Republic of the Philippines Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxo’s products in the Camarines Sur-
SUPREME COURT Camarines Norte sales area.
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 162994 September 17, 2004
DUNCAN ASSOCIATION OF DETAILMAN-PTGWO and PEDRO A.
TECSON, petitioners,
vs.
GLAXO WELLCOME PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondent.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
Confronting the Court in this petition is a novel question, with constitutional
overtones, involving the validity of the policy of a pharmaceutical company
prohibiting its employees from marrying employees of any competitor company.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision1 dated May 19,
2003 and the Resolution dated March 26, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 62434.2
Petitioner Pedro A. Tecson (Tecson) was hired by respondent Glaxo Wellcome
Philippines, Inc. (Glaxo) as medical representative on October 24, 1995, after Tecson
had undergone training and orientation.
Thereafter, Tecson signed a contract of employment which stipulates, among others,
that he agrees to study and abide by existing company rules; to disclose to
management any existing or future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-
employees or employees of competing drug companies and should management find
that such relationship poses a possible conflict of interest, to resign from the
company.
The Employee Code of Conduct of Glaxo similarly provides that an employee is
expected to inform management of any existing or future relationship by
consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees of competing drug
companies. If management perceives a conflict of interest or a potential conflict
between such relationship and the employee’s employment with the company, the
management and the employee will explore the possibility of a "transfer to another
department in a non-counterchecking position" or preparation for employment
outside the company after six months.
Subsequently, Tecson entered into a romantic relationship with Bettsy, an employee
of Astra Pharmaceuticals3(Astra), a competitor of Glaxo. Bettsy was Astra’s Branch
Coordinator in Albay. She supervised the district managers and medical
representatives of her company and prepared marketing strategies for Astra in that
area.
Even before they got married, Tecson received several reminders from his District
Manager regarding the conflict of interest which his relationship with Bettsy might
engender. Still, love prevailed, and Tecson married Bettsy in September 1998.
In January 1999, Tecson’s superiors informed him that his marriage to Bettsy gave
rise to a conflict of interest. Tecson’s superiors reminded him that he and Bettsy
should decide which one of them would resign from their jobs, although they told
him that they wanted to retain him as much as possible because he was performing
his job well.
Tecson requested for time to comply with the company policy against entering into a
relationship with an employee of a competitor company. He explained that Astra,
Bettsy’s employer, was planning to merge with Zeneca, another drug company; and
Bettsy was planning to avail of the redundancy package to be offered by Astra. With
Bettsy’s separation from her company, the potential conflict of interest would be
eliminated. At the same time, they would be able to avail of the attractive
redundancy package from Astra.
In August 1999, Tecson again requested for more time resolve the problem. In
September 1999, Tecson applied for a transfer in Glaxo’s milk division, thinking that
since Astra did not have a milk division, the potential conflict of interest would be
eliminated. His application was denied in view of Glaxo’s "least-movement-
possible" policy.
In November 1999, Glaxo transferred Tecson to the Butuan City-Surigao City-
Agusan del Sur sales area. Tecson asked Glaxo to reconsider its decision, but his
request was denied.
Tecson sought Glaxo’s reconsideration regarding his transfer and brought the matter
to Glaxo’s Grievance Committee. Glaxo, however, remained firm in its decision and
gave Tescon until February 7, 2000 to comply with the transfer order. Tecson defied
the transfer order and continued acting as medical representative in the Camarines
Sur-Camarines Norte sales area.
During the pendency of the grievance proceedings, Tecson was paid his salary, but
was not issued samples of products which were competing with similar products
manufactured by Astra. He was also not included in product conferences regarding
such products.
Because the parties failed to resolve the issue at the grievance machinery level, they
submitted the matter for voluntary arbitration. Glaxo offered Tecson a separation pay
of one-half (½) month pay for every year of service, or a total of ₱50,000.00 but he
declined the offer. On November 15, 2000, the National Conciliation and Mediation
Board (NCMB) rendered its Decision declaring as valid Glaxo’s policy on
relationships between its employees and persons employed with competitor
companies, and affirming Glaxo’s right to transfer Tecson to another sales territory.
Aggrieved, Tecson filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals assailing
the NCMB Decision.
On May 19, 2003, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision denying
the Petition for Review on the ground that the NCMB did not err in rendering
its Decision. The appellate court held that Glaxo’s policy prohibiting its employees
from having personal relationships with employees of competitor companies is a
valid exercise of its management prerogatives.4
Tecson filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the appellate court’s Decision, but the
motion was denied by the appellate court in its Resolution dated March 26, 2004.5
Petitioners filed the instant petition, arguing therein that (i) the Court of Appeals
erred in affirming the NCMB’s finding that the Glaxo’s policy prohibiting its
employees from marrying an employee of a competitor company is valid; and (ii) the
Court of Appeals also erred in not finding that Tecson was constructively dismissed
when he was transferred to a new sales territory, and deprived of the opportunity to
attend products seminars and training sessions.6
Petitioners contend that Glaxo’s policy against employees marrying employees of
competitor companies violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution
because it creates invalid distinctions among employees on account only of marriage.
They claim that the policy restricts the employees’ right to marry. 7
They also argue that Tecson was constructively dismissed as shown by the following
circumstances: (1) he was transferred from the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales
area to the Butuan-Surigao-Agusan sales area, (2) he suffered a diminution in pay,
(3) he was excluded from attending seminars and training sessions for medical
representatives, and (4) he was prohibited from promoting respondent’s products
which were competing with Astra’s products.8
In its Comment on the petition, Glaxo argues that the company policy prohibiting its
employees from having a relationship with and/or marrying an employee of a
competitor company is a valid exercise of its management prerogatives and does not
violate the equal protection clause; and that Tecson’s reassignment from the
Camarines Norte-Camarines Sur sales area to the Butuan City-Surigao City and
Agusan del Sur sales area does not amount to constructive dismissal.9
Glaxo insists that as a company engaged in the promotion and sale of pharmaceutical
products, it has a genuine interest in ensuring that its employees avoid any activity,
relationship or interest that may conflict with their responsibilities to the company.
Thus, it expects its employees to avoid having personal or family interests in any
competitor company which may influence their actions and decisions and
consequently deprive Glaxo of legitimate profits. The policy is also aimed at
preventing a competitor company from gaining access to its secrets, procedures and
policies.10
It likewise asserts that the policy does not prohibit marriage per se but only
proscribes existing or future relationships with employees of competitor companies,
and is therefore not violative of the equal protection clause. It maintains that
considering the nature of its business, the prohibition is based on valid grounds.11
According to Glaxo, Tecson’s marriage to Bettsy, an employee of Astra, posed a real
and potential conflict of interest. Astra’s products were in direct competition with
67% of the products sold by Glaxo. Hence, Glaxo’s enforcement of the foregoing
policy in Tecson’s case was a valid exercise of its management prerogatives.12 In any
case, Tecson was given several months to remedy the situation, and was even
encouraged not to resign but to ask his wife to resign form Astra instead. 13
Glaxo also points out that Tecson can no longer question the assailed company
policy because when he signed his contract of employment, he was aware that such
policy was stipulated therein. In said contract, he also agreed to resign from
respondent if the management finds that his relationship with an employee of a
competitor company would be detrimental to the interests of Glaxo. 14
Glaxo likewise insists that Tecson’s reassignment to another sales area and his
exclusion from seminars regarding respondent’s new products did not amount to
constructive dismissal.
It claims that in view of Tecson’s refusal to resign, he was relocated from the
Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area to the Butuan City-Surigao City and
Agusan del Sur sales area. Glaxo asserts that in effecting the reassignment, it also
considered the welfare of Tecson’s family. Since Tecson’s hometown was in Agusan
del Sur and his wife traces her roots to Butuan City, Glaxo assumed that his transfer
from the Bicol region to the Butuan City sales area would be favorable to him and
his family as he would be relocating to a familiar territory and minimizing his travel
expenses.15
In addition, Glaxo avers that Tecson’s exclusion from the seminar concerning the
new anti-asthma drug was due to the fact that said product was in direct competition
with a drug which was soon to be sold by Astra, and hence, would pose a potential
conflict of interest for him. Lastly, the delay in Tecson’s receipt of his sales
paraphernalia was due to the mix-up created by his refusal to transfer to the Butuan
City sales area (his paraphernalia was delivered to his new sales area instead of Naga
City because the supplier thought he already transferred to Butuan). 16
The Court is tasked to resolve the following issues: (1) Whether the Court of
Appeals erred in ruling that Glaxo’s policy against its employees marrying
employees from competitor companies is valid, and in not holding that said policy
violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution; (2) Whether Tecson was
constructively dismissed.
The Court finds no merit in the petition.
The stipulation in Tecson’s contract of employment with Glaxo being questioned by
petitioners provides:
… by management and the employee, to arrive at a solution within six (6)
10. You agree to disclose to management any existing or future relationship
you may have, either by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or
employees of competing drug companies. Should it pose a possible conflict
of interest in management discretion, you agree to resign voluntarily from
the Company as a matter of Company policy.
…17
The same contract also stipulates that Tescon agrees to abide by the existing
company rules of Glaxo, and to study and become acquainted with such policies. 18 In
this regard, the Employee Handbook of Glaxo expressly informs its employees of its
rules regarding conflict of interest:
1. Conflict of Interest
Employees should avoid any activity, investment relationship, or interest
that may run counter to the responsibilities which they owe Glaxo
Wellcome.
Specifically, this means that employees are expected:
a. To avoid having personal or family interest, financial or
otherwise, in any competitor supplier or other businesses which
may consciously or unconsciously influence their actions or
decisions and thus deprive Glaxo Wellcome of legitimate profit.
b. To refrain from using their position in Glaxo Wellcome or
knowledge of Company plans to advance their outside personal
interests, that of their relatives, friends and other businesses.
c. To avoid outside employment or other interests for income
which would impair their effective job performance.
d. To consult with Management on such activities or relationships
that may lead to conflict of interest.
1.1. Employee Relationships
Employees with existing or future relationships either by consanguinity or
affinity with co-employees of competing drug companies are expected to
disclose such relationship to the Management. If management perceives a
conflict or potential conflict of interest, every effort shall be made, together
months, either by transfer to another department in a non-counter checking
position, or by career preparation toward outside employment after Glaxo
Wellcome. Employees must be prepared for possible resignation within six
(6) months, if no other solution is feasible.19
No reversible error can be ascribed to the Court of Appeals when it ruled that
Glaxo’s policy prohibiting an employee from having a relationship with an employee
of a competitor company is a valid exercise of management prerogative.
Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing
strategies and other confidential programs and information from competitors,
especially so that it and Astra are rival companies in the highly competitive
pharmaceutical industry.
The prohibition against personal or marital relationships with employees of
competitor companies upon Glaxo’s employees is reasonable under the
circumstances because relationships of that nature might compromise the interests of
the company. In laying down the assailed company policy, Glaxo only aims to
protect its interests against the possibility that a competitor company will gain access
to its secrets and procedures.
That Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic interests cannot be denied. No
less than the Constitution recognizes the right of enterprises to adopt and enforce
such a policy to protect its right to reasonable returns on investments and to
expansion and growth.20 Indeed, while our laws endeavor to give life to the
constitutional policy on social justice and the protection of labor, it does not mean
that every labor dispute will be decided in favor of the workers. The law also
recognizes that management has rights which are also entitled to respect and
enforcement in the interest of fair play.21
As held in a Georgia, U.S.A case,22 it is a legitimate business practice to guard
business confidentiality and protect a competitive position by even-handedly
disqualifying from jobs male and female applicants or employees who are married to
a competitor. Consequently, the court ruled than an employer that discharged an
employee who was married to an employee of an active competitor did not violate
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.23 The Court pointed out that the policy was
applied to men and women equally, and noted that the employer’s business was
highly competitive and that gaining inside information would constitute a
competitive advantage.
The challenged company policy does not violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution as petitioners erroneously suggest. It is a settled principle that the
commands of the equal protection clause are addressed only to the state or those
acting under color of its authority.24 Corollarily, it has been held in a long array of
U.S. Supreme Court decisions that the equal protection clause erects no shield
against merely private conduct, however, discriminatory or wrongful. 25 The only
exception occurs when the state29 in any of its manifestations or actions has been
found to have become entwined or involved in the wrongful private
conduct.27 Obviously, however, the exception is not present in this case.
Significantly, the company actually enforced the policy after repeated requests to the
employee to comply with the policy. Indeed, the application of the policy was made
in an impartial and even-handed manner, with due regard for the lot of the employee.
In any event, from the wordings of the contractual provision and the policy in its
employee handbook, it is clear that Glaxo does not impose an absolute prohibition
against relationships between its employees and those of competitor companies. Its
employees are free to cultivate relationships with and marry persons of their own
choosing. What the company merely seeks to avoid is a conflict of interest between
the employee and the company that may arise out of such relationships. As
succinctly explained by the appellate court, thus:
The policy being questioned is not a policy against marriage. An employee
of the company remains free to marry anyone of his or her choosing. The
policy is not aimed at restricting a personal prerogative that belongs only to
the individual. However, an employee’s personal decision does not detract
the employer from exercising management prerogatives to ensure maximum
profit and business success. . . 28
The Court of Appeals also correctly noted that the assailed company policy which
forms part of respondent’s Employee Code of Conduct and of its contracts with its
employees, such as that signed by Tescon, was made known to him prior to his
employment. Tecson, therefore, was aware of that restriction when he signed his
employment contract and when he entered into a relationship with Bettsy. Since
Tecson knowingly and voluntarily entered into a contract of employment with
Glaxo, the stipulations therein have the force of law between them and, thus, should
be complied with in good faith."29 He is therefore estopped from questioning said
policy.
The Court finds no merit in petitioners’ contention that Tescon was constructively
dismissed when he was transferred from the Camarines Norte-Camarines Sur sales
area to the Butuan City-Surigao City-Agusan del Sur sales area, and when he was
excluded from attending the company’s seminar on new products which were
directly competing with similar products manufactured by Astra. Constructive
dismissal is defined as a quitting, an involuntary resignation resorted to when
continued employment becomes impossible, unreasonable, or unlikely; when there is
a demotion in rank or diminution in pay; or when a clear discrimination, insensibility
or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee. 30 None of these
conditions are present in the instant case. The record does not show that Tescon was
demoted or unduly discriminated upon by reason of such transfer. As found by the
appellate court, Glaxo properly exercised its management prerogative in reassigning
Tecson to the Butuan City sales area:
. . . In this case, petitioner’s transfer to another place of assignment was
merely in keeping with the policy of the company in avoidance of conflict
of interest, and thus valid…Note that [Tecson’s] wife holds a sensitive
supervisory position as Branch Coordinator in her employer-company
which requires her to work in close coordination with District Managers and
Medical Representatives. Her duties include monitoring sales of Astra
products, conducting sales drives, establishing and furthering relationship
with customers, collection, monitoring and managing Astra’s
inventory…she therefore takes an active participation in the market war
characterized as it is by stiff competition among pharmaceutical companies.
Moreover, and this is significant, petitioner’s sales territory covers
Camarines Sur and Camarines Norte while his wife is supervising a branch
of her employer in Albay. The proximity of their areas of responsibility, all
in the same Bicol Region, renders the conflict of interest not only possible,
but actual, as learning by one spouse of the other’s market strategies in the
region would be inevitable. [Management’s] appreciation of a conflict of
interest is therefore not merely illusory and wanting in factual basis… 31
In Abbott Laboratories (Phils.), Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission,32 which involved a complaint filed by a medical representative against
his employer drug company for illegal dismissal for allegedly terminating his
employment when he refused to accept his reassignment to a new area, the Court
upheld the right of the drug company to transfer or reassign its employee in
accordance with its operational demands and requirements. The ruling of the Court
therein, quoted hereunder, also finds application in the instant case:

By the very nature of his employment, a drug salesman or medical

representative is expected to travel. He should anticipate reassignment
according to the demands of their business. It would be a poor drug
corporation which cannot even assign its representatives or detail men to
new markets calling for opening or expansion or to areas where the need for
pushing its products is great. More so if such reassignments are part of the
employment contract.33

As noted earlier, the challenged policy has been implemented by Glaxo impartially
and disinterestedly for a long period of time. In the case at bar, the record shows that
Glaxo gave Tecson several chances to eliminate the conflict of interest brought about
by his relationship with Bettsy. When their relationship was still in its initial stage,
Tecson’s supervisors at Glaxo constantly reminded him about its effects on his
employment with the company and on the company’s interests. After Tecson married
Bettsy, Glaxo gave him time to resolve the conflict by either resigning from the
company or asking his wife to resign from Astra. Glaxo even expressed its desire to
retain Tecson in its employ because of his satisfactory performance and suggested
that he ask Bettsy to resign from her company instead. Glaxo likewise acceded to his
repeated requests for more time to resolve the conflict of interest. When the problem
could not be resolved after several years of waiting, Glaxo was constrained to
reassign Tecson to a sales area different from that handled by his wife for Astra.
Notably, the Court did not terminate Tecson from employment but only reassigned
him to another area where his home province, Agusan del Sur, was included. In
effecting Tecson’s transfer, Glaxo even considered the welfare of Tecson’s family.
Clearly, the foregoing dispels any suspicion of unfairness and bad faith on the part of
Glaxo.34

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 118978 May 23, 1997
PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE COMPANY, * petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and GRACE DE
GUZMAN, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
Seeking relief through the extraordinary writ of certiorari, petitioner Philippine
Telegraph and Telephone Company (hereafter, PT & T) invokes the alleged
concealment of civil status and defalcation of company funds as grounds to terminate
the services of an employee. That employee, herein private respondent Grace de
Guzman, contrarily argues that what really motivated PT & T to terminate her
services was her having contracted marriage during her employment, which is
prohibited by petitioner in its company policies. She thus claims that she was
discriminated against in gross violation of law, such a proscription by an employer
being outlawed by Article 136 of the Labor Code.
Grace de Guzman was initially hired by petitioner as a reliever, specifically as a
"Supernumerary Project Worker," for a fixed period from November 21, 1990 until
April 20, 1991 vice one C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave. 1Under the
Reliever Agreement which she signed with petitioner company, her employment was
to be immediately terminated upon expiration of the agreed period. Thereafter, from
June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991, and from July 19, 1991 to August 8, 1991, private
respondent's services as reliever were again engaged by petitioner, this time in
replacement of one Erlinda F. Dizon who went on leave during both periods. 2 After
August 8, 1991, and pursuant to their Reliever Agreement, her services were
terminated.
On September 2, 1991, private respondent was once more asked to join petitioner
company as a probationary employee, the probationary period to cover 150 days. In
the job application form that was furnished her to be filled up for the purpose, she
indicated in the portion for civil status therein that she was single although she had
contracted marriage a few months earlier, that is, on May 26, 1991. 3
It now appears that private respondent had made the same representation in the two
successive reliever agreements which she signed on June 10, 1991 and July 8, 1991.
When petitioner supposedly learned about the same later, its branch supervisor in
Baguio City, Delia M. Oficial, sent to private respondent a memorandum dated
January 15, 1992 requiring her to explain the discrepancy. In that memorandum, she
was reminded about the company's policy of not accepting married women for
employment.4
In her reply letter dated January 17, 1992, private respondent stated that she was not
aware of PT&T's policy regarding married women at the time, and that all along she
had not deliberately hidden her true civil status.5Petitioner nonetheless remained
unconvinced by her explanations. Private respondent was dismissed from the
company effective January 29, 1992,6 which she readily contested by initiating a
complaint for illegal dismissal, coupled with a claim for non-payment of cost of
living allowances (COLA), before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the National
Labor Relations Commission in Baguio City.
At the preliminary conference conducted in connection therewith, private respondent
volunteered the information, and this was incorporated in the stipulation of facts
between the parties, that she had failed to remit the amount of P2,380.75 of her
collections. She then executed a promissory note for that amount in favor of
petitioner7. All of these took place in a formal proceeding and with the agreement of
the parties and/or their counsel.
On November 23, 1993, Labor Arbiter Irenarco R. Rimando handed down a decision
declaring that private respondent, who had already gained the status of a regular
employee, was illegally dismissed by petitioner. Her reinstatement, plus payment of
the corresponding back wages and COLA, was correspondingly ordered, the labor
arbiter being of the firmly expressed view that the ground relied upon by petitioner
in dismissing private respondent was clearly insufficient, and that it was apparent
that she had been discriminated against on account of her having contracted marriage
in violation of company rules.
On appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), said public
respondent upheld the labor arbiter and, in its decision dated April 29, 1994, it ruled
that private respondent had indeed been the subject of an unjust and unlawful
discrimination by her employer, PT & T. However, the decision of the labor arbiter
was modified with the qualification that Grace de Guzman deserved to be suspended
for three months in view of the dishonest nature of her acts which should not be
condoned. In all other respects, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the labor arbiter,
including the order for the reinstatement of private respondent in her employment
with PT & T.
The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was rebuffed by
respondent NLRC in its resolution of November 9, 1994, hence this special civil
action assailing the aforestated decisions of the labor arbiter and respondent NLRC,
as well as the denial resolution of the latter.
1. Decreed in the Bible itself is the universal norm that women should be regarded
with love and respect but, through the ages, men have responded to that injunction
with indifference, on the hubristic conceit that women constitute the inferior sex.
Nowhere has that prejudice against womankind been so pervasive as in the field of
labor, especially on the matter of equal employment opportunities and standards. In
the Philippine setting, women have traditionally been considered as falling within the
vulnerable groups or types of workers who must be safeguarded with preventive and
remedial social legislation against discriminatory and exploitative practices in hiring,
training, benefits, promotion and retention.
The Constitution, cognizant of the disparity in rights between men and women in
almost all phases of social and political life, provides a gamut of protective
provisions. To cite a few of the primordial ones, Section 14, Article II 8 on the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies, expressly recognizes the role of women
in nation-building and commands the State to ensure, at all times, the fundamental
equality before the law of women and men. Corollary thereto, Section 3 of Article
XIII9 (the progenitor whereof dates back to both the 1935 and 1973 Constitution)
pointedly requires the State to afford full protection to labor and to promote full
employment and equality of employment opportunities for all, including an
assurance of entitlement to tenurial security of all workers. Similarly, Section 14 of
Article XIII 10 mandates that the State shall protect working women through
provisions for opportunities that would enable them to reach their full potential.
2. Corrective labor and social laws on gender inequality have emerged with more
frequency in the years since the Labor Code was enacted on May 1, 1974 as
Presidential Decree No. 442, largely due to our country's commitment as a signatory
to the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW). 11
Principal among these laws are Republic Act No. 6727 12 which explicitly prohibits
discrimination against women with respect to terms and conditions of employment,
promotion, and training opportunities; Republic Act No. 6955 13which bans the
"mail-order-bride" practice for a fee and the export of female labor to countries that
cannot guarantee protection to the rights of women workers; Republic Act No.
7192 14 also known as the "Women in Development and Nation Building Act,"
which affords women equal opportunities with men to act and to enter into contracts,
and for appointment, admission, training, graduation, and commissioning in all
military or similar schools of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine
National Police; Republic Act No. 7322 15 increasing the maternity benefits granted
to women in the private sector; Republic Act No. 7877 16 which outlaws and
punishes sexual harassment in the workplace and in the education and training
environment; and Republic Act No. 8042, 17or the "Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995," which prescribes as a matter of policy, inter alia, the
deployment of migrant workers, with emphasis on women, only in countries where
their rights are secure. Likewise, it would not be amiss to point out that in the Family
Code, 18 women's rights in the field of civil law have been greatly enhanced and
expanded.
In the Labor Code, provisions governing the rights of women workers are found in
Articles 130 to 138 thereof. Article 130 involves the right against particular kinds of
night work while Article 132 ensures the right of women to be provided with
facilities and standards which the Secretary of Labor may establish to ensure their
health and safety. For purposes of labor and social legislation, a woman working in a
nightclub, cocktail lounge, massage clinic, bar or other similar establishments shall
be considered as an employee under Article 138. Article 135, on the other hand,
recognizes a woman's right against discrimination with respect to terms and
conditions of employment on account simply of sex. Finally, and this brings us to the
issue at hand, Article 136 explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by reason of the
marriage of a female employee.
3. Acknowledged as paramount in the due process scheme is the constitutional
guarantee of protection to labor and security of tenure. Thus, an employer is
required, as a condition sine qua non prior to severance of the employment ties of an
individual under his employ, to convincingly establish, through substantial evidence,
the existence of a valid and just cause in dispensing with the services of such
employee, one's labor being regarded as constitutionally protected property.
On the other hand, it is recognized that regulation of manpower by the company falls
within the so-called management prerogatives, which prescriptions encompass the
matter of hiring, supervision of workers, work assignments, working methods and
assignments, as well as regulations on the transfer of employees, lay-off of workers,
and the discipline, dismissal, and recall of employees. 19 As put in a case, an
employer is free to regulate, according to his discretion and best business judgment,
all aspects of employment, "from hiring to firing," except in cases of unlawful
discrimination or those which may be provided by law. 20
In the case at bar, petitioner's policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified
from work any woman worker who contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and
the right against, discrimination, afforded all women workers by our labor laws and
by no less than the Constitution. Contrary to petitioner's assertion that it dismissed
private respondent from employment on account of her dishonesty, the record
discloses clearly that her ties with the company were dissolved principally because
of the company's policy that married women are not qualified for employment in PT
& T, and not merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty.
That it was so can easily be seen from the memorandum sent to private respondent
by Delia M. Oficial, the branch supervisor of the company, with the reminder, in the
words of the latter, that "you're fully aware that the company is not accepting
married women employee (sic), as it was verbally instructed to you." 21 Again, in the
termination notice sent to her by the same branch supervisor, private respondent was
made to understand that her severance from the service was not only by reason of her
concealment of her married status but, over and on top of that, was her violation of
the company's policy against marriage ("and even told you that married women
employees are not applicable [sic] or accepted in our company.") 22 Parenthetically,
this seems to be the curious reason why it was made to appear in the initiatory
pleadings that petitioner was represented in this case only by its said supervisor and
not by its highest ranking officers who would otherwise be solidarily liable with the
corporation. 23
Verily, private respondent's act of concealing the true nature of her status from PT &
T could not be properly characterized as willful or in bad faith as she was moved to
act the way she did mainly because she wanted to retain a permanent job in a stable
company. In other words, she was practically forced by that very same illegal
company policy into misrepresenting her civil status for fear of being disqualified
from work. While loss of confidence is a just cause for termination of employment, it
should not be simulated. 24 It must rest on an actual breach of duty committed by the
employee and not on the employer's caprices. 25 Furthermore, it should never be used
as a subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal, or unjustified. 26
In the present controversy, petitioner's expostulations that it dismissed private
respondent, not because the latter got married but because she concealed that fact,
does have a hollow ring. Her concealment, so it is claimed, bespeaks dishonesty
hence the consequent loss of confidence in her which justified her dismissal.
Petitioner would asseverate, therefore, that while it has nothing against marriage, it
nonetheless takes umbrage over the concealment of that fact. This improbable
reasoning, with interstitial distinctions, perturbs the Court since private respondent
may well be minded to claim that the imputation of dishonesty should be the other
way around.
Petitioner would have the Court believe that although private respondent defied its
policy against its female employees contracting marriage, what could be an act of
insubordination was inconsequential. What it submits as unforgivable is her
concealment of that marriage yet, at the same time, declaring that marriage as a
trivial matter to which it supposedly has no objection. In other words, PT & T says it
gives its blessings to its female employees contracting marriage, despite the
maternity leaves and other benefits it would consequently respond for and which
obviously it would have wanted to avoid. If that employee confesses such fact of
marriage, there will be no sanction; but if such employee conceals the same instead
of proceeding to the confessional, she will be dismissed. This line of reasoning does
not impress us as reflecting its true management policy or that we are being regaled
with responsible advocacy.
This Court should be spared the ennui of strained reasoning and the tedium of
propositions which confuse through less than candid arguments. Indeed, petitioner
glosses over the fact that it was its unlawful policy against married women, both on
the aspects of qualification and retention, which compelled private respondent to
conceal her supervenient marriage. It was, however, that very policy alone which
was the cause of private respondent's secretive conduct now complained of. It is then
apropos to recall the familiar saying that he who is the cause of the cause is the cause
of the evil caused.
Finally, petitioner's collateral insistence on the admission of private respondent that
she supposedly misappropriated company funds, as an additional ground to dismiss
her from employment, is somewhat insincere and self-serving. Concededly, private
respondent admitted in the course of the proceedings that she failed to remit some of
her collections, but that is an altogether different story. The fact is that she was
dismissed solely because of her concealment of her marital status, and not on the
basis of that supposed defalcation of company funds. That the labor arbiter would
thus consider petitioner's submissions on this supposed dishonesty as a mere
afterthought, just to bolster its case for dismissal, is a perceptive conclusion born of
experience in labor cases. For, there was no showing that private respondent
deliberately misappropriated the amount or whether her failure to remit the same was
through negligence and, if so, whether the negligence was in nature simple or grave.
In fact, it was merely agreed that private respondent execute a promissory note to
refund the same, which she did, and the matter was deemed settled as a peripheral
issue in the labor case.
Private respondent, it must be observed, had gained regular status at the time of her
dismissal. When she was served her walking papers on January 29, 1992, she was
about to complete the probationary period of 150 days as she was contracted as a
probationary employee on September 2, 1991. That her dismissal would be effected
just when her probationary period was winding down clearly raises the plausible
conclusion that it was done in order to prevent her from earning security of
tenure. 27 On the other hand, her earlier stints with the company as reliever were
undoubtedly those of a regular employee, even if the same were for fixed periods, as
she performed activities which were essential or necessary in the usual trade and
business of PT & T. 28 The primary standard of determining regular employment is
the reasonable connection between the activity performed by the employee in
relation to the business or trade of the employer. 29
As an employee who had therefore gained regular status, and as she had been
dismissed without just cause, she is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority
rights and other privileges and to full back wages, inclusive of allowances and other
benefits or their monetary equivalent. 30 However, as she had undeniably committed
an act of dishonesty in concealing her status, albeit under the compulsion of an
unlawful imposition of petitioner, the three-month suspension imposed by
respondent NLRC must be upheld to obviate the impression or inference that such
act should be condoned. It would be unfair to the employer if she were to return to its
fold without any sanction whatsoever for her act which was not totally justified.
Thus, her entitlement to back wages, which shall be computed from the time her
compensation was withheld up to the time of her actual reinstatement, shall be
reduced by deducting therefrom the amount corresponding to her three months
suspension.
4. The government, to repeat, abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature of that
adopted by petitioner PT & T. The Labor Code state, in no uncertain terms, as
follows:
Art. 136. Stipulation against marriage. — It shall be unlawful for
an employer to require as a condition of employment or
continuation of employment that a woman shall not get married, or
to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman
employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually
dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman
employee merely by reason of marriage.
This provision had a studied history for its origin can be traced to Section 8 of
Presidential Decree No. 148, 31 better known as the "Women and
Child Labor Law," which amended paragraph (c), Section 12 of Republic Act No.
679, 32 entitled "An Act to Regulate the Employment of Women and Children, to
Provide Penalties for Violations Thereof, and for Other Purposes." The forerunner to
Republic Act No. 679, on the other hand, was Act No. 3071 which became law on
March 16, 1923 and which regulated the employment of women and children in
shops, factories, industrial, agricultural, and mercantile establishments and other
places of labor in the then Philippine Islands.
It would be worthwhile to reflect upon and adopt here the rationalization in Zialcita,
et al. vs. Philippine Air Lines, 33 a decision that emanated from the Office of the
President. There, a policy of Philippine Air Lines requiring that prospective flight
attendants must be single and that they will be automatically separated from the
service once they marry was declared void, it being violative of the clear mandate in
Article 136 of the Labor Code with regard to discrimination against married women.
Thus:
Of first impression is the incompatibility of the respondent's policy
or regulation with the codal provision of law. Respondent is
resolute in its contention that Article 136 of the Labor Code
applies only to women employed in ordinary occupations and that
the prohibition against marriage of women engaged in
extraordinary occupations, like flight attendants, is fair and
reasonable, considering the pecularities of their chosen profession.
We cannot subscribe to the line of reasoning pursued by
respondent. All along, it knew that the controverted policy has
already met its doom as early as March 13, 1973 when Presidential
Decree No. 148, otherwise known as the Women and Child Labor
Law, was promulgated. But for the timidity of those affected or
their labor unions in challenging the validity of the policy, the
same was able to obtain a momentary reprieve. A close look at
Section 8 of said decree, which amended paragraph (c) of Section
12 of Republic Act No. 679, reveals that it is exactly the same
provision reproduced verbatim in Article 136 of the Labor Code,
which was promulgated on May 1, 1974 to take effect six (6)
months later, or on November 1, 1974.
It cannot be gainsaid that, with the reiteration of the same
provision in the new Labor Code, all policies and acts against it are
deemed illegal and therefore abrogated. True, Article 132 enjoins
the Secretary of Labor to establish standards that will ensure the
safety and health of women employees and in appropriate cases
shall by regulation require employers to determine appropriate
minimum standards for termination in special occupations, such as
those of flight attendants, but that is precisely the factor that
militates against the policy of respondent. The standards have not
yet been established as set forth in the first paragraph, nor has the
Secretary of Labor issued any regulation affecting flight
attendants.
It is logical to presume that, in the absence of said standards or
regulations which are as yet to be established, the policy of
respondent against marriage is patently illegal. This finds support
in Section 9 of the New Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 9. The State shall afford protection to labor, promote full
employment and equality in employment, ensure equal work
opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed, and regulate the
relations between workers and employees. The State shall assure
the rights of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining,
security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work . . . .
Moreover, we cannot agree to the respondent's proposition that
termination from employment of flight attendants on account of
marriage is a fair and reasonable standard designed for their own
health, safety, protection and welfare, as no basis has been laid
therefor. Actually, respondent claims that its concern is not so
much against the continued employment of the flight attendant
merely by reason of marriage as observed by the Secretary of
Labor, but rather on the consequence of marriage-pregnancy.
Respondent discussed at length in the instant appeal the supposed
ill effects of pregnancy on flight attendants in the course of their
employment. We feel that this needs no further discussion as it had
 been adequately explained by the Secretary of Labor in his
decision of May 2, 1976.
In a vain attempt to give meaning to its position, respondent went
as far as invoking the provisions of Articles 52 and 216 of the New
Civil Code on the preservation of marriage as an inviolable social
institution and the family as a basic social institution, respectively,
as bases for its policy of non-marriage. In both instances,
respondent predicates absence of a flight attendant from her home
for long periods of time as contributory to an unhappy married life.
This is pure conjecture not based on actual conditions, considering
that, in this modern world, sophisticated technology has narrowed
the distance from one place to another. Moreover, respondent
overlooked the fact that married flight attendants can program their
lives to adapt to prevailing circumstances and events.
Article 136 is not intended to apply only to women employed in
ordinary occupations, or it should have categorically expressed so.
The sweeping intendment of the law, be it on special or ordinary
occupations, is reflected in the whole text and supported by Article
135 that speaks of non-discrimination on the employment of
women.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals in Gualberto, et al. vs. Marinduque Mining &
Industrial Corporation 34considered as void a policy of the same nature. In said case,
respondent, in dismissing from the service the complainant, invoked a policy of the
firm to consider female employees in the project it was undertaking as separated the
moment they get married due to lack of facilities for married women. Respondent
further claimed that complainant was employed in the project with an oral
understanding that her services would be terminated when she gets married.
Branding the policy of the employer as an example of "discriminatory chauvinism"
tantamount to denying equal employment opportunities to women simply on account
of their sex, the appellate court struck down said employer policy as unlawful in
view of its repugnance to the Civil Code, Presidential Decree No. 148 and the
Constitution.
Under American jurisprudence, job requirements which establish employer
preference or conditions relating to the marital status of an employee are categorized
as a "sex-plus" discrimination where it is imposed on one sex and not on the other.
Further, the same should be evenly applied and must not inflict adverse effects on a
racial or sexual group which is protected by federal job discrimination laws.
Employment rules that forbid or restrict the employment of married women, but do
not apply to married men, have been held to violate Title VII of the United States
Civil Rights Act of 1964, the main federal statute prohibiting job discrimination
against employees and applicants on the basis of, among other things, sex. 35
Further, it is not relevant that the rule is not directed against all women but just
against married women. And, where the employer discriminates against married
women, but not against married men, the variable is sex and the discrimination is
unlawful. 36 Upon the other hand, a requirement that a woman employee must remain
unmarried could be justified as a "bona fide occupational qualification," or BFOQ,
where the particular requirements of the job would justify the same, but not on the
ground of a general principle, such as the desirability of spreading work in the
workplace. A requirement of that nature would be valid provided it reflects an
inherent quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory job performance. Thus, in one
case, a no-marriage rule applicable to both male and female flight attendants, was
regarded as unlawful since the restriction was not related to the job performance of
the flight attendants. 37
5. Petitioner's policy is not only in derogation of the provisions of Article 136 of the
Labor Code on the right of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against
marriage in connection with her employment, but it likewise assaults good morals
and public policy, tending as it does to deprive a woman of the freedom to choose
her status, a privilege that by all accounts inheres in the individual as an intangible
and inalienable right. 38 Hence, while it is true that the parties to a contract may
establish any agreements, terms, and conditions that they may deem convenient, the
same should not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public
policy. 39 Carried to its logical consequences, it may even be said that petitioner's
policy against legitimate marital bonds would encourage illicit or common-law
relations and subvert the sacrament of marriage.
Parenthetically, the Civil Code provisions on the contract of labor state that the
relations between the parties, that is, of capital and labor, are not merely contractual,
impressed as they are with so much public interest that the same should yield to the
common good. 40 It goes on to intone that neither capital nor labor should visit acts
of oppression against the other, nor impair the interest or convenience of the
public. 41 In the final reckoning, the danger of just such a policy against marriage
followed by petitioner PT & T is that it strikes at the very essence, ideals and
purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution and, ultimately, of the family
as the foundation of the nation. 42 That it must be effectively interdicted here in all its
indirect, disguised or dissembled forms as discriminatory conduct derogatory of the
laws of the land is not only in order but imperatively required.
ON THE FOREGOING PREMISES, the petition of Philippine Telegraph and
Telephone Company is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit, with double costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 164774 April 12, 2006
STAR PAPER CORPORATION, JOSEPHINE ONGSITCO & SEBASTIAN
CHUA, Petitioners,
vs.
RONALDO D. SIMBOL, WILFREDA N. COMIA & LORNA E.
ESTRELLA, Respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
We are called to decide an issue of first impression: whether the policy of the
employer banning spouses from working in the same company violates the rights of
the employee under the Constitution and the Labor Code or is a valid exercise of
management prerogative.
At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated August 3, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 73477 reversing the decision of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which affirmed the ruling of the
Labor Arbiter.
Petitioner Star Paper Corporation (the company) is a corporation engaged in trading
– principally of paper products. Josephine Ongsitco is its Manager of the Personnel
and Administration Department while Sebastian Chua is its Managing Director.
The evidence for the petitioners show that respondents Ronaldo D. Simbol (Simbol),
Wilfreda N. Comia (Comia) and Lorna E. Estrella (Estrella) were all regular
employees of the company.1
Simbol was employed by the company on October 27, 1993. He met Alma Dayrit,
also an employee of the company, whom he married on June 27, 1998. Prior to the
marriage, Ongsitco advised the couple that should they decide to get married, one of
them should resign pursuant to a company policy promulgated in 1995, 2 viz.:
1. New applicants will not be allowed to be hired if in case he/she has [a]
relative, up to [the] 3rd degree of relationship, already employed by the
company.
2. In case of two of our employees (both singles [sic], one male and another
female) developed a friendly relationship during the course of their
employment and then decided to get married, one of them should resign to
preserve the policy stated above.3
Simbol resigned on June 20, 1998 pursuant to the company policy. 4
Comia was hired by the company on February 5, 1997. She met Howard Comia, a
co-employee, whom she married on June 1, 2000. Ongsitco likewise reminded them
that pursuant to company policy, one must resign should they decide to get married.
Comia resigned on June 30, 2000.5
Estrella was hired on July 29, 1994. She met Luisito Zuñiga (Zuñiga), also a co-
worker. Petitioners stated that Zuñiga, a married man, got Estrella pregnant. The
company allegedly could have terminated her services due to immorality but she
opted to resign on December 21, 1999.6
The respondents each signed a Release and Confirmation Agreement. They stated
therein that they have no money and property accountabilities in the company and
that they release the latter of any claim or demand of whatever nature. 7
Respondents offer a different version of their dismissal. Simbol and Comia allege
that they did not resign voluntarily; they were compelled to resign in view of an
illegal company policy. As to respondent Estrella, she alleges that she had a
relationship with co-worker Zuñiga who misrepresented himself as a married but
separated man. After he got her pregnant, she discovered that he was not separated.
Thus, she severed her relationship with him to avoid dismissal due to the company
policy. On November 30, 1999, she met an accident and was advised by the doctor at
the Orthopedic Hospital to recuperate for twenty-one (21) days. She returned to work
on December 21, 1999 but she found out that her name was on-hold at the gate. She
was denied entry. She was directed to proceed to the personnel office where one of
the staff handed her a memorandum. The memorandum stated that she was being
dismissed for immoral conduct. She refused to sign the memorandum because she
was on leave for twenty-one (21) days and has not been given a chance to explain.
The management asked her to write an explanation. However, after submission of
the explanation, she was nonetheless dismissed by the company. Due to her urgent
need for money, she later submitted a letter of resignation in exchange for her
thirteenth month pay.8
Respondents later filed a complaint for unfair labor practice, constructive dismissal,
separation pay and attorney’s fees. They averred that the aforementioned company
policy is illegal and contravenes Article 136 of the Labor Code. They also contended
that they were dismissed due to their union membership.
On May 31, 2001, Labor Arbiter Melquiades Sol del Rosario dismissed the
complaint for lack of merit, viz.:
[T]his company policy was decreed pursuant to what the respondent corporation
perceived as management prerogative. This management prerogative is quite broad
and encompassing for it covers hiring, work assignment, working method, time,
place and manner of work, tools to be used, processes to be followed, supervision of
workers, working regulations, transfer of employees, work supervision, lay-off of
workers and the discipline, dismissal and recall of workers. Except as provided for or
limited by special law, an employer is free to regulate, according to his own
discretion and judgment all the aspects of employment.9 (Citations omitted.)
On appeal to the NLRC, the Commission affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter
on January 11, 2002. 10
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied by the NLRC in a
Resolution11 dated August 8, 2002. They appealed to respondent court via Petition
for Certiorari.
In its assailed Decision dated August 3, 2004, the Court of Appeals reversed the
NLRC decision, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the May 31, 2002 (sic)12 Decision of the
National Labor Relations Commission is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a
new one is entered as follows:
(1) Declaring illegal, the petitioners’ dismissal from employment and
ordering private respondents to reinstate petitioners to their former positions
without loss of seniority rights with full backwages from the time of their
dismissal until actual reinstatement; and
(2) Ordering private respondents to pay petitioners attorney’s fees
amounting to 10% of the award and the cost of this suit. 13
On appeal to this Court, petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in
holding that:
1. x x x the subject 1995 policy/regulation is violative of the constitutional
rights towards marriage and the family of employees and of Article 136 of
the Labor Code; and
2. x x x respondents’ resignations were far from voluntary. 14
We affirm.
The 1987 Constitution15 states our policy towards the protection of labor under the
following provisions, viz.:
Article II, Section 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It
shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.
xxx
Article XIII, Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas,
organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of
employment opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining
and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in
accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions
of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making
processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.
The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and
employers, recognizing the right of labor to its just share in the fruits of production
and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns on investments, and to expansion
and growth.
The Civil Code likewise protects labor with the following provisions:
Art. 1700. The relation between capital and labor are not merely contractual. They
are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts must yield to the common
good. Therefore, such contracts are subject to the special laws on labor unions,
collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts, closed shop, wages, working conditions,
hours of labor and similar subjects.
Art. 1702. In case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be
construed in favor of the safety and decent living for the laborer.
The Labor Code is the most comprehensive piece of legislation protecting labor. The
case at bar involves Article 136 of the Labor Code which provides:
Art. 136. It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of
employment or continuation of employment that a woman employee shall not get
married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married a woman
employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge,
discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of her
marriage.
Respondents submit that their dismissal violates the above provision. Petitioners
allege that its policy "may appear to be contrary to Article 136 of the Labor Code"
but it assumes a new meaning if read together with the first paragraph of the rule.
The rule does not require the woman employee to resign. The employee spouses
have the right to choose who between them should resign. Further, they are free to
marry persons other than co-employees. Hence, it is not the marital status of the
employee, per se, that is being discriminated. It is only intended to carry out its no-
employment-for-relatives-within-the-third-degree-policy which is within the ambit
of the prerogatives of management.16
It is true that the policy of petitioners prohibiting close relatives from working in the
same company takes the nature of an anti-nepotism employment policy. Companies
adopt these policies to prevent the hiring of unqualified persons based on their status
as a relative, rather than upon their ability.17 These policies focus upon the potential
employment problems arising from the perception of favoritism exhibited towards
relatives.
With more women entering the workforce, employers are also enacting employment
policies specifically prohibiting spouses from working for the same company. We
note that two types of employment policies involve spouses: policies banning only
spouses from working in the same company (no-spouse employment policies), and
those banning all immediate family members, including spouses, from working in
the same company (anti-nepotism employment policies).18
Unlike in our jurisdiction where there is no express prohibition on marital
discrimination,19 there are twenty state statutes20 in the United States prohibiting
marital discrimination. Some state courts21 have been confronted with the issue of
whether no-spouse policies violate their laws prohibiting both marital status and sex
discrimination.
In challenging the anti-nepotism employment policies in the United States,
complainants utilize two theories of employment discrimination:
the disparate treatment and the disparate impact. Under the disparate treatment
analysis, the plaintiff must prove that an employment policy is discriminatory on its
face. No-spouse employment policies requiring an employee of a particular sex to
either quit, transfer, or be fired are facially discriminatory. For example, an
employment policy prohibiting the employer from hiring wives of male employees,
but not husbands of female employees, is discriminatory on its face. 22
On the other hand, to establish disparate impact, the complainants must prove that a
facially neutral policy has a disproportionate effect on a particular class. For
example, although most employment policies do not expressly indicate which spouse
will be required to transfer or leave the company, the policy often disproportionately
affects one sex.23
The state courts’ rulings on the issue depend on their interpretation of the scope of
marital status discrimination within the meaning of their respective civil rights acts.
Though they agree that the term "marital status" encompasses discrimination based
on a person's status as either married, single, divorced, or widowed, they are divided
on whether the term has a broader meaning. Thus, their decisions vary.24
The courts narrowly25 interpreting marital status to refer only to a person's status as
married, single, divorced, or widowed reason that if the legislature intended a
broader definition it would have either chosen different language or specified its
intent. They hold that the relevant inquiry is if one is married rather than to whom
one is married. They construe marital status discrimination to include only whether a
person is single, married, divorced, or widowed and not the "identity, occupation,
and place of employment of one's spouse." These courts have upheld the questioned
policies and ruled that they did not violate the marital status discrimination provision
of their respective state statutes.
The courts that have broadly26 construed the term "marital status" rule that it
encompassed the identity, occupation and employment of one's spouse. They strike
down the no-spouse employment policies based on the broad legislative intent of the
state statute. They reason that the no-spouse employment policy violate the marital
status provision because it arbitrarily discriminates against all spouses of present
employees without regard to the actual effect on the individual's qualifications or
work performance.27 These courts also find the no-spouse employment policy invalid
for failure of the employer to present any evidence of business necessity other than
the general perception that spouses in the same workplace might adversely affect the
business.28 They hold that the absence of such a bona fide occupational
qualification29 invalidates a rule denying employment to one spouse due to the
current employment of the other spouse in the same office. 30 Thus, they rule that
unless the employer can prove that the reasonable demands of the business require a
distinction based on marital status and there is no better available or acceptable
policy which would better accomplish the business purpose, an employer may not
discriminate against an employee based on the identity of the employee’s
spouse.31 This is known as the bona fide occupational qualification exception.
We note that since the finding of a bona fide occupational qualification justifies an
employer’s no-spouse rule, the exception is interpreted strictly and narrowly by these
state courts. There must be a compelling business necessity for which no alternative
exists other than the discriminatory practice.32 To justify a bona fide occupational
qualification, the employer must prove two factors: (1) that the employment
qualification is reasonably related to the essential operation of the job involved; and,
(2) that there is a factual basis for believing that all or substantially all persons
meeting the qualification would be unable to properly perform the duties of the job. 33
The concept of a bona fide occupational qualification is not foreign in our
jurisdiction. We employ the standard of reasonableness of the company policy
which is parallel to the bona fide occupational qualification requirement. In the
recent case of Duncan Association of Detailman-PTGWO and Pedro Tecson v.
Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc.,34 we passed on the validity of the policy of a
pharmaceutical company prohibiting its employees from marrying employees of any
competitor company. We held that Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets,
manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies and other confidential programs and
information from competitors. We considered the prohibition against personal or
marital relationships with employees of competitor companies upon Glaxo’s
employees reasonable under the circumstances because relationships of that nature
might compromise the interests of Glaxo. In laying down the assailed company
policy, we recognized that Glaxo only aims to protect its interests against the
possibility that a competitor company will gain access to its secrets and procedures. 35
The requirement that a company policy must be reasonable under the circumstances
to qualify as a valid exercise of management prerogative was also at issue in the
1997 case of Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company v. NLRC.36 In said
case, the employee was dismissed in violation of petitioner’s policy of disqualifying
from work any woman worker who contracts marriage. We held that the company
policy violates the right against discrimination afforded all women workers under
Article 136 of the Labor Code, but established a permissible exception, viz.:
[A] requirement that a woman employee must remain unmarried could be justified as
a "bona fide occupational qualification," or BFOQ, where the particular
requirements of the job would justify the same, but not on the ground of a general
principle, such as the desirability of spreading work in the workplace. A requirement
of that nature would be valid provided it reflects an inherent quality reasonably
necessary for satisfactory job performance.37(Emphases supplied.)
The cases of Duncan and PT&T instruct us that the requirement of reasonableness
must be clearly established to uphold the questioned employment policy. The
employer has the burden to prove the existence of a reasonable business necessity.
The burden was successfully discharged in Duncan but not in PT&T.
We do not find a reasonable business necessity in the case at bar.
Petitioners’ sole contention that "the company did not just want to have two (2) or
more of its employees related between the third degree by affinity and/or
consanguinity"38 is lame. That the second paragraph was meant to give teeth to the
first paragraph of the questioned rule39 is evidently not the valid reasonable business
necessity required by the law.
It is significant to note that in the case at bar, respondents were hired after they were
found fit for the job, but were asked to resign when they married a co-employee.
Petitioners failed to show how the marriage of Simbol, then a Sheeting Machine
Operator, to Alma Dayrit, then an employee of the Repacking Section, could be
detrimental to its business operations. Neither did petitioners explain how this
detriment will happen in the case of Wilfreda Comia, then a Production Helper in the
Selecting Department, who married Howard Comia, then a helper in the cutter-
machine. The policy is premised on the mere fear that employees married to each
other will be less efficient. If we uphold the questioned rule without valid
justification, the employer can create policies based on an unproven presumption of a
perceived danger at the expense of an employee’s right to security of tenure.
Petitioners contend that their policy will apply only when one employee marries a
co-employee, but they are free to marry persons other than co-employees. The
questioned policy may not facially violate Article 136 of the Labor Code but it
creates a disproportionate effect and under the disparate impact theory, the only way
it could pass judicial scrutiny is a showing that it is reasonable despite the
discriminatory, albeit disproportionate, effect. The failure of petitioners to prove a
legitimate business concern in imposing the questioned policy cannot prejudice the
employee’s right to be free from arbitrary discrimination based upon stereotypes of
married persons working together in one company.40
Lastly, the absence of a statute expressly prohibiting marital discrimination in our
jurisdiction cannot benefit the petitioners. The protection given to labor in our
jurisdiction is vast and extensive that we cannot prudently draw inferences from the
legislature’s silence41 that married persons are not protected under our Constitution
and declare valid a policy based on a prejudice or stereotype. Thus, for failure of
petitioners to present undisputed proof of a reasonable business necessity, we rule
that the questioned policy is an invalid exercise of management prerogative.
Corollarily, the issue as to whether respondents Simbol and Comia resigned
voluntarily has become moot and academic.
As to respondent Estrella, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC based their ruling on the
singular fact that her resignation letter was written in her own handwriting. Both
ruled that her resignation was voluntary and thus valid. The respondent court failed
to categorically rule whether Estrella voluntarily resigned but ordered that she be
reinstated along with Simbol and Comia.
Estrella claims that she was pressured to submit a resignation letter because she was
in dire need of money. We examined the records of the case and find Estrella’s
contention to be more in accord with the evidence. While findings of fact by
administrative tribunals like the NLRC are generally given not only respect but, at
times, finality, this rule admits of exceptions,42 as in the case at bar.
Estrella avers that she went back to work on December 21, 1999 but was dismissed
due to her alleged immoral conduct. At first, she did not want to sign the termination
papers but she was forced to tender her resignation letter in exchange for her
thirteenth month pay.
The contention of petitioners that Estrella was pressured to resign because she got
impregnated by a married man and she could not stand being looked upon or talked
about as immoral43 is incredulous. If she really wanted to avoid embarrassment and
humiliation, she would not have gone back to work at all. Nor would she have filed a
suit for illegal dismissal and pleaded for reinstatement. We have held that in
voluntary resignation, the employee is compelled by personal reason(s) to dissociate
himself from employment. It is done with the intention of relinquishing an office,
accompanied by the act of abandonment. 44 Thus, it is illogical for Estrella to resign
and then file a complaint for illegal dismissal. Given the lack of sufficient evidence
on the part of petitioners that the resignation was voluntary, Estrella’s dismissal is
declared illegal.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.

73477 dated August 3, 2004 is AFFIRMED.1avvphil.net

SO ORDERED.