Carrier Liable Despite Accident Caused by Third Party

CIVIL LAW REVIEW II BATCH 2017 CASE DIGEST
SPEACIAL CONTRACTS (TORTS & DAM AGES)
AIR FRANCE vs CARRASCOSO ISSUE:

(“first class” plane ticket) Whether Air France is liable for damages, and on
G.R. No. L-21438, September 28, 1966 (18 what basis?
SCRA 155)
RULING:
FACTS : Yes. Air France's liability is based on culpa
Rafael Carrascoso (Plaintiff) bought “first class” contractual and culpa aquiliana.
round trip airplane ticket for his pilgrimage trip,
from Manila to Rome, from Air France Culpa Contractual – Because there exists a
(Defendant) through its authorized agent, contract of carriage between Air France. For Air
Philippine Airlines, Inc. France issued “first class” air passage to
Carrascoso; that there is failure to furnish “first
From Manila to Bangkok, Carrascoso travelled class” transport from Bangkok; and that such
“First class,” but at Bangkok, the manager of Air failure is caused with bad faith when plaintiff is
France forced plaintiff to vacate the first class seat compelled to leave his first class accommodation
he was occupying because according to witness, by Air France's employee alleging there is
Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a “white man”, who someone better entitled to the seat, by reason of
the Manager alleged to have a better right to the which plaintiff suffered inconvenience,
seat. When plaintiff was asked to vacate his “first embarrassment, and humiliation.
class” seat, as to be expected, refused, and told Air
France's Manager that his seat would be taken Cupla aquiliana – Because of the discourteous
over his dead body. And since many Filipino conduct on the part of Air France's employee
passengers got nervous in the tourist class when towards Carrasscoso, it commits violation of
they found out that a commotion ensued between public duty by Air France which is to provide its
Mr. Carrascoso and the manager, their group passengers with kindness, respect, courtesy and
came all across to the plaintiff and pacified him to due consideration.
give his seat to the “white man”; and plaintiff
reluctantly gave his “first class” seat in the plane. “The responsibility of an employer for the tortious
act of its employees need not be essayed. It is well
After the trip, Carrascoso sued Air France for settled in law. For the willful malevolent act of
damages for the embarrassment he suffered petitioner's manager, petitioner, his employer,
during the trip since he was forced to leave his must answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says:
accomodation after he was already seated. The
CFI Manila ruled in favor of the plaintiff and ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes
awarded him refund and damages. The Court of loss or injury to another in a manner that
Appeals reduced the amount of refund from Php is contrary to morals, good customs or
393.20 to Php 383.10 and affirmed the decision of public policy shall compensate the latter
the lower court “in all other respects.” for the damage.
Air France assailed that the decision of the trial In parallel circumstances, we applied the
court and the CA. It avers that the issuance of the foregoing legal precept; and, we held that upon
“first class ticket” to Carrascoso was not the provisions of Article 2219 (10), Civil Code,
assurance that he will be seated in first class moral damages are recoverable.
because allegedly in truth and fact, it is not the
true intent of the parties.
ARELLANO UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW Page 1

A contract to transport passengers is quite the carrier liable for the mental suffering of said
different in kind and degree from any other passenger.
contractual relation. And this, because of the
relation which an air-carrier sustains with the Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso is one
public. Its business is mainly with the travelling attended with public duty. The stress of
public. It invites people to avail of the comforts Carrascoso's action as we have said, is placed
and advantages it offers. The contract of air upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of
carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended public duty by the petitioner air carrier — a case
with a public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.
carrier's employees, naturally, could give ground
for an action for damages.
Passengers do not contract merely for

transportation. They have a right to be treated by
the carrier's employees with kindness, respect,
courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled
to be protected against personal misconduct,
injurious language, indignities and abuses from
such employees. So it is, that any rule or
discourteous conduct on the part of employees
towards a passenger gives the latter an action for
damages against the carrier.
Thus, "Where a steamship company had

accepted a passenger's check, it was a breach
of contract and a tort, giving a right of action for
its agent in the presence of third persons to falsely
notify her that the check was worthless and
demand payment under threat of ejection, though
the language used was not insulting and she was
not ejected." And this, because, although the
relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual
both in origin and nature" nevertheless "the act
that breaks the contract may be also a tort". And
in another case, "Where a passenger on a railroad
train, when the conductor came to collect his fare
tendered him the cash fare to a point where the
train was scheduled not to stop, and told him that
as soon as the train reached such point he would
pay the cash fare from that point to destination,
there was nothing in the conduct of the passenger
which justified the conductor in using insulting
language to him, as by calling him a lunatic," and
the Supreme Court of South Carolina there held

CALALAS VS. CA (332 SCRA 256), 2000 extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. 1733
G.R. No. 122039 and 1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily
shifts to the common carrier the burden of proof.
FACTS:
Private Respondent Sunga took a jeepney 2. No.
owned and operated by Petitioner Vicente As a general rule, moral damages are not
Calalas. Since the jeepney is already full capacity recoverable in actions for damages predicated on
the conducter gave her an extension seat which is a breach of contract for it is not one of the items
a “wooden stool” connected to the rear end of the enumerated under Art. 2219 of the Civil Code. As
jeep. When one of the passengers got of the jeep, an exception, such damages are recoverable: (1)
Sunga gave way when an Isuze truck driven by in cases in which the mishap results in the death
Verena and owned by Salva bumped the left rear of a passenger, as provided in Art. 1764, in
portion of the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was relation to Art. 2206(3) of the Civil Code; and (2)
injured and hospitalized. Subsequently, she sued in the cases in which the carrier is guilty of fraud
Calalas for damages alleging breach of contract of or bad faith, as provided in Art. 2220.
carriage. Calalas on the other hand filed a third
party complaint against Salva, the owner of the In this case, there is no legal basis for
truck. The lower court rendered judgment against awarding moral damages since there was no
Salva and absolve Calalas of liability holding that factual finding by the appellate court that
it was the owner of the truck who is responsible petitioner acted in bad faith in the performance of
for the accident. On appeal the CA reverse the the contract of carriage. Sunga’s contention that
decision contending that the action filed against petitioner’s admission in open court that the
Calalas is based on breach of contract of carriage. driver of the jeepney failed to assist her in going
to a nearby hospital cannot be construed as an
ISSUES: admission of bad faith. The fact that it was the
1. Whether or not Petitioner Calalas is liable for driver of the Isuzu truck who took her to the
damages for the breach of contract of carriage hospital does not imply that petitioner was
action filed by Sunga; utterly indifferent to the plight of his injured
2. Whether or no Calalas is liable for payment of passenger. If at all, it is merely implied
moral damages. recognition by Verena that he was the one at fault
for the accident.
HELD:
1. Yes.
Consequently, in quasi-delict, the
negligence or fault should be clearly established
because it is the basis of the action, whereas in
breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted
merely by proving the existence of the contract
and the fact that the obligor, in this case the
common carrier, failed to transport his passenger
safely to his destination. In case of death or
injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code
provides that common carriers are presumed to
have been at fault or to have acted negligently
unless they prove that they observed

HEIRS OF GUARING, JR. vs. CA, PHILIPPINE Whether or not the judgment in the criminal case
RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., and ANGELES CUEVAS extinguished the liability of private respondent
[G.R. No. 108395. March 7, 1997] Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and its driver,
Angeles Cuevas, for damages for the death of
FACTS: TeodoroGuaring, Jr.
This case arose from an unfortunate vehicular
HELD:
accident which happened on November 7, 1987,
along the North Expressway in San Rafael, It is now settled that acquittal of the accused, even
Mexico, Pampanga. Involved in the accident were if based on a finding that he is not guilty, does not
a Mitsubishi Lancer car driven by carry with it the extinction of the civil liability
TeodoroGuaring, Jr., who died as a result of the based on quasi delict.
mishap, Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 415, driven by
It is noteworthy that the accident in that case
Angeles Cuevas, and a Toyota Cressida car, driven
also involved a Philippine Rabbit bus and that, as
by Eligio Enriquez. The Mitsubishi Lancer was
in this case, the acquittal of the bus driver was
heading north, at the speed of 80 to 90 kilometers
based on reasonable doubt. We held that the civil
per hour. Following it was the Philippine Rabbit
case for damages was not barred since the cause
Bus No. 415, with Plate No. CVD-584. On the other
of action of the heirs was based on quasi delict.
hand, the Toyota Cressida was cruising on the
opposite lane, bound for Manila. Even if damages are sought on the basis of crime
and not quasi delict, the acquittal of the bus driver
Killed in the collision were TeodoroGuaring,
will not bar recovery of damages because the
Jr., who was driving the Lancer, and Dolores
acquittal was based not on a finding that he was
Enriquez, who was riding in the Cressida, while
not guilty but only on reasonable doubt.
injured were Bonifacio Clemente and the
occupants of the Toyota Cressida.
Private respondents, on the other hand,
presented evidence tending to show that the
accident was due to the negligence of the
deceased Guaring.
On May 16, 1990, the Regional Trial Court
rendered judgment finding Philippine Rabbit Bus
Lines, Inc. and its driver, Angeles Cuevas, at fault,
and holding them solidarily liable for damages to
petitioners.
On December 16, 1992, the Court of Appeals
rendered a decision, setting aside the decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila in the civil
action for damages and dismissing the complaint
The appellate court held that since the basis
of petitioners action was the alleged negligence of
the bus driver, the latters acquittal in the criminal
case rendered the civil case based on quasi
delict untenable.
ISSUE:

HEIRS OF GUARING, JR. vs. CA, PHILIPPINE case rendered the civil case based on quasi
RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., and ANGELES CUEVAS delict untenable.
[G.R. No. 108395. March 7, 1997]
ISSUE:
FACTS: Whether or not the judgment in the criminal case
This case arose from an unfortunate vehicular extinguished the liability of private respondent
accident which happened on November 7, 1987, Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and its driver,
along the North Expressway in San Rafael, Angeles Cuevas, for damages for the death of
Mexico, Pampanga. Involved in the accident were TeodoroGuaring, Jr.
a Mitsubishi Lancer car driven by
HELD:
TeodoroGuaring, Jr., who died as a result of the
mishap, Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 415, driven by It is now settled that acquittal of the accused, even
Angeles Cuevas, and a Toyota Cressida car, driven if based on a finding that he is not guilty, does not
by Eligio Enriquez. The Mitsubishi Lancer was carry with it the extinction of the civil liability
heading north, at the speed of 80 to 90 kilometers based on quasi delict.
per hour. Following it was the Philippine Rabbit
It is noteworthy that the accident in that case
Bus No. 415, with Plate No. CVD-584. On the other
also involved a Philippine Rabbit bus and that, as
hand, the Toyota Cressida was cruising on the
opposite lane, bound for Manila. in this case, the acquittal of the bus driver was
based on reasonable doubt. We held that the civil
case for damages was not barred since the cause
Killed in the collision were TeodoroGuaring, Jr.,
of action of the heirs was based on quasi delict.
who was driving the Lancer, and Dolores
Enriquez, who was riding in the Cressida, while Even if damages are sought on the basis of crime
injured were Bonifacio Clemente and the and not quasi delict, the acquittal of the bus driver
occupants of the Toyota Cressida. will not bar recovery of damages because the
acquittal was based not on a finding that he was
Private respondents, on the other hand,
not guilty but only on reasonable doubt.
presented evidence tending to show that the
accident was due to the negligence of the
deceased Guaring.
On May 16, 1990, the Regional Trial Court
rendered judgment finding Philippine Rabbit Bus
Lines, Inc. and its driver, Angeles Cuevas, at fault,
and holding them solidarily liable for damages to
petitioners.
On December 16, 1992, the Court of Appeals

rendered a decision, setting aside the decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila in the civil
action for damages and dismissing the complaint
The appellate court held that since the basis of

petitioners action was the alleged negligence of
the bus driver, the latters acquittal in the criminal

BATANGAS LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS COMPANY, in the case at bar, the damages sought to be
INC. VS COURT OF APPEALS recovered were based on quasi-delict or Article
64 SCRA 427 2176 & 2180 of the Civil Code which is an
June 27, 1975 independent civil action.
Facts:
In February 1963, Ilagan was driving a bus owned
by Batangas Laguna Tayaban Bus Company along
Manila South Super Highway. He sped pass a big
cargo truck thereby taking the opposite lane and
he hit the car driven by a certain de los Reyes
which resulted to the latter’s death and the
latter’s niece’s death and causing serious injuries
to the other car passengers. Ilagan was sued for
homicide through reckless imprudence and while
the case was pending in the CA the victims sued
Ilagan and BLTB for damages via an independent
civil action based on Article 2180. BLTB assailed
the suit as it invoked the opinion penned by
Justice Capistrano in Corpus vs Paje which states
that under Article 33 of the Civil Code it excludes
criminal negligence as one of those which an
independent civil action can be filed, hence
homicide through reckless imprudence or
criminal negligence comes under the general rule
that the acquittal of the defendant in the criminal
action is a bar to his civil liability based upon the
same criminal act notwithstanding that the
injured party reserved his right to institute a
separate civil action; and based on this, BLTB
wanted the dismissal of the civil suits pending the
criminal suit in the CA.
Issue:
Whether or not a civil suit can be filed
independently of the criminal negligence case
pending before the CA.
Held:
Yes. The opinion of Justice Capistrano in Corpus
vs Paje is not controlling because it is not
doctrinal – this is because the majority of the
court did not agree with it. Also, the Corpus case
was different because the damages claimed there
were based on the same criminal negligence. But

PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMERCE VS. CA negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
(269 SCRA 695), 1997 Such fault or negligence if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called
FACTS: a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of
RMC has 2 accounts wth PBC in connection with this Chapter."
its business of selling appliances.
There are three elements of a quasi-delict: (a)
From May 5, 1975 to July 16, 1976, petitioner damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or
Romeo Lipana entrusted RMC funds in the form of negligence of the defendant, or some other person
cash amounting to P304,979.74 to his secretary, for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the
Irene Yabut, to be deposited in the current connection of cause and effect between the fault
accounts of RMC with PBC. However, the said or negligence of the defendant and the damages
deposits were not credited to RMC's account but incurred by the plaintiff.
were deposited to the account of Yabut's
husband, Bienvenido Cotas who also has an In the case at bench, there is no dispute as to the
account with the same bank. During this period, damage suffered by RMC (P304,979.74). It is in
PBC regularly furnishes private respondent with ascribing fault or negligence which caused the
monthly statements showing its current accounts damage where the parties point to each other as
balances but Romeo Lipana failed to check these the culprit.
monthly statements of account reposing
complete trust and confidence on PBC. This Negligence is the omission to do something which
practice of Irene Yabut went on for one year. a reasonable man, guided by those considerations
which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human
Upon discovery of the loss of its funds, RMC affairs, would do, or the doing of something which
demanded from PBC the return of its money, but a prudent and reasonable man would do.
its demand went unheeded. It then filed a
collection suit before the RTC of Pasig where the Applying the above test, it appears that the bank's
court found PBC to be negligent. The CA affirmed teller, Ms. Azucena Mabayad, was negligent in
the decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition. validating, officially stamping and signing all the
deposit slips prepared and presented by Ms.
ISSUE: Yabut, despite the glaring fact that the duplicate
1. WON the proximate cause of the loss is the copy was not completely accomplished, contrary
negligence of RMC and Romeo Lipana in to the self-imposed procedure of the bank with
entrusting cash to a dishonest employee. respect to the proper validation of deposit slips,
2. WON the failure of RMC to cross-check the original or duplicate, as testified to by Ms.
bank's statements of account with its own records Mabayad herself.
during the entire period of more than one (1) year
is the proximate cause of the commission of Clearly, Ms. Mabayad failed to observe this very
subsequent frauds and misappropriation important procedure. The fact that the duplicate
committed by Ms. Irene Yabut. slip was not compulsorily required by the bank in
accepting deposits should not relieve the PBC
HELD: from responsibility. The odd circumstance that
1. No. Our law on quasi-delicts states: such duplicate copy lacked one vital information
"Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes — that of the name of the account holder —
damage to another, there being fault or should have already put Ms. Mabayad on guard.

Rather than readily validating the incomplete the act of Ms. Mabayad in negligently validating
duplicate copy, she should have proceeded more the incomplete duplicate copy of the deposit slip,
cautiously by being more probing as to the true Ms. Irene Yabut would not have the facility with
reason why the name of the account holder in the which to perpetrate her fraudulent scheme with
duplicate slip was left blank while that in the impunity.
original was filled up. She should not have been so
naive in accepting hook, line and sinker the too Furthermore, under the doctrine of "last clear
shallow excuse of Ms. Irene Yabut to the effect chance" (also referred to, at times as
that since the duplicate copy was only for her "supervening negligence" or as "discovered
personal record, she would simply fill up the peril"), petitioner bank was indeed the culpable
blank space later on. A "reasonable man of party. This doctrine, in essence, states that where
ordinary prudence" would not have given both parties are negligent, but the negligent act of
credence to such explanation and would have one is appreciably later in time than that of the
insisted that the space left blank be filled up as a other, or when it is impossible to determine
condition for validation. Unfortunately, this was whose fault or negligence should be attributed to
not how bank teller Mabayad proceeded thus the incident, the one who had the last clear
resulting in huge losses to RMC. opportunity to avoid the impending harm and
failed to do so is chargeable with the
Negligence here lies not only on the part of Ms. consequences thereof. Stated differently, the rule
Mabayad but also on the part of the bank itself in would also mean that an antecedent negligence of
its lackadaisical selection and supervision of Ms. a person does not preclude the recovery of
Mabayad. This was exemplified in the testimony damages for the supervening negligence of, or bar
of Mr. Romeo Bonifacio, then Manager of the Pasig a defense against liability sought by another, if the
Branch of PBC and now its Vice-President, to the latter, who had the last fair chance, could have
effect that, while he ordered the investigation of avoided the impending harm by the exercise of
the incident, he never came to know that blank due diligence. Here, assuming that private
deposit slips were validated in total disregard of respondent RMC was negligent in entrusting cash
the bank's validation procedures. to a dishonest employee, thus providing the latter
with the opportunity to defraud the company, as
It was this negligence of Ms. Azucena Mabayad, advanced by the petitioner, yet it cannot be
coupled by the negligence of the petitioner bank denied that the petitioner bank, thru its teller, had
in the selection and supervision of its bank teller, the last clear opportunity to avert the injury
which was the proximate cause of the loss incurred by its client, simply by faithfully
suffered by the private respondent, and not the observing their self-imposed validation
latter's act of entrusting cash to a dishonest procedure.
employee, as insisted by the petitioners.
At this juncture, it is worth to discuss the degree
Proximate cause is determined on the facts of of diligence ought to be exercised by banks in
each case upon mixed considerations of logic, dealing with their clients.
common sense, policy and precedent.
Jurisprudence defines proximate cause as "that The New Civil Code provides:
cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, "ART. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, consists in the omission of that diligence which is
produces the injury, and without which the result required by the nature of the obligation and
would not have occurred. . . ." In this case, absent corresponds with the circumstances of the

persons, of the time and of the place. When from her for whatever they shall be ordered to
negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of pay in this case.
articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.
If the law or contract does not state the diligence The foregoing notwithstanding, it cannot be
which is to be observed in the performance, that denied that, indeed, private respondent was
which is expected of a good father of a family shall likewise negligent in not checking its monthly
be required. (1104a)" statements of account. Had it done so, the
company would have been alerted to the series of
In the case of banks, however, the degree of frauds being committed against RMC by its
diligence required is more than that of a good secretary. The damage would definitely not have
father of a family. Considering the fiduciary ballooned to such an amount if only RMC,
nature of their relationship with their depositors, particularly Romeo Lipana, had exercised even a
banks are duty bound to treat the accounts of little vigilance in their financial affairs. This
their clients with the highest degree of care. omission by RMC amounts to contributory
negligence which shall mitigate the damages that
The point is that as a business affected with public may be awarded to the private respondent 23
interest and because of the nature of its functions, under Article 2179 of the New Civil Code, to wit:
the bank is under obligation to treat the accounts ". . . When the plaintiff's own negligence was the
of its depositors with meticulous care, always immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he
having in mind the fiduciary nature of their cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was
relationship. In the case before us, it is apparent only contributory, the immediate and proximate
that the petitioner bank was remiss in that duty cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of
and violated that relationship. due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but
the courts shall mitigate the damages to be
2. No. While it is true that had private respondent awarded."
checked the monthly statements of account sent
by the petitioner bank to RMC, the latter would In view of this, we believe that the demands of
have discovered the loss early on, such cannot be substantial justice are satisfied by allocating the
used by the petitioners to escape liability. This damage on a 60-40 ratio. Thus, 40% of the
omission on the part of the private respondent damage awarded by the respondent appellate
does not change the fact that were it not for the court, except the award of P25,000.00 attorney's
wanton and reckless negligence of the fees, shall be borne by private respondent RMC;
petitioners' employee in validating the only the balance of 60% needs to be paid by the
incomplete duplicate deposit slips presented by petitioners. The award of attorney's fees shall be
Ms. Irene Yabut, the loss would not have occurred. borne exclusively by the petitioners.
Considering, however, that the fraud was
committed in a span of more than one (1) year
covering various deposits, common human
experience dictates that the same would not have
been possible without any form of collusion
between Ms. Yabut and bank teller Mabayad. Ms.
Mabayad was negligent in the performance of her
duties as bank teller nonetheless. Thus, the
petitioners are entitled to claim reimbursement

SOLIMAN vs. TUASON Solomon was not a pupil, student or apprentice of

209 SCRA 47 [1992] the school.
FACTS: While the plaintiff was in the campus Respondent Judge granted private respondent
ground and premises of the defendant, REPUBLIC school's motion to dismiss, holding that security
CENTRAL COLLEGES, as he was and is still a guard Jimmy Solomon was not an employee of the
regular enrolled student of said school taking his school which accordingly could not be held liable
morning classes, the defendant, JIMMY B. for his acts or omissions. Petitioner moved for
SOLOMON, who was on said date and hour in the reconsideration, without success.
premises of said school performing his duties and
obligations as a duly appointed security guard RULING: As a general rule, a client or customer of
under the employment, supervision and control a security agency has no hand in selecting who
of his employer-defendant R.L. SECURITY among the pool of security guards or watchmen
AGENCY, INC., headed by Mr. Benjamin Serrano, employed by the agency shall be assigned to it;
without any provocation, in a wanton, fraudulent, the duty to observe the diligence of a good father
reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner, with of a family in the selection of the guards cannot, in
intent to kill, attack, assault, strike and shoot the the ordinary course of events, be demanded from
plaintiff on the abdomen with a .38 Caliber the client whose premises or property are
Revolver, a deadly weapon, which ordinarily such protected by the security guards. The fact that a
wound sustained would have caused plaintiff's client company may give instructions or
death were it not for the timely medical directions to the security guards assigned to it,
assistance given to him. The plaintiff was treated does not, by itself, render the client responsible as
and confined at Angeles Medical Center, Angeles an employer of the security guards concerned and
City, and, as per doctor's opinion, the plaintiff may liable for their wrongful acts or omissions. Those
not be able to attend to his regular classes and will instructions or directions are ordinarily no more
be incapacitated in the performance of his usual than requests commonly envisaged in the
work for a duration of from three to four months contract for services entered into with the
before his wounds would be completely healed. security agency. There being no employer-
employee relationship between the Colleges and
Private respondent Colleges filed a motion to Jimmy Solomon, petitioner student cannot
dismiss, contending that the complaint stated no impose vicarious liability upon the Colleges for
cause of action against it. Private respondent the acts of security guard Solomon.
argued that it is free from any liability for the
injuries sustained by petitioner student for the Since there is no question that Jimmy Solomon
reason that private respondent school was not was not a pupil or student or an apprentice of the
the employer of the security guard charged, Colleges, he being in fact an employee of the R.L.
Jimmy Solomon, and hence was not responsible Security Agency Inc., the other above-quoted
for any wrongful act of Solomon. Private paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code is
respondent school further argued that Article similarly not available for imposing liability upon
2180, 7th paragraph, of the Civil Code did not the Republic Central Colleges for the acts or
apply, since said paragraph holds teachers and omissions of Jimmy Solomon.
heads of establishment of arts and trades liable
for damages caused by their pupils and students
or apprentices, while security guard Jimmy

DULAY VS. CA
(GR No. 108017, April 3, 1995)
Facts: BBB’s employee killed the husband of AAA.

The latter sought to recover damages against BBB
for their vicarious responsibility for the injury
caused by its employee.
Issue: WON BBB may be held liable for the acts of

its employee.
Ruling: The NCC provides that whoever by act or

omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is
no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by
the provisions of this Chapter.
There is no justification for limiting the scope of

the above provision to acts or omissions resulting
from negligence. Well-entrenched is the doctrine
that it covers not only acts committed with
negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and
intentional.
When an injury is caused by the negligence of the

employee, there instantly arises a presumption of
law that there was negligence on the part of the
master or employer either in the selection of the
servant or employee, or in supervision over him
after selection or both.
The liability of the employer is direct and

immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior
recourse against the negligent employee and a
prior showing of the insolvency of such employee.
It is incumbent upon the employer to prove that

he exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of their
employee.

GARCIA VS. FLORIDO No. 25 by Pedro Tumala resulting in the

(52 CSRA 420), 1973 collision of the bus with the passenger car;
c. physical injuries and other damages sustained
FACTS: August 4, 1971: German C. Garcia, Chief of by as a result of the collision;
the Misamis Occidental Hospital, his wife, d. existence of direct causal connection between
Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester Francisco, the damage or prejudice and the fault or
bookkeeper of the hospital, hired and boarded a negligence of private respondents; and
PU car owned and operated by Marcelino Inesin, e. the absence of pre-existing contractual
and driven by respondent, Ricardo Vayson, for a relations between the parties.
round-trip from Oroquieta City to Zamboanga
City for the purpose of attending a conference. On Violation of traffic rules is merely descriptive of
August 4, 1971 9:30 a.m. While the PU car was the failure of said driver to observe for the
negotiating a slight curve on the national highway protection of the interests of others, that degree
at 21 km, it collided with an oncoming passenger of care, precaution and vigilance which the
bus owned and operated by the Mactan Transit circumstances justly demand, which failure
Co., Inc. and driven by Pedro Tumala. resulted in the injury on petitioners.
Garcia et al. sustained various physical injuries Petitioners never intervened in the criminal
which necessitated their medical treatment and action instituted by the Chief of Police against
hospitalization. They filed an action for damages respondent Pedro Tumala, much less has the said
against both drivers and their owners for driving criminal action been terminated either by
in a reckless, grossly negligent and imprudent conviction or acquittal of said accused. It is,
manner in gross violation of traffic rules and therefore, evident that by the institution of the
without due regard to the safety of the passengers present civil action for damages, petitioners have
aboard the PU car. in effect abandoned their right to press recovery
for damages in the criminal case, and have opted
RTC: Dismissed the case because it is not quasi- instead to recover them in the present civil case.
delict because there is a violation of law or traffic Petitioners have thereby foreclosed their right to
rules or regulations for excessive speeding intervene therein, or one where reservation to file
the civil action need not be made, for the reason
ISSUE: Whether or not Garcia et al. can still file a that the law itself (Article 33 of the Civil Code)
civil action for quasi-delict despite having a already makes the reservation and the failure of
criminal action. the offended party to do so does not bar him from
bringing the action, under the peculiar
HELD: YES. Decision appealed reversed and set circumstances of the case, We find no legal
aside, and the court a quo is directed to proceed justification for respondent court's order of
with the trial of the case. dismissal.
Essential averments for a quasi-delictual action

under Articles 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code
are present, namely:
a. act or omission of the private respondents;
b. presence of fault or negligence or the lack of
due care in the operation of the passenger bus

VALENZUELA VS. CA in no such situation. The law takes stock of

G.R. No. 115024, February 7, 1996 impulses of humanity when placed in threatening
or dangerous situations and does not require the
FACTS: same standard of thoughtful and reflective care
Plaintiff-appellant Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela from persons confronted by unusual and
was suddenly bumped by a vehicle driven by oftentimes threatening conditions. Consequently,
defendant-appellant Richard Li and owned by his evidence showed that plaintiff Valenzuela was not
employer, Alexander Commercial, Inc. Defendant expected to run the entire boulevard in search for
was at that time under the influence of liquor. a parking zone or turn on a dark Street or alley
Plaintiff was sent to UERM where she stayed for where she would likely find no one to help her. She
20 days and her leg was amputated and was properly halted at a lighted area of Aurora
replaced with an artificial one, incurring various Boulevard to verify the apparently flat tire and
hospital and other medical expenses. seek for aid.
RTC found Richard Li guilty of gross 2. YES.

negligence and liable for damages under Article
2176 of the Civil Code. Alexander Commercial, The applicable principle is the principle of
Inc., Li’s employer, jointly and severally liable for pater familias. The principle of respondeat
damages pursuant to Article 2180.On appeal, the superior, which holds the master liable for acts of
CA affirmed the lower court's decision but the servant (must be in the course of business),
absolved defendant Li's employer from liability. but that of pater familias, in which the liability
Morals damages were reduced. ultimately falls upon the employer, for his failure
to exercise the diligence of a good father of the
ISSUES: family in the selection and supervision of his
1. Whether or not plaintiff Valenzuela was employees. The use of the company car was partly
guilty of contributory negligence required by the nature of his work, but the
2. Whether or not the employer Alexander privilege of using it for non-official business is a
Commercial, Inc. should be held liable benefit, apparently referring to the fringe benefits
3. W/N the awarding of damages is proper. attaching to his position. To the opinion of the
court, Alexander Commercial, Inc. has not
HELD: successfully shown that it exercised the care and
1. NO. diligence of bonus pater familias in entrusting its
There was no issue as to the finding that company car to defendant Li. In addition, the
defendant Li was guilty of gross negligence in award of moral damages is proper the damage
driving his company-issued vehicle. The high done to her would not only be permanent, and
court agrees aslo that Valenzuela was not guilty of contuously changing and it has, to a great extent,
contributory negligence. Contributory negligence physical and psychological impact on her.
is conduct on the part of the injured party,
contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has
suffered, which falls below the standard to which
he is required to conform for his own protection.
Courts have traditionally been compelled to
recognize that an actor who is confronted with an
emergency is not to be held up to the standard of
conduct normally applied to an individual who is

CANLAS VS. ASIA SAVINGS which is required by the nature of the obligation
(326 SCRA 415), 2000 and corresponds with the circumstances of the
persons, of the time and of the place. When
FACTS: Petitioner, Osmundo S. Canlas, and negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of
private respondent, Vicente Mañ osca, decided to Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.
venture in a business where the former executed If the law or contract does not state the diligence
a SPA authorizing the latter to mortgage two which is to be observed in the performance, that
parcels of land situated in Parañaquea in his which is expected of a good father of a family shall
Osmundo's name and his wife Angelina Canlas. be required. (1104)"
Subsequently, Osmundo agreed to sell the said
parcels of land to Vicente Mañ osca, for The degree of diligence required of banks is more
P850,000.00, P500,000.00 payable within one than that of a good father of a family; in keeping
week,and the balance of P350,000.00 to serve as with their responsibility to exercise the necessary
Osmundo's investment in the business. Osmundo care and prudence in dealing even on a registered
delivered to Mañ osca the tct of the land involved. or titled property. The business of a bank is
Thus, Mañ osca issued two postdated checks but it affected with public interest, holding in trust the
turned out that the check covering the bigger money of the depositors, which bank deposits the
amount was not sufficiently funded. Mañ osca was bank should guard against loss due to negligence
able to mortgage the same parcels of land for or bad faith, by reason of which the bank would
P100,000.00 Vicente Mañ osca was granted a loan be denied the protective mantle of the land
by the respondent Asian Savings Bank (ASB) in registration law, accorded only to purchasers or
the amount of P500,000.00, with the use of mortgagees for value and in good faith.
subject parcels of land as security. However, the
loan it extended was not paid, hence the bank In the case under consideration, from the
extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage. evidence on hand it can be gleaned unerringly
On January 1983, Osmundo Canlas wrote the that respondent bank did not observe the
respondent bank as well as the sheriff that the requisite diligence in ascertaining or verifying the
execution of subject mortgage was without their real identity of the couple who introduced
authority, and request that the said mortgage be themselves as the spouses Osmundo Canlas and
annuled however the bank refused and Angelina Canlas. It is worthy to note that not even
proceeded with the auction sale. Petitioner filled a single identification card was exhibited by the
a case for the annulment of deed of real estate said impostors to show their true identity; and
mortgage with prayer for the issuance of a writ of yet, the bank acted on their representations
preliminary injunction which was granted by the simply on the basis of the residence certificates
RTC. On appeal, the CA reversed the ruling of the bearing signatures which tended to match the
RTC. Hence, this petition. signatures affixed on a previous deed of mortgage
to a certain Atty. Magno, covering the same
ISSUE: WON CA erred in holding that petitioners parcels of land in question. Felizado Mangubat,
are not entitled to relief because they were Assistant Vice President of Asian Savings Bank.
negligent and therefore must bear the loss.
Evidently, the efforts exerted by the bank to verify
HELD: Yes. Article 1173 of the Civil Code the identity of the couple posing as Osmundo
provides: Canlas and Angelina Canlas fell short of the
"ARTICLE 1173. The fault or negligence of the responsibility of the bank to observe more than
obligor consist in the omission of that diligence the diligence of a good father of a family. The

negligence of respondent bank was magnified by Asian Savings Bank has to bear the loss sued
the fact that the previous deed of mortgage upon.
(which was used as the basis for checking the
genuineness of the signatures of the supposed
Canlas spouses) did not bear the tax account
number of the spouses, as well as the Community
Tax Certificate of Angelina Canlas. But such fact
notwithstanding, the bank did not require the
impostors to submit additional proof of their true
identity.
Under the doctrine of last clear chance, which is

applicable here, the respondent bank must suffer
the resulting loss. In essence, the doctrine of last
clear chance is to the effect that where both
parties are negligent but the negligent act of one
is appreciably later in point of time than that of
the other, or where it is impossible to determine
whose fault or negligence brought about the
occurrence of the incident, the one who had the
last clear opportunity to avoid the impending
harm but failed to do so, is chargeable with the
consequences arising therefrom. Stated
differently, the rule is that the antecedent
negligence of a person does not preclude recovery
of damages caused by the supervening negligence
of the latter, who had the last fair chance to
prevent the impending harm by the exercise of
due diligence.
Assuming that Osmundo Canlas was negligent in

giving Vicente Mañ osca the opportunity to
perpetrate the fraud, by entrusting to latter the
owner's copy of the transfer certificates of title of
subject parcels of land, it cannot be denied that
the bank had the last clear chance to prevent the
fraud, by the simple expedient of faithfully
complying with the requirements for banks to
ascertain the identity of the persons transacting
with them.
For not observing the degree of diligence

required of banking institutions, whose business
is impressed with public interest, respondent

HEDY GAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS results and the failure to do so constitutes
G.R. No. L-44264 September 19, 1988 negligence. 5
Facts: In the morning of July 4, 1972 at about 8:00 A corollary rule is what is known in the law as the
o'clock, the accused Hedy Gan was driving a emergency rule. "Under that rule, one who
Toyota car along North Bay Boulevard, Tondo, suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is
Manila. As the car driven by the accused, there required to act without time to consider the best
was a vehicle coming from the opposite direction, means that may be adopted to avoid the impending
followed by another which tried to overtake and danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to
bypass the one in front of it and thereby adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may
encroached the lane of the car driven by the appear to have been a better method, unless the
accused. To avoid a head-on collision with the emergency in which he finds himself is brought
oncoming vehicle, the defendant swerved to the about by his own negligence." 6
right and as a consequence, the front bumper of
the Toyota Crown Sedan hit an old man who was Applying the above test to the case at bar, SC find
about to cross the boulevard from south to north, the petitioner not guilty of the crime of Simple
pinning him against the rear of the parked Imprudence resulting in Homicide.
jeepney. The force of the impact caused the
parked jeepney to move forward hitting the rear Due to the lack of eyewitnesses, no evidence was
of the parts truck ahead of it. The body of the old presented by the prosecution with respect to the
man who was later Identified as Isidoro Casino relative distances of petitioner to the parked
was immediately brought to the Jose Reyes jeepney and the oncoming overtaking vehicle that
Memorial Hospital but was (pronounced) dead on would tend to prove that petitioner did have
arrival. sufficient time to reflect on the consequences of
her instant decision to swerve her car to the light
Petitioner Hedy Gan was convicted of the crime of without stepping on her brakes. In fact, the
Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence in Criminal evidence presented by the prosecution on this
Case No. 10201 of the then Court of First Instance point is the petitioner's statement to the
of Manila,. On appeal, the trial court's decision police 8 stating::
was modified and petitioner was convicted only
of Homicide thru Simple Imprudence. And masasabi ko lang ho umiwas ho ako sa
isang sasakyan na biglang nagovertake sa
Issue: Whether the accused is guilty of sasakyan na aking kasalubong kung kaya ay
negligence aking kinabig sa kanan ang akin kotse subalit
siya naman biglang pagtawid ng tao o victim
Ruling: SC reversed. at hindi ko na ho naiwasan at ako ay wala ng
magawa . Iyan ho ang buong pangyayari nang
The test for determining whether or not a person nasabing aksidente. 9 (Emphasis supplied)
is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or
damage results to the person or property of The prosecution having presented this exhibit as
another is this: Would a prudent man in the its own evidence, Thus, under the circumstances
position of the person to whom negligence is narrated by petitioner, SC held that the appellate
attributed foresee harm to the person injured as court is asking too much from a mere mortal like
a reasonable consequence of the course about to the petitioner who in the blink of an eye had to
be pursued? If so, the law imposes the duty of the exercise her best judgment to extricate herself
doer to take precaution against its mischievous from a difficult and dangerous situation caused by
the driver of the overtaking vehicle. Petitioner

certainly could not be expected to act with all the
coolness of a person under normal
conditions. 10 The danger confronting petitioner
was real and imminent, threatening her very
existence. She had no opportunity for rational
thinking but only enough time to heed the very
powerfull instinct of self-preservation.
Also, the respondent court itself pronounced that

the petitioner was driving her car within the legal
limits. SC ruled that the "emergency rule"
enunciated above applies with full force to the
case at bar and consequently absolves petitioner
from any criminal negligence in connection with
the incident under consideration.
Petitioner was acquitted.

ONG VS. METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT having the last opportunity to save the
G.R. No. L-7664 August 29, 1958 Dominador, its employees failed to do so.
FACTS: ISSUE:
On July 5, 1952, Dominador Ong (14 years
old) and his two brothers went to the swimming Whether or not MWD is liable for the death
pool operated by Metropolitan Water District of Dominador Ong.
(MWD). After paying the entrance fee, the three
proceeded to the small pool. HELD:
The swimming pools of MWD are provided
with a ring buoy, toy roof, towing line, oxygen No. As established by the facts, MWD was
resuscitator and a first aid medicine kit. The not negligent in selecting its employees as all of
bottom of the pools is painted with black colors so them were duly certified. MWD was not negligent
as to insure clear visibility. There is on display in in managing the pools as there were proper safety
a conspicuous place within the area certain rules measures and precautions/regulations that were
and regulations governing the use of the pools. placed all over the pools. Hence, due diligence is
MWD employs six lifeguards who are all trained appreciated as a complete and proper defense in
as they had taken a course for that purpose and this case. Further, the testimony in court by the
were issued certificates of proficiency. These elder Ong and the other witness was belied by the
lifeguards work on schedule prepared by their statements they have given to the investigators
chief and arranged in such a way as to have two when they said that the lifeguard immediately
guards at a time on duty to look after the safety of dove into the water when he was called about the
the bathers. There is a male nurse and a sanitary boy at the bottom of the pool.
inspector with a clinic provided with oxygen
resuscitator. And there are security guards who The doctrine of “Last Clear Chance” is of no
are available always in case of emergency. application here. It was not established as to how
Later, Dominador told his brothers that Dominador was able to go to the big pool. He went
he’ll just be going to the locker room to drink a to the locker and thereafter no one saw him
bottle of Coke. No one saw him returned. Later, returned not until his body was retrieved from
the elder Ong noticed someone at the bottom of the bottom of the big pool. The last clear chance
the big pool and notified the lifeguard in doctrine can never apply where the party charged
attendant (Manuel Abaño), who immediately is required to act instantaneously (how can the
dove into the water. The body was later identified lifeguard act instantaneously in dissuading
as Dominador’s. He was attempted to be revived Dominador from going to the big pool if he did not
multiple times but of no avail. see him go there), and if the injury cannot be
The parents of Ong sued MWD averring avoided by the application of all means at hand
that MWD was negligent in selecting its after the peril is or should have been discovered;
employees. During trial, the elder brother of Ong at least in cases in which any previous negligence
and one other testified that Abaño was reading a of the party charged cannot be said to have
magazine and was chatting with a security guard contributed to the injury.
when the incident happened and that he was
called a third time before he responded. Plaintiff
further alleged that even assuming that there was
no negligence on the part of MWD, it is still liable
under the doctrine of “Last Clear Chance” for

DM CONSUNJI VS. JUEGO (357 SCRA 249), 2001 investigation report and the Prosecutor’s
GR No. 137873, April 20, 2001 | 357 SCRA 249 Memorandum dismissing the criminal complaint
against petitioner’s personnel.
FACTS: Supreme Court remanded to the RTC of Pasig City
Around 1:30PM of November 2, 1990, Jose Juergo, to determine whether the award decreed in its
a construction worker of D.M. Consunji Inc. fell 14 decision is more than that of the Employees
floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City. He Compensation Commission (ECC). Should the
was immediately rushed to Rizal Medical Center award decreed by the trial court be greater than
in Pasig City. The attending physician, Dr. Errol de that awarded by the ECC, payments already made
Yzo, pronounce Jose dead on arrival (DOA) at to private respondent pursuant to the Labor Code
around 2:15PM. shall be deducted therefrom.
Jose Juergo, together with Jessie Jaluag and Delso

Destajo, performing their work as carpenter at
the elevator core of the 14 th floor of Tower D,
Renaissance Tower Building were on board a
platform. Jose was crushed to death when the
platform fell due to removal or looseness of the
pin, which was merely inserted to the connecting
points of the chain block and platform but without
a safety lock. Luckily, Jessie and Delso jumped out
of safety.
PO3 Rogelio Villanueva of the Eastern Police

District investigated the tragedy and filed report
dated Nov. 25, 1990. Maria Juergo, Jose’s widow
filed a complaint on May 9, 1991 for damages in
the RTC and was rendered a favorable decision to
receive support from DM Consunji amounting to
P644,000.
DM Consunji seeks reversal of the CA decision.
ISSUE:
Whether Maria Juergo can still claim damages
with D.M. Consunji apart from the death benefits
she claimed in the State Insurance Fund.
HELD:
The respondent is not precluded from recovering
damages under the civil code. Maria Juergo was
unaware of petitioner’s negligence when she filed
her claim for death benefits from the State
Insurance Fund. She filed the civil complaint for
damages after she received a copy of the police

RAMOS VS. CA (321 SCRA 584) of suit. CA reversed, ordering the Ramos' to pay
G.R. No. 124354 December 29, 1999 their unpaid bills of P93,542.25 plus interest.
FACTS: ISSUE:
W/N the Ramoses are entitled to damages
June 17, 1985 afternoon: Erlinda Ramos, 47-year
old robust woman underwent on an operation to HELD:
the stone at her gall bladder removed after being YES. CA modified in favor of petitioners, and
tested that she was fit solidarily against private respondents the
for "cholecystectomy" operation performed following: 1) P1,352,000 actual damages
by Dr. Orlino Hozaka. Dr. Hosaka charged a fee of computed as of the date of promulgation plus a
P16,000.00, which was to include the monthly payment of P8,000.00 up to the time that
anesthesiologist's fee and which was to be paid petitioner Erlinda Ramos expires or miraculously
after the operation. He assured Rogelio E. Ramos, survives; 2) P2,000,000 moral damages, 3)
husband, that she will get a good anesthesiologist P1,500,000 temperate damages; 4) P100,000
who was Dra. Perfecta Gutierrez. Erlinda's hand exemplary damages and P100,000 attorney's
was held by Herminda Cruz, her sister -in-law fees; and, 5) the costs of the suit.
who was the Dean of the College of Nursing at the
Capitol Medical Center, together with her The application of res ipsa loquitur in medical
husband went down with her to the operating negligence cases presents a question of law since
room. it is a judicial function to determine whether a
certain set of circumstances does, as a matter of
Instead of 9:30 am, Dr. Hosaka arrived at about law, permit a given inference.
12:15 P.M. Herminda noticing what Dra. Perfecta
Gutierrez was doing, saw the nailbed of Erlinda Doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is availed by the
becoming bluish and Dr. Hosaka called for plaintiff, the need for expert medical testimony is
another anesthesiologist Dr. Calderon. She went dispensed with because the injury itself provides
out of the operating room to tell Rogelio that the proof of negligence - applicable in this case. It
something is wrong. When she went back she saw can have no application in a suit against a
Erlinda in a trendelenburg position and at 3 p.m. physician or surgeon which involves the merits of
she was taken to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU) a diagnosis or of a scientific treatment.
where she stayed for a month due As borne by the records, respondent Dra.
to bronchospasm incurring P93,542.25 and she Gutierrez failed to properly intubate the patient
was since then comatosed. She suffered brain according to witness Herminda. With her clinical
damage as a result of the absence of oxygen in her background as a nurse, the Court is satisfied with
brain for four to five minutes. She was also her testimony. Dra. Gutierrez' act of seeing her
diagnosed to be suffering from "diffused cerebral patient for the first time only an hour before the
parenchymal damage." Monthly expenses ranged scheduled operative procedure was, therefore, an
from P8,000 to P10,000. act of exceptional negligence and professional
irresponsibility.
Sps. Ramos and their minors filed against Dr.
Hosaka and Dra. Perfecta Gutierrez. RTC: favored Generally, to qualify as an expert witness, one
the Ramos' awarding P8,000 as actual monthly must have acquired special knowledge of the
expenses totalling to P632,000 as of April 15, subject matter about which he or she is to testify,
1992, P100,000 atty. fees, P800,000 moral either by the study of recognized authorities on
damages,P200,000 exemplary damages and cost the subject or by practical experience.
The reason is that these damages cover two

Dr. Jamora, not an anesthesiologist, stated distinct phases.
that oxygen deprivation which led to anoxic
encephalopathy was due to an unpredictable drug They should not be compelled by dire
reaction to the short-acting barbiturate was not circumstances to provide substandard care at
accepted as expert opinion. home without the aid of professionals, for
anything less would be grossly inadequate. Under
Dr. Hosaka's negligence can be found in his failure the circumstances, an award of P1,500,000.00 in
to exercise the proper authority in not temperate damages would therefore be
determining if his anesthesiologist observed reasonable.
proper anesthesia protocols. Dr. Hosaka had The damage done to her would not only be
scheduled another procedure in a different permanent and lasting, it would also be
hospital at the same time as Erlinda's permanently changing and adjusting to the
cholecystectomy, and was in fact over three hours physiologic changes which her body would
late for the latter's operation. Because of this, he normally undergo through the years.
had little or no time to confer with his
anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia Erlinda Ramos was in her mid-forties when the
delivery. This indicates that he was remiss in his incident occurred. She has been in a comatose
professional duties towards his patient. state for over fourteen years now. Ramoses are
charged with the moral responsibility of the care
Private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real of the victim. The family's moral injury and
control over their attending and visiting suffering in this case is clearly a real one. Award
"consultant" staff. While "consultants" are not, of P2,000,000 in moral damages would be
technically employees, a point which respondent appropriate.
hospital asserts in denying all responsibility for
the patient's condition, the control exercised, the
hiring, and the right to terminate consultants Finally, by way of example, exemplary damages in
fulfill the important hallmarks of an employer- the amount of P100,000.00 are hereby awarded.
employee relationship, with the exception of the Considering the length and nature of the instant
payment of wages. suit we are of the opinion that attorney's fees
valued at P100,000 are likewise proper.
Art. 2199. — Except as provided by law or by
stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate
compensation only for such pecuniary loss
suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such
compensation is referred to as actual or
compensatory damages.
Temperate damages can and should be awarded

on top of actual or compensatory damages in
instances where the injury is chronic and
continuing. And because of the unique nature of
such cases, no incompatibility arises when both
actual and temperate damages are provided for.

REYES VS SISTERS OF MERCY (341 SCRA 760),

2000 Held:
G.R. No. 130547, October 3, 2000, Mendoza, J. Res Ipsa Loquitur is not applicable. It finds no
application in a suit against a physician which
Facts: involves the merits of a diagnosis or of a scientific
On January 8, 1987, Jorge Reyes, husband of Leah treatment.
Alesna Reyes, had been suffering from a recurring
fever with chill when he was taken to the Mercy No, the respondents are not liable. In medical
Community Clinic by his wife. Dr. Rico subjected malpractice, negligence consists in the failure of a
Jorge to a series of tests and after a WidalTest, physician to apply to his practice of medicine that
was able to conclude that he was suffering from degree of care and skill which is ordinarily
typhoid fever. The clinic has been getting about employed by the profession generally, under
15 to 20 typhoid cases a month. After being similar conditions and in like surrounding
indorsed to Dr. Blanes, Jorge underwent a circumstances. The patient must prove that the
compatibility test with the antibiotic physician failed to do something which a
chloromycetin. Since there was no adverse reasonable prudent physician would have done
reaction, the doctor ordered 500 milligrams to be or did something a reasonably prudent physician
administered to Jorge at around 9:00pm and would not have done, and such failure caused
again before midnight. injury to the patient. Thus, there are four
At 1:00am, Jorge began exhibiting respiratory elements in medical negligence cases: duty,
distress, nausea, vomiting, and convulsions and breach, injury, and proximate causation.
Dr. Blanes was able to temporarily stabilize his
condition. His conditioned worsened a few While a physician-patient relationship existed
minutes later and after not responding to between the doctors and Jorge Reyes, there was
emergency treatment, he slipped into cyanosis no breach in their duty as the doctors did not
and died at around 2:00am due to Ventricular depart from reasonable standard recommended
Arythemia Secondary to Hyperpyrexia and by the experts. The Widal Test, coupled with the
typhoid fever. patient‘s existing symptoms and the clinic‘s status
of getting several typhoid cases a month were
On June 3. 1987, petitioners filed a complaint for sufficient to give upon any doctor of reasonable
damages against the hospital, its directress and skill the impression that Jorge Reyes had typhoid
the doctors before the RTC of Cebu City. They fever. Dr. Rico was also justified in recommending
contended that failure to exercise due care and the administration of the drug chloromycetin,
diligence, rushing the performance of tests, which is the drug of choice for typhoid fever. Also,
hastily diagnosing the patient with typhoid fever, the dosage given to Jorge was still within
and failing to conduct sufficient compatibility medically acceptable limits, as ruled by the Court
tests lead to the wrongful administration of of Appeals.
chloromycetin, which caused Jorge‘s death. The
RTC dismissed the complaint, which was affirmed
by the CA.
Issue:
Whether or not Res Ipsa Loquitur is applicable.
Whether or not the respondents are liable for the
death of Jorge Reyes.

Heirs of Ildefonso Coscullela vs. RGIC Ildefonso Coscoluella Inc.) against it. The refusal
(179 SCRA 511), 1989 of the insurer to satisfy the claim and the
consequent loss of the petitioner in incurring the
FACTS cost of acquiring legal assistance on the matter
Petitioner, Heirs of Ildefonso Coscoluella constitutes a violation of an injury brought to the
Inc., is a domestic corporation and the registered petitioner.
owner of an Isuzu pick-up truck. The vehicle was The private respondent’s invocation of the
insured with the private respondent Rico General exceptions clause in the insurance policy as the
Insurance Corp. for a consideration of basis for its non-liability and the consequent
P100,000.00 excluding third party liability. dismissal of the complaint is without merit. The
Within the period covered by the insurance, the SC likewise reiterate the established rule that
insured vehicle was severely damaged and when the terms of an insurance contract contains
rendered unserviceable when fired upon by a limitations on liability, the Court should construe
group of unidentified armed persons. In the same them in such a way as to preclude the insurer
incident, four persons died. from non-compliance with his obligations.
Petitioner filed its claim of P 80,000.00 for A policy of insurance with a narration of
the repair of the vehicle but private respondent exceptions tending to work a forfeiture of the
refused to grant it. As a consequence, the policy shall be interrupted liberally in favor of the
petitioner prompted to file a complaint with the insured and strictly against the insurance
RTC to recover claim of P80, 000.00 plus interest company or party for whose benefit they are
and Attorney’s fees. inserted.
Private respondent filed a motion to
dismiss alleging that the complaint lacks a cause
of action because the firing by armed men is a risk
exempted under the insurance policy.
The trial court ordered the dismissal of the
complaint for lack of cause of action. When the
case reached the appellate court, it affirmed the
trial court’s dismissal order. Hence, this case.
ISSUE:
W/N the petitioner Heirs of Ildefonso
Cosculuella Inc. has a cause of action for damages
arising from an insurance policy against the
private respondent Rico General Insurance Corp.
RULING
Yes. The facts as alleged clearly define the
existence of a right of action to a just claim against
the insurer (Rico General Insurance Corp.) for the
payment of the indemnity for a loss due to an
event against which the petitioner’s vehicle was
insured. The insurance contract mentioned
therein manifests a right to pursue a claim and a
duty on the part of the insurer or private
respondent to compensate the insured (Heirs of

THE BOARD OF LIQUIDATORS vs. HEIRS OF may bind the corporation by contracts in matters
MAXIMO M. KALAW arising in the usual course of business.
20 SCRA 987, No. L-18805 August 14, 1967 Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment
PONENTE: J. Sanchez or negligence; it imports a dishonest purpose or
Nature of the Action: Torts, Damages some moral obliquity and conscious doing of
wrong; it means breach of a known duty through
FACTS: National Coconut Corporation (NACOCO) some motive or interest or ill-will; it partakes of
embarked on copra trading activities led by its the nature of fraud.
General Manager Maximo Kalaw and the other
defendants as members of the board. Due to The present case is one of damnum absque
natural calamities, the business of copra became injuria. Conjunction of damage and wrong is here
unprofitable. Kalaw made a full disclosure of the absent. There cannot be an actionable wrong if
situation and apprised the board of the either one or the other is wanting.
impending losses on the contracts already
entered into, but no action was taken. But later on,
the contracts were unanimously approved by the
Board.
The buyers threatened damage suits, but some
were settled. Louis Dreyfus & Co. Ltd. Actually
sued but was also culminated in an out-of-court
settlement. NACOCO now seeks to recover the
sum paid to Louis from general manager and
board chairman Kalaw and the other members
who approved the contracts. It charges Kalaw
with negligence and bad faith and/or breach of
trust for having approved the contracts, which
was dismissed by the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Kalaw’s act of

approving the contracts as General Manager of
NACOCO without the approval of the Board
constitute bad faith that will make him liable for
damages?
HELD:
No.
A corporate officer, entrusted with the general
management and control of its business, has
implied authority to make any contract or do any
other act which is necessary or appropriate to the
conduct of the ordinary business of the
corporation. As such officer, he may, without any
special authority from the Board of Directors,
perform all acts of an ordinary nature, which by
usage or necessity are incident to his office, and

CONSOLACION GABETO vs. AGATON ARANETA could no longer be considered proximate cause.
G.R. No. L-15674 October 17, 1921 Therefore, Agaton was not liable for damages.
NATURE: Action for damages
FACTS: Basilio Ilano and Proceso Gayetano took a

carromata to go to a cockpit. When Julio Pagnaya,
the driver of the carromata, turned his horse and
started in the direction indicated, Agaton Araneta
stepped out in the street and stopped the horse by
laying his hands on the reins protesting that he
was the first to call the carromata. Julio pulled on
the reins of the bridle to free the horse from the
control of Agaton but the bit came out of the
horse's mouth, necessitating the driver to alight
in order to fix it.
When the driver led the horse to the curb to allow

vehicle to pass on, the bridle was slipped entirely
off. The horse, being free from the control of the
bit, became disturbed and moved forward and
farther on, until the carromata drawn by the
horse struck a police telephone box which came
down with a crash and frightened the horse to
such an extent that he set out at full speed up the
street. Basilio Ilano was able to alight while the
carromata was as yet along the sidewalk. Proceso
Gayetano, however, retained his seat but later on
jumped or fell from the rig sustaining injuries
which eventually caused his death. An action for
damages was filed against Agaton.
ISSUE: Whether or not Agaton’s wrongful act the

proximate cause of Proceso Gayetano’s death
RULING: No. The court held that Agaton’s act of

stopping the rig could not be considered the legal
or proximate cause since there was appreciable
interval of time that elapsed from the aforesaid
act and before the horse careened up the street.
Defense claimed that when Julio alighted and led
the horse to the curb, he was already in control of
the horse. Giving credence to such statement, the
court came to the view that Agaton’s prior act was
already too remote from the accident, hence,

FERNANDO VS. CA (208 SCRA 714) exception; more so with Mr. Bertulano, an old
GR No. 92087, May 8 1992 hand in this kind of service, who is presumed to
know the hazards of the job. His failure, therefore,
Facts: and that of his men to take precautionary
Bibiano Morta, market master of the Agdao Public measures for their safety was the proximate
Market filed a requisition request with the Chief cause of the accident.
of Property of the City Treasurer's Office for the
re-emptying of the septic tank in Agdao. An
invitation to bid was issued to Aurelio Bertulano,
Lito Catarsa, Feliciano Bascon, Federico Bolo and
Antonio Suñer, Jr. Bascon won the bid.Before
Bascon signed the the purchase order, the bidder
Bertulano with four other companions namely
Joselito Garcia, William Liagoso, Alberto
Fernando and Jose Fajardo, Jr. were found dead
inside the septic tank. The bodies were removed
by a fireman. One body, that of Joselito Garcia, was
taken out by his uncle, Danilo Garcia and taken to
the Regional Hospital but he expired there. The
City Engineer's office investigated the case and
learned that the five victims entered the septic
tank without clearance from it nor with the
knowledge and consent of the market master. In
fact, the septic tank was found to be almost empty
and the victims were presumed to be the ones
who did the re-emptying. Dr. Abear has done the
autopsy and found asphyxia as the cause of death
of the victims. Petitioners faults the city of Davao
for not emptying the septic tanks for 19 yrs and as
a result toxic gas accumulated.
Issue: Whether Davao city is guilty of negligence
Held:
No. While it may be true that the public
respondent has been remiss in its duty to re-
empty the septic tank annually, such negligence
was not a continuing one. The accident in the case
at bar occurred because the victims on their own
and without authority from the public respondent
opened the septic tank. Considering the nature of
the task of emptying a septic tank especially one
which has not been cleaned for years, an
ordinarily prudent person should undoubtedly be
aware of the attendant risks. The victims are no

JAVELLANA VS. TAYO (6 SCRA 1041), 1962 and him alone, this provision can only be invoked
G.R. No. L-18919, December 29, 1962 in instances wherein the the mayor was present
but he was prevented from presiding over the
FACTS: sessions. However, in this case, the mayor
On several sessions of the municipal council of absented himself. Tayo also claims that the
Buenavista, the mayor, vice-mayor, the secretary sessions should be declared null and void because
of the council and two councilors were absent they were not presided over by the vice-mayor or
from the session. During those sessions, the the councilor garnering the most votes during the
remaining council members elected a temporary election. This rule shall not be adopted in this
presiding officer and a temporary secretary to case since applying such rule will result in
take down notes. on those same sessions, they inconvenience, hardships, and injury to the public
passed several resolutions which the Tayo, as the interest because it will effectively give the mayor,
mayor of Buenavista refused to sign claiming that the vice-mayor, and the councilor having the most
the proceedings were illegal since he, as well as votes the power to defeat the law investing the
the vice-mayor and other 2 councilors were not legislative power to the municipal council by
present during those sessions. He also refused to simply being absent from the sessions.
sign the payrolls representing the per diem of the
present councilors for the said sessions. The Due to these reasons, it was held that the refusal
councilors sought the advice of the municipal of Tayo to sign the resolution and the payroll is
fiscal in relation to the validity of the sessions tantamount to non-performance of his official
which the municipal fiscal rendered the opinion duty without just cause. He should pay moral
that the sessions were valid. The matter was damages to Exequiel Goldez since out of the 6
raised to the provincial board and the latter councilors, he was the only one who was able to
affirmed the validity of such sessions. Despite this produce evidence to show that he suffered moral
resolution from the provincial board, the mayor damages.
still refused to sign the resolutions and the
payrolls. Due to the refusal of the mayor to act on
the resolutions and payroll, the councilors sued to
claim moral damages. During the trial, only
Exequiel Goldez was able to produce evidence
supporting his claim that he suffered moral
damages.
Issue:
Whether the refusal of the mayor to sign the
resolutions and payrolls is tantamount to non-
performance of his official duty without just cause
making him liable for moral damages under
Article 27 of the New Civil Code?
Held:
Yes. Mayor Tayo should be held liable for moral
damages. Although Article 2221 of the Revised
Administrative Code provides that the municipal
council’s sessions must be presided by the mayor,

PNB v CA (83 SCRA 237) responsibility of observing, for the protection of

G.R. No. L-27155 May 18, 1978 the interest of private respondents, that degree of
care, precaution and vigilance which the
FACTS: Philamgen (Philippine American General circumstances justly demand in approving or
Insurance Co., Inc.) executed its bond with Rita disapproving the lease of said sugar quota. The
GuecoTapnio in favor of PNB to guarantee the law makes it imperative that every person "must
payment of Rita's account with said bank. In turn, in the exercise of his rights and in the
Rita GuecoTapnio and CecilioGuecoexceutedan performance of his duties, act with justice, give
the indemnity agreement to guarantee the everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
payment of whatever amount the bonding faith, This petitioner failed to do.
company would pay to PNB.
By its disapproval of the lease, private
Rita was indebted to the bank in the sum of respondents would be unable to utilize the sugar
P2,000.00, plus accumulated interests unpaid, quota in question. In failing to observe the
which she failed to pay despite demands. The reasonable degree of care and vigilance which the
bank wrote a letter of demand to Philamgen surrounding circumstances reasonably impose,
whereupon the latter paid P2,379.91, for and on petitioner is consequently liable for the damages
account of Rita's obligation. Philamgen in turn caused on private respondents. Under Article 21
made several demands to Rita and Cecilio but but of the New Civil Code, "any person who wilfully
to no avail. causes loss or injury to another in a manner that
is contrary to morals, good customs or public
Rita claimed she did not consider herself to be policy shall compensate the latter for the
indebted to PNB because she had an agreement damage."
with one Jacobo C. Tuazon whereby she had
leased to the latter her unused export sugar quota A corporation is civilly liable in the same manner
for P2,800 with knowledge of PNB. But PNB has as natural persons for torts, because "generally
placed obstacles to the consummation of the lease speaking, the rules governing the liability of a
by requiring that the consideration be raised to principal or master for a tort committed by an
P3.00 per picul to make it P3,000 in total.The agent or servant are the same whether the
delay caused by said obstacles forced Tuazon to principal or master be a natural person or a
rescind the lease contract. Thus, Rita filed her corporation, and whether the servant or agent be
third-party complaint against PNB to recover a natural or artificial person. All of the authorities
from the latter any and all sums of money which agree that a principal or master is liable for every
may be adjudged against her and in favor of tort which he expressly directs or authorizes, and
Philamgen plus moral damages, attorney's fees this is just as true of a corporation as of a natural
and costs. person, A corporation is liable, therefore,
whenever a tortious act is committed by an officer
ISSUE: Whether or not the obstacles placed by or agent under express direction or authority
PNB causing Tuazon to rescind the contract of from the stockholders or members acting as a
lease would entitle the respondents for damages body, or, generally, from the directors as the
governing body."
HELD: Yes. While petitioner had the ultimate
authority of approving or disapproving the
proposed lease since the quota was mortgaged to
the Bank, the latter certainly cannot escape its

CITY OF MANILA VS TEOTICO control or supervision. Manila maintains that the

G.R. No. L-23052, January 29, 1968 former provision should prevail over the latter,
because Republic Act 409, is a special law,
Facts: intended exclusively for the City of Manila,
On January 27, 1958, Teotico was at the corner of whereas the Civil Code is a general law, applicable
the Old Luneta and P. Burgos Avenue, Manila, to the entire Philippines. The CA however applied
within a "loading and unloading" zone, waiting for the Civil Code. The SC concurs. The reason for
a jeepney. As he stepped down from the curb to such application is that while Section 4 of RA 409
board the jeepney he hailed, and took a few steps, refers toliability arising from negligence, in
he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catch general, regardless of the object thereof,
basin or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue. Due to the Article 2189 particularly governs liability due to
fall, Teotico suffered injuries his head hit the rim "defective streets. Since the present action is
of the manhole breaking his eyeglasses and based upon the alleged defective condition of a
causing broken pieces thereof to pierce his left road, said Article 2189 is decisive thereon
eyelid. As blood flowed therefrom, impairing his We note that it is based upon an allegation of fact
vision, several persons came to his assistance and not made in the answer of the City. Moreover,
pulled him out of the manhole. One of them Teotico alleged in his complaint, as well as in his
brought Teotico to the Philippine General amended complaint, that his injuries were due to
Hospital, where his injuries were treated, after the defective condition of a street which is "under
which he was taken home. In addition to the the supervision and control" of the City. In its
lacerated wound in his left upper eyelid, Teotico answer to the amended complaint, the City, in
suffered contusions on the left thigh, the left turn, alleged that "the streets aforementioned were
upper arm, the right leg and the upper lip apart and have been constantly kept in good condition
from an abrasion on the right infra-patella region. and regularly inspected and the storm drains and
These injuries and the allergic eruption caused by manholes thereof covered by the defendant City
anti-tetanus injections administered to him in the and the officers concerned" who "have been ever
hospital, required further medical treatment by a vigilant and zealous in the performance of their
private practitioner who charged therefor respective functions and duties as imposed upon
P1,400.00.. Teotico filed with the CFI Manila them by law." Thus, the City had, in effect,
complaint against the City which dismissed the admitted that P. Burgos Avenue was and
same. On appeal, CA sentenced the City of Manila is under its control and supervision.
to pay damages. At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code,
it is not necessary for the liability therein
Issue: established to attach that the defective roads or
Whether or not the City of Manila can be held streets belong to the province, city or municipality
liable to Teotico for damages from which responsibility is exacted. What said
article requires is that the province, city or
Held: municipality have either "control or supervision"
The high court ruled in affirmative. Article over said street or road. Even if P. Burgos Avenue
2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides: were, therefore, a national highway, this
―Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be circumstance would not necessarily detract from
liable for damages for the deathof, or injuries its "control or supervision" by the City of Manila.
suffered by, any person by reason of defective
conditions of road, streets, bridges, public
buildings, and other public works under their

CUADRA V MONFORT person for whom another is responsible, the

35 SCRA 160 latter then becomes himself liable under Article
2180, in the different cases enumerated therein,
FACTS: Maria Teresa Cuadra, 12, and Maria such as that of the father or the mother under the
Teresa Monfort, 13, were classmates in Grade Six circumstances above quoted. The basis of this
at the Mabini Elementary School in Bacolod City. vicarious, although primary, liability is, as in
On July 9, 1962 their teacher assigned them, Article 2176, fault or negligence, which is
together with three other classmates, to weed the presumed from that which accompanied the
grass in the school premises. While thus engaged causative act or omission. The presumption is
Maria Teresa Monfort found a plastic headband, merely prima facie and may therefore be
an ornamental object commonly worn by young rebutted. This is the clear and logical inference
girls over their hair. Jokingly she said aloud that that may be drawn from the last paragraph of
she had found an earthworm and, evidently to Article 2180, which states "that the responsibility
frighten the Cuadra girl, tossed the object at her. treated of in this Article shall cease when the
At that precise moment the latter turned around persons herein mentioned prove that they
to face her friend, and the object hit her right eye. observed all the diligence of a good father of a
Smarting from the pain, she rubbed the injured family to prevent damage."
part and treated it with some powder. The next
day, July 10, the eye became swollen and it was In the case at bar there is nothing from which it
then that the girl related the incident to her may be inferred that Alfonso Monfort could have
parents, who thereupon took her to a doctor for prevented the damage by the observance of due
treatment. She underwent surgical operation care, or that he was in any way remiss in the
twice, first on July 20 and again on August 4, 1962, exercise of his parental authority in failing to
and stayed in the hospital for a total of twenty- foresee such damage, or the act which caused it.
three days, for all of which the parents spent the On the contrary, his child was at school, where it
sum of P1,703.75. Despite the medical efforts, was his duty to send her and where she was, as he
however, Maria Teresa Cuadra completely lost had the right to expect her to be, under the care
the sight of her right eye. and supervision of the teacher. And as far as the
act which caused the injury was concerned, it was
In the civil suit subsequently instituted by the an innocent prank not unusual among children at
parents in behalf of their minor daughter against play and which no parent, however careful, would
Alfonso Monfort, Maria Teresa Monfort's father, have any special reason to anticipate much less
the defendant was ordered to pay P1,703.00 as guard against. Nor did it reveal any mischievous
actual damages; P20,000.00 as moral damages; propensity, or indeed any trait in the child’s
and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus the costs of character which would reflect unfavorably on her
the suit. upbringing and for which the blame could be
attributed to her parents.
ISSUE: Whether or not the parents can be held
liable under Article 2180.
HELD: The underlying basis of the liability

imposed by Article 2176 is the fault or negligence
accompanying the act or the omission, there
being no willfulness or intent to cause damage
thereby. When the act or omission is that of one

LIBI VS IAC (214 SCRA 16), of this court on the matter which warrant
G.R. No. 70890. September 18, 1992 comparative analyses. Our concern stems from
our readings that if the liability of the parents for
Facts: crimes or quasi-delicts of their minor children is
Wendell Libi, the son of herein Petitioners, shot subsidiary, then the parents can neither invoke
his ex-girlfriend Julie Ann Gotiong, daughter of nor be absolved of civil liability on the defense
herein private Respondents, using a gun owned that they acted with the diligence of a good father
by his father and causing Julie Ann’s death. After of a family to prevent damages. On the other hand,
Wendell shot Julie Ann, the former also shot if such liability imputed to the parents is
himself with the same gun causing his immediate considered direct and primary, that diligence
death. would constitute a valid and substantial defense.
As a result of the tragedy, the parents of
Julie Ann filed a civil case in the then Court of First We believe that the civil liability of parents for
Instance of Cebu against the parents of Wendell to quasi-delicts of their minor children, as
recover damages arising from the latter’s contemplated in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, is
vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil primary and not subsidiary. In fact, if we apply
Code. Article 2194 of said code which provides for
Petitioners argued that they had exercised solidary liability of joint tortfeasors, the persons
the due diligence of a good father of a family, responsible for the act or omission, in this case
hence they should not be civilly liable for the the minor and the father and, in case of his death
crime committed by their minor son. of incapacity, the mother, are solidarily liable.
Accordingly, such parental liability is primary and
Issue: not subsidiary, hence the last paragraph of Article
Whether or not Article 2180 of the Civil Code was 2180 provides that" (t)he responsibility treated
correctly interpreted by respondent court to of in this article shall cease when the persons
make petitioners liable for vicarious liability herein mentioned prove that they observed all
the diligence of a good father of a family to
Ruling: prevent damages.
The diligence of a good father of a family The parents are and should be held primarily
required by law in a parent and child relationship liable for the civil liability arising from criminal
consists, to a large extent, of the instruction and offenses committed by their minor children
supervision of the child. Petitioners were gravely under their legal authority or control, or who live
remiss in their duties as parents in not diligently in their company, unless it is proven that the
supervising the activities of their son, despite his former acted with the diligence of a good father of
minority and immaturity, so much so that it was a family to prevent such damages. That primary
only at the time of Wendell’s death that they liability is premised on the provisions of Article
allegedly discovered that he was a CANU agent 101 of the Revised Penal Code with respect to
and that Cresencio’s gun was missing from the damages ex delicto caused by their children 9
safety deposit box. years of age or under, or over 9 but under 15
years of age who acted without discernment; and,
Now, we do not have any objection to the with regard to their children over 9 but under 15
doctrinal rule holding, the parents liable, but the years of age who acted with discernment, or 15
categorization of their liability as being years or over but under 21 years of age, such
subsidiary, and not primary, in nature requires a primary liability shall be imposed pursuant to
hard second look considering previous decisions Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Under said Article

2180, the enforcement of such liability shall be

effected against the father and, in case of his death
or incapacity, the mother. This was amplified by
the Child and Youth Welfare Code which provides
that the same shall devolve upon the father and,
in case of his death or incapacity, upon the mother
or, in case of her death or incapacity, upon the
guardian, but the liability may also be voluntarily
assumed by a relative or family friend of the
youthful offender. However, under the Family
Code, this civil liability is now, without such
alternative qualification, the responsibility of the
parents and those who exercise parental
authority over the minor offender. For civil
liability arising from quasi-delicts committed by
minors, the same rules shall apply in accordance
with Articles 2180 and 2182 of the Civil Code, as
so modified.

TAMARGO VS. CA his natural parents, parental authority had not

G.R. No. 85044 ceased nor been relinquished by the mere filing
and granting of a petition for adoption.
Facts:
On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then a Issue:
minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo Whether or not the retroactive effect of adoption
with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in can be invoked for purposes of actions for
her death. Accordingly, a civil complaint for damages arising from quasi-delict due to the
damages was filed with the Regional Trial Court, action done by the adopted child prior to the
Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos Sur, docketed as Civil granting of the decree of adoption but after the
Case No. 3457-V, by petitioner Macario Tamargo, filing of the petition?
Jennifer's adopting parent, and petitioner
spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's Held:
natural parents against respondent spouses It was held by the Court that the adoptive parents
Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural should not be held vicariously liable for tortious
parents with whom he was living at the time of acts committed by the adopted child prior to the
the tragic incident. In addition to this case for granting of the decree of adoption but after the
damages, a criminal information or Homicide filing of the petition for adoption.
through Reckless Imprudence was filed [Criminal
Case No. 1722-V] against Adelberto Bundoc. Article 36 of the Family Code provides for the
Adelberto, however, was acquitted and exempted retroactive effect of parental authority of the
from criminal liability on the ground that he bad adoptive parents once the petition for adoption is
acted without discernment. granted. It states that the parental authority will
retroact to the date of the filing of the petition.
Prior to the incident, or on 10 December 1981, the Reading with Article 39, vesting the parental
spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed a authority to the adoptive parents at the time of
petition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc in the filing of the petition would mean the
Special Proceedings No. 0373-before the then dissolution of the parental authority of the
Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur. This petition natural parents at the same time. However, this
for adoption was granted on, 18 November 1982, retroactive effect will only be applicable to the
that is, after Adelberto had shot and killed accrual of benefits or advantage in favor of the
Jennifer. adopted child.
In their Answer, respondent spouses Bundoc, The basis of the liability of the parents over
Adelberto's natural parents, reciting the result of actions done by their minor children who are
the foregoing petition for adoption, claimed that living with them and are presumed by the law are
not they, but rather the adopting parents, namely under their control and supervision is the existing
the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura, were relationship between the parents and the child.
indispensable parties to the action since parental The retroactive effect of adoption cannot be taken
authority had shifted to the adopting parents effect for adopting parents who never had actual
from the moment the successful petition for custody and control over the child at the time the
adoption was filed. tortious act was done. It will still be the parents
who has actual custody over the child who will be
Petitioners in their Reply contended that since responsible for the actions of the child regardless
Adelberto Bundoc was then actually living with

of the retroactive effect of the decree of adoption.

To hold otherwise will be unfair.
Therefore, premises considered, it was held that

the natural parents will be responsible for the
tortious acts committed by the minor child who is
living with them even if the petition for adoption
filed prior to the incident was granted after the
tortious act.

B.A FINANCE VS COURT OF APPEALS for injuries caused the latter while the vehicle
GR. No. 98275, November 13, 1992 is being driven on the highways or streets. In
synthesis, we hold that the registered owner,
FACTS:On March 6, 1983, an accident occurred the defendant-appellant herein (B.A Finance,
involving petitioner's Isuzu ten-wheeler truck in this case), is primarily responsible for the
then driven by Rogelio Villar employee of damagecaused to the vehicle of the plaintiff-
LinoCastro which was leased to Rock Component appellee, but he (defendant-appellant) has a
Inc. by the petitioner. RTC held the driver guilty right to be indemnified by the real or actual
beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence owner of the amount that he may be required
resulting in triple homicide with multiple physical to pay as damage for the injury caused to the
injuries with damage to property and the plaintiff-appellant.
petitioner liable for damages because the truck
was registered in its name during the incident. If the foregoing words of wisdom were applied in
Rock Component Philippines, Inc. was ordered to solving the circumstance whereof the vehicle had
reimburse petitioner for any amount that the been alienated or sold to another, there certainly
latter may be adjudged liable to pay herein can be no serious exception against utilizing the
private respondents as expressly stipulated in the same rationale to the antecedents of this case
contract of lease between petitioner and Rock where the subject vehicle was merely leased by
Component Philippines, Inc. Petitioner refuses petitioner to Rock Component Philippines, Inc.,
liability saying that it was not the employer of the with petitioner retaining ownership over the
negligent driver who was under the control and vehicle.
supervision of Lino Castro at the time of the
accident, apart from the fact that the Isuzu truck
was in the physical possession of Rock
Component Philippines by virtue of the lease
agreement.
The Respondent Court, affirmed in toto the
decision of the trial court. Hence this petition for
review.
ISSUE: WON petitioner can be held liable for

damages considering that neither the driver nor
Lino Castro appears to be connected with the
petitioner.
HELD: YES. The SC cited the doctrine laid down in

Erezo;
that registered owner of a certificate of public
convenience is liable to
the public for the injuries or damages suffered
by passengers or third persons caused by the
operation of said vehicle, even though the
same had been transferred to a third person.
Registered owner of any vehicle, even if not
used for a public service, should primarily be
responsible to the public or to third persons
PLACIDO C. RAMOS VS PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING Issue: Whether or not PEPSI-COLA was able to
CO. OF THE P.I. and ANDRES BONIFACIO prove that they exercised the diligence of a good
G.R. No. L-22533 February 9, 1967 father of a family in the choice or selection of
defendant driver.
Facts: Placido and Augusto Ramos sued Pepsi- Ruling: Yes. It must be taken as established that,
Cola Bottling Co. of the P.I. and Andres Bonifacio as testified to by Añasco, PEPSI-COLA did in fact
in the Court of First Instance of Manila as a carefully examine the driver-applicant Bonifacio
consequence of a collision, on May 10, 1958, as to his qualifications, experiences and record of
involving the car of Placido Ramos and a tractor- service, taking all steps mentioned by the Court of
truck and trailer of PEPESI-COLA. Said car was at Appeals in its decision already quoted i.e
the time of the collision driven by Augusto Ramos, submission of clearances, previous work
son and co-plaintiff of Placido. PEPSI-COLA's experience, physical examinations, driver’s
tractor-truck was then driven by its driver and co- examination (theoretical and practical).
defendant Andres Bonifacio. Such being the case, there can be no doubt that
PEPSI-COLA exercised the required due diligence
The trial court found Bonifacio negligent and in the selection of its driver. As ruled by this Court
declared that PEPSI-COLA had not sufficiently in Campo vs. Camarote 53 O.G. 2794, 2797: "In
proved its having exercised the due diligence of a order that the defendant may be considered as
good father of a family to prevent the damage. having exercised all diligence of a good father of a
PEPSI-COLA and Bonifacio, solidarily, were family, he should not be satisfied with the mere
ordered to pay the plaintiffs. possession of a professional driver's license; he
should have carefully examined the applicant for
PEPSI-COLA appealed to the CA who rendered employment as to his qualifications, his experience
judgement in favour of PEPSI-COLA. The and record of service."
uncontradicted testimony of Juan T. Anasco,
personnel manager of defendant company, was to
the effect that defendant driver was first hired as
a member of the bottle crop in the production
department; that when he was hired as a driver,
'we had size [sic] him by looking into his
background, asking him to submit clearances,
previous experience, physical examination and
later on, he was sent to the pool house to take the
usual driver's examination, consisting of: First,
theoretical examination and second, the practical
driving examination, all of which he had
undergone, and that the defendant company was
a member of the Safety Council. In view hereof, we
are of the sense that defendant company had
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family
in the choice or selection of defendant driver'.
Ramos appealed to the Supreme Court via

Petition for Review.

MERRITT V. GOVERNMENT OF THE ISSUE:

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS Whether or not the government is liable for the
G.R. No. L-11154, March 21, 1916 negligent act of the driver of the ambulance.
FACTS: HELD:
Merritt was riding a motorcycle in Padre Faura No. By consenting to be sued a state simply
Street, Manila. In the intersection of Padre Faura waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby
and Taft Avenue, he was struck by an ambulance concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any
of the General Hospital. In doing so, the cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability
ambulance violated an ordinance of Manila and to any cause not previously recognized. It merely
the Motor Vehicle Act. By reason of the collision, gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability
the plaintiff was so severely injured. According to and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court,
the various merchants who testified as witnesses, subject to its right to interpose any lawful
the plaintiff's mental and physical condition prior defense. It follows therefrom that the state, by
to the accident was excellent, and that after virtue of such provisions of law, is not responsible
having received the injuries that have been for the damages suffered by private individuals in
discussed, his physical condition had undergone a consequence of acts performed by its employees
noticeable depreciation, for he had lost the agility, in the discharge of the functions pertaining to
energy, and ability that he had constantly their office, because neither fault nor even
displayed before the accident as one of the best negligence can be presumed on the part of the
constructors of wooden buildings and he could state in the organization of branches of public
not now earn even a half of the income that he had service and in the appointment of its agents. The
secured for his work because he had lost 50 per State can only be liable if it acts through a special
cent of his efficiency. As a contractor, he could no agent (and a special agent, in the sense in which
longer, as he had before done, climb up ladders these words are employed, is one who receives a
and scaffoldings to reach the highest parts of the definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to
building. As a consequence of the loss the plaintiff the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a
suffered in the efficiency of his work as a special official) so that in representation of the
contractor, he had to dissolved the partnership he state and being bound to act as an agent thereof,
had formed with the engineer. Wilson, because he he executes the trust confided to him.
was incapacitated from making mathematical In the case at bar, the ambulance driver was not a
calculations on account of the condition of his leg special agent nor was a government officer acting
and of his mental faculties, and he had to give up as a special agent hence, there can be no liability
a contract he had for the construction of the Uy from the government. “The Government does not
Chaco building. In order for Merritt to recover undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity
damages, he sought to sue the government which of the officers or agents whom it employs, since
later authorized Merritt to sue the government by that would involve it in all its operations in
virtue of Act 2457 enacted by the legislature (An endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses,
Act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the which would be subversive of the public interest.”
Government of the Philippine Islands and
authorizing the Attorney-General of said Islands
to appear in said suit). The lower court then
determined the amount of damages and ordered
the government to pay the same.

PALAFOX VS PROVINCE OF ILOCOS NORTE duty. Therefore, the province cannot be held
GR NO. l-10659, Jan. 31, 1958 liable for his negligent act. However tragic and
deplorable it may be, the death of Palafox
Facts: imposed on the province no duty to pay monetary
Sabas Torralba was employed as the driver of consideration.
Ilocos Norte and detailed to the Office of the
District Engineer. While driving a freight truck,
Sabas ran over Proceto Palafox on Sept. 30, 1948
resulting to the latter’s death. Sabas was
prosecuted for homicide through reckless
imprudence to which he pleaded guilty. The heirs
of Palafox instituted a civil case against him, the
Province, the District Engineer and the Provincial
Treasurer.
The case was dismissed against the defendants.

On appeal, the appellant insist that Art. 1903 of
the Civil Code provides that “The obligation
imposed by the next preceding articles is
enforceable not only for personal acts and
omissions but also for those persons for whom
another is responsible. The State is liable in this
sense when it acts through a special agent, but not
when the damage has been caused by the official
upon whom properly devolved the duty of doing
the act performed, in which case the provisions of
the preceding article shall be applicable”.
It will be observed that to attach liability to the

State for the negligence of Sabas Torralba a
declaration must be made that he was a “special
agent” and not upon whom properly devolved the
duty of driving the truck on that occasion.
Issue:
Whether or not the Province of Ilocos Norte can
be held liable?
Ruling:
NO. The general rule is that local government
units are not liable for negligent acts of its
employees while they are performing
governmental functions or duties. In this case, the
driver was involved in the construction or
maintenance of roads which was a governmental
ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL VS. CA AND DR. from the evidence the school principal had
ROMULO CASTILLO AND LILIA CADIZ knowledge of the picnic even from its planning
G.R. No. 82465 February 25, 1991 stage and had even been invited to attend the
affair; and yet he did not express any prohibition
Ferdinand Castillo, a freshman at St. Francis High against undertaking the picnic, nor did he
School died at a beach picnic undertaken by the prescribe any precautionary measures to be
class he was in. His parents, Dr. Romulo Castillo adopted during the picnic.Under Article
and Lilia Cadiz, purportedly did not allow him to 2180, supra, the defendant school and defendant
go but he got persuaded by the teachers when he school principal must be found jointly and
brought food for them. Francis drowned when he severally liable with the defendants-teachers for
tried to save a teacher who was drowning. His the damages incurred by the plaintiffs as a result
parents filed a complaint for damages against the of the death of their son.
six teachers named Connie Arquio, LuisitoVinas,
Tirso de Chaves, YolyJaro, Nida Aragones and The case reached the Supreme Court.
Patria Cadiz who were at the picnic, the school
(represented by Sps. Fernando Nantes and Issues:
Rosario Lacandula) and the principal, Benjamin A) Whether or not there was negligence
Illumin. attributable to the defendants which will
warrant the award of damages to the
The trial court ruled in favor of the respondents plaintiffs;
and against six petitioners-teachers ordering all B) Whether or not Art. 2180, in relation to
of them jointly and severally to pay respondents Art. 2176 of the New Civil Code is
the sum of P30,000.00 as actual damages, applicable to the case at bar
P20,000.00 as moral damages, P15,000.00 as The SC ruled that there is no negligence
attorney's fees, and to pay the costs. attributable to the teachers nor the school andits
principal.Evidence showed that Ferdinand was
The trial court declared that the teachers failed to permitted by his parents to go to the picnic. He
exercise the diligence of a good father of the was given the money to buy food for the picnic
family to guard against the foreseen harm.On the which according to SC is an indication of consent.
other hand, the trial court dismissed the case Respondent Court of Appeals committed an error
against the St. Francis High School, Benjamin in applying Article 2180 of the Civil Code in
Illumin and Aurora Cadorna holding that the rendering petitioner school liable for the death of
picnic was not part of extra-curricular activity respondent's son.
and it was not sanctioned by the school. Article 2180, par. 4 states that:
The plaintiffs and defendants both appealed to The obligation imposed by article 2176 is
the CA. demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for
The CA ruled that the school and the its principal whom one is responsible.
are also liable under Article 2176 taken together x xx x xx x xx
with the 1st, 4th and 5th paragraphs of Article Employers shall be liable for the damages
2180 of the Civil Code. The CA declared that they caused by their employees and household
cannot escape liability on the mere excuse that helpers acting within the scope of their
the picnic was not an extra-curricular activity of assigned tasks, even though the former are
the St. Francis High School. According to the CA, not engaged in any business or industry.

for moral or exemplary damages becomes

Under this paragraph, it is clear that before an baseless.
employer may be held liable for the negligence of PREMISES CONSIDERED, the questioned decision
his employee, the act or omission which caused dated November 19, 1987, finding petitioners
damage or prejudice must have occurred while an herein guilty of negligence and liable for the death
employee was in the performance of his assigned of Ferdinand Castillo and awarding the
tasks. respondents damages, is hereby SET ASIDE
In the case at bar, the teachers/petitioners were insofar as the petitioners herein are concerned,
not in the actual performance of their assigned but the portion of the said decision dismissing
tasks. The incident happened not within the their counterclaim, there being no merit, is
school premises, not on a school day and most hereby AFFIRMED.
importantly while the teachers and students were
holding a purely private affair, a picnic.This picnic
had no permit from the school head or its
principal, Benjamin Illuminbecause this picnic is
not a school sanctioned activity neither is it
considered as an extra-curricular activity.
As earlier pointed out by the trial court, mere

knowledge by petitioner/principal Illumin of the
planning of the picnic by the students and their
teachers does not in any way or in any manner
show acquiescence or consent to the holding of
the same. The application therefore of Article
2180 has no basis in law and neither is it
supported by any jurisprudence. If we were to
affirm the findings of respondent Court on this
score, employers wig forever be exposed to the
risk and danger of being hailed to Court to answer
for the misdeeds or omissions of the employees
even if such act or omission he committed while
they are not in the performance of their duties.
Finally, no negligence could be attributable to the

petitioners-teachers to warrant the award of
damages to the respondents-spouses.
While it is true that respondents-spouses did give

their consent to their son to join the picnic, this
does not mean that the petitioners were already
relieved of their duty to observe the required
diligence of a good father of a family in ensuring
the safety of the children. But in the case at bar,
petitioners were able to prove that they had
exercised the required diligence. Hence, the claim

ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL VS. CA and Dr. the St. Francis High School. According to the CA,
Romulo Castillo and Lilia Cadiz from the evidence the school principal had
G.R. No. 82465 February 25, 1991 knowledge of the picnic even from its planning
stage and had even been invited to attend the
FACTS: affair; and yet he did not express any prohibition
Ferdinand Castillo, a freshman at St. Francis High against undertaking the picnic, nor did he
School died at a beach picnic undertaken by the prescribe any precautionary measures to be
class he was in. His parents, Dr. Romulo Castillo adopted during the picnic.Under Article
and Lilia Cadiz, purportedly did not allow him to 2180, supra, the defendant school and defendant
go but he got persuaded by the teachers when he school principal must be found jointly and
brought food for them. Francis drowned when he severally liable with the defendants-teachers for
tried to save a teacher who was drowning. His the damages incurred by the plaintiffs as a result
parents filed a complaint for damages against the of the death of their son.
six teachers named Connie Arquio, LuisitoVinas,
Tirso de Chaves, YolyJaro, Nida Aragones and The case reached the Supreme Court.
Patria Cadiz who were at the picnic, the school
(represented by Sps. Fernando Nantes and ISSUES:
Rosario Lacandula) and the principal, Benjamin A) Whether or not there was negligence
Illumin. attributable to the defendants which will warrant
the award of damages to the plaintiffs;
The trial court ruled in favor of the respondents B) Whether or not Art. 2180, in relation to Art.
and against six petitioners-teachers ordering all 2176 of the New Civil Code is applicable to the
of them jointly and severally to pay respondents case at bar
the sum of P30,000.00 as actual damages,
P20,000.00 as moral damages, P15,000.00 as RULING:
attorney's fees, and to pay the costs. The SC ruled that there is no negligence
attributable to the teachers nor the school andits
The trial court declared that the teachers failed to principal.Evidence showed that Ferdinand was
exercise the diligence of a good father of the permitted by his parents to go to the picnic. He
family to guard against the foreseen harm.On the was given the money to buy food for the picnic
other hand, the trial court dismissed the case which according to SC is an indication of consent.
against the St. Francis High School, Benjamin Respondent Court of Appeals committed an error
Illumin and Aurora Cadorna holding that the in applying Article 2180 of the Civil Code in
picnic was not part of extra-curricular activity rendering petitioner school liable for the death of
and it was not sanctioned by the school. respondent's son.
Article 2180, par. 4 states that:
The plaintiffs and defendants both appealed to
the CA. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's own acts or
The CA ruled that the school and the its principal omissions, but also for those of persons for
are also liable under Article 2176 taken together whom one is responsible.
with the 1st, 4th and 5th paragraphs of Article x xx x xx x xx
2180 of the Civil Code. The CA declared that they Employers shall be liable for the damages
cannot escape liability on the mere excuse that caused by their employees and household
the picnic was not an extra-curricular activity of helpers acting within the scope of their

assigned tasks, even though the former are petitioners were able to prove that they had
not engaged in any business or industry. exercised the required diligence. Hence, the claim
for moral or exemplary damages becomes
Under this paragraph, it is clear that before an baseless.
employer may be held liable for the negligence of PREMISES CONSIDERED, the questioned decision
his employee, the act or omission which caused dated November 19, 1987, finding petitioners
damage or prejudice must have occurred while an herein guilty of negligence and liable for the death
employee was in the performance of his assigned of Ferdinand Castillo and awarding the
tasks. respondents damages, is hereby SET ASIDE
In the case at bar, the teachers/petitioners were insofar as the petitioners herein are concerned,
not in the actual performance of their assigned but the portion of the said decision dismissing
tasks. The incident happened not within the their counterclaim, there being no merit, is
school premises, not on a school day and most hereby AFFIRMED.
importantly while the teachers and students were
holding a purely private affair, a picnic.This picnic
had no permit from the school head or its
principal, Benjamin Illuminbecause this picnic is
not a school sanctioned activity neither is it
considered as an extra-curricular activity.
As earlier pointed out by the trial court, mere

knowledge by petitioner/principal Illumin of the
planning of the picnic by the students and their
teachers does not in any way or in any manner
show acquiescence or consent to the holding of
the same. The application therefore of Article
2180 has no basis in law and neither is it
supported by any jurisprudence. If we were to
affirm the findings of respondent Court on this
score, employers wig forever be exposed to the
risk and danger of being hailed to Court to answer
for the misdeeds or omissions of the employees
even if such act or omission he committed while
they are not in the performance of their duties.
Finally, no negligence could be attributable to the

petitioners-teachers to warrant the award of
damages to the respondents-spouses.
While it is true that respondents-spouses did give

their consent to their son to join the picnic, this
does not mean that the petitioners were already
relieved of their duty to observe the required
diligence of a good father of a family in ensuring
the safety of the children. But in the case at bar,

PALISOC VS. BRILLANTES resulting from the fight between the students
G.R. No. L-29025, October 4, 1971 could have been avoided, had said defendants but
complied with their duty of providing adequate
FACTS: supervision over the activities of the students in
Involved in this case were Dominador Palisoc (16 the school premises to protect their students
yrs old) and Virgilio Daffon ( of legal age), were from harm, whether at the hands of fellow
students of Manila Technical Institute, a school of students or other parties.At any rate, the law
arts and trades. Sometime in March 1966, during holds them liable unless they relieve themselves
recess,while Palisoc was watching Virgilio Daffon of such liability, in compliance with the last
and Desiderio Cruz work on a machine in their paragraph of Article 2180, Civil Code, by
laboratory class,Daffon scolded Palisoc for just “(proving) that they observed all the diligence of
standing around like a foreman. This caused a good father of a family to prevent damage.” In
Palisoc to slightly slap the faceof Daffon and a the light of the factual findings of the lower court’s
fistfight ensued between the two. Palisoc decision, said defendants failed to prove such
retreated but Daffon went after him until Palisoc exemption from liability.
stumbled falling face down. The parents of Palisoc
sued Daffon, the school president (Teodosio The SC reiterated that there is nothing in the law
Valenton), the instructor( Santiago Quibulue), which prescribes that a student must be living
and the owner (Antonio Brillantes). The basis of and boarding with his teacher or in the school
the suit against Valenton,Quibulue, and Brillantes before heads and teachers of the school may be
was Article 2180 of the Civil Code.The lower held liable for the tortious acts of their students.
court, as well as the CA, ruled that only Daffon is
liable for damages and that Valenton,
Quibulue,and Brillantes are not liable because Palisoc v. Brillantes (G.R. No. L-29025 October 4,
under Article 2180, they are only liable “so long as 1971)FACTS: Involved in this case were
they [the students]remain in their custody.” And Dominador Palisoc (16 yrs old) and Virgilio
that this means, as per Mercado vs Court of Daffon ( of legal age), whowere students of Manila
Appeals, that teachers or heads ofestablishments Technical Institute, a school of arts and trades.
are only liable for the tortious acts of their Sometime in March 1966, during recess,while
students if the students are living and boarding Palisoc was watching Virgilio Daffon and
with the teacher or other officials of the school – Desiderio Cruz work on a machine in their
which Daffon was laboratory class,Daffon scolded Palisoc for just
standing around like a foreman. This caused
ISSUE: Palisoc to slightly slap the faceof Daffon and a
Whether or not the ruling or interpretation of Art fistfight ensued between the two. Palisoc
2180 in the Mercado Case still applies. retreated but Daffon went after him until
Palisocstumbled, falling face down. The parents of
RULING: Palisoc sued Daffon, the school president
No. The SC abandoned the ruling in the Mercado (Teodosio Valenton), theinstructor (Santiago
Case as well as the ruling in the Exconde Case as Quibulue), and the owner (Antonio Brillantes).
they adopted Justice JBL Reyes’ dissenting The basis of the suit against Valenton,Quibulue,
opinion in the latter case. Valenton and Quibulue and Brillantes was Article 2180 of the Civil
as president and teacher in charge of the school Code.The lower court, as well as the CA, ruled that
must be held jointly and severally liable for the only Daffon is liable for damages and that
quasi-delict of Daffon. The unfortunate death Valenton, Quibulue,and Brillantes are not liable

because under Article 2180, they are only liable

“so long as they [the students]remain in their
custody.” And that this means, as per Mercado vs
Court of Appeals, that teachers or heads
ofestablishments are only liable for the tortious
acts of their students if the students are living and
boarding withthe teacher or other officials of the
school – which Daffon was not.ISSUE: Whether or
not the ruling or interpretation of Art 2180 in the
Mercado Case still applies.HELD: No. The SC
abandoned the ruling in the Mercado Case as well
as the ruling in the Exconde Case as theyadopted
Justice JBL Reyes’ dissenting opinion in the latter
case. Valenton and Quibulue as president
andteacher-in-charge of the school must be held
jointly and severally liable for the quasi-delict of
Daffon. The unfortunate death resulting from the
fight between the students could have been
avoided, had saiddefendants but complied with
their duty of providing adequate supervision over
the activities of the students inthe school
premises to protect their students from harm,
whether at the hands of fellow students or other
parties.At any rate, the law holds them liable
unless they relieve themselves of such liability, in
compliance with thelast paragraph of Article
2180, Civil Code, by “(proving) that they observed
all the diligence of a good father ofa family to
prevent damage.” In the light of the factual
findings of the lower court’s decision, said
defendantsfailed to prove such exemption from
liability. The SC reiterated that there is nothing
in the law which prescribes that a student must
be living and boardingwith his teacher or in the
school before heads and teachers of the school
may be held liable for the tortious actsof their
students.

DEAN C. WORCESTER VS. MARTIN OCAMPO, court. No fixed or precise rules can be laid down
TEODORO M. KALAW, LOPE K. SANTOS, FIDEL governing the amount of damages in cases of libel.
A. REYES, FAUSTINO AGUILAR, ET AL. It is difficult to include all of the facts and
G.R. No. L-5932, February 27, 1912 conditions which enter into the measure of such
damages. A man's good name and reputation are
FACTS: worth more to him than all the wealth which he can
Defendants were the owners, directors, writers, accumulate during a lifetime of industrious labor.
editors and administrators of the daily To have them destroyed may be eminently of more
newspaper known as "El Renacimiento" and damage to him personally than the destruction of
"Muling Pagsilang," which newspaper during all his physical wealth. No amount of money can
the time mentioned in this complaint was compensate him for his loss. Notwithstanding the
published and circulated daily in the Spanish and great loss which he, from his standpoint, sustains,
Tagalog languages in the city of Manila, having a the courts must have some tangible basis upon
large circulation throughout the Philippine which to estimate such damages.
Islands.
In discussing the elements of damages in a case of
That for a long time the defendants have been libel, the Honorable James C. Jenkins, who tried
persecuting and attacking Worcester in said the present case in the court below, correctly said
newspaper, until at last on the 30th of October, that, "The enjoyment of a private reputation is as
1908, with the intention of injuring the plaintiff, much a constitutional right as the possession of life,
who on said date was, and still is a member of the liberty or property. It is one of those rights
Civil Commission of the Philippines and Secretary necessary to human society, that underlie the
of the Interior in the Government of the whole scheme of human civilization. The respect
Philippines, they attacked the honesty and reviled and esteem of his fellows are among the highest
the fame of the plaintiff as a private individual and rewards of a wellspent life vouchsafed to man in
as an official of the government, and with the this existence. The hope of it is the inspiration of
object of exposing him to the contempt, and youth and its possession is a solace in later years.
ridicule of the public, printed, wrote, and A man of affairs, a business man, who has been
published in said newspaper in its ordinary seen known by his fellowmen in the active
number an article entitled, “Birds of Prey”. pursuits of life for many years, and who has
developed a great character and an unblemished
ISSUE: reputation, has secured a possession more useful
Whether defendants are liable for P60,000 as and more valuable than lands or houses or silver
damages in favor of Dean Worcester or gold. The law recognizes the value of such a
reputation and constantly strives to give redress
HELD: for its injury. It imposes upon him who attacks it
No, because Dean Worcester is entitled only to by slanderous words or libelous publications, the
P25,000 as damages. liability to make full compensation for the
The amount of damages resulting from a libelous damage to the reputation, for the shame, obloquy
publication to a man's good name and reputation and for the injury to the feelings of its owner,
is difficult of ascertainment. It is not difficult to which are caused by the publication of the slander
realize that the damage thus done is great and or libel. The law goes further. If the words are
almost immeasurable. The specific amount the spoken or the publication is made with the intent
damages to be awarded must depend upon the to injure the victim or with criminal indifference
facts in each case and the sound discretion of the to civil obligation, it imposes such damages as the

jury, in view of all the circumstances of the In determining the amount, the courts must be
particular case, adjudge that the wrongdoer governed in each case by the evidence, the
ought to pay as an example to the public and to circumstances and their sound discretion. Taking
deter others from doing likewise, and for into consideration the fact that some of the
punishment for the infliction of the injury." defendants have been prosecuted criminally and
have been sentenced, and considering that fact as
After a careful examination, we are of the opinion a part of the punitive damages, we have arrived at
that part of the judgment of the lower court the conclusion that the judgment of the lower
relating to the damages suffered by the Honorable court should be modified, and that a judgment
Dean C. Worcester, should be modified, and that a should be rendered against the defendants,
judgment should be rendered in favor of Mr. Dean jointly and severally, and in favor of the plaintiff,
C. Worcester and against the defendants, jointly the Honorable Dean C. Worcester, in the sum of
and severally, for P15,000, with interest at 6% P10,000, as punitive damages, with interest at 6
from the 23d of January, 1909. per cent from the 23d day of January, 1909.
On the issue that the court erred in imposing Therefore, a judgment should be rendered in
punitive damages upon the defendants, we are of favor of Dean C. Worcester and against the
the opinion, after a careful examination of the defendants Martin Ocampo, Teodoro M. Kalaw,
evidence, and the malice connected with the Manuel Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose, Galo
publication of said editorial and the subsequent Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio M.
publications with relation to said editorial, that Cansipit, jointly and severally, for the sum of
the lower court, by virtue of the provisions of Act P25,000 with interest at 6 per cent from the 23d
No. 277 of the Philippine Commission, was of January, 1909, with costs, and that a judgment
justified in imposing punitive damages upon the should be entered absolving Lope K. Santos from
defendants. any liability under said complaint. So ordered.
Section 11 of Act No. 277 allows the court, in an

action for libel, to render a judgment for punitive
damages, in an amount which the court may think
will be a just punishment to the libeler and an
example to others.
Exemplary damages in civil actions for libel may

always be recovered if the defendant or
defendants are actuated by malice. In the present
case there was not the slightest effort on the part
of the defendants to show the existence of
probable cause or foundation whatever for the
facts contained in said editorial. Malice, hatred,
and ill will against the plaintiff are seen
throughout the record. The said editorial not only
attempted to paint the plaintiff as a villain, but
upon every occasion, the defendants resorted to
ridicule of the severest kind.

METRO MANILA TRANSIT VS. CA In order that the defense of due diligence in the
223 SCRA 521 (1993) selection and supervision of employees may be
deemed sufficient and plausible, it is not enough
FACTS: to emptily invoke the existence of said company
A collission of vehicles in DBP intersection – a guidelines and policies on hiring and supervision.
jeepney and bus that is government owned – As the negligence of the employee gives rise to the
cause plaintiff NenitaCustodio to hit the presumption of negligence on the part of the
windshield of the passenger jeepney and thrown employer, the latter has the burden of proving
therefrom. As a consequence, she was unable to that it has been diligent not only in the selection
work for 3 ½ months. The private respondent of employees but also in the actual supervision of
who was a minor complained for damages. their work. The mere allegation of the existence of
Defendant VictorinoLamayo, the driver of the hiring procedures and supervisory policies,
jeepney, contended that the MMTC is at fault for without anything more, is decidedly not sufficient
failure to exercise diligence in the selection of its to overcome presumption.
employees. The training officer of MMTC testified
that as a training officer of MMTC that they We emphatically reiterate our holding, as a
conducted tedious selection to its employees. It warning to all employers, that "(t)he mere
was further testified that MMTC checks its buses formulation of various company policies on safety
before it is taken for dispatch. without showing that they were being complied
with is not sufficient to exempt petitioner from
ISSUES: liability arising from negligence of its employees.
Whether or not MMTC is did not exercise It is incumbent upon petitioner to show that in
diligence of a good father in the selection of its recruiting and employing the erring driver the
employees, hence liable under the quasi delict. recruitment procedures and company policies on
efficiency and safety were followed." 54 Paying lip-
RULING: service to these injunctions or merely going
Yes. through the motions of compliance therewith will
Due diligence in the supervision of employees, on warrant stern sanctions from the Court.
the other hand, includes the formulation of
suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of These obligations, imposed by the law and public
employees and the issuance of proper policy in the interests and for the safety of the
instructions intended for the protection of the commuting public, herein petitioner failed to
public and persons with whom the employer has perform. Respondent court was definitely correct
relations through his or its employees and the in ruling that ". . . due diligence in the selection
imposition of necessary disciplinary measures and supervision of employee (is) not proved by
upon employees in case of breach or as may be mere testimonies to the effect that its applicant
warranted to ensure the performance of acts has complied with all the company requirements
indispensable to the business of and beneficial to before one is admitted as an employee but
their employer. 53 To this, we add that actual without proof thereof." 55 It is further a distressing
implementation and monitoring of consistent commentary on petitioner that it is a
compliance with said rules should be the constant government-owned public utility, maintained by
concern of the employer, acting through public funds, and organized for the public welfare.
dependable supervisors who should regularly
report on their supervisory functions. The Court it is necessary to once again stress the
following rationale behind these all-important

statutory and jurisprudential mandates, for it has consequently, we find no reason to disturb said
been observed that despite its pronouncement in ruling.
Kapalaran Bus Line vs. Coronado, et al., supra,
there has been little improvement in the
transport situation in the country:
In requiring the highest possible degree of

diligence from common carriers and creating a
presumption of negligence against them, the
law compels them to curb the recklessness of
their drivers. While the immediate
beneficiaries of the standard of extraordinary
diligence are, of course, the passengers and
owners of the cargo carried by a common
carrier, they are not the only persons that the
law seeks to benefit. For if common carriers
carefully observe the statutory standard of
extraordinary diligence in respect of their own
passengers, they cannot help but
simultaneously benefit pedestrians and the
owners and passengers of other vehicles who
are equally entitled to the safe and convenient
use of our roads and highways. The law seeks
to stop and prevent the slaughter and maiming
of people (whether passengers or not) and the
destruction of property (whether freight or
not) on our highways by buses, the very size
and power of which seem often to inflame the
minds of their drivers. . . .
Finally, we believe that respondent court acted in

the exercise of sound discretion when it affirmed
the trial court's award, without requiring the
payment of interest thereon as an item of
damages just because of delay in the
determination thereof, especially since private
respondent did not specifically pray therefor in
her complaint. Article 2211 of the Civil Code
provides that in quasi-delicts, interest as a part of
the damages may be awarded in the discretion of
the court, and not as a matter of right. We do not
perceive that there have been international
dilatory maneuvers or any special circumstances
which would justify that additional award and,

BACHELOR EXPRESS vs CA the debtor to comply with his obligation, must be

G.R. No. 85691 July 31, 1990 independent of the human will. (2) It must be
impossible to foresee the event which constitutes
FACTS: On August 1, 1980, Bus No. 800 owned by the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it must
Bachelor Express, Inc. and driven by Cresencio be impossible to avoid. (3) The occurrence must
Rivera was the situs of a stampede which resulted be such as to render it impossible for the debtor
in the death of passengers Ornominio Beter and to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner. And
Narcisa Rautraut. Petitioners denied liability for (4) the obligor (debtor) must be free from any
the death of Beter and Rautraut alleged that the participation in the aggravation of the injury
driver was able to transport his passengers safely resulting to the creditor.
to their respective places of destination except
Beter and Rautraut who jumped off the bus As will be seen, these authorities agree that some
without the knowledge and consent, much less, extraordinary circumstance independent of the
the fault of the driver and conductor; the will of the obligor or of his employees, is an
defendant corporation had exercised due essential element of a caso fortuito. ...
diligence in the choice of its employees to avoid as The running amuck of the passenger was the
much as possible accidents, it was an incident or proximate cause of the incident as it triggered off
event very much beyond the control of Bachelor a commotion and panic among the passengers
Express. The trial court dismiss the complaint. such that the passengers started running to the
CA reversed and awarded Beter P75,000.00 in sole exit shoving each other resulting in the falling
loss of earnings and support, moral damages, off the bus by passengers Beter and Rautraut
straight death indemnity and attorney's fees; and causing them fatal injuries. The sudden act of the
the heirs of Rautraut, the amount of P45,000.00 passenger who stabbed another passenger in the
for straight death indemnity, moral damages and bus is within the context of force majeure.
attorney's fees
However, in order that a common carrier may be
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not the vehicular accident absolved from liability in case of force majeure, it
falls within the purview of caso fortuito; (2) is not enough that the accident was caused
Whether or not the petitioner's common carrier by force majeure. The common carrier must still
observed extraordinary diligence to safeguard prove that it was not negligent in causing the
the lives of its passengers. injuries resulting from such accident.
RULING: Affirmative. In discussing and (2) Negative. Pursuant to Article 1756 1 of the
analyzing the term caso fortuito the Enciclopedia Civil Code, petitioner Bachelor Express, Inc. is
Juridica Española says: 'In a legal sense and, presumed to have acted negligently unless it can
consequently, also in relation to contracts, a caso prove that it had observed extraordinary
fortuito presents the following essential diligence in accordance with Articles 1733 2 and
characteristics: (1) The cause of the unforeseen 17553 of the New Civil Code.
and unexpected occurrence, or of the failure of
1 ART. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the
common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by
have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed them, according to all the circumstances of each case.
extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 3 ART. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the
1755. passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can

2 ART. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons,
business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to with a due regard for all the circumstances.
Considering the factual findings of the Court of

Appeals-the bus driver did not immediately stop
the bus at the height of the commotion; the bus
was speeding from a full stop; the victims fell
from the bus door when it was opened or gave
way while the bus was still running; the
conductor panicked and blew his whistle after
people had already fallen off the bus; and the bus
was not properly equipped with doors in
accordance with law-it is clear that the
petitioners have failed to overcome the
presumption of fault and negligence found in the
law governing common carriers.
Petitioner’s common carrier was negligent in the

provision of safety precautions so that its
passengers may be transported safely to their
destinations.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED.

The questioned decision dated May 19, 1988 and
the resolution dated August 1, 1988 of the Court
of Appeals are AFFIRMED.

GOTESCO vs CHATTO defect," and not due to an act of god or force

G.R. No. L-87584 June 16, 1992 majeure.
FACTS: b. Whether the lower court erred in finding that

In the afternoon of June 4, 1982 plaintiff Gloria E. the appellant was grossly negligent in failing
Chatto, and her 15-year old daughter, plaintiff "to cause proper and adequate inspection
LinaDelza went to see the movie "Mother Dear" at maintenance and upkeep of the building."
Superama I theater, owned by defendant Gotesco
Investment Corporation. They bought balcony RULING:
tickets but even then were unable to find seats a. Negative. Significant is the finding of the trial
considering the number of people patronizing the court, affirmed by the respondent Court that
movie. Hardly ten (10) minutes after entering the the collapse was due to construction defects.
theater, the ceiling of its balcony collapsed. There was no evidence offered to overturn this
Plaintiffs,walked the nearby FEU Hospital where finding. The building was constructed barely
they were confined and treated for one (1) four (4) years prior to the accident in question.
day.The next day, they transferred to the UST It was not shown that any of the causes
hospital. Plaintiff Gloria Chatto was treated in said denominates as force majeure obtained
hospital from June 5 to June 19 and plaintiff immediately before or at the time of the
LinaDelzaChatto from June 5 to 11. collapse of the ceiling. Such defects could have
been easily discovered if only petitioner
Due to continuing pain in the neck, headache and exercised due diligence and care in keeping
dizziness, plaintiff went to Illinois, USA in July and maintaining the premises. But as disclosed
1982 for further treatment. She was treated at the by the testimony of Mr. Ong, there was no
Hospital in Chicago, Illinois. She stayed in the U.S. adequate inspection of the premises before the
for about three (3) months during which time she date of the accident.
had to return to the Cook County Hospital five (5)
or, six (6) times.Defendant tried to avoid liability b. Negative. It is settled that:
by alleging that the collapse of the ceiling of its
theater was done due to force majeure. It The owner or proprietor of a place of public
maintained that its theater did not suffer from any amusement impliedly warrants that the
structural or construction defect. premises, appliances and amusement
devices are safe for the purpose for which
The trial court decided in favor of the plaintiff and they are designed, the doctrine being
awarded moral, actual and consequential subject to no other exception or
damages plus attorney’s fees plus the cost of the qualification than that he does not contract
suit. These awards, except for the attorney's fees, against unknown defects not discoverable
were to earn interest at the rate of 12% per by ordinary or reasonable means.
annum beginning from the date the complaint
was filed, 16 November 1982, until the amounts This implied warranty has given rise to the rule
were fully paid, hence the appeal. that:
ISSUE: Where a patron of a theater or other place

a. Whether the lower court erred in finding that of public amusement is injured, and the
"the ceiling of the balcony collapsed due to thing that caused the injury is wholly and
some structural construction or architectural exclusively under the control and

management of the defendant, and the

accident is such as in the ordinary course of
events would not have happened if proper
care had been exercised, its occurrence
raises a presumption or permits of an
inference of negligence on the part of the
defendant.
That presumption or inference was not overcome

by the petitioner.

THE BOARD OF LIQUIDATORS vs. HEIRS OF Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment
MAXIMO M. KALAW or negligence; it imports a dishonest purpose or
20 SCRA 987, No. L-18805 August 14, 1967 some moral obliquity and conscious doing of
PONENTE: J. Sanchez wrong; it means breach of a known duty through
Nature of the Action: Torts, Damages some motive or interest or ill-will; it partakes of
the nature of fraud.
FACTS: National Coconut Corporation (NACOCO) The present case is one of damnum absque
embarked on copra trading activities led by its injuria. Conjunction of damage and wrong is here
General Manager Maximo Kalaw and the other absent. There cannot be an actionable wrong if
defendants as members of the board. Due to either one or the other is wanting.
natural calamities, the business of copra became
unprofitable. Kalaw made a full disclosure of the
situation and apprised the board of the
impending losses on the contracts already
entered into, but no action was taken. But later on,
the contracts were unanimously approved by the
Board.
The buyers threatened damage suits, but some
were settled. Louis Dreyfus & Co. Ltd. Actually
sued but was also culminated in an out-of-court
settlement. NACOCO now seeks to recover the
sum paid to Louis from general manager and
board chairman Kalaw and the other members
who approved the contracts. It charges Kalaw
with negligence and bad faith and/or breach of
trust for having approved the contracts, which
was dismissed by the trial court.
Issue: Whether or not the Kalaw’s act of

approving the contracts as General Manager of
NACOCO without the approval of the Board
constitute bad faith that will make him liable for
damages?
HELD: No.
A corporate officer, entrusted with the general
management and control of its business, has
implied authority to make any contract or do any
other act which is necessary or appropriate to the
conduct of the ordinary business of the
corporation. As such officer, he may, without any
special authority from the Board of Directors,
perform all acts of an ordinary nature, which by
usage or necessity are incident to his office, and
may bind the corporation by contracts in matters
arising in the usual course of business.

PNR vs. CA
GR NO. L-55347, OCT 4, 1985
FACTS
Tupang fell on the tracks while riding a
PNR train. Heirs sued PNR for damages. Trial
court found PNR liable and ordered PNR to pay
12K for the death of Tupang, + 20k for loss of
earning capacity, + 10k for moral damages, + 2k
attys fees.
On appeal, the CA sustained the findings of the

Trial Court and added 5k as exemplary damages.
ISSUE
W/N the award of damages are correct?
HELD
No, because while PNR failed to exercise
the extra ordinary diligence, Tupang was guilty of
contributory negligence since he opted to sit on
the open platform between the coaches of the
train. This justifies the deletion of Moral Damages.
The exemplary damages must also be set aside

because it is only allowed when the defendant
acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, or
oppressive manner. There being no evidence of
fraud, malice or bad faith on the party of the
PNR, this imposition should be removed.

ESCUETA vs FANDIALAN case under Rule 111, section 3 of the Rules of

G.R. No. L-39675 / November 29, 1974 / Court. Being a case of physical injuries under
TEEHANKEE, J. Article 33 of the Civil Code, plaintiffs civil action
for damages did not arise from nor depend upon
SUBJECT: TORTS & DAMAGES / III. Persons the result of the criminal action but from
liable (D.4) Prescription defendant's act of infliction of physical injuries.
Hence, plaintiff's cause of action clearly accrued
FACTS: The complaint alleged that on July 2, from July 2, 1952 the date that the physical
1952, Fandialan inflicted several physical injuries injuries were inflicted on him. As of that date, he
on the person of plaintiff Escueta for which he had the right to file and maintain his civil action
was charged with the crime of frustrated for damages and the period of prescription
homicide but was convicted of slight physical started to run.
injuries by the CFI of Laguna, which judgment was
affirmed by the CA on August 31, 1955; that on Plaintiffs civil suit for damages arising from
June 20, 1956, plaintiff, having reserved his right physical injuries is clearly one based upon an
to institute a separate civil action, filed with the injury to his rights, for which Article 1146 (1)
CFI a complaint to enforce defendant's civil provides a prescriptive period of four years.
liability under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Plaintiff's contention that his prescriptive period
Code but the same was dismissed without should be ten years based upon the judgment of
prejudice and costs on October 31, 1962, for lack defendant's conviction for physical injuries in the
of interest; and that despite the lapse of several criminal case is untenable. No civil liability was
years and the attempt on plaintiff's part to adjudged in the criminal case since plaintiff
enforce the said civil liability, defendant failed to expressly reserved the right of filing a separate
settle the same, thus compelling plaintiff to refile civil action. Hence, he had no standing in the
the case on July 5, 1968. criminal action as an offended party and the
verdict of conviction excluded any civil liability.
On defendant's motion, the court dismissed the
complaint on the ground of prescription, that is, ACCORDINGLY, the appealed order of dismissal is
"the instant action has been barred by the Statute hereby affirmed, with costs against plaintiff-
of Limitations because the crime of physical appellant.
injuries was committed by defendant on July 2,
1952 and this case was filed on July 5, 1968, or
after the lapse of 16 years, the period
of prescription applicable being 4 years according
to Art. 1146 (1) of the Civil Code
ISSUE: The correctness of the lower court's

dismissal of the complaint filed after the lapse of
16 years on the ground that the action is barred
by prescription.
RULING: Affirmed. Plaintiff's civil action for

damages does not fall under that category of civil
actions based upon a criminal offense which are
suspended to await the outcome of the criminal

PICART vs SMITH, JR. (horse and automobile but in so doing the automobile passed in such
accident) close proximity to the animal that it became
G.R. No. L-12219, March 15, 1918 (37 PHIL frightened and turned its body across the bridge
809) with its head toward the railing. In so doing, it as
struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the flange
FACTS: of the car and the limb was broken. The horse fell
and its rider was thrown off with some violence.
On December 12, 1912, on the Carlatan Bridge, at From the evidence adduced in the case we believe
San Fernando, La Union, Picart (plaintiff) was that when the accident occurred the free space
riding on his pony over said bridge. Before he had where the pony stood between the automobile
gotten half way across, the Smith, Jr. (defendant) and the railing of the bridge was probably less
approached from the opposite direction in an than one and one half meters. As a result of its
automobile, going at the rate of about ten or injuries the horse died. The plaintiff received
twelve miles per hour. As the defendant neared contusions which caused temporary
the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his unconsciousness and required medical attention
horn to give warning of his approach. He for several days.
continued his course and after he had taken the
bridge he gave two more successive blasts, as it ISSUE:
appeared to him that the man on horseback
before him was not observing the rule of the road. Whether or not the defendant in manuevering his
car in the manner described is guilty of negligence
Picart, it appears, saw the automobile coming and such as it gives rise to a civil obligation to repair
heard the warning signals. However, being the damage done? When there is negligence on
flustered by the rapidity of the approach of the the part of both parties, who is liable for
vehicle, he pulled the pony closely up against the damages?
railing on the right side of the bridge instead of
going to the left. He says that the reason he did HELD:
this was that he thought he did not have sufficient
time to get over to the other side. As the Yes. Defendant is liable. When the defendant
automobile approached, the defendant guided it exposed the horse and rider to this danger he was
toward his left, that being the proper side of the negligent in the eye of the law.
road for the machine. In so doing the defendant
assumed that the horseman would move to the The existence of negligence in a given case is not
other side. The pony had not as yet exhibited determined by reference to the personal
fright, and the rider had made no sign for the judgment of the actor in the situation before him.
automobile to stop. Seeing that the pony was The law considers what would be reckless,
apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary
veering to the right while yet some distance away intelligence and prudence and determines
or slowing down, continued to approach directly liability by that.
toward the horse without diminution of speed.
When he had gotten quite near, there being then Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent
no possibility of the horse getting across to the man in the position of the tortfeasor would have
other side, the defendant quickly turned his car foreseen that an effect harmful to another was
sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing
alongside of the railing where it as then standing; conduct or guarding against its consequences.

Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant

in the present case we think that negligence is
clearly established. A prudent man, placed in the
position of the defendant, would in our opinion,
have recognized that the course which he was
pursuing was fraught with risk, and would
therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and the
rider as reasonable consequence of that course.
Under these circumstances the law imposed on
the defendant the duty to guard against the
threatened harm.
The plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for

he was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting
himself on the wrong side of the road. But the
defendant was also negligent; and in such case the
problem always is to discover which agent is
immediately and directly responsible. It will be
noted that the negligent acts of the two parties
were not contemporaneous, since the negligence
of the defendant succeeded the negligence of the
plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these
circumstances the law is that the person who has
the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm
and fails to do so is chargeable with the
consequences, without reference to the prior
negligence of the other party.
While contributory negligence on the part of the

person injured did not constitute a bar to
recovery, it could be received in evidence to
reduce the damages which would otherwise have
been assessed wholly against the other party.
Where the defendant was actually present and
operating the automobile which caused the
damage, The court do not feel constrained to
attempt to weigh the negligence of the respective
parties in order to apportion the damage
according to the degree of their relative fault. It is
enough to say that the negligence of the defendant
was in this case the immediate and determining
cause of the accident and that the antecedent
negligence of the plaintiff was a more remote
factor in the case.

LBC AIR CARGO v CA (Suzuki Motorcycle vs LBC defendants Jaime Tano and LBC Air Cargo, Inc. to
Cargo Van) jointly and severally pay the plaintiff Patrocinia
G.R. No. 101683, February 23, 1995 (241 SCRA Monterola for damages.
619)
ISSUE:
FACTS:
Whether or not the proximate cause of the
At about 11:30 in the morning of 15 November accident was Monterola's negligence in the
1987. Rogelio Monterola, a licensed driver, was driving of his motorcycle in a very fast speed and
traveling on board his Suzuki motorcycle towards thus hitting the petitioner's cargo van.
Mangagoy on the right lane along a dusty national
road in Bislig, Surigao del Sur. At about the same HELD:
time, a cargo van of the LBC Air Cargo
Incorporated, driven by defendant Jaime Tano, Jr., No. The proximate cause of the accident was the
was coming from the opposite direction on its negligence of Tano who, despite extremely poor
way to the Bislig Airport. On board were visibility, hastily executed a left turn (towards the
passengers Fernando Yu, Manager of LBC Air Bislig airport road entrance) without first waiting
Cargo, and his son who was seated beside Tano. for the dust to settle. It was this negligent act of
When Tano was approaching the vicinity of the Tano, which had placed his vehicle (LBC van)
airport road entrance on his left, he saw two directly on the path of the motorcycle coming
vehicles racing against each other from the from the opposite direction, that almost
opposite direction. Tano stopped his vehicle and instantaneously caused the collision to occur.
waited for the two racing vehicles to pass by. The Simple prudence required him not to attempt to
stirred cloud of dust made visibility extremely cross the other lane until after it would have been
bad. Instead of waiting for the dust to settled, safe from and clear of any oncoming vehicle
Tano started to make a sharp left turn towards
the airport road. When he was about to reach the Petitioners poorly invoke the doctrine of "last
center of the right lane, the motorcycle driven by clear chance" (also referred to, at times, as
Monterola suddenly emerged from the dust and "supervening negligence" or as "discovered
smashed head-on against the right side of the LBC peril"). The doctrine, in essence, is to the effect
van. Monterola died from the severe injuries he that where both parties are negligent, but the
sustained. negligent act of one is appreciably later in time
than that of the other, or when it is impossible to
A criminal case for "homicide thru reckless determine whose fault or negligence should be
imprudence" was filed against Tano. A civil suit attributed to the incident, the one who had the
was likewise instituted by the heirs of deceased last clear opportunity to avoid the impending
Monterola against Tano, along with Fernando Yu harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the
and LBC Air Cargo Incorporated, for the recovery consequences thereof (see Picart vs. Smith, 37
of damages. Phil. 809). Stated differently, the rule would also
mean that an antecedent negligence of a person
On 29 July 1990, the trial court dismissed both does not preclude the recovery of damages for
cases on the ground that the proximate cause of supervening negligence of, or bar a defense
the "accident" was the negligence of deceased against the liability sought by, another if the latter,
Rogelio Monterola. The Court of Appeals reversed who had the last fair chance, could have avoided
the decision of the lower court ordering the the impending harm by the exercise of due

diligence (Pantranco North Express, Inc. vs.

Baesa, 179 SCRA 384; Glan People's Lumber and
Hardware vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 173
SCRA 464).
In the case at bench, the victim was traveling

along the lane where he was rightly supposed to
be. The incident occurred in an instant. No
appreciable time had elapsed, from the moment
Tano swerved to his left to the actual impact; that
could have afforded the victim a last clear
opportunity to avoid the collision.
It is true however, that the deceased was not all

that free from negligence in evidently speeding
too closely behind the vehicle he was following.
We, therefore, agree with the appellate court that
there indeed was contributory negligence on the
victim's part that could warrant a mitigation of
petitioners’ liability for damages.

TAYAG VS. ALCANTARA and/or with grave abuse of discretion in

98 SCRA 723 (1980) dismissing the civil case.
Facts: Held:
On Sept. 2, 1974, Pedro Tayag, Sr. was bumped Yes, the respondent Judge acted with grave abuse
and hit by a Philippine Rabbit Bus bearing Body of discretion in dismissing the civil case. In this
No. 1107 and Plate No. YL 604 PUB ’74 and as a case, the allegations in the complaint show that
result of which he was physically injured causing petitioners’cause of action was based upon a
his instantaneous death as well as destroying the quasi-delict. The essential averments for a quasi
bike he was riding. The bus was being driven delictual action are present, namely:
bydefendant, Romeo Villa y Cunanan, at the times 1) An act or omission constituting fault
of the accident in a faster and greater speed than or negligence on the part of private respondent:
whatwas reasonable and proper and in a grossly 2) Damage caused by the said act or omission;
negligent, careless, reckless and imprudent 3) Direct causal relation between the damage and
manner.The heirs of Pedro Tayag, Sr., petitioners, the act or omission;
filed with the Court of First Instance a complaint 4) No pre-existing contractual relation
for damages against Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, between the parties.
Inc. and Romeo Villa y Cunanan, private
respondents, on Sept. 25, 1974. The private As stated in the case of Elcano vs.
respondents admitted some and denied the other Hill, the civil liability for the same act considered
allegations in the complaints; thereafter, file a as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not
motion to suspend trial on the ground of a extinguished by the acquittal of the accused in the
pending criminal case against the driver of the criminal action arising from the same act.
bus, Romeo Villa y Cunanan. The respondent The petitioner’s cause of action is based on a quasi
Judge granted the motion and subsequently -delict, therefore, the acquittal of the driver,
suspended the hearing of the Civil Case. The Romeo Villa, in the criminal case is not a bar to the
respondent judge acquitted the accused, Romeo prosecution in the civil case for damages based on
Villa, of the crime of homicide on the ground of a quasi-delict. The petition is granted and the
reasonable doubt in the criminal case filed against order of dismissal rendered by the respondent
him. The private respondents then filed a motion Judge is set aside and the case is remanded to the
to dismiss the civil case on the ground that lower court for further proceedings.
petitioners have no cause of action on the basis of
the driver’s acquittal in the related criminal case.
The petitioners then opposed the motion alleging
that their cause of action is based on a quasi-
delict, not on a crime, but the respondent Judge
dismissed the complaint and denied the motion
for reconsideration filed by the petitioners.
Hence, this petition for certiorari, to annul and set
aside the order of the respondent Judge was filed.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent Judge acted
without or in excess of his jurisdiction

GREGORIO FERNANDEZ, vs. THE MANILA ISSUE:

ELECTRIC RAILROAD AND LIGHT COMPANY Whether or not defendant shall no longer
G.R. No. L-3865, October 16, 1909 be liable based on the document signed by the
plaintiff
FACTS:
Some time prior to the night of the 28th of HELD:
January, 1906, the defendant company had strung
some electric light wire in Calle Gagalañgin in the The weight of the testimony, it seems to
city of Manila. The work was so negligently done me, is strongly against the contention of the
that the end of a wire, heavily charged with plaintiff:
electricity, loosely dangled in the street within First. The plaintiff's testimony is directly
reach of persons passing. law library and flatly contradicted by the witnesses, Lopez
On the night in question the plaintiff was a and Van Hoven.
policeman of the city of Manila on duty in that Second. The circumstances are not in
street. On the morning of the 29th aforesaid, harmony with the plaintiff's contention.
between 2 and 3 o'clock, passing along the said
street in the performance of his duties, he came in Third. The evidence of the plaintiff himself
contact with said wire and sustained certain is contradictory an import particulars.
burns and shocks, which, he claims, rendered him Fourth. It is contended, and perhaps justly,
temporarily unconscious. Regaining his senses that the great point in favor of plaintiff's
shortly, he made his way to the police station and contention is the apparent inadequacy of the
was from there sent to the Civil Hospital. consideration which he received for signing the
On the morning of the 29th above referred release.
to, between the hours of 7 and 9, two persons, Thus, the Court landed into a decision:
Lopez and Van Hoven, the Civil Hospital, where
The presumption that the written
the plaintiff then was. After some conversation
instrument was carefully and deliberately
with him, lasting about twenty minutes, they, on
behalf of the company, made a compromise prepared and executed is indulged in all cases,
and the plaintiff is entitled to relief on the ground
settlement with him, pursuance of which he, in
of mistake only upon clear, strong, and convincing
consideration of P20 paid him at that time,
evidence, for the writing should be deemed the
executed a release, in Spanish, of each and every
sole expositor of the intent of the parties until the
one of his rights and claims to any further
contrary is established beyond reasonable
damages arising from such negligence.
controversy.
The plaintiff claims that he was at the time
In the Maxwell Land-Grant Case (121 U. S.,
unable to read the Spanish language and that he
325, 379, 381), the court says: It thus appears that
did not read the document, and that he relied
the title of the defendants rests upon the
entirely upon the representations of defendant's
strongest presumptions of fact, which, although
agents as to the contents of the paper which he
they may be rebutted, nevertheless, can be
signed.It nowhere appears in the evidence that
overthrown only by full proofs to the contrary,
the agents at the time knew that the plaintiff could
clear, convincing and unambiguous.
not read the Spanish language.cy
The fact that the plaintiff may not have
fully understood the legal effect of the document

is no ground for setting it aside. (Arenal et al vs.

Barnes et al., 8 Phil. Rep., 551, 552.)
The mere fact that one has made a poor
bargain is no ground for setting aside the
agreement. (Christianson vs. Railway Co., 67
Minn., 94.)
We, therefore, decide that the release in
question is an instrument binding upon the
plaintiff and that he has no cause of action against
the defendant to recover damages for causing the
injuries mentioned therein.

UE VS JADER 325 SCRA 804 (2000) through whose agency the loss occurred must
February 17, 2000 bear it. The modern tendency is to grant
indemnity for damages in cases where there is
FACTS: abuse of right, even when the act is not illicit. If
Romeo Jader took his law proper at UE from mere fault or negligence in one's acts can make
1984-88. During the first semester of his last year him liable for damages for injury caused thereby,
in law school, he failed to take the examination for with more reason should abuse or bad faith make
Practice Court I in which he obtained an him liable. A person should be protected only
incomplete grade. He filed an application for when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right,
removal of the incomplete grade given by Prof. that is, when he acts with prudence and in good
Carlos Ortega on February 1, 1988 which was faith, but not when he acts with negligence or
approved by Dean Celedonio Tiongson after the abuse.
payment of required fees. He took the exam on
March 28 and on May 30, the professor gave him However, while petitioner was guilty of
a grade of 5, a failing grade. negligence and thus liable to respondent for the
His name was still on the tentative list of latter's actual damages, we hold that respondent
candidates for graduation. Likewise, his name should not have been awarded moral damages.
appeared in the invitation for the commencement We do not agree with the Court of Appeals'
exercises which was held on April 16, 1988. When findings that respondent suffered shock, trauma
he learnt of his deficiency, he dropped from his and pain when he was informed that he could not
Bar Review classes thereby made him ineligible to graduate and will not be allowed to take the bar
take the bar exam. examinations. At the very least, it behooved on
He filed a civil suit against UE for respondent to verify for himself whether he has
damages because he suffered moral shock, mental completed all necessary requirements to be
anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, eligible for the bar examinations. As a senior law
wounded feelings, and sleepless nights due to student, respondent should have been
UE’s negligence. The petitioner denied liability responsible enough to ensure that all his affairs,
arguing that it never led respondent to believe specifically those pertaining to his academic
that he completed the requirements for an LlB achievement, are in order. Given these
degree when his name was included in the considerations, we fail to see how respondent
tentative list of graduating students. The court could have suffered untold embarrassment in
ruled in favor of the respondent. attending the graduation rites, enrolling in the
bar review classes and not being able to take the
ISSUE: bar exams. If respondent was indeed humiliated
Whether or not an educational institution by his failure to take the bar, he brought this upon
may be held liable for damages for misleading a himself by not verifying if he has satisfied all the
student into believing that the latter had satisfied requirements including his school records, before
all the requirements for graduation when such is preparing himself for the bar examination.
not the case, Certainly, taking the bar examinations does not
only entail a mental preparation on the subjects
HELD: thereof; there are also prerequisites of
Petitioner cannot pass on its blame to the documentation and submission of requirements
professors to justify its own negligence that led to which the prospective examinee must meet.
the delayed relay of information to respondent.
When one of two innocent parties must suffer, he

GRAND UNION VS. ESPINO stopped and led by a uniformed guard toward the
94 SCRA 953 (1979) rear of the supermarket. Plaintiff acquiesced and
G.R. No. L-48250 December 28, 1979 signaled to his wife and daughters to wait.
"The guard who had accosted plaintiff took
FACTS: him back inside the supermarket in the company
In the morning of August 22, 1970, of his wife. Plaintiff and his wife were directed
plaintiff Jose J. Espino. Jr., a civil engineer and an across the main entrance to the shopping area,
executive of Procter and Gamble Philippines, Inc., down the line of check-out counters, to a desk
and his wife and their two daughters went to shop beside the first checkout counter. To the woman
at the defendants' South Supermarket in Makati. seated at the desk, who turned out to be
While his wife was shopping at the groceries defendant Nelia Santos-Fandino, the guard
section, plaintiff browsed around the other parts presented the incident report and the file, Exhibit
of the market. Finding a cylindrical "rat tail" file B. Defendant Fandino read the report and
which he needed in his hobby and had been addressing the guard remarked: "Ano,
wanting to buy, plaintiff picked up that item from nakawnanamanito" (p. 22, Id.). Plaintiff explained
one of the shelves. He held it in his hand thinking and narrated the incident that led to the finding of
that it might be lost, because of its tiny size, if he the file in his pocket, telling Fandino that he was
put it in his wife's grocery cart. In the course of going to pay for the file because he needed it. But
their shopping, plaintiff and his wife saw the maid this defendant replied: "That is all they say, the
of plaintiff's aunt. While talking to this maid, people whom we cause not paying for the goods
plaintiff stuck the file into the front breast pocket say... They all intended to pay for the things that
of his shirt with a good part of the merchandise are found to them."
exposed. "Extracting a P5.00 bill from his pocket,
"At the check-out counter, the plaintiff plaintiff told Fandino that he was paying for the
paid for his wife's purchases which amounted to file whose cost was P3.85. Fandino reached over
P77.00, but he forgot to pay for the file. As he was and took the P5.00 bill from plaintiff with these
leaving by the exit of the supermarket on his way words: "We are fining you P5.00. That is your the
to his car, carrying two bags of groceries and fine."He drew a P50.00 bill and took back the file.
accompanied by his wife and two daughter, Fandino directed him to the nearest check-out
plaintiff was approached by a uniformed guard of counter where he had to fall in line. The people
the supermarket who said: "Excuse me, Mr., I who heard the exchange of words between
think you have something in your pocket which Fandino and plaintiff continued to stare at him. At
you have not paid for." (p. 5, tsn, Aug. 13, 1971), the trial, plaintiff expressed his embarrassment
pointing to his left front breast pocket. Suddenly and humiliation thus: " I felt as though I wanted to
reminded of the file, plaintiff apologized thus: "I disappear into a hole on the ground" (p. 34, Id.).
am sorry," and he turned back toward the cashier After paying for the file, plaintiff and his wife
to pay for the file. But the guard stopped him and walked as fast as they could out of the
led him instead toward the rear of the supermarket.
supermarket. The plaintiff protested but the Private respondent's complaint filed on
guard was firm saying: "No, Mr., please come with October 8, 1970 is founded on Article 21 in
me. It is the procedure of the supermarket to relation to Article 2219 of the New Civil Code and
bring people that we apprehend to the back of the prays for moral damages, exemplary damages,
supermarket" (p. 8, Ibid). The time was between attorney s fees and 'expenses of litigation, costs of
9 and 10 o'clock. A crowd of customers on their the suit and the return of the P5.00 fine.
way into the supermarket saw the plaintiff being

ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent is everyone his due and observe honesty and good
entitled to the damages prayed for. faith (Article 19, Civil Code).
RULING: We likewise concur with the Court of
Appeals that "(u)pon the facts and under the law, Private respondent is entitled to damages but We
plaintiff has clearly made the cause of action for hold that the award of Seventy-Five Thousand
damages against the defendants. Defendants Pesos (P75,000.00) for moral damages and
wilfully caused loss or injury to plaintiff in a Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00, for
manner that was contrary to morals, good exemplary damages is unconscionable and
customs or public policy, making them amenable excessive.
to damages under Articles 19 and 21 in relation to
Article 2219 of the Civil Code." While no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in
order that moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated
Private respondent was regarded and or exemplary damages may be adjudicated, the
pronounced a shoplifter and had committed assessment of such damages, except liquidated
"shoplifting."We also affirm the Court of Appeals' ones, is left to the discretion of the court,
finding that petitioner Nelia Santos Fandino, after according to the circumstances of each case (Art.
reading the incident report, remarked the 2216, New Civil Code). In the case at bar, there is
following: "Ano, nakawnanamanito". Such a no question that the whole incident that befell
remark made in the presence of private respondent had arisen in such a manner that was
respondent and with reference to the incident created unwittingly by his own act of forgetting to
report with its entries, was offensive to private pay for the file. It was his forgetfullness in
respondent's dignity and defamatory to his checking out the item and paying for it that
character and honesty. started the chain of events which led to his
embarassment and humiliation thereby causing
The false accusation charged against the him mental anguish, wounded feelings and
private respondent after detaining and serious anxiety. Yet, private respondent's act of
interrogating him by the uniformed guards and omission contributed to the occurrence of his
the mode and manner in which he was subjected, injury or loss and such contributory negligence is
shouting at him, imposing upon him a fine, a factor which may reduce the damages that
threatening to call the police and in the presence private respondent may recover (Art. 2214, New
and hearing of many people at the Supermarket Civil Code). Moreover, that many people were
which brought and caused him humiliation and present and they saw and heard the ensuing
embarrassment, sufficiently rendered the interrogation and altercation appears to be
petitioners liable for damages under Articles 19 simply a matter of coincidence in a supermarket
and 21 in relation to Article 2219 of the Civil Code. which is a public place and the crowd of
We rule that under the facts of the case at bar, onlookers, hearers or bystanders was not
petitioners wilfully caused loss or injury to deliberately sought or called by management to
private respondent in a manner that was contrary witness private respondent's predicament. We do
to morals, good customs or public policy. It is not believe that private respondent was
against morals, good customs and public policy to intentionally paraded in order to humiliate or
humiliate, embarrass and degrade the dignity of a embarrass him because petitioner's business
person. Everyone must respect the dignity, depended for its success and patronage the good
personality, privacy and peace of mind of his will of the buying public which can only be
neighbors and other persons (Article 26, Civil preserved and promoted by good public relations.
Code). And one must act with justice, give

In Our considered estimation and assessment, In the light of the reduction of the
moral damages in the amount of Five Thousand damages, We hereby likewise reduce the original
Pesos (P5,000.00) is reasonable and just to award award of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) as
to private respondent. attorney's fees to Two Thousand Pesos
(P2,000.00).
The grant of Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos
(P25,000.00) as exemplary damages is WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE
unjustified. Exemplary or corrective damages are FOREGOING, the judgment of the Court of Appeals
imposed by way of example or correction for the is hereby modified. Petitioners are hereby
public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, ordered to pay, jointly and severally, to private
liquidated or compensatory damages (Art. 2229, respondent moral damages in the sum of Five
New Civil Code). Exemplary damages cannot be Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) and the amount of
recovered as a matter of right; the court will Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) as and for
decide whether or not they could be adjudicated attorney's fees; and further, to return the P5.00
(Art. 2223, New Civil Code). Considering that fine to private respondent. No costs.
exemplary damages are awarded for wanton acts,
that they are penal in character granted not by
way of compensation but as a punishment to the
offender and as a warning to others as a sort of
deterrent, We hold that the facts and
circumstances of the case at bar do not warrant
the grant of exemplary damages.
Petitioners acted in good faith in trying to

protect and recover their property, a right which
the law accords to them. Under Article 429, New
Civil Code, the owner or lawful possessor of a
thing has a right to exclude any person from the
enjoyment and disposal thereof and for this
purpose, he may use such force as may be
reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an
actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion
or usurpation of his property. And since a person
who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the
lawful exercise of a right or office exempts him
from civil or criminal liability, petitioner may not
be punished by imposing exemplary damages
against him. We agree that petitioners acted upon
probable cause in stopping and investigating
private respondent for taking the file without
paying for it, hence, the imposition of exemplary
damages as a warning to others by way of a
deterrent is without legal basis. We, therefore,
eliminate the grant of exemplary damages to the
private respondent.

HERMOSISIMA vs. COURT OF APPEALS breach of promise of marriage, and that

109 PHIL 629 creating liability for causing a marriage
engagement to be broken.
FACTS: On October 4, 1954, Soledad Cagigas,
hereinafter referred to as complaint, filed with Apart from the fact that the general tenor of said
said of her child, Chris Hermosisima, as natural Article 2219, particularly the paragraphs
child and moral damages for alleged breach of preceding and those following the one cited by
promise. Petitioner admitted the paternity of the Court of Appeals, and the language used in
child and expressed willingness to support the said paragraph strongly indicates that the
latter, but denied having ever promised to marry "seduction" therein contemplated is
the complainant. Upon her motion, said court the crime punished as such in Article as such in
ordered petitioner, on October 27, 1954, to pay, Article 337 and 338 of the Revised Penal Code,
by way of alimony pendente lite, P50.00 a month, which admittedly does not exist in the present
which was, on February 16, 1955, reduced to case, we find ourselves unable to say that
P30.00 a month. petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not only
On appeal taken by petitioner, the Court of because he is approximately ten (10) years
Appeals affirmed this decision, except as to the younger than the complainant — who around
actual and compensatory damages and the moral thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly
damages, which were increased to P5,614.25 and enlightened as a former high school teacher and a
P7,000.00, respectively. life insurance agent are supposed to be — when
ISSUE: Whether moral damages are recoverable, she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere
under our laws, for breach of promise to marry. apprentice pilot, but, also, because, the court of
first instance found that, complainant
RULING: Inasmuch as these articles were never in "surrendered herself" to petitioner because,
force in the Philippines, this Court ruled in De "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted
Jesus vs. Syquia (58 Phil., 866), that "the action for to bind" "by having a fruit of their engagement
breach of promises to marry has no standing in even before they had the benefit of clergy."
the civil law, apart from the right to recover
money or property advanced . . . upon the faith of
such promise". The Code Commission charged
with the drafting of the Proposed Civil Code of the
Philippines deem it best, however, to change the
law thereon. We quote from the report of the
Code Commission on said Proposed Civil Code:
Articles 43 and 44 the Civil Code of 1889 refer

to the promise of marriage. But these articles
are not enforced in the Philippines. The subject
is regulated in the Proposed Civil Code not only
as to the aspect treated of in said articles but
also in other particulars. It is advisable to
furnish legislative solutions to some questions
that might arise relative to betrothal. Among
the provisions proposed are: That authorizing
the adjudication of moral damages, in case of

TANJANCO VS. CA grievous moral wrong has been committed, and

(GR No. L-18630, December 17, 1966) though the girl and her family have suffered
incalculable moral damage, she and her parents
Facts: Due to the promise of marriage made by cannot bring any action for damages. But under
AAA, BBB acceded to the former’s pleas for sexual the proposed article, she and her parents would
intercourse. They, both adult, had intimate sexual have such a right of action.
relations for one whole year. When BBB informed The example set forth in the Code Commission's
AAA of her pregnancy, the latter refrained from memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who
seeing the former. has been seduced. The essential feature is
seduction that in law is more than mere sexual
Issue: WON BBB has a cause of action against intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage;
AAA. it connotes essentially the idea of deceit,
enticement, superior power or abuse of
Ruling: The NCC provides that any person who confidence on the part of the seducer to which the
wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a woman has yielded.
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs To constitute seduction there must in all cases be
or public policy shall compensate the latter for the some sufficient promise or inducement and the
damage. woman must yield because of the promise or
In holding that the complaint stated a cause of other inducement. If she consents merely from
action for damages under the above provision, the carnal lust and the intercourse is from mutual
CA relied upon and quoted from the desire, there is no seduction. She must be induced
memorandum submitted by the Code to depart from the path of virtue by the use of
Commission to the Legislature to support the some species of arts, persuasions and wiles,
original draft of the NCC – which are calculated to have and do have that
But the Code Commission has gone farther than effect, and which result in her ultimately
the sphere of wrongs defined or determined by submitting her person to the sexual embraces of
positive law. Fully sensible that there are her seducer.
countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so
many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even
though they have actually suffered material and
moral injury, the Commission has deemed it
necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate
in the proposed Civil Code the following rule:
“Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate
the latter for the damage.”
An example will illustrate the purview of the
foregoing norm: “A” seduces the 19-year old
daughter of “X”. A promise of marriage either has
not been made, or cannot be proved. The girl
becomes pregnant. Under the present laws, there
is no crime, as the girl is above 18 years of age.
Neither can any civil action for breach of promise
of marriage be filed. Therefore, though the

VELASCO VS. MERALCO been established that the hospital is located in

40 SCRA 342 (1971) surroundings similar to the residential zone
where the plaintiff lived or that the sound at the
FACTS: MERALCO started the construction of a hospital is similarly monotonous and ceaseless as
sub-station. The facility reduces high voltage the sound emitted by the sub-station.
electricity to a current suitable for distribution to
the company's consumers. It was constructed at a The fact that the MERALCO had received no
distance of 10 to 20 meters from the appellant's complaint although it had been operating
house. The company built a stone and cement wall hereabouts for the past 50 years with substations
at the sides along the streets but along the side similar to the one in controversy is not a valid
adjoining the appellant's property it put up a argument. The absence of suit neither lessens the
“sawale” wall but later changed it to an interlink company's liability under the law nor weakens
wire fence. the right of others against it to demand their just
due.
It is undisputed that a sound unceasingly
emanates from the substation. Velasco contends As to the damages caused by the noise, appellant
that the sound constitutes an actionable nuisance Velasco, himself a physician, claimed that the
under Article 694 of the Civil Code of the noise, as a precipitating factor, has caused him
Philippines. Velasco contends that the sound, anxiety neurosis, which, in turn, predisposed him
since 1954 had disturbed his concentration and to, or is concomitant with, the other ailments
sleep, and impaired his health and lowered the which he was suffering at the time of the trial.
value of his property. Wherefore, he sought a
judicial decree for the abatement of the nuisance There are, moreover, several factors that mitigate
and asked that he be declared entitled to recover defendant's liability in damages. The first is that
compensatory, moral and other damages under the noise from the substation does not appear to
Article 2202 of the Civil Code. be an exclusive causative factor of plaintiff-
appellant's illnesses. This is proved by the
ISSUE: Whether this sound constitutes an circumstance that no other person in Velasco's
actionable nuisance or not which will entitle own household nor in his immediate
Velasco to the damages prayed for. neighborhood was shown to have become sick
despite the noise complained of.
HELD: Yes it as an actionable nuisance. The The other factor militating against full recovery
general rule is that everyone is bound to bear the by the petitioner Velasco in his passivity in the
habitual or customary inconveniences that result face of the damage caused to him by the noise of
from the proximity of others, and so long as this the substation. Realizing as a physician that the
level is not surpassed, he may not complain latter was disturbing or depriving him of sleep
against them. But if the prejudice exceeds the and affecting both his physical and mental well-
inconveniences that such proximity habitually being, he did not take any steps to bring action to
brings, the neighbor who causes such disturbance abate the nuisance or remove himself from the
is held responsible for the resulting damage. affected area as soon as the deleterious effects
MERALCO argues that the plaintiff should not be became noticeable. To evade them appellant did
heard to complain because the sound level at the not even have to sell his house; he could have
North General Hospital, where silence is leased it and rented other premises for sleeping
observed, is even higher than at his residence. and maintaining his office and thus preserve his
This comparison lacks basis because it has not health as ordinary prudence demanded. Instead

he obstinately stayed until his health became

gravely affected, apparently hoping that he would
thereby saddle appellee with large damages.
The law in this jurisdiction is clear. Article 2203

prescribes that "The party suffering loss or injury
must exercise the diligence of a good father of a
family to minimize the damages resulting from
the act or omission in question". This codal rule,
which embodies the previous jurisprudence on
the point, clearly obligates the injured party to
undertake measures that will alleviate and not
aggravate his condition after the infliction of the
injury, and places upon him the burden of
explaining why he could not do so. This was not
done.

CITY OF MANILA VS. GARCIA, ET AL days'notice. They have been asked to leave; they
G.R. No. L-26053 refused to heed. The ownership is paramount
over the defendants' claim. Their claim that they
FACTS: have gained the status as tenants by virtue of the
City of Manila owns parcels of land, lease contract is wrong. They entered the
covered byTorrens Titles Nos. 49763, 37082 and property and and built houses thereon without
37558, forming a compact area bordering Kansas, the knowledge and consent of the city; to which
Vermont, and Singalong, Manila. After liberation the nomen squatters is quite proper. More
from 1945 to 1947, defendants Garcia, et al importantly, the purpose of which the land was
entered upon these premises without plaintiff's being recovered is equally paramount: the public
knowledge and consent and built houses thereon purpose of constructing the school building
without plaintiff's knowledge and consent. The annex.
occupation was also secured without necessary
building permits from the local govevrnment.
In 1947, the occupation, having been

discovered, were secured by permits labeled as
“lease contracts”, given by the then City Mayor.
Defendants were charged nominal rentals. Later,
the Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School, the
area of which is near the subject property, was in
need of expansion. On September 14, 1961,
plaintiff's City Engineer, following the Mayor's
directive to clear squatters' houses on city
property, gave each of defendants thirty (30) days
to vacate and remove their construction or
improvements thereon. This was
followed by the City Treasurer's
demand on each defendant, made in February an
d March, 1962, for the payment of the amount du
e by reason of the occupancy and to vacate in fift
een (15) days.
Defendants sought to recover their

possession.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the squatters may be
ejected
HELD: Yes
Defendants have absolutely no right to
remain in the premises. The excuse that they
have permits from the mayor holds no water.
The permits to occupy are recoverable on thirty

DR. JAIME CRUZ VS. AGAS of Appeals likewise agreed with the position of
G.R. No. 204095 June 15, 2015 the City Prosecutor.
MENDOZA, J.: 2nd Division
Torts: Serious Physical Injuries through Reckless Issue:
Imprudence and Medical Malpractice 1.) WON Dr. Agas was negligent in providing an
adequate and reasonable standard of care in
Facts: following all precautionary measures in
Dr. Cruz engaged the services of St. Luke’s safeguarding Dr. Cruz from any possible
Medical Center (SLMC) for a medical check-up complications; and that the colonoscopy was
sometime in May of 2003. He underwent stool, done properly. Stated differently, WON Dr. Agas
urine, blood, and other body fluid tests conducted demonstrated an inexcusable lack of precaution
by the employees and doctors of the said hospital. to make him liable for Serious Physical Injuries
On May 29, 203, Dr. Cruz underwent gastroscopy through Reckless Imprudence and Medical
and colonoscopy operation. When Dr. Cruz Malpractice.
regained consciousness, he felt dizzy, had cold 2.) WON the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur applies
clammy perspiration and experienced breathing in this case to show that Dr. Agas was negligent,
difficulty; he could not stand or sit upright when Dr. Cruz suffered injuries due to the medical
because he felt so exhausted and so much pain in operation.
his abdomen, and when he was about to urinate
he collapsed. Ruling:
Dr. Cruz cardiologist, Dra. Agnes Del Rosario 1.) A medical negligence case can prosper if the
observe his critical condition and immediately patient can present solid proof that the doctor,
referred him to the surgical department which like in this case, either failed to do something
suspected that he had hemorrhage in his which a reasonably prudent doctor would have
abdomen and advised him to undergo an done, or that he did something that a reasonably
emergency surgical operation. prudent doctor would not have done, and such
Dr. Cruz claimed that Dr. Agas admitted that he failure or action caused injury to the patient.
was the one who performed the colonoscopy To successfully pursue this kind of case, a patient
procedure but the latter insisted that nothing must only prove that a health care provider either
went wrong. On June 7, 2003, he was discharged failed to do something which a reasonably
from SLMC. Nevertheless, he complained prudent health care provider would have done, or
experiencing pain, and weakness and tiredness. that he did something that a reasonably prudent
Dr. Agas countered that Dr. Cruz unfairly made it provider would not have done; and that failure or
appear that he did not know that he would action caused injury to the patient. Simply put, the
perform the procedure. He explained that Dr. elements are duty, breach, injury and proximate
Cruz was informed of the procedures every step causation.
of the way, and that there certification and sworn In this case, Dr. Cruz has the burden of showing
statements to prove that adequate and the negligence or recklessness of Dr. Agas.
reasonable standards of care were done and Although there is no dispute that Dr. Cruz
administered by the physicians and the hospital. sustained internal hemorrhage due to a tear in the
The Dr. Cruz filed a case with the Office of the City serosa of his sigmoid colon, he failed to show that
Prosecutor, which issued a resolution dismissing it was caused by Dr. Agas’s negligent and reckless
the complaint for Serious Physical Injuries conduct of the colonoscopy procedure. In other
through Reckless Imprudence and Medical words, Dr. Cruz failed to show and explain that
Malpractice. The DOJ, and subsequently the Court particular negligent or reckless act or omission

committed by Dr. Agas. Stated differently, Dr.

Cruz did not demonstrate that there was
"inexcusable lack of precaution" on the part of Dr.
Agas.
2.) Not Applicable Against Dr. Agas

Literally, res ipsa loquitur means the thing speaks
for itself. It is the rule that the fact of the
occurrence of an injury, taken with the
surrounding circumstances, may permit an
inference or raise a presumption of negligence, or
make out a plaintiff’s prima facie case, and
present a question of fact for defendant to meet
with an explanation.
The requisites for the applicability of the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur are: (1) the occurrence of an
injury; (2) the thing which caused the injury was
under the control and management of the
defendant; (3) the occurrence was such that in the
ordinary course of things, would not have
happened if those who had control or
management used proper care; and (4) the
absence of explanation by the defendant. Of the
foregoing requisites, the most instrumental is the
control and management of the thing which
caused the injury.
In this case, the Court agrees with Dr. Agas that
his purported negligence in performing the
colonoscopy on Dr. Cruz was not immediately
apparent to a layman to justify the application of
res ipsa loquitur doctrine.
Dr. Agas was able to establish that the internal
bleeding sustained by Dr. Cruz was due to the
abnormal condition and configuration of his
sigmoid colon which was beyond his control
considering that the said condition could not be
detected before a colonoscopic procedure. Dr.
Agas adequately explained that no clinical
findings, laboratory tests, or diagnostic imaging,
such as x-rays, ultrasound or computed
tomography (CT) scan of the abdomen, could
have detected this condition prior to an
endoscopic procedure.

VILLA REY TRANSIT, INC vs COURT OF for breach of the contract of carriage between
APPEALS, TRINIDAD A. QUINTOS, PRIMA A. said petitioner and the deceased Policronio
QUINTOS, AND JULITA A. Quintos, Jr. Said petitioner — defendant in the
QUINTOS, respondents. court of first instance — contended that the
G.R. No. L-25499 February 18, 1970 mishap was due to a fortuitous event, but this
pretense was rejected by the trial court and the
Facts: At about 1:30 in the morning of March 17, Court of Appeals, both of which found that the
1960, an Izuzu passenger bus owned and accident and the death of Policronio had been due
operated by Villa Rey Transit, driven by Laureano to the negligence of the bus driver, for whom
Casim, left Lingayen, Pangasinan, for Manila. petitioner was liable under its contract of carriage
Among its paying passengers was the deceased, with the deceased.
Policronio Quintos, Jr. who sat on the first seat,
second row, right side of the bus. At about 4:55 Issue:Whether the amount of damages
o'clock a.m. when the vehicle was nearing the recoverable by private respondents herein
northern approach of the Sadsaran Bridge on the depends, mainly:
national highway in barrio Sto. Domingo,
municipality of Minalin, Pampanga, it frontally hit (1) the number of years on the basis of which the
the rear side of a bullcart filled with hay. As a damages shall be computed and
result the end of a bamboo pole placed on top of
the hayload and tied to the cart to hold it in place, (2) the rate at which the losses sustained by said
hit the right side of the windshield of the bus. The respondents should be fixed.
protruding end of the bamboo pole, about 8 feet
long from the rear of the bullcart, penetrated Ruling: SC affirmed the ruling of the court of
through the glass windshield and landed on the appeals with modifications.
face of Policronio Quintos, Jr.. A La Mallorca
passenger bus going in the opposite direction As to the first issue, SC agreed to the basis of the
towards San Fernando, Pampanga, reached the trial court and the Court of Appeals — upon the
scene of the mishap and it was stopped by life expectancy of Policronio Quintos, Jr., which
Patrolman Felino Bacani placed Policronio was placed at 33-1/3 years — he being over 29
Quintos, Jr. and three other injured men who rode years of age (or around 30 years for purposes of
on the bullcart aboard the La Mallorca bus and computation) at the time of his demise.
brought them to the provincial hospital of
Pampanga at San Fernando for medical Court of Appeals has not erred in basing the
assistance. Notwithstanding such assistance, computation of petitioner's liability upon the life
Policronio Quintos, Jr. died at 3:15 p.m. on the expectancy of Policronio Quintos, Jr.
same day, March 17, 1960, due to traumatic shock
due to cerebral injuries. With respect to the rate at which the damages
shall be computed, the liability of petitioner
The private respondents, Trinidad, Prima and herein had been fixed at the rate only of P2,184.00
Julita, all surnamed Quintos, are the sisters and a year, which is the annual salary of Policronio
only surviving heirs of Policronio Quintos Jr., who Quintos, Jr. at the time of his death, as a young
died single, leaving no descendants nor "training assistant" in the Bacnotan Cement
ascendants. Said respondents herein brought this Industries, Inc. In other words, unlike the
action against herein petitioner, Villa Rey Transit, Alcantara case, on which petitioner relies, the
Inc., as owner and operator of said passenger bus, lower courts did not consider, in the present case,
Policronio's potentiality and capacity
to increase his future income. Indeed, upon the

conclusion of his training period, he was
supposed to have a better job and be promoted
from time to time, and, hence, to earn more, if not
— considering the growing importance of trade,
commerce and industry and the concomitant rise
in the income level of officers and
employees therein
it is fair and reasonable to fix the deductible living

and other expenses of the deceased at the sum of
P1,184.00 a year, or about P100.00 a month, and
that, consequently, the loss sustained by his
sisters may be roughly estimated at P1,000.00 a
year or P33,333.33 for the 33-1/3 years of his life
expectancy. To this sum of P33,333.33, the
following should be added:
(a) P12,000.00, pursuant to Arts. 104 and 107 of

the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article
2206 of our Civil Code, as construed and applied
by this Court;
8 (b) P1,727.95, actually spent by private

respondents for medical and burial expenses; and
(c) attorney's fee, which was fixed by the trial

court, at P500.00, but which, in view of the appeal
taken by petitioner herein, first to the Court of
Appeals and later to this Supreme Court, should
be increased to P2,500.00. In other words, the
amount adjudged in the decision appealed from
should be reduced to the aggregate sum of
P49,561.28, with interest thereon, at the legal
rate, from December 29, 1961, date of the
promulgation of the decision of the trial court.
Thus modified, said decision and that of the Court

of Appeals are hereby affirmed, in all other
respects, with costs against petitioner, Villa Rey
Transit, Inc. It is so ordered.

PEOPLE VS. QUILATON

G.R. No. 69666, 205 SCRA 279 , January 23, HELD:
1992 The amount of P100,000.00 awarded to
the heirs of Rolando Manahan as indemnity for
FACTS: death must, however, be reduced to P50,000.00
Appellant GumercindoQuilaton was found conformably with prevailing jurisprudence on the
guilty of murder and sentenced to suffer the matter. The propriety of the award of
penalty of reclusion perpetua, and required to pay P250,000.00 by the trial court in concept of moral
the heirs of the offended party various amounts of damages needs some analysis.
money.Appellant was tried and convicted under
the following information: The monetary liabilities of a person
accused and convicted of a crime are specified in
That on or about the 16th day of August, Article 2206 of the Civil Code.
1983, in the municipality of San Simon,
province of Pampanga, Philippines, and Aside, therefore, from the ordinary
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable indemnity for death which is currently set by case
Court, the above-named accused law at P50,000.00, appellant is obliged: (1) to
GUMERCINDO QUILATON y EBAROLA alias compensate the heirs of Rolando Manahan for the
"ROBERTO SANDOVAL" armed with a knife latter's loss of earning capacity; (2) to give
(balisong), with deliberate intent to kill, by support in the form of expenses for education to
means of treachery and with evident the sisters of Rolando Manahan who had been
premeditation, did then and there wilfully, dependent on him therefor; and (3) to pay the
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault heirs of Rolando Manahan moral damages for the
and wound ROLANDO S. MANAHAN, mental anguish suffered by them. In the instant
thereby inflicting upon him serious and case, the trial court lumped these monetary
fatal injuries, which directly caused the obligations into what it called "moral damages."
death of the said Rolando S. Manahan.
The more important variables taken into
The Court further sentences him to account in determining the compensable amount
indemnify the heirs of Rolando S. Manahan the of lost earnings are: (1) the number of years for
sum of One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) which the victim would otherwise have lived; and
Pesos, Philippine Currency, for the death of (2) the rate of loss sustained by the heirs of the
Rolando S. Manahan, the sum of Twenty-Six deceased. In Villa Rey-Transit, Inc. v. Court of-
Thousand Four Hundred Forty-Five (P26,445.00) Appeals (supra), the Court computed the first
Pesos, Philippine Currency, for actual damages factor, i.e., life expectancy, by applying the
incurred for burial and other expenses of the formula (2/3 x [80 - age at death) adopted in the
deceased, the sum of Two Hundred Fifty American Expectancy Table of Mortality or the
Thousand (P250,000.00) Pesos, Philippine actuarial Combined Experience Table of
Currency, for moral damages. The Court further Mortality. Actuarial experience subsequent to
orders the accused to pay the costs. 1970 has, however, changed and indicates a
longer life expectancy in the Philippines due to
ISSUE: conditions including, among other things,
Whether or not the trial court erred in advances in medical science, improved nutrition
awarding the amount for damages incurred and food supply, diet consciousness and health
against the accused. maintenance.

Considering that Rolando Manahan was 26

years of age at the time of death, he was expected
to live for another 46 years. But a man does not
normally continue working to earn money up to
the final month or year of his life; hence 46 years
could be reasonably reduced to 39 years. Besides,
Rolando Manahan was a government employee
who is expected to retire at the age of 65. If there
are 261 working days in a year and Rolando
Manahan was receiving P23.00 a day, Rolando
Manahan's gross earnings would be
approximately P234,000.00. A reasonable
amount must be deducted therefrom that would
represent Rolando Manahan's necessary
expenses had he been living, in this case
P120,000.00. The net or compensable earnings
lost by reason of Rolando Manahan's death is,
accordingly, P114,000.00.
Finally, the Court in the exercise of its

discretion, considers it appropriate and
reasonable to award the amount of P20,000.00 to
the heirs of Rolando Manahan by way of moral
damages. Ruben Manahan, brother of Rolando
Manahan, testified that their mother suffered a
mild stroke upon learning of Rolando Manahan's
slaying; this eventually resulted in the mother's
semi-paralysis.
The Court instead finds appellant

GumercindoQuilaton guilty of HOMICIDE.
Appellant is ORDERED to pay the heirs of Rolando
Manahan the following amounts:
1. P50,000.00 as indemnity for death;

2. P26,445.00 as actual damages;
3. P114,000.00 by way of lost earnings;
4. P10,000.00 by way of educational assistance to
Rolando Manahan's two (2) sisters; and
5. P20,000.00 as moral damages.

PEOPLE VS. BALANAG 236 SCRA 474 (1994) the mathematical computation of annual income
G.R. No. 103225, Sept. 15, 1994 times life expectancy. Allowances are made for
Puno, J. circumstances which could reduce the computed
Doctrine: In computing the loss of the earning life expectancy of the victim, e.g., nature of work
capacity of the victim, allowances of the victim, his lifestyle, age, and state of health
are made for circumstances which prior to his death. In addition, we have to consider
could reduce the computed life the rate of loss sustained by the heirs of the
expectancy. victim. In this case, albeit there was no evidence
on the state of health of the victim, considering his
Facts: advanced age, we find it reasonable and fair to
Accused Pedring et. al. (Tortfeasors), on Nov. 24, assume that he would not be able to work and
1985, entered the house of Dr. Guillermo Ferrer earn, as a dentist, until he reaches the final
(DGF). Upon entry, they stole a shoulder bag moment of his life. Thus, we reduce the award for
containing a diamond ring and earrings worth loss of the earning capacity of the deceased to
P3,000.00, a United States fifty dollar bill (US P144,000.00, which is the approximate amount
$50.00), Philippine currency in the amount of he would have earned until his 75th birthday.
Two Hundred Pesos (P200.00), as well as a mini
stereo cassette valued at Two Thousand Pesos The victim was already 69 years old at the time he
(P2,000.00) belonging to Genoveva L. Obra (GLO), was killed on November 24, 1985. His income as
daughter of DGF. On occasion of the commission a dentist was P10,000.00 per month, or
of the offense, they shot and stabbed DGF, causing P120,000.00 per annum. After deducting
the death of DGF. therefrom the necessary and incidental expenses
which the victim would have incurred if he were
According to the widow, Iluminada Ferrer, her alive, the victim’s annual net income would be
dentist husband used to earn P10,000.00 P24,000.00. The trial court multiplied his net
monthly. At the time of her husband’s death, they annual income by his life expectancy of seven (7)
had three (3) children in college. She suffered years and two (2) months, hence, P172,000.00
mental anguish and could hardly sleep or eat was awarded for loss of the earning capacity of
upon her husband’s death. During the two weeks the victim.
wake for her deceased husband, she spent, more
or less, P25,000.00.
Tortfeasors meted the penalty of reclusion

perpetua. The court a quo also ordered accused--
appellant and Tito Balanag, to indemnify,
solidarily, the heirs of the deceased Dr. Guillermo
Lopez, the following amounts:
a) P50,000.00 (for death of GLO)
b) P48,110.00 (actual damages)
c) P20,000.00 (moral damages)
d) P172,000.00 (for loss of earning capacity).
Held:
In computing the loss of the earning capacity of
the victim, several factors are considered besides

COJUANCO VS CA which the private respondents posed no

GR No. 119398, July 2, 1999 objection to.
Facts: CA reversed the trial court’s finding of bad faith,

Petitioner Eduardo Cojuangco Jr. filed a Petition holding that the former PCSO chairman was
for Review under Rule 45 of the ROC seeking to merely carrying out the instruction of the PCGG. It
set aside CA’s decision, after it reversed a likewise noted that Carrascoso’s acts of promptly
favorable decision of the RTC that ordered the replying to demands and not objecting to partial
private respondents to pay him moral and execution negated bad faith.
exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs of
the suit, and denied his Motion for Issue:
Reconsideration. W/N the award for damages against respondent
Carrascoso is warranted by evidence the law
Cojuangco, a known businessman-sportsman
owned several racehorses which he entered in Held:
sweepstakes races. Several of his horses won the YES AND NO. Petitioner is only entitled to
races on various dates, and won prizes together nominal damages.
with the 30% due for trainer/grooms. He sent
letters of demand for the collection of the prizes To hold public officers personally liable for moral
due him but private respondents PCSO and its and exemplary damages and for attorney’s fees
then chairman Fernando Carrascoso Jr. for acts done in the performance of official
consistently replied that the demanded prizes are functions, the plaintiff must prove that these
being withheld on advice of PCGG. officers exhibited acts characterized by evident
bad faith, malice, or gross negligence. But even if
Consequently, Cojuangco filed this case before the their acts had not been so tainted, public officers
Manila RTC but before the receipt summons, may still be held liable for nominal damages if
PCGG advised private respondents that “it poses they had violated the plaintiff’s constitutional
no more objection to its remittance of the prized rights.
winnings”. This was immediately communicated
to petitioner’s counsel Estelito Mendoza by Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment
Carrascoso but the former refused to accept the or simple negligence. It imports a dishonest
prizes at this point, reasoning that the matter had purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious
already been brought to court. doing of a wrong, a breach of a known duty due to
some motive or interest of ill will that partakes of
The trial court ruled that the private respondents the nature of fraud. There is sufficient evidence on
had no authority to withhold the subject record to support Respondent Court’s conclusion
racehorse winnings since no writ of sequestration that Carrascoso did not act in bad faith. His letters
was issued by PCGG. Ordering the private to PCGG indicated his uncertainties as to the
respondents to pay in solidum the claimed extent of the sequestration against the properties
winnings, the trial court further held that, by not of the plaintiff. There is also denying that plaintiff
paying the winnings, Carrascoso had acted in bad is a very close political and business associate of
faith amounting to the persecution and the former President Marcos. Sequestration was
harassment of petitioner and his family. While the also a novel remedy. Under these equivocalities,
case was pending with the CA, the petitioner Carrascoso could not be faulted in asking further
moved for partial execution pending appeal to instructions from the PCGG, on what to do and

more so, to obey the instructions given. Besides, the racehorse winnings of petitioner. There was
EO2 has just been issued by President Aquino, apparently no record of any such writ covering
“freezing all assets and properties in the his racehorses either. The issuance of a
Philippines (of) former President Marcos and/or sequestration order requires the showing of
his wife…their close friends, subordinates, a prima facie case and due regard for the
business associates…” requirements of due process. The withholding of
the prize winnings of petitioner without a
The extant rule is that public officers shall not be properly issued sequestration order clearly spoke
liable by way of moral and exemplary damages of a violation of his property rights without due
for acts done in the performance of official duties, process of law.
unless there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice
or gross negligence. Attorney’s fees and expenses Art. 2221 of the Civil Code authorizes the award
of litigation cannot be imposed either, in the of nominal damages to a plaintiff whose right has
absence of clear showing of any of the grounds been violated or invaded by the defendant, for the
provided therefor under the Civil Code. The trial purpose of vindicating or recognizing that right,
court’s award of these kinds of damages must not for indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss
perforce be deleted. suffered.
Nevertheless, this Court agrees with the

petitioner and the trial that Respondent
Carrascoso may still be held liable under Article
32 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any
private individual, who directly or indirectly
obstruct, defeats, violates or in any manner
impedes or impairs any of the following rights
and liberties of another person shall be liable to
the latter for damages:
xxx xxx xxx
(6) The rights against deprivation of property
without due process of law;
Under the aforecited article, it is not necessary
that the public officer acted with malice or bad
faith. To be liable, it is enough that there was a
violation of the constitutional rights of petitioner,
even on the pretext of justifiable motives or good
faith in the performance of one’s duties.
We hold that petitioner’s right to the use of his

property was unduly impeded. While Respondent
Carrascoso may have relied upon the PCGG’s
instructions, he could have further sought the
specific legal basis therefor. A little exercise of
prudence would have disclosed that there was no
writ issued specifically for the sequestration of

LBC EXPRESS VS. CA, 236 SCRA 602 (1994) Kinasangan, Pardo, Cebu City. However, he was
G.R. No. 108670,236 SCRA 602, September 21, not around to receive it.
1994
Claiming that petitioner LBC wantonly and
Facts: recklessly disregarded its obligation, respondent
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari, Carloto instituted an action for Damages Arising
petitioner LBC questions the decision of from Non-performance of Obligation and prayed
respondent CA affirming the judgment of the RTC for the reimbursement of P32,000.00.
of Dipolog City, Branch 8, awarding moral and
exemplary damages, reimbursement of After hearing, the trial court rendered its
P32,000.00, and costs of suit; but deleting the decision, to wit:
amount of attorney's fees. 1. Ordering the defendant LBC to pay unto
plaintiff Adolfo M. Carloto and Rural Bank of
Private respondent Adolfo Carloto, incumbent Labason, Inc., moral damages in the amount of
President-Manager of private respondent Rural P10,000.00; exemplary damages in the amount of
Bank of Labason, purchased a round trip plane P5,000.00; attorney's fees in the amount of
ticket to Manila to follow-up the Rural Bank's plan P3,000.00 and litigation expenses of P1,000.00;
of payment of rediscounting obligations with and
Central Bank's main office in Manila. He also 2. Sentencing defendant LBC Air Cargo, Inc., to
phoned his sister Elsie Carloto-Concha to send reimburse plaintiff Rural Bank of Labason, Inc.
him P1,000.00 for his pocket money in going to the sum of P32,000.00.
Manila and some rediscounting papers thru
petitioner's LBC Office at Dipolog City. On Issue:
November 16, 1984, Mrs. Concha thru her clerk, Whether or not respondent Rural Bank of
Adelina Antigo consigned thru LBC Dipolog Labason Inc., being an artificial person should be
Branch the pertinent documents and the sum of awarded moral damages.
P1,000.00 to respondent Carloto.
Held:
The documents arrived without the cashpack. The respondent court erred in awarding moral
After several follow-ups, he received the money damages to the Rural Bank of Labason, Inc., an
only on December 15, 1984 less the revenue artificial person.
charges. Respondent Carloto claimed that
because of the delay in the transmittal of the Moral damages are granted in recompense for
cashpack, he failed to submit the rediscounting physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
documents to Central Bank on time. As a anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
consequence, his Rural Bank was made to pay the feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and
Central Bank P32,000.00 as penalty interest. He similar injury. A corporation, being an artificial
allegedly suffered embarrassment and person and having existence only in legal
humiliation. contemplation, has no feelings, no emotions, no
senses; therefore, it cannot experience physical
Petitioner LBC, on the other hand, alleged that the suffering and mental anguish. Mental suffering
cashpack was forwarded via PAL to LBC Cebu City can be experienced only by one having a nervous
branch on November 22, 1984. On the same day, system and it flows from real ills, sorrows, and
it was delivered at respondent Carloto's griefs of life — all of which cannot be suffered by
residence at No. 2 Greyhound Subdivision, respondent bank as an artificial person.

The Court can neither sustain the award of moral

damages in favor of the private respondents. The
right to recover moral damages is based on
equity. Moral damages are recoverable only if the
case falls under Article 2219 of the Civil Code in
relation to Article 21. Part of conventional
wisdom is that he who comes to court to demand
equity, must come with clean hands.
In the case at bench, respondent Carloto is not

without fault. The Court also hold that
respondents failed to show that petitioner LBC's
late delivery of the cashpack was motivated by
personal malice or bad faith, whether intentional
or thru gross negligence. In breach of contract
cases where the defendant is not shown to have
acted fraudulently or in bad faith, liability for
damages is limited to the natural and probable
consequences of the branch of the obligation
which the parties had foreseen or could
reasonable have foreseen. The damages,
however, will not include liability for moral
damages.
Hence, the award of exemplary damages made by

the respondent court would have no legal leg to
support itself. Under Article 2232 of the Civil
Code, in a contractual or quasi-contractual
relationship, exemplary damages may be
awarded only if the defendant had acted in "a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or
malevolent manner."

PONCE VS. LEGASPI which he was duty bound to protect, constituted

208 SCRA 377 (1992) grave misconduct and gross malpractice. Since
the petitioner, however, was of the honest
FACTS perception that YRASPORT was actually
Petitioner Erlinda Ponce and husband organized to appropriate for itself some of
Manuel owned 43% of the stockholdings of L'NOR L'NOR's business, then we find that she had
Marine Services, Inc. (L'NOR). 48% of it was probable cause to file the disbarment suit.
owned by the spouses Porter. The allegations of Atty. Legaspi may have suffered injury as a
petitioner states that during the time while consequence of the disbarment proceedings. But
respondent Valentino Legaspi (Legaspi) is the the adverse result of an action does not per se
legal counsel of L’NOR, there occurred fraudulent make the action wrongful and subject the actor to
manipulations by spouses Edward and Norma make payment of damages for the law could not
Porter and other officers; that with the aid of have meant to impose a penalty on the right to
Legaspi, they incorporated the Yrasport litigate. One who exercises his rights does no
Drydocks, Inc. which was done to compete with injury. If damage results from a person's
L’NOR but still used the office space, equipments exercising his legal rights, it is damnum absque
and goodwill of L’NOR. On account of flagrant injuria.
frauds committed by Porter, a charge for estafa
was filed where Legaspi appeared as counsel for
Porter; that complainant asked Legaspi to take
steps to protect L’NOR but the latter refused.
Complainant filed for disbarment against Legaspi
which was dismissed. Legaspi subsequently filed
a complaint for damages against petitioner which
was granted by the lower court and affirmed by
the CA.
ISSUE
W/N the complaint for damages by
Legaspi is justified.
RULING
While generally, malicious prosecution
refers to unfounded criminal actions and has been
expanded to include unfounded civil suits, the
foundation of an action for malicious prosecution
is an original proceeding, judicial in character. A
disbarment proceeding is, without doubt, judicial
in character and therefore may be the basis for a
subsequent action for malicious prosecution.
However, malice and want of probable cause
must both exist in order to justify the action. In
the case at bar, in the mind of petitioner, the act of
the respondent in appearing as counsel for Porter,
who had allegedly swindled L'NOR, the interest of

BAYANI VS. PANAY ELECTRIC prosecutor acted without probable cause; and (3)
330 SCRA 759 (2000) the prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal
GR 139680 APR 12, 2000 malice. 15 Considering the facts in this case, we
agree with the respondent appellate court that
FACTS: one of the elements for an action based on
malicious prosecution, the element of final
PECO discontinued supplying electrical services termination of the action resulting in an acquittal,
to two pension houses owned by Bayani on the was absent at the time petitioner filed Civil Case
ground that the latter had been stealing electricity No. 23276. The records show that petitioner's
in said establishments. Subsequently, PECO filed action for injunction and damages was filed on
2 criminal complaints against Bayani for violation October 10, 1996, whereas the Secretary of
of RA 7832. The City Prosecutor dismissed the Justice dismissed with finality PECO's criminal
complaint. Hence, PECO appealed with the Sec of complaints against herein petitioner only on
Justice. March 4, 1998. Hence, Civil Case No. 23276 was
Bayani filed an action for damages arising from prematurely filed.
malicious prosecution. (The RTC also approved
Bayani’s petition for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction for PECO to
restore electricity to said pension houses after
putting up a surety bond. RTC also approved
Bayani’s motion to substitute said surety with a
cashier’s check.) PECO, in a petition for certiorari,
sought, among others, to have the civil case
dismissed. Meanwhile, the secretary of justice
upheld the prosecutor’s decision to dismiss the
criminal complaint against Bayani. Later, the CA
dismissed the civil case instituted by Bayanai
against PECO on the ground of prematurity since
one of the elements of malicious prosecution is
that of the final termination of the criminal action
resulting in acquittal was absent. Hence, this
petition by Bayani.
ISSUE:
Wether or not the civil case was prematurely
filed.
HELD:
The requisites for an action for damages

based on malicious prosecution are: (1) the fact of
the prosecution and the further fact that the
defendant was himself the prosecutor, and that
the action was finally terminated with an
acquittal; (2) that in bringing the action, the

EUSTAQUIO MAYO y AGPAOA vs. RULING: No. The court held that the award of
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES moral damages in the amount of P700.000.00 was
G.R. No. 91201 December 5, 1991, unconscionable and excessive.
GUTIEREZ, JR., J. While there is well-entrenched principle that
NATURE: Action for damages moral damages depend upon the discretion of the
trial courts based on the facts and circumstances
FACTS: June Navarette was driving a Mitsubishi of each case, according to the court, such
Lancer, owned by her sister Linda Navarette, discretion is, however, conditioned - in that
along McArthur Highway in Mabalacat, “amount awarded should not be palpably and
Pampanga. Together with her in the car was her scandalously excessive”, in that the actual losses
sister and other passengers. While the car was sustained by the aggrieved party and the gravity
cruising steadily at the right lane of the road, a of the injuries must be considered, in that award
Philippine Rabbit bus driven by Eustaquio Mayo should not be intended to enrich a complainant at
which was trailing closely behind it, tried to the expense of the defendant, and furthermore,
overtake but an oncoming vehicle from the that the award of moral damages is to enable the
opposite direction appeared prompting the bus to injured party to obtain means, diversion or
swerve back to the right to avoid collision with amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral
the oncoming vehicle. In the process, the bus hit suffering she has undergone, by reason of the
and bumped the left rear side portion of the car defendant’s culpable action.
with its right front bumper. The impact caused Applying the principles, the court, in the instant
June Navarette to lose control of the wheel and case, stated that since the complainant asked for
the car swerved across to the left and hit Narciso the amount of P500,000.00 as moral damages due
Yandan, a bystander, and thereafter crashed to her personal injuries, therefore, the award for
against the concrete fence. The car was heavily moral damages should not exceed such amount.
damaged and the passengers sustained injuries in Under the circumstances, the court considered
varying degrees. June Navarette, in particular, the amount of P200,000.00 as moral damages
underwent several medical procedures, reasonable just and fair.
nonetheless still lost her sight. On the other hand, claim by June Navarette for the
A criminal case of Reckless Imprudence Resulting amount of P1,000,000.00 as moral damages due
in Damage to Property with Multiple Serious, Less to losing her boyfriend was without legal basis.
Serious, and Slight Physical injuries was filed. Article 2719 enumerates cases wherein damages
Eustaquio was convicted, and was as well meted may be granted. Loss of boyfriend as a result of
to pay P700,000.00 as moral damages with the physical injuries is not one of them.
bus company as subsidiarily liable in case of
insolvency.
A Motion for Reconsideration on the decision was
filed but subsequently denied. On appeal, the
appellate court affirmed the decision using
Articles 2217 and 2219 as legal basis to justify the
award of moral damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not the award of moral

damages is justified

SOLIS AND YARISANTOS VS. SALVADOR appellees paid him another P2,000.00 then and
14 SCRA 887 there.
GR No L- 17022, August 14 1965
ISSUE:
FACTS: Whether the award of Moral Damages is proper?
Petitioner is a partnership with the firm name
"Solis & Yarisantos," engaged in the business of HELD:
general engineering and construction. It No. There is no clear showing of malice on the
contracted with respondents in 1952 "to prepare part of the petitioner in filing the action: indeed,
and interpret all the necessary plans and while both the trial and appellant courts found
specifications of the proposed residential house the facts to weigh more heavily in favor of
of the latter and to supervise the construction respondents, and this finding is no longer subject
thereof as well as to supply the technical know- to review at this stage, we cannot say that
how needed for work. The contract provided that petitioner's evidence is utterly unworthy of
appellant "shall give all the necessary assistance credence. If respondents have suffered worries
to the owner in the procurement needed in the and mental anxiety, they could not have been
construction The specifications accompanying more than what are usually caused to a party who
the Contract provide, among others, that is haled into court as defendant in a litigation.
appellees would secure and pay for all permits
and fees that might be required by the laws and
ordinances; that all alterations and amendments
should be the subject of the agreement between
the parties and all works done in the process of
construction which are not part of the contract or
specifications would be considered extras to be
paid for by the owner. When appellees took
delivery of the finished building, they had so far
paid appellant P16,750.00 only, still P1,103.00
short of the contract price of P17,853.00
including the service fee; Appellant gave them the
list of alleged extras for the cost of which they are
being charged;for the second time they again paid
P2,000.00 to cover the unpaid balance of
stipulated price and the cost of materials used in
the terrace which were included in the list of
extras and thus considered their house fully paid;
that by this payment, they impliedly rejected the
rest of appellant's claim for extras; appellant
made written demands upon appellees for the
settlement of their unpaid account, meaning the
cost of the extras; that appellees having refused to
make any more payment, appellant filed its
complaint on, upon appellees' request,
Yarisantos, with his lawyer, went to the former's
house to consider the settlement of the claim, and

BEATRIZ P. WASSMER v FRANCISCO X. VELEZ

12 SCRA 648
G.R. No. L-20089 December 26, 1964
FACTS: Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P.

Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love,
decided to get married. But two days before the
wedding, defendant simply left a note for plaintiff
stating: "Will have to postpone wedding — My
mother opposes it ... " He enplaned to his home
city in Mindanao, and the next day, the day before
the wedding, he wired plaintiff: "Nothing changed
rest assured returning soon." But he never
returned and was never heard from again.
Beatriz sued Velez for damages. Velez asserted

that "there is no provision of the Civil Code
authorizing" an action for breach of promise to
marry.
ISSUE: Whether or not a "mere breach of a

promise to marry" is an actionable wrong that
would entitle the plaintiff for damages.
HELD: Yes. While it may be true that a "mere

breach of a promise to marry" is not an actionable
wrong, it must not be overlooked, however, that
the extent to which acts not contrary to law may
be perpetrated with impunity is not limitless for
Article 21 of said Code provides that "any person
who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage." To formally set a wedding and go
through all preparation and publicity, only to
walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be
solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and
unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which
defendant must be held answerable in damages.

SARKIES TOURS VS IAC relationship between Sarkies and the

G.R. No. L-63723. September 2, 1983. excursionists was “a single operation…which in
effect guaranteed them safe passage all
Facts: throughout.
A few weeks before June 12, 1971, petitioner
Sarkies Tours Phils., Inc. advertised in the Issue: Whether or not the petitioner for the
newspapers its tour to Corregidor on award of moral and exemplary damages.
Independence Day, for a fee of "P10.00 per person
including: a) boat fare - Manila-Corregidor- Held:
Manila b) shrine fee and c) tour of Corregidor The award of exemplary damages should be
Island by bus." The Sps. Dizon, together with their eliminated. It is not enough to say that an example
four children purchased round trip tickets for a should be made, or corrective measures be
fee ofP10.00 per person from Sarkies Tour. employed, for the public good especially in
accident cases where public carriers are involved.
The M/V Edisco was owned and operated by The causative negligence in such cases is personal
Julian Mendoza. It was an to the employees actually in charge of the
oversized motorized banca. It was not registered vehicles, and it is they who should be made to pay
to ferry passengers, nor was it licensed to operate this kind of damages by way of example or
as a watercraft. On that trip, it had 146 passengers correction, unless by the demonstrative tolerance
on board, was overloaded and lacked adequate or approval of the owners they themselves can be
life saving equipment. held at fault and their fault is of the character
described in article 2232 of the Civil Code."
On the way back to Manila, at around 2 p.m. the
boat capsized. The Dizons lost cash and personal In the case at bar, there is no showing that
belongings but their six year daughter drowned. SARKIES acted "in a wanton or malevolent
Then Dizon’s filed a complaint against Sarkies and manner" (Art. 2232, Civil Code) in contracts and
Mendoza. Sarkies alleged that it was only quasi-contracts, the court may award exemplary
a booking agent and not a carrier and that it acted damages if the defendant acted in a wanton,
with due diligence and care in relying on fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent
Mendoza’s representation that his vessel was manner.
duly authorized to operate and was sea-worthy. As to the Moral Damages although such should be
Mendoza denied liability claiming that he was not awarded, the amount of P100,000 is excessive
the registered owned and that the contract of and reduced toP30,000. The actual negligence for
carriage was between Sarkies and the Dizons and the drowning of the daughter was
that the accident was due to force majeure. the responsibility of Mendoza and it is but fair
Mendoza was declared in default for failure to that Sarkies should have a right of action against
appear during the pre-trial. The Trial Court Mendoza for reimbursement. Mendoza is ordered
exonerated Sarkies and found Mendoza liable for to reimburse Sarkies for all expenses and
negligence consisting of “unscrupulous damages to be paid to the Dizons by Sarkies.
conversion of a fishing boat into a ferry boat
without first securing a license to operate as
such.”
The CA held both Sarkies and Mendoza liable

jointly and severally for the reason that the

Carrier Liable Despite Accident Caused by Third Party

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CIVIL LAW REVIEW II BATCH 2017 CASE DIGEST

SPEACIAL CONTRACTS (TORTS & DAM AGES)

AIR FRANCE vs CARRASCOSO ISSUE:

ARELLANO UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW Page 1

Passengers do not contract merely for

Thus, "Where a steamship company had

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On December 16, 1992, the Court of Appeals

The appellate court held that since the basis of

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SOLIMAN vs. TUASON Solomon was not a pupil, student or apprentice of

ARELLANO UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW Page 10

Facts: BBB’s employee killed the husband of AAA.

Issue: WON BBB may be held liable for the acts of

Ruling: The NCC provides that whoever by act or

There is no justification for limiting the scope of

When an injury is caused by the negligence of the

The liability of the employer is direct and

It is incumbent upon the employer to prove that

ARELLANO UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW Page 11

GARCIA VS. FLORIDO No. 25 by Pedro Tumala resulting in the

Essential averments for a quasi-delictual action

ARELLANO UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW Page 12

VALENZUELA VS. CA in no such situation. The law takes stock of

RTC found Richard Li guilty of gross 2. YES.

ARELLANO UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW Page 13

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Under the doctrine of last clear chance, which is

Assuming that Osmundo Canlas was negligent in

For not observing the degree of diligence

ARELLANO UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW Page 15

the driver of the overtaking vehicle. Petitioner

Also, the respondent court itself pronounced that

Petitioner was acquitted.

ARELLANO UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW Page 17

ARELLANO UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW Page 18

Jose Juergo, together with Jessie Jaluag and Delso

PO3 Rogelio Villanueva of the Eastern Police

DM Consunji seeks reversal of the CA decision.

ARELLANO UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW Page 19

The reason is that these damages cover two

Temperate damages can and should be awarded

ARELLANO UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW Page 21

REYES VS SISTERS OF MERCY (341 SCRA 760),

ARELLANO UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW Page 22

ARELLANO UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW Page 23

ISSUE: Whether or not the Kalaw’s act of

ARELLANO UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW Page 24

FACTS: Basilio Ilano and Proceso Gayetano took a

When the driver led the horse to the curb to allow

ISSUE: Whether or not Agaton’s wrongful act the

RULING: No. The court held that Agaton’s act of

ARELLANO UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW Page 25

Issue: Whether Davao city is guilty of negligence

ARELLANO UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW Page 26

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