Gimenez vs.

Nazareno
Facts:
On 3 August 1973, Samson Suan, Alex Potot, Rogelio Mula, Fernando Cargando, Rogelio
Baguio and Teodoro de la Vega, Jr., were charged with the crime of murder. The accused were
arraigned and each of them pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Following the arraignment,
the judge, Hon. Ramon E. Nazareno, set the hearing of the case for 18 September 1973 at 1:00
p.m. All the accused were duly informed of this. Before the scheduled date of the first hearing
the de la Vega escaped from his detention center and on the said date, failed to appear in court.
This prompted the fiscals handling the case (Fiscal Celso M. Gimenez and Federico B. Mercado)
to file a motion with the lower court to proceed with the hearing of the case against all the
accused praying thatde la Vega, Jr. be tried in absentia invoking the application of Section 19,
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. Pursuant to the above-written provision, the lower court
proceeded with the trial of the case but nevertheless gave de ala Vega the opportunity to take the
witness stand the moment he shows up in court. After due trial, or on 6 November 1973, the
lower court rendered a decision dismissing the case against the other five accused (Suan, et. al.)
while holding in abeyance the proceedings against de la Vega. On 16 November 1973, Gimenez
and Mercado filed a Motion for Reconsideration questioning the dispositive portion of the court's
decision on the ground that it will render
nugatory the constitutional provision on "trial in absentia" cited earlier. However, this was
denied by the lower court in an Order dated 22 November 1973. Gimenez and Mercado filed a
petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether judgment upon an accused tried should be in abeyance pending the appearance
of the accused before the court.

Held: The second part of Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution provides that a "trial in
absentia" may be had when the following requisites are present:
(1) that there has been an arraignment
(2) that the accused has been notified;
(3) that he fails to appear and his failure to do so is unjustified.

Herein, all the above conditions were attendant calling for a trial in absentia. De la Vega was
arraigned on 22 August 1973 and in the said arraignment he pleaded not guilty. He was also
informed of the scheduled hearings set on September 18 and 19, 1973 and this is evidenced by
his signature on the notice issued by the lower court. It was also proved by a certified copy of the
Police Blotter that de la Vega escaped from his detention center. No explanation for his failure to
appear in court in any of the scheduled hearings was given. Even the trial court considered his
absence unjustified.
The lower court correctly proceeded with the reception of the evidence of the prosecution and
the other accused in the absence of de la Vega, but it erred when it suspended the proceedings as
to de la Vega and rendered a decision as to the other accused only. Upon the termination of a
trial in absentia, the court has the duty to rule upon the evidence presented in court. The court
need not wait for the time until the accused who escape from custody finally decides to appear in
court to present his evidence and cross-examine the witnesses against him. To allow the delay of
proceedings for this purpose is to render ineffective the constitutional provision on trial in
absentia. Still, the accused remain to be presumed innocent, a judgment of conviction must still
be based upon the evidence presented in court, and such evidence must prove him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. There can be no violation of due process since the accused was given the
opportunity to be heard. By his failure to appear during the trial of which he had notice, he
virtually waived the rights to cross-examine and to present evidence on his behalf. Thus, an
escapee who has been duly tried in absentia waives his right to present evidence on his own
behalf and to confront and cross-examine witnesses who testified against him.

Doctrine:
The trial against the fugitives, just like those of the others, should have been brought to its
ultimate conclusion. Thereafter, the trial court had the duty to rule on the evidence presented by
the prosecution against all the accused and to render its judgment accordingly. It should not
wait for the fugitives’ re-appearance or re-arrest. They were deemed to have waived their right
to present evidence on their own behalf and to confront and cross-examine the witnesses who
testified against them

Miranda et al. v. Tuliao, G.R. No. 158763, March

31, 2006
Crim Pro - Jurisdiction

Facts:
On March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Ramon, Isabela which were
later identified as the bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of the private
respondent Virgilio Tuliao who is now under the witness protection program.
Two Informations for murder were filed against 5 police officers including SPO2
Maderal in the RTC of Santiago City. The venue was later transferred to the RTC of
Manila. The RTC convicted the accused and sentenced them two counts of reclusion
perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be arraigned at that time being at large.
Upon automatic review, the SC acquitted the accused on the ground of reasonable
doubt.
In Sept. 1999, Maderal was arrested. He executed a sworn confession and
identified the petitioners as the ones responsible for the death of the victims, so, Tuliao
filed a criminal complaint for murder against the petitioners. Acting Presiding Judge
Tumaliuan issued a warrant of arrest against the petitioners and SPO2 Maderal.
Then, the petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary
investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall or quash the warrant of arrest. In the hearing
of the urgent motion, Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of the petitioners and issued
a Joint order denying the urgent motion on the ground that since the court did not
acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the court.
Issues: Whether or not an accused can seek judicial relief if he does not submit his
person to the jurisdiction of the court.

Whether or not a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires jurisdiction over the
person of the accused.

Held. No, one who seeks affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the
Jurisdiction of the Court. Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires
neither jurisdiction over the person of the accused, nor custody of law over the body of
the accused.
Citing Santiago v. Vasquez, there is a distinction between the custody of the law
and jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is required before the Court can act
upon the application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other relief sought
by the dependant where by mere application, thereof, constitutes a waiver of the
defence of lack of jurisdiction over the person accused.

Garcia vs. Sandiganbayan Digest (460

SCRA 588)
Garcia vs. Sandiganbayan
460 SCRA 588
June 22, 2005, TINGA

NATURE
Petitioner filed this Petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 to annul and set aside
public respondent Sandiganbayan’s Resolution[1] dated 29 October 2004 and Writ of
Preliminary Attachment[2] dated 2 November 2004, and to enjoin public respondents
Sandiganbayan and Office of the Ombudsman from further proceeding with any action relating
to the enforcement of the assailed issuances.

FACTS
-Major General Carlos F. Garcia was the Deputy Chief of Staff for Comptrollership of the AFP.
-On Sept27, 2004, Atty. Maria Olivia Roxas, Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer of the
Field Investigation Office of the Office of the Ombudsman, after due investigation, filed a
COMPLAINT vs. Garcia for VIOLATION OF
1. SECTION 8 (IN RE Section 11) of RA 6713(Code of Conduct of Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees)
2. Art 183, RPC
3. Sec52(A)(1), (3) & (20) of the Civil Service Law
-based on this complaint, a case was filed vs. Petitioner
-Wife and 3 sons were impleaded for violation of RA 1379 insofar as they acted as conspirators,
conduits, dummies and fronts of petitioner in receiving, accumulating, using and disposing of
ill-gotten wealth
-Also, a PETITION W/ VERIFIED URGENT EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR THE ISSUANCE
OF A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT was filed by Ombudsman before the SB vs.
Garcia, his wife and 3 sons: Ombudsman, after conducting inquiry (similar to PI) has
determined a prima facie case exists vs. Maj. Gen Garcia since during his incumbency as a
soldier and public officer he acquired huge amounts of money and properties manifestly out of
proportion to his salary as such public officer and his other lawful income – SB GRANTED
PETITION, ISSUED WRIT OF PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT

-Garcia filed MTD then this PETITION (same day):

a.LACK OF JURISDICTION over forfeiture proceedings (CIVIL ACTION) under RA 1379 –
should be w/ RTC as provided under SEC2(9) of the law
b. Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction in Civil Actions pertains only to separate actions for recovery of
unlawfully acquired property vs. Pres. Marcos etc.
c. SB was intended principally as a criminal court
BASIS: Presidential issuances and laws
d. Granting that SB has jurisdiction, petition for forfeiture is fatally defective for failing to
comply with jurisdictional requirements under RA 1379, SEC2:
i. inquiry similar to a PI
ii. Certification to SOLGEN of prima facie case – here: no certification
iii. action filed by SOLGEN - here: by Ombudsman

COMMENT by SB:
1.Republic vs. SB: “there is no issue that jurisdiction over violations of [R.A.] Nos. 3019 and 1379
now rests with the Sandiganbayan.”
2. Under Consti and prevailing statutes, SB is vested w/ authority and jurisdiction over the
petition for forfeiture under RA 1379
3. Section4a(1), PD 1606, not Section 2(9), RA 1379 should be made the basis of SB’s
jurisdiction:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following
positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of
the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as
Grade ‘27’ and higher of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758),
specifically including:
….
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher ranks;
….
4. SB’s jurisdiction based on PD 1606 encompasses all cases involving violations of RA 3019
IRRESPECTIVE OF WON THESE CASES ARE CIVIL OR CRIMINAL IN NATURE

COMMENT BY OMBUDSMAN:
1. Republic vs. SB
2. Grant of jurisdiction over violations of RA 1379 did not change even under the amendments of
RA7975 and RA 8294, though it came to be limited to cases involving high-ranking public
officials
3. It has authority to investigate and initiate forfeiture proceedings vs. petitioner based on
COnsti and RA 6770: The constitutional power of investigation of the Office of the Ombudsman
is plenary and unqualified; its power to investigate any act of a public official or employee which
appears to be “illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient” covers the unlawful acquisition of wealth
by public officials as defined under R.A. No. 1379
4. Section 15, RA 6770 expressly empowers Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute such cases
of unlawful acquisition of wealth.
5. ON REQUIREMENTS under RA 1379: inquiry was conducted similar to PI + SOLGEN’s
participation no longer required since Ombudsman endowed w/ authority to investigate and
prosecute
6. dismiss petition for forum shopping: MTD was already filed before SB

REPLY by Garcia
1. SB’s criminal jurisdiction is separate and distinct from its civil jurisdiction : SB’s jurisdiction
over forfeiture cases had been removed w/o subsequent amendments expressly restoring such
civil jurisdiction
2. Petition for forfeiture is not an ancilliary action for the criminal action against him, so not
under jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan

ISSUES
1. WON SB has jurisdiction over petitions for forfeiture under RA 1379
2. WON Ombudsman has authority to investigate, initiate and prosecute such petitions for
forfeiture
3. WON petitioner is guilty of forum shopping

HELD
Petition W/O MERIT, dismissed

1. SB HAS JURISDICTION
Reasoning:
*Republic vs. Sandiganbayan: Originally, SOLGEN was authorized to initiate forfeiture
proceedings before then CFI of the city or province where the public officer/employee resides or
holds office [RA 1379, SEC2]
…Upon the creation of the Sandiganbayan [PD 1486], original and exclusive jurisdiction over
such violations was vested in SB.
…PD 1606: repealed 1486 and modified jurisdiction of SB by removing its jurisdiction over civil
actions brought in connection w/ crimes w/n exclusive jurisdiction of SB, including:
> restitution or reparation for damages
>recovery of instruments and effects of the crime
>civil actions under Art32 and 34 of the Civil Code
>and forfeiture proceedings provided under RA 1379
…BP 129: abolished concurrent jurisdiction of SB and regular courts, expanded EOJ of SB over
offenses enumerated in SEC4 of PD1606 to embrace all such offenses irrespective of imposable
penalty.
…PD1606 was later amended by PD 1869 and eventually by PD 1861 because of the proliferation
of filing cases w/ penalty not higher than PC or its equivalent and even such cases not serious in
nature
jurisdiction over violations of RA 3019 and 1379 is lodged w/ SB
…under RA 8249: SB vested w/ EOJ in all cases involving violations of :
>>RA 3019
>>RA 1379
>>ChapII, Sec2, Title VII, Book II of the RPC
Where 1 or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense (see above)

ON CIVIL NATUR OF FORFEITURE ACTIONS

-they are actions in rem, therefore, civil in nature BUT FORFEITURE OF AN ILLEGALLY
ACQUIRED PROPERTY PARTAKES THE NATURE OF A PENALTY [as discussed in Cabal vs.
Kapunan]

SB VESTED W/ JURISDICTION OVER VIOLATIONS OF RA 1379 [“An Act Declaring

Forfeiture In Favor of the State Any Property Found to Have Been Unlawfully Acquired By Any
Public Officer or Employee and Providing For the Proceedings Therefor.”]: the law provides a
procedure for forfeiture in case a public officer has acquired during his incumbency an amount
of property manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to
his lawful income and income from legitimately acquired property. No penalty for the public
officer for unlawful acquisition but the law imposes forfeiture as a penalty for unlawfully
acquired properties

2. YES, as resolved in Republic vs. SB (it was the main issue there)
RA 1379, Sec2: SOLGEN authorized to initiate forfeiture proceedings
PD 1486: vested SB w/ jurisdiction over RA 1379 forfeiture proceedings
…Sec12: Chief Special Prosecutor has authority to file and prosecute forfeiture cases, not
SOLGEN, to SB, not CFI (BUT THIS IS JUST AN IMPLIED REPEAL as may be derived from the
repealing clause of PD 1486)
PD 1487: created Ombudsman
PD 1606 repealed expressly PD 1486
PD 1607 provided that Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor has exclusive authority to conduct
preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable by the SB, file info therefore, and direct and
control prosecution of said cases
…also removed authority to file actions for forfeiture under RA 1379
the repeal of P.D. No. 1486 by P.D. No. 1606 necessarily revived the authority of the Solicitor
General to file a petition for forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379, but not the jurisdiction of the Courts
of First Instance over the case nor the authority of the Provincial or City Fiscals (now
Prosecutors) to conduct the preliminary investigation therefore, since said powers at that time
remained in the Sandiganbayan and the Chief Special Prosecutor.
PD 1630: expanded the Tanodbayan’s authority: given exclusive authority to conduct PI of all
cases cognizable by SB, to file info therefore and to direct and control the prosecution of said
cases
**1987 CONSTI enacted
RA 6770 + ART XI, SEC 13 of 1987 CONSTI: POWERS OF OMBUDSMAN:
1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of
any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, may take over, at any stage,
from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases;
…
(11) Investigate and initiate the proper action for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained
wealth amassed after 25 February 1986 and the prosecution of the parties involved therein.
It is the Ombudsman who should file petition for forfeiture under RA 1379
BUT powers to investigate and initiate proper action for recovery of ill-gotten and/or
unexplained wealth is restricted only to cases for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained
wealth amassed AFTER FEB 1986

3. ON FORUM SHOPPING: GUILTY!

–Garcia failed to inform the court that he had filed a MTD in relation to the petition for
forfeiture before the SB.
A scrutiny of the Motion to Dismiss reveals that petitioner raised substantially the same issues
and prayed for the same reliefs therein as it has in the instant petition. In fact, the Arguments
and Discussion[89] in the Petition of petitioner’s thesis that the Sandiganbayan has no
jurisdiction over separate civil actions for forfeiture of unlawfully acquired properties appears to
be wholly lifted from the Motion to Dismiss. The only difference between the two is that in the
Petition, petitioner raises the ground of failure of the petition for forfeiture to comply with the
procedural requirements of R.A. No. 1379, and petitioner prays for the annulment of the
Sandiganbayan’s Resolution dated 29 October 2004 and Writ of Preliminary Attachment dated
2 November 2004. Nevertheless, these differences are only superficial. Both Petition and
Motion to Dismiss have the same intent of dismissing the case for forfeiture filed against
petitioner, his wife and their sons. It is undeniable that petitioner had failed to fulfill his
undertaking. This is incontestably forum-shopping which is reason enough to dismiss the
petition outright, without prejudice to the taking of appropriate action against the counsel and
party concerned

COJUANGCO vs SANDIGANBAYAN Case Digest

IMELDA O. COJUANGCO et al. v. SANDIGANBAYAN et al.

586 SCRA 790 (2009), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.)

While the general rule is that the portion of a decision that becomes the subject of execution
is that ordained or decreed in the dispositive part thereof, there are recognized exceptions to
this rule, one of which is where extensive and explicit discussion and settlement of the issue
is found in the body of the decision.

FACTS: The Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed before the Sandiganbayan a "Complaint for
Reconveyance, Reversion, Accounting, Restitution and Damages," of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of
the Marcoses which have been invested in the Philippine Long Distance Telecommunication
Corporation (PLDT). Ramon and Imelda Cojuangco (Spouses Cojuangco) were subsequently
impleaded. The Sandiganbayan dismissed the complaint with respect to the recovery of the PLDT
shares. The Republic appealed to the Supreme Court, and the same issued a favorable ruling.

The Republic thereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of
Execution, praying for the cancellation of the shares of stock registered in the name of Prime
Holdings and the annotation of the change of ownership on PTIC‘s Stock and Transfer Book. The
Republic further prayed for the issuance of an order for PTIC to account for all cash and stock
dividends declared by PLDT in favor of PTIC from 1986 up to the present including compounded
interests. The Sandiganbayan granted the same, except its prayer for accounting of dividends.

The Republic moved for reconsideration with respect to the denial of accounting of dividends, which
the Sandiganbayan granted. The Cojuangcos protested, alleging that the SC‘s decision did not
include in its dispositive portion the grant of dividends and interests accruing to the shares
adjudicated in favor of the Republic.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Republic is entitled to the dividends and interests accruing to the shares
despite its non-inclusion in the dispositive portion of the decision
HELD: The Cojuangcos insist on a literal reading of the dispositive portion of the SC‘s Decision,
excluding the dividends, interests, and earnings accruing to the shares of stock from being
accounted for and remitted.

The SC, in directing the reconveyance to the Republic of the 111,415 shares of PLDT stock owned
by PTIC in the name of Prime Holdings, declared the Republic as the owner of said shares and,
necessarily, the dividends and interests accruing thereto.

Ownership is a relation in law by virtue of which a thing pertaining to one person is completely
subjected to his will in everything not prohibited by law or the concurrence with the rights of another.
Its traditional elements or attributes include jus utendi or the right to receive from the thing that it
produces.

Contrary to the Cojuangcos‘ contention, while the general rule is that the portion of a decision that
becomes the subject of execution is that ordained or decreed in the dispositive part thereof, there
are recognized exceptions to this rule, viz: (a) where there is ambiguity or uncertainty, the body of
the opinion may be referred to for purposes of construing the judgment, because the dispositive part
of a decision must find support from the decision‘s ratio decidendi; and (b) where extensive and
explicit discussion and settlement of the issue is found in the body of the decision.

In the Decision, although the inclusion of the dividends, interests, and earnings of the 111,415 PTIC
shares as belonging to the Republic was not mentioned in the dispositive portion of the Court‘s
Decision, it is clear from its body that what was being adjudicated in favor of the Republic was the
whole block of shares and the fruits thereof, said shares having been found to be part of the
Marcoses‘ illgotten wealth, and therefore, public money.