CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Political Law Review (7th BATCH)
1. PEOPLE vs. ANDRE MARTI
FACTS: The appellant and his common law wife, Shirley Reyes, went to the
booth of the Manila Packing and Export Forwarders in the Pistang Filipino
Complex Ermita, Manila carrying with them four gift wrapped packages to be
sent in Zurich Switzerland. The proprietress, Anita Reyes (not related to
Shirley Reyes) then asked the appellant if he could examine and expect the
packages however appellant refused, assuring her that the packages simply
contained books, cigars, and gloves and were just gifts to a friend. Anita no
longer insisted. Before delivery of appellant’s box to the bureau of Customs
and or bureau of Post, Mr. Job Reyes, proprietor and husband of Anita,
following standard procedure opened the boxes for final inspection. When he
opened a peculiar odor emitted therefrom. He squeezed one of the bundles
allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside. Job prepared a letter
reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting laboratory examination
sample he extracted from the cellophane. Therefore, job and three NBI agents
and a photographer went to the Reyes’ office at Ermita. Job brought out the
box in which appellants’ packages were places and in the presence of the NBI
agents, open the top flaps, removed the Styrofoam and took out the
cellophane wrappers from inside the gloves. Dried marijuana leaves are found
inside the cellophane.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is violation of appellant’s constitutional right
against unreasonable search and seizure.
RULING: The Supreme Court held that it is not the NBI who made the search.
Records of the case clearly indicate that it was Mr. Job who made search and
inspection of the said packages. Said inspection was reasonable and a
standard operating procedure on the part of Mr. Job as a precautionary
measure before delivery of packages to the Bureau of Custom or Post. If the
search is made upon the request of law enforces, a warrant must generally
must be secured first if it to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the
search is made in the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private
establishment for its own and private purpose, as in the case at bar, and
without the intervention of the police authorities, the right against
unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private
individual, not the law enforcer, is involved.
In sum, the protection against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be
extended to acts committed by private individual as to bring it within the ambit
of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
The alleged violation against unreasonable search and seizure may only
invoked against the State by an individual unjustly traduced by the exercise
by the sovereign authority.
2. GUAZON vs. DE VILLA
181 SCRA 623; G.R. NO. 80508; 30 JAN 1990
FACTS: The 41 petitioners alleged that the "saturation drive" or "aerial target
zoning" that were conducted in their place (Tondo, Manila) were
unconstitutional. They alleged that there is no specific target house to be
searched and that there is no search warrant or warrant of arrest served. Most
of the policemen are in their civilian clothes and without nameplates or
identification cards. The residents were rudely rouse from their sleep by
banging on the walls and windows of their houses. The residents were at the
point of high-powered guns and herded like cows. Men were ordered to strip
down to their briefs for the police to examine their tattoo marks. The residents
complained that their homes were ransacked, tossing their belongings and
destroying their valuables. Some of their money and valuables had
disappeared after the operation. The residents also reported incidents of
mauling, spot-beatings and maltreatment. Those who were detained also
suffered mental and physical torture to extract confessions and tactical
information.
The respondents said that such accusations were all lies. Respondents
contend that the Constitution grants to government the power to seek and
cripple subversive movements for the maintenance of peace in the state. The
aerial target zoning were intended to flush out subversives and criminal
elements coddled by the communities were the said drives were conducted.
They said that they have intelligently and carefully planned months ahead for
the actual operation and that local and foreign media joined the operation to
witness and record such event.
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ISSUE: Whether the saturation drive committed consisted of violation of the
right against unlawful arrest and against unlawful searches and seizures.
HELD: There appears to have been no impediment to securing search
warrants or warrants of arrest before any houses were searched or individuals
roused from sleep were arrested. There is no strong showing that the
objectives sought to be attained by the “areal zoning" could not be achieved
as the rights of the squatter and low income families are fully protected. Where
a violation of human rights specifically guaranteed by the Constitution is
involved, it is the duty of the court to stop the transgression and state where
even the awesome power of the state may not encroach upon the rights of
the individual.
Where there is large scale mutiny or actual rebellion, the police or military may
go in force to the combat areas, enter affected residences or buildings, round
up suspected rebels and otherwise quell the mutiny or rebellion without having
to secure search warrants and without violating the Bill of Rights. A show of
force is sometimes necessary as long as the rights of the people are protected
and not violated. A blanket prohibition such as that sought by the petitioners
would limit all police power to one on one confrontation where search warrants
and warrants of arrest against specific individuals are easily procured.
3. AAA vs. JUDGE CARBONELL
FACTS: AAA worked as a secretary at the Arzadon Automotive and Car
Service Center. Upon her returned to the office to get her handbag from the
delivery of book, the lights had been turned off and the gate was closed. She
saw Arzadon standing beside a parked van holding a pipe and when she
reached his side, he threatened her with the pipe and forced her to lie on the
pavement, removed her pants and underwear, and inserted his penis into her
vagina. She wept and cried out for help but to no avail because there was
nobody else in the premises. However, AAA did not report the incident
because Arzadon threatened to kill her and her family until she discovered
that she was pregnant as a consequence of the rape. On July 24, 2002,
petitioner filed a complaint for rape against Arzadon.
Asst City Prosecutor Imelda Cosalan issued a Resolution finding probable
cause and recommended the filing of an information for rape. However, AAA
failed to attend the next hearing hence, the case was provisionally dismissed.
Petitioner filed another Affidavit-Complaint with a comprehensive account of
the alleged rape incident. The case was assigned to 2nd Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Georgina Hidalgo. The investigating prosecutor issued a
Resolution finding that a prima facie case of rape exists and recommending
the filing of the information.
Arzadon moved for reconsideration but was denied. An Information for rape
was filed before the RTC San Fernando. Accused filed a "Motion to Hold in
Abeyance All Court Proceedings Including the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest
and to Determine Probable Cause for the Purpose of Issuing a Warrant of
Arrest." On March 18, 2004, respondent Judge Antonio A. Carbonell granted
the motion and directed petitioner and her witnesses to take the witness stand
for determination of probable cause. On appeal, the panel of prosecutors
found probable cause before the DOJ. Thereafter, Acting Secretary of Justice
Merceditas Gutierrez found no probable cause and directed the withdrawal of
the Information in the Criminal Case.
On motion for reconsideration, DOJ Sec Raul Gonzales reversed the
resolution and issued another finding that probable cause exists. Thus, a new
Information for rape was filed against Arzadon. He then filed an "Urgent
Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause for the Purpose of
Issuing a Warrant of Arrest." In an Order dated August 11, 2005, respondent
Judge Carbonell granted the motion and directed petitioner and her witnesses
to take the witness stand.
Instead of taking the witness stand, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration claiming that the documentary evidence sufficiently
established the existence of probable cause. Pending resolution thereof, she
likewise filed a petition with this Court for the transfer of venue of Criminal
Case. The case was then raffled to the RTC Manila, Branch 25. However, the
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proceedings have been suspended pending the resolution of the petition.On
December 16, 2005, respondent Judge Carbonell issued the assailed Order
dismissing Criminal Case No. 6983 for lack of probable cause. Petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration was denied hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
I. Whether the petition should be dismissed for being the wrong mode of
appeal
II. Whether respondent Judge Carbonell acted with grave abuse of discretion
in dismissing Criminal Case No. 6983 for lack of probable cause.
RULING:
I. The petition has merit. Grave abuse of discretion is not an allowable ground
under Rule 45. However, a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 may
be considered a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 where it is alleged that
the respondents abused their discretion in their questioned actions, as in the
instant case. However, the procedural error committed by petitioner in directly
filing the instant petition before SC instead of the Court of Appeals, thereby
violating the principle of judicial hierarchy of courts.
II. Yes. Judge Carbonell committed grave abuse of discretion. The Supreme
Court explained that this constitutional provision does not mandatorily require
the judge to personally examine the complainant and her witnesses. Instead,
he may opt to personally evaluate the report and supporting documents
submitted by the prosecutor or he may disregard the prosecutor’s report and
require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses.
In the leading case of Soliven v. Makasiar, the Court explained that Artcile III
sec 2 does not mandatorily require the judge to personally examine the
complainant and her witnesses. Instead, he may opt to personally evaluate
the report and supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor or he may
disregard the prosecutor’s report and require the submission of supporting
affidavits of witnesses. Thus: The addition of the word "personally" after the
word "determined" and the deletion of the grant of authority by the 1973
Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as may be
authorized by law," has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the
Constitution now requires the judge to personally examine the complainant
and his witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of
warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation.
The Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of
the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. The
judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1)
personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by
the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof,
issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable
cause, he may disregard the fiscal’s report and require the submission of
supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to
the existence of probable cause.
In the case of Webb v. De Leon, the court held that before issuing warrants of
arrest, judges merely determine the probability, not the certainty, of guilt of an
accused. In doing so, judges do not conduct a de novo hearing to determine
the existence of probable cause. They just personally review the initial
determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is
supported by substantial evidence.
True, there are cases where the circumstances may call for the judge’s
personal examination of the complainant and his witnesses. But it must be
emphasized that such personal examination is not mandatory and
indispensable in the determination of probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest. The necessity arises only when there is an utter failure of
the evidence to show the existence of probable cause. Otherwise, the judge
may rely on the report of the investigating prosecutor, provided that he
likewise evaluates the documentary evidence in support thereof.
Judge Carbonell dismissed the Case without taking into consideration the
Resolution of the 2nd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, the panel of
prosecutors, and the Resolution of DOJ; all of which sustain a finding of
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probable cause against Arzadon. Moreover, he failed to evaluate the evidence
in support thereof. Respondent judge’s finding of lack of probable cause was
premised only on the complainant’s and her witnesses’ absence during the
hearing scheduled by the respondent judge for the judicial determination of
probable cause.
The court finds sufficient evidence to establish probable cause. The gravamen
of rape is the carnal knowledge by the accused of the private complainant
under any of the circumstances provided in Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended. Petitioner has categorically stated that Arzadon raped
her, recounting her ordeal in detail during the preliminary investigations.
Taken with the other evidence presented before the investigating prosecutors,
such is sufficient for purposes of establishing probable cause. It is well-settled
that a finding of probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing
evidence beyond reasonable doubt. Probable cause is that which engenders
a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the
respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It does not
require that the evidence would justify conviction.
Therefore, Judge Carbonell gravely abused his discretion in dismissing
Criminal Case for lack of probable cause on the ground that petitioner and her
witnesses failed to take the witness stand. Moreover, he erred in holding that
petitioner’s absences in the scheduled hearings were indicative of a lack of
interest in prosecuting the case. In fact, the records show that she has
relentlessly pursued the same.
Needless to say, that the credibility of petitioner may be tested during the trial
where the respective allegations and defenses of the complainant and the
accused are properly ventilated. It is only then that the truth as to Arzadon’s
innocence or guilt can be determined. The RTC Manila is DIRECTED to take
cognizance of the case and let the records thereof be REMANDED to the said
court for further proceedings.
4. RETIRED SP04 BIENVENIDO LAUD vs. PEOPLE
FACTS: The Philippine National Police (PNP), through Police Senior
Superintendent Roberto B. Fajardo, applied with the (RTC) of Manila for a
warrant to search three (3) caves located inside the Laud Compound in Purok
3, Barangay Ma-a, Davao City, where the alleged remains of the victims
summarily executed by the so-called "Davao Death Squad" may be found. a
certain Ernesto Avasola (Avasola) was presented to the RTC and there
testified that he personally witnessed the killing of six (6) persons. Judge
Peralta acting as Vice Executive Judge of the Manila-RTC, found probable
cause for the issuance of a search warrant.
The search of the Laud Compound caves yielded positive results for the
presence of human remains. petitioner, retired SPO4 Bienvenido Laud
(Laud), filed an Urgent Motion to Quash and to Suppress Illegally Seized
Evidence premised on the following grounds: (a) Judge Peralta had no
authority to act on the application for a search warrant since he had been
automatically divested of his position as Vice Executive Judge when several
administrative penalties were imposed against him by the Court; (b) the
Manila-RTC had no jurisdiction to issue Search Warrant which was to be
enforced in Davao City; (c) the human remains sought to be seized are not a
proper subject of a search warrant; (d) the police officers are mandated to
follow the prescribed procedure for exhumation of human remains; (e) the
search warrant was issued despite lack of probable cause; f) the rule against
forum shopping was violated; and (g) there was a violation of the rule requiring
one specific offense and the proper specification of the place to be searched
and the articles to be seized. the Manila-RTC granted the motion of Laud
"after a careful consideration [of] the grounds alleged [therein]."
Respondent, the People filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied.
CA granted the People’s petition and thereby annulled and set aside the
Orders of the Manila-RTC It held that the requirements for the issuance of a
search warrant were satisfied, pointing out that an application therefor
involving a heinous crime, such as Murder, is an exception to the compelling
reasons requirement under Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court as
explicitly recognized in A.M. No. 99-20-09-SC25 and reiterated in A.M. No.
03-8-02-SC. the CA found that probable cause was established since, among
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others, witness Avasola deposed and testified that he personally witnessed
the murder of six (6) persons and was actually part of the group that buried
the victims
ISSUES:
a) whether the administrative penalties imposed on Judge Peralta invalidated
Search Warrant No. 09-14407; (b) whether the Manila-RTC had jurisdiction to
issue the said warrant despite non-compliance with the compelling reasons
requirement under Section 2, Rule126 of the Rules of Court; (c) whether the
requirements of probable cause and particular description were complied with
and the one-specific-offense rule under Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court was violated;
RULING: The petition has no merit.
While the Court does agree that the imposition of said administrative penalties
did operate to divest Judge Peralta’s authority to act as Vice Executive Judge,
it must be qualified that the abstraction of such authority would not, by and of
itself, result in the invalidity of Search Warrant No. 09-14407 considering that
Judge Peralta may be considered to have made the issuance as a de facto
officer whose acts would, nonetheless, remain valid.
In order for the de facto doctrine to apply, all of the following elements must
concur: (a) there must be a de jure office; (b) there must be color of right or
general acquiescence by the public; and (c) there must be actual physical
possession of the office in good faith.
The existence of the foregoing elements is rather clear in this case.
Undoubtedly, there is a de jure office of a 2nd Vice-Executive Judge. Judge
Peralta also had a colorable right to the said office as he was duly appointed
to such position and was only divested of the same by virtue of a supervening
legal technicality – that is, the operation of Section 5, Chapter III of A.M. No.
03-8-02-SC as above-explained; also, it may be said that there was general
acquiescence by the public since the search warrant application was regularly
endorsed to the sala of Judge Peralta by the Office of the Clerk of Court of
the Manila-RTC under his apparent authority as 2nd Vice Executive Judge.42
Finally, Judge Peralta’s actual physical possession of the said office is
presumed to be in good faith, as the contrary was not established.43
Accordingly, Judge Peralta can be considered to have acted as a de facto
officer when he issued Search Warrant No. 09-14407, hence, treated as valid
as if it was issued by a de jure officer suffering no administrative impediment.
Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC states the requirements for the
issuance of search warrants in special criminal cases by the RTCs of Manila
and Quezon City. These special criminal cases pertain to those "involving
heinous crimes, illegal gambling, illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions, as well as violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002, the Intellectual Property Code, the Anti-Money Laundering Act of
2001, the Tariff and Customs Code, as amended, and other relevant laws that
may hereafter be enacted by Congress, and included herein by the Supreme
Court."
The Court observes that all the above-stated requirements were complied
with in this case.
As explicitly mentioned in Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8- 02-SC, the
rule on search warrant applications before the Manila and Quezon City RTCs
for the above-mentioned special criminal cases "shall be an exception to
Section 2 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court." Perceptibly, the fact that a search
warrant is being applied for in connection with a special criminal case as
above-classified already presumes the existence of a compelling reason;
hence, any statement to this effect would be superfluous and therefore should
be dispensed with. By all indications, Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-
8-02-SC allows the Manila and Quezon City RTCs to issue warrants to be
served in places outside their territorial jurisdiction for as long as the
parameters under the said section have been complied with, as in this case.
Thus, on these grounds, the Court finds nothing defective in the preliminary
issuance of Search Warrant No. 09-14407.
C.
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In order to protect the people’s right against unreasonable searches and
seizures, Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution)
provides that no search warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized
Complementarily, Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court states that a
search warrant shall not be issued except upon probable cause in connection
with one specific offense
In this case, the existence of probable cause for the issuance of Search
Warrant No. 09-14407 is evident from the first-hand account of Avasola who,
in his deposition, stated that he personally witnessed the commission of the
afore-stated crime and was, in fact, part of the group that buried the victims
Verily, the facts and circumstances established from the testimony of Avasola,
who was personally examined by Judge Peralta, sufficiently show that more
likely than not the crime of Murder of six (6) persons had been perpetrated
and that the human remains in connection with the same are in the place
sought to be searched. In Santos v. Pryce Gases, Inc.,48 the Court explained
the quantum of evidence necessary to establish probable cause for a search
warrant, as follows:
Probable cause for a search warrant is defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discrete and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. A finding
of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely
than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the
accused. Probable cause demands more than bare suspicion; it requires less
than evidence which would justify conviction. The existence depends to a
large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the
examination. However, the findings of the judge should not disregard the facts
before him nor run counter to the clear dictates of reason.
In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that the quantum of proof to establish
the existence of probable cause had been met. That a "considerable length
of time" attended the search warrant’s application from the crime’s
commission does not, by and of itself, negate the veracity of the applicant’s
claims or the testimony of the witness presented. As the CA correctly
observed, the delay may be accounted for by a witness’s fear of reprisal and
natural reluctance to get involved in a criminal case.50 Ultimately, in
determining the existence of probable cause, the facts and circumstances
must be personally examined by the judge in their totality, together with a
judicious recognition of the variable complications and sensibilities attending
a criminal case. To the Court’s mind, the supposed delay in the search
warrant’s application does not dilute the probable cause finding made herein.
In fine, the probable cause requirement has been sufficiently met.
The Court similarly concludes that there was compliance with the
constitutional requirement that there be a particular description of "the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized."
A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized
when the description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily
allow(People v. Rubio, 57 Phil. 384 [1932]); or when the description expresses
a conclusion of fact — not of law — by which the warrant officer may be guided
in making the search and seizure (idem., dissent of Abad Santos, J.); or when
the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the
offense for which the warrant is being issued(Sec. 2, Rule 126, Revised Rules
of Court) x x x If the articles desired to be seized have any direct relation to
an offense committed, the applicant must necessarily have some evidence,
other than those articles, to prove the said offense; and the articles subject of
search and seizure should come in handy merely to strengthen such
evidence.
Consequently, the Court finds that the particular description requirement –
both as to the place to be searched and the things to be seized – had been
complied with.
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Finally, the Court finds no violation of the one-specific-offense rule under
Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court as above-cited which, to note, was
intended to prevent the issuance of scattershot warrants, or those which are
issued for more than one specific offense. The defective nature of scatter-shot
warrants was discussed in the case of People v. CA59 as follows: There is no
question that the search warrant did not relate to a specific offense, in violation
of the doctrine announced in Stonehill v. Diokno and of Section 3 [now,
Section 4] of Rule 126
Hence, given that Search Warrant No. 09-14407 was issued only for one
specific offense – that is, of Murder, albeit for six (6) counts – it cannot be said
that Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court had been violated.
5. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY vs. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD
FACTS: In these petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of RA 9165,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,
insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public
office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and
employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the
prosecutor's office with certain offenses, among other personalities, is put
into question.
ISSUE: WON PAR. (C), (D), (F), AND (G) OF SEC. 36, RA 9165
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
WON THESE PARAGRAPHS VIOLATE THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY, THE
RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURE, AND
THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
RULING:
AS TO PARAGRAPH (C), COVERING STUDENTS OF SECONDARY AND
TERTIARY SCHOOLS
The drug test prescribed under Sec. 36(c), (d), and (f) of RA 9165 for
secondary and tertiary level students and public and private employees, while
mandatory, is a random and suspicionless arrangement. The objective is to
stamp out illegal drug and safeguard in the process "the well being of the
citizenry, particularly the youth, from the harmful effects of dangerous drugs."
The primary legislative intent is not criminal prosecution, as those found
positive for illegal drug use as a result of this random testing are not
necessarily treated as criminals. They may even be exempt from criminal
liability should the illegal drug user consent to undergo rehabilitation. Secs.
54 and 55 of RA 9165 are clear on this point.
Citing the U.S. cases of Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton and Board
of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie
County, et al. v. Earls, et al., the Court deduced and applied the following
principles: (1) schools stand in loco parentis (in the place of the parents) over
their students; (2) school children, while not shedding their constitutional
rights at the school gate, have less privacy rights; (3) athletes have less
privacy rights than non - athletes since the former observe communal undress
before and after sports events; (4) by joining the sports activity, the athletes
voluntarily subjected themselves to a higher degree of school supervision and
regulation; (5) requiring urine samples does not invade a student's privacy
since a student need not undress for this kind of drug testing; and (6) there is
need for the drug testing because of the dangerous effects of illegal drugs on
the young. The US Supreme Court held that the policy constituted reasonable
search under the Fourth and 14th Amendments and declared the random
drug - testing policy constitutional.
In sum, what can reasonably be deduced from the above two cases and
applied to this jurisdiction are: (1) schools and their administrators stand in
loco parentis with respect to their students; (2) minor students have
contextually fewer rights than an adult, and are subject to the custody and
supervision of their parents, guardians, and schools; (3) schools, acting in
loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health and well - being of their
students and may adopt such measures as may reasonably be necessary to
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discharge such duty; and (4) schools have the right to impose conditions on
applicants for admission that are fair, just, and non-discriminatory.
Guided by Vernonia and Board of Education, the Court is of the view and so
holds that the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and
suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional. Indeed, it is
within the prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a
condition for admission, compliance with reasonable school rules and
regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to enroll is not absolute;
it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable requirements.
As to paragraph (d), covering officers and employees of public and
private offices
The mandatory but random drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165 for
officers and employees of public and private offices is also justifiable, albeit
not exactly for the same reason.
The Court notes in this regard that petitioner SJS, other than saying that
"subjecting almost everybody to drug testing, without probable cause, is
unreasonable, an unwarranted intrusion of the individual right to privacy," has
failed to show how the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing
under Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 violates the right to privacy and
constitutes unlawful and/or unconsented search under Art. III, Secs. 1 and 2
of the Constitution.
Petitioner Laserna's lament is just as simplistic, sweeping, and gratuitous and
does not merit serious consideration.
As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couched and
as has been held, "reasonableness" is the touchstone of the validity of a
government search or intrusion. And whether a search at issue hews to the
reasonableness standard is judged by the balancing of the government -
mandated intrusion on the individual's privacy interest against the promotion
of some compelling state interest.
In the criminal context, reasonableness requires showing of probable cause
to be personally determined by a judge. Given that the drug - testing policy for
employees--and students for that matter--under RA 9165 is in the nature of
administrative search needing what was referred to in Vernonia as "swift and
informal disciplinary procedures," the probable - cause standard is not
required or even practicable. Be that as it may, the review should focus on the
reasonableness of the challenged administrative search in question.
The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature of the
privacy interest upon which the drug testing, which effects a search within the
meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution, intrudes. In this case, the office
or workplace serves as the backdrop for the analysis of the privacy
expectation of the employees and the reasonableness of drug testing
requirement. The employees' privacy interest in an office is to a large extent
circumscribed by the company's work policies, the collective bargaining
agreement, if any, entered into by management and the bargaining unit, and
the inherent right of the employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in the
workplace. Their privacy expectation in a regulated office environment is, in
fine, reduced; and a degree of impingement upon such privacy has been
upheld.
Just as defining as the first factor is the character of the intrusion authorized
by the challenged law. Reduced to a question form, is the scope of the search
or intrusion clearly set forth, or, as formulated in Ople v. Torres, is the enabling
law authorizing a search "narrowly drawn" or "narrowly focused"?32
The poser should be answered in the affirmative. For one, Sec. 36 of RA 9165
and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR), as couched, contain
provisions specifically directed towards preventing a situation that would
unduly embarrass the employees or place them under a humiliating
experience. While every officer and employee in a private establishment is
under the law deemed forewarned that he or she may be a possible subject
of a drug test, nobody is really singled out in advance for drug testing. The
goal is to discourage drug use by not telling in advance anyone when and who
is to be tested. And as may be observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165 itself
prescribes what, in Ople, is a narrowing ingredient by providing that the
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employees concerned shall be subjected to "random drug test as contained
in the company's work rules and regulations x x x for purposes of reducing the
risk in the work place."
For another, the random drug testing shall be undertaken under conditions
calculated to protect as much as possible the employee's privacy and dignity.
As to the mechanics of the test, the law specifies that the procedure shall
employ two testing methods, i.e., the screening test and the confirmatory test,
doubtless to ensure as much as possible the trustworthiness of the results.
But the more important consideration lies in the fact that the test shall be
conducted by trained professionals in access - controlled laboratories
monitored by the DOH to safeguard against results tampering and to ensure
an accurate chain of custody. In addition, the IRR issued by the DOH provides
that access to the drug results shall be on the "need to know" basis; that the
"drug test result and the records shall be [kept] confidential subject to the
usual accepted practices to protect the confidentiality of the test
results."35 Notably, RA 9165 does not oblige the employer concerned to report
to the prosecuting agencies any information or evidence relating to the
violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act received as a result of
the operation of the drug testing. All told, therefore, the intrusion into the
employees' privacy, under RA 9165, is accompanied by proper safeguards,
particularly against embarrassing leakages of test results, and is relatively
minimal.
To reiterate, RA 9165 was enacted as a measure to stamp out illegal drug in
the country and thus protect the well - being of the citizens, especially the
youth, from the deleterious effects of dangerous drugs. The law intends to
achieve this through the medium, among others, of promoting and resolutely
pursuing a national drug abuse policy in the workplace via a mandatory
random drug test.36 To the Court, the need for drug testing to at least minimize
illegal drug use is substantial enough to override the individual's privacy
interest under the premises. The Court can consider that the illegal drug
menace cuts across gender, age group, and social - economic lines. And it
may not be amiss to state that the sale, manufacture, or trafficking of illegal
drugs, with their ready market, would be an investor's dream were it not for
the illegal and immoral components of any of such activities. The drug
problem has hardly abated since the martial law public execution of a
notorious drug trafficker. The state can no longer assume a laid back stance
with respect to this modern - day scourge. Drug enforcement agencies
perceive a mandatory random drug test to be an effective way of preventing
and deterring drug use among employees in private offices, the threat of
detection by random testing being higher than other modes. The Court holds
that the chosen method is a reasonable and enough means to lick the
problem.
Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of
privacy on the part of the employees, the compelling state concern likely to
be met by the search, and the well - defined limits set forth in the law to
properly guide authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we hold that
the challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited context of the case,
reasonable and, ergo, constitutional.
Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and
employees also labor under reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed
by the Civil Service law and other laws on public officers, all enacted to
promote a high standard of ethics in the public service.37 And if RA 9165
passes the norm of reasonableness for private employees, the more reason
that it should pass the test for civil servants, who, by constitutional command,
are required to be accountable at all times to the people and to serve them
with utmost responsibility and efficiency.
As to paragraph (f), covering persons charged before the prosecutor’s
office with a crime with an imposable penalty of imprisonment of not
less than 6 years and 1 day
Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the
Court finds no valid justification for mandatory drug testing for persons
accused of crimes. In the case of students, the constitutional viability of the
mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing for students emanate
primarily from the waiver by the students of their right to privacy when they
seek entry to the school, and from their voluntarily submitting their persons to
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the parental authority of school authorities. In the case of private and public
employees, the constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random, and
suspicionless drug testing proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug test
policy and requirement.
We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged
before the public prosecutor's office with criminal offenses punishable with 6
years and 1 day imprisonment. The operative concepts in the mandatory drug
testing are “randomness” and “suspicionless.” In the case of persons charged
with a crime before the prosecutor’s officer, a mandatory drug testing can
never be random or suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being
suspicionless are antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal
complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond
suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they
are singled out and are impleaded against their will. The persons thus
charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutor’s office and
peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not
necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy. To
impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is blatant attempt to harness
a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated
objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a person’s right
to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the
accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.
6. JAIME D. DELA CRUZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 200748 July 23, 2014
FACTS: Petitioner Jaime D. dela Cruz was charged with violation of Section
15, Article II of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9165, or The Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, by the Graft Investigation and Prosecution
Officer of the Office of the Ombudsman – Visayas.
At 8:00 a.m. of 31 January 2006, the agents and special investigators of NBI,
received a Complaint from Corazon Absin (Corazon) and Charito Escobido
(Charito). The complainants claimed that at 1:00 a.m. of that same day, Ariel
Escobido (Ariel), the live-in partner of Corazon and son of Charito, was picked
up by several unknown male persons believed to be police officers for
allegedly selling drugs. An errand boy gave a number to the complainants,
and when the latter gave the number a ring, they were instructed to proceed
to the Gorordo Police Office located along Gorordo Avenue, Cebu City. In the
said police office, they met "James" who demanded from them ₱100,000,
later lowered to ₱40,000, in exchange for the release of Ariel. After the
meeting, the complainants proceeded to the NBI to file a complaint and
narrate the circumstances of the meeting to the authorities. While at theNBI,
Charitoeven received calls supposedly from "James" instructing her to bring
the money as soon as possible.
The special investigators at the NBI-CEVRO verified the text messages
received by the complainants.1âwphi1 A team was immediately formed to
implement an entrapment operation, which took place inside a Jollibee branch
at the corner of Gen. Maxilom and Gorordo Avenues, Cebu City. The officers
were able to nab Jaime dela Cruz by using a pre-marked 500 bill dusted with
fluorescent powder, which was made part of the amount demanded by
"James" and handed by Corazon. Petitioner was later brought to the forensic
laboratory of the NBI where forensic examination was done by forensic
chemist Rommel Paglinawan. Petitioner was required to submit his urine for
drug testing. It later yielded a positive result for presence of dangerous drugs
as indicated in the confirmatory test result labeled as Toxicology (Dangerous
Drugs).
RTC-Cebu City found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 15, Article II of R.A. 9165.
Petitioner filed an appeal assigning as error the RTC’s validation of the result
of the urine test despite its dubiousness having been admitted in spite of the
lack of legal basis for its admission. First, he alleges that the forensic
laboratory examination was conducted despite the fact that he was not
assisted by counsel, in clear violation of his constitutional right. Secondly, he
was allegedly held guilty beyond reasonable doubt notwithstanding the lack
of sufficient basis to convict him.
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The CA found the appeal devoid of merit and affirmed the ruling of the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether the drug testing conducted to petitioner is legal.
RULING: We declare that the drug test conducted upon petitioner is not
grounded upon any existing law or jurisprudence.
Making the phrase "a person apprehended or arrested" in Section 15
applicable to all persons arrested or apprehended for unlawful acts, not only
under R.A. 9165 but for all other crimes, is tantamount to a mandatory drug
testing of all persons apprehended or arrested for any crime. To overextend
the application of this provision would run counter to our pronouncement in
Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board and Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency, to wit:
x x x [M]andatory drug testing can never be random and suspicion less. The
ideas of randomness and being suspicion less are antithetical to their being
made defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked;
neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a
crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded against their will.
The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the
prosecutor’s office and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if
that be the case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive
their right to privacy. To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a
blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution,
contrary to the stated objectives of RA 6195. Drug testing in this case would
violate a person’s right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the
Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to
incriminate themselves. (Emphasis supplied)
The drug test is not covered by allowable non-testimonial compulsion.
We find that petitioner never raised the alleged irregularity of his arrest before
his arraignment and raises the issue only now before this tribunal; hence, he
is deemed to have waived his right to question the validity of his arrest curing
whatever defect may have attended his arrest. However, "a waiver of an illegal
warrantless arrest does not mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence
seized during an illegal warrantless arrest."
We are aware of the prohibition against testimonial compulsion and the
allowable exceptions to such proscription. Cases where non-testimonial
compulsion has been allowed reveal, however, that the pieces of evidence
obtained were all material to the principal cause of the arrest.
The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes the
use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from the
accused and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material.
Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as the accused does
not thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance and guiding hand of counsel
is not required. (People vs. Olvis, 238 Phil. 513 [1987]) The essence of the
right against self-incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving of
evidence against himself through a testimonial act. (People vs. Casinillo, 213
SCRA 777 [1992]; People vs. Tranca, 235 SCRA 455 [1994]; People vs.
Rondero, 378 Phil. 123 [1999]) Hence, it has been held that a woman charged
with adultery may be compelled to submit to physical examination to
determine her pregnancy; (Villaflor vs. Summers, 41 Phil. 62 [1920]) and an
accused may be compelled to submit to physical examination and to have a
substance taken from his body for medical determination as to whether he
was suffering from gonorrhea which was contracted by his victim;(U.S. vs.
Tan Teng, 23 Phil. 145 [1912]) to expel morphine from his mouth; (U.S. vs.
Ong Siu Hong, 36 Phil. 735 [1917]) to have the outline of his foot traced to
determine its identity with bloody footprints; (U.S. vs. Salas, 25 Phil. 337
[1913]; U.S. vs. Zara, 42 Phil. 308 [1921]) and to be photographed or
measured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to move his body
to enable the foregoing things to be done.(People vs. Otadora, 86 Phil. 244
[1950])28(Emphasis supplied)
In the instant case, we fail to see how a urine sample could be material
to the charge of extortion.1âwphi1 The RTC and the CA, therefore, both
erred when they held that the extraction of petitioner’s urine for
purposes of drug testing was "merely a mechanical act, hence, falling
outside the concept of a custodial investigation."
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We note a case where a urine sample was considered as admissible. In
Gutang v. People,29 the petitioner therein and his companions were arrested
in connection with the enforcement of a search warrant in his residence. A
PNP-NARCOM team found and confiscated shabu materials and
paraphernalias. The petitioner and his companions in that case were also
asked to give urine samples, which yielded positive results. Later, the
petitioner therein was found guilty of the crime of illegal possession and use
of prohibited drugs. Gutang claimed that the latter’s urine sample was
inadmissible in evidence, since it was derived in effect from an uncounselled
extrajudicial confession.
In the Gutang et al.case, the Court clarified that "what the Constitution
prohibits is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication
from the accused, but not an inclusion of his body in evidence, when it may
be material." The situation in Gutang was categorized as falling among the
exemptions under the freedom from testimonial compulsion since what was
sought to be examined came from the body of the accused. The Court said:
This was a mechanical act the accused was made to undergo which was not
meant to unearth undisclosed facts but to ascertain physical attributes
determinable by simple observation. In fact, the record shows that petitioner
and his co-accused were not compelled to give samples of their urine but they
in fact voluntarily gave the same when they were requested to undergo a drug
test.
Assuming arguendo that the urine samples taken from the petitioner are
inadmissible in evidence, we agree with the trial court that the record is replete
with other pieces of credible evidence including the testimonial evidence of
the prosecution which point to the culpability of the petitioner for the crimes
charged.
We emphasize that the circumstances in Gutang are clearly different from the
circumstances of petitioner in the instant case.1awp++i1 First, Gutang was
arrested in relation to a drug case. Second, he volunteered to give his urine.
Third, there were other pieces of evidence that point to his culpability for the
crimes charged. In the present case, though, petitioner was arrested for
extortion; he resisted having his urine sample taken; and finally, his urine
sample was the only available evidence that was used as basis for his
conviction for the use of illegal drugs.
The drug test was a violation of petitioner’s right to privacy and right against
self-incrimination.
It is incontrovertible that petitioner refused to have his urine extracted and
tested for drugs. He also asked for a lawyer prior to his urine test. He was
adamant in exercising his rights, but all of his efforts proved futile, because
he was still compelled to submit his urine for drug testing under those
circumstances.
The pertinent provisions in Article III of the Constitution are clear:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
In the face of these constitutional guarantees, we cannot condone drug testing
of all arrested persons regardless of the crime or offense for which the arrest
is being made.
While we express our commendation of law enforcement agents as they
vigorously track down offenders in their laudable effort to curb the pervasive
and deleterious effects of dangerous drugs on our society, they must,
however, be constantly mindful of the reasonable limits of their authority,
because it is not unlikely that in their clear intent to purge society of its lawless
elements, they may be knowingly or unknowingly transgressing the protected
rights of its citizens including even members of its own police force.
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7. JESSE U. LUCAS v. JESUS S. LUCA
G.R. No. 190710, June 6, 2011, Nachura, J.
Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures is still applicable.
FACTS: Jesse Lucas filed a Petition to Establish Filiation with a Motion for
the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing before the RTC, alleging that he is
the son of his mother Elsie who got acquainted with respondent, Jesus Lucas
in Manila. The RTC dismissed his petition, because he failed to establish
compliance with the four procedural aspects for a paternity action enumerated
in the case of Herrera v. Alba namely: (1) a prima facie case; (2) affirmative
defences; (3) presumption of legitimacy; and (4) physical resemblance
between the putative father and the child.
ISSUE: Whether a prima facie showing of legitimacy is necessary before a
court can issue a DNA testing.
RULING: Yes. But it is not yet time to discuss the lack of a prima facie case
vis-à-vis the motion for DNA testing since no evidence has, as yet, been
presented by petitioner. The Supreme Court of Louisiana eloquently
explained: “Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is still applicable, and
a proper showing of sufficient justification under the particular factual
circumstances of the case must be made before a court may order a
compulsory blood test. Courts in various jurisdictions have differed regarding
the kind of procedures which are required, but those jurisdictions have almost
universally found that a preliminary showing must be made before a court can
constitutionally order compulsory blood testing in paternity cases. We agree,
and find that, as a preliminary matter, before the court may issue an order for
compulsory blood testing, the moving party must show that there is a
reasonable possibility of paternity. As explained hereafter, in cases in which
paternity is contested and a party to the action refuses to voluntarily undergo
a blood test, a show cause hearing must be held in which the court can
determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case
which warrants issuance of a court order for blood testing.”
The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect
the putative father from mere harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on
the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie evidence
or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.
8. PEOPLE vs. MARIACOS
GR 188611, 16 June 2010
Doctrine: A warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest is valid.
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari, appealing the decision of the CA
affirming the decision of RTC San Fernando, La Union in a criminal case
finding Belen Mariacos guilty for transporting and possession of marijuana
Facts: On October 26, 2005, the San Gabriel Police conducted a checkpoint
near the police station to intercept a suspected transportation of marijuana.
When the checkpoint did not yield any suspect or marijuana, then proceeded
to Brgy. Balbalayang, where they met with a secret agent on the dawn of the
next day, October 27th, where the latter informed him that a baggage of
marijuana had been loaded on a jeepney inside 3 bags and 1 blue plastic bag.
One backpack bag had an O.K. marking on it. PO2 Pallayoc boarded the
jeepney and found the OK backpack on top of the jeepney and true enough,
bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspapers were found. When the jeepney
reached the poblacion, he noticed that the bags were already being carried
away by two women, one of them was Defendant Mariacos. He caught up
with the women and arrested them but the other woman got away. The
investigators contacted the mayor to witness the opening of the bags. Upon
arrival of the mayor, the 3 bricks, 2 round bundles, and 2 bricks of fruiting tops
of marijuana items were marked, inventoried, and forwarded to the crime lab
for examination; all of which tested positive. For the defense, the defendant
averred that she, together with Lani Herbacio, was approached by her
neighbor Bennie Lao-ang and requested them to carry a few bags which had
been loaded on top of the jeepney. At first she refused but was later
persuaded. When they reached the poblacion, Lao-ang suddenly ran away
after giving them the bags. Only at the police station did she discover the true
contents of the bags.
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RTC found her guilty and sentenced her to life imprisonment with a fine of
PhP500,000. Upon appeal to CA, she argued that there was an unreasonable
search, assuming the bag was hers, for a lack of search warrant and
permission. She also claimed that the prosecution failed to prove the corpus
delicti of the crime because of irregularities in the chain of custody (not
photographed and inventoried in her presence or that of her counsel).
However, the people thru the OSG argued that the warrantless arrest and
seizure of marijuana were valid and legal, justified as a search of a moving
vehicle, wherein the police had a reasonable ground to believe that the
Mariacos committed a crime, which was confirmed when he peeked into the
bags and smelled the distinctive odor of marijuana. OSG also contends that
Mariacos is now estopped from questioning the illegality since she voluntarily
entered a plea upon arraignment and participated in trial and presented her
evidence. CA affirmed the decision in toto, ruling that Mariacos was caught in
flagrante delicto and thus held that the warrantless arrest was valid. Thus,
appeal to the SC.
Issue: Whether the warrantless search and warrantless arrest were valid?
Ruling: Yes. Admittedly, Article III, Section 2 of the Philippine Constitution
provides the right of a person against unreasonable searches and seizures,
and warrantless arrests, but this right is not absolute. Law and jurisprudence
provide exceptions, such as:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under
Section 12 [now Section 13], Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by
prevailing jurisprudence;
2. Seizure of evidence in plain view, the elements of which are:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in
which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official
duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had
the right to be where they are;
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent[;] and;
(d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further
search.
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the
vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its
transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion
amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.
To apply the exceptions, the officer effecting the arrest or seizure must have
been impelled by probable cause. The vehicle carrying the contraband was
about to leave and PO2 Pallayoc had to decide quickly and act fast. Worthy
to remember that the police were also acting on reliable information received
beforehand. Thus there was probable cause to search the packages. A
warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest is valid. Warrantless arrests
are provided by Rule 113, Sec. 5, in cases:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person
arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest
police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance
with section 7 of Rule 112
Jurisprudence also held that a search substantially contemporaneous with an
arrest can precede the arrest if the police has probable cause to make the
arrest at the outset of the search. Given that the search was valid, the
arrest based on that search is also valid.
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Other Related Matters:
Probable cause is defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to induce a cautious man to
believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense charged. It refers to
the existence of such facts and circumstances that can lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and
that the items, articles or objects sought in connection with said offense or
subject to seizure and destruction by law are in the place to be searched.
Over the years, the rules governing search and seizure have been steadily
liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis
of practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant could be obtained,
the place, things and persons to be searched must be described to the
satisfaction of the issuing judge a requirement which borders on the
impossible in instances where moving vehicle is used to transport contraband
from one place to another with impunity.
Appellants defense that the package did not belong to her is of no
consequence. Under the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,
when an accused is charged with illegal possession or transportation, the
ownership thereof is immaterial/ Appellants alleged lack of knowledge is not
a valid defense, as lack of criminal intent and good faith are not exempting
circumstances where the crime charged is malum prohibitum. Mere
possession and/or delivery, without legal authority is punishable.
Non-compliance with photographing of the drugs, absence of a counsel,
media or DOJ are not fatal to the case and will not render the accused’s arrest
as illegal or make the items seized inadmissible. What is of utmost importance
is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items.
Fallo: The appeal was dismissed. The decision of the CA was affirmed by the
SC.
9. ERWIN LIBO-ON DELA CRUZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 209387, January 11, 2016
FACTS: Routine baggage inspections conducted by port authorities, although
done without search warrants, are not unreasonable searches per se.
Constitutional provisions protecting privacy should not be so literally
understood so as to deny reasonable safeguards to ensure the safety of the
traveling public.
Dela Cruz was an on-the-job trainee of an inter-island vessel. He frequently
traveled, "coming back and forth taking a vessel. On May 11, 2007, Dela Cruz
was at a pier of the Cebu Domestic Port to go home to Iloilo. While buying a
ticket, he allegedly left his bag on the floor with a porter. Thereafter, he
proceeded to the entrance of the terminal and placed his bag on the x-ray
scanning machine for inspection. The operator of the x-ray machine saw
firearms inside Dela Cruz's bag.
Flores was the x-ray machine operator-on-duty on May 11, 2007. She saw
the impression of what appeared to be three (3) firearms inside Dela Cruz's
bag. Upon seeing the suspected firearms, she called the attention of port
personnel Igot) who was the baggage inspector then.
Igot asked Dela Cruz whether he was the owner of the bag and consented to
Igot's manual inspection of the bag"Port Police Officer Abregana was on duty
at the terminal of the Cebu Domestic Port in Pier 1-G when his attention was
called by Igot and was informed that there were firearms in a bag owned by
Dela Cruz.
After the inspection conducted the following items were found inside: 3
revolvers; NBI clearance; seaman's book; other personal items; and 4 live
ammunitions placed inside the cylinder. When asked whether he had the
proper documents for the firearms, Dela Cruz answered in the negative.
An information was filed against Dela Cruz for violation of Republic Act No.
8294 for simple illegal possession of firearms and for violation of Elections
Resolution No. 7764, in relation to Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881
Gun Ban.
He entered a plea of not guilty to both charges during arraignment. The
Regional Trial Court, Cebu City found Dela Cruz guilty beyond reasonable
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doubt for violation of Gun ban and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of
one (1) year with disqualification from holding public office and the right to
suffrage. While violation of R.A. 8294 was dismissed since the requirement
before a person can be charge of simple illegal possession is that the accused
has no other crime being committed at the moment of violation. The trial court
further held that the search conducted by the port authorities was reasonable
and, thus, valid since it is not violative of the accused's constitutional rights.
Dela Cruz is deemed to have been caught in flagrante delicto, justifying his
arrest even without a warrant under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure. The firearms and ammunitions obtained in the course of
such valid search are thus admissible as evidence against him.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's Judgment. It held
that the defense failed to show that the prosecution witnesses were moved by
improper motive; thus, their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit. The
acts of government authorities were found to be regular.
The Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUES:
Whether petitioner waived his right against unreasonable searches and
seizures
Whether there was a valid search and seizure in this case.
HELD: Yes, the port personnel's actions proceed from the authority and policy
to ensure the safety of travelers and vehicles within the port. At this point,
petitioner already submitted himself and his belongings to inspection by
placing his bag in the x-ray scanning machine.
The presentation of petitioner's bag for x-ray scanning was voluntary.
Petitioner had the choice of whether to present the bag or not. He had the
option not to travel if he did not want his bag scanned or inspected. X-ray
machine scanning and actual inspection upon showing of probable cause that
a crime is being or has been committed are part of reasonable security
regulations to safeguard the passengers passing through ports or terminals.
The Constitution safeguards a person's right against unreasonable searches
and seizures. A warrantless search is presumed to be unreasonable.
However, this court lays down the exceptions where warrantless searches are
deemed legitimate:
(1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;
(2) seizure in "plain view";
(3) search of a moving vehicle;
(4) consented warrantless search;
(5) customs search;
(6) stop and frisk; and
(7) exigent and emergency circumstances.
In Caballes v. Court of Appeals, the Court held in cases of consented
searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against obtrusive searches,
it is fundamental that to constitute a waiver, it must first appear that:
(1) the right exists;
(2) that the person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of
the existence of such right;
(3) the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.
In cases involving the waiver of the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures, events must be weighed in its entirety.
There was probable cause that petitioner was committing a crime leading to
the search of his personal effects. Similar to the accused in People v. Kagui
Malasugui and People v. Omaweng who permitted authorities to search their
persons and premises without a warrant, petitioner is now precluded from
claiming an invalid warrantless search when he voluntarily submitted to the
search on his person. In addition, petitioner's consent to the search at the
domestic port was not given under intimidating or coercive circumstances.
This case should be differentiated from that of Aniag, Jr. v. Commission on
Elections, which involved the search of a moving vehicle at a checkpoint. In
that case, there was no implied acquiescence to the search since the
checkpoint set up by the police authorities was conducted without proper
consultation, and it left motorists without any choice except to subject
themselves to the checkpoint. Hence, the Court cannot subscribe to
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petitioner's argument that there was no valid consent to the search since the
petitioner voluntarily submitted himself to port security measures and, as he
claimed during trial, he was familiar with the security measures since he had
been traveling back and forth through the sea port. Clearly, the petitioner
validly waived his right against unreasonable searches and seizures
2nd Issue:
Yes, since the officer conducted a consented search and not a custom search.
The consented search conducted on petitioner's bag is different from a
customs search. Customs searches, as exception to the requirement of a
valid search warrant, are allowed when "persons exercising police authority
under the customs law . . . effect search and seizure ... in the enforcement of
Tariff and custom laws." In Salvador v. People, in that the state's policy to
combat smuggling must not lose to the difficulties posed by the debate on
whether the state has the duty to accord constitutional protection to dutiable
articles on which duty has not been paid, as with a person's papers and/or
effects.
Hence, to be a valid customs search, the requirements are:
(1) the person/s conducting the search was/were exercising police authority
under customs law;
(2) the search was for the enforcement of customs law; and
(3) the place searched is not a dwelling place or house.
Here, the facts reveal that the search was part of routine port security
measures. The search was not conducted by persons authorized under
customs law. It was also not motivated by the provisions of the Tariff and
Customs Code or other customs laws. Although customs search usually occur
within ports or terminals, it is important that the search must be for the
enforcement of customs laws. Hence, there is a valid search and seizure in
this case.
10. PEOPLE vs. COGAED
Gr. No. 200334 | 30 Jul 2014
FACTS: At about 6am of 25 Nov. 2005, Police Senior Inspector Sofronio
Bayan (PSI Bayan) of San Gabriel, La Union, received a text message from
an unidentified civilian informer that one Marvin Buya would be transporting
marijuana from Brgy. Lun-Oy, San Gabriel, La Union to the Poblacion of San
Gabriel, La Union. PSI Bayan organized checkpoints to intercept the suspect.
PSI Bayan ordered SPO1 Jaime Taracatac to set up a checkpoint in the
waiting area of passengers from San Gabriel bound for San Fernando City.
A passenger jeepney from Brgy. Lun-Oy arrived at SPO1 Taracatac's
checkpoint. The jeepney driver disembarked and signalled to SPO1
Taracatac indicating the two male passengers who were carrying marijuana.
SPO1 Taracatac approached the two male passengers, namely: Victor
Romana Cogaed and Santiago Sacpa Dayao. Cogaed was carrying a blue
bag and a sack while Dayao was holding a yellow bag. SPO1 Taracatac asked
Cogaed and Dayao about the contents of their bags. Cogaed and Dayao told
SPO1 Taracatac that they did not know since they were transporting the bags
as a favor for their barriomate named Marvin. After this exchange, Cogaed
opened the blue bag, revealing three bricks of what looked like marijuana.
Cogaed then muttered "Marvin is a fool, this is what is contained in the bag."
SPO1 Taracatac arrested Cogaed and Dayao and brought them to the police
station. According to Cogaed's testimony during trial, he was at Balbalayan,
La Union, waiting for a jeepney to take him to the Poblacion of San Gabriel so
he could buy pesticide. He boarded a jeepney and recognized Dayao, his
younger brother's friend. Dayao allegedly asked for Cogaed's help in carrying
his things, which included a travelling bag and a sack. Cogaed agreed.
The case was filed before RTC. Cogaed and Dayao pleaded not guilty. The
case was dismissed against Dayao because he was only 14 y/o at that time
and was exempt from criminal liability under RA no. 9344. RTC finds accused
Cogaed guilty for the crime of Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
Cogaed appealed the RTC's decision. However, CA denied his appeal and
affirmed the trial court's decision. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether there was a valid search and seizure of marijuana as against the
appelant;
2. Whether the evidence obtained through the search should be admitted; and
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3. Whether there was enough evidence to sustain the conviction of the
accused.
HELD: SC finds for the accused. The right to privacy is a fundamental right
enshrined by implication in our Constitution. It has many dimensions. One of
its dimensions is its protection through the prohibition of unreasonable
searches and seizures in Art. III, Sec.2 of the Constitution: The right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized. One of the jurisprudential exceptions to search
warrants is "stop and frisk".
Stop and frisk searches are often confused with searches incidental to lawful
arrests under the ROC. Searches incidental to lawful arrest require that a
crime be committed in flagrante delicto, and the search conducted within the
vicinity and within reach by the person arrested is done to ensure that there
are no weapons, as well as to preserve the evidence. On the other hand, stop
and frisk searches are conducted to prevent the occurrence of a crime. Stop
and frisk searches should be used when dealing with a rapidly unfolding and
potentially criminal situation in the city streets where unarguably there is no
time to secure a search warrant. The search involved in this case was initially
a "stop and frisk" search, but it did not comply with all the requirements of
reasonability required by the Constitution. "Stop and frisk" searches
(sometimes referred to as Terrysearches68) are necessary for law
enforcement. That is, law enforcers should be given the legal arsenal to
prevent the commission of offenses. However, this should be balanced with
the need to protect the privacy of citizens in accordance with Article III, Section
2 of the Constitution.
The balance lies in the concept of "suspiciousness" present in the situation
where the police officer finds himself or herself in. This may be undoubtedly
based on the experience of the police officer. Experienced police officers have
personal experience dealing with criminals and criminal behavior. Hence, they
should have the ability to discern — based on facts that they themselves
observe — whether an individual is acting in a suspicious manner. Clearly, a
basic criterion would be that the police officer, with his or her personal
knowledge, must observe the facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act.
The case of Cogaed was different. He was simply a passenger carrying a bag
and traveling aboard a jeepney. There was nothing suspicious, moreover,
criminal, about riding a jeepney or carrying a bag. The assessment of
suspicion was not made by the police officer but by the jeepney driver. It was
the driver who signalled to the police that Cogaed was "suspicious." It is the
police officer who should observe facts that would lead to a reasonable degree
of suspicion of a person. The police officer should not adopt the suspicion
initiated by another person. This is necessary to justify that the person
suspected be stopped and reasonably searched. Anything less than this
would be an infringement upon one's basic right to security of one's person
and effects. Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not
required to conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere
suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason
must exist, in light of the police officer’s experience and surrounding
conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons
concealed about him.
In his dissent for Esquillo v. People, Justice Bersamin reminds us that police
officers must not rely on a single suspicious circumstance. There should be
"presence of more than one seemingly innocent activity, which, taken
together, warranted a reasonable inference of criminal activity." The
Constitution prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures." Certainly,
reliance on only one suspicious circumstance or none at all will not result in a
reasonable search. There was not a single suspicious circumstance in this
case, and there was no approximation for the probable cause requirement for
warrantless arrest. The person searched was not even the person mentioned
by the informant. The informant gave the name of Marvin Buya, and the
person searched was Victor Cogaed. Even if it was true that Cogaed
responded by saying that he was transporting the bag to Marvin Buya, this
still remained only as one circumstance. This should not have been enough
reason to search Cogaed and his belongings without a valid search warrant.
None of the other exceptions to warrantless searches exist to allow the
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evidence to be admissible. The facts of this case do not qualify as a search
incident to a lawful arrest. The apprehension of Cogaed was not effected with
a warrant of arrest.
None of the instances enumerated in Rule 113, Sec. 5 ROC were present
when the arrest was made. There can be no valid waiver of Cogaed's
constitutional rights even if we assume that he did not object when the police
asked him to open his bags. Appellant's silence should not be lightly taken as
consent to such search. The implied acquiescence to the search, if there was
any, could not have been more than mere passive conformity given under
intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at
all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.
Cogaed's silence or lack of aggressive objection was a natural reaction to a
coercive environment brought about by the police officer's excessive intrusion
into his private space. For a valid waiver by the accused of his or her
constitutional right, it is not sufficient that the police officer introduce himself
or herself, or be known as a police officer. The police officer must also inform
the person to be searched that any inaction on his or her part will amount to
a waiver of any of his or her objections that the circumstances do not amount
to a reasonable search. The police officer must communicate this clearly and
in a language known to the person who is about to waive his or her
constitutional rights. There must be an assurance given to the police officer
that the accused fully understands his or her rights. The fundamental nature
of a person’s constitutional right to privacy requires no less. Any evidence
obtained in violation of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Cogaed is acquitted.
11. POLLO vs. CONSTANTINO-DAVID
GR 181881, 18 October 2011
FACTS: Petitioner is a former Supervising Personnel Specialist of the CSC
Regional Office No. IV and also the Officer-in-Charge of the Public Assistance
and Liaison Division (PALD) under the "Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya
Na" program of the CSC.
Petitioner Assails the legality of the search conducted on his office computer
and the copying of his personal files upon the order of the Chairwoman of the
Civil Service Commission without his knowledge and consent, alleged as a
transgression on his constitutional right to privacy.
ISSUE:
1. Was there a violation of right to privacy?
2. Can the government as employer invade the private files of an employee
stored in the computer assigned to him for his official use, in the course of
initial investigation of possible misconduct committed by said employee and
without the latter’s consent or participation?
1. None.
DOCTRINE: To establish a violation of rights to privacy, one must first prove
that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place searched or the
item seized. x x x And, in order to prove a legitimate expectation of privacy,
one must show that his subjective expectation of privacy is one that society is
prepared to accept as objectively reasonable. x x x
In this case, Petitioner failed to prove that he had an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy either in his office or government-issued computer
which contained his personal files. Petitioner did not allege that he had a
separate enclosed office which he did not share with anyone, or that his office
was always locked and not open to other employees or visitors. Neither did
he allege that he used passwords or adopted any means to prevent other
employees from accessing his computer files. On the contrary, he submits
that being in the public assistance office of the CSC-ROIV, he normally would
have visitors in his office like friends, associates and even unknown people,
whom he even allowed to use his computer which to him seemed a trivial
request. He described his office as "full of people, his friends, unknown
people" and that in the past 22 years he had been discharging his functions
at the PALD, he is "personally assisting incoming clients, receiving
documents, drafting cases on appeals, in charge of accomplishment report,
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Mamamayan Muna Program, Public Sector Unionism, Correction of name,
accreditation of service, and hardly had anytime for himself alone, that in fact
he stays in the office as a paying customer."46 Under this scenario, it can
hardly be deduced that petitioner had such expectation of privacy that society
would recognize as reasonable. Moreover, The CSC in its Office
Memorandum No. 10, S. 2002 "Computer Use Policy (CUP)" had
implemented a policy that put its employees on notice that they have no
expectation of privacy in anything they create, store, send or receive on the
office computers, and that the CSC may monitor the use of the computer
resources using both automated or human means.
2. Yes.
DOCTRINE: Government agencies, in their capacity as employers, rather
than law enforcers, could validly conduct search and seizure in the
governmental workplace for noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as
well as for investigations of work-related misconduct without meeting the
"probable cause" or warrant requirement for search and seizure, provided the
search is reasonable in its inception and scope.
"Determining the reasonableness of any search involves a twofold inquiry:
first, one must consider ‘whether the…action was justified at its inception,’ x x
x ; second, one must determine whether the search as actually conducted
‘was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the
interference in the first place,’" x x x
Ordinarily, a search of an employee’s office by a supervisor will be
"justified at its inception" when there are reasonable grounds for
suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of
work-related misconduct, or that the search is necessary for a
noninvestigatory work-related purpose such as to retrieve a needed file. x x
x The search will be permissible in its scope when "the measures adopted
are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively
intrusive in light of …the nature of the [misconduct]." x x x39 (Citations omitted;
emphasis supplied.)
In this case, the search of Pollo’s computer has successfully passed the test
of reasonableness for warrantless searches in the workplace. It bears
emphasis that the CSC pursued the search in its capacity as a
government employer and that it was undertaken in connection with an
investigation involving a work-related misconduct, one of the
circumstances exempted from the warrant requirement. At the inception of the
search, a complaint was received recounting that a certain division chief in
the CSCRO No. IV was "lawyering" for parties having pending cases with the
said regional office or in the Commission. The nature of the imputation was
serious, as it was grievously disturbing. If, indeed, a CSC employee was
found to be furtively engaged in the practice of "lawyering" for parties with
pending cases before the Commission would be a highly repugnant scenario,
then such a case would have shattering repercussions. It would undeniably
cast clouds of doubt upon the institutional integrity of the Commission as a
quasi-judicial agency, and in the process, render it less effective in fulfilling its
mandate as an impartial and objective dispenser of administrative justice. It is
settled that a court or an administrative tribunal must not only be actually
impartial but must be seen to be so, otherwise the general public would not
have any trust and confidence in it.
12. ANONYMOUS LETTER-COMPLAINT AGAINST ATTY.
MORALES
AM No. P-08-2519 November 19, 2008.
FACTS: On February 24, 2005, the Office of the Court Administrator received
a anonymous letter-complaint which alleged that Atty. Morales, then detailed
at the OCC, was consuming his working hours filing and attending to personal
cases, attending to personal cases while using official time, office supplies,
equipment and utilities, leaving the office after logging-in in the morning only
to return in the afternoon, and playing computer games whenever he was at
the office.
Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) Reuben P. dela Cruz conducted a spot
investigation together with four NBI agents, a crime photographer and a
support staff. The team was able to access the personal computer of Atty.
Morales and print two documents stored in its hard drive. The hard drive of
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Atty. Moraless computer yielded a pre-trial brief and a petition for relief from
judgment with the name of Atty. Icaonapo. The said pre-trial brief was the
same pleading that was submitted to RTC Branch 1, Manila by Atty. Icaonapo
on February 10, 2003. In his Manifestation, Atty. Morales alleged that the
letter-complaint should not have been given due course as there is no truth to
the allegation therein, the raid conducted by DCA Dela Cruz without search
and seizure orders violated his right to privacy and the articles seized
therewith should be considered inadmissible. The OCA concluded that Atty.
Morales should be found guilty of gross misconduct.
ISSUE: Are the pleadings found in Atty. Morales’s personal computer
admissible in the present administrative case against him?
RULING: Enshrined in our Constitution is the inviolable right of the people to
be secure in their persons and properties against unreasonable searches and
seizures, which is provided for under Section 2, Article III thereof. The
exclusionary rule under Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution also bars
the admission of evidence obtained in violation of such right. The fact that the
present case is administrative in nature does not render the above principle
inoperative. As expounded in Zulueta v. Court of Appeals, any violation of
the aforestated constitutional right renders the evidence obtained
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
There are exceptions to this rule one of which is consented warrantless
search. Consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred and must be shown
by clear and convincing evidence. It must be voluntary in order to validate an
otherwise illegal search; that is, the consent must be unequivocal, specific,
intelligently given and uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. To
constitute a valid consent or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against
obtrusive searches, it must be shown that (1) the right exists; (2) that the
person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence
of such right; and (3) the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the
right.
In the case at bar, what is missing is a showing that Atty. Morales had an
actual intention to relinquish his right. While he may have agreed to the
opening of his personal computer and the printing of files therefrom, in the
presence of DCA Dela Cruz, his staff and some NBI agents during the spot
investigation, it is also of record that Atty. Morales immediately filed an
administrative case against said persons questioning the validity of the
investigation, specifically invoking his constitutional right against
unreasonable search and seizure. While Atty. Morales may have fallen short
of the exacting standards required of every court employee, unfortunately, the
Court cannot use the evidence obtained from his personal computer against
him for it violated his constitutional right.
13. WORLDWIDE WEB CORPORATION vs. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 161106, JANUARY 13, 2014
FACTS: Police Chief Inspector Villegas of the Regional Intelligence Special
Operations Office of the PNP filed applications for warrants before the RTC
of Quezon City to search the office premises of Worldwide Web Corporation
and Planet Internet Corporation. The applications alleged that petitioners
were conducting illegal toll bypass operations, which amounted to theft and
violation of P.D. No. 401 (Penalizing the Unauthorized Installation of Water,
Electrical or Telephone Connections, the Use of Tampered Water or Electrical
Meters and Other Acts), to the damage and prejudice of the PLDT.
The trial court conducted a hearing on the applications for search warrants.
The applicants Rivera and Gali of the Alternative Calling Pattern Detection
Division of PLDT testified as witnesses.
According to Rivera, a legitimate international long distance call should pass
through the local exchange or public switch telephone network (PSTN) on to
the toll center of one of the international gateway facilities (IGFs) in the
Philippines. The call is then transmitted to the other country through voice
circuits, either via fiber optic submarine cable or microwave radio using
satellite facilities, and passes the toll center of one of the IGFs in the
destination country. The toll center would then meter the call, which will pass
through the PSTN of the called number to complete the circuit. In contrast,
WWC and Planet Internet were able to provide international long distance call
services to any part of the world by using PLDT’s telephone lines, but
bypassing its IGF. This scheme constitutes toll bypass, a "method of routing
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and completing international long distance calls using lines, cables, antenna
and/or wave or frequency which connects directly to the local or domestic
exchange facilities of the originating country or the country where the call is
originated."
On the other hand, Gali claimed that a phone number serviced by PLDT and
registered to WWC was used to provide a service called GlobalTalk, "an
internet-based international call service, which can be availed of via prepaid
or billed/post-paid accounts." During a test call using GlobalTalk, Gali dialed
the local PLDT telephone number 6891135, the given access line. After a
voice prompt required him to enter the user code and PIN provided under a
GlobalTalk prepaid account, he was then requested to enter the destination
number, which included the country code, phone number and a pound sign.
The call was completed to a phone number in Taiwan. However, when he
checked the records, it showed that the call was only directed to the local
number 6891135. This indicated that the international test call using
GlobalTalk bypassed PLDT’s IGF.
Based on the records of PLDT, telephone number 6891135 is registered to
WWC. However, upon an ocular inspection conducted by Rivera at this
address, it was found that the occupant of the unit is Planet Internet, which
also uses the telephone lines registered to WWC. These telephone lines are
interconnected to a server and used as dial-up access lines/numbers of
WWC.
Gali further alleged that because PLDT lines and equipment had been illegally
connected by petitioners to a piece of equipment that routed the international
calls and bypassed PLDT’s IGF, they violated P.D. No. 401 as amended, on
unauthorized installation of telephone connections. Petitioners also
committed theft, because through their misuse of PLDT phone lines/numbers
and equipment and with clear intent to gain, they illegally stole business and
revenues that rightly belong to PLDT. Moreover, they acted contrary to the
letter and intent of R. A. No. 7925, because in bypassing the IGF of PLDT,
they evaded the payment of access and bypass charges in its favor while
"piggy-backing" on its multi-million dollar facilities and infrastructure, thus
stealing its business revenues from international long distance calls. Further,
petitioners acted in gross violation of Memorandum Circular No. 6-2-92 of
498 the National Telecommunications Commission prohibiting the use of
customs premises equipment without first securing type approval license from
the latter. PLDT computed a monthly revenue loss of P764,718.09. They
alleged that petitioners deprived it of foreign exchange revenues, and evaded
the payment of taxes, license fees, and charges, to the prejudice of the
government.
During the hearing, the trial court required the identification of the office
premises/units to be searched, as well as their floor plans showing the location
of particular computers and servers that would be taken. The RTC granted
the application for search warrants. Three warrants were issued against the
office premises of petitioners, authorizing police officers to seize various items
in the office premises of WWC and Planet Internet, which includes various
telecommunications equipment consisting of computers, lines, cables,
antennas, modems, or routers, multiplexers, PABX or switching equipment,
and support equipment such as software, diskettes, tapes, manuals and other
documentary records to support the illegal toll bypass operations. The
warrants were implemented on the same day by RISOO operatives of the
NCR-PNP.
Over a hundred items were seized, including 15 CPUs, 10 monitors,
numerous wires, cables, diskettes and files, and a laptop computer. Planet
Internet notes that even personal diskettes of its employees were confiscated;
and areas not devoted to the transmission of international calls, such as the
President’s Office and the Information Desk, were searched. Voltage
regulators, as well as reserve and broken computers, were also seized.
Petitioners filed their respective motions to quash the search warrants, citing
basically the same grounds: (1) the search warrants were issued without
probable cause, since the acts complained of did not constitute theft; (2) toll
bypass, the act complained of, was not a crime; (3) the search warrants were
general warrants; and (4) the objects seized pursuant thereto were "fruits of
the poisonous tree." PLDT filed a Consolidated Opposition to the motions to
quash.
In the hearing of the motions to quash, the test calls alluded to by Gali in his
Affidavit were shown to have passed the IGF of Eastern Telecommunications
Philippines, Inc. and of Capital Wireless. Planet Internet explained that
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Eastern and Capwire both provided international direct dialing services, which
Planet Internet marketed by virtue of a "Reseller Agreement." Planet Internet
used PLDT lines for the first phase of the call; but for the second phase, it
used the IGF of either Eastern or Capwire. Planet Internet religiously paid
PLDT for its domestic phone bills and Eastern and Capwire for its IGF usage.
None of these contentions were refuted by PLDT.
The RTC granted the motions to quash on the ground that the warrants issued
were in the nature of general warrants. Thus, the properties seized under the
said warrants were ordered released to petitioners.
PLDT moved for reconsideration, but its motion was denied on the ground
that it had failed to get the conformity of the City Prosecutor prior to filing the
motion, as required under Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure. PLDT appealed to the CA and the appellate court reversed and
set aside the RTC Resolutions and declared the search warrants valid and
effective.
Petitioners separately moved for reconsideration of the CA ruling. Among the
points raised was that PLDT should have filed a petition for certiorari rather
than an appeal when it questioned the RTC Resolution before the CA. The
appellate court denied the Motions for Reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not conformity of the public prosecutor is necessary prior filing
a motion for reconsideration to question an order quashing search warrants
2. Whether or not an order quashing a search warrant issued independently
prior to the filing of a criminal action is deemed a final order that can be the
subject of an appeal
3. Whether or not the assailed search warrants were issued upon probable
cause, considering that the acts complained of allegedly do not constitute theft
4. Whether or not the assailed search warrants were general warrants
HELD:
1. No. An application for a search warrant is not a criminal action, therefore,
conformity of the public prosecutor is not necessary to give PLDT personality
to question the motion to quash granted by the RTC.
SEC. 5. Who must prosecute criminal actions. — All criminal actions
commenced by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the
direction and control of the prosecutor.
The above provision states the general rule that the public prosecutor has
direction and control of the prosecution of all criminal actions commenced by
a complaint or information. However, a search warrant is obtained, not by the
filing of a complaint or an information, but by the filing of an application
therefor.
An application for a search warrant is a special criminal process, rather than
a criminal action.The application for and the obtention of a search warrant
cannot be equated with the institution and prosecution of a criminal action in
a trial court. It would thus categorize what is only a special criminal process,
the power to issue which is inherent in all courts, as equivalent to a criminal
action, jurisdiction over which is reposed in specific courts of indicated
competence. The requisites, procedure and purpose for the issuance of a
search warrant are completely different from those for the institution of a
criminal action.
A warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely constitutes
process. A search warrant is defined in our jurisdiction as an order in writing
issued in the name of the People of the Philippines signed by a judge and
directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property
and bring it before the court. A search warrant is in the nature of a criminal
process akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic
in its nature, and made necessary because of a public necessity.
A search warrant is definitively considered merely as a process, generally
issued by a court in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction, and not a criminal
action to be entertained by a court pursuant to its original jurisdiction.
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Therefore, an application for a search warrant is not a criminal action. The
Supreme Court consistently recognizes the right of parties to question orders
quashing those warrants. The CA's ruling that the conformity of the public
prosecutor is not necessary before an aggrieved party moves for
reconsideration of an order granting a motion to quash search warrants is
sustained.
2. Yes. An order quashing a search warrant, which was issued independently
prior to the filing of a criminal action, is not merely an interlocutory order. It
partakes of a final order and can be the proper subject of an appeal.
Therefore, PLDT was correct when they assailed the quashal orders via an
appeal rather than a petition for certiorari.
A final order is defined as one which disposes of the whole subject matter or
terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing to be done but to
enforce by execution what has been determined; on the other hand an order
is interlocutory if it does not dispose of a case completely, but leaves
something more to be done upon its merits.
An application for a search warrant is a judicial process conducted either as
an incident in a main criminal case already filed in court or in anticipation of
one yet to be filed. Whether the criminal case (of which the search warrant is
an incident) has already been filed before the trial court is significant for the
purpose of determining the proper remedy from a grant or denial of a motion
to quash a search warrant.
Where the search warrant is issued as an incident in a pending criminal case,
the quashal of a search warrant is merely interlocutory. There is still
something more to be done in the said criminal case, i.e., the determination
of the guilt of the accused therein.
In contrast, where a search warrant is applied for and issued in anticipation of
a criminal case yet to be filed, the order quashing the warrant (and denial of
a motion for reconsideration of the grant) ends the judicial process. There is
nothing more to be done thereafter.
Thus, the CA correctly ruled that is this case, the applications for search
warrants were instituted as principal proceedings and not as incidents to
pending criminal actions. When the search warrants issued were
subsequently quashed by the RTC, there was nothing left to be done by the
trial court. Thus, the quashal of the search warrants were final orders, not
interlocutory, and an appeal may be properly taken therefrom.
3. Yes. The assailed search warrants were issued upon probable cause. Trial
judges determine probable cause in the exercise of their judicial functions. A
trial judge’s finding of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is
accorded respect by reviewing courts when the finding has substantial basis.
The rules pertaining to the issuance of search warrants are enshrined in
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
In the issuance of a search warrant, probable cause requires such facts and
circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and the objects sought in connection with that
offense are in the place to be searched.
There is no exact test for the determination of probable cause in the issuance
of search warrants. It is a matter wholly dependent on the finding of trial judges
in the process of exercising their judicial function. They determine probable
cause based on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been
committed and that it was committed by the offender. When a finding of
probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is made by a trial judge,
the finding is accorded respect by reviewing courts.
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It is presumed that a judicial function has been regularly performed, absent a
showing to the contrary. A magistrate’s determination of probable cause for
the issuance of a search warrant is paid great deference by a reviewing court,
as long as there was substantial basis for that determination. Substantial
basis means that the questions of the examining judge brought out such facts
and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed, and the objects in connection
with the offense sought to be seized are in the place sought to be searched.
Petitioners insist that the determination of the existence of probable cause
necessitates the prior determination of whether a crime or an offense was
committed in the first place. They argue that there is no law punishing toll
bypass, the act complained of by PLDT. Thus, no offense was committed that
would justify the issuance of the search warrants.
According to PLDT, toll bypass enables international calls to appear as local
calls and not overseas calls, thus effectively evading payment to the PLDT of
access, termination or bypass charges, and accounting rates; payment to the
government of taxes; and compliance with NTC regulatory requirements.
PLDT concludes that toll bypass is prohibited, because it deprives legitimate
telephone operators, of the compensation which it is entitled to had the call
been properly routed through its network. As such, toll bypass operations
constitute theft, because all of the elements of the crime are present therein.
Petitioners argue that there is no theft to speak of, because the properties
allegedly taken from PLDT partake of the nature of future earnings and lost
business opportunities and, as such, are uncertain, anticipative, speculative,
contingent, and conditional. PLDT cannot be deprived of such unrealized
earnings and opportunities because these do not belong to it in the first place.
However, it is to be noted that the affidavits of Rivera and Gali that
accompanied the applications for the search warrants charge petitioners with
the crime, not of toll bypass per se, but of theft of PLDT’s international long
distance call business committed by means of the alleged toll bypass
operations.
For theft to be committed in this case, the following elements must be shown
to exist: (1) the taking by petitioners (2) of PLDT’s personal property (3) with
intent to gain (4) without the consent of PLDT (5) accomplished without the
use of violence against or intimidation of persons or the use of force upon
things.
It is the use of these communications facilities without the consent of PLDT
that constitutes the crime of theft, which is the unlawful taking of the telephone
services and business.
Furthermore, toll bypass operations could not have been accomplished
without the installation of telecommunications equipment to the PLDT
telephone lines. Thus, petitioners may also be held liable for violation of P.D.
401, to wit: 502
Section 1. Any person who installs any water, electrical, telephone or piped
gas connection without previous authority from the Metropolitan Waterworks
and Sewerage System, the Manila Electric Company, the Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company , or the Manila Gas Corporation, as the case
may be, tampers and/or uses tampered water, electrical or gas meters,
jumpers or other devices whereby water, electricity or piped gas is stolen;
steals or pilfers water, electric or piped gas meters, or water, electric and/or
telephone wires, or piped gas pipes or conduits; knowingly possesses stolen
or pilfered water, electrical or gas meters as well as stolen or pilfered water,
electrical and/or telephone wires, or piped gas pipes and conduits, shall, upon
conviction, be punished with prision correccional in its minimum period or a
fine ranging from two thousand to six thousand pesos, or both.
It must be noted that the trial judge did not quash the warrants in this case
based on lack of probable cause. The RTC granted the motions to quash on
the ground that the warrants issued were in the nature of general warrants,
which was reversed by the CA.
4. No. The assailed search warrants are not general warrants. The
requirement of particularity in the description of things to be seized is fulfilled
when the items described in the search warrant bear a direct relation to the
offense for which the warrant is sought.
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A general warrant is defined as a search or arrest warrant that is not particular
as to the person to be arrested or the property to be seized. It is one that
allows the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another and gives
the officer executing the warrant the discretion over which items to take.
Such discretion is abhorrent, as it makes the person, against whom the
warrant is issued, vulnerable to abuses. Our Constitution guarantees our right
against unreasonable searches and seizures, and safeguards have been put
in place to ensure that people and their properties are searched only for the
most compelling and lawful reasons.
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no such search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
In furtherance of this constitutional provision, Sections 3 and 4, Rule 126 of
the Rules of Court, amplify the rules regarding the following places and items
to be searched under a search warrant:
SEC. 3. Personal property to be seized. — A search warrant may be issued
for the search and seizure of personal property:
a) Subject of the offense;
b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense;
c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense
SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall not
issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized
which may be anywhere in the Philippines.
Within the context of the above legal requirements for valid search warrants,
the Court has been mindful of the difficulty faced by law enforcement officers
in describing the items to be searched, especially when these items are
technical in nature, and when the extent of the illegal operation is largely
unknown to them.
The things to be seized must be described with particularity. Technical
precision of description is not required. It is only necessary that there be
reasonable particularity and certainty as to the identity of the property to be
searched for and seized, so that the warrant shall not be a mere roving
commission. Indeed, the law does not require that the things to be seized
must be described in precise and minute detail as to leave no room for doubt
on the part of the searching authorities. If this were the rule, it would be
virtually impossible for the applicants to obtain a warrant as they would not
know exactly what kind of things to look for. Any description of the place or
thing to be searched that will enable the officer making the search with
reasonable certainty to locate such place or thing is sufficient.
The particularity of the description of the place to be searched and the things
to be seized is required wherever and whenever it is feasible. A search
warrant need not describe the items to be seized in precise and minute detail.
The warrant is valid when it enables the police officers to readily identify the
properties to be seized and leaves them with no discretion regarding the
articles to be seized.
A search warrant fulfills the requirement of particularity in the description of
the things to be seized when the things described are limited to those that
bear a direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued.
PLDT was able to establish the connection between the items to be searched
as identified in the warrants and the crime of theft of its telephone services
and business. Prior to the application for the search warrants, Rivera
conducted ocular inspection of the premises of petitioners and was able to
confirm that they had utilized various telecommunications equipment
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consisting of computers, lines, cables, antennas, modems, or routers,
multiplexers, PABX or switching equipment, a d support equipment such as
software, diskettes, tapes, manuals and other documentary records to support
the illegal toll bypass operations.
The petitions were DENIED. The Court of Appeals decision were AFFIRMED.
14. JOEY M. PESTILLOS vs. MORENO GENEROSO and PEOPLE
G.R. No. 182601 November 10, 2014
FACTS: On February 20, 2005, at around 3: 15 in the morning, an altercation
ensued between the petitioners and Atty. Moreno Generoso (Atty. Generoso)
at Kasiyahan Street, Barangay Holy Spirit, Quezon City where the petitioners
and Atty. Generoso reside.
The altercation turned into a stabbing incident. The petitioners stabbed Atty.
Generoso with a bladed weapon. Atty. Generoso fortunately survived the
attack.
Atty. Generoso called the Central Police District, Station 6 (Batas an Hills
Police Station) to report the incident. Acting on this report, Desk Officer SPOl
Primitivo Monsalve (SPO1 Monsalve) dispatched SP02 Dominador Javier
(SP02 Javier) to go to the scene of the crime and to render assistance. SP02
Javier, together with augmentation personnel, arrived at the scene of the
crime less than one hour after the alleged altercation and they saw Atty.
Generoso badly beaten.
Atty. Generoso then pointed to the petitioners as those who mauled him. This
prompted the police officers to "invite" the petitioners to go to Batasan Hills
Police Station for investigation. The petitioners went with the police officers to
Batasan Hills Police Station. At the inquest proceeding, the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City found that the petitioners stabbed Atty. Generoso with a bladed
weapon. Atty. Generoso fortunately survived the attack.
ISSUES:
1) Whether the petitioners were validly arrested without a warrant.
2) Whether the petitioners were lawfully arrested when they were
merely invited to the police precinct.
RULING:
1) Yes. The police officers had personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances upon which they had properly determined probable cause in
effecting a warrantless arrest against the petitioners. The arresting officers'
personal observation of Atty. Generoso's bruises when they arrived at the
scene of the crime is corroborated by the petitioners' admissions that Atty:
Generoso indeed suffered blows from petitioner Macapanas and his brother
Joseph Macapanas,
In determining the reasonableness of the warrantless arrests, it is incumbent
upon the courts to consider if the police officers have complied with the
requirements set under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, specifically, the requirement of immediacy; the police
officer's personal knowledge of facts or circumstances; and lastly, the
propriety of the determination of probable cause that the person sought to be
arrested committed the crime.
Personal knowledge of a crime just committed under the terms of the above-
cited provision, does not require actual presence at the scene while a crime
was being committed; it is enough that evidence of the recent commission of
the crime is patent (as in this case) and the police officer has probable cause
to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances, that the
person to be arrested has recently committed the crime.
Considering the circumstances of the stabbing, particularly the locality where
it took place, its occasion, the personal circumstances of the parties, and the
immediate on-the-spot investigation that took place, the immediate and
warrantless arrests of the perpetrators were proper. Consequently, the
inquest proceeding that the City Prosecutor conducted was appropriate under
the circumstances.
2) Yes. After a crime had just been committed and the attending
policemen have acquired personal knowledge of the incidents of the crime,
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including the alleged perpetrators, the arrest of the petitioners as the
perpetrators pointed to by the victim, was not a mere random act but was in
connection with a particular offense. Furthermore, SP02 Javier had informed
the petitioners, at the time of their arrest, of the charges against them before
taking them to Batasan Hills Police Station for investigation.
Arrest is defined as the taking of a person into custody in order that he may
be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. An arrest is made by
an actual restraint of the person to be arrested, or by his submission to the
custody of the person making the arrest.91 Thus, application of actual force,
manual touching of the body, physical restraint or a formal declaration of
arrest is not required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one
of the parties to arrest the other and the intent of the other to submit, under
the belief and impression that submission is necessary.
Notwithstanding the term "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest, SP02 Javier could
not but have the intention of arresting the petitioners following Atty. Generoso'
s account. SP02 Javier did not need to apply violent physical restraint when
a simple directive to the petitioners to follow him to the police station would
produce a similar effect. In other words, the application of actual force would
only be an alternative if the petitioners had exhibited resistance.
15. MA. MIMIE CRESCENCIO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS: Acting on an information that there was a stockpile of lumber or forest
products in the vicinity of the house of the petitioner, the Chief of the Forest
Protection Unit of DENR and some forest rangers went to the petitioner’s
house and saw forest products lying under the house and at the shoreline
about two meters away from the petitioner’s house. As the DENR personnel
tried to investigate from the neighborhood as to who was the owner of the
lumber, the petitioner admitted its ownership. Thereafter, the DENR personnel
entered the premises of the petitioner’s house without a search warrant. Upon
inspection, 24 pieces of magsihagonl umber, which is equivalent to 452 board
feet, were discovered. When the DENR personnel asked for documents to
support the petitioner’s claim of ownership, the latter showed to them Official
Receipt No. 35053 issued by Pengavitor Enterprises where she allegedly
bought the said lumber. However, when the DENR personnel scaled the
lumber, they found out that the dimensions and the species of the lumber did
not tally with the items mentioned in the receipt. Since the petitioner could not
present any other receipt, the chief ordered the confiscation of the lumber.
The petitioner contends that the warrantless search and seizure conducted
by the DENR personnel was illegal and, thus, the items seized should not
have been admitted in evidence against her.
ISSUE: Whether the warrantless search and seizure conducted by the DENR
personnel was illegal and, thus, the items seized should not have been
admitted in evidence.
HELD: The Constitution recognizes the right of the people to be secured in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures. Nonetheless, the constitutional prohibition against warrantless
searches and seizures admits of certain exceptions, one of which is seizure
of evidence in plain view. Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the
"plain view" of an officer, who has a right to be in the position to have that
view, are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.
There is no question that the DENR personnel were not armed with a search
warrant when they went to the house of the petitioner. When the DENR
personnel arrived at the petitioner’s house, the lumbers were lying under the
latter’s house and at the shoreline about two meters away from the house of
the petitioner. It is clear, therefore, that the said lumber is plainly exposed to
sight. Hence, the seizure of the lumber outside the petitioner’s house falls
within the purview of the plain view doctrine.
Besides, the DENR personnel had the authority to arrest the petitioner, even
without a warrant. Section 80 of the Forestry Code authorizes the forestry
officer or employee of the DENR or any personnel of the Philippine National
Police to arrest, even without a warrant, any person who has committed or is
committing in his presence any of the offenses defined by the Forestry Code
and to seize and confiscate the tools and equipment used in committing the
offense or the forest products gathered or taken by the offender. Clearly, in
the course of such lawful intrusion, the DENR personnel had inadvertently
come across the lumber which evidently incriminated the petitioner.
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16. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANTONIO LAUGA Y PINA
ALIAS TERIO
G.R. No. 186228 March 15, 2010
FACTS: In an Information dated 21 September 2000,2 the appellant was
accused of the crime of QUALIFIED RAPE allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of March 2000, in the evening, at Barangay xxx,
municipality of xxx, province of Bukidnon, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the
father of AAA with lewd design, with the use of force and intimidation, did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally have carnal knowledge with his
own daughter AAA, a 13 year[s]old minor against her will.3
On trial, three (3) witnesses testified for the prosecution, namely: victim
AAA;6 her brother BBB;7 and one Moises Boy Banting,8 a "bantay bayan" in
the barangay. Their testimonies revealed the following: In the afternoon of 15
March 2000, AAA was left alone at home.9 AAA’s father, the appellant, was
having a drinking spree at the neighbor’s place.10 Her mother decided to leave
because when appellant gets drunk, he has the habit of mauling AAA’s
mother.11 Her only brother BBB also went out in the company of some
neighbors.12 At around 10:00 o’clock in the evening, appellant woke AAA
up;13 removed his pants, slid inside the blanket covering AAA and removed
her pants and underwear;14 warned her not to shout for help while threatening
her with his fist;15 and told her that he had a knife placed above her head.16 He
proceeded to mash her breast, kiss her repeatedly, and "inserted his penis
inside her vagina."17
Soon after, BBB arrived and found AAA crying.18 Appellant claimed he
scolded her for staying out late.19 BBB decided to take AAA with him.20 While
on their way to their maternal grandmother’s house, AAA recounted her
harrowing experience with their father.21 Upon reaching their grandmother’s
house, they told their grandmother and uncle of the incident,22 after which,
they sought the assistance of Moises Boy Banting.23 Moises Boy Banting
found appellant in his house wearing only his underwear.24 He invited
appellant to the police station,25 to which appellant obliged. At the police
outpost, he admitted to him that he raped AAA because he was unable to
control himself.26
The Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, rendered its
decision finding appellant guilty of rape qualified by relationship and minority,
and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The CA
affirmed.
ISSUE: The lone assignment of error in the appellant’s brief is that, the trial
court gravely erred in finding him guilty as charged despite the failure of the
prosecution to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt,50 because: his
extrajudicial confession before Moises Boy Banting was without the
assistance of a counsel, in violation of his constitutional right.
RULING: Appellant contests the admissibility in evidence of his alleged
confession with a "bantay bayan" and the credibility of the witnesses for the
prosecution.
Admissibility in Evidence of an Extrajudicial Confession before a
"Bantay Bayan"
Appellant argues that even if he, indeed, confessed to Moises Boy Banting, a
"bantay bayan," the confession was inadmissible in evidence because he was
not assisted by a lawyer and there was no valid waiver of such requirement.54
The case of People v. Malngan55 is the authority on the scope of the Miranda
doctrine provided for under Article III, Section 12(1)56 and (3)57 of the
Constitution. In Malngan, appellant questioned the admissibility of her
extrajudicial confessions given to the barangay chairman and a neighbor of
the private complainant. This Court distinguished. Thus:
Arguably, the barangay tanods, including the Barangay Chairman, in this
particular instance, may be deemed as law enforcement officer for purposes
of applying Article III, Section 12(1) and (3), of the Constitution. When
accused-appellant was brought to the barangay hall in the morning of 2
January 2001, she was already a suspect, actually the only one, in the fire
that destroyed several houses x x x. She was, therefore, already under
custodial investigation and the rights guaranteed by x x x [the] Constitution
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should have already been observed or applied to her. Accused-appellant’s
confession to Barangay Chairman x x x was made in response to the
‘interrogation’ made by the latter – admittedly conducted without first informing
accused-appellant of her rights under the Constitution or done in the presence
of counsel. For this reason, the confession of accused-appellant, given to
Barangay Chairman x x x, as well as the lighter found x x x in her bag are
inadmissible in evidence against her x x x.
[But such does] not automatically lead to her acquittal. x x x [T]he
constitutional safeguards during custodial investigations do not apply to those
not elicited through questioning by the police or their agents but given in an
ordinary manner whereby the accused verbally admits x x x as x x x in the
case at bar when accused-appellant admitted to Mercedita Mendoza, one of
the neighbors x x x [of the private complainant].58 (Emphasis supplied)
Following the rationale behind the ruling in Malngan, this Court needs to
ascertain whether or not a "bantay bayan" may be deemed a law enforcement
officer within the contemplation of Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution.
In People of the Philippines v. Buendia,59 this Court had the occasion to
mention the nature of a "bantay bayan," that is, "a group of male residents
living in [the] area organized for the purpose of keeping peace in their
community[,which is] an accredited auxiliary of the x x x PNP."60
Also, it may be worthy to consider that pursuant to Section 1(g) of Executive
Order No. 309 issued on 11 November 1987, as amended, a Peace and Order
Committee in each barangay shall be organized "to serve as implementing
arm of the City/Municipal Peace and Order Council at the Barangay
level."61 The composition of the Committee includes, among others: (1)
the Punong Barangay as Chairman; (2) the Chairman of the Sangguniang
Kabataan; (3) a Member of the Lupon Tagapamayapa; (4) a Barangay Tanod;
and (5) at least three (3) Members of existing Barangay-Based Anti-Crime or
neighborhood Watch Groups or a Non-Government Organization
Representative well-known in his community.62
This Court is, therefore, convinced that barangay-based volunteer
organizations in the nature of watch groups, as in the case of the "bantay
bayan," are recognized by the local government unit to perform functions
relating to the preservation of peace and order at the barangay level. Thus,
without ruling on the legality of the actions taken by Moises Boy Banting, and
the specific scope of duties and responsibilities delegated to a "bantay bayan,"
particularly on the authority to conduct a custodial investigation, any inquiry
he makes has the color of a state-related function and objective insofar as the
entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights provided for under Article
III, Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda Rights, is
concerned.
We, therefore, find the extrajudicial confession of appellant, which was taken
without a counsel, inadmissible in evidence.
Be that as it may, We agree with the Court of Appeals that the conviction of
the appellant was not deduced solely from the assailed extrajudicial
confession but "from the confluence of evidence showing his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt."63
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30 September
2008 in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00456-MIN is hereby AFFIRMED. Appellant
Antonio Lauga is GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of qualified rape, and is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility
for parole and to pay AAA ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as
moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
17. ZENON PEREZ vs. PEOPLE
GR 164763, 12 February 2008
DOCTRINE: The right to counsel is not imperative in administrative
investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine
whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measures against erring public
officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of
government service. It is not an absolute right and may be invoked or rejected
in a criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative inquiry.
FACTS: On December 28, 1988, an audit team headed by Auditor I Arlene R.
Mandin, Provincial Auditor’s Office, Bohol, conducted a cash examination on
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the account of petitioner, who was then the acting municipal treasurer of An administrative case was filed against petitioner on February 13, 1989.
Tubigon, Bohol.
Petitioner gave himself away with his first Answer filed at the Office of
Petitioner was absent on the first scheduled audit at his office on December the Provincial Treasurer of Bohol in the administrative case filed against
28, 1988. A radio message was sent to Loon, the town where he resided, to him.
apprise him of the on-going audit. The following day, the audit team counted
the cash contained in the safe of petitioner in his presence. In the course of In that Answer, petitioner narrated how he disposed of the missing
the audit, the amount of P21,331.79 was found in the safe of petitioner. funds under his custody and control, to wit: (1) about P30,000.00 was
used to pay the commercial loan of his late brother; (2) he
The audit team embodied their findings in the Report of Cash spent P10,000.00 for the treatment of his toxic goiter; and (3)
Examination, which also contained an inventory of cash items. Based on the about P32,000.00 was spent for food and clothing of his family, and the
said audit, petitioner was supposed to have on hand the total amount education of his children in the administrative case filed against him.
of P94,116.36, instead of the P21,331.79, incurring a shortage of P72,784.57.
On April 17, 1989, petitioner again remitted the amount of P8,000.00 to the
The report also contained the Cash Production Notice dated January 4, 1989, Provincial Treasurer of Bohol. Petitioner had then fully restituted his shortage
where petitioner was informed and required to produce the amount in the amount of P72,784.57. The full restitution of the missing money was
of P72,784.57, and the cash count sheet signed and acknowledged by confirmed and shown by the following receipts:
petitioner indicating the correctness of the amount of P21,331.79 found in his
safe and counted in his presence. A separate demand letter dated January 4, Official Receipt No. Date Issued and Amount
1989 requiring the production of the missing funds was sent and received by Received
petitioner on January 5, 1989.
8266659 January 16, 1989 P10,000.00
When asked by the auditing team as to the location of the missing funds, 8266660 January 16, 1989 P15,000.00
petitioner verbally explained that part of the money was used to pay for the 8266662 February 14, 1989 P35,000.00
loan of his late brother, another portion was spent for the food of his family,
8266667 February 16, 1989 P 2,000.00
and the rest for his medicine.
8266668 February 16, 1989 P 2,784.00
As a result of the audit, Arlene R. Mandin prepared a memorandum dated 8266675 April 17, 1989 P 8,000.00
January 13, 1989 addressed to the Provincial Auditor of Bohol recommending TOTAL - P72,784.57
the filing of the appropriate criminal case against petitioner.

On January 16, 1989, petitioner remitted to the Office of the Provincial

Treasurer of Bohol the amounts of P10,000.00 and P15,000.00, respectively. Petitioner was charged before the Sandiganbayan with malversation of
On February 14, 1989, petitioner again remitted to the Provincial Treasurer public funds, defined and penalized by Article 217 of the Revised Penal
an additional amount of P35,000.00, followed by remittances made on Code.
February 16, 1989 in the amounts of P2,000.00 and P2,784.00.

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SANDIGANBAYAN: GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Malversation of Public Funds as defined in and penalized by Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code and, there being one mitigating circumstance without
any aggravating circumstance to offset the same, is hereby sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of from TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY
of prision mayor as the minimum to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS and EIGHT (8)
MONTHS of reclusion temporal as the maximum and to suffer perpetual
special disqualification.
ISSUE: Whether Zenon Perez can be held criminally liable for
malversation of public funds on the ground that he was not assisted by
a counsel when he made the admission in the administrative case filed
against him.
RULING: Yes. In malversation, all that is necessary to prove is that the
defendant received in his possession public funds; that he could not account
for them and did not have them in his possession; and that he could not give
a reasonable excuse for its disappearance. An accountable public officer may
be convicted of malversation even if there is no direct evidence of
misappropriation and the only evidence is shortage in his accounts which he
has not been able to explain satisfactorily.
Verily, an accountable public officer may be found guilty of malversation even
if there is no direct evidence of malversation because the law establishes a
presumption that mere failure of an accountable officer to produce public
funds which have come into his hands on demand by an officer duly
authorized to examine his accounts is prima facie case of conversion.
Because of the prima facie presumption in Article 217, the burden of evidence
is shifted to the accused to adequately explain the location of the funds or
property under his custody or control in order to rebut the presumption that he
has appropriated or misappropriated for himself the missing funds. Failing to
do so, the accused may be convicted under the said provision.
By the explicit admission of petitioner, the fourth element of the crime of
malversation was duly established.
It is contended that petitioner’s first Answer of February 22, 1989 should not
have been given probative weight because it was executed without the
assistance of counsel.
There is no law, jurisprudence or rule which mandates that an employee
should be assisted by counsel in an administrative case. On the contrary,
jurisprudence is in unison in saying that assistance of counsel is not
indispensable in administrative proceedings.
The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing
and in the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or accused during
custodial investigation. It is not an absolute right and may be invoked or
rejected in a criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative
inquiry.
While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be
akin to a criminal proceeding, the fact remains that under existing laws, a party
in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel,
irrespective of the nature of the charges and of respondent’s capacity to
represent himself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person being
investigated with counsel.
Thus, the right to counsel is not imperative in administrative investigations
because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are
facts that merit disciplinary measures against erring public officers and
employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service.
There is nothing in the Constitution that says that a party in a non-litigation
proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel and that, without such
representation, he shall not be bound by such proceedings. The assistance
of lawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable.
18. GOVERNMENT OF HONGKONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE
REGION vs. OLALIA
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Bail, Section 1, Rule 114, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure - is the surety
for the release of a person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a
bondsman, to guarantee his appearance before any court as required under
the conditions hereinafter specified. Bail may be given in the form of corporate
surety, property bond, cash deposit, or recognizance.
FACTS:
Respondent Muñoz was charged of 3 counts of offences of “accepting an
advantage as agent”, and 7 counts of conspiracy to defraud, punishable by
the common law of Hongkong. The Hongkong Depoartment of Justice
requested DOJ for the provisional arrest of respondent Muñoz; the DOJ
forward the request to the NBI then to RTC. On the same day, NBI agents
arrested him.
Respondent filed with the CA a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with application for preliminary mandatory injunction and writ of
habeas corpus questioning the validity of the order of arrest.
The CA declared the arrest void. Hence this petition by the Hongkong
Department of Justice thru DOJ.
DOJ filed a petition for certiorari in this Court and sustained the validity of the
arrest.
Hongkong Administrative Region then filed in the RTC petition for extradition
and arrest of respondent. Meanwhile, respondent filed a petition for bail, which
was opposed by the petitioner, initially the RTC denied the petition holding
that there is no Philippine Law granting bail in extradition cases and that
private responded is a “flight risk”.
Motion for reconsideration was filed by the respondent, which was granted.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not right to bail can be avail in extradition cases.
HELD:
In Purganan case, the right to bail was not included in the extradition cases,
since it is available only in criminal proceedings.
However the Supreme Court, recognised the following trends in International
Law.
1. The growing importance of the individual person in publican international law
who, in the 20th century attained global recognition.
2. The higher value now being given in human rights in international sphere
3. The corresponding duty of countries to observe these human rights in fulfilling
their treaty obligations
4. The duty of this court to balance the rights of the individual under our
fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition on the other.
The modern trend in the public international law is the primacy placed
on the sanctity of human rights.
Enshrined the Constitution “The state values the dignity of every human
person and guarantees full respect for human rights.” The Philippines
therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of
every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained
or arrested can participate in the proceeding before the a court, to
enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and
order their release if justified.
Examination of this Court in the doctrines provided for in the US Vs Purganan
provide the following.
1. The exercise of the State’s police power to deprive a person of his liberty is
not limited to criminal proceedings.
2. To limit the right to bail in the criminal proceeding would be to close our eyes
to jurisprudential history. Philippines has not limited the exercise of the right
to bail to criminal proceedings only. This Court has admitted to bail persons
who are not involved in criminal proceedings. In fact, bail has been involved
in this jurisdiction to persons in detention during the tendency of administrative
proceedings, taking into cognisance the obligation of the Philippines under
international conventions to uphold human rights.
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EXTRADITION, is defined as the removal of an accused from the Philippines
with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable
the requesting state or government to hold him in connection with criminal
investigation directed against him or execution of a penalty imposed on him
under the penal and criminal law of the requesting state or government. Thus
characterized as the right of the a foreign power, created by treaty to demand
the surrender of one accused or convicted of a crimes within its territorial
jurisdiction, and the correlative obligation of the other state to surrender him
to the demanding state.
The extradited may be subject to detention as may be necessary step in the
process of extradition, but the length of time in the detention should be
reasonable.
In the case at bar, the record show that the respondent, Muñoz has been
detained for 2 years without being convicted in Hongkong.
The Philippines has the obligation of ensuring the individual his right to liberty
and due process and should not therefor deprive the extraditee of his right to
bail PROVIDED that certain standards for the grant is satisfactorily met. In
other words there should be “CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE”.
However in the case at bar, the respondent was not able to show and clear
and convincing evidence that he be entitled to bail. Thus the case is remanded
in the court for the determination and otherwise, should order the cancellation
of his bond and his immediate detention.
19. ENRILE vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION)
G.R. No. 213847; August 18, 2015
Ponente: Bersamin
Doctrines:
Primary objective of bail – The strength of the Prosecution's case, albeit a
good measure of the accused's propensity for flight or for causing harm to the
public, is subsidiary to the primary objective of bail, which is to ensure that the
accused appears at trial.
Bail is a right and a matter of discretion – Right to bail is afforded in Sec. 13,
Art III of the 1987 Constitution and repeted in Sec. 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure to wit: “No person charged with a capital offense, or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be
admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of
the criminal prosecution.”
FACTS: On June 5, 2014, Petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile was charged with
plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of his purported involvement in
the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) Scam. Initially, Enrile in an
Omnibus Motion requested to post bail, which the Sandiganbayan denied. On
July 3, 2014, a warrant for Enrile's arrest was issued, leading to Petitioner's
voluntary surrender.
Senator Enrile
Petitioner again asked the Sandiganbayan in a Motion to Fix Bail which was
heard by the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner argued that: (a) Prosecution had not
yet established that the evidence of his guilt was strong; (b) that, because of
his advanced age and voluntary surrender, the penalty would only be
reclusion temporal, thus allowing for bail and; (c) he is not a flight risk due to
his age and physical condition. Sandiganbayan denied this in its assailed
resolution. Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not bail may be granted as a matter of right unless the crime
charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua where the evidence of guilt is
strong.
a. Whether or not prosecution failed to show that if ever petitioner would be
convicted, he will be punishable by reclusion perpetua.
b. Whether or not prosecution failed to show that petitioner's guilt is strong.
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2. Whether or not petitioner is bailable because he is not a flight risk.
HELD:
1. YES.
Bail as a matter of right – due process and presumption of innocence.
Article III, Sec. 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution provides that in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved. This right is safeguarded by the constitutional right to be released on
bail.
The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at trial and
so the amount of bail should be high enough to assure the presence of the
accused when so required, but no higher than what may be reasonably
calculated to fulfill this purpose.
Bail as a matter of discretion
Right to bail is afforded in Sec. 13, Art III of the 1987 Constitution and repeted
in Sec. 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure to wit:
Capital offense of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, not bailable. — No person charged with a capital offense, or
an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be
admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of
the criminal prosecution.
The general rule: Any person, before conviction of any criminal offense, shall
be bailable.
Exception: Unless he is charged with an offense punishable with reclusion
perpetua [or life imprisonment] and the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Thus, denial of bail should only follow once it has been established that the
evidence of guilt is strong. Where evidence of guilt is not strong, bail may be
granted according to the discretion of the court.
Thus, Sec. 5 of Rule 114 also provides:
Bail, when discretionary. — Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment,
admission to bail is discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and
acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided
it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court. However, if the
decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the
offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed
with and resolved by the appellate court.
Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to
continue on provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the
same bail subject to the consent of the bondsman.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6)
years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a
showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or
other similar circumstances:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has
committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence,
or violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional
pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if
released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the
pendency of the appeal.
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the
resolution of the Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either
case.
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Thus, admission to bail in offenses punished by death, or life imprisonment,
or reclusion perpetua subject to judicial discretion. In Concerned Citizens vs.
Elma, the court held: “[S]uch discretion may be exercised only after the
hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose
of whether or not he should be granted provisional liberty.” Bail hearing with
notice is indispensable (Aguirre vs. Belmonte). The hearing should primarily
determine whether the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong.
The procedure for discretionary bail is described in Cortes vs. Catral:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the
prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit
his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for
bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence
to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the
court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of
evidence of the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the
approval of the bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be
denied.
2. YES. Petitioner's poor health justifies his admission to bail
The Supreme Court took note of the Philippine's responsibility to the
international community arising from its commitment to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. We therefore have the responsibility of
protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process
and for detainees to avail of such remedies which safeguard their fundamental
right to liberty. Quoting from Government of Hong Kong SAR vs. Olalia, the
SC emphasized:
x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and
dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II
of our Constitution which provides: “The State values the dignity of every
human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.” The Philippines,
therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every
person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested
can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without
delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other
words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to
every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their
fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted
to bail. (emphasis in decision)
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion
Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail to ensure the
appearance of the accused during the trial and unwarrantedly disregarded the
clear showing of the fragile health and advanced age of Petitioner. As such
the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying the Motion to Fix
Bail. It acted whimsically and capriciously and was so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty [to allow petitioner to post bail].
20. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF
LEONARDO PAQUINTO AND JESUS CABANGUNAY.
CHAIRMAN SEDFREY A. ORDOÑEZ, COMM. SAMUEL M. SORIANO,
COMM. HESIQUIO R. MALLILLIN, COMM. NARCISO C. MONTEIRO,
COMM. PAULYNN PAREDES-SICAM, THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, petitioners,
vs.
DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondent.
G.R. No. 115576 August 4, 1994
Why are Leonardo Paquinto and Jesus Cabangunay still in prison?
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These persons are among the civilians who were tried by the military
commissions during the period of martial law. Both were originally condemned
to die by musketry, but their sentence was commuted by the new Constitution
to reclusion perpetua.
Their convictions were subsequently nullified by this Court in the case
of Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34, 1where we held that the military
tribunals had no jurisdiction to try civilians when the courts of justice were
functioning.
Accordingly, in the case of Cruz v. Ponce Enrile, 2 this Court directed the
Department of Justice to file the corresponding informations in the civil courts
against the petitioners within 180 days from notice of the decision.
No information has so far been filed against Paquinto and Cabangunay, but
they have remained under detention.
On May 27, 1992, Ernesto Abaloc, together with Cabangunay and Paquinto,
wrote to the United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) complaining
that their continued detention violated their rights under Articles 6, 7, 9, 10,
14, and 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 3
In its decision dated October 14, 1993, the UNHRC declared their
communication as admissible and requested the Republic of the Philippines
to submit a written explanation of their complaint within six months from the
date of transmittal. 4
The Department of Foreign Affairs furnished the Commission on Human
Rights with a copy of the decision. Thereupon, the Commission, through its
Chairman Sedfrey A. Ordoñez wrote the Secretary of Justice of its intention
to sue for the release of the complaints unless criminal charges had already
been filed against them. 5
On June 7, 1994, the Department of Justice informed the Commission that
Abaloc had been released on September 29, 1992, and that Paquinto and
Cabangunay were still detained at the National Penitentiary. There was the
intimation that it would not object to a petition for habeas corpus that the
Commission might choose to file for Paquinto and Cabangunay.6 This
assurance was later confirmed in a letter from the Department dated May 31,
1994.7
The present petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on June 13,
1994. The writ was immediately issued, returnable on or before June 22,
1994, on which date a hearing was also scheduled.
At the hearing, Chairman Ordoñez argued for the prisoners and pleaded for
their immediate release in view of the failure of the Department of Justice to
file charges against them within the period specified in the Cruz case. He
stressed that their continued detention despite the nullification of their
convictions was a clear violation of their human rights.
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General, as counsel for the respondent
Director of Prisons, argued that under our ruling in Tan v. Barrios, 8 the
Olaguer decision could not be retroactively applied to decisions of the military
tribunals that have already become final or to persons who were already
serving their sentence. It suggested that, under the circumstances, the only
recourse of the prisoners was to reiterate and pursue their applications for
executive clemency.
It has been seven years since the Olaguer decision nullifying the convictions
of Paquinto and Cabangunay by the military commissions was promulgated.
It has been six years since our decision in the Cruz case directed the
Secretary of Justice to file the appropriate informations against the civilians
still detained under convictions rendered by the military tribunals. The
prisoners have been confined since 1974. We can only guess at the validity
of their convictions as the records of their cases have allegedly been burned.
The loss of these records is the main reason the Department gives for its
failure to file the corresponding charges against the two detainees before the
civil courts. It is unacceptable, of course. It is not the fault of the prisoners that
the records cannot now be found. If anyone is to be blamed, it surely cannot
be the prisoners, who were not the custodian of those records. It is illogical
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and even absurd to suggest that because the government cannot prosecute
them, the prisoners' detention must continue.
The other excuse of the government must also be rejected. During the
hearing, the Office of the Solicitor General contended that the prisoners had
themselves opted to serve their sentences rather than undergo another trial.
Their ultimate objective, so it was maintained, was to secure their release by
applying for executive clemency. To prove this, counsel submitted a letter
from one
Atty. Anselmo B. Mabuti to the Secretary of Justice manifesting that Leonardo
B. Paquinto "chooses to complete the service of his sentence so that the
Board of Pardons and Parole has jurisdiction over his case." 9 No mention
was made of Jesus Cabangunay.
Upon direct questioning from the Court during the hearing, both Paquinto and
Cabangunay disowned Atty. Mabuti as their counsel and said they had never
seen nor talked to him before. Paquinto denied ever having authorized him to
write the letter. Instead, the two prisoners reiterated their plea to be released
on the strength of the Olaguer decision.
The petitioners further contend in their memorandum that a re-examination of
the ruling in Cruz v. Enrile 10 in relation to the case of Tan v. Barrios, 11 is
necessary in view of certain supervening events. These are the failure of the
Department of Justice to file the informations against the prisoners; the
decision of the UNHRC declaring admissible the communication
No. 503/1992 of Abaloc, Paquinto and Cabangunay and thus suggesting the
violation of their liberty as guaranteed under the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights; and the assurance of the Department of Justice that
it would have no objection to the filing of a petition for habeas corpus by the
Commission on behalf of Paquinto and Cabangunay.
The Court stresses that in its en banc resolution dated February 26, 1991, it
declared, citing the Tan case, that "those civilians who were convicted by
military courts and who have been serving (but not yet completed) their
sentences of imprisonment for the past many years" . . . "may be given the
option either to complete the service of their sentence, or be tried anew by the
civil courts. Upon conviction, they should be credited in the service of their
sentence for the full period of their previous imprisonment. Upon acquittal,
they should be set free."
Accordingly, it directed "the Department of Justice to forthwith comply with the
directive in the "Cruz Cases" for the filing of the necessary informations
against them in the courts having jurisdiction over the offenses involved,
without prejudice to said petitioners' exercise of the option granted to them by
this Court's ruling in G.R. Nos. 85481-82, William Tan, et al. v. Hernani T.
Barrios, etc., et al., supra."
The Office of the Solicitor General submitted its memorandum after its second
motion for extension was denied, in view of the necessity to decide this
petition without further delay. 12 The memorandum was admitted just the
same, but we find it adds nothing to the respondent's original arguments.
There is absolutely no question that the prisoners' plea should be heeded.
The government has failed to show that their continued detention is supported
by a valid conviction or by the pendency of charges against them or by any
legitimate cause whatsoever. If no information can be filed against them
because the records have been lost, it is not the prisoners who should be
made to suffer. In the eyes of the law, Paquinto and Cabangunay are not guilty
or appear to be guilty of any crime for which they may be validly held. Hence,
they are entitled to be set free.
Liberty is not a gift of the government but the right of the governed. Every
person is free, save only for the fetters of the law that limit but do not bind him
unless he affronts the rights of others or offends the public welfare. Liberty is
not derived from the sufferance of the government or its magnanimity or even
from the Constitution itself, which merely affirms but does not grant it. Liberty
is a right that inheres in every one of us as a member of the human family.
When a person is deprived of this right, all of us are diminished and debased
for liberty is total and indivisible.
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WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Jesus Cabangunay and Leonardo
Paquinto should not be detained in prison a minute longer. They are ordered
released IMMEDIATELY.
21. In RE: DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO vs. WARDEN QUEZON CITY
JAI
FACTS: From November 7, 2009 to December 19, 2009, Datukan Malang
Salibo (Salibo) and other Filipinos were allegedly in Saudi Arabia for the Hajj
Pilgrimage. He returned to the Philippines on December 20, 2009.
On August 3, 2010, Salibo learned that police officers of Datu Hofer Police
Station in Maguindanao suspected him to be Butukan S. Malang.
Butukan S. Malang was one of the 197 accused of 57 counts of murder for
allegedly participating in the November 23, 2009 Maguindanao Massacre.
Salibo presented himself before the police officers of Datu Hofer Police
Station to clear his name. There, he explained that he was not Butukan S.
Malang and that he could not have participated in the November 23, 2009
Maguindanao Massacre because he was in Saudi Arabia at that time.
Afterwards, however, the police officers apprehended Salibo and tore off page
two of his passport that evidenced his departure for Saudi Arabia on
November 7, 2009. They then detained Salibo at the Datu Hofer Police Station
for about three (3) days.
The police officers transferred Salibo to the Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group in Cotabato City, where he was detained for another 10 days.
On August 20, 2010, Salibo was finally transferred to the Quezon City Jail
Annex, Bureau of Jail Management and Penology Building, Camp Bagong
Diwa, Taguig City, where he is currently detained.
On September 17, 2010, Salibo filed before the Court of Appeals the Urgent
Petition for Habeas Corpus questioning the legality of his detention and
deprivation of his liberty.
Issue: Whether a Writ of Habeas Corpus should issue.
Held: Petitioner Salibo was not arrested by virtue of any warrant charging
him of an offense. He was not restrained under a lawful process or an order
of a court. He was illegally deprived of his liberty, and, therefore, correctly
availed himself of a Petition for Habeas Corpus.
The writ of habeas corpus “was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual
remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only
sufficient defense of personal freedom.” The remedy of habeas corpus is
extraordinary and summary in nature, consistent with the law’s “zealous
regard for personal liberty.” Under Rule 102, Section 1 of the Rules of Court,
the writ of habeas corpus“shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful
custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.” The
primary purpose of the writ “is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint
as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such
restraint is illegal.” “Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is
sufficient.”
22. SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE vs. MANALO
FACTS: Brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were abducted by military
men belonging to the CAFGU on the suspicion that they were members and
supporters of the NPA. After 18 months of detention and torture, the brothers
escaped on August 13, 2007.
Ten days after their escape, they filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction,
and Temporary Restraining Order to stop the military officers and agents from
depriving them of their right to liberty and other basic rights. While the said
case was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on October 24,
2007. The Manalos subsequently filed a manifestation and omnibus motion to
treat their existing petition as amparo petition.
On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the privilege of the writ
of amparo. The CA ordered the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief
of Staff of the AFP to furnish the Manalos and the court with all official and
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unofficial investigation reports as to the Manalos’ custody, confirm the present
places of official assignment of two military officials involved, and produce all
medical reports and records of the Manalo brothers while under military
custody. The Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP
appealed to the SC seeking to reverse and set aside the decision promulgated
by the CA.
HELD: In upholding the CA decision, the Supreme Court ruled that there is a
continuing violation of the Manalos right to security. xxx The Writ of Amparo
is the most potent remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty,
and security has been violated or is threatened with violation by an unlawful
act or omission by public officials or employees and by private individuals or
entities. xxx Understandably, since their escape, the Manalos have been
under concealment and protection by private citizens because of the threat to
their life, liberty, and security. The circumstances of respondents’ abduction,
detention, torture and escape reasonably support a conclusion that there is
an apparent threat that they will again be abducted, tortured, and this time,
even executed. These constitute threats to their liberty, security, and life,
actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo,” the Court explained. (GR
No. 180906, The Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, October 7, 2008)
Distinguish the production order under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo
from a search warrant.
The production order under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo should not be
confused with a search warrant for law enforcement under Art. III, sec. 2 of
the 1987 Constitution. It said that the production order should be likened to
the production of documents or things under sec. 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure which states that “upon motion of any party showing good
cause therefor, the court in which an action is pending may (a) order any party
to produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on
behalf of the moving party, of any designated documents, papers, books of
accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, not privileged,
which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the
action and which are in his possession, custody or control.” (GR No. 180906,
The Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, October 7, 2008)
23. YANO vs. SANCHEZ
FACTS: Fr. Reyes was among of those who were arrested during the Manila
Peninsula Hotel siege, 30th of November, 2007 and they were temporarily
held at Camp Crame. A Hold Departure Order (HDO) for the petitioner and to
the other accused was issued by the DOJ upon the request of the Department
of Interior and Local Government. Probable cause was found during
investigation and petitioner was charged with rebellion. The RTC however
dismissed the charge against him but the HDO was still in effect. Petitioner
requested that HDO should be lifted in view of the dismissal of the criminal
case. Petitioner argued that a writ of amparo should be issued against the
respondents, violating the whole breadth of rights enshrined in the
Constitution, specifically, his right to travel.
ISSUE: Whether the right to travel is covered by the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo.
RULING: No. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any
person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of
a private individual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
The restriction on petitioner’s right to travel as a consequence of the pendency
of the criminal case filed against him was not unlawful. Petitioner has failed to
establish that his right to travel was impaired in the manner and to the extent
that it amounted to a serious violation of his right to life, liberty and security,
for which there exists no readily available legal recourse or remedy.
A person’s right to travel is subject to the usual constraints imposed by the
very necessity of safeguarding the system of justice. In such cases, whether
the accused should be permitted to leave the jurisdiction for humanitarian
reasons is a matter of the court’s sound discretion.
24. LOURDES RUBRICO vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO
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FACTS:
1. On April 3, 2007, armed men belonging to the 301st Air Intelligence and
Security Squadron (AISS, for short) based in Fernando Air Base in Lipa City
abducted Lourdes D. Rubrico (Lourdes), then attending a Lenten pabasa in
Bagong Bayan, Dasmarias, Cavite, and brought to, and detained at, the air
base without charges. Following a week of relentless interrogation -
conducted alternately by hooded individuals - and what amounts to verbal
abuse and mental harassment, Lourdes, chair of the Ugnayan ng Maralita
para sa Gawa Adhikan, was released at Dasmarias, Cavite, her hometown,
but only after being made to sign a statement that she would be a military
asset.
After Lourdes release, the harassment, coming in the form of being tailed on
at least two occasions at different places, i.e., Dasmarias, Cavite and
Baclaran in Pasay City, by motorcycle-riding men in bonnets, continued;
2. During the time Lourdes was missing, P/Sr. Insp. Arsenio Gomez (P/Insp.
Gomez), then sub-station commander of Bagong Bayan, Dasmarias, Cavite,
kept sending text messages to Lourdes daughter, Mary Joy R. Carbonel (Mary
Joy), bringing her to beaches and asking her questions about Karapatan, an
alliance of human rights organizations. He, however, failed to make an
investigation even after Lourdes disappearance had been made known to
him;
3. A week after Lourdes release, another daughter, Jean R. Apruebo (Jean),
was constrained to leave their house because of the presence of men
watching them;
4. Lourdes has filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a criminal complaint
for kidnapping and arbitrary detention and administrative complaint for gross
abuse of authority and grave misconduct against Capt. Angelo Cuaresma
(Cuaresma), Ruben Alfaro (Alfaro), Jimmy Santana (Santana) and a certain
Jonathan, c/o Headquarters 301st AISS, Fernando Air Base and Maj.
Sy/Reyes with address at No. 09 Amsterdam Ext., Merville Subd., Paraaque
City, but nothing has happened; and the threats and harassment incidents
have been reported to the Dasmarias municipal and Cavite provincial police
stations, but nothing eventful resulted from their respective investigations.
Two of the four witnesses to Lourdes abduction went into hiding after being
visited by government agents in civilian clothes; and
5. Karapatan conducted an investigation on the incidents. The investigation
would indicate that men belonging to the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP), namely Capt. Cuaresma of the Philippine Air Force (PAF), Alfaro,
Santana, Jonathan and Maj. Darwin Sy/Reyes, led the abduction of Lourdes;
that unknown to the abductors, Lourdes was able to pilfer a mission order
which was addressed to CA Ruben Alfaro and signed by Capt. Cuaresma of
the PAF.
The petition prayed that a writ of amparo issue, ordering the individual
respondents to desist from performing any threatening act against the security
of the petitioners and for the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) to immediately
file an information for kidnapping qualified with the aggravating circumstance
of gender of the offended party. It also prayed for damages and for
respondents to produce documents submitted to any of them on the case of
Lourdes.
Before the CA, respondents President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Gen.
Hermogenes Esperon, then Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of
Staff, Police Director-General (P/Dir. Gen.) Avelino Razon, then Philippine
National Police (PNP) Chief, Police Superintendent (P/Supt.) Roquero of the
Cavite Police Provincial Office, Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Gomez, now retired,
and the OMB (answering respondents, collectively) filed, through the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), a joint return on the writ specifically denying the
material inculpatory averments against them. The OSG also denied the
allegations against the following impleaded persons, namely: Cuaresma,
Alfaro, Santana, Jonathan, and Sy/Reyes, for lack of knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the allegations truth. And by way
of general affirmative defenses, answering respondents interposed the
following defenses: (1) the President may not be sued during her incumbency;
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and (2) the petition is incomplete, as it fails to indicate the matters required by
Sec. 5(d) and (e) of the Amparo Rule.
The hearing started on November 13, 2007.[7] In that setting, petitioners
counsel prayed for the issuance of a temporary protection order (TPO) against
the answering respondents on the basis of the allegations in the petition. At
the hearing of November 20, 2007, the CA granted petitioners motion that the
petition and writ be served by the courts process server on Darwin Sy/Reyes,
Santana, Alfaro, Capt. Cuaresma, and Jonathan.
The legal skirmishes that followed over the propriety of excluding President
Arroyo from the petition, petitioners motions for service by publication, and
the issuance of a TPO are not of decisive pertinence in this recital. The bottom
line is that, by separate resolutions, the CA dropped the President as
respondent in the case; denied the motion for a TPO for the courts want of
authority to issue it in the tenor sought by petitioners; and effectively denied
the motion for notice by publication owing to petitioners failure to submit the
affidavit required under Sec. 17, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.[8]
After due proceedings, the CA rendered, on July 31, 2008, its partial
judgment, subject of this review, disposing of the petition but only insofar as
the answering respondents were concerned. The fallo of the CA decision
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, partial judgment is hereby rendered
DISMISSING the instant petition with respect to respondent Gen.
Hermogenes Esperon, P/Dir. Gen. Avelino Razon, Supt. Edgar B. Roquero,
P/Sr. Insp. Arsenio C. Gomez (ret.) and the Office of the Ombudsman.
Nevertheless, in order that petitioners complaint will not end up as another
unsolved case, the heads of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
Philippine National Police are directed to ensure that the investigations
already commenced are diligently pursued to bring the perpetrators to justice.
The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and P/Dir. Gen.
Avelino Razon are directed to regularly update petitioners and this Court on
the status of their investigation.
SO ORDERED.
ISSUE: WHETHER A WRIT OF AMPARO SHOULD BE ISSUED
HELD: As the Court stressed in Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo
(Manalo), the writ of amparo was conceived to provide expeditious and
effective procedural relief against violations or threats of violation of the basic
rights to life, liberty, and security of persons; the corresponding amparo suit,
however, is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond
reasonable doubt x x x or administrative liability requiring substantial evidence
that will require full and exhaustive proceedings.
If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these
proceedings, it should, at most, be only to determine the author who, at the
first instance, is accountable for, and has the duty to address, the
disappearance and harassments complained of, so as to enable the Court to
devise remedial measures that may be appropriate under the premises to
protect rights covered by the writ of amparo. As intimated earlier, however,
the determination should not be pursued to fix criminal liability on respondents
preparatory to criminal prosecution, or as a prelude to administrative
disciplinary proceedings under existing administrative issuances, if there be
any.
Petitioners, as the CA has declared, have not adduced substantial evidence
pointing to government involvement in the disappearance of Lourdes. To a
concrete point, petitioners have not shown that the actual perpetrators of the
abduction and the harassments that followed formally or informally formed
part of either the military or the police chain of command.
Sec. 17, as complemented by Sec. 18 of the Amparo Rule, expressly
prescribes the minimum evidentiary substantiation requirement and
norm to support a cause of action under the Rule, thus:
Sec. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required.The parties
shall establish their claims by substantial evidence.
xxxx
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Sec. 18. Judgment.x x x If the allegations in the petition are proven by
substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and
such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege
shall be denied. (Emphasis added.)
Substantial evidence is more than a mere imputation of wrongdoing or
violation that would warrant a finding of liability against the person
charged;[31] it is more than a scintilla of evidence. It means such
amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion, even if other equally reasonable
minds might opine otherwise.[32] Per the CAs evaluation of their
evidence, consisting of the testimonies and affidavits of the three
Rubrico women and five other individuals, petitioners have not
satisfactorily hurdled the evidentiary bar required of and assigned to
them under the Amparo Rule. In a very real sense, the burden of
evidence never even shifted to answering respondents. The Court finds
no compelling reason to disturb the appellate courts determination of
the answering respondents role in the alleged enforced disappearance
of petitioner Lourdes and the threats to her familys security.
The privilege of the writ of amparo, to reiterate, is a remedy available to victims
of extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances or threats of similar
nature, regardless of whether the perpetrator of the unlawful act or omission
is a public official or employee or a private individual.
At this juncture, it bears to state that petitioners have not provided the CA with
the correct addresses of respondents Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana, Jonathan,
and Sy/Reyes. The mailed envelopes containing the petition for a writ of
amparo individually addressed to each of them have all been returned
unopened. And petitioners motion interposed before the appellate court for
notice or service via publication has not been accompanied by supporting
affidavits as required by the Rules of Court. Accordingly, the appealed CA
partial judgmentdisposing of the underlying petition for a writ of amparo
without (1) pronouncement as to the accountability, or lack of it, of the four
non-answering respondents or (2) outright dismissal of the same petition as
to themhews to the prescription of Sec. 20 of the Amparo Rule on archiving
and reviving cases.[41] Parenthetically, petitioners have also not furnished
this Court with sufficient data as to where the afore-named respondents may
be served a copy of their petition for review.
Apart from the foregoing considerations, the petition did not allege ultimate
facts as would link the OMB in any manner to the violation or threat of violation
of the petitioners rights to life, liberty, or personal security.
The privilege of the writ of amparo is envisioned basically to protect and
guarantee the rights to life, liberty, and security of persons, free from fears
and threats that vitiate the quality of this life.[42] It is an extraordinary writ
conceptualized and adopted in light of and in response to the prevalence of
extra-legal killings and enforced disappearances.[43] Accordingly, the remedy
ought to be resorted to and granted judiciously, lest the ideal sought by the
Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined by the indiscriminate filing of amparo
petitions for purposes less than the desire to secure amparo reliefs and
protection and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations.
In their petition for a writ of amparo, petitioners asked, as their main prayer,
that the Court order the impleaded respondents to immediately desist from
doing any acts that would threaten or seem to threaten the security of the
Petitioners and to desist from approaching Petitioners, x x x their residences
and offices where they are working under pain of contempt of [this] Court.
Petitioners, however, failed to adduce the threshold substantive evidence to
establish the predicate facts to support their cause of action, i.e., the adverted
harassments and threats to their life, liberty, or security, against responding
respondents, as responsible for the disappearance and harassments
complained of. This is not to say, however, that petitioners allegation on the
fact of the abduction incident or harassment is necessarily contrived. The
reality on the ground, however, is that the military or police connection has
not been adequately proved either by identifying the malefactors as
components of the AFP or PNP; or in case identification is not possible, by
showing that they acted with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the
government. For this reason, the Court is unable to ascribe the authorship of
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and responsibility for the alleged enforced disappearance of Lourdes and the
harassment and threats on her daughters to individual respondents. To this
extent, the dismissal of the case against them is correct and must,
accordingly, be sustained.
Prescinding from the above considerations, the Court distinctly notes that the
appealed decision veritably extended the privilege of the writ of amparo to
petitioners when it granted what to us are amparo reliefs. Consider: the
appellate court decreed, and rightly so, that the police and the military take
specific measures for the protection of petitioners right or threatened right to
liberty or security. The protection came in the form of directives specifically to
Gen. Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razon, requiring each of them (1) to ensure
that the investigations already commenced by the AFP and PNP units,
respectively, under them on the complaints of Lourdes and her daughters are
being pursued with urgency to bring to justice the perpetrators of the acts
complained of; and (2) to submit to the CA, copy furnished the petitioners, a
regular report on the progress and status of the investigations. The directives
obviously go to Gen. Esperon in his capacity as head of the AFP and, in a
sense, chief guarantor of order and security in the country. On the other hand,
P/Dir. Gen. Razon is called upon to perform a duty pertaining to the PNP, a
crime-preventing, investigatory, and arresting institution.
As the CA, however, formulated its directives, no definitive time frame was set
in its decision for the completion of the investigation and the reportorial
requirements. It also failed to consider Gen. Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razons
imminent compulsory retirement from the military and police services,
respectively. Accordingly, the CA directives, as hereinafter redefined and
amplified to fully enforce the amparo remedies, are hereby given to, and shall
be directly enforceable against, whoever sits as the commanding general of
the AFP and the PNP.
At this stage, two postulates and their implications need highlighting for a
proper disposition of this case.
First, a criminal complaint for kidnapping and, alternatively, for arbitrary
detention rooted in the same acts and incidents leading to the filing of the
subject amparo petition has been instituted with the OMB, docketed as OMB-
P-C-O7-0602-E. The usual initial steps to determine the existence of a prima
facie case against the five (5) impleaded individuals suspected to be actually
involved in the detention of Lourdes have been set in motion. It must be
pointed out, though, that the filing[44] of the OMB complaint came before the
effectivity of the Amparo Rule on October 24, 2007.
Second, Sec. 22[45] of the Amparo Rule proscribes the filing of an amparo
petition should a criminal action have, in the meanwhile, been commenced.
The succeeding Sec. 23,[46] on the other hand, provides that when the
criminal suit is filed subsequent to a petition for amparo, the petition shall be
consolidated with the criminal action where the Amparo Rule shall
nonetheless govern the disposition of the relief under the Rule. Under the
terms of said Sec. 22, the present petition ought to have been dismissed at
the outset. But as things stand, the outright dismissal of the petition by force
of that section is no longer technically feasible in light of the interplay of the
following factual mix: (1) the Court has, pursuant to Sec. 6[47] of the Rule,
already issued ex parte the writ of amparo; (2) the CA, after a summary
hearing, has dismissed the petition, but not on the basis of Sec. 22; and (3)
the complaint in OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E named as respondents only those
believed to be the actual abductors of Lourdes, while the instant petition
impleaded, in addition, those tasked to investigate the kidnapping and
detention incidents and their superiors at the top. Yet, the acts and/or
omissions subject of the criminal complaint and the amparo petition are so
linked as to call for the consolidation of both proceedings to obviate the
mischief inherent in a multiplicity-of-suits situation.
Given the above perspective and to fully apply the beneficial nature of the writ
of amparo as an inexpensive and effective tool to protect certain rights
violated or threatened to be violated, the Court hereby adjusts to a degree the
literal application of Secs. 22 and 23 of the Amparo Rule to fittingly address
the situation obtaining under the premises. [48] Towards this end, two things
are at once indicated: (1) the consolidation of the probe and fact-finding
aspects of the instant petition with the investigation of the criminal complaint
before the OMB; and (2) the incorporation in the same criminal complaint of
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the allegations in this petition bearing on the threats to the right to security.
Withal, the OMB should be furnished copies of the investigation reports to aid
that body in its own investigation and eventual resolution of OMB-P-C-O7-
0602-E. Then, too, the OMB shall be given easy access to all pertinent
documents and evidence, if any, adduced before the CA. Necessarily,
Lourdes, as complainant in OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E, should be allowed, if so
minded, to amend her basic criminal complaint if the consolidation of cases is
to be fully effective.
25. RODRIGUEZ vs. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
FACTS: Rodriguez claims that the military tagged KMP as an enemy of the
State under the Oplan Bantay Laya, making its members targets of
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.On 6 September 2009, at
5:00 p.m., Rodriguez had just reached Barangay Tapel, Cagayan onboard a
tricycle driven by Hermie Antonio Carlos (Carlos), when four men forcibly took
him and forced him into a car. Inside the vehicle were several men in civilian
clothes, one of whom was holding a .45 caliber pistol. Subsequently, three
more persons arrived, and one of them carried a gun at his side.
Two men boarded the car, while the others rode on the tricycle.
The men tied the hands of Rodriguez, ordered him to lie on his stomach, sat
on his back and started punching him. The car travelled towards the direction
of Sta. Teresita-Mission and moved around the area until about 2:00 a.m.
During the drive, the men forced Rodriguez to confess to being a member of
the New Peoples Army (NPA), but he remained silent. The car then entered
a place that appeared to be a military camp. There were soldiers all over the
area, and there was a banner with the word Bravo written on it. Rodriguez
later on learned that the camp belonged to the 17th Infantry Battalion of the
Philippine Army.
Rodriguez was brought to a canteen, where six men confronted him, ordering
him to confess to his membership in the NPA. Due to his exhaustion, he
unintentionally fell asleep. As a result, the men hit him on the head to wake
him up. After the interrogation, two of the men guarded him, but did not allow
him to sleep.
In the morning of 7 September 2009, the men tied the hands of Rodriguez,
blindfolded him and made him board a vehicle. While they were in transit, the
soldiers repeatedly hit him in the head and threatened to kill him. When the
car stopped after about ten minutes, the soldiers brought him to a room,
removed his blindfold, and forced him to confess to being a member of the
NPA. During the interrogation, the soldiers repeatedly hit him on the head.
Thereafter, he was detained inside the room for the entire day. The soldiers
tied his stomach to a papag, and gave him rice and viand. Fearing that the
food might be poisoned, he refused to eat anything. He slept on the papag
while being tied to it at the waist.
ISSUE: Whether the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in
amparo and habeas data cases
RULING:
To attribute responsibility or accountability to former President Arroyo,
Rodriguez contends that the doctrine of command responsibility may be
applied. As we explained in Rubrico v. Arroyo, command responsibility
pertains to the responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by
subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their
control in international wars or domestic conflict.
Although originally used for ascertaining criminal complicity, the command
responsibility doctrine has also found application in civil cases for human
rights abuses.[79] In the United States, for example, command responsibility
was used in Ford v. Garcia and Romagoza v. Garcia civil actions filed under
the Alien Tort Claims Act and the Torture Victim Protection Act. This
development in the use of command responsibility in civil proceedings shows
that the application of this doctrine has been liberally extended even to cases
not criminal in nature. Thus, it is our view that command responsibility may
likewise find application in proceedings seeking the privilege of the writ of
amparo. As we held in Rubrico:
It may plausibly be contended that command responsibility, as legal basis to
hold military/police commanders liable for extra-legal killings, enforced
disappearances, or threats, may be made applicable to this jurisdiction on the
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theory that the command responsibility doctrine now constitutes a principle of
international law or customary international law in accordance with the
incorporation clause of the Constitution.
If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these
proceedings, it should, at most, be only to determine the author who, at the
first instance, is accountable for, and has the duty to address, the
disappearance and harassments complained of, so as to enable the Court to
devise remedial measures that may be appropriate under the premises to
protect rights covered by the writ of amparo. As intimated earlier, however,
the determination should not be pursued to fix criminal liability on respondents
preparatory to criminal prosecution, or as a prelude to administrative
disciplinary proceedings under existing administrative issuances, if there be
any. (Emphasis supplied.)
Precisely in the case at bar, the doctrine of command responsibility may be
used to determine whether respondents are accountable for and have the
duty to address the abduction of Rodriguez in order to enable the courts to
devise remedial measures to protect his rights. Clearly, nothing precludes this
Court from applying the doctrine of command responsibility in amparo
proceedings to ascertain responsibility and accountability in extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances. In this regard, the Separate Opinion of
Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales in Rubrico is worth noting, thus:
That proceedings under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo do not determine
criminal, civil or administrative liability should not abate the applicability of the
doctrine of command responsibility. Taking Secretary of National Defense v.
Manalo and Razon v. Tagitis in proper context, they do not preclude the
application of the doctrine of command responsibility to Amparo cases.
26. SECRETARY LEILA M. DE LIMA, DIRECTOR NONNATUS R.
ROJAS and DEPUTY DIRECTOR REYNALDO 0. ESMERALDA
vs. MAGTANGGOL B. GATDULA
G.R. No. 204528 February 19, 2013
Short Version:
The judge in this case required an Answer (instead of a Return) from De Lima
et al and did not follow the correct procedure in issuing the writ and privilege
of Writ of Amparo.
FACTS:
 On February 27, 2012, respondent Magtanggol B. Gatdula filed a
Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo in the RTC of Manila
(In the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Amparo of Atty.
Magtanggol B. Gatdula, SP No. 12-127405) The case was raffled to
Judge Pampilo, Jr. on the same day
 The Amparo was directed against petitioners De Lima et al. Gatdula
wanted De Lima, et al “to cease and desist from framing him up for
the fake ambush incident by filing bogus charges of Frusrated
Murder against Gatdula in relation to the alleged ambush incident”
 Instead of deciding on whether to issue a Writ of Amparo, the judge
issued summons and ordered De Lima, et al. to file an Answer. He
also set the case for hearing on 1 March 2012. The hearing was held
allegedly for determining whether a temporary protection order may
be issued. During that hearing, counsel for De Lima, et al. manifested
that a Return, not an Answer, is appropriate for Amparo cases
 In an Order dated 2 March 2012,6 Judge Pampilo insisted that
“[s]ince no writ has been issued, return is not the required pleading
but answer.” The judge noted that the Rules of Court apply
suppletorily in Amparo cases. He opined that
 Judge Pampilo proceeded to conduct a hearing on the main case on
7 March 2012.10 Even without a Return nor an Answer, he ordered
the parties to file their respective memoranda within five (5) working
days after that hearing. Since the period to file an Answer had not
yet lapsed by then, the judge also decided that the memorandum of
De Lima, et al. would be filed in lieu of their Answer
 On 20 March 2012, the RTC rendered a “Decision” granting the
issuance of the Writ of Amparo. The RTC also granted the interim
reliefs prayed for, namely: temporary protection, production and
inspection orders. The production and inspection orders were in
relation to the evidence and reports involving an on-going
investigation of the attempted assassination of Deputy Director
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Esmeralda. It is not clear from the records how these pieces of
evidence may be related to the alleged threat to the life, liberty or
security of the respondent Gatdula.
 RTC denied MR filed by De Lima, et al
 De Lima, et al thus came to the SC assailing the March 20 RTC
Decision via Rule 45.
 the claims of the party litigants and is a final pleading
ISSUE:
 Whether the Writ of Amparo can be executed and reviewed – No.
RTC committed several procedural errors on issuing the privilege of
the Writ of Amparo.
RATIO:
 Writ of Amparo (See Notes)
 The Decision dated 20 March could not be the judgment ro ginal
order that is appealable under Sec. 19 of the Rule on the Writ of
Amapro. This Decision pertained to the issuance of the writ, not the
judgment.
 Irregularities in the RTC procedues:
1. The insistence on filing of an Answer was inappropriate. It
is the Return that serves as the responsive pleading for
petitions for the issuance of Writs of Amparo.
 The requirement to file an Answer is contrary to the
intention of the Court to provide a speedy remedy to
those whose right to life, liberty and security are
violated or are threatened to be violated.
 A writ of Amparo is a special proceeding. It is a
remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a
right or particular fact. It is not a civil nor a criminal
action, hence, the application of the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure is seriously misplaced.
2. The holding of a hearing on the main case prior to the
issuance of the writ and the filing of a Return. Without a
Return, the issues could not have been properly joined.
3. The court required a memorandum in lieu of a responsive
pleading (Answer) of De Lima, et al
 The Return in Amparo cases allows the respondents to
frame the issues subject to a hearing. Hence, it should
be done prior to the hearing, not after.
 A memorandum, on the other hand, is a synthesis of
usually required before the case is submitted for
decision.
 One cannot substitute for the other since these
submissions have different functions in facilitating the
suit.
 A memorandum is a prohibited pleading under the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo
 The privilege of the Writ of Amparo is different from the actual
order called the Writ of Amparo
 The privilege includes availment of the entire
procedure outline in the Rule on the Writ of Mparo
 After examining the petition and its attached affidavits,
the Return and the evidence presented in the summary
hearing, the judgment should detail the required acts
from the respondents that will mitigate, if not totally
eradicate, the violation of or the threat to the
petitioner’s life, liberty or security.
 A judgment which simply grants the “privilege of the
writ” cannot be executed.
 Petition for Review – not the proper remedy. Petition for Certitorari is
prohibited. However, simply dismissing the present petition will
cause grave injustice to the parties involved.
 The rules can be suspended on the following grounds:
(1) matters of life, liberty, honor or property, (2) the
existence of special or compelling circumstances, (3)
the merits of the case, (4) a cause not entirely
attributable to the fault or negligence of the party
favored by the suspension of the rules, (5) a lack of any
showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and
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dilatory, and (6) the other party will not be unjustly
prejudiced thereby.
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice, as a prophylactic to the irregularities
committed by the trial court judge, and by virtue of its powers under Article
VIII, Section 5 (5) of the Constitution, the Court RESOLVES to:
(1) NULLIFY all orders that are subject of this Resolution issued by Judge
Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr. after respondent Gatdula filed the Petition for the
Issuance of a Writ of Amparo;
(2) DIRECT Judge Pampilo to determine within forty- eight (48) hours from his
receipt of this Resolution whether the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is proper
on the basis of the petition and its attached affidavits.
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to cause the personal service of this
Resolution on Judge Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr. of Branch 26 of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila for his proper guidance together with a WARNING that further
deviation or improvisation from the procedure set in A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC shall
be meted with severe consequences.
SO ORDERED.
NOTES:
NATURE OF THE REMEDY OF AMPARO
 The remedy of the Writ of Amparo is an equitable and
extraordinary remedy to safeguard the right of the people to life,
liberty and security as enshrined in the 1987 Constitution
 It was issued as an exercise of the Supreme Court’s power to
promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights
 Aims to address concerns such as, among others, extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances
PROCESS:
 Initiated through a petition to be filed in RTC, Sandiganbayan, CA,
or the SC
o The judge or justice then makes an “immediate evaluation”
of the facts as alleged in the petition and affidavits
submitted “with the attendant circumstances detailed.”
 After evaluation, the judge has the option to issue the Writ of
Amparo or immediately dismiss the case.
o Dismissal if the petition and the supporting affidavits do not
show that the petitioner’s right to life, liberty or security is
under threat or the acts complained of are not unlawful
o The issuance of the writ itself sets in motion presumptive
judicial protection for the petitioner. The court compels the
respondents to appear before a court of law to show
whether the grounds for more permanent protection and
interim reliefs are necessary.
 The respondents are required to file a Return after the issuance of
the writ through the clerk of court.
o The Return serves as the responsive pleading to the
petition.
o Unlike an Answer, the Return has other purposes aside
from identifying the issues in the case. Respondents are
also required to detail the actions they had taken to
determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party
o If the respondents are public officials or employees, they
are also required to state the actions they had taken to: (i)
verify the identity of the aggrieved party; (ii) recover and
preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance of
the person identified in the petition; (iii) identify witnesses
and obtain statements concerning the death or
disappearance; (iv) determine the cause, manner, location,
and time of death or disappearance as well as any pattern
or practice that may have brought about the death or
disappearance; and (v) bring the suspected offenders
before a competent court . These information are important,
so that the judge can calibrate the means and methods that
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will be required to further the protections, if any, that will be
due to the petitioner.
 There will be a summary hearing only after the Return is filed to
determine the merits of the petition and whether interim reliefs are
warranted. If the Return is not filed, the hearing will be done ex parte
 After the hearing, the court will render the judgment within ten (10)
days from the time the petition is submitted for decision.
o If the allegations are proven with substantial evidence, the
court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs
as may be proper and appropriate.
o The judgment should contain measures which the judge
views as essential for the continued protection of the
petitioner in the Amparo case. These measures must be
detailed enough so that the judge may be able to verify and
monitor the actions taken by the respondents.
o It is this judgment that could be subject to appeal to the SC
via Rule 45.
 After measures have served their purpose, the judgment will be
satisfied.
o In Amparo cases, this is when the threats to the petitioner’s
life, liberty and security cease to exist as evaluated by the
court that renders the judgment
o The case may also be terminated through consolidation
should a subsequent case be filed – either criminal or civil.
27. MAMBA vs. BUENO
February 7, 2017; G.R. No. 191416; REYES, J.
FACTS: The canteen owned by Emelita in Tuao, Cagayan was robbed.
Emelita is the mother of Mayor Mamba, then Mayor of the Municipality of
Tuao, Cagayan and Atty. Mamba, then a Malacañang official. The Task Force
Lingkod Bayan (Task Force), an agency created by the Sangguniang Bayan
of Tuao to help the local police force in maintaining peace and order in the
municipality, undertook an investigation on the robbery.
Several members of the Task Force, Malana, Aggangan and Sagalon,
together with barangay officials Cinabre and Encollado, went to the house of
the respondent, then still a minor, to invite him for questioning on his supposed
involvement in the robbery. The respondent and his mother acceded to the
invitation. Thereupon, the respondent was brought to the Tuao police station.
The parties gave different accounts of what happened after the respondent
was brought to the Tuao police station.
The petitioners claim that when they reached the Tuao police station, there
were no police investigators or any representative from the local Social
Welfare and Development (SWD) office and, hence, the investigation could
not proceed. At that time, Raymund allegedly an eyewitness to the robbery,
was at the police station. Raymund pointed to the respondent as among those
who robbed the store; the respondent then told Raymund that he would kill
him for ratting him out. The petitioners allege that prior to the robbery of the
canteen, the respondent approached Raymund and his brother Robin and
proposed to them that they rob the canteen. The latter, however, declined the
offer. Later that night, Raymund saw the respondent and Haber robbing the
canteen. Thereafter, Robin reported the incident to the Task Force.
The petitioners further claim that at the time of the robbery, Mayor Mamba
and Atty. Mamba were not around since they previously left Tuao, Cagayan
for Manila. Mayor Mamba was on official leave for 10 days, while Atty. Mamba
had to report for work in Malacañang.
The respondent's custody was then referred to the Task Force. Haber was
later invited to the police station for questioning regarding his involvement in
the robbery. However, his custody was likewise referred to the Task Force
since there were still no police investigators.
Atty. Mamba arrived in Tuao, Cagayan. While going out of his residence,
Maritess approached Atty. Mamba and asked him about her son. Atty. Mamba
told her that he does not know her son and that if the respondent indeed
committed a crime, she should not tolerate what her son was doing.
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While the members of the Task Force were on their way to bring the
respondent and Haber to the police station, they were met by Police
Superintendent Joselito Buenaobra (P/Supt. Buenaobra) of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) Cagayan Regional Office. Thereafter, the respondent's
custody was transferred to the PNP Cagayan Regional Office.
Maritess then went to the office of Mayor Mamba, but she was told to come
back at later date since Mayor Mamba was still on official leave. When Mayor
Mamba arrived in Tuao, a conference was immediately held. Maritess
requested that the members of the Task Force be brought to Mayor Mamba's
office. Almost all of the members of the Task Force arrived. However, Maritess
was unable to pinpoint who among them took custody of his son. Mayor
Mamba then advised her to file a complaint in court should she be able to
identify the responsible persons.
On the other hand, the respondent alleges that Tumaliuan and Dayag, both
members of the Task Force, upon the order of Baligod, then Municipal
Administrator of Tuao, fetched the respondent from the police station and
brought him to Mayor Mamba's house. Sometime in the evening, the
respondent was made to board a white van driven by Aggangan. Inside the
van, he was beaten with a gun by Malana, who later threatened him that he
would be killed. Thereafter, he was brought back to Mayor Mamba's house.
That same evening, Haber, likewise a minor, was invited by the barangay
captain in his place, accompanied by about 10 barangay tanods and two
police officers, for questioning as regards the robbery of the canteen. Haber
was brought to the police station where he spent the night.
Haber was brought to Mayor Mamba's house. The respondent and Haber
were then tortured to force them to admit to their involvement in the robbery.
They were made to roll on the grass while being kicked and beaten with a cue
stick by Malana; hot wax was poured over their bodies to force them to admit
to the robbery, but they denied any involvement therein. Thereafter, they were
blindfolded and were questioned by Atty. Mamba regarding the robbery of the
canteen. When his blindfold was taken off, the respondent saw Atty. Mamba
sitting nearby. Malana brought the respondent and Haber, together with Robin
and Raymund, to the office of the Task Force, where they all spent the night.
Meanwhile, Maritess went to the Tuao police station to look for her son; she
was told that the respondent was brought to Mayor Mamba's house. However,
when Maritess went to Mayor Mamba's house, she was not permitted to see
her son. Maritess was able to talk to Mayor Mamba who told her that she
should not condone the acts of her son. Maritess then sought the assistance
of P/Supt. Buenaobra regarding the respondent's disappearance from the
police station. The PNP Cagayan Regional Office was then preparing a case
for habeas corpus when the respondent to the local SWD office.
Maritess then sought the assistance of the Regional Office of the Commission
on Human Rights (CHR) in Cagayan as regards the case of the respondent.
The respondent, assisted by the CHR, filed a Petition for the Issuance of a
Writ of Amparo with the CA.
The CA, gave due course to the petition and directed the issuance of the writ
of amparo. The petitioners filed their verified return.
The CA opined that the respondent's rights to liberty and security were
undeniably undermined when he was invited by the members of the Task
Force for investigation and was brought to Mayor Mamba's house from the
Tuao police station. It further pointed out that notwithstanding that Mayor
Mamba was not in Tuao when the incident happened, he is still accountable
since he failed to show sufficient action to protect the respondent's rights; that
Mayor Mamba failed to acknowledge the irregularity of the acts of the
members of the Task Force or to identify those who were responsible for the
violation of the respondent's rights. The CA further ruled that it was incumbent
upon Atty. Mamba, being a public servant, to ensure that the respondent's
constitutional rights are not violated.
The CA pointed out that the "invitation" extended to the respondent by the
members of the Task Force was in the nature of an arrest as the real purpose
of the same was to make him answer to the heist committed the night before.
The CA ruled that the same amounted to an invalid warrantless arrest since
the circumstances of the case do not fall within the purview of Section 5 of
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
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Further, the CA ruled that although the respondent was subsequently
released and that he failed to establish that there is an impending danger of
physical harm to him or his family, the refusal of the respondent officials of the
local government of Tuao, especially Mayor Mamba, to admit and address the
irregularities committed by the members of the Task Force is tantamount to a
continuing violation of the respondent's right to security.
The petitioners sought a reconsideration of the Decision but it was denied by
the CA in its Resolution.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred when it directed the issuance of a writ of
amparo in favor of the respondent.
RULING: The CA correctly issued the writ of amparo in favor of the
respondent.
The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief
consisting of the appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be
crafted by the court, in order to address specific violations or threats of
violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty or security.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats
thereof. Extralegal killings are killings committed without due process of law,
i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings. On the other hand,
enforced disappearance has been defined by the Court as the arrest,
detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of
the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization,
support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge
the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the
disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the
law.
In an amparo action, the parties must establish their respective claims by
substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is that amount of evidence which
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. It is
more than a mere imputation of wrongdoing or violation that would warrant a
finding of liability against the person charged.
What is clear is that the respondent was able to prove by substantial
evidence that he was apprehended by the members of the Task Force,
illegally detained, and tortured. It was further established that Maritess
would not have seen his son if not for the timely intercession of P/Supt.
Buenaobra of the PNP Cagayan Regional Office. The members of the Task
Force apprehended and detained the respondent to make him admit to his
complicity in the heist the night before sans the benefit of legal and judicial
processes.
Nevertheless, it is undisputed that the respondent, after four days of
detention, had been released by the members of the Task Force. This fact
alone, however, does not negate the propriety of the grant of a writ of amparo.
More importantly, the writ of amparo likewise covers violations of the
right to security. At the core of the guarantee of the right to security, as
embodied in Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, is the immunity of one's
person, including the extensions of his/her person, i.e., houses, papers and
effects, against unwarranted government intrusion. Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution not only limits the State's power over a person's home and
possession, but more importantly, protects the privacy and sanctity of the
person himself.
In the context of the writ of amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the
rights to life and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and
the right to security of person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily
and psychological integrity) under Article III, Section 2. The right to security of
person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State "guarantees
full respect for human rights" under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987
Constitution. As the government is the chief guarantor of order and security,
the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person
is rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights
especially when they are under threat. Protection includes conducting
effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend
protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or
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threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of
justice.
In this case, it is incumbent upon the petitioners, who all hold positions
in the local government of Tuao, to conduct, at the very least, an
investigation on the alleged illegal arrest, illegal detention and torture of
the respondent. The petitioners, nevertheless, claim that the Office of the
Mayor and the police station of Tuao, unknown to the respondent, are
conducting an investigation on the incident. However, other than their bare
assertion, they failed to present any evidence that would prove the supposed
investigation. Mere allegation is not a fact. Absent any evidence that would
corroborate the said claim, it is a mere allegation that does not have any
probative value.
Verily, the petitioners failed to point to any specific measures undertaken by
them to effectively investigate the irregularities alleged by the respondent and
to prosecute those who are responsible therefor. Worse, the illegal detention
and torture suffered by the respondent were perpetrated by the members of
the Task Force themselves.
Instead of effectively addressing the irregularities committed against the
respondent, the petitioners seemingly justify the illegal arrest and detention
and infliction of bodily harm upon the respondent by stating that the latter is a
habitual delinquent and was the one responsible for the robbery of the
canteen. As stated earlier, even if the respondent committed a crime, the
petitioners, as local government officials, are not at liberty to disregard the
respondent's constitutionally guaranteed rights to life, liberty and security. It is
quite unfortunate that the petitioners, all local government officials, are the
very ones who are infringing on the respondent's fundamental rights to life,
liberty and security.
Clearly, there is substantial evidence in this case that would warrant the
conclusion that the respondent's right to security, as a guarantee of
protection by the government, was violated.
28. Infant JULIAN YUSA Y CARAM, represented by his mother, MA.
CHRISTINA YUSAY CARAM vs. Atty. MARIJOY D. SEGUI, Atty.
SALLY D. ESCUTIN, VILMA B. CABRERA, and CELIA C.
YANGCO
G.R. No. 193652 August 5, 2014
FACTS: Petitioner Christina had an amorous relationship with Marcelino and
eventually became pregnant with the latter’s child without the benefit of
marriage. After getting pregnant, Christina mislead Marcelino into believing
that she had an abortion when in fact she proceeded to complete the term of
her pregnancy. During this time, she intended to have the child adopted
through Sun and Moon Home for Children in Parañaque City.
On July 26, 2009, Christina gave birth to Baby Julian at Amang Rodriguez
Memorial Medical Center, Marikina City. Sun and Moon shouldered all the
hospital and medical expenses. On August 13, 2009, Christina voluntarily
surrendered Baby Julian by way of a Deed of Voluntary Commitment to the
DSWD.
On November 27, 2009, the DSWD, a certificate was issued declaring Baby
Julian as “Legally Available for Adoption.” On February 5, 2010, Baby Julian
was “matched” with Spouses Medina and supervised trial custody was then
commenced.
On May 5, 2010, Christina who had changed her mind about the adoption,
wrote a letter to the DSWD asking for the suspension of Baby Julian’s
adoption proceedings. She also said she wanted her family back together.
On May 28, 2010, the DSWD, through respondent Atty. Segui, sent a
Memorandum to DSWD Assistant Secretary Cabrera informing her that the
certificate declaring Baby Julian legally available for adoption had attained
finality on November 13, 2009, or three months after Christina signed the
Deed of Voluntary Commitment which terminated her parental authority and
effectively made Baby Julian a ward of the State.
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On July 27, 2010, Christina filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo
before the RTC seeking to obtain custody of Baby Julian from DSWD. She
argues that the life, liberty and security of Baby Julian is being violated or
threatened by the respondent DSWD officers’ enforcement of an illegal Deed
of Voluntary Commitment between her and Sun and Moon. She claims that
she had been "blackmailed" through the said Deed by the DSWD officers and
Sun and Moon’s representatives into surrendering her child thereby causing
the "forced separation" of the said infant from his mother. Furthermore, she
also reiterates that the respondent DSWD officers acted beyond the scope of
their authority when they deprived her of Baby Julian’s custody.
However, the RTC denied the petition for issuance of a writ of amparo without
prejudice to the filing of the appropriate action in court. The RTC held that
Christina availed of the wrong remedy to regain custody of her child Baby
Julian. The RTC further stated that Christina should have filed a civil case for
custody of her child as laid down in the Family Code and the Rule on Custody
of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors. If there
is extreme urgency to secure custody of a minor who has been illegally
detained by another, a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus
may be availed of, either as a principal or ancillary remedy, pursuant to the
Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody
of Minors.
ISSUE: Whether the petition for a writ of amparo is the proper recourse for
obtaining parental authority and custody of a minor child.
RULING: No. The availment of the remedy of writ of amparo is not proper
since there is no existence of enforced disappearance.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides as follows: The petition
for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life,
liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful actor
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats
thereof.
In the landmark case of Secretary of National Defense, et al. v. Manalo, et
al., this Court held:
[T]he AmparoRule was intended to address the intractable problem of
"extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its
present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof.
"Extralegal killings" are "killings committed without due process of law, i.e.,
without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings." On the other hand,
"enforced disappearances" are "attended by the following characteristics: an
arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or
organized groupsor private individuals acting with the direct or indirect
acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate
or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the
deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law.
As to what constitutes “enforced disappearance,” the Court in Navia v.
Pardico enumerated the elements constituting “enforced disappearances” as
the term is statutorily defined in Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 9851 to wit:
1. That there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivationof
liberty;
2. That it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence
of, the State or a political organization;
3. That it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to
acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person
subject of the amparo petition; and,
4. That the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the
protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.
The Court held that there was no enforced disappearance because
the respondent DSWD officers never concealed Baby Julian’s whereabouts.
In fact, Christina obtained a copy of the DSWD’s Memorandum explicitly
stating that Baby Julian was in the custody of the Medina Spouses when she
filed her petition before the RTC. Besides, she even admitted in her petition
that the respondent DSWD officers presented Baby Julian before the RTC
during the hearing. There is therefore, no “enforced disappearance” as used
in the context of the Amparo rule as the third and fourth elements are missing.
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Christina’s directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating
her from her child and placing the latter up for adoption, supposedly without
complying with the necessary legal requisites to qualify the child for adoption,
clearly indicates that she is not searching for a lost child but asserting her
parental authority over the child and contesting custody over him.
To reiterate, the privilege of the writ of amparo is a remedy available
to victims of extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances or threats of
a similar nature, regardless of whether the perpetrator of the unlawful act or
omission is a public official or employee or a private individual. It is envisioned
basically to protect and guarantee the right to life, liberty and security of
persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of life.
Petition is dismissed. Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that
what is involved is the issue of child custody and the exercise of parental
rights over a child, who, for all intents and purposes, has
been legally considered a ward of the State, the Amparo rule cannot be
properly applied.
29. In RE: PETITION FOR RADIO AND TELEVISION COVERAGE OF
THE MULTIPLE MURDER CASES AGAINST MAGUINDANAO
GOVERNER ZALDY AMPATUAN
FACTS: On November 23, 2009, 57 people including 32 journalists and media
practitioners were killed while on their way to Shariff Aguak in Maguindanao.
Touted as the worst election-related violence and the most brutal killing of
journalists in recent history, the tragic incident which came to be known as the
Maguindanao Massacre spawned charges for 57 counts of murder and an
additional charge of rebellion against 197 accused. Almost a year later , the
National Union of Journalists of the Philippines (NUJP), ABS-CBN
Broadcasting Corporation, GMA Network, Inc., relatives of the victims,[1]
individual journalists[2] from various media entities, and members of the
academe[3] filed a petition before this Court praying that live television and
radio coverage of the trial in these criminal cases be allowed, recording
devices (e.g., still cameras, tape recorders) be permitted inside the courtroom
to assist the working journalists, and reasonable guidelines be formulated to
govern the broadcast coverage and the use of devices.
President Benigno S. Aquino III, by letter addressed to Chief Justice Renato
Corona, came out in support of those who have petitioned [this Court] to
permit television and radio broadcast of the trial."
Petitioners seek the lifting of the absolute ban on live television and radio
coverage of court proceedings. They principally urge the Court to revisit the
1991 ruling in Re: Live TV and Radio Coverage of the Hearing of President
Corazon C. Aquinos Libel Case[12] and the 2001 ruling in Re: Request Radio-
TV Coverage of the Trial in the Sandiganbayan of the Plunder Cases Against
the Former President Joseph E. Estrada[13] which rulings, they contend,
violate the doctrine that proposed restrictions on constitutional rights are to be
narrowly construed and outright prohibition cannot stand when regulation is a
viable alternative.
Petitioners state that the trial of the Maguindanao Massacre cases has
attracted intense media coverage due to the gruesomeness of the crime,
prominence of the accused, and the number of media personnel killed. They
inform that reporters are being frisked and searched for cameras, recorders,
and cellular devices upon entry, and that under strict orders of the trial court
against live broadcast coverage, the number of media practitioners allowed
inside the courtroom has been limited to one reporter for each media
institution.
Judge Solis-Reyes replied, however, that matters concerning media coverage
should be brought to the Courts attention through appropriate motion.[15]
Hence, the present petitions which assert the exercise of the freedom of the
press, right to information, right to a fair and public trial, right to assembly and
to petition the government for redress of grievances, right of free access to
courts, and freedom of association, subject to regulations to be issued by the
Court.
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ISSUE: Whether the Court should grant pro hac vice the request for live
broadcast by television and radio of the trial court proceedings of the
Maguindanao Massacre cases.
HELD: The Court partially GRANTS pro hac vice petitioners prayer for a live
broadcast of the trial court proceedings, subject to the guidelines.
On the media coverages influence on judges, counsels and witnesses,
petitioners point out that Aquino and Estrada, like Estes, lack empirical
evidence to support the sustained conclusion. They point out errors of
generalization where the conclusion has been mostly supported by studies on
American attitudes, as there has been no authoritative study on the particular
matter dealing with Filipinos.
Respecting the possible influence of media coverage on the impartiality of trial
court judges, petitioners correctly explain that prejudicial publicity insofar as it
undermines the right to a fair trial must pass the totality of circumstances test,
applied in People v. Teehankee, Jr.[24] and Estrada v. Desierto,[25] that the
right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press, that
pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to a fair
trial, and that there must be allegation and proof of the impaired capacity of a
judge to render a bias-free decision. Mere fear of possible undue influence is
not tantamount to actual prejudice resulting in the deprivation of the right to a
fair trial.
One apparent circumstance that sets the Maguindanao Massacre cases apart
from the earlier cases is the impossibility of accommodating even the parties
to the cases the private complainants/families of the victims and other
witnesses inside the courtroom. On public trial, Estrada basically discusses:
An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him,
more than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in
balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not
be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not compromised in secrete
conclaves of long ago. A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it
only implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit
in the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial
process. In the constitutional sense, a courtroom should have enough
facilities for a reasonable number of the public to observe the proceedings,
not too small as to render the openness negligible and not too large as to
distract the trial participants from their proper functions, who shall then be
totally free to report what they have observed during the proceedings
The impossibility of holding such judicial proceedings in a courtroom that will
accommodate all the interested parties, whether private complainants or
accused, is unfortunate enough. What more if the right itself commands that
a reasonable number of the general public be allowed to witness the
proceeding as it takes place inside the courtroom. Technology tends to
provide the only solution to break the inherent limitations of the courtroom, to
satisfy the imperative of a transparent, open and public trial.
In so allowing pro hac vice the live broadcasting by radio and television of the
Maguindanao Massacre cases, the Court lays down the following guidelines
toward addressing the concerns mentioned in Aquino and Estrada:
(a) An audio-visual recording of the Maguindanao massacre cases may be
made both for documentary purposes and for transmittal to live radio and
television broadcasting.
(b) Media entities must file with the trial court a letter of application,
manifesting that they intend to broadcast the audio-visual recording of the
proceedings and that they have the necessary technological equipment and
technical plan to carry out the same, with an undertaking that they will faithfully
comply with the guidelines and regulations and cover the entire remaining
proceedings until promulgation of judgment.
No selective or partial coverage shall be allowed. No media entity shall be
allowed to broadcast the proceedings without an application duly approved by
the trial court.
(c) A single fixed compact camera shall be installed inconspicuously inside
the courtroom to provide a single wide-angle full-view of the sala of the trial
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court. No panning and zooming shall be allowed to avoid unduly highlighting
or downplaying incidents in the proceedings. The camera and the necessary
equipment shall be operated and controlled only by a duly designated official
or employee of the Supreme Court. The camera equipment should not
produce or beam any distracting sound or light rays. Signal lights or signs
showing the equipment is operating should not be visible. A limited number of
microphones and the least installation of wiring, if not wireless technology,
must be unobtrusively located in places indicated by the trial court.
The Public Information Office and the Office of the Court Administrator shall
coordinate and assist the trial court on the physical set-up of the camera and
equipment.
(d) The transmittal of the audio-visual recording from inside the courtroom to
the media entities shall be conducted in such a way that the least physical
disturbance shall be ensured in keeping with the dignity and solemnity of the
proceedings and the exclusivity of the access to the media entities.
The hardware for establishing an interconnection or link with the camera
equipment monitoring the proceedings shall be for the account of the media
entities, which should employ technology that can (i) avoid the cumbersome
snaking cables inside the courtroom, (ii) minimize the unnecessary ingress or
egress of technicians, and (iii) preclude undue commotion in case of technical
glitches.
If the premises outside the courtroom lack space for the set-up of the media
entities facilities, the media entities shall access the audio-visual recording
either via wireless technology accessible even from outside the court
premises or from one common web broadcasting platform from which
streaming can be accessed or derived to feed the images and sounds.
At all times, exclusive access by the media entities to the real-time audio-
visual recording should be protected or encrypted.
(e) The broadcasting of the proceedings for a particular day must be
continuous and in its entirety, excepting such portions thereof where Sec. 21
of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court[27] applies, and where the trial court
excludes, upon motion, prospective witnesses from the courtroom, in
instances where, inter alia, there are unresolved identification issues or there
are issues which involve the security of the witnesses and the integrity of their
testimony (e.g., the dovetailing of corroborative testimonies is material,
minority of the witness).
The trial court may, with the consent of the parties, order only the pixelization
of the image of the witness or mute the audio output, or both.
(f) To provide a faithful and complete broadcast of the proceedings, no
commercial break or any other gap shall be allowed until the days proceedings
are adjourned, except during the period of recess called by the trial court and
during portions of the proceedings wherein the public is ordered excluded.
(g) To avoid overriding or superimposing the audio output from the on-going
proceedings, the proceedings shall be broadcast without any voice-overs,
except brief annotations of scenes depicted therein as may be necessary to
explain them at the start or at the end of the scene. Any commentary shall
observe the sub judice rule and be subject to the contempt power of the court;
(h) No repeat airing of the audio-visual recording shall be allowed until after
the finality of judgment, except brief footages and still images derived from or
cartographic sketches of scenes based on the recording, only for news
purposes, which shall likewise observe the sub judice rule and be subject to
the contempt power of the court;
(i) The original audio-recording shall be deposited in the National Museum
and the Records Management and Archives Office for preservation and
exhibition in accordance with law.
(j) The audio-visual recording of the proceedings shall be made under the
supervision and control of the trial court which may issue supplementary
directives, as the exigency requires, including the suspension or revocation of
the grant of application by the media entities.
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(k) The Court shall create a special committee which shall forthwith study,
design and recommend appropriate arrangements, implementing regulations,
and administrative matters referred to it by the Court concerning the live
broadcast of the proceedings pro hac vice, in accordance with the above-
outlined guidelines. The Special Committee shall also report and recommend
on the feasibility, availability and affordability of the latest technology that
would meet the herein requirements. It may conduct consultations with
resource persons and experts in the field of information and communication
technology.
(l) All other present directives in the conduct of the proceedings of the trial
court (i.e., prohibition on recording devices such as still cameras, tape
recorders; and allowable number of media practitioners inside the courtroom)
shall be observed in addition to these guidelines.
Technology per se has always been neutral. It is the use and regulation
thereof that need fine-tuning. Law and technology can work to the advantage
and furtherance of the various rights herein involved, within the contours of
defined guidelines.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing disquisition, the Court PARTIALLY
GRANTS PRO HAC VICE the request for live broadcast by television and
radio of the trial court proceedings of the Maguindanao Massacre cases,
subject to the guidelines herein outlined.
30. HARRY L. GO, TONNY NGO, JERRY NGO AND JANE GO vs. THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HIGHDONE COMPANY,
LTD., ET AL.
G.R. No. 185527 July 18, 2012
FACTS: Petitioners Harry Go, Tonny Ngo, Jerry Ngo and Jane Go were
charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila for Other
Deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The prosecution's complaining witness, Li Luen Ping, a frail old businessman
from Laos, Cambodia, traveled from his home country back to the Philippines
in order to attend the hearing held on September 9, 2004. However, trial dates
were subsequently postponed due to his unavailability.
The private prosecutor filed with the MeTC a Motion to Take Oral Deposition
of Li Luen Ping, alleging that he was being treated for lung infection at the
Cambodia Charity Hospital in Laos, Cambodia and that, upon doctor's advice,
he could not make the long travel to the Philippines by reason of ill health.
Notwithstanding petitioners' Opposition, the MeTC granted the motion after
the prosecution complied with the directive to submit a Medical Certificate of
Li Luen Ping. Petitioners sought its reconsideration which the MeTC denied,
prompting petitioners to file a Petition for Certiorari before the RTC.
Upon denial by the RTC of their motion for reconsideration through an Order
dated March 5, 2006, the prosecution elevated the case to the CA. the CA
denied petitioners' motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in sustaining the judicial legislation committed
by the MeTC in applying the ruled on deposition-taking in civil case to criminal
cases.
RULING: The examination of witnesses must be done orally before a judge
in open court. This is true especially in criminal cases where the Constitution
secures to the accused his right to a public trial and to meet the witnesses
against him face to face. The requirement is the “safest and most satisfactory
method of investigating facts” as it enables the judge to test the witness'
credibility through his manner and deportment while testifying. It is not without
exceptions, however, as the Rules of Court recognizes the conditional
examination of witnesses and the use of their depositions as testimonial
evidence in lieu of direct court testimony.
The procedure under Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court allows the taking of
depositions in civil cases, either upon oral examination or written
interrogatories, before any judge, notary public or person authorized to
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administer oaths at any time or place within the Philippines; or before any
Philippine consular official, commissioned officer or person authorized to
administer oaths in a foreign state or country, with no additional requirement
except reasonable notice in writing to the other party.
But for purposes of taking the deposition in criminal cases, more particularly
of a prosecution witness who would forseeably be unavailable for trial, the
testimonial examination should be made before the court, or at least before
the judge, where the case is pending as required by the clear mandate of
Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The
pertinent provision reads thus:
SEC. 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. – When it satisfactorily
appears that a witness for the prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the
trial as directed by the court, or has to leave the Philippines with no definite
date of returning, he may forthwith be conditionally examined before the court
where the case is pending. Such examination, in the presence of the accused,
or in his absence after reasonable notice to attend the examination has been
served on him shall be conducted in the same manner as an examination at
the trial. Failure or refusal of the accused to attend the examination after
notice shall be considered a waiver. The statement taken may be admitted in
behalf of or against the accused.
Certainly, to take the deposition of the prosecution witness elsewhere and not
before the very same court where the case is pending would not only deprive
a detained accused of his right to attend the proceedings but also deprive the
trial judge of the opportunity to observe the prosecution witness' deportment
and properly assess his credibility, which is especially intolerable when the
witness' testimony is crucial to the prosecution's case against the accused.
This is the import of the Court's ruling in Vda. de Manguerra where we further
declared that – While we recognize the prosecution's right to preserve the
testimony of its witness in order to prove its case, we cannot disregard the
rules which are designed mainly for the protection of the accused's
constitutional rights. The giving of testimony during trial is the general rule.
The conditional examination of a witness outside of the trial is only an
exception, and as such, calls for a strict construction of the rules.
31. REYNALDO H. JAYLO, WILLIAM VALENZONA AND ANTONIO
G. HABALO, Petitioners, v. SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST
DIVISION), PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND HEIRS OF COL.
ROLANDO DE GUZMAN, FRANCO CALANOG AND AVELINO
MANGUERA
G.R. Nos. 183152-54 January 21, 2015 SERENO, C.J.
As a statutory right, the filing of a motion for reconsideration is to be exercised
in accordance with and in the manner provided by law.
FACTS: The Sandiganbayan found Reynaldo Jaylo, Edgardo Castro, William
Valenzona, and Antonio Habalo (petitioners) guilty of homicide. During the
promulgation of the Sandiganbayan’s judgment, none of the accused
appeared despite notice. Counsel for the three petitioners filed a Motion for
Partial Reconsideration. The Sandiganbayan took no action on the motion
and ordered the implementation of the warrants for the arrest of the convicted
accused. In an Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration, counsel for the three
urged the Sandiganbayan to give due course to and resolve the Motion for
Partial Reconsideration but to no avail. They argued that the right to file a
Motion for Reconsideration is a statutory grant and not merely a remedy
available in the Rules, as provided under Section 6 of Rule 120 of the Rules
of Court. Thus, according to them, their absence at the promulgation of
judgment before the Sandiganbayan cannot be deemed to have resulted in
the loss of their right to file a motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioners lost their right to file a motion for
reconsideration.
RULING: Yes. Like an appeal, the right to file a motion for reconsideration is
a statutory grant or privilege. As a statutory right, the filing of a motion for
reconsideration is to be exercised in accordance with and in the manner
provided by law. Thus, a party filing a motion for reconsideration must strictly
comply with the requisites laid down in the Rules of Court.
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32. PEOPLE vs. RELOVA
GR L-45129, 6 March 1987
Doctrines: The first sentence of Article IV (22) is the general rule: the
constitutional protection against double jeopardy is not available where the
second prosecution is for an offense that is different from the offense charged
in the first or prior prosecution, although both the first and second offenses
may be based upon the same act or set of acts. The second sentence of
Article IV (22) is an exception: the constitutional protection against double
jeopardy is available although the prior offense charged under an ordinance
be different from the offense charged subsequently under a national statute
such as the Revised Penal Code, provided that both offenses spring from the
same act or set of acts.
Nature: Petition for certiorari and mandamus by the People, seeking to set
aside orders of Judge Relova in a criminal case against defendant Opulencia,
quashing an information for theft on the ground of double jeopardy and
denying petitioner’s MR.
Facts: On February 1, 1975, the Batangas City Police, together with
personnel from Batangas City Electric Light System, equipped with a search
warrant, search and examined the Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant and Cold
storage, owned and operated by defendant Opulencia, and discovered that
electric wiring devices and contraptions had been installed, without necessary
authority from the LGU, and architecturally concealed inside the walls of the
building, which were allegedly designed to purposely lower or decrease
readings of electric consumption of the plant. During investigation, defendant
admitted in a written statement that he caused the installation of the devices
to lower or decrease the readings of his electric meter. The Assistant City
Fiscal filed an information with MTC Batangas for violation of the City
Ordinance No. 1, s. 1974, punishable by a fine from 5.00 to 50.00 or
imprisonment not exceeding 30 days, or both.
Defendant Opulencia pleaded not guilty and filed a MTD due to prescription
and that the civil indemnity sought to be recovered was beyond the court’s
jurisdiction. The MTC granted the MTD, it appearing that the offense charged
was a light felony which prescribes two months from the time of discovery
thereof and that the information was filed more than nine months after
discovery. Fourteen days later, the Acting City Fiscal then filed another
information with RTC Batangas, this time for theft of electric power under Art.
308 in rel. to Art. 309 of the RPC, for appropriating and converting electric
current amounting to PhP 41,062.16. Before arraignment, Opulencia filed an
MTQ alleging that he had been previously acquitted on the offense charged,
thus violating his right against double jeopardy. Respondent judge Relova
granted the MTQ and ordered the case dismissed. On the order, Judge
Relova emphasized that the first information contained allegations of
damages to the LGU, thus covering not only the illegal connections but also
the amount prayed for in the second information. The subsequent MR filed
was also denied. Thereby prompting the present petition for certiorari and
mandamus.
Issue: Whether double jeopardy had set in?
Ruling: Yes. The petitioner stresses that the first information filed before the
MTC Batangas was one for unlawful or unauthorized installation of electrical
wiring and devices, acts which were in violation of an ordinance of the LGU.
The gist of the is the installing of electric wiring and devices without authority
from the proper officials of the city government. To constitute an offense under
the city ordinance, it is not essential to establish any mens rea on the part of
the offender generally speaking, nor, more specifically, an intent to
appropriate and steal electric fluid. In contrast, Art. 308 of RPC on theft has
different essential elements. As the petitioner concludes, the unauthorized
installation punished by the ordinance is not the same as theft of electricity;
that the second offense is not an attempt to commit the first or a frustration
thereof and that the second offense is not necessarily included in the offense
charged in the first information.
However, where the offenses charged are penalized either by different
sections of the same statute or by different statutes, the important inquiry
relates to the identity of offenses charge: the constitutional protection against
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double jeopardy is available only where an Identity is shown to exist between
the earlier and the subsequent offenses charged. In contrast, where one
offense is charged under a municipal ordinance while the other is penalized
by a statute, the critical inquiry is to the identity of the acts which the accused
is said to have committed and which are alleged to have given rise to the two
offenses: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available so
long as the acts which constitute or have given rise to the first offense under
a municipal ordinance are the same acts which constitute or have given rise
to the offense charged under a statute.
In this case, the relevant acts took place within the same time frame: from
November 1974 to February 1975, where Opulencia installed the devices
without permit. The corrupt intent was present from the moment of installation,
whereby the taking of the electric current was integral with the unauthorized
installation. It must be noted that the identity of offenses that must be shown
need not be absolute identity: the first and second offenses may be regarded
as the "same offense" where the second offense necessarily includes the first
offense or is necessarily included in such first offense or where the second
offense is an attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof. Thus, for
double jeopardy to be available, not all the technical elements constituting the
first offense need be present in the technical definition of the second offense.
This is to prevent harassment by multiple prosecutions. Acts of a person which
physically occur on the same occasion and are infused by a common intent
or design or negligence and therefore form a moral unity, should not be
segmented and sliced, as it were, to produce as many different acts as there
are offenses under municipal ordinances or statutes that an enterprising
prosecutor can find. The dismissal by MTC of the ordinance violation case on
the ground of prescription amounts to an acquittal of the accused of that
offense.
Other Related Matters:
Prescription of the crime is one of the grounds for total extinction of criminal
liability under Art. 89 of the RPC. Under the ROC, an order sustaining a MTQ
based on prescription is a bar to another prosecution for the same offense.
The civil liability was impliedly instituted with the criminal action, as no
reservation of the right to file a separate civil action was made by the Batangas
City Electric Light System. However, the extinction of criminal liability whether
by prescription or by the bar of double jeopardy does not carry with it the
extinction of civil liability arising from the offense charged. As noted,
Opulencia freely admitted having stolen electric current. Accordingly, the
related civil action which has not been waived expressly or impliedly, should
be remanded to the RTC Batangas for reception of evidence on the amount
or value of the electric power appropriated and converted by Opulencia and
rendition of judgment conformably with such evidence.
Fallo: The petition for certiorari and mandamus is denied. Civil action for
related civil liability is remanded to RTC Batangas for further proceedings.
33. PEOPLE vs. HON. TIRSO VELASCO
[G.R. No. 127444. September 13, 2000]
FACTS: A shooting incident took place in San Ildefonso, Bulacan killing Alex
Vinculado and seriously injured his twin brother Levi. Their uncle, Miguel
Vinculado, Jr. was also shot. Three (3) criminal Informations - one (1) for
homicide and two (2) for frustrated homicide were initially filed against
Honorato Galvez, Mayor of San Ildefonso, and Godofredo Diego, the alleged
bodyguard of the mayor.
However, the charges were withdrawn and a new set was filed upgrading the
crimes to murder and frustrated murder. Mayor Galvez was charged, in
addition, with violation of PD 1866 for unauthorized carrying of firearm outside
his residence.
The trial court found the accused Godofredo Diego guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crimes of murder and double frustrated murder. However, it
acquitted Mayor Honorato Galvez of the same charges due to insufficiency of
evidence. He was also absolved from the charge of illegal carrying of firearm
upon its finding that the act was not a violation of law.
The acquittal of accused Honorato Galvez was challenged by the Government
before this Court in a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. Allegedly, in holding in favor of Galvez, the judge deliberately and
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wrongfully disregarded certain facts and evidence on record which, if
considered, it would have led to a finding of guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt.
Petitioner proposes that this patently gross judicial indiscretion and
arbitrariness should be rectified by a re-examination of the evidence by the
Court upon a determination that a review of the case will not transgress the
constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy. It is urged that this is
necessary because the judgment of acquittal should be nullified and
substituted with a verdict of guilt.
Petitioner invokes the constitutional doctrine in the United States that the
Double Jeopardy Clause permits a review of acquittals decreed by US trial
magistrates where, as in this case, no retrial is required should judgment be
overturned. Since Philippine concepts on double jeopardy have been sourced
from American constitutional principles, statutes and jurisprudence,
particularly the case of Kepner v. United States and because similarly in this
jurisdiction a retrial does not follow in the event an acquittal on appeal is
reversed, double jeopardy should also be allowed to take the same directional
course.
ISSUES: Whether a review by the Supreme Court of a judgment of acquittal
in light of the constitutional interdict against double jeopardy is permissible
HELD/RATIO: NO. It must be explained that under existing American law and
jurisprudence, appeals may be had not only from criminal convictions but also,
in some limited instances, from dismissals of criminal charges, sometimes
loosely termed "acquittals." But this is so as long as the judgments of
dismissals do not involve determination of evidence. It must involve questions
of law or matters unrelated to a factual resolution of the case which
consequently, on appeal, will not involve a review of evidence.
United States v. Scott positively spelled out that if an acquittal was based on
an appreciation of the evidence adduced, no appeal would lie. In the case at
bar, the records show that respondent trial judge based his finding of acquittal,
no matter how erroneous it might seem to petitioner, upon the evidence
presented by both parties. The judgment here was no less than a factual
resolution of the case.
The doctrine that an appeal of a judgment after the defendant had been
acquitted by the court in a bench trial is a new trial, is applicable in this case.
Requisites for invoking double jeopardy:
(a) a valid complaint or information;
(b) before a competent court before which the same is filed;
(c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and,
(d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
It bears repeating that where acquittal is concerned, the rules do not
distinguish whether it occurs at the level of the trial court or on appeal from a
judgment of conviction. This firmly establishes the finality-of-acquittal rule in
our jurisdiction. Therefore, as mandated by our laws and jurisprudence, an
acquittal is final and unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy, whether
it happens at the trial court level or before the Court of Appeals.
In general, the rule is that a remand to a trial court of a judgment of acquittal
brought before the Supreme Court on certiorari cannot be had unless there is
a finding of mistrial. The doctrine that "double jeopardy may not be invoked
after trial" may apply only when the Court finds that the “criminal trial was a
sham” because the prosecution representing the sovereign people in the
criminal case was denied due process. The "remand of the criminal case for
further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a
continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a
second jeopardy.
On the ground of double jeopardy, an acquittal is final and
unappealable. Prosecution cannot accomplish through a writ of certiorari
what it could not do so by appeal. However, Acquittal must be valid – an error
of jurisdiction is the only valid ground for review. If appeal is based on error of
judgment, it will amount to double jeopardy.
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34. DENNIS T. VILLAREAL vs. CONSUELO C. ALIGA.
G.R. No 166995 January 13, 2014
FACTS: Respondent Aliga is an accountant of Dentrade Inc., represented by
petitioner Villareal. On Oct. 31, 1996, an Information was filed against Aliga
for the crime of qualified theft thru falsification of commercial document.
Complainant Dennis Villareal is the President and General Manager of
Dentrade, Inc. He maintains checking accounts with the head office of
Chinabank and UCPB. He has under his employ, respondent who has
custody of personal checks of Villareal. Aliga prepares the personal checks
by typing its contents and submits them to Villareal for his signature. After the
signed checks are delivered to her, she in turn, gives the checks to the
messenger for encashment with the bank.
The case ensued when respondent Aliga take, steal and carry away from
complainant’s office, UCPB check in the amount of P5,000, once in
possession of said check, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously falsify the amount by changing it to P65,000 and having the same
encashed with the bank, thereafter misappropriate and convert to her own
personal use and benefit the amount of P60,000.
During her arraignment, respondent pleaded not guilty. She claimed that the
NBI agents arrested her but they did not inform her of her constitutional rights
to remain silent and to be assisted by counsel.
The RTC found the accused Aliga guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged (qualified theft thru falsification of commercial document). It
appearing that the amount of P60,000 subject of the offense was already
returned by the accused, the Court absolves the accused of civil liability in this
case.
Aliga appealed to the CA which reversed and set aside the judgment of the
RTC on the grounds that:
1) Her admission or confession of guilt before the NBI authorities, which
already qualifies as a custodial investigation, is inadmissible in
evidence because she was not informed of her rights to remain silent
and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of her
own choice; and
2) The totality of the circumstantial evidence presented by the
prosecution is insufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence
of the accused.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI
SHOULD BE DISMISSED ON THE GROUND OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY.
HELD: YES.
The petition should have been filed by the State through the OSG. In criminal
cases, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case against him
can only be appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State.
The private complainant or the offended party may question such acquittal or
dismissal only insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned. In
Rodriguez v. Gadiane, it was categorically stated that if the criminal case is
dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, the appeal on the criminal
aspect of the case must be instituted by the Solicitor General in behalf of the
State.
It is well settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State,
the interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited
to the civil liability. Thus, in the prosecution of the offense, the complainant's
role is limited to that of a witness for the prosecution.
In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds,
the rules state that the petition may be filed by the person aggrieved. In such
case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party or
complainant. The complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case
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so he may file such special civil action questioning the decision or action of
the respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, complainant
should not bring the action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The
action may be prosecuted in [the] name of said complainant.
In the case at bar, the petition filed essentially assails the criminal, not the
civil, aspect of the CA Decision. It must even be stressed that petitioner never
challenged before the CA, and in this Court, the RTC judgment which
absolved respondent Aliga from civil liability in view of the return of the
₱60,000.00 subject matter of the offense on October 30, 1996. Therefore, the
petition should have been filed only by the State through the OSG. Petitioner
lacks the personality or legal standing to question the CA Decision because it
is only the OSG which can bring actions on behalf of the State in criminal
proceedings before the Supreme Court and the CA. Unlike in Montañez v.
Cipriano17 where we adopted a liberal view, the OSG, in its Comment on this
case,18 neither prayed that the petition be granted nor expressly ratified and
adopted as its own the petition for the People of the Philippines. Instead, it
merely begged to excuse itself from filing a Comment due to conflict of interest
and for not having been impleaded in the case.
Petitioner also committed another procedural blunder. A petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules should have been filed instead of
herein petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. The People may assail
a judgment of acquittal only via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules. If the petition, regardless of its nomenclature, merely calls for an
ordinary review of the findings of the court a quo, the constitutional right
of the accused against double jeopardy would be violated.
Section 21, Article III of the Constitution provides that "no person shall be
twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense." The rule is
that a judgment acquitting the accused is final and immediately executory
upon its promulgation, and that accordingly, the State may not seek its review
without placing the accused in double jeopardy. Such acquittal is final and
unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy whether it happens at the trial
court or on appeal at the CA. Thus, the State is proscribed from appealing the
judgment of acquittal of the accused to this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court.
A judgment of acquittal may be assailed by the People in a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court without placing the accused in
double jeopardy. However, in such case, the People is burdened to establish
that the court a quo, in this case, the Sandiganbayan, acted without
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion generally refers to capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The
abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion
of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law, or to act
in contemplation of law or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. No grave abuse of
discretion may be attributed to a court simply because of its alleged
misapplication of facts and evidence, and erroneous conclusions based on
said evidence. Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction, and
not errors or mistakes in the findings and conclusions of the trial court.21
However, the rule against double jeopardy is not without exceptions, which
are: (1) Where there has been deprivation of due process and where there is
a finding of a mistrial, or (2) Where there has been a grave abuse of discretion
under exceptional circumstances.31 Unfortunately for petitioner, We find that
these exceptions do not exist in this case.
First, there is no deprivation of due process or a mistrial.1âwphi1 In fact,
petitioner did not make any allegation to that effect. What the records show is
that during the trial, both parties had more than sufficient occasions to be
heard and to present their evidence. The same is true during the appeal
before the CA. The State, represented by the OSG, was not deprived of a fair
opportunity to prove its case. And second, no grave abuse of discretion could
be attributed to the CA. It could not be said that its judgment was issued
without jurisdiction, and, for this reason, void. Again, petitioner did not even
allege that the CA gravely abused its discretion. Instead, what he asserted
was that the CA "gravely erred" in the evaluation and assessment of the
evidence presented by the parties. Certainly, what he questioned was the
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purported errors of judgment or those involving misappreciation of evidence
or errors of law, which, as aforesaid, cannot be raised and be reviewed in a
Rule 65 petition. To repeat, a writ of certiorari can only correct errors of
jurisdiction or those involving the commission of grave abuse of discretion,
not those which call for the evaluation of evidence and factual findings.
The case does not fall within the exception to rule on double jeopardy.
The petition is dismissed.
35. IVLER vs. MODESTO-SAN PEDRO
GR 172716, 17 November 2010
FACTS: Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler
(petitioner) was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367) for injuries
sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2)
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property
(Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of respondent Ponce’s husband
Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce’s vehicle. Petitioner
posted bail for his temporary release in both cases.
ISSUE: Does Ivler’s constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause
bars further proceedings in the information charging him with reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property?
Yes, the Supreme Court dismissed the Information against Ivler in Criminal
Case No. 82366 (Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage
to Property) against petitioner Jason Ivler pending with the MTC on the ground
of double jeopardy.
DOCTRINES:
1) Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime; its Consequences on
Persons and Property are Material Only to Determine the Penalty
Quasi-offenses penalize “the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the
dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible,”
unlike willful offenses which punish the intentional criminal act. These
structural and conceptual features of quasi-offenses set them apart from the
mass of intentional crimes.
2) Prior Conviction or Acquittal of Reckless Imprudence Bars
Subsequent Prosecution for the Same Quasi-offense
Once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the
accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of
the quasi-offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if
intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus
the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof.
The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the
penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless
act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or several
persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and
cannot be split into different crimes and prosecutions.
3) Article 48 Does Not Apply to Acts Penalized Under Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code
Article 48 is a procedural device allowing single prosecution of multiple
felonies falling under either of two categories: (1) when a single act constitutes
two or more grave or less grave felonies (thus excluding from its operation
light felonies); and (2) when an offense is a necessary means for committing
the other. The legislature crafted this procedural tool to benefit the accused
who, in lieu of serving multiple penalties, will only serve the maximum of the
penalty for the most serious crime.
In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as
a felony but the mental attitude behind the act, the dangerous recklessness,
lack of care or foresight, a single mental attitude regardless of the resulting
consequences. Thus, Article 365 was crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in
one or more consequences. Article 48 is incongruent to the notion of quasi-
crime resulting in one or more consequences.
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Article 48 is incongruent to the notion of quasi-crimes under Article 365. It is
conceptually impossible for a quasi-offense to stand for (1) a single act
constituting two or more grave or less grave felonies; or (2) an offense which
is a necessary means for committing another.
Prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge
regardless of the number or severity of the consequences. In imposing
penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the penalties under Article 365
for each consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no splitting
of charges under Article 365, and only one information shall be filed in the
same first level court.
36. VALEROSO vs. PEOPLE
GR No. 164815, February 22, 2008.
FACTS: Petitioner was charged with the crime of illegal possession of
firearms and ammunition under the first paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No.
1866, as amended. It provides that the penalty of reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who
shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any
firearm, part of firearm, ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument used or
intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition.
P.D. No. 1866, as amended, was the governing law at the time petitioner
committed the offense on July 10, 1996. However, R.A. No. 8294 amended
P.D. No. 1866 on July 6, 1997, during the pendency of the case with the trial
court. The present law now states: the penalty of prision correccional in its
maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen Thousand Pesos
(P15,000) shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully
manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low-powered firearm.
ISSUE: Whether the prescribed penalty in the new law RA No. 8294 for illegal
possession of firearms shall be retroactively applied to the case of the
petitioner Valeroso.
RULING: As a general rule, penal laws should not have retroactive
application, lest they acquire the character of an ex post facto law. An
exception to this rule, however, is when the law is advantageous to the
accused. According to Chief Justice Araullo, this is not as a right of the
offender, but founded on the very principles on which the right of the State to
punish and the commination of the penalty are based, and regards it not as
an exception based on political considerations, but as a rule founded on
principles of strict justice. Although an additional fine of P15,000.00 is
imposed by R.A. No. 8294, the same is still advantageous to the accused,
considering that the imprisonment is lowered to prision correccional in its
maximum period from reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua under P.D. No. 1866.
37. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT
(PCGG) v. THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN CONCHITA
CARPIO-MORALES, et. al.
G.R. No. 206357, 12 November 2014, THIRD DIVISION (Velasco, Jr., J.)
FACTS : In 1992, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order
No. 13 creating a Presidential Ad-Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest
Loans (Ad Hoc Committee) and Memorandum Order No. 61 prescribing
certain criteria to be used by the Ad Hoc Committee as a guide in investigating
and studying loans granted by government financing institutions that amount
to behest loans. One of the loan accounts referred to the Ad Hoc Committee
for investigation was that of Resorts Hotel Corporation (RHC), which was
37.2% owned by Rodolfo Cuenca, a known Marcos business associate. From
1969 to 1977, RHC obtained a number of loans totaling P86.9 million. To
secure said loans, RHC offered as collaterals the assets that were acquired
by these loans. In 1980, 40% of the amount were converted into DBP’s
common shareholding in RHC, and the balance of P58.4 million was
restructured. The properties were foreclosed in 1983 with arrearages of
P11.97 million.
On the basis of the foregoing, the Ad Hoc Committee found that DBP’s total
exposure as of 1986 amounted to P99.1 million. On January 4, 1993, the Ad
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Hoc Committee then submitted a report to the President where it concluded
that the RHC account qualifies as behest in character. An Affidavit-Complaint
was filed on January 6, 2003 with the Office of the Ombudsman, against
respondent directors and officers of RHC and the directors of DBP for violation
of Sections 3(e) and 3 (g) of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. The Ombudsman issued an Order dismissing the
Affidavit-Complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration but the Ombudsman issued another Order dismissing the
complaint on the ground of prescription, effectively denying the motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether respondent Ombudsman committed grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing the Affidavit-Complaint dated January 6, 2003 on the
ground of prescription UST Law Review, Vol. LIX, No. 1, May 2015
RULING: The petition is without merit. RA 3019, Section 11 provides that all
offenses punishable under saidlaw shall prescribe in ten (10) years. This
period was later increased tofifteen (15) years with the passage of Batas
Pambansa (BP) Blg. 195, whichtook effect on March 16, 1982. This does not
mean, however, that the longerprescriptive period shall apply to all violations
of RA 3019.
Following the Court’s pronouncements in People v. Pacificador, the rule is
that “in the interpretation of the law on prescription of crimes, that which is
more favorable to the accused is to be adopted.” As such, the longer
prescriptive period of 15 years pursuant to BP Blg. 195 cannot be applied to
crimes committed prior to the effectivity of the said amending law on March16,
1982.
Considering that the crimes were committed in 1969, 1970, 1973,1975, and
1977, the applicable prescriptive period thereon is the ten-year period set in
RA 3019, the law in force at that time. What is, then, left for the Court’s
determination is the reckoning point for the 10-year period. Notably, RA 3019
is silent as to when the period of prescription shall begin to run. This void,
however, is remedied by Act No. 3326, Section 2 of which provides in part:
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceeding for its investigation
and punishment.
Based on the above, there are two reckoning points for the counting of the
prescription of an offense:
1) the day of the commission of the violation of the law; and
2) if the day when the violation was committed be not known, then it shall
begin to run from the discovery of said violation and the institution of judicial
proceedings for investigation and punishment.
In the case at bar, involving as it does the grant of behest loans which the
Court has recognized as a violation that, by their nature, could be concealed
from the public eye by the simple expedient of suppressing their
documentation, the second mode applies. The Court, therefore, counts the
running of the prescriptive period from the date of discovery thereof on
January 4,1993, when the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee
reported to the President its findings and conclusions anent RHC’s loans. This
being the case, the filing by the PCGG of its Affidavit-Complaint before the
Office ofthe Ombudsman on January 6, 2003, a little over ten (10) years from
the date of discovery of the crimes, is clearly belated. Undoubtedly, the ten-
year period within which to institute the action has already lapsed, making it
proper for the Ombudsman to dismiss petitioner’s complaint on the ground of
prescription.
38. BUREAU OF CUSTOMS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (BOCEA)
vs. HON. MARGARITO TEVES
FACTS: On January 25, 2005, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
signed into law R.A. No. 9335 (Attrition Act of 2005) which took effect on
February 11, 2005.
The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed
their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through
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the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue
Performance Evaluation Board (Board).
Contending that the enactment and implementation of R.A. No. 9335 are
tainted with constitutional infirmities in violation of the fundamental rights of its
members, petitioner Bureau of Customs Employees Association (BOCEA), an
association of rank-and-file employees of the Bureau of Customs (BOC),
directly filed the present petition before the Supreme Court.
person or group of persons (and not upon the general community) without a
prior charge or demand, without notice and hearing, without an opportunity to
defend, without any of the civilized forms and safeguards of the judicial
process as we know it. Such is the archetypal bill of attainder wielded as a
means of legislative oppression.

BOCEA argued, among others, that its members and other BOC employees
are in great danger of losing their jobs should they fail to meet the required
quota provided under the law, in clear violation of their constitutional right to
security of tenure, and at their and their respective families’ prejudice.

ISSUE: Whether Republic Act 9335 (Attrition Act of 2005) is a bill of attainder
and hence, unconstitutional because it inflicts punishment through legislative
fiat upon a particular group or class of officials and employees without trial.

RULING: No. A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment

on individuals or members of a particular group without a judicial trial.
Essential to a bill of attainder are a specification of certain individuals or a
group of individuals, the imposition of a punishment, penal or otherwise, and
the lack of judicial trial.

R.A. No. 9335 does not possess the elements of a bill of attainder. It does not
seek to inflict punishment without a judicial trial. R.A. No. 9335 merely lays
down the grounds for the termination of a BIR or BOC official or employee
and provides for the consequences thereof. The democratic processes are
still followed and the constitutional rights of the concerned employee are
amply protected.

A bill of attainder is essentially a usurpation of judicial power by a legislative

body. It envisages and effects the imposition of a penalty — the deprivation
of life or liberty or property — not by the ordinary processes of judicial trial,
but by legislative fiat. While cast in the form of special legislation, a bill of
attainder (or bill of pains and penalties, if it prescribed a penalty other than
death) is in intent and effect a penal judgment visited upon an identified

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