector,
vis-à-vis local workers with fixed-period employment;
without distinction as to place of deployment, full protection of their rights and welfare.
In sum, prior to R.A. No. 8042, OFWs and local workers with fixed-term employment who
To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional provisions
were illegally discharged were treated alike in terms of the computation of their money
translate to economic security and parity: all monetary benefits should be equally enjoyed by
claims: they were uniformly entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired portions of their
workers of similar category, while all monetary obligations should be borne by them in equal
contracts. But with the enactment of R.A. No. 8042, specifically the adoption of the subject
degree; none should be denied the protection of the laws which is enjoyed by, or spared the
clause, illegally dismissed OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their
burden imposed on, others in like circumstances.
employment contract have since been differently treated in that their money claims are

Such rights are not absolute but subject to the inherent power of Congress to incorporate, subject to a 3-month cap, whereas no such limitation is imposed on local workers with fixed-

when it sees fit, a system of classification into its legislation; however, to be valid, the term employment.

classification must comply with these requirements: 1) it is based on substantial distinctions;

2) it is germane to the purposes of the law; 3) it is not limited to existing conditions only; and
4) it applies equally to all members of the class. There are three levels of scrutiny at which the
Court reviews the constitutionality of a classification embodied in a law: a) the deferential or
rational basis scrutiny in which the challenged classification needs only be shown to be
rationally related to serving a legitimate state interest; b) the middle-tier or intermediate
scrutiny in which the government must show that the challenged classification serves an
important state interest and that the classification is at least substantially related to serving
that interest; and c) strict judicial scrutiny in which a legislative classification which
impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar
disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the
government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest
and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest.
The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a suspect classification in that, in the
computation of the monetary benefits of fixed-term employees who are illegally discharged,
it imposes a 3-month cap on the claim of OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or
more in their contracts, but none on the claims of other OFWs or local workers with fixed-
term employment. The subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it
with a peculiar disadvantage.
There being a suspect classification involving a vulnerable sector protected by the
Constitution, the Court now subjects the classification to a strict judicial scrutiny, and
determines whether it serves a compelling state interest through the least restrictive means.
What constitutes compelling state interest is measured by the scale of rights and powers
arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by history. It is akin to the paramount interest of
the state for which some individual liberties must give way, such as the public interest in
safeguarding health or maintaining medical standards, or in maintaining access to
information on matters of public concern.

In the present case, the Court dug deep into the records but found no compelling state
interest that the subject clause may possibly serve.
In fine, the Government has failed to discharge its burden of proving the existence of a
compelling state interest that would justify the perpetuation of the discrimination against
OFWs under the subject clause.
Assuming that, as advanced by the OSG, the purpose of the subject clause is to protect the
employment of OFWs by mitigating the solidary liability of placement agencies, such callous
and cavalier rationale will have to be rejected. There can never be a justification for any form
of government action that alleviates the burden of one sector, but imposes the same burden
on another sector, especially when the favored sector is composed of private businesses such
as placement agencies, while the disadvantaged sector is composed of OFWs whose
protection no less than the Constitution commands. The idea that private business interest
can be elevated to the level of a compelling state interest is odious.
Moreover, even if the purpose of the subject clause is to lessen the solidary liability of
placement agencies vis-a-vis their foreign principals, there are mechanisms already in place
that can be employed to achieve that purpose without infringing on the constitutional rights
of OFWs.
The POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Land-
Based Overseas Workers, dated February 4, 2002, imposes administrative disciplinary
measures on erring foreign employers who default on their contractual obligations to
migrant workers and/or their Philippine agents. These disciplinary measures range from
temporary disqualification to preventive suspension. The POEA Rules and Regulations
Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Seafarers, dated May 23, 2003, contains
similar administrative disciplinary measures against erring foreign employers.
Resort to these administrative measures is undoubtedly the less restrictive means of aiding
local placement agencies in enforcing the solidary liability of their foreign principals.
Thus, the subject clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is violative of the
right of petitioner and other OFWs to equal protection.
Page 7 of 84
The subject clause “or for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is
less” in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is DECLARED
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Note:
When the Court is called upon to exercise its power of judicial review of the acts of its co-
equals, such as the Congress, it does so only when these conditions obtain: (1) that there is an
actual case or controversy involving a conflict of rights susceptible of judicial determination;
(2) that the constitutional question is raised by a proper party and at the earliest opportunity;
and (3) that the constitutional question is the very lis mota of the case, otherwise the Court
will dismiss the case or decide the same on some other ground.
----
As discussed earlier, prior to R.A. No. 8042, a uniform system of computation of the
monetary awards of illegally dismissed OFWs was in place. This uniform system was
applicable even to local workers with fixed-term employment.
Article 605 of the Code of Commerce provides:
Article 605. If the contracts of the captain and members of the crew with the agent should be
for a definite period or voyage, they cannot be discharged until the fulfillment of their
contracts, except for reasons of insubordination in serious matters, robbery, theft, habitual
drunkenness, and damage caused to the vessel or to its cargo by malice or manifest or proven
negligence.
Article 605 was applied to Madrigal Shipping Company, Inc. v. Ogilvie, in which the Court
held the shipping company liable for the salaries and subsistence allowance of its illegally
dismissed employees for the entire unexpired portion of their employment contracts.
While Article 605 has remained good law up to the present, Article 299 of the Code of
Commerce was replaced by Art. 1586 of the Civil Code of 1889, to wit:

Article 1586. Field hands, mechanics, artisans, and other laborers hired for a certain time and
for a certain work cannot leave or be dismissed without sufficient cause, before the
fulfillment of the contract.
5. RE: COA OPINION ON THE COMPUTATION OF THE APPRAISED VALUE OF THE
PROPERTIES PURCHASED BY THE RETIRED CHIEF/ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE
SUPREME COURT.
A.M. No. 11-7-10-SC, July 31, 2012, PER CURIAM
In an opinion issued by the Legal Services Sector, Office of the General Counsel of the
Commission on Audit (COA), it shows that the scheme in the judiciary allowing the sale of
their personal properties to retired justices after their incumbency resulted to an
underpayment amounting to P221,021.50. This underpayment was attributed to the
erroneous appraisal of the value of the property involved using the Constitutional Fiscal
Autonomy Group (CFAG) Joint Resolution No. 35 and its guidelines. Acting on this Opinion,
Atty. Eden T. Candelaria, Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief Administrative Officer, Office of
Administrative Services, to the Office of the Chief Justice, submitted Memorandum to the SC
praying that the Court advise the COA to respect the scheme existing in the Judiciary
pursuant to the recognize fiscal autonomy of the Judicial Branch.
ISSUE:
Whether the post-audit examination conducted by COA violated the Judiciary’s fiscal
autonomy.
RULING:
YES. The COA’s authority to conduct post-audit examinations on constitutional bodies
granted fiscal autonomy as provided under Section 2(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution
must be read not only in light of the Court’s fiscal autonomy, but also in relation with the
constitutional provisions on judicial independence and the existing jurisprudence and Court
rulings on these matters. The Constitution mandates that the judiciary shall enjoy fiscal
autonomy, and grants the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and
judicial personnel. The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the
Page 8 of 84
independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their
operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of
the Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and
separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is based.
The Judiciary’s fiscal autonomy is realized through the actions of the Chief Justice, as its
head, and of the Supreme Court En Banc, in the exercise of administrative control and
supervision of the courts and its personnel. Thus, under the guarantees of the Judiciary’s
fiscal autonomy and its independence, the Chief Justice and the Court En Banc determine
and decide the who, what, where, when and how of the privileges and benefits they extend
to justices, judges, court officials and court personnel within the parameters of the Court’s
granted power; they determine the terms, conditions and restrictions of the grant as grantor.
The use of the formula provided in CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 is a part of the Court’s
exercise of its discretionary authority to determine the manner the granted retirement
privileges and benefits can be availed of. Any kind of interference on how these retirement
privileges and benefits are exercised and availed of, not only violates the fiscal autonomy and
independence of the Judiciary, but also encroaches upon the constitutional duty and
privilege of the Chief Justice and the Supreme Court En Banc to manage the Judiciary’s own
affairs.
6. A.M. No. 13-09-08-SC, October 01, 2013 RE: REQUEST FOR
GUIDANCE/CLARIFICATION ON SECTION 7, RULE III OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10154
REQUIRING RETIRING GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES TO SECURE A CLEARANCE OF
PENDENCY/NON-PENDENCY OF CASE/S FROM THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a Memorandum dated September 18, 2013 from Atty. Eden T. Candelaria,
Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief Administrative Officer, Office of Administrative Services of
the Supreme Court, requesting guidance/clarification on the applicability to the Judiciary of
Section 7, Rule III of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. (RA)
101541 which states:chanrobles virtua1aw 1ibrary
 Page 9 of 84

Section 7. Notice of Pendency of Case. The retiring employee shall seek Clearance of WHEREFORE, the requirement of seeking a Clearance of Pendency/Non-Pendency of
Pendency/Non-Pendency of Administrative Case from his/her employer agency, Civil Administrative Case from the Civil Service Commission embodied in Section 7, Rule III of the
Service Commission (CSC), Office of the Ombudsman, or in case of presidential appointees, Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 10154 is declared INAPPLICABLE
from the Office of the President. to retiring employees of the Judiciary.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Section 6,2 Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution) exclusively vests in SO ORDERED.
the Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel.3As such, it
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, Del Castillo, Abad,
oversees the court personnel�s compliance with all laws and takes the proper administrative
Perez, Reyes, and Leonen, JJ., concur.
action against them for any violation thereof.4 As an adjunct thereto, it keeps in its custody
records pertaining to the administrative cases of retiring court personnel. Bersamin, Villarama, Jr., and Mendoza, JJ., on leave.

In view of the foregoing, the Court rules that the subject provision � which requires retiring Endnotes:
government employees to secure a prior clearance of pendency/non-pendency of
administrative case/s from, among others, the CSC � should not be made to apply to 1 �AN ACT REQUIRING ALL CONCERNED GOVERNMENT AGENCIES TO ENSURE
employees of the Judiciary. To deem it otherwise would disregard the Court�s THE EARLY RELEASE OF THE RETIREMENT PAY, PENSIONS, GRATUITIES AND
constitutionally-enshrined power of administrative supervision over its personnel. Besides, OTHER BENEFITS OF RETIRING GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES.�
retiring court personnel are already required to secure a prior clearance of the pendency/non-
2 Section 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the
pendency of administrative case/s from the Court which makes the CSC clearance a
personnel thereof.cralawnad
superfluous and non-expeditious requirement contrary to the declared state policy of RA
10154.5cralaw virtualaw library 3Maceda v. Vasquez, G. R. No. 102781, April 22, 1993, 221 SCRA 464, 466-467, cited in
Ampong v. Civil Service Commission, CSC-Regional Office No. 11, G.R. No. 167916, August
To further clarify the matter, the same principles dictate that a prior clearance of
26, 2008, 563 SCRA 293, 302-303.cralawnad
pendency/non-pendency of administrative case/s from the Office of the President (albeit
some court personnel are presidential appointees, e.g., Supreme Court Justices) or the Office 4 Id.cralawnad
of the Ombudsman should not equally apply to retiring court personnel. Verily, the
administrative supervision of court personnel and all affairs related thereto fall within the 5 Section 1. Declaration of State Policy. � It is hereby declared that it is the policy of the State
exclusive province of the Judiciary. to ensure the timely and expeditious release of the retirement pay, pensions, gratuities and
other benefits of all retiring employees of the government. Public officers and employees who
It must, however, be noted that since the Constitution only accords the Judiciary have spent the best years of their lives serving the government and the public should not be
administrative supervision over its personnel, a different treatment of the clearance made to wait to receive benefits which are due to them under the law. Accordingly, it is
requirement obtains with respect to criminal cases. As such, a clearance requirement which hereby mandated that highest priority shall be given to the payment and/or settlement of the
pertains to criminal cases may be imposed by the appropriate government agency, i.e., the pensions, gratuities and/or other retirement benefits of retiring government
Office of the Ombudsman,6 on retiring court personnel as it is a matter beyond the ambit of employees.cralawnad
the Judiciary�s power of administrative supervision.

6 �The authority of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute offenses committed by
public officers and employees is founded in Section 15 and Section 11 of RA 6770. Section 15
vests the Ombudsman with the power to investigate and prosecute any act or omission of
any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient, x x x.
xxxx
The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and
unqualified. It pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or employee when such
act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. x x x.� (Uy v.
Sandiganbayan, 407 Phil. 154, 163-164 [2001].)
8. FRANCISCO CHAVEZ v. JUDICIAL BAR COUNCIL, et al. G.R. No. 202242, 16 April
2013, EN BANC (Mendoza, J.)
From the moment of the creation of the Judicial and Bar Council OBC), Congress designates
one representative to sit in the JBC to act as one of the ex-officio members. Each House sent a
representative to the JBC, not together, but alternately or by rotation. In 1994, the seven-
member composition of the JBC was substantially altered. An eighth member was added to
the JBC as the two (2) representatives from Congress began sitting simultaneously in the JBC,
with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. In 2001, the JBC En Banc decided to allow the
representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each. It has
been the situation since then.
Francisco Chavez, in his petition, asked the Supreme Court (SC) to determine whether the
first paragraph of Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution allows more than one
member of Congress to sit in the JBC. Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman
Niel C. Tupas, Jr. however argues that it would be absurd if there will only be one member
from the Congress in the JBC despite the Congress' bicameral nature. They added that the
framers of the 1987 Constitution committed a plain oversight by not making the adjustments
on the members of the JBC, in view of the Congress' shift from unicameralism to
bicameralism.
ISSUE:
Page 10 of 84
Does the first paragraph of Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution allow more than
one member of Congress to sit in the JBC
RULING:
No. It is basic that what the Constitution clearly says, according to its plain text, compels
acceptance. For this reason, the Court cannot accede to the argument of plain oversight in
order to justify constitutional construction. In opting to use the singular letter "a" to describe
"representative of Congress," the Filipino people through the framers intended that Congress
be entitled to only one (1) seat in the JBC. Had the intention been otherwise, the Constitution
could have so provided, as can be read in its other provisions.
The rationale why the framers of the Constitution added a representative of Congress to sit in
the JBC is to equally represent all three co-equal branches of the Government in the JBC.
Despite the Congress' bicameral nature, the framers did not adjust the provision on
congressional representation in the JBC because it was not in the exercise of the Congress'
primary function — to legislate. JBC was created to support the executive power to appoint,
and Congress, as one whole body, was merely assigned a contributory non-legislative
function.
Moreover, the creation of the JBC is intended to curtail the influence of Congress politics in
the appointment of judges. As such, the interpretation that two representatives from
Congress shall sit in the JBC runs counter to the intendment of the framers. Such
interpretation actually gives Congress more influence in the appointment of judges. Also,
two votes for Congress would increase the number of JBC members to eight, which could
lead to voting deadlock by reason of even-numbered membership, and a clear violation of 7
enumerated members in the Constitution.
8. REP. REYNALDO V. UMALI, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE AND EX OFFICIO MEMBER OF THE
JBC, Petitioner, v. THE JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, CHAIRED BY THE HON.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO, CHIEF JUSTICE AND EX OFFICIO CHAIRPERSON,
Respondent. D E C I S I O N VELASCO JR., J.:

Stare decisis et non quieta movere. This principle of adherence to precedents has not lost its
luster and continues to guide the bench in keeping with the need to maintain stability in the
law.1
This Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed directly
with this Court by herein petitioner Rep. Reynaldo V. Umali, current Chair of the House of
Representatives Committee on Justice, impugns the present-day practice of six-month
rotational representation of Congress in the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) for it unfairly
deprives both Houses of Congress of their full participation in the said body. The
aforementioned practice was adopted by the JBC in light of the ruling in Chavez v. Judicial
and Bar Council.2
As an overview, in Chavez, the constitutionality of the practice of having two representatives
from both houses of Congress with one vote each in the JBC, thus, increasing its membership
from seven to eight, was challenged. With that, this Court examined the constitutional
provision that states the composition of the JBC, that is, Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution, which reads:
SECTION 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the
Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice,
and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated
Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the
private sector. (Emphasis supplied.)
Following a painstaking analysis, this Court, in a Decision dated July 17, 2012, declared the
said practice of having two representatives from Congress with one vote each in the JBC
unconstitutional. This Court enunciated that the use of the singular letter "a" preceding
"representative of the Congress" in the aforequoted provision is unequivocal and leaves no
room for any other construction or interpretation. The same is indicative of the Framers'
intent that Congress may designate only one representative to the JBC. Had it been
otherwise, they could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided. This Court further articulated
that in the context of JBC representation, the term "Congress" must be taken to mean the
Page 11 of 84
entire legislative department as no liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of
the JBC. There is no mechanism required between the Senate and the House of
Representatives in the screening and nomination of judicial officers. Moreover, this Court,
quoting the keen observation of Retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-
Santiago, who is also a JBC Consultant, stated that the ex officio members of the JBC consist
of representatives from the three main branches of government, to wit: the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court representing the judiciary, the Secretary of Justice representing the
executive, and a representative of the Congress representing the legislature. It can be
deduced therefrom that the unmistakable tenor of Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution was to treat each ex officio member as representing one co-equal branch of
government having equal say in the choice of judicial nominees. Now, to allow the
legislature to have more than one representative in the JBC would negate the principle of
equality among these three branches of the government, which is enshrined in the
Constitution.3
The subsequent motion for reconsideration thereof was denied in a Resolution dated April
16, 2013, where this Court reiterated that Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
providing for "a representative of the Congress" in the JBC is clear and unambiguous and
does not need any further interpretation. Besides, this Court is not convinced that the
Framers simply failed to adjust the aforesaid constitutional provision, by sheer inadvertence,
to their decision to shift to a bicameral form of legislature. Even granting that there was,
indeed, such omission, this Court cannot supply the same. Following the rule of casus
omissus, that is, a case omitted is to be held as intentionally omitted, this Court cannot under
its power of interpretation supply the omission even if the same may have resulted from
inadvertence or it was not foreseen or contemplated for to do so would amount to judicial
legislation. Ergo, this Court has neither power nor authority to add another member in the
JBC simply by judicial construction.4
In light of these Decision and Resolution, both Houses of Congress agreed on a six-month
rotational representation in the JBC, wherein the House of Representatives will represent
Congress from January to June and the Senate from July to December.5 This is now the
current practice in the JBC. It is by reason of this arrangement that the votes cast by the
petitioner for the selection of nominees for the vacancies of then retiring Supreme Court
 Page 12 of 84

Associate Justices Jose P. Perez (Perez) and Arturo Brion (Brion) were not counted by the JBC JBC PROCEEDINGS AND ALL APPOINTMENTS TO THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT,
during its En Banc deliberations held last December 2 and 9, 2016. Instead, the petitioner's INCLUDING AND PARTICULARLY [THIS COURT].
votes were simply placed in an envelope and sealed subject to any further disposition as this
A. THE BICAMERAL NATURE OF THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT WAS BELATEDLY
Court may direct in a proper proceeding.6 This is the root of the present controversy that
DECIDED UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, BUT MUST BE DEEMED AS
prompted the petitioner to file the instant Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus based on the
INCORPORATED AND MODIFYING THE JBC STRUCTURE UNDER SECTION 8(1)[,]
following grounds:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ARTICLE VIII OF THE [1987] CONSTITUTION, TO GIVE FULL MEANING TO THE
I. INTENT OF ITS FRAMERS.

THE WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS PROPER TO ENJOIN THE JBC TO CORRECT ITS B. THERE WAS A CLEAR OVERSIGHT AND TECHNICAL OMISSION INVOLVING
UNWARRANTED DENIAL OF THE VOTES REGISTERED BY [HEREIN PETITIONER] SECTIONS 8(1)[,] ARTICLE VIII OF THE [1987] CONSTITUTION THAT SHOULD BE
DURING THE EN BANC DELIBERATIONS ON DECEMBER 2 AND 9, 2016 BECAUSE THE RECTIFIED BY [THIS COURT].
DECISION IN THE CHAVEZ CASE IS DEFECTIVE/FLAWED.
C. THE FULL REPRESENTATION OF CONGRESS IN THE JBC IS POSSIBLE ONLY WITH
II. PARTICIPATING AND VOTING FROM REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE TWO
INDEPENDENT CHAMBERS, OTHERWISE THE JBC PROCEEDINGS ARE
THE WRIT OF MANDAMUS IS PROPER TO MANDATE THE JBC TO ACCEPT/COUNT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
SAID VOTES CAST BY [PETITIONER] BECAUSE THE RECONSTITUTION OF THE JBC IS
DEFECTIVE/FLAWED AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL. D. THE PRESENCE OF THE SENATE AND [THE] HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
MEMBERS IN THE JBC UPHOLDS THE CO-EQUAL REPRESENTATION IN THE
III.
COUNCIL OF THE THREE MAIN BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT.7
THE PRESENT PRACTICE OF THE JBC IN ALLOWING ONLY ONE REPRESENTATIVE
As instructed by this Court,8 both Houses of Congress, through the Manifestation of the
FROM THE SENATE OR THE HOUSE OF [REPRESENTATIVES] TO PARTICIPATE AND
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), which acts as the People's Tribune in this case, and the
VOTE ON A [6-MONTH] ROTATION BASIS IS IMPRACTICABLE, ABSURD AND
JBC commented on the Petition.
UNCONSTITUTIONAL, CREATES AN [INSTITUTIONAL] IMBALANCE BETWEEN THE
TWO INDEPENDENT CHAMBERS OF CONGRESS, AND INSTITUTES AN INHERENT The OSG wants this Court to revisit Chavez for its alleged unexecutability arising from
AND CONTINUING CONSTITUTIONAL DEFECT IN THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JBC constitutional constraints. It holds that the current practice of alternate representation was
THAT ADVERSELY AFFECTS APPOINTMENTS TO THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT, only arrived at because of time constraints and difficulty in securing the agreement of both
INCLUDING AND PARTICULARLY [THIS COURT]. Houses of Congress.9 And, since the Constitution itself did not clearly state who is the
Congress' representative in the JBC, the provision, therefore, regarding the latter's
IV.
composition must be harmonized to give effect to the current bicameral system.10 With this

THE 1987 CONSTITUTION CLEARLY REQUIRES PARTICIPATION AND VOTING BY in view, the OSG believes that it is only proper for both Houses of Congress to be given equal

REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN representation in the JBC as neither House can bind the other for tliere can be no single

member of either House who can fully represent the entire legislature for to do so would
definitely result in absurdity.11
Further, the OSG avers that Chavez's strict interpretation of Section 8(1), Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution violates the very essence of bicameralism and sets aside the inherent
dichotomy between the two Houses of Congress.12 To note, a JBC member's votes are
reflective of the position and the interest such member wants to uphold, such that when the
representatives from each House of Congress vote for a certain judicial nominee, they carry
the interests and views of the group they represent. Thus, when only one would represent
both Houses of Congress in the JBC, the vote would not be representative of the interests
embodied by the Congress as a whole.13
In the same way, the OSG contends that the bicameral nature of the legislature strictly
adheres to the distinct and separate personality of both Houses of Congress; thus, no member
of Congress can represent the entire Congress. Besides, the phrase "a representative of the
Congress" in Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution is qualified by the phrase "ex
officio members." The ex officio nature of the position derives its authority from the principal
office. It, thus, follows that each house of Congress must be represented in the JBC.14
Also, the OSG states that the constitutional intent in creating the JBC is to ensure community
representation from the different sectors of society, as well as from the three branches of
government, and to eliminate partisan politics in the selection of members of the judiciary.
The focus, therefore, is more on proper representation rather than qualitative limitation. It
even insists that when the Framers deliberated on Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution, they were still thinking of a unicameral legislature, thereby, giving Congress
only one representative to the JBC. However, with the shift from unicameralism to
bicameralism, "a representative of the Congress" in the JBC should now be understood to
mean one representative from each House of Congress. For had it been the intention of the
Framers for the JBC to be composed only of seven members, they would have specified the
numbers just like in the other constitutional provisions. As such, the membership in the JBC
should not be limited to seven members. More so, an eventual deadlock in the voting would
not pose any problem since the voting in the JBC is not through a "yes" or a "no" vote.15
Page 13 of 84
As its final argument, the OSG maintains that while Congress' participation in the JBC may
be non-legislative, still, the involvement of both Houses of Congress in its every proceeding
is indispensable, as each House represents different constituencies and would necessarily
bring a unique perspective to the recommendation process of the JBC.16
For its part, the JBC vehemently pleads that the present Petition be dismissed as its adopted
rotational scheme and the necessary consequences thereof are not the proper subjects of a
certiorari and even a mandamus petition for the same do not involve an exercise of judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. Apart from that, it committed no grave abuse of
discretion in refusing to recognize, accept and count the petitioner's votes during its En Banc
deliberations last December 2 and 9, 2016 for it merely acted in accordance with the
Constitution and with the ruling in Chavez. More so, there is no showing that the petitioner
has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy other than this Petition for nowhere herein did he
assert that he exerted all efforts to have his concern addressed by Congress, such as asking
the latter to repudiate the rotational arrangement. Thus, for the petitioner's failure to exhaust
all remedies available to him in Congress, he deprived the latter of an opportunity to address
the matter. Also, the practice and acquiescence of both Houses of Congress to such an
arrangement operates as an estoppel against any member thereof to deny its validity. As
regards a writ of mandamus, it cannot be issued to compel the JBC to count the petitioner's
votes for it will not lie to control the performance of a discretionary act.17
The JBC further enunciates that the petitioner has no locus standi to institute this Petition in
his capacity as Chairman of the House of Representatives Committee on Justice and Ex
Officio Member of the JBC without the requisite resolution from both Houses of Congress
authorizing him to sue as a member thereof, which absence is a fatal defect rendering this
Petition dismissible.18
In the same vein, the JBC asseverates that this Petition should also be dismissed as the
allegations herein are mere rehash of the arguments and dissents in Chavez, which have
already been exhaustively litigated and settled therein by this Court, more in particular, the
interpretation of Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, hence, barred by the
doctrine of stare decisis. Similarly, there exists no substantial reason or even supervening
event or material change of circumstances that warrants Chavez's reversal.19

The JBC likewise insists that it was the intent of the Framers of the Constitution for the JBC to
have only seven members. The reason for that was laid down in Chavez, that is, to provide a
solution should there be a stalemate in the voting. As to the alleged oversight and technical
omission of the Framers in changing the provision on the JBC to reflect the bicameral nature
of Congress, these are flimsy excuses to override the clear provision of the Constitution and
to disturb settled jurisprudence. As explained in Chavez, Congress' membership in the JBC
was not in the interest of a certain constituency but in reverence to it as a major branch of
government.20
Last of all, the JBC holds that should this Petition be granted, there would be an imbalance in
favor of Congress with respect to the representation in the JBC of the three main and co-equal
branches of the government. For the unmistakable tenor of Section 8(1), Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution was to treat each ex officio member as representing one co-equal branch of
government. And, even assuming that the current six-month rotational scheme in the JBC
created an imbalance between the two Houses of Congress, it is not within the power of this
Court or the JBC to remedy such imbalance. For the remedy lies in the amendment of this
constitutional provision.21
Given the foregoing arguments, the issues ought to be addressed by this Court can be
summed up into: (1) whether the petitioner has locus standi to file this Petition even without
the requisite resolution from both Houses of Congress permitting him to do so; (2) whether
the petitioner's direct resort to this Court via a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus is the
plain, speedy and adequate remedy available to him to assail the JBC's adoption of the
rotational representation leading to the non-counting of his votes in its En Banc deliberations
last December 2 and 9, 2016; (3) whether the JBC acted with grave abuse of discretion in
adopting the six-month rotational scheme of both Houses of Congress resulting in the non-
counting of the petitioner's votes in its En Banc deliberations last December 2 and 9, 2016; (4)
whether the JBC can be compelled through mandamus to count the petitioner's votes in its En
Banc deliberations last December 2 and 9, 2016; and (4) whether this Court's ruling in Chavez
applies as stare decisis to the present case.
Page 14 of 84
Before delving into the above-stated issues, this Court would like to note that this Petition
was primarily filed because of the non-counting of the petitioner's votes in the JBC En Banc
deliberations last December 2 and 9, 2016 held for the purpose of determining, among others,
who will be the possible successors of the then retiring Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court Perez and Brion, whose retirements were set on December 14 and 29, 2016,
respectively. The list of nominees will then be forwarded to the President as the appointing
authority. With the appointments of Associate Justices Samuel R. Martires (Martires) and
Noel G. Tijam (Tijam) on March 2 and 8, 2017, respectively, this Petition has now been
rendered moot insofar as the petitioner's prayers to (1) reverse and set aside the JBC En Banc
deliberations last December 2 and 9, 2016; and (2) direct the JBC to count his votes therein as
its ex officio member,22 are concerned.
As a rule, courts do not entertain moot questions. An issue becomes moot and academic
when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy so that a declaration on the issue would be
of no practical use or value. This notwithstanding, the Court in a number of cases held that
the moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the
courts from resolving a case. Courts will still decide cases otherwise, moot and academic if:
(1) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) the exceptional character of the situation
and the paramount public interest is involved; (3) when the constitutional issue raised
requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and
(4) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.23 Considering that all the arguments
herein once again boil down to the proper interpretation of Section 8(1), Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution on congressional representation in the JBC, this Court deems it proper to
proceed on deciding this Petition despite its mootness to settle the matter once and for all.
Having said that, this Court shall now resolve the issues in seriatim.
On petitioner's locus standi. The petitioner brings this suit in his capacity as the current
Chairman of the House of Representatives Committee on Justice and Ex Officio Member of
the JBC. His legal standing was challenged by the JBC for lack of an enabling resolution for
that purpose coming from both Houses of Congress.
Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such
that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged

governmental act. It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so
largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.24 With that definition,
therefore, a party will be allowed to litigate only when he can demonstrate that (1) he has
personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct
of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury
is likely to be redressed by the remedy being sought.25 Otherwise, he/she would not be
allowed to litigate. Nonetheless, in a long line of cases, concerned citizens, taxpayers and
legislators when specific requirements have been met have been given standing by this
Court. This was succinctly explained in Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives,
thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a
statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or any
government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining
some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in
some indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be
denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be
subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of. In fine,
when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen
satisfies the requirement of personal interest.
In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are
illegally disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that
there is a wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional
law. Before he can invoke the power of judicial review, however, he must specifically prove
that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by
taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the
questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest
common to all members of the public.
xxxx
Page 15 of 84
As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which he
claims infringes his prerogatives as a legislator. Indeed, a member of the House of
Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges
vested by the Constitution in his office.26 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
The legal standing of each member of Congress was also upheld in Philippine Constitution
Association v. Enriquez,27 where this Court pronounced that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The legal standing of the Senate, as an institution, was recognized in Gonzales v. Macaraig,
Jr. (citation omitted). In said case, 23 Senators, comprising the entire membership of the
Upper House of Congress, filed a petition to nullify the presidential veto of Section 55 of the
GAA of 1989. The filing of the suit was authorized by Senate Resolution No. 381, adopted on
February 2, 1989, and which reads as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Authorizing and Directing the Committee on Finance to Bring in the Name of the Senate of
the Philippines the Proper Suit with the Supreme Court of the Philippines contesting the
Constitutionality of the Veto by the President of Special and General Provisions, particularly
Section 55, of the General Appropriation Bill of 1989 (H.B. No. 19186) and For Other
Purposes.
In the United States, the legal standing of a House of Congress to sue has been recognized
(citation omitted).
While the petition in G.R. No. 113174 was filed by 16 Senators, including the Senate President
and the Chairman of the Committee on Finance, the suit was not authorized by the Senate
itself. Likewise, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 113766 and 113888 were filed without an enabling
resolution for the purpose.
Therefore, the question of the legal standing of petitioners in the three cases becomes a
preliminary issue before this Court can inquire into the validity of the presidential veto and
the conditions for the implementation of some items in the GAA of 1994.
We rule that a member of the Senate, and of the House of Representatives for that matter, has
the legal standing to question the validity of a presidential veto or a condition imposed on an
item in an appropriation bill.

Where the veto is claimed to have been made without or in excess of the authority vested on
the President by the Constitution, the issue of an impermissible intrusion of the Executive
into the domain of the Legislature arises (citation omitted).
To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof,
since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution
(citation omitted).
An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but
nonetheless substantial injury, which can be questioned by a member of Congress (citation
omitted). In such a case, any member of Congress can have a resort to the courts.
Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, as Amicus Curiae,
noted:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
This is, then, the clearest case of the Senate as a whole or individual Senators as such having a
substantial interest in the question at issue. It could likewise be said that there was the
requisite injury to their rights as Senators. It would then be futile to raise any locus standi
issue. Any intrusion into the domain appertaining to the Senate is to be resisted. Similarly, if
the situation were reversed, and it is the Executive Branch that could allege a transgression,
its officials could likewise file the corresponding action. What cannot be denied is that a
Senator has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by
the Constitution in his office (citation omitted).28 (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)
It is clear therefrom that each member of Congress has a legal standing to sue even without
an enabling resolution for that purpose so long as the questioned acts invade the powers,
prerogatives and privileges of Congress. Otherwise stated, whenever the acts affect the
powers, prerogatives and privileges of Congress, anyone of its members may validly bring
an action to challenge the same to safeguard and maintain the sanctity thereof.
With the foregoing, this Court sustains the petitioner's legal standing as Member of the
House of Representatives and as the Chairman of its Committee on Justice to assail the
alternate representation of Congress in the JBC, which arrangement led to the non-counting
of his votes in its En Banc deliberations last December 2 and 9, 2016, as it allegedly affects
adversely Congress' prerogative to be fully represented before the said body.
Page 16 of 84
On petitioner's direct resort to this Court via certiorari petition. The JBC questions the
propriety of the petitioner's direct resort to this Court via the present Petition to assail its
adoption of the rotational representation of Congress resulting in the non-counting of his
votes in its En Banc deliberations last December 2 and 9, 2016. The JBC insists that the said
scheme was a creation of Congress itself; as such, the petitioner's plain, speedy and adequate
remedy is to appeal to Congress to repudiate the same. Direct resort to this Court should not
be allowed if there is a remedy available to the petitioner before Congress.
Generally, the writ of certiorari can only be availed of in the absence of an appeal or any
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In Bordomeo v. Court of
Appeals, however, this Court clarified that it is inadequacy that must usually determine the
propriety of certiorari and not the mere absence of all other remedies and the danger of
failure of justice without the writ. A remedy is considered plain, speedy and adequate if it
will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment, order, or
resolution of the lower court or agency.29
In the same way, as a matter of policy, direct resort to this Court will not be entertained
unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate lower courts, and
exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as in cases involving national interest and
those of serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of the writ of
certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction.30 In The Diocese of Bacolod v.
Commission on Elections,31 and again in Maza v. Turla,32 this Court took pains in
enumerating the circumstances that would warrant a direct resort to this Court, to wit: (1)
when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must be addressed at the most
immediate time; (2) when the issues involved are of transcendental importance; (3) cases of
first impression as no jurisprudence yet exists that will guide the lower courts on this matter;
(4) the constitutional issues raised are better decided by this court; (5) the time element
presented in this case cannot be ignored; (6) the filed petition reviews the act of a
constitutional organ; (7) petitioners rightly claim that they had no other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; and (8) the petition includes questions that
are dictated by public welfare and the advancement of public policy, or demanded by the
broader interest of justice, or the orders complained of were found to be patent nullities, or
the appeal was considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy.33

Here, while this Court agrees with the JBC that the petitioner's preliminary remedy to
question the rotational arrangement of Congress is to ask the latter to repudiate the same,
this, however, cannot be considered plain, speedy and adequate. This Court is, thus, inclined
to sustain the petitioner's direct resort to this Court not only because it is the plain, speedy
and adequate remedy available to him but also by reason of the constitutional issues
involved herein and the urgency of the matter. As correctly pointed out by the OSG, the
Constitution mandates that any vacancy to the office of an Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court must be filled up within the 90-day period from its occurrence. Therefore, the JBC must
submit the list of nominees prior to the start of that period. As the nominations covered by
the questioned December 2016 JBC En Banc deliberations were intended for vacancies
created by then Associate Justices Perez and Brion, who respectively retired last December 14
and 29, 2016, hence, any resort to Congress during that time would already be inadequate
since the JBC list of nominees would be submitted any moment to the Office of the President
for the appointment of the next Associate Justices of the Supreme Court. Since time is of the
essence, the petitioner's direct resort to this Court is warranted.
On the alleged grave abuse of discretion of the JBC in adopting the rotational representation
of Congress correctable by certiorari. The petitioner ascribed grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the JBC in its adoption of the rotational scheme, which led to the non-counting of his
votes in its En Banc deliberations last December 2 and 9, 2016, as it deprives Congress of its
full representation therein. The JBC, on the other hand, believes otherwise for it merely acted
in accordance with the mandate of the Constitution and with the ruling in Chavez. Also, such
rotational scheme was a creation of Congress, which it merely adopted.
Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the present Rules of Court are the two special
civil actions used for determining and correcting grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of
jurisdiction, which necessarily includes the commission of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.34 The burden is on the petitioner to prove that the
respondent tribunal committed not merely a reversible error but also a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Showing mere abuse of discretion is
not enough, for the abuse must be shown to be grave. Grave abuse of discretion means either
that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
Page 17 of 84
reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board
evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.35
But, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and reach
before this Court as the writs may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not
only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the
Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions. Thus, they are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review
and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive officials.36
Here, it is beyond question that the JBC does not fall within the scope of a tribunal, board, or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Neither did it act in any judicial or
quasi-judicial capacity nor did it assume any performance of judicial or quasi-judicial
prerogative in adopting the rotational scheme of Congress, which was the reason for not
counting the votes of the petitioner in its En Banc deliberations last December 2 and 9, 2016.
But, despite this, its act is still not beyond this Court's reach as the same is correctible by
certiorari if it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion even if it is not exercising judicial and
quasi-judicial functions. Now, did the JBC abuse its discretion in adopting the six-month
rotational arrangement and in not counting the votes of the petitioner? This Court answers in
the negative. As correctly pointed out by the JBC, in adopting the said arrangement, it merely
acted pursuant to the Constitution and the Chavez ruling, which both require only one
representative from Congress in the JBC. It cannot, therefore, be faulted for simply
complying with the Constitution and jurisprudence. Moreover, said arrangement was crafted
by both Houses of Congress and the JBC merely adopted the same. By no stretch of
imagination can it be regarded as grave abuse of discretion on the part of the JBC.

With the foregoing, despite this Court's previous declaration that certiorari is the plain,
speedy and adequate remedy available to petitioner, still the same cannot prosper for the
petitioner's failure to prove that the JBC acted with grave abuse of discretion in adopting the
rotational scheme.
On the propriety of mandamus. It is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that the
applicant has a clear legal right to the tiling demanded and it must be the imperative duty of
the respondent to perform the act required. The burden is on the petitioner to show that there
is such a clear legal right to the performance of the act, and a corresponding compelling duty
on the part of the respondent to perform the act. As an extraordinary writ, it lies only to
compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one.37 A clear line
demarcates a discretionary act from a ministerial one. A purely ministerial act is one which
an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience
to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment
upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.38 On the other hand, if the law imposes a
duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be
performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when
the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment.39
Clearly, the use of discretion and the performance of a ministerial act are mutually exclusive.
Further, the writ of mandamus does not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion
or to compel a course of conduct.40
In the case at bench, the counting of votes in the selection of the nominees to the judiciary
may only be considered a ministerial duty of the JBC if such votes were cast by its rightful
members and not by someone, like the petitioner, who is not considered a member during
the En Banc deliberations last December 2 and 9, 2016. For during the questioned period, the
lawful representative of Congress to the JBC is a member of the Senate and not of the House
of Representatives as per their agreed rotational scheme. Considering that a member of the
Senate already cast his vote therein, the JBC has the full discretion not to count the votes of
the petitioner for it is mandated by both the Constitution and jurisprudence to maintain that
Congress will only have one representative in the JBC. As the act of the JBC involves a
discretionary one, accordingly, mandamus will not lie.
Page 18 of 84
On the application of Chavez as stare decisis in this case. The petitioner strongly maintains
that Chavez must be revisited and reversed due to its unexecutability. But the JBC insists that
the arguments herein are mere rehash of those in Chavez, hence, already barred by the
doctrine of stare decisis. Also, there is no cogent reason for Chavez's reversal.
This Court takes another glance at the arguments in Chavez and compares them with the
present arguments of the petitioner. A careful perusal, however, reveals that, although the
petitioner questioned the JBC's adoption of the six-month rotational representation of
Congress leading to the non-counting of his votes in its En Banc deliberations last December
2 and 9, 2016, the supporting arguments hereof still boil down to the proper interpretation of
Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. Hence, being mere rehash of the arguments
in Chavez, the application of the doctrine of stare decisis in this case is inevitable. More so,
the petitioner failed to present strong and compelling reason not to rule this case in the same
way that this Court ruled Chavez.
As stated in the beginning of this ponencia, stare decisis et non quieta movere is a doctrine
which means to adhere to precedents and not to unsettle things which are established. This is
embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides,
thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a
part of the legal system of the Philippines.
The doctrine enjoins adherence to judicial precedents and requires courts in a country to
follow the rule established in a decision of the Supreme Court thereof. That decision becomes
a judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The doctrine
is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it
should be deemed settled and closed to further argument. The same is grounded on the
necessity for securing certainty and stability of judicial decisions, thus, time and again, the
court has held that it is a very desirable and necessary judicial practice that when a court has
laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that
principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are substantially the same. It
simply means that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be
applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties

may be different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful
countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same
questions relating to the same event have been put forward by the parties similarly situated
as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a
bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue. The doctrine has assumed such value in our
judicial system that the Court has ruled that "[a]bandonment thereof must be based only on
strong and compelling reasons, otherwise, the becoming virtue of predictability which is
expected from this Court would be immeasurably affected and the public's confidence in the
stability of the solemn pronouncements diminished." Verily, only upon showing that
circumstances attendant in a particular case override the great benefits derived by our
judicial system from the doctrine of stare decisis can the courts be justified in setting aside the
same.41
Here, the facts are exactly the same as in Chavez, where this Court has already settled the
issue of interpretation of Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. Truly, such ruling
may not be unanimous, but it is undoubtedly a reflection of the wisdom of the majority of
members of this Court on that matter. Chavez cannot simply be regarded as an erroneous
application of the questioned constitutional provision for it merely applies the clear mandate
of the law, that is, Congress is entitled to only one representative in the JBC in the same way
that its co-equal branches are.
As this Court declared in Chavez, Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution is clear,
categorical and unambiguous. Thus, it needs no further construction or interpretation. Time
and time again, it has been repeatedly declared by this Court that where the law speaks in
clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation, only application.42 The
wordings of Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution are to be considered as
indicative of the final intent of its Framers, that is, for Congress as a whole to only have one
representative to sit in the JBC. This Court, therefore, cannot simply make an assumption that
the Framers merely by oversight failed to take into account the bicameral nature of Congress
in drafting the same. As further laid down in Chavez, the Framers were not keen on
adjusting the provision on congressional representation in the JBC as it was not in the
exercise of its primary function, which is to legislate. Notably, the JBC was created to support
the executive power to appoint, and Congress, as one whole body, was merely assigned a
Page 19 of 84
contributory non-legislative function. No parallelism can be drawn between the
representative of Congress in the JBC and the exercise by Congress of its legislative powers
under Article VI and constituent powers under Article XVII of the Constitution. Congress, in
relation to the executive and judicial branches of government, is constitutionally treated as
another co-equal branch in the matter of its JBC representation.43
This Court cannot succumb to the argument that Congress, being composed of two distinct
and separate chambers, cannot represent each other in the JBC. Again, as this Court
explained in Chavez, such an argument is misplaced because in the JBC, any member of
Congress, whether from the Senate or the House of Representatives, is constitutionally
empowered to represent the entire Congress. It may be a constricted constitutional authority,
but it is not an absurdity. To broaden the scope of congressional representation in the JBC is
tantamount to the inclusion of a subject matter which was not included in the provision as
enacted. True to its constitutional mandate, the Court cannot craft and tailor constitutional
provisions in order to accommodate all situations no matter how ideal or reasonable the
proposed solution may sound. To the exercise of this intrusion, the Court declines.44
While it is true that Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution did not explicitly state
that the JBC shall be composed of seven members, however, the same is implied in the
enumeration of who will be the members thereof. And though it is unnecessary for the JBC
composition to be an odd number as no tie-breaker is needed in the preparation of a shortlist
since judicial nominees are not decided by a "yes" or "no" vote, still, JBC's membership cannot
be increased from seven to eight for it will be a clear violation of the aforesaid constitutional
provision. To add another member in the JBC or to increase the representative of Congress to
the JBC, the remedy is not judicial but constitutional amendment.
In sum, this Court will not overthrow Chavez for it is in accord with the constitutional
mandate of giving Congress "a representative" in the JBC. In the same manner, the adoption
of the rotational scheme will not in any way deprive Congress of its full participation in the
JBC for such an arrangement is also in line with that constitutional mandate.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
DISSENTING OPINION
LEONEN, J.:
This Court is once again tasked to re-examine our interpretation of Article VIII, Section 8(1)
of the Constitution, previously the subject of this Court's review in Chavez v. Judicial and Bar
Council.1 In the aftermath of Chavez, we see the absurd and unworkable effects of having
only one (1) representative of Congress within the Judicial and Bar Council.
Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council2 sanctioned what was clearly unintended by the
Constitution: the periodic disempowerment of one (1) legislative chamber. In doing so, it
weakens Congress itself as a bicameral constitutional department. The subtraction of the
critical one (1) vote that determines who gets into the shortlist is achieved by periodically
disempowering one (1) chamber. From the time Chavez was promulgated, significant facts
have come to light that justifies the abandonment of that precedent.
We must do so in this case.
This is a Petition for mandamus and certiorari filed by Representative Reynaldo V. Umali
(Representative Umali), current Chair of the House of Representatives Committee on Justice,
questioning the six (6)-month rotational representation arrangement of Congress adopted by
the Judicial and Bar Council pursuant to Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council,3 which was
decided with finality on April 16, 2013. Petitioner claims that the current arrangement
unfairly deprives both chambers of Congress of its full participation in the Judicial and Bar
Council.
An understanding of the process of appointment to the judiciary, especially in its historical
context, is important to situate this Court's proper interpretation of the current provisions of
the Constitution.
Before the creation of the Judicial and Bar Council, the power to nominate and appoint
members of the judiciary was vested in the executive and legislative branches.
Title X, Article 80 of the Malolos Constitution provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Page 20 of 84
TITLE X
The Judicial Power
Article 80. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and the Solicitor-General shall be chosen
by the National Assembly in concurrence with the President of the Republic and the
Secretaries of the Government, and shall be absolutely independent of the Legislative and
Executive Powers.
The 1935 Constitution similarly states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ARTICLE VIII
Judicial Department
Section 5. The Members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts shall be
appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
The promulgation of the 1973 Constitution, however, vested the chief executive with both
executive and legislative powers. Vetting and appointing of members to the judiciary became
the sole prerogative of the President:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ARTICLE X
The Judiciary
Section 4. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of inferior courts shall be
appointed by the President.
Hoping to unshackle the Republic from the abuses of power during Martial Law but at the
same time wanting to insulate the process of judicial appointments from partisan politics, the
1986 Constitutional Commission, through Commissioner Roberto Concepcion, proposed the
creation of an independent body that would vet potential appointees to the judiciary.4 This
body would be represented by the different stakeholders of the legal sector and would have
the mandate of preparing the list of potential judicial appointees to be submitted to the
President. The proposal became what is now the Judicial and Bar Council. Article VIII,
Section 8 of the Constitution now provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

ARTICLE VIII
Judicial Department
Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the
Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice,
and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated
Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the
private sector.
(2) The regular members of the Council shall be appointed by the President for a term of four
years with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Of the Members first appointed,
the representative of the Integrated Bar shall serve for four years, the professor of law for
three years, the retired Justice for two years, and the representative of the private sector for
one year.
(3) The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex officio of the Council and shall
keep a record of its proceedings.
(4) The regular Members of the Council shall receive such emoluments as may be determined
by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court shall provide in its annual budget the
appropriations for the Council.
(5) The Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the
Judiciary. It may exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may assign
to it.
Based on their understanding of the provision stating that one (1) of its ex officio members
would be "a representative of Congress," both the House of Representatives and Senate sent
representatives to the Council. Representative Rogaciano A. Mercado sat as ex officio
member from December 10, 1987 to February 23, 1989 while Senator Wigberto E. Ta�ada sat
as ex officio member from March 2, 1988 to May 21, 1990.5 In a previous case, however, this
Court stated that membership in the Council would be altered only in 1994, stating that
before then, the House of Representatives and the Senate would alternate its
representation:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Page 21 of 84
[F]rom the moment of the creation of the JBC, [Congress] designated one representative to sit
in the JBC to act as one of the ex officio members. Perhaps in order to give equal opportunity
to both houses to sit in the exclusive body, the House of Representatives and the Senate
would send alternate representatives to the JBC. In other words, Congress had only one (1)
representative.
In 1994, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of having only seven (7)
members, an eighth (8th) member was added to the JBC as two (2) representatives from
Congress began sitting in the JBC�one from the House of Representatives and one from the
Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, curiously, the JBC En Banc, in
separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives from the
Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each.6
The practice of giving each member of Congress one (1) full vote was questioned in 2012 in
Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council.7
This Court, voting 7-2,8 stated that the Constitution intended for the Judicial and Bar Council
to only have seven (7) members; thus, only one (1) representative from Congress must sit as
an ex officio member. The dispositive portion of the Decision
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical composition of the Judicial
and Bar Council is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar Council is hereby
enjoined to reconstitute itself so that only one (1) member of Congress will sit as a
representative in its proceedings, in accordance with Section 8 (1), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution.
This disposition is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Upon Motion for Reconsideration, this Court, voting 10-3,9 reiterated that "[i]n the [Judicial
and Bar Council], any member of Congress, whether from the Senate or the House of
Representatives, is constitutionally empowered to represent the entire Congress."10

The Minutes of the July 29, 2013 Judicial and Bar Council En Banc meeting reflect their
actions after the case was promulgated. Representative Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (Representative
Tupas) informed the Council that pursuant to Chavez, the House of Representatives and
Senate agreed that their representation would be on a six (6)-month rotational basis, with
Senator Aquilino "Koko" Pimentel III (Senator Pimentel) representing Congress from July 1 to
December 31, 2013.11 The Minutes state:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[Congressman Tupas] said that in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in April this
year, the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Senate President authorized him
and Senator Pimentel, Chairperson of the Committee on Justice of the Senate to discuss the
matter of representation to the JBC. They decided that the representation would be on a
rotation basis. For the first six (6) months, Senator Pimentel would be the one to represent
both Houses of Congress; and for the next six (6) months, it would be he. In the absence of
Senator Pimentel, Congressman Tupas will automatically attend the meetings, and vice
versa. He cautioned that since it is quite difficult for both Houses to come up with an
agreement, it would not be good to assume that whenever the Senate President or the
Speaker of the House writes the JBC, it is the decision of Congress. It should be a
communication from both Houses. He then requested that he be furnished with copies of all
notices from the JBC even during the term of Senator Pimentel.
Chief Justice Sereno clarified that she received the Letter of Senate President Drilon stating,
among other things, that the Speaker of the House and the Senate President agreed that
Senator Pimentel would be the one to represent Congress until December 31, 2013, but that in
his absence it would be Congressman Tupas. She assured both Congressman Tupas and
Senator Pimentel that they will both receive copies of all notices and information that are
being circulated among the JBC Members. She thanked Congressman Tupas for personally
informing the Council of the agreement between the two Houses of Congress, thus giving a
higher level of comfort than it had already given.
Congressman Tupas mentioned that he was not aware that the Senate President sent a letter.
His assumption is that the information would come from both Houses, not just from the
Senate. He thus came to the meeting to personally inform the JBC of the agreement. He
thanked the Chief Justice and asked for permission to leave.
Page 22 of 84
Senator Pimentel likewise requested that he also be furnished with copies of all documents
during the rotation of Congressman Tupas. He then requested for a three-minute break, as he
had some matters to discuss with the Congressman before leaving.12
There was no showing of the presence of any resolution from any of the legislative chambers
that authorized or ratified the practice.
From then on, it became the practice of the House of Representatives to represent Congress in
the Judicial and Bar Council from January to June and for the Senate to represent Congress
from July to December.13
The present controversy arose from the En Banc deliberations of the Judicial and Bar Council
on December 2 and December 9, 2016, for the selection of nominees for the vacancies of
retiring Supreme Court Associate Justices Arturo D. Brion and Jose P. Perez. On both
occasions, Representative Umali14 cast his votes. His votes, however, were not counted due
to the present rotational representation arrangement. The votes were instead placed in an
envelope and sealed, "subject to any further disposition as the Supreme Court may direct in a
proper proceeding."15
Representative Umali filed this present Petition16 praying that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The JBC's denial of petitioner Umali's vote as ex-officio member during the En Banc sessions
on December 2 and 9, 2016, be reversed and set aside;
The JBC be directed to count the votes of petitioner Umali as ex-officio member during the en
bane sessions on December 2 and 9, 2016;
The current six-month rotational representation of Congress by the Senate and the House of
Representatives in the JBC be declared unconstitutional; and
The JBC be directed to revert back to its prior representational arrangement where two
representatives from Congress are recognized and allowed to vote, or the status quo ante,

prior to the Chavez ruling, and in accordance with such specific guidelines that the Supreme
Court will promulgate to ensure full and proper representation and voting by both members
from the Senate and the House of Representatives, and thereafter to recognize, accept and
count the votes cast by the petitioner Umali in all proceedings of the JBC.17
The Judicial and Bar Council was directed to file its comment to the Petition. On February 6,
2017, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted a Manifestation (in lieu of Comment)18
entering its appearance for "[t]he Congress of the Republic of the Philippines, represented by
the Senate and the House of Representatives"19 and "[acting] as the People's Tribune."20 On
February 10, 2017, the Judicial and Bar Council Executive Chair21 and its regular members22
filed its Comment23 on behalf of the Council.
Petitioner argues that Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council24 did not define the manner by
which the Judicial and Bar Council should be reconstituted and that no formal resolution was
issued by the Council to resolve the issue. The Council instead adopted Representative
Tupas' manifestation that the Senate and House of Representatives agreed on a six (6)-month
rotational representation.25
Petitioner points out that Representative Tupas had cautioned the Council that decisions of
Congress should be a communication of both houses. He argues that neither Representative
Tupas' manifestation nor then Senate President Franklin Drilon's (then Senate President
Drilon) letter conferring Senator PimentePs representation constitute a plenary act of both
Houses of Congress so the present rotational representation cannot be adopted by the
Council.26
Petitioner asserts that allowing only one (1) representative of Congress on the Council is
"impractical, absurd and unconstitutional".27 He explains that the bicameral nature of
Congress results in both houses having different powers, functions, and decision-making
processes. Thus, any communication, action, or resolution from either house should not be
interpreted as binding on the whole Congress. He points out that other than this Court's
interpretation of Article VIII, Section 8(1),28 there is also no provision in the Constitution that
expressly mandates a single representation of Congress to any political or adjudicating
Page 23 of 84
body.29 The genuine and full representation of Congress expresses the voice of the electorate
to the Judicial and Bar Council.30
Petitioner contends that the distinction between both houses is recognized under the
Constitution. He claims that denying the House of Representatives' continuous
representation in the Council would be denying it of its duty to screen and vote for the
candidates for the eight (8) Associate Justices of the Supreme Court who will compulsorily
retire from 2017 to 2019.31 The Senate would also be deprived of its duty to screen and vote
for the two (2) vacant positions in the Supreme Court in 2022.32 He cites as basis the vote for
the vacancies left by Associate Justices Perez and Brion that was scheduled in December,
which deprived petitioner of his chance to vote.33
Petitioner asserts that the bicameral nature of Congress requires both houses to observe inter-
parliamentary courtesies and were meant to represent different constituencies. Because of the
shift from National Assembly to a bicameral Congress, Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the
Constitution should be interpreted to allow representatives from both chambers to fully
participate and vote in the Judicial and Bar Council.34 He maintains that Article VIII, Section
8(1) was not plain and was unambiguous because from 2001 until the promulgation of
Chavez, the Judicial and Bar Council allowed both the House of Representatives and the
Senate to be given one (1) full vote each.35 He insists that a verba legis interpretation of
Article III, Section 8(1) would deny Congress of its representation since neither chamber on
its own can represent the entirety of Congress.36
Petitioner claims that allowing both the House of Representatives and the Senate to represent
Congress in the Council upholds the co-equal representation of the three (3) branches of the
government. He explains that under the present composition, there are actually three (3)
representatives from the judicial branch (the Chief Justice, a retired Justice of the Supreme
Court, and a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines) and three (3) representatives of
the executive branch (Secretary of Justice, the professor of law, and the representative of the
private sector who are all presidential appointees).37 Thus, he claims that continuing the
present practice results in the legislative department having a disproportionate
representation in the constitutional body and diminishes the integrity of the House of
Representatives, which represents the people.38

For these reasons, petitioner argues that the Judicial and Bar Council committed grave abuse
of discretion that could be remedied through a writ of certiorari.39 He adds that a writ of
mandamus would also be proper to compel the Judicial and Bar Council to accept and
recognize the votes he cast in the December 2 and 9, 2016 En Banc sessions.40
Unlike in Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council,41 both the House of Representatives and the
Senate were able to comment on the petition, through a Manifestation42 and Consolidated
Manifestation43 by the Office of the Solicitor General.
The Office of the Solicitor General, for Congress, argues that Chavez should be revisited due
to its "unexecutability . . . arising from constitutional constraints."44 It explains that the
current practice "was arrived at in view of time constraints and difficulty in securing the
agreement of both Houses."45 It likewise points out that since the Constitution did not
identify who should represent Congress in the Judicial and Bar Council, the provision must
be harmonized to take into account the current bicameral system.46
The Office of the Solicitor General contends that the current rotational arrangement sets aside
the inherent dichotomy between the two (2) Houses of Congress and violates the essence of
bicameralism.47 It explains that when the representatives of the Senate or the House of
Representatives vote for a certain judicial nominee, they carry the interests and views of the
group they represent. If there is only one (1) member of Congress in the Council, this vote
would not be representative of the interests represented by Congress as a whole.48
The Office of the Solicitor General maintains that no member of Congress can represent all of
Congress, which is why Congress has always sent two (2) representatives to the Council.49 It
points out that the phrase "a representative of Congress" in Article VIII, Section 8(1) is
qualified by the phrase "ex-officio members" signifying that the member in an ex-officio
capacity must be qualified to represent the entirety of Congress.50
The Office of the Solicitor General asserts that the intent of the Judicial and Bar Council's
composition is for the representation to be collegial and to eliminate partisan politics in the
selection of members of the judiciary; thus, "the focus is more on proper representation rather
than quantitative limitation."51 It asserts that when the framers deliberated on Article VIII,
Section 8(1), they were still of the belief that legislature would be unicameral.52 If they had
Page 24 of 84
intended for the Council to only have seven (7) members, it would have specified the
number, as it did in other provisions of the Constitution.53 It contends that a deadlock in the
voting is not enough justification to undermine the bicameral nature of the legislature since
voting in the Council is not decided by a "yes" or "no" vote.54
The Office of the Solicitor General likewise holds that while the function of the Judicial and
Bar Council may be non-legislative, the involvement of both Houses of Congress is
indispensable since each represents different constituencies and would necessarily bring a
unique perspective to the Council's recommendation process.55 It cites statistics from June
2016 to present showing that a large number of appointments were made to the lower courts
at a time when the House of Representatives, which represents sectors or local districts, was
not able to participate in the voting process.56
The Office of the Solicitor General also cites Aguinaldo v. Judicial and Bar Council57 to argue
that in the review of the Judicial and Bar Council's rules, it should also include a review of
the rule on Congress' representation on the Council.58
Respondent Judicial and Bar Council, on the other hand, attests that the Petition should be
dismissed since the rotational scheme adopted by Congress is not the proper subject of a
petition for certiorari or mandamus. It contends that the controversy does not involve the
Council's exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions.59 It maintains that there
was also no grave abuse of discretion when it refused to count petitioner's votes since this act
was authorized by the Constitution and Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council.60 It argues that
the Council's performance of its duties is discretionary; thus, mandamus cannot be issued to
control the performance of a discretionary act.61
Respondent counters that the Petition is not the plain, speedy, and adequate remedy since
petitioner did not show that he exerted all efforts to have his concern addressed by Congress.
It points out that it was Congress, not the Council, which adopted the rotational
scheme.62Chavez declared that the representation of Congress in the Council would be for
Congress to determine; thus, petitioner should have first asked Congress to repudiate the
rotational scheme agreement.63 Respondent insists that the practice and acquiescence of
Congress to this arrangement operates as an estoppel against any member of Congress to
deny the validity of this agreement.64 It also points out that petitioner has no locus standi to
 Page 25 of 84

file this Petition in his capacity as Chair of the House of Representatives Committee on whether the Judicial and Bar Council can be compelled, by writ of mandamus, to count
Justice absent any resolution by the Senate and the House of Representatives authorizing him petitioner's votes in the En Banc sessions of December 2 and 9, 2016.
to do so.65
I
Respondent likewise prays for the dismissal of the Petition on the ground that petitioner's
Every case brought to this Court must be filed by the party having the standing to file the
allegations are mere rehashes of the arguments and dissents in Chavez and are, thus, barred
case. The definition of legal standing is settled:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
by the doctrine of stare decisis.66 It insists that any issue on the interpretation of Article VIII,
Section 8(1) has already been settled in Chavez.67 Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question." In
private suits, standing is governed by the "real-parties-in interest" rule as contained in
Respondent reiterates the ruling in Chavez and argues that the framers of the Constitution
Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides that "every
intended for the Council to only have seven (7) members to provide a solution when there is
action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest." Accordingly,
a stalemate in the voting.68 It insists that Chavez has also settled the alleged "oversight and
the "real-party-in interest" is "the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment
technical omission" argued by petitioner when it stated that the membership of Congress to
in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit." Succinctly put, the plaintiff's standing
the Council was not in the interest of a certain constituency but in reverence to it as the third
is based on his own right to the relief sought.72
branch of the government.69

Respondent contends that petitioner has no standing to file this case absent a resolution from
Respondent argues that the grant of the Petition would create an imbalance since Article VIII
the House of Representatives authorizing him to do so.73 It anchors its argument on
treats each ex officio member as representing one (1) co-equal branch of the government.70 It
Philippine Constitutional Association v. Enriquez,74 where this Court
maintains that even assuming that there is an imbalance, it is not for this Court or the Council
stated:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
to remedy the imbalance since the remedy lies in the amendment of the constitutional
provision.71 While the petition in G.R. No. 113174 was filed by 16 Senators, including the Senate President
and the Chairman of the Committee on Finance, the suit was not authorized by the Senate
The case presents several procedural and substantive issues. Procedurally, this Court is asked
itself. Likewise, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 113766 and 113888 were filed without an enabling
to determine first, whether petitioner has the locus standi to file the Petition in the absence of
resolution for the purpose.75
a resolution of both Houses of Congress authorizing him for that purpose; second, whether
the Petition is the plain, speedy, and adequate remedy for addressing the issue of the Respondent, however, failed to read the entirety of the quoted portion. In Philippine
rotational representation arrangement; and third, whether the doctrine of stare decisis Constitutional Association, the procedural issue on standing was whether Senators could
operates as a bar for petitioner to question the ruling in Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council. question a presidential veto on an appropriations bill despite the absence of a Senate
resolution authorizing them to file the case. This Court, in addressing the issue, first
On the substantive issues, this Court is likewise asked to determine, first, whether the current
acknowledged that previous decisions have required Senators to first submit a Senate
six (6)-month rotational representation arrangement deprives Congress of its full
resolution authorizing the filing of the case. Nevertheless, this Court ruled that members of
participation in the deliberations in the Judicial and Bar Council; second, whether the Judicial
Congress have standing to question any action that impairs the Congress' powers and
and Bar Council committed grave abuse of discretion in adopting a six (6)-month rotational
privileges, regardless of whether there was a prior Congressional
representation arrangement absent a plenary action by both Houses of Congress; and finally,
resolution:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The legal standing of the Senate, as an institution, was recognized in Gonzales v. Macaraig,
Jr. . . . In said case, 23 Senators, comprising the entire membership of the Upper House of
Congress, filed a petition to nullify the presidential veto of Section 55 of the GAA of 1989.
The filing of the suit was authorized by Senate Resolution No. 381, adopted on February 2,
1989, and which reads as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Authorizing and Directing the Committee on Finance to Bring in the Name of the Senate of
the Philippines the Proper Suit with the Supreme Court of the Philippines contesting the
Constitutionality of the Veto by the President of Special and General Provisions, particularly
Section 55, of the General Appropriation Bill of 1989 (H.B. No. 19186) and For Other
Purposes.
In the United States, the legal standing of a House of Congress to sue has been recognized . . .
While the petition in G.R. No. 113174 was filed by 16 Senators, including the Senate President
and the Chairman of the Committee on Finance, the suit was not authorized by the Senate
itself. Likewise, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 113766 and 113888 were filed without an enabling
resolution for the purpose.
....
We rule that a member of the Senate, and of the House of Representatives for that matter, has
the legal standing to question the validity of a presidential veto or a condition imposed on an
item in an appropriation bill.
Where the veto is claimed to have been made without or in excess of the authority vested on
the President by the Constitution, the issue of an impermissible intrusion of the Executive
into the domain of the Legislature arises . . .
To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof,
since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution . .
An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but
nonetheless substantial injury, which can be questioned by a member of Congress . . . In such
a case, any member of Congress can have a resort to the courts.
Page 26 of 84
Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, as Amicus Curiae, noted[:]
This is, then, the clearest case of the Senate as a whole or individual Senators as such having
substantial interest in the question at issue. It could likewise be said that there was requisite
injury to their rights as Senators. It would then be futile to raise any locus standi issue. Any
intrusion into the domain appertaining to the Senate is to be resisted. Similarly, if the
situation were reversed, and it is the Executive Branch that could allege a transgression, its
officials could likewise file the corresponding action. What cannot be denied is that a Senator
has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the
Constitution in his office.76 (Emphasis supplied; Citations omitted.)
Every member of Congress has standing to question acts which affect the powers,
prerogatives, and privileges of Congress. In Pimentel v. Executive Secretary:77
As regards Senator Pimentel, it has been held that "to the extent the powers of Congress are
impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to
participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution." Thus, legislators have the
standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the
Constitution in their office and are allowed to sue to question the validity of any official
action which they claim infringes their prerogatives as legislators. The petition at bar invokes
the power of the Senate to grant or withhold its concurrence to a treaty entered into by the
executive branch, in this case, the Rome Statute. The petition seeks to order the executive
branch to transmit the copy of the treaty to the Senate to allow it to exercise such authority.
Senator Pimentel, as member of the institution, certainly has the legal standing to assert such
authority of the Senate.78 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Here, petitioner, as a member of Congress and the Chair of the House Committee on Justice,
alleges that the rotational representation arrangement adopted by respondent Judicial and
Bar Council impairs the prerogative of Congress to have full representation within the
Council. Petitioner need not have the required House resolution to file his Petition.
In any case, parties are vested by this Court with legal standing when constitutional
challenges have become justiciable, consistent with this Court's role in the constitutional
order. While the parties must first establish their right to appear before us on a given

question of law, they must, more importantly, present concrete cases and controversies. In
this instance, the continuing problematic application of Chavez vests petitioner, as the
current representative of the House to the Judicial and Bar Council, with sufficient standing
to raise this issue before us.
The Office of the Solicitor General, however, may have been confused when it filed its
Manifestation (in Lieu of Comment). It stated before this Court that the Manifestation is filed
by "[t]he Congress of the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Senate and the
House of Representatives, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) who in this case
acts as the People's Tribune."79
It is unclear whether the Office of the Solicitor General intends to represent Congress or to act
as the People's Tribune.
The Office of the Solicitor General's mandate is to "represent the Government of the
Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation,
proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer."80
Thus, as a general rule, the Office of the Solicitor General represents the Philippine
government in all legal proceedings. The rule has exceptions, such as when it takes an
adverse position and acts as the "People's Tribune." In Pimentel v. Commission on
Elections:81
True, the Solicitor General is mandated to represent the Government, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or
matter requiring the services of a lawyer. However, the Solicitor General may, as it has in
instances take a position adverse and contrary to that of the Government on the reasoning
that it is incumbent upon him to present to the court what he considers would legally uphold
the best interest of the government although it may run counter to a client's position.
....
As we commented on the role of the Solicitor General in cases pending before this
Court:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
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This Court does not expect the Solicitor General to waver in the performance of his duty. As a
matter of fact, the Court appreciates the participation of the Solicitor General in many
proceedings and his continued fealty to his assigned task. He should not therefore desist
from appearing before this Court even in those cases he finds his opinion inconsistent with
the Government or any of its agents he is expected to represent. The Court must be advised
of his position just as well.82 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Gonzales v. Chavez83 further explains:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Indeed, in the final analysis, it is the Filipino people as a collectivity that constitutes the
Republic of the Philippines. Thus, the distinguished client of the OSG is the people
themselves of which the individual lawyers in said office are a part.
....
Moreover, endowed with a broad perspective that spans the legal interests of virtually the
entire government officialdom, the OSG may be expected to transcend the parochial concerns
of a particular client agency and instead, promote and protect the public weal. Given such
objectivity, it can discern, metaphorically speaking, the panoply that is the forest and not just
the individual trees. Not merely will it strive for a legal victory circumscribed by the narrow
interests of the client office or official, but as well, the vast concerns of the sovereign which it
is committed to serve.84
The Office of the Solicitor General is not prohibited from taking a position adverse from that
of the Judicial and Bar Council. Its representation would be on behalf of the Filipino people,
instead of a particular government instrumentality.
Its representation in this case, however, is contradictory. It intends to represent Congress, a
government instrumentality, and act as the People's Tribune; that is, it will be taking a
position contrary to that of a government instrumentality. Obviously, the Office of the
Solicitor General cannot represent both at the same time.
Nevertheless, considering that the Office of the Solicitor General manifested that it would not
be representing the Judicial and Bar Council as mandated and will instead be taking an
adverse position, this Court will presume that it intends to act as the People's Tribune.

In future cases, however, the Office of the Solicitor General should be more cautious in
entering its appearance to this Court as the People's Tribune to prevent further confusion as
to its standing.
II
Respondent claims that the Petition is not the plain, speedy, and adequate remedy for
questioning the rotational representation arrangement adopted by Congress.85
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court primarily requires that there
must be no appeal, or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy available before filing
the petition:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. � When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal,
board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or
resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent
thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph
of section 3, Rule 46. (Emphasis supplied)
Citing the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies, respondent contends that the
Petition is not the plain, speedy, and adequate remedy since petitioner should have first
asked Congress to repudiate the rotational representation agreement.86
This rule, however, applies to administrative agencies, not to Congress. Respondent fails to
cite any provision of law or Congressional rule that requires petitioner to have his concern
addressed by Congress before filing a petition with this Court.
There is also a time element to be considered that would allow the direct resort to this Court.
In Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections,87 we stated that "a direct resort to this
Page 28 of 84
court is allowed when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must be addressed at
the most immediate time."88 We further recognized that "[e]xigency in certain situations
would qualify as an exception for direct resort to this [C]ourt."89
Under the Constitution, the President only has 90 days from the vacancy to appoint members
of the Supreme Court. Thus, the Judicial and Bar Council must be able to submit its list of
nominees before the running of the period.
Article VIII
Judicial Department
....
Section 4. (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate
Justices. It may sit en bane or in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven Members.
Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
This 90-day period is mandatory. Failure to comply is considered a culpable violation of the
Constitution. In De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council:90
[T]he usage in Section 4 (1), Article VIII of the word shall�an imperative, operating to
impose a duty that may be enforced�should not be disregarded. Thereby, Sections 4 (1)
imposes on the President the imperative duty to make an appointment of a Member of the
Supreme Court within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy. The failure by the
President to do so will be a clear disobedience to the Constitution.91 (Emphasis in the
original, citation omitted)
Admittedly, petitioner's prayer to have his vote counted in the December 2 and 9, 2016 En
Banc Meetings has already become moot with the appointments of Associate Justice Samuel
R. Martires and Associate Justice Noel G. Tijam.92 Nevertheless:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Th[is] Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if: first, there is a grave violation of the
Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public
interest is involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of

controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is
capable of repetition yet evading review.93 (Citation omitted)
An erroneous interpretation of a constitutional provision would be considered a grave
violation of the Constitution. Judicial appointments are likewise of paramount public
interest. This case will also settle, once and for all, the issue on the interpretation of Article
VIII, Section 8(1).
This issue will once again arise considering that two (2) more justices are set to retire this
year.94 There is, thus, a limited amount of time for petitioner to question the lists of
nominees submitted by respondent to the Office of the President. A direct resort to this Court
would be warranted under the circumstances.
III
Respondent argues that this Petition is barred by the doctrine of stare decisis95 considering
that the interpretation of Article VIII, Section 8(1) has already been settled in Chavez v.
Judicial and Bar Council.96
The principle of stare decisis is derived from the Latin maxim "stare decisis, et non quieta
movere"; that is, "it is best to adhere to decisions and not to disturb questions put at rest."97
Its function is to ensure certainty and stability in the legal system.98 Ruling by precedent is
meant to assure the public of the court's objectivity.99Stare decisis provides the public with a
reasonable expectation that courts will rule in a certain manner given a similar set of facts.
Courts, however, are cautioned against "blind adherence to precedents."100 Decisions of this
Court previously found to have been valid may become impractical, contrary to law, or even
unconstitutional. It then becomes the duty of this Court to abandon that
decision:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The principle of stare decisis does not mean blind adherence to precedents. The doctrine or
rule laid down, which has been followed for years, no matter how sound it may be, if found
to be contrary to law, must be abandoned. The principle of stare decisis does not and should
not apply when there is conflict between the precedent and the law. The duty of this Court is
to forsake and abandon any doctrine or rule found to be in violation of the law in force.101
Page 29 of 84
Similarly, in De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council:102
The Court, as the highest court of the land, may be guided but is not controlled by precedent.
Thus, the Court, especially with a new membership, is not obliged to follow blindly a
particular decision that it determines, after re-examination, to call for a rectification. The
adherence to precedents is strict and rigid in a common-law setting like the United Kingdom,
where judges make law as binding as an Act of Parliament. But ours is not a common-law
system; hence, judicial precedents are not always strictly and rigidly followed. A judicial
pronouncement in an earlier decision may be followed as a precedent in a subsequent case
only when its reasoning and justification are relevant, and the court in the latter case accepts
such reasoning and justification to be applicable to the case. The application of the precedent
is for the sake of convenience and stability.103 (Citations omitted)
Whenever this Court renders its decisions, the intended effects of those decisions to future
cases are taken into consideration. The changing membership of the bench likewise
contributes to the evolution of this Court's stand on certain issues and cases. Ruling by
precedent, thus, requires more than a mechanical application:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[T]he use of precedents is never mechanical.
Some assumptions normally creep into the facts established for past cases. These
assumptions may later on prove to be inaccurate or to be accurate only for a given historical
period. Sometimes, the effects assumed by justices who decide past cases do not necessarily
happen. Assumed effects are given primacy whenever the spirit or intent of the law is
considered in the interpretation of a legal provision. Some aspect of the facts or the context of
these facts would not have been fully considered. It is also possible that doctrines in other
aspects of the law related to a precedent may have also evolved.
In such cases, the use of precedents will unduly burden the parties or produce absurd or
unworkable outcomes. Precedents will not be useful to achieve the purposes for which the
law would have been passed.104 (Citations omitted)

There is also a need to abandon decisions "when this Court discerns, after full deliberation,
that a continuing error in the interpretation of the spirit and intent of a constitutional
provision exists."105 Assuring the public of stability in the law and certainty of court actions
is important. It is, however, more important for this Court to be right. Thus, it becomes
imperative for this Court to re-examine previous decisions to avoid continuing its
error:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The rule of stare decisis is entitled to respect. Stability in the law . . . is desirable. But
idolatrous reverence for precedent, simply as precedent, no longer rules. More important
than anything else is that the court should be right. And particularly is it not wise to
subordinate legal reason to case law and by so doing perpetuate error when it is brought to
mind that the views now expressed conform in principle to the original decision and that
since the first decision to the contrary was sent forth there has existed a respectable opinion
of non-conformity in the court. Indeed, on at least one occasion has the court broken away
from the revamped doctrine, while even in the last case in point the court was as evenly
divided as it was possible to be and still reach a decision.106
Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council was not a unanimous decision of this Court. Vigorous
dissents accompanied not only the main decision but also the resolution on the motion for
reconsideration. This Petition precisely assails Chavez's outcome and its effect on the
diminished representation of Congress in the vetting process of judicial nominees. Rather
than dismiss this case on the basis of stare decisis, it would be more prudent for this Court to
revisit Chavez in order to settle the issue.
IV
The doctrine of Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council107 must be abandoned and revised.
Under the Constitution, Congress is bicameral in nature. It consists of two (2) chambers: the
Senate and the House of Representatives. Article VI, Section 1
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ARTICLE VI
Page 30 of 84
The Legislative Department
Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall
consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the
people by the provision on initiative and referendum. (Emphasis supplied)
The Constitution considers both chambers as separate and distinct from each other. The
manner of elections, terms of office, and organization of each chamber is provided for under
separate provisions of the Constitution.
Senators are "elected at large by the qualified voters of the Philippines."108 Members of the
House of Representatives are elected by their respective legislative districts109 or through the
party-list system.110 The differing nature of its elections affects the scope of its
representation. Senators represent a national constituency while the House of
Representatives represents only a particular legislative district or marginalized and
underrepresented sector.
A Senator's term of office is for six (6) years111 while the term of office of a Member of the
House of Representatives is for three (3) years.112
Each chamber chooses its own officers.113 Each chamber promulgates its own rules of
procedure.114 Each chamber maintains separate Journals.115 Each chamber keeps separate
Records of its proceedings.116 Each chamber disciplines its own members.117 Each chamber
even maintains separate addresses.118 There is no mechanism that would allow the two (2)
chambers to represent the other:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
There is no presiding officer for the Congress of the Philippines, but there is a Senate.
President and a Speaker of the House of Representatives. There is no single journal for the
Congress of the Philippines, but there is a journal for the Senate and a journal for the House
of Representatives. There is no record of proceedings for the entire Congress of the
Philippines, but there is a Record of proceedings for the Senate and a Record of proceedings
for the House of Representatives. The Congress of the Philippines does not discipline its
members. It is the Senate that promulgates its own rules and disciplines its members.
Likewise, it is the House that promulgates its own rules and disciplines its members.

No Senator reports to the Congress of the Philippines. Rather, he or she reports to the Senate.
No Member of the House of Representatives reports to the Congress of the Philippines.
Rather, he or she reports to the House of Representatives.
Congress, therefore, is the Senate and the House of Representatives. Congress does not exist
separate from the Senate and the House of Representatives.
Any Senator acting ex officio or as a representative of the Senate must get directions from the
Senate. By constitutional design, he or she cannot get instructions from the House of
Representatives. If a Senator represents the Congress rather than simply the Senate, then he
or she must be open to amend or modify the instructions given to him or her by the Senate if
the House of Representatives' instructions are different. Yet, the Constitution vests
disciplinary power only on the Senate for any Senator.
The same argument applies to a Member of the House of Representatives. No Senator may
carry instructions from the House of Representatives. No Member of the House of
Representatives may carry instructions from the Senate. Neither Senator nor Member of the
House of Representatives may therefore represent Congress as a whole.119
Thus, there is no Member of Congress that can represent all of Congress. Congress is
represented by both the Senate and the House of Representatives. The Constitution itself
provides for only one (1) instance when both chambers must vote
jointly:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ARTICLE VII
Executive Department. . . .
Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion,
when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under
martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or
Page 31 of 84
in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all
its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension,
which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President,
the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period
to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safely
requires it. (Emphasis supplied)
In Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council,120 this Court, however, ruled that Congress is only
entitled to one (1) seat in the Judicial and Bar Council, pursuant to its interpretation of Article
VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution. Article VIII, Section 8(1)
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ARTICLE VIII
Judicial Department. . . .
Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the
Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice,
and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated
Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the
private sector. (Emphasis supplied)
A verba legis interpretation of Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution leads to an
ambiguity and disregards the bicameral nature of Congress. Chavez presumes that one (1)
member of Congress can vote on behalf of the entire Congress.
It is a basic rule of statutory construction that constitutional provisions must be harmonized
so that all words are operative. Thus, in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary:121
It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the
Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the
provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so
interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a
particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole
 Page 32 of 84

purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any On October 8, 1986, the Article on the Judiciary was reopened to introduce amendments to
reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together. the proposed Sections 3, 7, 10, 11, 13, and 14 only.128 The entire Article on the Legislature,
meanwhile, was approved on October 9, 1986.129 By October 15, 1986, the Constitution was
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a
presented to the President of the Constitutional Commission, Cecilia Mu�oz Palma.130
construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make the
words idle and nugatory.122 (Emphasis provided, citations omitted) The chronology of events shows that the provision on the composition of the Judicial and Bar
Council had been passed at a time when the framers were still of the belief that there was to
Civil Liberties Union also instructs us that constitutional interpretation should depend on the
be a unicameral legislature. Thus, Section 8(1) provides for only "a representative" instead of
understanding of the people adopting it, rather than how the framers interpreted
"representatives."
it:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
However, Section 8(1) must also be interpreted according to the understanding of the people
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the
who ratified it.
constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting
Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail as said proceedings are Historically, both the Senate and the House of Representatives sent their members to sit in
powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the the Judicial and Bar Council:131
constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and
Ex Officio Members Representing the Senate, �
as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large
majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the Congress: �
polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the
constitution from what appears upon its face." The proper interpretation therefore depends � �
more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framer[s']
WIGBERTO E. TA�ADA 2 March 1988 to 21 May 1990
understanding thereof.123 (Emphasis provided, citations omitted)
+RAUL S. ROCO 30 September 1992 to 3 March 1993
Resort to the records of the Constitutional Commission to discern the framers' intent must
always be with the understanding of its context and its contemporary consequences.124 ALBERTO G. ROMULO 14 April 1993 to 1 August 1995
Records show that Article VIII, Section 8(1) was approved by the Constitutional Commission
on July 19, 1986.125 On July 21, 1986, the Commission voted to amend the proposal of a +MARCELO B. FERNAN 2 August 1995 to 31 December 1996
unicameral "National Assembly" to a bicameral "Congress."126
+RAUL S. ROCO 1 January 1997 to 30 July 1998
The change of legislative structure led Commissioner Christian Monsod on July 30, 1986 to
+RENATO L. CAYETANO 31 July 1998 to 31 January 2000
remark:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. 1 February 2000 to 29 November 2000
Last week, we voted for a bicameral legislature. Perhaps it is symptomatic of what the
thinking of this group is, that all the provisions that were being drafted up to that time +MIRIAM D. SANTIAGO 10 January 2001 to 14 February 2001
assumed a unicameral government.127
 Page 33 of 84

+RENATO L. CAYETANO 16 May 2001 to 28 August 2001 ALLAN PETER S.CAYETANO 8 August 2001 to 3 March 2003

FRANCIS N. PANGILINAN 29 August 2001 to August 2004 MARCELINO C. LIBANAN 4 March 2003 to 8 August 2003

� 23 August 2004 to 30 June 2007 SIMEON A. DATUMANONG 9 August 2004 to 30 June 2007

� 6 August 2007 to 23 November 2008 MATIAS V. DEFENSOR, JR. 8 August 2007 to 30 June 2010

FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO 24 November 2008 to 30 June 2013 NIEL C. TUPAS, JR. 29 July 2010 to 30 June 2013

AQUILINO MARTIN DL. PIMENTEL III 23 July 2013 to 31 December 2013 � 1 January 2014 to 30 June 2014

� 1 July 2014 to 31 December 2014 � 1 January 2015 to 30 June 2015

� 1 July 2015 to 31 December 2015 REYNALDO V. UMALI 3 August 2016 to date

LEILA M. DE LIMA 26 July 2016 to 19 September 2016 From the promulgation of the Constitution, Congress already recognized that "a
representative of Congress" can only mean one (1) representative from each chamber. This
RICHARD J. GORDON 19 September 2016 to date
interpretation was so prevalent that from 2001, each member from the Senate and the House
� � of Representatives was given one (1) full vote.132 This is the representation of Congress
contemplated in the Constitution.
Ex Officio Members Representing the House of �
The current practice of alternate representation not only diminishes Congress' representation.
Representatives, Congress: � It negates it.133

� � When a Senator sits in the Council, he or she can only represent the Senate. Likewise, when a
Member of the House of Representatives sits in the Council, he or she can only represent the
+ROGACIANO M. MERCADO 10 December 1987 to 23 February 1989
House of Representatives. Congress is not represented at all in this kind of arrangement.
ISIDRO C. ZARRAGA 31 July 1989 to 12 August 1992
The composition of the Judicial and Bar Council is representative of the constituencies and
PABLO P. GARCIA 26 August 1992 to 8 March 1995 sectors affected by judicial appointments. Hence, practicing lawyers, prosecutors, the legal
academe, members of the Bench, and the private sector are represented in the Council.
ISIDRO C. ZARRAGA 28 June 1995 to 30 June 1998
Members of Congress are the only officials within the Judicial and Bar Council that are
ALFREDO E. ABUEG 31 July 1998 to 29 November 2000
elected. The rest of the officials are appointed by the President. Thus, their membership

+HENRY P. LANOT 14 December 2000 to 30 June 2001 within the Council is the only genuine representation of the People. Their input in the

possible candidates to the judiciary is as invaluable as that of a member of the legal academe
or that of the private sector.
The antecedents of this case only serve to highlight the absurd results wrought by Chavez. In
2013, then Representative Tupas approached the Judicial and Bar Council to personally
inform it of the agreed representation between the Senate and the House of Representatives.
When told by Chief Justice Sereno that she had already received a letter from then Senate
President Drilon informing the Council of the agreed representation, Representative Tupas
replied that he was not aware of the letter:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[Congressman Tupas] said that in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in April this
year, the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Senate President authorized him
and Senator Pimentel, Chairperson of the Committee on Justice of the Senate to discuss the
matter of representation to the JBC. They decided that representation would be on a rotation
basis. For the first six (6) months, Senator Pimentel would be the one to represent both
Houses of Congress; and for the next six (6) months, it would be [him]. In the absence of
Senator Pimentel, Congressman Tupas will automatically attend the meetings, and vice
versa. He cautioned that since it is quite difficult for both Houses to come up with an
agreement, it would not be good to assume that whenever the Senate President or the
Speaker of the House writes the JBC, it is the decision of Congress. It should be a
communication from both Houses. He then requested that he be furnished with copies of all
notices from the JBC even during the term of Senator Pimentel.
Chief Justice Sereno clarified that she received the Letter of the Senate President Drilon
stating, among other things, that the Speaker of the House and the Senate President agreed
that Senator Pimentel would be the one to represent Congress until December 31, 2013, but
that in his absence it would be Congressman Tupas. She assured both Congressman Tupas
and Senator Pimentel that they will both receive copies of all notices and information that are
being circulated among the JBC Members. She thanked Congressman Tupas for personally
informing the Council of the agreement between the two Houses of Congress, thus giving a
higher level of comfort than it had already given.
Congressman Tupas mentioned that he was not aware that the Senate President sent a letter.
His assumption is that the information would come from both Houses, not just from the
Page 34 of 84
Senate. He thus came to the meeting to personally inform the JBC of the agreement. He
thanked the Chief Justice and asked for permission to leave.
Senator Pimentel likewise requested that he also be furnished with copies of all documents
during the rotation of Congressman Tupas. He then requested for a three-minute break, as he
had some matters to discuss with the Congressman before leaving.134 (Emphasis supplied)
There is no office or officer in Congress that can represent both chambers. Representative
Tupas recognized this difficulty and cautioned the Council that it should never presume that
one (1) chamber can speak for the entire Congress. He proved this point when he told the
Council that he was unaware of any letter sent by the Senate President.
Chavez forces one (1) chamber of Congress to arrogate upon itself all the powers,
prerogatives, and privileges of the entire Congress in the Judicial and Bar Council. This is
contrary to its bicameral nature.
When members of Congress sit in the Judicial and Bar Council, it may be with the instruction
of their respective chambers, as Representative Tupas demonstrated in the July 23, 2013 En
Banc Meeting. Their votes may likewise be constrained by resolutions and actions of the
Congressional Committees they represent. They do not just represent themselves. They are
"representatives of Congress" "ex officio"135
Of the two (2) chambers in Congress, the House of Representatives represent constituencies
on a more local scale. As pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, current voting
patterns of the Council shows that a large number of appointees were for the lower
courts:136
Court/Tribunal
Number of Appointees
Supreme Court
1
Court of Appeals
 Page 35 of 84

0 Chavez also implied that the framers intended for the Council's membership to be seven (7),
not eight (8).
Legal Education Board
Article VIII, Section 8(1), however, does not provide a numerical count for its membership
1
unlike in other the provisions of the Constitution.138 Increasing the Council's membership to

Sandiganbayan eight (8) would not violate the provisions of the Constitution.

1 Chavez also insisted that the Council should have an odd-number representation so that one
(1) member could function as a tie-breaker.
Court of Tax Appeals
Judicial nominees, however, are not decided by a "yes" or "no" vote. The Council submits to
1 the President a list of at least three (3) potential nominees who garnered a plurality of the
votes. Some nominees may even have the same number of votes, and the Council will still
Ombudsman
include all of those names in the shortlist.
0
The shortlist dated December 2, 2016 for the vacancy of Associate Justice Perez contained the
Lower Courts following names:139

38 1. REYES, Jose Jr. C.

Chavez deprives Congress its opportunity to fully represent its constituencies, whether at the -
national or at the local level.
7 votes
The purported reasons for having only one (1) representative of Congress to the Council are
2. BRUSELAS, Apolinario Jr. D.
illusory.
-
Chavez stated that Congress should be represented in the Council by only one (1) member
"not because it was in the interest of a certain constituency, but in reverence to it as a major 5 votes
branch of government."137
3. DIMAAMPAO, Japar B.
Within the Council, the Executive is represented by the Secretary of Justice, considered as the
alter ego of the President. The Judiciary is represented by the Chief Justice. Congress, -
however, operates through a Senate and a House of Representatives. Two (2) separate and
5 votes
distinct chambers cannot be represented by a single individual.
4. MARTIRES, Samuel R.
 Page 36 of 84

- -

5 votes 4 votes

5. REYES, Andres Jr. B. 6. TIJAM, Noel G.

- -

4 votes 4 votes

The shortlist dated December 9, 2016 for the vacancy of Associate Justice Brion contained the 7. VENTURA-JIMENO, Rita Linda S.
following names:140
-
1. CARANDANG, Rosmari D.
4 votes
-
As demonstrated, no tie-breaker was needed in the preparation of the shortlist. Insisting that
6 votes the composition of the Council should be an odd number is unnecessary. The Council will
still be able to discharge its functions regardless of whether it is composed of seven (7) or
2. BRUSELAS, Apolinario Jr. D.
eight (8) members.\

-
V

5 votes
Respondent Judicial and Bar Council, however, did not commit grave abuse of discretion

3. REYES, Jose, Jr. C. when it adopted the six (6)-month rotational representation arrangement.

- Grave abuse of discretion is defined as:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

5 votes [S]uch capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction . .
. , or, in other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
4. DIMAAMPAO, Japar B. reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
-
contemplation of law.141 (Citations omitted)
4 votes
Respondent Judicial and Bar Council was merely implementing a prior decision of this Court
5. LAZARO-JAVIER, Amy C. when it refused to count petitioner's votes. A relevant portion of the Chavez's, fallo
states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The Judicial and Bar Council is hereby enjoined to reconstitute itself so that only one (1)
member of Congress will sit as a representative in its proceedings, in accordance with Section
8 (1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.142
The method of reconstitution was left to the discretion of the Judicial and Bar Council, in
recognition of its status as an independent constitutional body. The Council, in turn,
implemented Chavez by requiring that Congress provide it with only one (1) representative.
In the July 23, 2013 En Banc Meeting, Representative Tupas relayed the instructions of the
House of Representatives. Then Senate President Drilon sent the instructions of the Senate
through a letter to the Chief Justice. Both the Senate and the House of Representatives did not
offer any other type of representation that may have been agreed upon. The Council,
therefore, was merely complying with the directive in Chavez. In De Castro v. Judicial and
Bar Council:143
Judicial decisions assume the same authority as a statute itself and, until authoritatively
abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria that must
control the actuations, not only of those called upon to abide by them, but also of those duty-
bound to enforce obedience to them.144
These events, however, highlight the inevitable difficulty in implementing Chavez's
interpretation of Article VIII, Section 8(1). There is no one (1) office in Congress that could
provide the Council with one (1) representative. The Council has no authority to order
Congress to jointly convene for the determination of its sole representative. Thus, the Council
would only be able to implement what is practicable, that is, whatever arrangement the
Congressional representatives may have agreed upon. Considering that the Congressional
representatives have not yet manifested to the Council that it was considering another type of
arrangement, the Council could not have been faulted for refusing to count petitioner's votes
at a time when Senate was representing Congress in the Council.
The Office of the Solicitor General likewise requests that this Court take up the matter of
rotational representation in the review of the Council's rules in Aguinaldo v. Judicial and Bar
Council.145
Page 37 of 84
In Aguinaldo, the new rules and practices of the Judicial and Bar Council were docketed as a
separate administrative matter to be discussed at a future time.146
This case, however, is a matter of constitutional interpretation. There is, thus, no need to
direct the Judicial and Bar Council to review its own rules to allow for the interpretation of
this constitutional provision.
VI
The Judicial and Bar Council could have been compelled by a writ of mandamus to count
petitioner's votes in the En Banc sessions of December 2 and 9, 2016.
Mandamus is provided for under Rule 65, Section 3 of the Rules of
Court:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 3. Petition for Mandamus. - When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying
that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time
to be specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the
petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts
of the respondent.
Mandamus may issue to compel the performance of a ministerial duty. It cannot be issued to
compel the performance of a discretionary act. In Metro Manila Development Authority v.
Concerned Residents of Manila Bay:147
Generally, the writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial duty. A
ministerial duty is one that "requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment."
It connotes an act in which nothing is left to the discretion of the person executing it. It is a
"simple, definite duty arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist and imposed by
law." Mandamus is available to compel action, when refused, on matters involving

discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion one way or the other.148
(Citations omitted)
The difference between a discretionary act and a ministerial act
settled:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well delineated. A purely
ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in
a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or
the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the
law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the
duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is
ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official
discretion or judgment.149 (Citation omitted)
The determination of the qualifications and fitness of judicial applicants is discretionary on
the part of the Judicial and Bar Council.150 A writ of mandamus cannot be issued to compel
the council to withdraw a list originally submitted and to add other nominees that have not
previously qualified.151
De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council,152 however, states that a writ of mandamus may be
issued to compel the Council to comply with its constitutional mandate to submit a list of
nominees to the President before the 90-day period to appoint:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The duty of the JBC to submit a list of nominees before the start of the President's mandatory
90-day period to appoint is ministerial, but its selection of the candidates whose names will
be in the list to be submitted to the President lies within the discretion of the JBC. The object
of the petitions for mandamus herein should only refer to the duty to submit to the President
the list of nominees for every vacancy in the Judiciary, because in order to constitute
unlawful neglect of duty, there must be an unjustified delay in performing that duty. For
mandamus to lie against the JBC, therefore, there should be an unexplained delay on its part
in recommending nominees to the Judiciary, that is, in submitting the list to the President.153
(Citation omitted)
Page 38 of 84
The Judicial and Bar Council has the ministerial duty to count the votes of all its members.
Petitioner, as the Chair of the House of Representatives Committee on Justice, should be
considered a regular ex officio member of the Council, and his votes in the December 2 and 9,
is
2016 En Banc Meetings should have been counted. This relief, however, has already become
moot in light of the recent appointments to this Court. In future deliberations, however, the
Judicial and Bar Council should have the ministerial duty to separately count the votes of
both Congressional representatives in the Council.
Accordingly, I vote to GRANT the Petition. The doctrine in Chavez v. Judicial and Bar
Council154 must be ABANDONED and the Judicial and Bar Council must be DIRECTED to
separately count the votes of both Congressional representatives in the Council in its En Banc
deliberations.
10. FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA, PRESIDING JUDGE, MCTC, COMPOSTELA-NEW
BATAAN, COMPOSTELA VALLEY PROVINCE, Petitioner, v. JUDICIAL AND BAR
COUNCIL, Respondent.
FACTS : The petitioner was appointed on September 18, 2012 as the Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Compostela-New Bataan, Poblacion, Compostela Valley
Province, Region XI, which is a first-level court. On September 27, 2013, he applied for the
vacant position of Presiding Judge in the following Regional Trial Courts (RTCs): Branch 31,
Tagum City; Branch 13, Davao City; and Branch 6, Prosperidad, Agusan Del Sur In a letter2
dated December 18, 2013, JBC's Office of Recruitment, Selection and Nomination, informed
the petitioner that he was not included in the list of candidates for the said stations. On the
same date, the petitioner sent a letter, through electronic mail, seeking reconsideration of his
non-inclusion in the list of considered applicants and protesting the inclusion of applicants
who did not pass the prejudicature examination. The petitioner was informed by the JBC
Executive Officer, through a letter3 dated February 3, 2014, that his protest and
reconsideration was duly noted by the JBC en banc. However, its decision not to include his
name in the list of applicants was upheld due to the JBC's long-standing policy of opening
the chance for promotion to second-level courts to, among others, incumbent judges who
have served in their current position for at least five years, and since the petitioner has been a
 Page 39 of 84

judge only for more than a year, he was excluded from the list. This caused the petitioner to applicant to second-level judge is not properly compellable by mandamus inasmuch as it
take recourse to this Court involves the exercise of sound discretion by the JBC

ISSUE : WON the writ of certiorari and prohibition cannot issue to prevent the JBC from The petition for declaratory relief is improper. "An action for declaratory relief should be
performing its principal function under the Constitution to recommend appointees to the filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other written instrument, and
Judiciary because the JBC is not a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The
relief sought under this remedy includes the interpretation and determination of the validity
HELD : The remedies of certiorari and prohibition are tenable. "The present Rules of Court
of the written instrument and the judicial declaration of the parties' rights or duties
uses two special civil actions for determining and correcting grave abuse of discretion
thereunder."
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
In this case, the petition for declaratory relief did not involve an unsound policy. Rather, the
In this case, it is clear that the JBC does not fall within the scope of a tribunal, board, or officer
petition specifically sought a judicial declaration that the petitioner has the right to be
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. In the process of selecting and screening
included in the list of applicants although he failed to meet JBC's five-year requirement
applicants, the JBC neither acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor assumed unto
policy. Again, the Court reiterates that no person possesses a legal right under the
itself any performance of judicial or quasi-judicial prerogative. However, since the
Constitution to be included in the list of nominees for vacant judicial positions. The
formulation of guidelines and criteria, including the policy that the petitioner now assails, is
opportunity of appointment to judicial office is a mere privilege, and not a judicially
necessary and incidental to the exercise of the JBC's constitutional mandate, a determination
enforceable right that may be properly claimed by any person
must be made on whether the JBC has acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in issuing and enforcing the said policy. Furthermore, the instant petition must necessarily fail because this Court does not have
original jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are
Besides, the Court can appropriately take cognizance of this case by virtue of the Court's
involved.18 The special civil action of declaratory relief falls under the exclusive jurisdiction
power of supervision over the JBC. Jurisprudence provides that the power of supervision is
of the appropriate RTC pursuant to Section 1919 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by
the power of oversight, or the authority to see that subordinate officers perform their duties.
R.A.No. 7691

Following this definition, the supervisory authority of the Court over the JBC is to see to it
Therefore, by virtue of the Court's supervisory duty over the JBC and in the exercise of its
that the JBC complies with its own rules and procedures. Thus, when the policies of the JBC
expanded judicial power, the Court assumes jurisdiction over the present petition. But in any
are being attacked, then the Court, through its supervisory authority over the JBC, has the
event, even if the Court will set aside procedural infirmities
duty to inquire about the matter and ensure that the JBC complies with its own rules
11. RE: PETITION FOR RECOGNITION OF THE EXEMPTION OF THE GSIS FROM
The remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by the petitioner in assailing JBC's policy. It is
PAYMENT OF LEGAL FEES. A.M. No. 08-2-01-0 February 11, 2010
essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that the applicant should have a clear legal
right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform FACTS:
the act required. The remedy of mandamus, as an extraordinary writ, lies only to compel an
officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one.14 Clearly, the use of discretion The GSIS seeks exemption from the payment of legal fees imposed on GOCCs under Sec 22,
and the performance of a ministerial act are mutually exclusive. Clearly, to be included as an Rule 141 (Legal Fees) of the ROC. The said provision states:

SEC. 22. Government exempt. – The Republic of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities are exempt from paying the legal fees provided in this Rule. Local
government corporations and government-owned or controlled corporations with or without
independent charter are not exempt from paying such fees. xx
The GSIS anchors its petition on Sec 39 of its charter, RA 8291 (The GSIS Act of 1997):
SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien. – It is hereby declared to be the policy
of the State that the actuarial solvency of the funds of the GSIS shall be preserved and
maintained at all times and that contribution rates necessary to sustain the benefits under this
Act shall be kept as low as possible in order not to burden the members of the GSIS and their
employers. Taxes imposed on the GSIS tend to impair the actuarial solvency of its funds and
increase the contribution rate necessary to sustain the benefits of this Act. Accordingly,
notwithstanding any laws to the contrary, the GSIS, its assets, revenues including accruals
thereto, and benefits paid, shall be exempt from all taxes, assessments, fees, charges or duties
of all kinds. These exemptions shall continue unless expressly and specifically revoked and
any assessment against the GSIS as of the approval of this Act are hereby considered paid.
Consequently, all laws, ordinances, regulations, issuances, opinions or jurisprudence
contrary to or in derogation of this provision are hereby deemed repealed, superseded and
rendered ineffective and without legal force and effect. xx
Required to comment on the GSIS’ petition, the OSG maintains that the petition should be
denied. On this Court’s order, the Office of the Chief Attorney (OCAT) submitted a report
and recommendation on the petition of the GSIS and the comment of the OSG thereon.
According to the OCAT, the claim of the GSIS for exemption from the payment of legal fees
has no legal basis.
ISSUE: May the legislature exempt the GSIS from legal fees imposed by the Court on GOCCs
and local government units?
HELD: WHEREFORE, the petition of the GSIS for recognition of its exemption from the
payment of legal fees imposed under Sec 22 of Rule 141 of the ROC on GOCCs and LGUs is
hereby DENIED .
NO
Page 40 of 84
Rule 141 (on Legal Fees) of the ROC was promulgated by this Court in the exercise of its rule-
making powers under Sec 5(5), Art VIII of the Constitution:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxxxxxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged.
xxxxxxxx
Clearly, therefore, the payment of legal fees under Rule 141 of the ROC is an integral part of
the rules promulgated by this Court pursuant to its rule-making power under Section 5(5),
Article VIII of the Constitution. In particular, it is part of the rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure in courts. Indeed, payment of legal (or docket) fees is a jurisdictional
requirement.
Since the payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by this Court
concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or
modified by Congress. As one of the safeguards of this Court’s institutional independence,
the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now the Court’s
exclusive domain. That power is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, much less
with the Executive.
NOTES:
-The GSIS cannot successfully invoke the right to social security of government employees in
support of its petition. It is a corporate entity whose personality is separate and distinct from
that of its individual members. The rights of its members are not its rights; its rights, powers
and functions pertain to it solely and are not shared by its members.
-Congress could not have carved out an exemption for the GSIS from the payment of legal
fees without transgressing another equally important institutional safeguard of the Court’s
independence — fiscal autonomy. Fiscal autonomy recognizes the power and authority of the

Court to levy, assess and collect fees, including legal fees. Moreover, legal fees under Rule
141 have two basic components, the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and the Special
Allowance for the Judiciary Fund (SAJF). The laws which established the JDF and the
SAJF[33] expressly declare the identical purpose of these funds to “guarantee the
independence of the Judiciary as mandated by the Constitution and public policy.” Legal fees
therefore do not only constitute a vital source of the Court’s financial resources but also
comprise an essential element of the Court’s fiscal independence. Any exemption from the
payment of legal fees granted by Congress to government-owned or controlled corporations
and local government units will necessarily reduce the JDF and the SAJF. Undoubtedly, such
situation is constitutionally infirm for it impairs the Court’s guaranteed fiscal autonomy and
erodes its independence.
-Speaking for the Court, then Associate Justice (now Chief Justice) Reynato S. Puno traced the
history of the rule-making power of this Court and highlighted its evolution and
development in Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice:
Under the 1935 Constitution, the power of this Court to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure was granted but it appeared to bco-existent with legislative
power for it was subject to the power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement. Thus, its
Section 13, Article VIII provides:
Sec. 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall
be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby repealed
as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to
alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter or supplement
the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of
law in the Philippines.
The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may appear on its surface. In In
re Cunanan, Congress in the exercise of its power to amend rules of the Supreme Court
regarding admission to the practice of law, enacted the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953 which
considered as a passing grade, the average of 70% in the bar examinations after July 4, 1946
Page 41 of 84
up to August 1951 and 71% in the 1952 bar examinations. This Court struck down the law as
unconstitutional. In his ponencia, Mr. Justice Diokno held that “x x x the disputed law is not
a legislation; it is a judgment – a judgment promulgated by this Court during the aforecited
years affecting the bar candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke
these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court,
and not the legislative nor executive department, that may do so. Any attempt on the part of
these departments would be a clear usurpation of its function, as is the case with the law in
question.” The venerable jurist further ruled: “It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate
power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law
passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities say,
merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.” By its ruling, this Court qualified the
absolutist tone of the power of Congress to “repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.
The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the 1973 Constitution. For the
1973 Constitution reiterated the power of this Court “to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, x x x which, however, may be repealed, altered
or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa x x x.” More completely, Section 5(2)5 of its
Article X provided:
xxxxxxxxx
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.
xxxxxxxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, and the integration of the Bar, which, however, may be
repealed, altered, or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform
for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights.

Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further strengthened the independence of the
judiciary by giving to it the additional power to promulgate rules governing the integration
of the Bar.
The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary. Among
others, it enhanced the rule making power of this Court. Its Section 5(5), Article VIII
provides:
xxxxxxxxx
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxxxxxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform
for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective
unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given
the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights. The Court was also granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987
Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of
pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so
with the Executive.
12. Estipona v Lobrigo
Estipona, Jr. accused in Criminal Case, Possession of Dangerous Drugs, (Shabu),
Page 42 of 84
Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea Bargaining Agreement,
praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and instead, to enter a plea of guilty for violation of
Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession)
He argued that Section 23(disallowance of plea bargaining) of R.A. No. 9165 violates:
(1) the intent of the law expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2 thereof;
(2) the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution; and
(3) the principle of separation of powers among the three equal branches of the government.
Prosecution moved for the denial for being contrary to Section 23 which is said to be justified
by the Congress' prerogative to choose which offense it would allow plea bargaining.
Respondent Judge Frank E. Lobrigo issued an Order denying Estipona's motion
Estipona 􏰀led a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied. hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
I. WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165, WHICH PROHIBITS PLEA
BARGAINING IN ALL VIOLATIONS OF THE SAID LAW, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR
BEING VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF
THE LAW.
II. WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS IT
ENCROACHED UPON THE POWER OF THE SUPREME COURT TO PROMULGATE
RULES OF PROCEDURE. –YES
-The Supreme Court held that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure is now Their exclusive domain and no longer shared with the Executive and
Legislative departments.
The Court further held that the separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of
our government has erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules

of pleading, practice and procedure within the sole province of this Court. The other
branches trespass upon this prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that effectively
repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by the Court.
III. WHETHER THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, AS PRESIDED BY HON. FRANK E.
LOBRIGO, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT REFUSED TO DECLARE SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 9165 AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
RULING
Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
Power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now Our exclusive domain
and no longer shared with the Executive and Legislative departments.
Under the1935 Constitution, the power of this Court to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure was granted but it appeared to be co-existent with
legislative power for it was subject to the power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement.
Section 13, Article VIII provides
The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines
The power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may appear on its surface. In In re:
Cunanan Congress in the exercise of its power to amend rules of the Supreme Court
regarding admission to the practice of law
1973 Constitution reiterated the power of this Court "to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, x xx which, however, may be repealed, altered
or supplemented by the BatasangPambansa
1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary. Among others,
it enhanced the rule making power of this Court. Its Section 5(5), Article VIII
Page 43 of 84
“Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court."
-rule making power of this Court was expanded.
-The Court was also granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of
special courts and quasi- judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took
away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure. In one, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive
Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice (Echegaray), the Court traced the evolution of its rule-
making authority, which, under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, had been priorly subjected
to a power-sharing scheme with Congress. As it now stands, the 1987 Constitution textually
altered the old provisions by deleting the concurrent power of Congress to amend the rules,
thus solidifying in one body the Court's rule-making powers, in line with the Framers' vision
of institutionalizing a "[s]tronger and more independent judiciary." DETACa
Thus, as it now stands, Congress has no authority to repeal, alter, or supplement rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure.
Plea bargaining in criminal cases
plea bargaining has been defined as "a process whereby the accused and the prosecution
work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval
-give-and-take negotiation common in plea bargaining.50 The essence of the agreement is
that both the prosecution and the defense make concessions to avoid potential losses
-plea bargaining is to be encouraged because the chief virtues of the system — speed,
economy, and finality — can benefit the accused, the offended party, the prosecution, and the
court.
BUT TN: the rules on plea bargainingneither create a right nor take away a vested right.
 Page 44 of 84

-it operates as a means to implement an existing right by regulating the judicial process for We deem it proper to declare as invalid the prohibition against plea bargaining on drug cases
enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering until and unless it is made part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular
remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. duly issued for the purpose. ETHID

A GUILTY PLEA is a "serious and sobering occasion" inasmuch as it constitutes a waiver of
the fundamental rights to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, to be heard by
himself and counsel, to meet the witnesses face to face, to bail (except those charged with
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong), to be convicted
by proof beyond reasonable doubt, and not to be compelled to be a witness against himself.
55
BUT!!! He has no constitutional right to plea bargain. No basic rights are infringed by trying
him rather than accepting a plea of guilty
Under the present Rules, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty is not a demandable right
but depends on
1. the consent of the offended party 57 and
2. the prosecutor, which is a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser
offense that is necessarily included in the offense charged
SERRENO (CONCURRING)
When an accused pleads to a lesser offense, he or she waives all the fundamental rights
guaranteed to an accused. 4 It is essentially a choice that only the accused can make, as a way
to acknowledge his or her guilt and as atonement for that guilt.
The reality is that most "drug-pushers" that come before the courts are found with less than n
0.1 gram of illegal drugs. While some of these accused will be charged with both selling and
possession, most of them will have to suffer the penalty of selling, that is, life imprisonment.
5 They will be sentenced to life imprisonment for evidence amounting to "only about 2.5% of
the weight of a five-centavo coin (1.9 grams) or a one- centavo coin (2.0 grams)." 6
The plea is subject to the acceptance of the prosecution and is only allowed by discretion of
the court. 9 What is essential is that the choice exists. Preventing the accused from pleading to
the lesser offense of possession is a cruel, degrading, and unusual punishment for those who
genuinely accept the consequences of their actions and seek to be rehabilitated. It will not
advance the policy of the law to punish offenders with penalties not commensurate with the
offense and to hinder their reintegration into society.

The plea is further addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, which may allow the
accused to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense
charged.

Plea bargaining is allowed during the

1. arraignment,

2. the pre-trial, or even up to the point when the

3. prosecution already rested its case E. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS

On whether Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 violates the equal protection clause

1. DENNIS A. FUNA v. THE CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON AUDIT and REYNALDO
A. VILLAR G.R. No. 192791 April 24, 2012, EN BANC (Velasco, Jr., J.)
FACTS: On February 15, 2001, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) appointed
Guillermo N. Carague (Carague) as Chairman of the Commission on Audit (COA) for a term
of seven years starting February 2, 2004 to February 2, 2008. Meanwhile, on February 7, 2004,
she appointed Reynaldo A. Villar (Villar) as a third member of COA for a term of seven years
starting from February 2, 2004, to February 2, 2011. Following the retirement of Carague on
February 2, 2008 and during the fourth year of Villar as commissioner, the latter was
designated acting chairman of the COA from February 4, 2008 to April 14, 2008.
Subsequently, on April 18, 2008 Villar was appointed and nominated as Chairman of the
COA.
The Commission on Appointments confirmed his appointment. He was to serve chairman for
the unexpired portion of his term as commissioner or on February 2, 2011. Herein petitioner
opposes Villar’s appointment saying that such appointment is invalid under Sec. 1(2), Art.
IX(D) of the 1987 Constitution. He said that reappointment of any kind within the COA be it
for the same position (Commissioner to Commissioner) or for an upgraded position
(Commissioner to Chairman) is a prohibited appointment and therefore a nullity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Villar’s appointment is invalid under Sec. 1(2), Art.IX (D) of the 1987
Constitution.
RULING:
No, Villar’s appointment is not prohibited under the Constitution. The Constitutional
provision provides: The Chairman and Commissioners [on Audit] shall be appointed by the
President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years
without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven
years, one commissioner for five years, and the other commissioner for three years, without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the
term of the predecessor. The provision, on its face, does not prohibit a promotional
appointment from commissioner to chairman as long as the commissioner has not served the
Page 45 of 84
full term of seven years, further qualified by the third sentence of Sec. 1(2), Article IX (D) that
the appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the
predecessor.
In addition, such promotional appointment to the position of Chairman must conform to the
rotational plan or the staggering of terms in the commission membership such that the
aggregate of the service of the Commissioner in said position and the term to which he will
be appointed to the position of Chairman must not exceed seven years so as not to disrupt
the rotational system in the commission prescribed by Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D). There is nothing
in Sec. 1(2), Article IX(D) that explicitly precludes a promotional appointment from
Commissioner to Chairman, provided it is made under the aforestated circumstances or
conditions.
2. DENNIS A. B. FUNA v. THE CHAIRMAN, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,
FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III, et. al. G.R. No. 191672, 25 November 2014
Section 1, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional
Commissions as “independent.” Although their respective functions are essentially executive
in nature, they are not under the control of the President of the Philippines in the discharge of
such functions.
Each of the Constitutional Commissions conducts its own proceedings under the applicable
laws and its own rules and in the exercise of its own discretion.
In 2010, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed Francisco T. Duque III (Duque)
as Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, which was thereafter confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments. Subsequently, President Arroyo issued Executive Order No.
864 (EO 864). Pursuant to it, Duque was designated as a member of the Board of Directors or
Trustees in an ex officio capacity of the following government-owned or government-
controlled corporations: (a) Government Service Insurance System (GSIS); (b) Philippine
Health Insurance Corporation (PHILHEALTH), (c) the Employees Compensation
Commission (ECC), and (d) the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF).
Petitioner Dennis A.B. Funa, in his capacity as taxpayer, concerned citizen and lawyer, filed
the instant petition challenging the constitutionality of EO 864, as well as Section 14, Chapter

3, Title I-A, Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (EO 292), otherwise known as The
Administrative Code of 1987, and the designation of Duque as a member of the Board of
Directors or Trustees of the GSIS, PHIC, ECC and HDMF for being clear violations of Section
1 and Section 2, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE:
Does the designation of Duque as member of the Board of Directors or Trustees of the GSIS,
PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, in an ex officio capacity, impair the independence of the
CSC and violate the constitutional prohibition against the holding of dual or multiple offices
for the Members of the Constitutional Commissions?
HELD:
Yes. The Court partially grants the petition. The Court upholds the constitutionality of
Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292, but declares unconstitutional EO 864 and
the designation of Duque in an ex officio capacity as a member of the Board of Directors or
Trustees of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF.
Section 1, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional
Commissions as “independent.” Although their respective functions UST Law Review, Vol.
LIX, No. 1,
May 2015 are essentially executive in nature, they are not under the control of the President
of the Philippines in the discharge of such functions. Each of the Constitutional Commissions
conducts its own proceedings under the applicable laws and its own rules and in the exercise
of its own discretion. Its decisions, orders and rulings are subject only to review on certiorari
by the Court as provided by Section 7, Article IXA of the 1987 Constitution. To safeguard the
independence of these Commissions, the 1987 Constitution, among others, imposes under
Section 2, Article IX-A of the Constitution certain inhibitions and disqualifications upon the
Chairmen and members to strengthen their integrity, to wit:
(a) Holding any other office or employment during their tenure;
(b) Engaging in the practice of any profession;
Page 46 of 84
(c) Engaging in the active management or control of any business which in any way may be
affected by the functions of his office; and
(d) Being financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any franchise
or privilege granted by the Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies or
instrumentalities, including government owned or -controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries.
The issue herein involves the first disqualification abovementioned, which is the
disqualification from holding any other office or employment during Duque’s tenure as
Chairman of the CSC. The Court finds it imperative to interpret this disqualification in
relation to Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B of the Constitution and the Court’s
pronouncement in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary.
Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 7. x x x
Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position, no appointive
official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations
or their subsidiaries.
Being an appointive public official who does not occupy a Cabinet position (i.e., President,
the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants), Duque was thus
covered by the general rule enunciated under Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B. He can
hold any other office or employment in the Government during his tenure if such holding is
allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position.
Section 3, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution describes the CSC as the central personnel
agency of the government and is principally mandated to establish a career service and adopt
measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and
courtesy in the civil service; to strengthen the merit and rewards system; to integrate all
human resources development programs for all levels and ranks; and to institutionalize a
management climate conducive to public accountability.
 Page 47 of 84

Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 is clear that the CSC Chairman’s independence of the CSC. Under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, the President
membership in a governing body is dependent on the condition that the functions of the exercises control over all government offices in the Executive Branch. An office that is legally
government entity where he will sit as its Board member must affect the career development, not under the control of the President is not part of the Executive Branch.
employment status, rights, privileges, and welfare of government officials and employees.
As provided in their respective charters, PHILHEALTH and ECC have the status of a
Based on this, the Court finds no irregularity in Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO
government corporation and are deemed attached to the Department of Health and the
292 because matters affecting the career development, rights and welfare of government
Department of Labor, respectively. On the other hand, the GSIS and HDMF fall under the
employees are among the primary functions of the CSC and are consequently exercised
Office of the President. The corporate powers of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF
through its Chairman. The CSC Chairman’s membership therein must, therefore, be
are exercised through their governing Boards, members of which are all appointed by the
considered to be derived from his position as such. Accordingly, the constitutionality of
President of the Philippines. Undoubtedly, the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF and
Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 is upheld.
the members of their respective governing Boards are under the control of the President. As
The GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are vested by their respective charters with such, the CSC Chairman cannot be a member of a government entity that is under the control
various powers and functions to carry out the purposes for which they were created. While of the President without impairing the independence vested in the CSC by the 1987
powers and functions associated with appointments, compensation and benefits affect the Constitution.
career development, employment status, rights, privileges, and welfare of government
In view of the application of the prohibition under Section 2, Article IX-A of the 1987
officials and employees, the GSIS,PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are also tasked to perform
Constitution, Duque did not validly hold office as Director or Trustee of the GSIS,
other corporate powers and functions that are not personnel-related. All of these powers and
PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF concurrently with his position of CSC Chairman.
functions, whether personnel-related or not, are carried out and exercised by the respective
Accordingly, he was not to be considered as a de jure officer while he served his term as
Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF.
Director or Trustee of these GOCCs. A de jure officer is one who is deemed, in all respects,
Hence, when the CSC Chairman sits as a member of the governing Boards of the GSIS, legally appointed and qualified and whose term of office has not expired.That
PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, he may exercise these powers and functions, which are not notwithstanding, Duque was a de facto officer during his tenure as a Director or Trustee of
anymore derived from his position as CSC Chairman, such as imposing interest on unpaid or the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF.
unremitted contributions, issuing guidelines for the accreditation of health care providers, or
A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment from one having colorable authority to
approving restructuring proposals in the payment of unpaid loan amortizations. The Court
appoint, if the office is an appointive office, and whose appointment is valid on its face. He
also notes that Duque’s designation as member of the governing Boards of the GSIS,
may also be one who is in possession of an office, and is discharging its duties under color of
PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF entitles him to receive per diem, a form of additional
authority, by which is meant authority derived from an appointment, however irregular or
compensation that is disallowed by the concept of an ex officio position by virtue of its clear
informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer. Consequently, the acts of the de facto
contravention of the proscription set by Section 2, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution. This
officer are just as valid for all purposes as those of a de jure officer, in so far as the public or
situation goes against the principle behind an ex officio position, and must, therefore, be held
third persons who are interested therein are concerned.
unconstitutional.
In order to be clear, therefore, the Court holds that all official actions of Duque as a Director
Apart from violating the prohibition against holding multiple offices, Duque’s designation as
or Trustee of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, were presumed valid, binding and
member of the governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF impairs the

effective as if he was the officer legally appointed and qualified for the office. This
clarification is necessary in order to protect the sanctity and integrity of the dealings by the
public with persons whose ostensible authority emanates from the State. Duque’s official
actions covered by this clarification extend but are not limited to the issuance of Board
resolutions and memoranda approving appointments to positions in theconcerned GOCCs,
promulgation of policies and guidelines on compensation and employee benefits, and
adoption of programs to carry out the corporate powers of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC
and HDMF.
3. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Petitioner, v. NITA P. JAVIER, Respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to reverse the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated September 29, 2005, as
well as its Resolution of June 5, 2006, in CA-G.R. SP No. 88568, which set aside the
resolutions and orders of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) invalidating the appointment
of respondent as Corporate Secretary of the Board of Trustees of the Government Service and
Insurance System (GSIS).
The facts are undisputed.
According to her service record,2 respondent was first employed as Private Secretary in the
GSIS, a government owned and controlled corporation (GOCC), on February 23, 1960, on a
"confidential" status. On July 1, 1962, respondent was promoted to Tabulating Equipment
Operator with "permanent" status. The "permanent" status stayed with respondent
throughout her career. She spent her entire career with GSIS, earning several more
promotions, until on December 16, 1986, she was appointed Corporate Secretary of the Board
of Trustees of the corporation.
On July 16, 2001, a month shy of her 64th birthday,3 respondent opted for early retirement
and received the corresponding monetary benefits.4
Page 48 of 84
On April 3, 2002, GSIS President Winston F. Garcia, with the approval of the Board of
Trustees, reappointed respondent as Corporate Secretary, the same position she left and
retired from barely a year earlier. Respondent was 64 years old at the time of her
reappointment.5 In its Resolution, the Board of Trustees classified her appointment as
"confidential in nature and the tenure of office is at the pleasure of the Board."6
Petitioner alleges that respondent's reappointment on confidential status was meant to
illegally extend her service and circumvent the laws on compulsory retirement.7 This is
because under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8291, or the Government Service Insurance System
Act of 1997, the compulsory retirement age for government employees is 65 years, thus:
Sec. 13. x x x
(b) Unless the service is extended by appropriate authorities, retirement shall be compulsory
for an employee at sixty-five (65) years of age with at least fifteen (15) years of service:
Provided, That if he has less than fifteen (15) years of service, he may be allowed to continue
in the service in accordance with existing civil service rules and regulations.
Under the civil service regulations, those who are in primarily confidential positions may
serve even beyond the age of 65 years. Rule XIII of the Revised Omnibus Rules on
Appointments and Other Personnel Actions, as amended, provides that:
Sec. 12. (a) No person who has reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years can be
appointed to any position in the government, subject only to the exception provided under
sub-section (b) hereof.
xxx
b. A person who has already reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 can still be
appointed to a coterminous/primarily confidential position in the government.
A person appointed to a coterminous/primarily confidential position who reaches the age of
65 is considered automatically extended in the service until the expiry date of his/her
appointment or until his/her services are earlier terminated.8

It is for these obvious reasons that respondent's appointment was characterized as
"confidential" by the GSIS.
On October 10, 2002, petitioner issued Resolution No. 021314, invalidating the reappointment
of respondent as Corporate Secretary, on the ground that the
position is a permanent, career position and not primarily confidential.9
On November 2, 2002, the CSC, in a letter of even date, through its Chairperson Karina
Constantino-David, informed GSIS of CSC's invalidation of respondent's appointment,
stating, thus:
Records show that Ms. Javier was formerly appointed as Corporate Secretary in a
"Permanent" capacity until her retirement in July 16, 2001. The Plantilla of Positions shows
that said position is a career position. However, she was re-employed as Corporate Secretary,
a position now declared as confidential by the Board of Trustees pursuant to Board
Resolution No. 94 dated April 3, 2002.
Since the position was not declared primarily confidential by the Civil Service Commission
or by any law, the appointment of Ms. Javier as Corporate Secretary is hereby invalidated.10
Respondent and GSIS sought to reconsider the ruling of petitioner. CSC replied that the
position of Corporate Secretary is a permanent (career) position, and not primarily
confidential (non-career); thus, it was wrong to appoint respondent to this position since she
no longer complies with eligibility requirements for a permanent career status. More
importantly, as respondent by then has reached compulsory retirement at age 65, respondent
was no longer qualified for a permanent career position.11 With the denial of respondent's
plea for reconsideration, she filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals.
On September 29, 2005, the CA rendered a Decision setting aside the resolution of petitioner
invalidating respondent's appointment.12 The CA ruled that in determining whether a
position is primarily confidential or otherwise, the nature of its functions, duties and
responsibilities must be looked into, and not just its formal classification.13 Examining the
functions, duties and responsibilities of the GSIS Corporate Secretary, the CA concluded that
indeed, such a position is primarily confidential in nature.
Page 49 of 84
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the CA on June 5, 2006.
Hence, herein petition.
The petition assails the CA Decision, contending that the position of Corporate Secretary is a
career position and not primarily confidential in nature.14 Further, it adds that the power to
declare whether any position in government is primarily confidential, highly technical or
policy determining rests solely in petitioner by virtue of its constitutional power as the
central personnel agency of the government.15
Respondent avers otherwise, maintaining that the position of Corporate Secretary is
confidential in nature and that it is within the powers of the GSIS Board of Trustees to declare
it so.16 She argues that in determining the proper classification of a position, one should be
guided by the nature of the office or position, and not by its formal designation.17
Thus, the Court is confronted with the following issues: whether the courts may determine
the proper classification of a position in government; and whether the position of corporate
secretary in a GOCC is primarily confidential in nature.
The Court's Ruling
The courts may determine the proper
classification of a position in government.
Under Executive Order No. 292, or the Administrative Code of 1987, civil service positions
are currently classified into either 1) career service and 2) non-career service positions.18
Career positions are characterized by: (1) entrance based on merit and fitness to be
determined as far as practicable by competitive examinations, or based on highly technical
qualifications; (2) opportunity for advancement to higher career positions; and (3) security of
tenure.19
In addition, the Administrative Code, under its Book V, sub-classifies career positions
according to "appointment status," divided into: 1) permanent - which is issued to a person
who meets all the requirements for the positions to which he is being appointed, including
 Page 50 of 84

the appropriate eligibility prescribed, in accordance with the provisions of law, rules and (5) Emergency and seasonal personnel. (Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary
standards promulgated in pursuance thereof; and 2) temporary - which is issued, in the
A strict reading of the law reveals that primarily confidential positions fall under the non-
absence of appropriate eligibles and when it becomes necessary in the public interest to fill a
career service. It is also clear that, unlike career positions, primarily confidential and other
vacancy, to a person who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being
non-career positions do not have security of tenure. The tenure of a confidential employee is
appointed except the appropriate civil service eligibility; provided, that such temporary
co-terminous with that of the appointing authority, or is at the latter's pleasure. However, the
appointment shall not exceed twelve months, and the appointee may be replaced sooner if a
confidential employee may be appointed or remain in the position even beyond the
qualified civil service eligible becomes available.20
compulsory retirement age of 65 years.22
Positions that do not fall under the career service are considered non-career positions, which
Stated differently, the instant petition raises the question of whether the position of corporate
are characterized by: (1) entrance on bases other than those of the usual tests of merit and
secretary in a GOCC, currently classified by the CSC as belonging to the permanent, career
fitness utilized for the career service; and (2) tenure which is limited to a period specified by
service, should be classified as primarily confidential, i.e., belonging to the non-career
law, or which is co-terminous with that of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure,
service. The current GSIS Board holds the affirmative view, which is ardently opposed by
or which is limited to the duration of a particular project for which purpose employment was
petitioner. Petitioner maintains that it alone can classify government positions, and that the
made.21
determination it made earlier, classifying the position of GOCC corporate secretary as a
Examples of positions in the non-career service enumerated in the Administrative Code are: permanent, career position, should be maintained.

Sec. 9. Non-Career Service. - x x x At present, there is no law enacted by the legislature that defines or sets definite criteria for
determining primarily confidential positions in the civil service. Neither is there a law that
The Non-Career Service shall include:
gives an enumeration of positions classified as primarily confidential.

(1) Elective officials and their personal or confidential staff;

What is available is only petitioner's own classification of civil service positions, as well as

(2) Secretaries and other officials of Cabinet rank who hold their positions at the pleasure of jurisprudence which describe or give examples of confidential positions in government.

the President and their personal or confidential staff(s);

Thus, the corollary issue arises: should the Court be bound by a classification of a position as

(3) Chairman and members of commissions and boards with fixed terms of office and their confidential already made by an agency or branch of government?cralawred

personal or confidential staff;

Jurisprudence establishes that the Court is not bound by the classification of positions in the

(4) Contractual personnel or those whose employment in the government is in accordance civil service made by the legislative or executive branches, or even by a constitutional body

with a special contract to undertake a specific work or job, requiring special or technical skills like the petitioner.23 The Court is expected to make its own determination as to the nature of

not available in the employing agency, to be accomplished within a specific period, which in a particular position, such as whether it is a primarily confidential position or not, without
no case shall exceed one year, and performs or accomplishes the specific work or job, under being bound by prior classifications made by other bodies.24 The findings of the other

his own responsibility with a minimum of direction and supervision from the hiring agency; branches of government are merely considered initial and not conclusive to the Court.25

andcralawlibrary Moreover, it is well-established that in case the findings of various agencies of government,

such as the petitioner and the CA in the instant case, are in conflict, the Court must exercise
its constitutional role as final arbiter of all justiciable controversies and disputes.26
Piñero v. Hechanova,27 interpreting R.A. No. 2260, or the Civil Service Act of 1959,
emphasized how the legislature refrained from declaring which positions in the bureaucracy
are primarily confidential, policy determining or highly technical in nature, and declared that
such a determination is better left to the judgment of the courts. The Court, with the ponencia
of Justice J.B.L. Reyes, expounded, thus:
The change from the original wording of the bill (expressly declared by law x x x to be policy
determining, etc.) to that finally approved and enacted ("or which are policy determining, etc.
in nature") came about because of the observations of Senator Tañada, that as originally
worded the proposed bill gave Congress power to declare by fiat of law a certain position as
primarily confidential or policy determining, which should not be the case. The Senator
urged that since the Constitution speaks of positions which are "primarily confidential, policy
determining or highly technical in nature," it is not within the power of Congress to declare
what positions are primarily confidential or policy determining. "It is the nature alone of the
position that determines whether it is policy determining or primarily confidential." Hence,
the Senator further observed, the matter should be left to the "proper implementation of the
laws, depending upon the nature of the position to be filled", and if the position is "highly
confidential" then the President and the Civil Service Commissioner must implement the law.
To a question of Senator Tolentino, "But in positions that involved both confidential matters
and matters which are routine, x x x who is going to determine whether it is primarily
confidential?" Senator Tañada replied:
"SENATOR TAÑADA: Well. at the first instance, it is the appointing power that determines
that: the nature of the position. In case of conflict then it is the Court that determines whether
the position is primarily confidential or not.
"I remember a case that has been decided by the Supreme Court involving the position of a
district engineer in Baguio, and there. precisely, the nature of the position was in issue. It was
the Supreme Court that passed upon the nature of the position, and held that the President
could not transfer the district engineer in Baguio against his consent."
Page 51 of 84
Senator Tañada, therefore, proposed an amendment to section 5 of the bill, deleting the
words "to be" and inserting in lieu thereof the words "Positions which are by their nature"
policy determining, etc., and deleting the last words "in nature". Subsequently, Senator
Padilla presented an amendment to the Tañada amendment by adopting the very words of
the Constitution, i.e., "those which are policy determining, primarily confidential and highly
technical in nature". The Padilla amendment was adopted, and it was this last wording with
which section 5 was passed and was enacted (Senate Journal, May 10, 1959, Vol. 11, No. 32,
pp. 679-681).
It is plain that, at least since the enactment of the 1959 Civil Service Act (R. A. 2260), it is the
nature of the position which finally determines whether a position is primarily confidential,
policy determining or highly technical. Executive pronouncements can be no more than
initial determinations that are not conclusive in case of conflict. And it must be so, or else it
would then lie within the discretion of title Chief Executive to deny to any officer, by
executive fiat, the protection of section 4, Article XII, of the Constitution.28 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary
This doctrine in Piñero was reiterated in several succeeding cases.29
Presently, it is still the rule that executive and legislative identification or classification of
primarily confidential, policy-determining or highly technical positions in government is no
more than mere declarations, and does not foreclose judicial review, especially in the event of
conflict. Far from what is merely declared by executive or legislative fiat, it is the nature of
the position which finally determines whether it is primarily confidential, policy determining
or highly technical, and no department in government is better qualified to make such an
ultimate finding than the judicial branch.
Judicial review was also extended to determinations made by petitioner. In Griño v. Civil
Service Commission,30 the Court held:
The fact that the position of respondent Arandela as provincial attorney has already been
classified as one under the career service and certified as permanent by the Civil Service
Commission cannot conceal or alter its highly confidential nature. As in Cadiente where the
position of the city legal officer was duly attested as permanent by the Civil Service

Commission before this Court declared that the same was primarily confidential, this Court
holds that the position of respondent Arandela as the provincial attorney of Iloilo is also a
primarily confidential position. To rule otherwise would be tantamount to classifying two
positions with the same nature and functions in two incompatible categories.31
The framers of the 1987 Constitution were of the same disposition. Section 2 (2) Article IX (B)
of the Constitution provides that:
Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit and fitness to be
determined, as far as practicable, and, except to positions which are policy-determining,
primarily confidential, or highly technical, by competitive examination.
The phrase "in nature" after the phrase "policy-determining, primarily confidential, or highly
technical" was deleted from the 1987 Constitution.32 However, the intent to lay in the courts
the power to determine the nature of a position is evident in the following deliberation:
MR. FOZ. Which department of government has the power or authority to determine
whether a position is policy-determining or primarily confidential or highly
technical?cralawred
FR. BERNAS: The initial decision is made by the legislative body or by the executive
department, but the final decision is done by the court. The Supreme Court has constantly
held that whether or not a position is policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly
technical, it is determined not by the title but by the nature of the task that is entrusted to it.
For instance, we might have a case where a position is created requiring that the holder of
that position should be a member of the Bar and the law classifies this position as highly
technical. However, the Supreme Court has said before that a position which requires mere
membership in the Bar is not a highly technical position. Since the term 'highly technical'
means something beyond the ordinary requirements of the profession, it is always a question
of fact.
MR. FOZ. Does not Commissioner Bernas agree that the general rule should be that the merit
system or the competitive system should be upheld?cralawred
Page 52 of 84
FR. BERNAS. I agree that that it should be the general rule; that is why we are putting this as
an exception.
MR. FOZ. The declaration that certain positions are policy-determining, primarily
confidential or highly technical has been the source of practices which amount to the spoils
system.
FR. BERNAS. The Supreme Court has always said that, but if the law of the administrative
agency says that a position is primarily confidential when in fact it is not, we can always
challenge that in court. It is not enough that the law calls it primarily confidential to make it
such; it is the nature of the duties which makes a position primarily confidential.
MR. FOZ. The effect of a declaration that a position is policy-determining, primarily
confidential or highly technical - as an exception - is to take it away from the usual rules and
provisions of the Civil Service Law and to place it in a class by itself so that it can avail itself
of certain privileges not available to the ordinary run of government employees and officers.
FR. BERNAS. As I have already said, this classification does not do away with the
requirement of merit and fitness. All it says is that there are certain positions which should
not be determined by competitive examination.
For instance, I have just mentioned a position in the Atomic Energy Commission. Shall we
require a physicist to undergo a competitive examination before appointment? Or a
confidential secretary or any position in policy-determining administrative bodies, for that
matter? There are other ways of determining merit and fitness than competitive examination.
This is not a denial of the requirement of merit and fitness.33 (Emphasis
supplied)cralawlibrary
This explicit intent of the framers was recognized in Civil Service Commission v. Salas,34 and
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation v. Rilloraza,35 which leave no doubt that
the question of whether the position of Corporate Secretary of GSIS is confidential in nature
may be determined by the Court.
The position of corporate secretary in a government owned and controlled corporation,
currently classified as a permanent career position, is primarily confidential in nature.

First, there is a need to examine how the term "primarily confidential in nature" is described
in jurisprudence. According to Salas,36
Prior to the passage of the x x x Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2260), there were two
recognized instances when a position may be considered primarily confidential: Firstly, when
the President, upon recommendation of the Commissioner of Civil Service, has declared the
position to be primarily confidential; and, secondly in the absence of such declaration, when
by the nature of the functions of the office there exists "close intimacy" between the appointee
and appointing power which insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or
freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state.37
(Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary
However, Salas declared that since the enactment of R.A. No. 2260 and Piñero,38 it is the
nature of the position which finally determines whether a position is primarily confidential
or not, without regard to existing executive or legislative pronouncements either way, since
the latter will not bind the courts in case of conflict.
A position that is primarily confidential in nature is defined as early as 1950 in De los Santos
v. Mallare,39 through the ponencia of Justice Pedro Tuason, to wit:
x x x These positions (policy-determining, primarily confidential and highly technical
positions), involve the highest degree of confidence, or are closely bound up with and
dependent on other positions to which they are subordinate, or are temporary in nature. It
may truly be said that the good of the service itself demands that appointments coming
under this category be terminable at the will of the officer that makes them.
xxx
Every appointment implies confidence, but much more than ordinary confidence is reposed
in the occupant of a position that is primarily confidential. The latter phrase denotes not only
confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close
intimacy which insures freedom of [discussion, delegation and reporting] without
embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or confidential
matters of state. x x x40 (Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary
Page 53 of 84
Since the definition in De los Santos came out, it has guided numerous other cases.41 Thus, it
still stands that a position is primarily confidential when by the nature of the functions of the
office there exists "close intimacy" between the appointee and appointing power which
insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of
betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state.
In classifying a position as primarily confidential, its functions must not be routinary,
ordinary and day to day in character.42 A position is not necessarily confidential though the
one in office may sometimes handle confidential matters or documents.43 Only ordinary
confidence is required for all positions in the bureaucracy. But, as held in De los Santos,[44]
for someone holding a primarily confidential position, more than ordinary confidence is
required.
In Ingles v. Mutuc,45 the Court, through Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion as ponente, stated:
Indeed, physicians handle confidential matters. Judges, fiscals and court stenographers
generally handle matters of similar nature. The Presiding and Associate Justices of the Court
of Appeals sometimes investigate, by designation of the Supreme Court, administrative
complaints against judges of first instance, which are confidential in nature. Officers of the
Department of Justice, likewise, investigate charges against municipal judges. Assistant
Solicitors in the Office of the Solicitor General often investigate malpractice charges against
members of the Bar. All of these are "confidential" matters, but such fact does not warrant the
conclusion that the office or position of all government physicians and all Judges, as well as
the aforementioned assistant solicitors and officers of the Department of Justice are primarily
confidential in character.46 (Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary
It is from De los Santos that the so-called "proximity rule" was derived. A position is
considered to be primarily confidential when there is a primarily close intimacy between the
appointing authority and the appointee, which ensures the highest degree of trust and
unfettered communication and discussion on the most confidential of matters.47 This means
that where the position occupied is already remote from that of the appointing authority, the
element of trust between them is no longer predominant.48 On further interpretation in
Griño, this was clarified to mean that a confidential nature would be limited to those

positions not separated from the position of the appointing authority by an intervening
public officer, or series of public officers, in the bureaucratic hierarchy.49
Consequently, brought upon by their remoteness to the position of the appointing authority,
the following were declared by the Court to be not primarily confidential positions: City
Engineer;50 Assistant Secretary to the Mayor;51 members of the Customs Police Force or Port
Patrol;52 Special Assistant of the Governor of the Central Bank, Export Department;53 Senior
Executive Assistant, Clerk I and Supervising Clerk I and Stenographer in the Office of the
President;54 Management and Audit Analyst I of the Finance Ministry Intelligence Bureau;55
Provincial Administrator;56 Internal Security Staff of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR);57 Casino Operations Manager;58 and Slot Machine Attendant.59
All positions were declared to be not primarily confidential despite having been previously
declared such either by their respective appointing authorities or the legislature.
The following were declared in jurisprudence to be primarily confidential positions: Chief
Legal Counsel of the Philippine National Bank;60 Confidential Agent of the Office of the
Auditor, GSIS;61 Secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan;62 Secretary to the City Mayor;63
Senior Security and Security Guard in the Office of the Vice Mayor;64 Secretary to the Board
of a government corporation;65 City Legal Counsel, City Legal Officer or City Attorney;66
Provincial Attorney;67 Private Secretary;68 and Board Secretary II of the Philippine State
College of Aeronautics.69
In fine, a primarily confidential position is characterized by the close proximity of the
positions of the appointer and appointee as well as the high degree of trust and confidence
inherent in their relationship.
Ineluctably therefore, the position of Corporate Secretary of GSIS, or any GOCC, for that
matter, is a primarily confidential position. The position is clearly in close proximity and
intimacy with the appointing power. It also calls for the highest degree of confidence
between the appointer and appointee.
In classifying the position of Corporate Secretary of GSIS as primarily confidential, the Court
took into consideration the proximity rule together with the duties of the corporate secretary,
enumerated as follows:70
Page 54 of 84
1. Performs all duties, and exercises the power, as defined and enumerated in Section 4, Title
IX, P.D. No. 1146;
2. Undertakes research into past Board resolutions, policies, decisions, directives and other
Board action, and relate these to present matters under Board consideration;
3. Analyzes and evaluates the impact, effects and relevance of matters under Board
consideration on existing Board policies and provide the individual Board members with
these information so as to guide or enlighten them in their Board decision;
4. Records, documents and reproduces in sufficient number all proceedings of Board
meetings and disseminate relevant Board decisions/information to those units concerned;
5. Coordinates with all functional areas and units concerned and monitors the manner of
implementation of approved Board resolutions, policies and directives;
6. Maintains a permanent, complete, systematic and secure compilation of all previous
minutes of Board meetings, together with all their supporting documents;
7. Attends, testifies and produces in Court or in administrative bodies duly certified copies of
Board resolutions, whenever required;
8. Undertakes the necessary physical preparations for scheduled Board meetings;
9. Pays honoraria of the members of the Board who attend Board meetings;
10. Takes custody of the corporate seal and safeguards against unauthorized use;
andcralawlibrary
11. Performs such other functions as the Board may direct and/or require.
The nature of the duties and functions attached to the position points to its highly
confidential character.71 The secretary reports directly to the board of directors, without an
intervening officer in between them.72 In such an arrangement, the board expects from the
secretary nothing less than the highest degree of honesty, integrity and loyalty, which is
crucial to maintaining between them "freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or
freedom from misgivings or betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state."73

The responsibilities of the corporate secretary are not merely clerical or routinary in nature.
The work involves constant exposure to sensitive policy matters and confidential
deliberations that are not always open to the public, as unscrupulous persons may use them
to harm the corporation. Board members must have the highest confidence in the secretary to
ensure that their honest sentiments are always and fully expressed, in the interest of the
corporation. In this respect, the nature of the corporate secretary's work is akin to that of a
personal secretary of a public official, a position long recognized to be primarily confidential
in nature.74 The only distinction is that the corporate secretary is secretary to the entire
board, composed of a number of persons, but who essentially act as one body, while the
private secretary works for only one person. However, the degree of confidence involved is
essentially the same.
Not only do the tasks listed point to sensitive and confidential acts that the corporate
secretary must perform, they also include "such other functions as the Board may direct
and/or require," a clear indication of a closely intimate relationship that exists between the
secretary and the board. In such a highly acquainted relation, great trust and confidence
between appointer and appointee is required.
The loss of such trust or confidence could easily result in the board's termination of the
secretary's services and ending of his term. This is understandably justified, as the board
could not be expected to function freely with a suspicious officer in its midst. It is for these
same reasons that jurisprudence, as earlier cited, has consistently characterized personal or
private secretaries, and board secretaries, as positions of a primarily confidential nature.75
The CA did not err in declaring that the position of Corporate Secretary of GSIS is primarily
confidential in nature and does not belong to the career service.
The Court is aware that this decision has repercussions on the tenure of other corporate
secretaries in various GOCCs. The officers likely assumed their positions on permanent
career status, expecting protection for their tenure and appointments, but are now re-
classified as primarily confidential appointees. Such concern is unfounded, however, since
the statutes themselves do not classify the position of corporate secretary as permanent and
career in nature. Moreover, there is no absolute guarantee that it will not be classified as
confidential when a dispute arises. As earlier stated, the Court, by legal tradition, has the
Page 55 of 84
power to make a final determination as to which positions in government are primarily
confidential or otherwise. In the light of the instant controversy, the Court's view is that the
greater public interest is served if the position of a corporate secretary is classified as
primarily confidential in nature.
Moreover, it is a basic tenet in the country's constitutional system that "public office is a
public trust,"76 and that there is no vested right in public office, nor an absolute right to hold
office.77 No proprietary title attaches to a public office, as public service is not a property
right.78 Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary
and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office.79 The rule is that offices
in government, except those created by the constitution, may be abolished, altered, or created
anytime by statute.80 And any issues on the classification for a position in government may
be brought to and determined by the courts.81
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated September 29, 2005, in CA-G.R. SP No. 88568, as well as its Resolution of June
5, 2006 are hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
4. LUCIANO VELOSO, et al. v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT G.R. No. 193677, 06 September
2011, EN BANC (Peralta, J.)
In 2000, the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8040 authorizing the conferment of
Exemplary Service Award (EPSA) to elective officials of the City who have been elected for
three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Such officials shall be given a retirement and
gratuity pay remuneration equivalent to the actual time served in the position for three (3)
consecutive terms. In 2006, Legal and Adjudication Office (LAO)-Local of the COA issued a
Notice of Disallowance. Petitioner filed a Motion to Lift the Notice of Disallowance on the
ground that LGUs have fiscal autonomy and that they have the power to grant
allowances/gratuity.
ISSUE:
 Page 56 of 84

Did the COA properly exercise its jurisdiction in disallowing the disbursement of the City of The Director, Legal and Adjudication Office (LAO)-Local of the COA issued ND No.
Manila's funds for the EPSA of its former three-term councilors? 06-010-100-05 dated May 24, 2006.

RULING: The COA sustained the Notice of Disallowance

YES. COA is vested with the authority to determine whether government entities, including ISSUE:

LGUs, comply with laws and regulations in disbursing government funds, and to disallow (1) Whether the COA has the authority to disallow the disbursement of local
illegal or irregular disbursements of these funds. LGUs, though granted local fiscal government funds
autonomy, are still within the audit jurisdiction of the COA. Moreover, COA was held correct
(2) Whether the COA committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the
in issuing the Notice of Disallowance because, contrary to the contention of the petitioners
disallowance of P9,923,257.00 covering the EPSA of former three-term councilors of the City
that the award is a form of gratuity, the recomputation of the award disclosed that it is
of Manila authorized by Ordinance No. 8040.
equivalent to the total compensation received by each awardee for nine years, that includes
basic salary, additional compensation. Undoubtedly, thecomputation of the awardees' RULING:
reward is excessive and tantamount to doubleand additional compensation which is
prohibited by law. Under the 1987 Constitution, however, the COA is vested with the authority to determine
whether government entities, including LGUs, comply with laws and regulations in
LUCIANO VELOSO, ABRAHAM CABOCHAN, JOCELYN DAWIS-ASUNCION AND disbursing government funds, and to disallow illegal or irregular disbursements of these
MARLON M. LACSON, PETITIONERS, VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, funds.
RESPONDENT.
Thus, LGUs, though granted local fiscal autonomy, are still within the audit jurisdiction of
FACTS: the COA. However, in line with existing jurisprudence, we need not require the refund of the
disallowed amount because all the parties acted in good faith.
On December 7, 2000, the City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8040 entitled
An Ordinance Authorizing the Conferment of Exemplary Public Service Award to Elective
Local Officials of Manila Who Have Been Elected for Three (3) Consecutive Terms in the
Same Position. Section 2 thereof provides:

SEC. 2. The EPSA shall consist of a Plaque of Appreciation, retirement and gratuity
pay remuneration equivalent to the actual time served in the position for three (3)
consecutive terms, subject to the availability of funds as certified by the City Treasurer. 5. DIMAGIBA V ESPARTERO

….xxx…..
FACTS

Pursuant to the ordinance, the City made partial payments to some former city
Petitioners HilarionDimagiba (Dimagiba), Irma Mendoza (Mendoza), and Ellen Rasco
councilors including herein petitioners the total amount of P9,923,257.00.
(Rasco) were employees of The Livelihood Corporation (LIVECOR), a government-owned

and controlled corporation created under Executive Order No. 866. Petitioner Dimagiba was
the Group Manager, Petitioners HilarionDimagiba (Dimagiba), Irma Mendoza (Mendoza),
and Ellen Rasco (Rasco) were employees of The Livelihood Corporation (LIVECOR), a
government-owned and controlled corporation created under Executive Order No. 866.
Petitioner Dimagiba was the Group Manager, LIVECOR and the Human Settlement
Development Corporation (HSDC), now known as Strategic Investment and Development
Corporation (SIDCOR), also a government-owned and controlled corporation, created under
Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1396, entered into a Trust Agreement3 whereby the former would
undertake the task of managing, administering, disposing and liquidating the corporate
assets, projects and accounts of HSDC. In HSDC Board Resolution No. 3- 26-A4 dated March
26, 1990, it was provided that in order to carry out the trust agreement, LIVECOR personnel
must be designated concurrently to operate certain basic HSDC/SIDCOR functions, thus,
LIVECOR personnel, namely, petitioners Dimagiba and Mendoza were designated as
Assistant General Manager for Operations and Head, Inter-Agency Committee on Assets
Disposal and as Treasurer and Controller, respectively. The same resolution provided for the
designees' monthly honoraria and commutable reimbursable representation allowances
(CRRA).
In a letter6 dated November 14, 1997, the Department of Budget and Management informed
LIVECOR of the approval of its organization/staffing pattern modifications which resulted in
the abolition of petitioners' positions. As a result, petitioners were separated from the service
which entitled them to separation pay which includes granting gratuity pay
In a Memorandum dated July 17, 1998 issued by LIVECOR Administrator Manuel Portes
(Portes), it was stated that any payment of gratuities by the HSDC/SIDCOR to LIVECOR
officers concurrently performing HSDC functions shall not be processed without prior
clearance from him as the same shall be first cleared with the COA and OGCC to avoid any
legal problem. Portes then sought the opinion of LIVECOR’s Resident COA Auditor,
Alejandro Fumar, regarding petitioners' claim for additional gratuity, who opined that such
gratuity payment would amount to double compensation.
ISSUE
Page 57 of 84
W/N the gratuities granted to petitioners dimagiba, mendoza and rasco by hsdc constitute
double compensation prohibited under article ix (b), section 8 of the 1987 constitution
RULING
YES The additional grant of gratuity pay to petitioners amounted to additional compensation
prohibited by the Constitution. Clearly, the only exception for an employee to receive
additional, double and indirect compensation is where the law allows him to receive extra
compensation for services rendered in another position which is an extension or is connected
with his basic work. The prohibition against additional or double compensation, except when
specifically authorized by law, is considered a “constitutional curb” on the spending power
of the government.
In Peralta v. Mathay, 41 we stated the purpose of the prohibition, to wit: x xxThis is to
manifest a commitment to the fundamental principle that a public office is a public trust. It is
expected of a government official or employee that he keeps uppermost in mind the demands
of public welfare. He is there to render public service. He is of course entitled to be rewarded
for the performance of the functions entrusted to him, but that should not be the overriding
consideration. The intrusion of the thought of private gain should be unwelcome. The
temptation to further personal ends, public employment as a means for the acquisition of
wealth, is to be resisted. That at least is the ideal. There is then to be awareness on the part of
an officer or employee of the government that he is to receive only such compensation as
may be fixed by law. With such a realization, he is expected not to avail himself of devious or
circuitous means to increase the remuneration attached to his position.42 x xx
The gratuity pay being given to petitioners by the HSDC Board was by reason of the
satisfactory performance of their work under the trust agreement. It is considered a bonus
and by its very nature, a bonus partakes of an additional remuneration or compensation.43 It
bears stressing that when petitioners were separated from LIVECOR, they were given
separation pay which also included gratuity pay for all the years they worked thereat and
concurrently in HSDC/SIDCOR. Granting them another gratuity pay for the works done in
HSDC under the trust agreement would be indirectly giving them additional compensation
for services rendered in another position which is an extension or is connected with his basic
work which is prohibited. This can only be allowed if there is a law which specifically

authorizes them to receive an additional payment of gratuity. The HSDC Board Resolution
No. 05-19-A granting petitioners’ gratuity pay is not a law which would exempt them from
the Constitutional proscription against additional, double or indirect compensation. Neither
does the HSDC law under P.D. 1396 contain a provision allowing the grant of such gratuity
pay to petitioners.
The second paragraph of Section 8, Article IX specifically adds that "pensions and gratuities
shall not be considered as additional, double or indirect compensation." This has reference to
compensation already earned, for instance by a retiree. A retiree receiving pensions or
gratuities after retirement can continue to receive such pension or gratuity even if he accepts
another government position to which another compensation is attached. The grant to
designees Dimagiba et al. of another gratuity from HSDC would not fall under the exception
in the second paragraph as the same had not been primarily earned, but rather being granted
for service simultaneously rendered to LIVECOR and HSDC. Hence, to allow the release of
the second gratuity from HSDC would run afoul over the wellsettled rule that "in the absence
of an express legal exception, pension or gratuity laws should be construed as to preclude
any person from receiving double compensation. 44
7. TORRES v. DE LEON G.R. No. 199440, January 18, 2016, THIRD DIVISION, (Peralta, J.)
FACTS: PNRC, General Santos City Chapter, the PNRC Internal Auditing Office conducted
an audit of the funds and accounts of the PNRC, General Santos City Chapter for the period
November 6, 2002 to March 14, 2006, and based on the audit report submitted to respondent
Corazon Alma G. De Leon (De Leon), petitioner incurred a "technical shortage" in the
amount of P4,306,574.23. Hence, respondent De Leon in a Memorandum dated January 3,
2007, formally charged petitioner with Grave Misconduct for violating PNRC Financial
Policies on Oversubscription, Remittances and Disbursement of Funds.
The CSC, on April 21, 2008, promulgated a Resolution dismissing petitioner's appeal and
imposing upon her the penalty of dismissal from service. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration with the CSC, but the same was denied.Thus, petitioner filed a petition for
review under Rule 43 with the CA, and in its assailed Decision dated June 30, 2011, the CA
denied the said petition. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied on
October 6, 2011.Hence, the present petition
Page 58 of 84
ISSUES:
Does the CSC has appellate jurisdiction over the case?
RULING:
Yes. the PNRC, although not a GOCC, is sui generis in character, thus, requiring this Court to
approach controversies involving the PNRC on a case-to-case basis. having jurisdiction over
the PNRC, the CSC had authority to modify the penalty and order the dismissal of petitioner
from the service.
Under the Administrative Code of 1987,6 as well as decisions7 of this Court, the CSC has
appellate jurisdiction on administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a
penalty of suspension for more than thirty (30) days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty
(30) days salary. The CA, therefore, did not err when it agreed with the CSC that the latter
had appellate jurisdiction.
EDCA is consistent with the content, purpose, and framework of the MDT and the VFA.
The admission and presence of U.S. military and civilian personnel in Philippine territory are
already allowed under the VFA, the treaty supposedly being implemented by EDCA. What
EDCA has effectively done, in fact, is merely provide the mechanism to identify the locations
in which U.S. personnel may perform allowed activities pursuant to the VF A. As the
implementing agreement, it regulates and limits the presence of U.S. personnel in the
country. Moreover, EDCA does not allow the presence of U.S.-owned or -controlled military
facilities and bases in the Philippines. As it is, EDCA is not constitutionally infirm. As an
executive agreement, it remains consistent with existing laws and treaties that it purports to
implement.

8. CAREER EXECUTIVE SERVICE BOARD represented by CHAIRPERSON BERNARDO
P. ABESAMIS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR MA. ANTHONETTE VELASCO-ALLONES, and
DEPUTY EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR ARTURO M. LACHICA, Petitioner VS. CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION represented by CHAIRMAN FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III AND
PUBLIC ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, CHIEF PUBLIC ATTORNEY PERSIDA V. RUEDA-
ACOSTA, DEPUTY CHIEF PUBLIC ATTORNEYS MACAPANGCAT A. MAMA,
SYLVESTRE A. MOSING, REGIONAL PUBLIC ATTORNEYS CYNTHIA M. VARGAS,
FRISCO F. DOMALSIN, TOMAS B. PADILLA, RENATO T. CABRIDO, SALVADOR S.
HIPOLITO, ELPIDIO C. BACUYAG, DIOSDADO S. SAVELLANO, RAMON N. GOMEZ,
MARIE G-REE R. CALINAWAN, FLORENCIO M. DILOY, EDGARDO D. GONZALEZ,
NUNILA P. GARCIA, FRANCIS A. CALATRAVA, DATUMANONG A. DUMAMBA,
EDGAR Q. BALANSAG, PUBLIC ATTORNEY IV MARVIN R. OSIAS, PUBLIC
ATTORNEY IV HOWARD B. AREZA, PUBLIC ATTORNEY IV IMELDA C. ALFORTE-
GANANCIAL, Respondents
DECISION
SERENO, CJ.:
The dispute in this case concerns the classification of certain positions in the Public
Attorney's Office (PAO).The Court is asked to determine, in particular, whether these
positions are properly included in the Career Executive Service (CES); and whether the
occupants of these positions must obtain third-level eligibility to qualify for permanent
appointment. To resolve these questions, the Court must also delineate the respective
jurisdictions granted by law to the competing authorities involved in this case - the Civil
Service Commission (CSC) and the Career Executive Service Board (CESB).
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,1 the CESB2 seeks the reversal of the Decision3
and Resolution4 of the CSC declaring that (a) it had the jurisdiction to resolve an appeal from
Page 59 of 84
a CESB Resolution5 refusing to declassify certain positions in PAO; and (b) the PAO
positions involved in the appeal do not require third-level eligibility.
The facts leading to the controversy are not in dispute.
On 24 September 2010, the PAO received a copy of the CESB Report on the CES Occupancy
of the Department of Justice (DOJ).6 This document stated, among others, that out of 35 filled
positions in the PAO, 33 were occupied by persons without the required CES eligibility.
In response to the report, PAO Deputy Chief Public Attorney Silvestre A. Mosing (Deputy
Chief Mosing) sent a letter7 to CESB Executive Director Maria Anthonette V. Allones. He
informed her that the positions of Chief Public Attorney, Deputy Chief Public Attorneys, and
Regional Public Attorneys (subject positions) were already permanent in nature pursuant to
Section 68 of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9406, which accorded security of tenure to the
occupants thereof.
A second letter dated 9 November 20109 was sent to the CESB by Deputy Chief Mosing to
reiterate its earlier communication. The letter also contained supplementary arguments in
support of the assertion that the subject positions were permanent posts; hence, their
occupants may only be removed for cause provided by law. Based on the foregoing premises,
the PAO requested the deletion of its office from the Data on CES Occupancy for the
Department of Justice (DOJ).
On 18 November 2010, the PAO received the reply sent to Deputy Chief Mosing by the CESB,
through Deputy Executive Director Arturo M. Lachica.10 The latter informed Deputy Chief
Mosing that the CESB would conduct a position classification study on the specified PAO
positions to determine whether they may still be considered CES positions in the DOJ.
The DOJ Legal Opinion
While the matter was pending, PAO Deputy Chief Mosing wrote a letter to then DOJ
Secretary Leila M. de Lima to inform her about the communications sent by the PAO to the
CESB.11 He also reiterated the PAO's opinion that the subject positions must be considered
permanent in nature, and not subject to CES requirements.12

In a letter13 sent to Chief Public Attorney Persida V. Rueda-Acosta on 3 January 2011, Chief
State Counsel Ricardo V. Paras III elucidated the legal opinion of the DOJ on the matter:
Based on the foregoing, your claim that the appointments of the top-level officials of the PAO
are permanent is without merit. For one, the positions of the Chief Public Attorney, Deputy
Chief Public Attorney and Regional Public Attorneys are part of the CES. xxx
xxxx
Secondly, since the Chief Public Attorney, Deputy Chief Public Attorneys and Regional
Public Attorneys are occupying CES positions, it is required by law that they should be CES
eligibles to become permanent appointees to the said position. x x x.
xxxx
This leads to the inevitable conclusion that the appointments of the Chief Public Attorney,
Deputy Chief Public Attorneys and Regional Public Attorneys are not permanent, despite
your claims to the contrary, considering that they do not possess the required CES eligibility
for the said positions. As such, they cannot invoke their right to security of tenure even if it
was expressly guaranteed to them by the PAO Law.
xxxx
Considering that the appointments of the Chief Public Attorney, Deputy Chief Public
Attorneys and Regional Public Attorneys are temporary, they are required to subsequently
take the CES examination. In the absence of any evidence that would show compliance with
the said condition, it is presumed that the top-level officials of the PAO are non-CES eligibles;
therefore they may be removed from office by the appointing authority without violating
their constitutional and statutory rights to security of tenure.14
The DOJ also noted that the permanent nature of an appointment does not automatically
translate to an exemption from CES coverage, as it is only the CESB that has the authority to
exempt certain positions from CES requirements.15 The DOJ further rejected the claim that
the occupants of the subject positions were exercising quasi-judicial functions. It explained
that while the lawyers of the PAO regularly conduct mediation, conciliation or arbitration of
Page 60 of 84
disputes, their functions do not entail the rendition of judgments or decisions - an essential
element of the exercise of quasi-judicial functions.16
The CSC Legal Opinion
It appears that while waiting for the CESB to respond to its letters, the PAO wrote to the CSC
to request a legal opinion on the same matter.17 The PAO thereafter informed the CESB of
the former's decision to seek the opinion and requested the latter to issue no further opinion
or statement, oral or written, relative to the qualifications of the PAO officials.18
On 7 January 2011, the CSC issued the requested legal opinion.19 Citing its mandate as an
independent constitutional commission and its authority under the Administrative Code to
"render opinions and rulings on all personnel and other civil service matters," the CSC
declared that third-level eligibility is not required for the subject positions in the PAO:
The law is explicit that the positions [of] Chief Public Attorney, Deputy Chief Public Attorney
and Regional Public Attorney in PAO shall have the same qualifications for appointment,
among other things, as those of the Chief State Prosecutor, Assistant Chief State Prosecutor
and Regional State Prosecutor, respectively. These, of course include, the eligibility
requirement for these positions. x x x.
xxxx
The Prosecution Service Act of 2010 explicitly provides that the Prosecutor General (the
retitled position of Chief State Prosecutor) has the same qualifications for appointment,
among other things, as those of the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals (CA). Further,
the Senior Deputy State Prosecutor and the Regional Prosecutor have the same qualifications
as those of an associate justice of the CA. x x x.
xxxx
No less than the Constitution provides that justices and judges in the judiciary are required,
among other things, practice of law as requirement for appointment thereto. Pointedly, the
Presiding Justice and the Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals (CA) have the same
qualifications as those provided for in the Constitution for Justices of the Supreme Court[,]
which includes, among other requirements, practice of law. This means that the Constitution

and the Civil Service Law prescribe RA 1080 (BAR) as the appropriate civil service eligibility
therefor. Accordingly, any imposition of a third-level eligibility (e.g. CESE, CSEE) is not
proper, if not, illegal under the circumstances. In fact, even in the 1997 Qualification
Standards Manual of the Commission, all of these positions require RA 1080 BAR eligibility
for purposes of appointment.
xxxx
Thus, it is the Commission's op1mon that for purposes of permanent appointment to the
positions of Chief Public Attorney, Deputy Chief Public Attorney and Regional Public
Attorney, no thirdlevel eligibility is required but only RA 1080 (BAR) civil service
eligibility.20
CESB Resolution No. 918
On 12 January 2011, the CESB issued Resolution No. 91821 (CESB Resolution No, 918)
denying the PAO's request to declassify the subject positions. Citing the Position
Classification Study22 submitted by its secretariat, the CESB noted that the positions in
question "require leadership and managerial competence"23 and were thus part of the CES.
Hence, the appointment of persons without third-level eligibility for these posts cannot be
considered permanent. The CESB explained:
WHEREAS, pursuant to its mandate to identify positions of equivalent rank as CES positions,
the Secretariat revisited its previous classification as part of the CES [ ofj the above positions
of PAO and conducted a position classification of the above positions and arrived at the
following findings:
1. The positions of Chief Public Attorney, Deputy Chief Public Attorneys, Regional Public
Attorneys and Assistant Regional Public Attorneys who are all presidential appointees fall
within the criteria set under CESB Resolution No. 299, s. 2009, namely:
a. The position is a career position;
b. The position is above division chief level;
Page 61 of 84
c. The duties and responsibilities of the position require the performance of executive or
managerial functions.
2. While Section 3 of Republic Act 9406 which provides that:
SEC. 3. A new Section 14-A, is hereby inserted in Chapter 5, Title III, Book IV of Executive
Order No. 292, otherwise known as the "Administrative Code of 1987", to read as follows:
"SEC. 14-A Powers and Functions. - The PAO shall independently discharge its mandate to
render, free of charge, legal representation, assistance, and counselling to indigent persons in
criminal, civil, labor, administrative and other quasi-judicial cases. In the exigency of the
service, the PAO may be called upon by proper government authorities to render such
service to other persons, subject to existing laws, rules and regulations."
The aforecited provision does not limit the mandate of PAO to perform only non-executive
functions. All that the aforecited provision states is that the PAO is mandated to render legal
representation, assistance and counseling to indigent persons in criminal, civil, labor,
administrative and other quasi-judicial cases, free of charge. Notably, the positions of Chief
Public Attorney, Deputy Chief Public Attorney, Regional Public Attorneys and Assistant
Regional Public Attorneys evidently require leadership and managerial competence.
xxxx
WHEREAS, it is undisputed that the subject pos1t10ns are CES in nature and as such, the
eligibility requirement for appointment thereto is CES eligibility.
With regard to the question of its jurisdiction over the matter as against that of the CSC, the
CESB stated:
WHEREAS, under Section 8, Chapter 2, Book V of EO 292, it is the Board which has the
mandate over Third-level positions in the Career Service and not the CSC. Section 8, Chapter
2, Book V of EO 292 provides:
Section 8. Classes of Positions in the Civil Service. - (l) Classes of positions in the career
service, appointment to which requires examinations shall be grouped into three major levels
as follows:

(c) The third-level shall cover positions in the Career Executive Service.
(2) x x x Entrance to the third-level shall be prescribed by the Career Executive Service Board.
WHEREAS, in the case of De Jesus v. People, G.R. No. 61998, February 22, 1983, 120 SCRA
760, the Supreme Court ruled that "where there are two acts, one of which is special and
particular and the other general which, if standing alone, would include the same matter and
thus conflict with the special act, the special must prevail since it evinces the legislative intent
more clearly than that of a general statute and must be taken as intended to constitute an
exception to the general act."
WHEREAS, following the above-cited rule, it is clear that Section 8, Chapter 2, Book V of EO
292 is the exception to [the] general act pertaining to the authority of the CSC;
WHEREAS, it is clear that the mandate of the Board is in accordance with existing laws and
pertinent jurisprudence on matters pertaining to the CES[.]24
Aggrieved by the CESB Resolution, the PAO filed a Verified Notice of Appeal25 and an
Urgent Notice of Appeal26 with the CSC.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE CSC
Before the CSC, the PAO assailed CESB Resolution No. 918 on the following grounds: (a) the
resolution was rendered contrary to R.A. 9406 in relation to R.A. 10071,27 the 1987
Constitution and the CSC letter-opinion; and (b) the CESB usurped the legislative function of
Congress when the former required additional qualifications for appointment to certain PAO
positions. The PAO likewise asserted that its appeal had been brought to the CSC, because
the latter had the power to review decisions and actions of one of its attached agencies - the
CESB.
In an Order28 dated 17 January 2011, the CSC directed the CESB to comment on the appeal.
Instead of submitting a comment, however, the CESB filed a Motion for Clarification29 to
assail the authority of the CSC to review its Decision. It asserted that the CSC had no
jurisdiction to decide the appeal given that (a) the appeal involved a controversy between
two government entities regarding questions of law;30 and (b) the CESB was an autonomous
Page 62 of 84
agency whose actions were appealable to the Office of the President.31 In addition, the CESB
emphasized the inability of the CSC to render an unbiased ruling on the case, considering the
latter's previous legal opinion on the appropriate eligibility for key positions in the PA0.32
In a Decision33 dated 15 February 2011, the CSC granted the appeal and reversed CESB
Resolution No. 918.
As a preliminary matter, the CSC ruled that it could assume jurisdiction over the appeal,
which involved the employment status and qualification standards of employees belonging
to the civil service. It was supposedly a matter falling within its broad and plenary authority
under the Constitution and the Administrative Code. The CSC also declared that the
authority of the CESB over third-level employees was limited to the imposition of entry
requirements and "should not be interpreted as cutting off the reach of the Commission over
this particular class of positions."34 Moreover, the CESB was declared subject to the revisory
power of the CSC, given that an attached office is not entirely and totally insulated from its
mother agency.35 With respect to the provision in the Integrated Reorganization Plan36 on
appeals from the CESB to the Office of the President, the CSC construed this requirement as
pertaining only to disciplinary proceedings.37
On the merits, the CSC ruled in favor of the PAO officials. It declared that the CESB would be
in violation of R.A. 9406 if the latter would require an additional qualification - in this case,
third-level eligibility - for purposes of permanent appointments to certain PAO positions:
The foregoing elaboration shows the qualifications of the subject PAO positions under the
existing laws. It is gleaned that nowhere in these laws is there a reference to third-level
eligibility and CESO rank as qualification requirements for attaining tenurial security. All
that the laws uniformly prescribe for the positions in question is practice of law for certain
period of time, which presupposes a bar license. This being the case, the CESB cannot, in the
guise of enforcing and administering the policies of the third-level, validly impose
qualifications in addition to what the laws prescribe. It cannot add another layer of
qualification requirement which is not otherwise specified in the statutes. As an
administrative agency, the CESB can only promulgate rules and regulations which must be
consistent with and in harmony with the provisions of the laws, and it cannot add or subtract
thereto. Most evidently, therefore, in promulgating the assailed resolution, which sets out

additional qualifications for the subject positions in the PAO, the CESB has overstepped the
bounds of its authority. x x x.
In so saying, the Commission does not lose sight of the power of the CESB to identify other
positions equivalent to those enumerated in the Administrative Code of 1987 as being part of
the third-level or CES for as long as they come within the ambit of the appointing prerogative
of the President. Yet, such grant of authority is derived from a general law (the
Administrative Code) and hence, it must be deemed circumscribed or qualified by the special
law governing the PAO. Reiteratively, the PAO Law, in conjunction with other laws, merely
fixes practice of law as the principal qualification requirement for the positions of Acosta, et
al.
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby GRANTED.
Accordingly, the CESB Resolution No. 918 dated Jnaury 12, 2011 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE for not being in conformity with law and jurisprudence. It is declared that the
following key positions in the Public Attorney's Office do not require third-level eligibility
and CESO rank for purposes of tenurial security:
1. Chief Public Attorney;
2. Deputy Chief Public Attorneys;
3. Regional Public Attorneys; and
4. Assistant Regional Public Attorneys.38
The CESB sought reconsideration of the Decision, but its motion was denied.39
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THIS COURT
On 9 August 2011, the CESB filed the instant Petition40 imputing grave abuse of discretion to
respondent CSC. It asserts that (a) the CSC has no jurisdiction to review the Resolution of the
CESB, given the latter's autonomy as an attached agency; (b) CESB Resolution No. 918 should
have been appealed to the Office of the President, and not to the CSC, in accordance with
Article IV, Part III of the Integrated Reorganization Plan. The subject PAO positions are
supposedly part of the CES, based on criteria established by the CESB.41 These criteria were
Page 63 of 84
set pursuant to the latter's power to identify positions belonging to the third-level of the civil
service and to prescribe the requirements for entry thereto. The Petition further reiterates the
alleged inability of the CSC to decide the case with impartiality.
In its Comment,42 the CSC contends that the Petition filed by the CESB before this Court
should be dismissed outright for being an improper remedy and for violating the hierarchy
of courts. The CSC further asserts its jurisdiction over the PAO's appeal from the CESB
Resolution in this case. Citing its mandate as the central personnel agency of the government
based on the 1987 Constitution and the Administrative Code, the CSC insists that it has broad
authority to administer and enforce the constitutional and statutory provisions on the merit
system for all levels and ranks of the civil service. This authority allegedly encompasses the
power to review and revise the decisions and actions of offices attached to it, such as the
CESB. It also claims that the present dispute involves a personnel action that is within its
jurisdiction.
Respondents PAO and its officials have also filed their own Comment43 on the Petition. They
assert that (a) the Petition should be dismissed outright as it is tainted with serious
procedural and jurisdictional flaws; (b) the CSC properly exercised its jurisdiction when it
resolved the appeal in this case; and (c) CESB Resolution No. 918 contravened R.A. 9406 in
relation to the 1987 Constitution, R.A. 10071 and the CSC letteropinion dated 7 January 2011.
Because the instant case involves the contradictory views of two government offices, the
Court likewise required the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on the matter as
the lawyer of the government tasked to uphold the best interest of the latter.
On 28 February 2012, the OSG filed the required Comment.44 On the issue of jurisdiction, it
supports the view of the CSC and the PAO. It cites the Constitution and the Administrative
Code as the sources of the authority of the CSC to review rulings of the CESB, particularly
with regard to personnel matters such as the reclassification of positions.
As to the merits of the case, the OSG asserts that the subject positions in the PAO should be
declassified from the CES. It points out that the primary function of these PAO officials -- the
provision of legal assistance to the indigent - is specialized in nature; in contrast, their
managerial functions are merely incidental to their role. The OSG further contends that the

manifest intent of the law is to require PAO officials to have the same qualifications as their
counterpmis in the National Prosecution Service (NPS). Consequently, the OSG argued that
the decision of the CESB to declassify certain posts in the NPS should have likewise resulted
in the declassification of the corresponding positions in the PAO.
In its Reply to the Comment of the OSG,45 the CESB urges the Court to adhere to the alleged
limitations on the general authority of the CSC over all matters concerning the civil service.
In particular, the CESB asserts its specific and exclusive mandate to administer all matters
pertaining to the third-level of the career service. Included in these matters is the power to
promulgate rules, standards and procedures for the selection, classification, compensation
and career development of its members. Moreover, the CESB insists that it is an agency
within the Executive Department under the Integrated Reorganization Plan; hence, its
decisions are appealable only to the Office of the President. Lastly, the CESB maintains that
the subject positions properly belong to the CES, considering that executive and managerial
functions must be exercised by the occupants thereof.
ISSUES
The following issues are presented for resolution:
(1) Whether a petition for certiorari and prohibition was the proper remedy to question the
assailed CSC Decision and Resolution
(2) Whether the CSC had the jurisdiction to resolve the appeal filed by the PAO and to
reverse CESB Resolution No. 918
(3) Whether the CSC acted in accordance with law when it reversed the CESB and declared
that third-level eligibility is not required for occupants of the subject PAO positions
OUR RULING
We DENY the Petition.
At the outset, we note that the CESB availed itself of an improper remedy to challenge the
ruling of the CSC. In any event, after a judicious consideration of the case, we find that the
CSC acted within its jurisdiction when it resolved the PAO's appeal and reversed CESB
Page 64 of 84
Resolution No. 918. The CSC also correctly ruled that third-level eligibility is not required for
the subject positions.
A petition for certiorari and prohibitinn is not the appropriate remedy to challenge the ruling
of the CSC.
As a preliminary matter, this Court must address the objections of respondents to the remedy
availed of by the CESB to question the ruling of the CSC.
Respondents contend that the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by the CESB before
this Court was improper, because the remedy of appeal was available via a petition for
review under Rule 43. On the other hand, the CESB insists that a Rule 65 petition is proper,
because it is disputing the authority and jurisdiction of the CSC.
We find in favor of respondents.
It is settled that a resort to the extraordinary remedies of certiorari and prohibition is proper
only in cases where (a) a tribunal, a board or an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (b) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
requires the concurrence of both these requisites:
Section l. Petition for certiorari. - When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal,
board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.1âwphi1
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or
resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent
thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph
of section 3, Rule 46.
 Page 65 of 84

Section 2. Petition for prohibition. - When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, Section 5. How appeal taken. - Appeal shall be taken by filing a verified petition for review in
board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, seven (7) legible copies with the Court of Appeals, with proof of service of a copy thereof on
are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting the adverse party and on the court or agency a quo. The original copy of the petition
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and intended for the Court of Appeals shall be indicated as such by the petitioner.
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a
Upon the filing of the petition, the petitioner shall pay to the clerk of court of the Court of
verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
Appeals the docketing and other lawful fees and deposit the sum of ₱500.00 for costs.
judgment he rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further proceedings in the
Exemption from payment of docketing and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs may be
action or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and
granted by the Court of Appeals upon a verified motion setting forth valid grounds therefor.
justice may require.
If the Court of Appeals denies the motion, the petitioner shall pay the docketing and other
lawful fees and deposit for costs within fifteen (15) days from notice of the denial. (Emphasis
supplied)
The petition shall likewise be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or
resolution subject thereof copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent In an attempt to justify its resort to certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65, the CESB asserts
thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph that the allegations in its Petition - the patent illegality of the assailed Decision and
of section 3, Rule 46. (Emphasis supplied) Resolution of the CSC, as well as the lack of jurisdiction and the grave abuse of discretion
attending the latter's ruling - are not suitable for an appeal under Rule 43. It argues that since
In this case, the second requirement is plainly absent. As respondents correctly observed,
these grounds properly pertain to a petition for certiorari and prohibition, this remedy is
there was an appeal available to the CESB in the form of a petition for review under Rule 43
more appropriate.
of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 1 of Rule 43 specifically provides for appeals from
decisions of the CSC: We find the CESB's contention untenable. As previously stated, certiorari and prohibition are
proper only if both requirements are present, that is, if the appropriate grounds are invoked;
Section 1. Scope. - This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the
and an appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy is unavailable. Mere reference to a
Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or
ground under Rule 65 is not sufficient. This Court has, in fact, dismissed a Petition for
authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among
Certiorari assailing another CSC Resolution precisely on this ground. In Mahinay v. Court of
these agencies are the Civil Service Commission, Central Board of Assessment Appeals,
Appeals,46 the Court ruled:
Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of the President, Land Registration Authority,
Social Security Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and As provided by Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, the proper mode of appeal from the decision of
Technology Transfer, National Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, a quasi-judicial agency, like the CSC, is a petition for review filed with the CA.
National Telecommunications Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic
The special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court may be resorted to
Act No. 6657, Government Service Insurance System, Employees Compensation
only when any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has
Commission, Agricultural Invention Board, Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic
acted without or in excess of its/his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
Energy Commission, Board of Investments, Construction Industry Arbitration Commission,
and voluntary arbitrators authorized by law.

to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.
In this case, petitioner clearly had the remedy of appeal provided by Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court. Madrigal Tran.\port, Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corporation held:
Where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the action for certiorari will not be
entertained. Remedies of appeal (including petitions for review) and certiorari are mutually
exclusive, not alternative or successive. Hence, certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for
an appeal, especially if one's own negligence or error in one's choice of remedy occasioned
such loss or lapse. One of the requisites of certiorari is that there be no available appeal or
any plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not
prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave abuse of discretion. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Here, the CESB could have appealed the CSC Decision and Resolution to the CA via a
petition for review under Rule 43. Hence, the filing of the instant Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition is improper regardless of the grounds invoked therein.
Moreover, we find no reason to allow the CESB to avail itself of the extraordinary remedies
of certiorari and prohibition. Indeed, the petition itself cites no exceptional circumstance47
other than the supposed transcendental importance of the issues raised, "as the assailed CSC
Decision is gravely prejudicial to the mandate of the Petitioner." Even when confronted by
respondents with regard to the availability of an appeal, the CESB still failed to cite any
special justification for its refusal to avail itself of an appeal. Instead, it opted to focus on the
nature of the grounds asserted in its Petition. For the reasons stated above, a mere reference
to grave abuse of discretion cannot justify a resort to a petition under Rule 65.
Considering the failure of the CESB to offer a compelling explanation for its insistence upon
the special remedies of certiorari and prohibition, the Court finds no justification for a liberal
application of the rules.
In any event, the contentions of the CESB are without merit. As will be further explained, we
find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CSC. In resolving the appeal filed by the
Page 66 of 84
PAO, the CSC merely exercised the authority granted to it by the Constitution as the central
personnel agency of the government.
The CSC acted within its }urisdiction when it resolved the PAO's appeal and reversed CESB
Resolution No. 918.
At its core, this case requires the Court to delineate the respective authorities granted by law
to two agencies involved in the management of government personnel - the CSC and the
CESB. This particular dispute involves not only the jurisdiction of each office over personnel
belonging to the third-level of the civil service, but also the relationship between the two
offices.
On the one hand, the CESB asserts its jurisdiction over members of the CES. Specifically, it
refers to the identification and classification of positions belonging to the third-level, as well
as the establishment of the qualifications for appointment to those posts. The CESB further
emphasizes its autonomy from the CSC on the basis of this Court's ruling that its status as an
attached agency only pertains to policy and program coordination.
The CSC, on the other hand, defends its authority to review actions and decisions of its
attached agencies, including the CESB. The CSC further claims original and appellate
jurisdiction over administrative cases involving contested appointments, pursuant to its
constitutional mandate as the central personnel agency of the government.
In the interest of the effective and efficient organization of the civil service, this Court must
ensure that the respective powers and functions of the CSC and the CESB are well-defined.
After analyzing and harmonizing the legal provisions pertaining to each of these two
agencies, the Court concludes that the CSC has the authority to review CESB Resolution No.
918. We have arrived at this conclusion after a consideration of (a) the broad mandate of the
CSC under the Constitution and the Administrative Code; and (b) the specific and narrowly
tailored powers granted to the CESB in the Integrated Reorganization Plan and the
Administrative Code.

As the central personnel agency of the government, the CSC has broad authority to pass
upon all civil service matters.
Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution entrusts to the CSC48 the administration of the civil
service, which is comprised of "all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of
the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters."49 In particular, Section 3 of Article IX-B provides for the mandate of this
independent constitutional commission:
SECTION 3. The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the
Government, shall establish a career service and adopt measures to promote morale,
efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service. It shall
strengthen the merit and rewards system, integrate all human resources development
programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a management climate conducive to
public accountability. It shall submit to the President and the Congress an annual report on
its personnel programs. (Emphases supplied)
The proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission reveal the intention to emphasize the
status of the CSC as the "central personnel agency of the Government with all powers and
functions inherent in and incidental to human resources management."50 As a matter of fact,
the original proposed provision on the functions of the CSC reads:
Sec. 3. The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the government.
shall establish a career service, promulgate and enforce policies on personnel actions,
classif[y] positions, prescribe conditions of employment except as to compensation and other
monetary benefits which shall be provided by law, and exercise alt powers and functions
inherent in and incidental to human resources management, to promote morale, efficiency,
and integrity in the Civil Service. It shall submit to the President and the Congress an aimual
report on its personnel programs, and perform such other functions as may be provided by
law.51 (Emphases supplied)
Although the specific powers of the CSC are not enumerated in the final version of 1987
Constitution,52 it is evident from the deliberations of the framers that the concept of a
Page 67 of 84
"central personnel agency" was considered all-encompassing. The concept was understood to
be sufficiently broad as to include the authority to promulgate and enforce policies on
personnel actions, to classify positions, and to exercise all powers and functions inherent in
and incidental to human resources management:
MR. FOZ. Will the amendment reduce the powers and functions of the Civil Service as
embodied in our original draft?
MS. AQUINO: No, it will not. The proposed deletion of lines 35 to 40 of page 2 until line 1 of
page 3 would not in any way minimize the powers of the Civil Service (Commission] because
they are deemed implicitly included in the all-embracing definition and concept of "central
personnel agency of the government." I believe that the lines we have mentioned are but
redundant articulation of that same concept, unnecessary surplusage.
MR. FOZ. For instance, will the power or function to promulgate policies on personnel
actions be encompassed by the Commissioner's amendment?
MS. AQUINO. It is not an amendment because I am retaining lines 33 to 35. I proposed an
amendment after the words "career service.'' I am only doing away with unnecessary
redundancy.
MR. FOZ. Can we say that all of the powers enumerated in the original provision are still
being granted by the Civil Service Commission despite the elimination of the listing of these
powers and functions?
MS. AQUINO. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, in the nature of a central personnel agency, it
would have to necessarily execute all of these functions.
MR. FOZ. And will the elimination of all these specific functions be a source of ambiguity
and controversies later on as to the extent of the powers and functions of the commission?
MS. AQUINO. I submit that this would not be susceptible of ambiguity because the concept
of a central personnel agency is a generally accepted concept and as experience would bear
out, this function is actually being carried out already by the Civil Service Commission,
except that we are integrating this concept. I do not think that it would be susceptible of any
ambiguity.
 Page 68 of 84

MR. REGALADO. Mr. Presiding Officer. SECTION 12. Powers and Functions.-The Commission shall have the following powers and
functions:
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treñas). Yes, Commissioner Regalado is recognized.
(1) Administer and enforce the constitutional and statutory provisions on the merit system
MR. REGALADO. This is more for clarification.
for all levels and ranks in the Civil Service;

The original Section 3 states, among others, the functions of the Civil Service Commission - to
(2) Prescribe, amend and enforce rules and regulations for carrying into effect the provisions
promulgate and enforce policies on personnel actions. Will Commissioner Aquino kindly
of the Civil Service Law and other pertinent laws;
indicate to us the corresponding provisions and her proposed amendment which would
encompass the powers to promulgate and enforce policies on personnel actions? (3) Promulgate policies, standards and guidelines for the Civil Service and adopt plans and
programs to promote economical, efficient and effective personnel administration in the
MS. AQUINO. It is my submission that the same functions are already subsumed under the
government;
concept of a central personnel agency.
(4) Formulate policies and regulations for the administration, maintenance and
MR. REGALADO. In other words, all those functions enumerated from line 35 on page 2 to
implementation of position classification and compensation and set standards for the
line I of page 3 inclusive, are understood to be encompassed in the phrase "central personnel
establishment, allocation and reallocation of pay scales, classes and positions;
agency of the government."
(5) Render opinion and rulings on all personnel and other Civil Service matters which shall
MS. AQUINO. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, except that on line 40 of page 2 and line 1 of the
be binding on all heads of departments, offices and agencies and which may be brought to
subsequent page, it was only subjected to a little modification.
the Supreme Court on certiorari;
MR. REGALADO. May we, therefore, make it of record that the phrase"... promulgate and
xxxx
enforce policies on personnel actions, classify positions, prescribe conditions of employment
except as to compensation and other monetary benefits which shall be provided by law" is (11) Hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on
understood to be subsumed under and included in the concept of a central personnel agency. appeal, including contested appointments, and review decisions and actions of its offices and
of the agencies attached to it. Officials and employees who fail to comply with such decisions,
MS. AQUINO. I would have no objection to that.53 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
orders, or rulings shall be liable for contempt of the Commission. Its decisions, orders, or

In accordance with the foregoing deliberations, the mandate of the CSC should therefore be rulings shall be final and executory. Such decisions, orders, or rulings may be brought to the

read as the comprehensive authority to perform all functions necessary to ensure the efficient Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty (30) days from receipt of a

administration of the entire civil service, including the CES. copy thereof;

The Administrative Code of 1987 further reinforces this view. Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, (14) Take appropriate action on all appointments and other personnel matters in the Civil

Chapter 3, Section 12 thereof enumerates the specific powers and functions of the CSC while Service including extension of Service beyond retirement age;

recognizing its comprehensive authority over all civil service matters. Section 12, Items (1) to
(19) Perform all functions properly belonging to a central personnel agency and such other
(5), (11), (14), and (19), are of particular relevance to this dispute:
functions as may be provided by law.

It is evident from the foregoing constitutional and statutory provisions that the CSC, as the
central personnel agency of the government, has been granted the broad authority and the
specific powers to pass upon all civil service matters. The question before the Court today is
whether this broad authority encompasses matters pertaining to the CES and are, as such,
recognized to be within the jurisdiction of the CESB.
To allow us to understand the legal framework governing the two agencies and to harmonize
the provisions of law, it is now necessary for the Court to examine the history and the
mandate of the CESB. It may thereby determine the proper relation between the CSC and the
CESB.
The CESB has been granted specific and limited powers under the law.
On 9 September 1968, Congress enacted R.A. 5435 authorizing the President to reorganize
different executive departments, bureaus, offices, agencies, and instrumentalities of the
government. The statute also created a Commission on Reorganization with the mandate to
study and investigate the status of all offices in the executive branch. This commission was
also tasked to submit an integrated reorganization plan to the President, and later on to
Congress, for approval. The Commission was given until 31 December 1970 to present its
plan to the President.54
After the conduct of hearings and intensive studies, a proposed Integrated Reorganization
Plan55 was submitted to then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on 31 December 1970. The plan
included a proposal to develop a professionalized and competent civil service through the
establishment of the CES - a group of senior administrators carefully selected for managerial
posts in the higher levels.56 To promulgate standards for the CES, the Commission on
Reorganization recommended the creation of the CESB:
To promulgate standards, rules and procedures regarding the selection, classification,
compensation and career development of members of the Career Executive Service, a Board
is proposed to be established. The Board shall be composed of high-level officials to provide
a government-wide view and to ensure effective support for the establishment and
development of a corps of highly competent, professional administrators.57
Page 69 of 84
The plan was referred to a presidential commission for review, but Martial Law was declared
before the proposal could be acted upon. Four days after the declaration of Martial Law,
however, the Integrated Reorganization Plan was approved by former President Marcos
through Presidential Decree No. 1.58 This approved plan included the creation of the CES
and the CESB.
The CES was created to "form a continuing pool of well-selected and development-oriented
career administrators who shall provide competent and faithful service."59 The CESB was
likewise established to serve as the governing body of the CES60 with the following
functions: (a) to promulgate rules, standards and procedures for the selection, classification,
compensation and career development of members of the CES;61 (b) to set up the
organization and operation of the civil service in accordance with the guidelines provided in
the plan;62 (c) to prepare a program of training and career development for members of the
CES;63 (d) to investigate and adjudicate administrative complaints against members of the
CES.64
When the Administrative Code was enacted in 1987, the CESB was given the additional
authority to (a) identify other officers belonging to the CES in keeping with the conditions
imposed by law;65 and (b) prescribe requirements for entrance to the third-level.66
Based on the foregoing provisions, it is clear that the powers granted to the CESB are specific
and limited. This Court must now determine whether it is possible to interpret these powers
in harmony with the broad constitutional mandate of the CSC.
The specific powers of the CESB must be narrowly interpreted as exceptions to the
comprehensive authority granted to the CSC by the Constitution and relevant statutes.
As we have earlier observed, the interplay between the broad mandate of the CSC and the
specific authority granted to the CESB is at the root of this controversy. The question we must
resolve, in particular, is whether the CSC had the authority to review and ultimately reverse
CESB Resolution No. 918, upon the appeal of the PAO.
For its part, the CESB contends that the Integrated Reorganization Plan and the
Administrative Code have granted it the exclusive authority to identify the positions
belonging to the third-level of the civil service and to prescribe the eligibility requirements
 Page 70 of 84

for appointments thereto.67 It thus asserts that the foregoing matters are beyond the revisory for the civil service; and to render opinions and rulings on all personne1 and other
jurisdiction of the CSC, and must instead be appealed to the Office of the President in civilservice matters.71
accordance with the specific provisions of the aforementioned laws. This special mandate
Here, the question of whether the subject PAO positions belong to the CES is clearly a civil
must allegedly prevail over the general authority granted to the CSC.
service matter falling within the comprehensive jurisdiction of the CSC. Further, considering
As to its status as an attached agency, the CESB cites this Court's pronouncement in Eugenio the repercussions of the issue concerning the appointments of those occupying the posts in
v. CSC68 on its autonomy from its mother agency. The CESB contends that its attachment to question, the jurisdiction of the CSC over personnel actions is implicated.
the CSC is only for the purpose of "policy and program coordination."69 Allegedly, this
It must likewise be emphasized that the CSC has been granted the authority to review the
attachment does not mean that the former's decisions, particularly CESB Resolution No. 918,
decisions of agencies attached to it under Section 12(11), Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V
are subject to the CSC's review.
of the Administrative Code:
On the other hand, the CSC asserts its jurisdiction to act upon the appeal from CESB
SECTION 12. Powers and Functions.--The Commission shall have the following powers and
Resolution No. 918 by virtue of its status as the central personnel agency of the government.
functions:
It contends that the CESB 's authority to prescribe entrance requirements for the third-level of
the civil service does not mean that the CSC no longer has jurisdiction over that class of (11) Hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on
positions. It also points out that the case involves a personnel action that is within the appeal, including contested appointments, and review decisions and actions of its offices and
jurisdiction conferred upon it by law. of the agencies attached to it. Officials and employees who fail to comply with such decisions,
orders, or rulings shall be liable for contempt of the Commission. Its decisions, orders, or
We uphold the position of the CSC.
rulings shall be final and executory. Such decisions, orders, or rulings may be brought to the
It is a basic principle in statutory construction that statutes must be interpreted in harmony Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty (30) days from receipt of a
with the Constitution and other laws.70 In this case, the specific powers of the CESB over copy thereof;
members of the CES must be interpreted in a manner that takes into account the
Since the CESB is an attached agency of the CSC,72 the former's decisions are expressly
comprehensive mandate of the CSC under the Constitution and other statutes.
subject to the CSC's review on appeal.
The present case involves the classification of positions belonging to the CES and the
Against the express mandate given to the CSC in the foregoing provision, the contention of
qualifications for these posts. These are matters clearly within the scope of the powers
the CESB that its decisions may only be appealed to the Office of the President must fail. We
granted to the CESB under the Administrative Code and the Integrated Reorganization Plan.
note that the supporting provision73 cited by the CESB in support of its argument refers only
However, this fact alone does not push the matter beyond the reach of the CSC.
to administrative cases involving the discipline of members of the CES:
As previously discussed, the CSC, as the central personnel agency of the government, is
5. The Board shall promulgate rules, standards and procedures on the selection,
given the comprehensive mandate to administer the civil service under Article IX-B, Section 3
classification, compensation and career development of members of the Career Executive
of the 1987 Constitution; and Section 12, Items (4), (5), and (14) of the Administrative Code. It
Service. The Board shall set up the organization and operation of the Service in accordance
has also been expressly granted the power to promulgate policies, standards, and guidelines
with the following guidelines:

h. Discipline. Investigation and adjudication of administrative complaints against members
of the Career Executive Service shall be governed by Article VI, Chapter II and Paragraph I
(d) of Article II, Chapter III of this Part; provided that appeals shall be made to the Career
Executive Service Board instead of the Civil Service Commission. Administrative cases
involving members of the Service on assignment with the Board shall be investigated and
adjudicated by the Board with the right to appeal to the Office of the President. (Emphasis
supplied)
In our view, the foregoing rule on appeals to the Office of the President only covers
disciplinary cases involving members of the CES. It is evident that this special rule was
created for that particular type of case, because members of the CES arc all presidential
appointees. Given that the power to appoint generally carries with it the power to
discipline,74 it is only reasonable for the president to be given the ultimate authority to
discipline presidential appointees. But this special rule cannot apply to the matter at hand,
because CESB Resolution No. 918 did not involve a disciplinary case. Since it was clearly
outside the scope of the foregoing provision, the Resolution did not come within the
jurisdiction of the Office of the President. It was therefore correctly appealed to the CSC.
From the above discussion, it is evident that the CSC acted within its jurisdiction when it
resolved the PAO's appeal. The arguments of the CESB on this point must perforce be
rejected.
The CSC correctly ruled that third level eligibility is not required for the subject positions.
The Court now comes to the final issue for resolution - whether the CSC ruled in accordance
with law when the latter declared that it was not necessary for occupants of the subject PAO
posts to possess third-level eligibility.
On this point, the CESB argues that third-level eligibility is required for the positions
pursuant to R.A. 9406 in relation to R.A. 10071. It avers that R.A. 9406 requires the Chief
Public Attorney, Deputy Chief Public Attorneys, Regional Public Attorneys and Assistant
Regional Public Attorneys to have the same qualifications for appointment, rank, salaries,
allowances and retirement privileges as the Chief State Prosecutor, Assistant Chief State
Prosecutor, Regional State Prosecutor and Assistant Regional State Prosecutor of the NPS
Page 71 of 84
under P.D. 1275. The latter law is the old one that governs the NPS and requires third-level
eligibility for senior prosecutorial posts. According to the CESB, R.A. 10071 cannot apply,
because R.A. 9406 could not have referred to a law that had not yet been enacted at the time.
It also asserts that the subsequent declassification of prosecutors cannot benefit members of
the PAO, because the prosecutors exercise quasi-judicial functions while the PAO members
do not.
On the other hand, the CSC argues that nowhere in R.A. 9406, P.D. 1275, R.A. 10071 or Batas
Pambansa Blg. (B.P.) 129 is there a reference to third-level eligibility and CESO rank as
qualification requirements. It emphasizes that the CESB cannot add to the provisions of these
laws, which only require the practice of law for a certain period of time and presuppose a bar
license. The PAO, for its part, maintains that the posts concerned are highly technical in
nature because they primarily involve legal practice, and any managerial functions
performed are merely incidental to their principal roles. It also claims that the legislature
could never have intended to require third-level eligibility for occupants of the subject posts
when it enacted R.A. 9406.
After a careful consideration of the relevant statutes and rules, this Court agrees with the
conclusion of the CSC. To require the occupants of the subject PAO positions to possess
third-level eligibility would be to amend the law and defeat its spirit and intent.
The CESB effectively amended the law when it required the occupants of the subject PAO
positions to obtain third-level eligibility.
The authority to prescribe qualifications for pos1t10ns in the government is lodged in
Congress75 as part of its plenary legislative power to create, abolish and modify public
offices to meet societal demands.76 From this authority emanates the right to change the
qualifications for existing statutory offices.77
It was in the exercise of this power that the legislature enacted Section 5 of R.A. 9406, which
provides for the qualifications for the Chief Public Attorney, Deputy Chief Public Attorneys,
Regional Public Attorneys and Assistant Regional Public Attorneys:
SEC. 5. Section 16, Chapter 5, Title III, Book IV of Executive Order No. 292, as amended, is
hereby further amended to read as follows:

SEC. 16. The Chief Public Attorney and Other PAO Officials. - The PAO shall be headed by a
Chief Public Attorney and shall be assisted by two (2) Deputy Chief Public Attorneys. Each
PAO Regional Office established in each of the administrative regions of the country shall be
headed by a Regional Public Attorney who shall be assisted by an Assistant Regional Public
Attorney. The authority and responsibility for the exercise of the mandate of the PAO and for
the discharge of its powers and functions shall be vested in the Chief Public Attorney.
The Chief Public Attorney shall have the same qualifications for appointment, rank, salaries,
allowances, and retirement privileges as those of the Chief State Prosecutor of the National
Prosecution Service. The Deputy Chief Public Attorneys shall have the same qualifications
for appointment, rank, salaries, allowances, and retirement privileges as those of the
Assistant Chief State Prosecutor of the National Prosecution Service.
The Regional Public Attorney and the Assistant Regional Public Attorney shall have the same
qualifications for appointment, rank, salaries, allowances, and retirement privileges as those
of a Regional State Prosecutor and the Assistant Regional State Prosecutor of the National
Prosecution Service respectively.
At the time of the enactment of R.A. 9406, the qualifications of officials of the NPS, to which
the foregoing provision referred, were provided by Section 3 of P.D. 1275:
Section 3. Prosecution Staff; Organization, Qualifications, Appointment. The Prosecution
Staff shall be composed of prosecuting officers in such number as hereinbelow determined. It
shall be headed by a Chief State Prosecutor who shall be assisted by three Assistants Chief
State Prosecutors.
The Chief State Prosecutor, the three Assistants Chief State Prosecutors; and the members of
the Prosecution Staff shall be selected from among qualified and professionally trained
members of the legal profession who arc of proven integrity and competence and have been
in the actual practice of the legal profession for at least five (5) years prior to their
appointment or have held during like period, any position requiring the qualifications of a
lawyer. (Emphases supplied)
Page 72 of 84
Soon after, R.A. 10071 or the Prosecution Service Act of 201078 was passed. In updating the
qualifications for senior positions in the NPS, Congress again opted to refer to another set of
positions, this time in the judiciary:
SECTION 14. Qualifications, Rank and Appointment of the Prosecutor General. - The
Prosecutor General shall have the same qualifications for appointment, rank, category,
prerogatives, salary grade and salaries, allowances, emoluments and other privileges, shall
be subject to the same inhibitions and disqualifications, and shall enjoy the same retirement
and other benefits as those of the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals and shall be
appointed by the President.
SECTION 15. Ranks of Prosecutors. - The Prosecutors m the National Prosecution Service
shall have the following ranks:
Rank Position/Title
Prosecutor V (I) Senior Deputy State Prosecutors;
(2) Regional Prosecutors; and
(3) Provincial Prosecutors or City Prosecutors of provinces or cities with at least twenty-five
(25) prosecutors and City Prosecutors of cities within a metropolitan area established by law
Prosecutor IV (1) Deputy State Prosecutors;
(2) Deputy Regional Prosecutors
(3) Provincial Prosecutors or City Prosecutors of provinces or cities with less than twenty-five
(25) prosecutors; and
(4) Deputy Provincial Prosecutors or Deputy City Prosecutors of provinces or cities with at
least twenty- five (25) prosecutors; and Deputy City Prosecutors of cities within a
metropolitan area established by law.
SECTION 16. Qualifications, Ranks and Appointments of Prosecutors and Other Prosecution
Officers. - Prosecutors with the rank of Prosecutor V shall have the same qualifications for
appointment, rank, category, prerogatives, salary grade and salaries, allowances,

emoluments and other privileges, shall be subject to the same inhibitions and
disqualifications, and shall enjoy the same retirement and other benefits as those of an
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals.
Prosecutors with the rank of Prosecutor IV shall have the same qualifications for
appointment, rank, category, prerogatives, salary grade and salaries, allowances,
emoluments and other privileges, shall be subject to the same inhibitions and
disqualifications, and shall enjoy the same retirement and other benefits as those of a Judge
of the
Regional Trial Court.
A reading of B.P. 129 reveals, in turn, that the Presiding Justice and the Associate Justices of
the Court of Appeals79 are required to have the same qualifications as the members of this
Court. 80 On the other hand, judges of the regional trial courts are governed by a separate
provision.81
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that occupants of the subject PAO positions are only
mandated to comply with requirements as to age, citizenship, education, and experience.
Since third-level eligibility is not at all mentioned in the law, it would be improper for the
CESB to impose this additional qualification as a prerequisite to permanent appointments.82
To do so would be to amend the law and to overrule Congress.
While the CESB has been granted the power to prescribe entrance requirements for the third-
level of the civil service, this power cannot be construed as the authority to modify the
qualifications specifically set by law for certain positions. Hence, even granting that the
occupants of the subject positions indeed exercise managerial and executive functions as
incidents of their primary roles, the CESB has no power to impose additional qualifications
for them. It cannot use the authority granted to it by Congress itself to defeat the express
provisions of statutes enacted by the latter.
It is also beyond the power of the CESB to question or overrule the specific qualifications
imposed by Congress for the subject positions. The legislature must be deemed to have
considered the entirety of the functions attendant to these posts when it enacted R.A. 9406
and prescribed the relevant qualifications for each position. The choice not to require third
Page 73 of 84
level eligibility in this instance must be respected - not only by the CESB but also by this
Court - as a matter that goes into the wisdom and the policy of a statute.83
The intent of R.A. 9406 to establish and maintain the parity in qualifications between the
senior officials of the PAO and the NPS must he respected.
This Court must likewise reject the CESB's contention that the declassification of positions in
the NPS (as a result of the enactment of R.A. 10071) cannot benefit the PAO because of a
supposed difference in their functions. This argument goes against the express terms and the
clear intent of R.A. 9406 and is therefore untenable.
As stated previously, Section 5 of R.A. 9406 amended the Administrative Code of 1987. The
amendment was done to provide for "the same qualifications for appointment, rank, salaries,
allowances, and retirement privileges" of senior officials of both the PAO and the NPS. The
deliberations of Congress on R.A. 9406 reveal its intention to establish parity between the two
offices. The lawmakers clearly viewed these officers as counterparts in the administration of
justice:
Senator Enrile. Well, I agree with the gentleman. As I said, we should equalize the
prosecution and the defense. The PAO Office is actually an arm of the same government to
protect those who need protection.
Senator Pimentel. That is right.
Senator Enrile. At the same time, the Prosecution Service is the arm of the government to
punish those who would need punishment. So, these two perform the same class of service
for the nation and they should be equalized.
Senator Pimentel. Yes, I totally agree with that, that is why precisely I made this observation
that talking alone of starting pay, the level of starting pay of a PAO lawyer should not be
lower than the starting pay of a prosecutor.
Now maybe at the proper time we can insert that amendment.
Senator Enrile. I will be glad to receive the proposed amendment.84 (Emphases supplied)
 Page 74 of 84

During the bicameral conference on the proposed bill, Senator Franklin M. Drilon explained public officers in the executive department and the Judges and Justices who are covered by
that equal treatment of the two offices was essential: Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, and other relevant laws. In effect, these laws recognize
that public officers who are expressly identified in the laws by the special nature of their
SEN. DRILON. Yes, this is our amendment that the PAO chief should have the same salary as
official functions render services which are as important as the services rendered by the
the Chief State Prosecutor and down the line, the Assistant Chief State Prosecutor, etcetera.
Judges and Justices. They acknowledge the respective roles of those public officers and of the
And I want to put this on record because there are PAO lawyers here. There are PAO lawyers
members of the Judiciary in the promotion of justice and the proper functioning of our legal
here before us and we want to explain why we have placed this.
and judicial systems.
SEN. DRILON. All right. As I said - you know, I want to put on record why we had tried to
To fulfill the legislative intent to accord equal treatment to senior officials of the PAO and the
streamline the salary structure and place it at the same level as the Chief State Prosecutor.
NPS, parity in their qualifications for appointment must be maintained. Accordingly, the
Because we do not want a salary distortion in the Department of Justice where you have the
revised qualifications of those in the NPS must also be considered applicable to those in the
PAO higher than the prosecutors. That's why we want to put them on equal footing rather
PAO. The declassification of positions in the NPS should thus benefit their counterpart
than mag - you know, there'll be whipsawing. You place the prosecutors below the PAO. I
positions in the PAO. There is no justification for treating the two offices differently, given
can assure you that tomorrow the PAO will come to us - the prosecutors will come to us and
the plain provisions and the rationale of the law.
say, "Put us higher than the PAO lawyers." So you will have whipsawing here.85
This Court would render nugatory both the terms and the intent of the law if it sustains the
Although these statements were made to address the specific issue of salary, this Court
view of the CESB. We cannot construe R.A. 9046 in relation to P.D. 1275 only, while
considers them as manifestations of the intent to create and maintain parity between
disregarding the amendments brought about by R.A. 10071. To do so would defeat the
prosecutors and public attorneys. In Re: Vicente S. E. Veloso,86 this Court considered similar
legislature's very purpose, which is to equalize the qualifications of the NPS and the PAO.
provisions in other laws as confirmations of the legislative intent to grant equal treatment to
certain classes of public officers: Based on the foregoing discussion, it is evident that the CSC acted within its jurisdiction and
authority as the central personnel agency of the government when it passed upon the appeal
Nonetheless, there are existing laws which expressly require the qualifications for
filed by the PAO from CESB Resolution No. 918. Further, there was no grave abuse of
appointment, confer the rank, and grant the salaries, privileges, and benefits of members of
discretion on the part of the CSC when it reversed the said resolution, which refused to
the Judiciary on other public officers in the Executive Department, such as the following:
declassify the subject PAO positions. As the CSC noted, the third-level eligibility required by

(a) the Solicitor General and Assistant Solicitor Generals of the Office of the Solicitor General the CESB as an additional qualification for these posts contravened not only the express

(OSG); and terms, but also the clear intent of R.A. 9406.

(b) the Chief Legal Counsel and the Assistant Chief Legal Counsel, the Chief State Prosecutor, For the reasons stated above, and as a consequence of the improper remedy the CESB has

and the members of the National Prosecution Service (NPS) in the Department of Justice. resorted to, this Court must dismiss the instant petition.

The intention of the above laws is to establish a parity in qualifications required, the rank WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

conferred, and the salaries and benefits given to members of the Judiciary and the public CSC Decision No. 110067 and Resolution No. 1100719 dated 15 February 2011 and 1 June

officers covered by the said laws. The said laws seek to give equal treatment to the specific 2011, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

F. NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY
1. WILSON P. GAMBOA v. FINANCE SECRETARY TEVES
G.R. No. 176579, June 28, 2011, EN BANC (Carpio, J.)
This is a petition to nullify the sale of shares of stock of Philippine Telecommunications
Investment Corporation (PTIC) by the government of the Republic of the Philippines, acting
through the Inter-Agency Privatization Council (IPC), to Metro Pacific Assets Holdings, Inc.
(MPAH), an affiliate of First Pacific Company Limited (First Pacific), a Hong Kong-based
investment management and holding company and a shareholder of the Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company (PLDT).
The petitioner questioned the sale on the ground that it also involved an indirect sale of 12
million shares (or about 6.3 percent of the outstanding common shares) of PLDT owned by
PTIC to First Pacific. With the this sale, First Pacific’s common shareholdings in PLDT
increased from 30.7 percent to 37 percent, thereby increasing the total common shareholdings
of foreigners in PLDT to about 81.47%. This, according to the petitioner, violates Section 11,
Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which limits foreign ownership of the capital
of a public utility to not more than 40%.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the term “capital” in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers to the
total common shares only, or to the total outstanding capital stock (combined total of
common and nonvoting preferred shares) of PLDT, a public utility.
RULING:
Section 11, Article XII (National Economy and Patrimony) of the 1987 Constitution mandates
the Filipinization of public utilities, to wit:
Section 11. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a
public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or
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associations organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose
capital is owned by such citizens; nor shall such franchise, certificate, or authorization be
exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. Neither shall any such franchise
or right be granted except under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment,
alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires. The State shall
encourage equity participation in public utilities by the general public. The participation of
foreign investors in the governing body of any public utility enterprise shall be limited to
their proportionate share in its capital, and all the executive and managing officers of such
corporation or association must be citizens of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)
The term “capital” in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to shares of stock
entitled to vote in the election of directors, and thus in the present case only to common
shares, and not to the total outstanding capital stock comprising both common and non-
voting preferred shares [of PLDT].
Indisputably, one of the rights of a stockholder is the right to participate in the control or
management of the corporation. This is exercised through his vote in the election of directors
because it is the board of directors that controls or manages the corporation. In the absence of
provisions in the articles of incorporation denying voting rights to preferred shares, preferred
shares have the same voting rights as common shares. However, preferred shareholders are
often excluded from any control, that is, deprived of the right to vote in the election of
directors and on other matters, on the theory that the preferred shareholders are merely
investors in the corporation for income in the same manner as bondholders. xxx.
Considering that common shares have voting rights which translate to control, as opposed to
preferred shares which usually have no voting rights, the term “capital” in Section 11, Article
XII of the Constitution refers only to common shares. However, if the preferred shares also
have the right to vote in the election of directors, then the term “capital” shall include such
preferred shares because the right to participate in the control or management of the
corporation is exercised through the right to vote in the election of directors. In short, the
term “capital” in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to shares of stock that
can vote in the election of directors.

Mere legal title is insufficient to meet the 60 percent Filipino-owned “capital” required in the
Constitution. Full beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock, coupled
with 60 percent of the voting rights, is required. The legal and beneficial ownership of 60
percent of the outstanding capital stock must rest in the hands of Filipino nationals in
accordance with the constitutional mandate. Otherwise, the corporation is “considered as
non-Philippine national[s].”
To construe broadly the term “capital” as the total outstanding capital stock, including both
common and non-voting preferred shares, grossly contravenes the intent and letter of the
Constitution that the “State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos.”
A broad definition unjustifiably disregards who owns the all-important voting stock, which
necessarily equates to control of the public utility.
We shall illustrate the glaring anomaly in giving a broad definition to the term “capital.” Let
us assume that a corporation has 100 common shares owned by foreigners and 1,000,000 non-
voting preferred shares owned by Filipinos, with both classes of share having a par value of
one peso (P1.00) per share. Under the broad definition of the term “capital,” such corporation
would be considered compliant with the 40 percent constitutional limit on foreign equity of
public utilities since the overwhelming majority, or more than 99.999 percent, of the total
outstanding capital stock is Filipino owned. This is obviously absurd.
In the example given, only the foreigners holding the common shares have voting rights in
the election of directors, even if they hold only 100 shares. The foreigners, with a minuscule
equity of less than 0.001 percent, exercise control over the public utility. On the other hand,
the Filipinos, holding more than 99.999 percent of the equity, cannot vote in the election of
directors and hence, have no control over the public utility. This starkly circumvents the
intent of the framers of the Constitution, as well as the clear language of the Constitution, to
place the control of public utilities in the hands of Filipinos. It also renders illusory the State
policy of an independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.
The example given is not theoretical but can be found in the real world, and in fact exists in
the present case.
Page 76 of 84
[O]nly holders of common shares can vote in the election of directors [of PLDT], meaning
only common shareholders exercise control over PLDT. Conversely, holders of preferred
shares, who have no voting rights in the election of directors, do not have any control over
PLDT. In fact, under PLDT’s Articles of Incorporation, holders of common shares have voting
rights for all purposes, while holders of preferred shares have no voting right for any
purpose whatsoever.
It must be stressed, and respondents do not dispute, that foreigners hold a majority of the
common shares of PLDT. In fact, based on PLDT’s 2010 General Information Sheet (GIS),
which is a document required to be submitted annually to the Securities and Exchange
Commission, foreigners hold 120,046,690 common shares of PLDT whereas Filipinos hold
only 66,750,622 common shares. In other words, foreigners hold 64.27% of the total number
of PLDT’s common shares, while Filipinos hold only 35.73%. Since holding a majority of the
common shares equates to control, it is clear that foreigners exercise control over PLDT. Such
amount of control unmistakably exceeds the allowable 40 percent limit on foreign ownership
of public utilities expressly mandated in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution.
As shown in PLDT’s 2010 GIS, as submitted to the SEC, the par value of PLDT common
shares is P5.00 per share, whereas the par value of preferred shares is P10.00 per share. In
other words, preferred shares have twice the par value of common shares but cannot elect
directors and have only 1/70 of the dividends of common shares. Moreover, 99.44% of the
preferred shares are owned by Filipinos while foreigners own only a minuscule 0.56% of the
preferred shares. Worse, preferred shares constitute 77.85% of the authorized capital stock of
PLDT while common shares constitute only 22.15%. This undeniably shows that beneficial
interest in PLDT is not with the non-voting preferred shares but with the common shares,
blatantly violating the constitutional requirement of 60 percent Filipino control and Filipino
beneficial ownership in a public utility.
The legal and beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock must rest in
the hands of Filipinos in accordance with the constitutional mandate. Full beneficial
ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock, coupled with 60 percent of the
voting rights, is constitutionally required for the State’s grant of authority to operate a public
utility. The undisputed fact that the PLDT preferred shares, 99.44% owned by Filipinos, are
non-voting and earn only 1/70 of the dividends that PLDT common shares earn, grossly

violates the constitutional requirement of 60 percent Filipino control and Filipino beneficial
ownership of a public utility.
In short, Filipinos hold less than 60 percent of the voting stock, and earn less than 60 percent
of the dividends, of PLDT. This directly contravenes the express command in Section 11,
Article XII of the Constitution that “[n]o franchise, certificate, or any other form of
authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to x x x corporations
x x x organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose capital is
owned by such citizens x x x.”
To repeat, (1) foreigners own 64.27% of the common shares of PLDT, which class of shares
exercises the sole right to vote in the election of directors, and thus exercise control over
PLDT; (2) Filipinos own only 35.73% of PLDT’s common shares, constituting a minority of
the voting stock, and thus do not exercise control over PLDT; (3) preferred shares, 99.44%
owned by Filipinos, have no voting rights; (4) preferred shares earn only 1/70 of the
dividends that common shares earn; (5) preferred shares have twice the par value of common
shares; and (6) preferred shares constitute 77.85% of the authorized capital stock of PLDT and
common shares only 22.15%. This kind of ownership and control of a public utility is a
mockery of the Constitution. Incidentally, the fact that PLDT common shares with a par
value of P5.00 have a current stock market value of P2,328.00 per share, while PLDT
preferred shares with a par value of P10.00 per share have a current stock market value
ranging from only P10.92 to P11.06 per share, is a glaring confirmation by the market that
control and beneficial ownership of PLDT rest with the commonshares, not with the
preferred shares.
2. JOSE M. ROY III, Petitioner, v. CHAIRPERSON TERESITA HERBOSA,THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, AND PHILILIPPINE LONG
DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, Respondents.
FACTS OF THE CASE:
This is a case of special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
seeking to annul Memorandum Circular No. 8, Series of 2013 (SEC-MC No. 8)issued by the
SEC for allegedly being in violation of the Court's Decision ("Gamboa Decision") and
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Resolution ("Gamboa Resolution") in Gamboa v. Finance Secretary Teves, G.R. No. 176579
which jurisprudentially established the proper interpretation of Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution.
On June 28, 2011, the Court issued the Gamboa Decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, we PARTLY GRANT the petition and rule that the term "capital" in Section
11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution refers only to shares of stock entitled to vote in the
election of directors, and thus in the present case only to common shares, and not to the total
outstanding capital stock (common and non-voting preferred shares). Respondent
Chairperson of the Securities and Exchange Commission is DIRECTED to apply this
definition of the term "capital" in determining the extent of allowable foreign ownership in
respondent Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, and if there is a violation of
Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, to impose the appropriate sanctions under the law.
On May 20, 2013, the SEC, through Chairperson Herbosa, issued SEC-MC No. 8
entitled "Guidelines on Compliance with the Filipino-Foreign Ownership Requirements
Prescribed in the Constitution and/or Existing Laws by Corporations Engaged in
Nationalized and Partly Nationalized Activities." Section 2 of SEC-MC No. 8 provides:
Section 2. All covered corporations shall, at all times, observe the constitutional or statutory
ownership requirement. For purposes of determining compliance therewith, the required
percentage of Filipino ownership shall be applied to BOTH (a) the total number of
outstanding shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of directors; AND (b) the total
number of outstanding shares of stock, whether or not entitled to vote in the election of
directors.
On June 10, 2013, Roy, as a lawyer and taxpayer, filed the Petition, assailing the
validity of SEC-MC No. 8 for not conforming to the letter and spirit of the Gamboa Decision
and Resolution and for having been issued by the SEC with grave abuse of discretion.
Petitioner Roy also questions the ruling of the SEC that respondent Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company ("PLDT") is compliant with the constitutional rule on foreign
ownership. He prays that the Court declare SEC-MC No. 8 unconstitutional and direct the

SEC to issue new guidelines regarding the determination of compliance with Section 11,
Article XII of the Constitution in accordance with Gamboa.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner has standing to question the validity of the subject act or
issuance, i.e., he has a personal and substantial interest in the case that he has sustained, or
will sustain, direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the act or issuance
RULING:
Petitioners have no legal standing to question the constitutionality of SEC-MC No.
8.The personal and substantial interest that enables a party to have legal standing is one that
is both material, an interest in issue and to be affected by the government action, as
distinguished from mere interest in the issue involved, or a mere incidental interest, and real,
which means a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a
future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest.
As to injury, the party must show that (1) he will personally suffer some actual or
threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is
fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a
favorable action.
To establish his standing, petitioner Roy merely claimed that he has standing to
question SEC-MC No. 8 "as a concerned citizen, an officer of the Court and as a taxpayer" as
well as "the senior law partner of his own law firm[, which] x xx is a subscriber of PLDT."
The Court has previously emphasized that the locus standi requisite is not met by the
expedient invocation of one's citizenship or membership in the bar who has an interest in
ensuring that laws and orders of the Philippine government are legally and validly issued as
these supposed interests are too general, which are shared by other groups and by the whole
citizenry. Per their allegations, the personal interest invoked by petitioners as citizens and
members of the bar in the validity or invalidity of SEC-MC No. 8 is at best equivocal, and
totally insufficient.
Page 78 of 84
Petitioners' status as taxpayers is also of no moment. As often reiterated by the Court,
a taxpayer's suit is allowed only when the petitioner has demonstrated the direct correlation
of the act complained of and the disbursement of public funds in contravention of law or the
Constitution, or has shown that the case involves the exercise of the spending or taxing
power of Congress. SEC-MC No. 8 does not involve an additional expenditure of public
funds and the taxing or spending power of Congress.
The allegation that petitioner Roy's law firm is a "subscriber of PLDT" is ambiguous.
It is unclear whether his law firm is a "subscriber" of PLDT's shares of stock or of its various
telecommunication services. Petitioner Roy has not identified the specific direct and
substantial injury he or his law firm stands to suffer as "subscriber of PLDT" as a result of the
issuance of SEC-MC No. 8 and its enforcement. Moreover, in the most practical sense, a
PLDT subscriber loses or gains nothing in the event that SEC-MC No. 8 is either sustained or
struck down by [the Court].
3. MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R.
No. 155650 July 20, 2006
Facts:
MIAA received Final Notices of Real Estate Tax Delinquency from the City of Parañaque for
the taxable years 1992 to 2001. MIAA’s real estate tax delinquency was estimated at P624
million.
The City of Parañaque, through its City Treasurer, issued notices of levy and warrants of levy
on the Airport Lands and Buildings. The Mayor of the City of Parañaque threatened to sell at
public auction the Airport Lands and Buildings should MIAA fail to pay the real estate tax
delinquency.
MIAA filed with the Court of Appeals an original petition for prohibition and injunction,
with prayer for preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order. The petition sought to
restrain the City of Parañaque from imposing real estate tax on, levying against, and
auctioning for public sale the Airport Lands and Buildings.

Paranaque’s Contention: Section 193 of the Local Government Code expressly withdrew the
tax exemption privileges of “government-owned and-controlled corporations” upon the
effectivity of the Local Government Code. Respondents also argue that a basic rule of
statutory construction is that the express mention of one person, thing, or act excludes all
others. An international airport is not among the exceptions mentioned in Section 193 of the
Local Government Code. Thus, respondents assert that MIAA cannot claim that the Airport
Lands and Buildings are exempt from real estate tax.
MIAA’s contention: Airport Lands and Buildings are owned by the Republic. The
government cannot tax itself. The reason for tax exemption of public property is that its
taxation would not inure to any public advantage, since in such a case the tax debtor is also
the tax creditor.
Issue:
WON Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are exempt from real estate tax under existing
laws? Yes. Ergo, the real estate tax assessments issued by the City of Parañaque, and all
proceedings taken pursuant to such assessments, are void.
Held:
1. MIAA is Not a Government-Owned or Controlled Corporation
MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation but an instrumentality of the
National Government and thus exempt from local taxation.
MIAA is not a stock corporation because it has no capital stock divided into shares. MIAA
has no stockholders or voting shares.
MIAA is also not a non-stock corporation because it has no members. A non-stock
corporation must have members.
MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers to perform efficiently
its governmental functions. MIAA is like any other government instrumentality, the only
difference is that MIAA is vested with corporate powers.
Page 79 of 84
When the law vests in a government instrumentality corporate powers, the instrumentality
does not become a corporation. Unless the government instrumentality is organized as a
stock or non-stock corporation, it remains a government instrumentality exercising not only
governmental but also corporate powers. Thus, MIAA exercises the governmental powers of
eminent domain, police authority and the levying of fees and charges. At the same time,
MIAA exercises “all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law, insofar as these
powers are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive Order.”
2. Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are Owned by the Republic
a. Airport Lands and Buildings are of Public Dominion
The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are property of public dominion and therefore
owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines.
No one can dispute that properties of public dominion mentioned in Article 420 of the Civil
Code, like “roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State,” are
owned by the State. The term “ports” includes seaports and airports. The MIAA Airport
Lands and Buildings constitute a “port” constructed by the State. Under Article 420 of the
Civil Code, the MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings are properties of public dominion and
thus owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines.
The Airport Lands and Buildings are devoted to public use because they are used by the
public for international and domestic travel and transportation. The fact that the MIAA
collects terminal fees and other charges from the public does not remove the character of the
Airport Lands and Buildings as properties for public use.
The charging of fees to the public does not determine the character of the property whether it
is of public dominion or not. Article 420 of the Civil Code defines property of public
dominion as one “intended for public use.” The terminal fees MIAA charges to passengers, as
well as the landing fees MIAA charges to airlines, constitute the bulk of the income that
maintains the operations of MIAA. The collection of such fees does not change the character
of MIAA as an airport for public use. Such fees are often termed user’s tax. This means taxing
those among the public who actually use a public facility instead of taxing all the public
including those who never use the particular public facility.

b. Airport Lands and Buildings are Outside the Commerce of Man
The Court has also ruled that property of public dominion, being outside the commerce of
man, cannot be the subject of an auction sale.
Properties of public dominion, being for public use, are not subject to levy, encumbrance or
disposition through public or private sale. Any encumbrance, levy on execution or auction
sale of any property of public dominion is void for being contrary to public policy. Essential
public services will stop if properties of public dominion are subject to encumbrances,
foreclosures and auction sale. This will happen if the City of Parañaque can foreclose and
compel the auction sale of the 600-hectare runway of the MIAA for non-payment of real
estate tax.
c. MIAA is a Mere Trustee of the Republic
MIAA is merely holding title to the Airport Lands and Buildings in trust for the Republic.
Section 48, Chapter 12, Book I of the Administrative Code allows instrumentalities like MIAA
to hold title to real properties owned by the Republic. n MIAA’s case, its status as a mere
trustee of the Airport Lands and Buildings is clearer because even its executive head cannot
sign the deed of conveyance on behalf of the Republic. Only the President of the Republic can
sign such deed of conveyance.
d. Transfer to MIAA was Meant to Implement a Reorganization
The transfer of the Airport Lands and Buildings from the Bureau of Air Transportation to
MIAA was not meant to transfer beneficial ownership of these assets from the Republic to
MIAA. The purpose was merely toreorganize a division in the Bureau of Air Transportation
into a separate and autonomous body. The Republic remains the beneficial owner of the
Airport Lands and Buildings. MIAA itself is owned solely by the Republic. No party claims
any ownership rights over MIAA’s assets adverse to the Republic.
e. Real Property Owned by the Republic is Not Taxable
Sec 234 of the LGC provides that real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or
any of its political subdivisions except when the beneficial use thereof has been granted, for
Page 80 of 84
consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person following are exempted from payment of the
real property tax.
However, portions of the Airport Lands and Buildings that MIAA leases to private entities
are not exempt from real estate tax. For example, the land area occupied by hangars that
MIAA leases to private corporations is subject to real estate tax.
4. Dante Liban, et al. v. Richard Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, January 18, 2011
RESOLUTION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
I. THE FACTS
Petitioners Liban, et al., who were officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red
Cross Chapter, filed with the Supreme Court what they styled as “Petition to Declare Richard
J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate” against respondent Gordon, who was
elected Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors during
his incumbency as Senator.
Petitioners alleged that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors,
respondent Gordon ceased to be a member of the Senate pursuant to Sec. 13, Article VI of the
Constitution, which provides that “[n]o Senator . . . may hold any other office or employment
in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without
forfeiting his seat.” Petitioners cited the case of Camporedondo vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 129049,
decided August 6, 1999, which held that the PNRC is a GOCC, in supporting their argument
that respondent Gordon automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate when he accepted and
held the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors.
Formerly, in its Decision dated July 15, 2009, the Court, voting 7-5,[1] held that the office of
the PNRC Chairman is NOT a government office or an office in a GOCC for purposes of the
prohibition in Sec. 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The PNRC Chairman is elected by
the PNRC Board of Governors; he is not appointed by the President or by any subordinate
 Page 81 of 84

government official. Moreover, the PNRC is NOT a GOCC because it is a privately-owned, [The Court GRANTED reconsideration and MODIFIED the dispositive portion of the
privately-funded, and privately-run charitable organization and because it is controlled by a Decision by deleting the second sentence thereof.]
Board of Governors four-fifths of which are private sector individuals. Therefore, respondent
NO, it was not correct for the Court to have decided on the constitutional issue because it
Gordon did not forfeit his legislative seat when he was elected as PNRC Chairman during his
was not the very lis mota of the case. The PNRC is sui generis in nature; it is neither strictly a
incumbency as Senator.
GOCC nor a private corporation.
The Court however held further that the PNRC Charter, R.A. 95, as amended by PD 1264 and
The issue of constitutionality of R.A. No. 95 was not raised by the parties, and was not among
1643, is void insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation since Section 7, Article
the issues defined in the body of the Decision; thus, it was not the very lis mota of the case.
XIV of the 1935 Constitution states that “[t]he Congress shall not, except by general law,
We have reiterated the rule as to when the Court will consider the issue of constitutionality in
provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations, unless such
Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, Inc., thus:
corporations are owned or controlled by the Government or any subdivision or
instrumentality thereof.” The Court thus directed the PNRC to incorporate under the This Court will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it is the very lis mota. It is a
Corporation Code and register with the Securities and Exchange Commission if it wants to be well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a
a private corporation. The fallo of the Decision read: law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that
when it is raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon which the court may
WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red
[rest] its judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for
Cross is not a government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled
consideration until such question will be unavoidable.
corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
We also declare that Sections 1, 2, 3, 4(a), 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of the Charter of the [T]his Court should not have declared void certain sections of . . . the PNRC Charter. Instead,
Philippine National Red Cross, or Republic Act No. 95, as amended by Presidential Decree the Court should have exercised judicial restraint on this matter, especially since there was
Nos. 1264 and 1643, are VOID because they create the PNRC as a private corporation or grant some other ground upon which the Court could have based its judgment. Furthermore, the
it corporate powers. PNRC, the entity most adversely affected by this declaration of unconstitutionality, which
was not even originally a party to this case, was being compelled, as a consequence of the
Respondent Gordon filed a Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration of the
Decision, to suddenly reorganize and incorporate under the Corporation Code, after more
Decision. The PNRC likewise moved to intervene and filed its own Motion for Partial
than sixty (60) years of existence in this country.
Reconsideration. They basically questioned the second part of the Decision with regard to the
pronouncement on the nature of the PNRC and the constitutionality of some provisions of
the PNRC Charter.
Since its enactment, the PNRC Charter was amended several times, particularly on June 11,
II. THE ISSUE 1953, August 16, 1971, December 15, 1977, and October 1, 1979, by virtue of R.A. No. 855,
R.A. No. 6373, P.D. No. 1264, and P.D. No. 1643, respectively. The passage of several laws
Was it correct for the Court to have passed upon and decided on the issue of the
relating to the PNRC’s corporate existence notwithstanding the effectivity of the
constitutionality of the PNRC charter? Corollarily: What is the nature of the PNRC?
constitutional proscription on the creation of private corporations by law is a recognition that
III. THE RULING

the PNRC is not strictly in the nature of a private corporation contemplated by the aforesaid
constitutional ban.
A closer look at the nature of the PNRC would show that there is none like it[,] not just in
terms of structure, but also in terms of history, public service and official status accorded to it
by the State and the international community. There is merit in PNRC’s contention that its
structure is sui generis. It is in recognition of this sui generis character of the PNRC that R.A.
No. 95 has remained valid and effective from the time of its enactment in March 22, 1947
under the 1935 Constitution and during the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and the 1987
Constitution. The PNRC Charter and its amendatory laws have not been questioned or
challenged on constitutional grounds, not even in this case before the Court now.
[T]his Court [must] recognize the country’s adherence to the Geneva Convention and respect
the unique status of the PNRC in consonance with its treaty obligations. The Geneva
Convention has the force and effect of law. Under the Constitution, the Philippines adopts
the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. This
constitutional provision must be reconciled and harmonized with Article XII, Section 16 of
the Constitution, instead of using the latter to negate the former. By requiring the PNRC to
organize under the Corporation Code just like any other private corporation, the Decision of
July 15, 2009 lost sight of the PNRC’s special status under international humanitarian law
and as an auxiliary of the State, designated to assist it in discharging its obligations under the
Geneva Conventions.
The PNRC, as a National Society of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement,
can neither “be classified as an instrumentality of the State, so as not to lose its character of
neutrality” as well as its independence, nor strictly as a private corporation since it is
regulated by international humanitarian law and is treated as an auxiliary of the State.
Although [the PNRC] is neither a subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the government,
nor a GOCC or a subsidiary thereof . . . so much so that respondent, under the Decision, was
correctly allowed to hold his position as Chairman thereof concurrently while he served as a
Senator, such a conclusion does not ipso facto imply that the PNRC is a “private corporation”
within the contemplation of the provision of the Constitution, that must be organized under
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the Corporation Code. [T]he sui generis character of PNRC requires us to approach
controversies involving the PNRC on a case-to-case basis.
In sum, the PNRC enjoys a special status as an important ally and auxiliary of the
government in the humanitarian field in accordance with its commitments under
international law. This Court cannot all of a sudden refuse to recognize its existence,
especially since the issue of the constitutionality of the PNRC Charter was never raised by the
parties. It bears emphasizing that the PNRC has responded to almost all national disasters
since 1947, and is widely known to provide a substantial portion of the country’s blood
requirements. Its humanitarian work is unparalleled. The Court should not shake its
existence to the core in an untimely and drastic manner that would not only have negative
consequences to those who depend on it in times of disaster and armed hostilities but also
have adverse effects on the image of the Philippines in the international community. The
sections of the PNRC Charter that were declared void must therefore stay.
[Thus, R.A. No. 95 remains valid and constitutional in its entirety. The Court MODIFIED the
dispositive portion of the Decision by deleting the second sentence, to now read as follows:
WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red
Cross is not a government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled
corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.]
5. BOY SCOUTS OF THE PHILIPPINES, v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
G.R. No. 177131, June 7, 2011, EN BANC (Leonardo-De Castro, J.)
COA issued Resolution No. 99-0115 on August 19, 1999 with the subject "Defining the
Commissions policy with respect to the audit of the Boy Scouts of the Philippines." In its
whereas clauses, the COA Resolution stated that the BSP was created as a public corporation
under CA No. 111, as amended by PD No. 460 and Republic Act No. 7278; that in Boy Scouts
of the Philippines v. NLRC, the Supreme Court ruled that the BSP, as constituted under its
charter, was a "government-controlled corporation within the meaning of Article IX(B)(2)(1)
of the Constitution"; and that "the BSP is appropriately regarded as a government
instrumentality under the 1987 Administrative Code." The COA

Resolution also cited its constitutional mandate under Section 2(1), Article IX (D). COA
General Counsel, Director Sunico wrote BSP that latter have to comply with COA Resolution
No. 99-011, among which is to conduct an annual financial audit therein.
Upon the BSPs request, the audit was deferred for thirty (30) days. The BSP then filed a
Petition for Review with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining
Order before the COA. This was denied by the COA in its questioned Decision, which held
that the BSP is under its audit jurisdiction. The BSP moved for reconsideration but this was
likewise denied under its questioned Resolution.
This led to the filing by the BSP of this petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction
and temporary restraining order against the COA.
ISSUE:
Whether the BSP falls under the COAs audit jurisdiction.
RULING:
The BSP is under the COAs audit jurisdiction.
POLITICAL LAW personality of BSP
We believe that the BSP is appropriately regarded as "a government instrumentality" under
the 1987 Administrative Code.
It thus appears that the BSP may be regarded as both a "government controlled corporation
with an original charter" and as an "instrumentality" of the Government within the meaning
of Article IX (B) (2) (1) of the Constitution.
The existence of public or government corporate or juridical entities or chartered institutions
by legislative fiat distinct from private corporations and government owned or controlled
corporation is best exemplified by the 1987 Administrative Code cited above, which we
quote in part:
Sec. 2. General Terms Defined. Unless the specific words of the text, or the context as a whole,
or a particular statute, shall require a different meaning:
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(10) "Instrumentality" refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within
the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed
with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational
autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered
institutions and government-owned or controlled corporations.
(12) "Chartered institution" refers to any agency organized or operating under a special
charter, and vested by law with functions relating to specific constitutional policies or
objectives. This term includes the state universities and colleges and the monetary authority
of the State.
(13) "Government-owned or controlled corporation" refers to any agency organized as a stock
or non-stock corporation, vested with functions relating to public needs whether
governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the Government directly or through its
instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to
the extent of at least fifty-one (51) per cent of its capital stock: Provided, That government-
owned or controlled corporations may be further categorized by the Department of the
Budget, the Civil Service Commission, and the Commission on Audit for purposes of the
exercise and discharge of their respective powers, functions and responsibilities with respect
to such corporations.
Assuming for the sake of argument that the BSP ceases to be owned or controlled by the
government because of reduction of the number of representatives of the government in the
BSP Board, it does not follow that it also ceases to be a government instrumentality as it still
retains all the characteristics of the latter as an attached agency of the DECS under the
Administrative Code. Vesting corporate powers to an attached agency or instrumentality of
the government is not constitutionally prohibited and is allowed by the above-mentioned
provisions of the Civil Code and the 1987 Administrative Code.
Historically, therefore, the BSP had been subjected to government audit in so far as public
funds had been infused thereto. However, this practice should not preclude the exercise of
the audit jurisdiction of COA, clearly set forth under the Constitution, which pertinently
provides: Section 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty
to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and
 Page 84 of 84

expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the
Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-
owned and controlled corporations with original charters, and on a post-audit basis: (a)
constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy under
this Constitution; (b) autonomous state colleges and universities; (c) other government-
owned or controlled corporations with original charters and their subsidiaries; and (d) such
non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or through
the Government, which are required by law of the granting institution to submit to such
audit as a condition of subsidy or equity.

Since the BSP, under its amended charter, continues to be a public corporation or a
government instrumentality, we come to the inevitable conclusion that it is subject to the
exercise by the COA of its audit jurisdiction in the manner consistent with the provisions of
the BSP Charter.

The Petition for prohibition is dismissed.