Eng. Management 5 - Safety PDF

HERVE Engineering Training
BARON
Welcome to this presentation.
It is part of a suite of Engineering training modules.
It shows the activities and deliverables of the Design Safety

& Environment (HSE) discipline.
Comments are most welcome (herve.baron@gmail.com),

which I will incorporate for the benefit of all.
Please download this file so that you can see my trainer’s

notes in the top left corner – latest Acrobat Pro feature.
© 2015 – Hervé Baron

Hervé
HERVE Engineering disciplines: activities and deliverables
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 PROCESS
 PLANT LAYOUT
 EQUIPMENT
 SAFETY & ENVIRONMENT
 CIVIL
 PIPING
 PIPELINE

 INSTRUMENTATION
 ELECTRICAL
HERVE Design Safety
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The “Design Safety” discipline is to safeguard against the PLANT

hazards.
Where does PLANT hazard come from? Loss of containment
Which are the two ways Design Safety can safeguard against loss of
containment?
Reduce possibility
Minimize effect
Give some examples of each

HERVE Design Safety
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hazards.

HERVE Design Safety
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hazards.
containment?

HERVE Design Safety
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hazards.
containment?
 Reduce possibility
 Minimize effect

HERVE Design Safety
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hazards.
containment?
 Reduce likelihood
 Minimize effect
How?

HERVE Design Safety
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hazards.
containment?
• QA and QC during design and construction
• Detection of plant upsets
• Overpressure protection
• Pipes to be protected against mechanical failure as a result of vibration
• Correct fail-safe position of control elements

• Pipes to be sized to avoid hammering and surge
• Minimize number of flanges
• Explosion protection of Electrical Equipment and Instruments
• Specify adequate Safety Integrity Level for Safety Automated Functions
HERVE Design Safety
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hazards.
containment?
 Minimize effect
How?

HERVE Design Safety
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hazards.
containment?
 Minimize effect
• PLANT layout: isolation of ignition/leak sources, spacing between units
and equipment, bounding of liquid storage
• Adequate personnel escape ways
• Fire protection and fighting

• Fire and Gas Detection and alarm
• ESD system to isolate and depressurize
HERVE Design Safety
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hazards.
containment?
 Minimize effect
The different areas of involvement of Design Safety are defined in the
Design Safety Philosophy, also called “Safety Concept”.

HERVE Design Safety
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hazards.
containment?
 Minimize effect
The different areas of involvement of Design Safety are defined in the
Design Safety Philosophy, also called “Safety Concept”.
This presentation of the discipline will follow the table of content of this

document
HERVE Design Safety Philosophy / Safety Concept
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 HAZARD Identification
 Risk assessment
 PLANT Layout
 Process Safety Systems
 Fire protection & Fire fighting
 Fire & Gas Detection
 Hazardous area classification
 Escape, Evacuation

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 Risk assessment
 PLANT Layout

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• General Hazards
• Process related hazards

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• General Hazards
How are PLANT general
• Process related hazards hazards identified?

HERVE HAZard IDentification (HAZID)
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 A structured, key word based Qualitative risk identification and

analysis methodology
 Risk (to personnel safety, environment, assets) resulting from
accident – normal operation excluded
 Using check-lists enables a systematic screening.
 Guided team brainstorming activity that benefits from the broad
experience of a multidisciplinary team.
 The result of the review is documented in a table where potential
hazards, corresponding causes, consequences and associated
safeguards are reported.
When necessary actions are formulated and followed-up


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GUIDEWORDS

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Output

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• General Hazards
• Process related hazards

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• General Hazards
• Process related hazards How are process hazards
identified?

HERVE Hazard and Operability Review (HAZOP)
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What is a HAZOP?

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What is a HAZOP?
A review of the possible deviations of the process from normal

conditions

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What is a HAZOP?

conditions
What are these possible deviations?

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What is a HAZOP?

conditions
High/Low Pressure, High/Low Temperature, High/Low Flow, change

in composition

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What is a HAZOP?

conditions

in composition
How does a HAZOP review proceed?

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What is a HAZOP?
A review of the possible process deviations from normal conditions

in composition
The plant is split in nodes. For each node, each deviation is

reviewed.

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What is a HAZOP?
A review of the possible process deviations from normal conditions

in composition
The plant is split in nodes. For each node, each deviation is

reviewed.

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What type of failure are reviewed

in HAZOP?

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What type of failure are reviewed

in HAZOP?
• Failure of process controls
• Failure of equipment
• Missoperation by operator

HERVE HAZOP action and response sheet
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HERVE Action items follow-up
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 Risk assessment
 PLANT Layout

HERVE Safety of Layout
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Where shall we locate the air-coolers electrical sub-station?
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 Risk assessment
 PLANT Layout

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 Risk assessment
 PLANT Layout
There are 2 types of Fire protection:
 Fire protection & Fire fighting Active and Passive.
Give an example of each…

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 Risk assessment
 PLANT Layout
There are 2 types of Fire protection:
 Fire protection & Fire fighting Active and Passive.
Give an example of each…

HERVE Fire Fighting
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What type of fire fighting equipment uses water?
HERVE Fire Water demand calculation
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HERVE Spray (deluge) system
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What is the purpose of fixed water

spray systems?

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What is the purpose of fixed water

spray systems?
Which equipment are concerned?

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Equipment to be protected by water spray system are not defined in codes but project
wise, according to Client requirements if they exist or as per the Engineer’s choice, in the
Job Specification for Design Active Fire Protection.
Off-shore all equipment are deluged to cool down the equipment to limit the risk of fire
escalation as equipment are very close to each other.
On-shore fire fighting is much easier (access) and more space is provided between
equipment. Hence a limited number of equipment are deluged. For instance:
For fire intensity control: high hazard equipment that contain a severe fuel hazard with a
high heat release rate thus requiring an immediate application of water, e.g.,
• All vessels, columns, heat exchangers holding more than 5 m3 LPG type hydrocarbon –
except equipment located at elevation of more than 8 meters.
• Pumps handling LPG
• HC close to their auto-ignition temperature

• Compressors handling flammable gases – deluged area shall extend to auxiliaries
Exposure protection: e.g. “Equipment containing hydrocarbons which cannot be reached

by firewater monitors.”
HERVE Fire Fighting
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How do we calculate the Plant Fire water equirements?
HERVE Fire Fighting / Fire Zones
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HERVE Fire Water demand calculation
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HERVE Fire Water facilities
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HERVE Fire Water distribution
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HERVE Fire Water P&IDs
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HERVE Deluge system arrangements
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HERVE Fire protection and Personnel protection drawing
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HERVE Passive fire protection
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How are Fire envelopes defined?
•A list of equipment creating a fire risk zone is drawn, generally,

equipment containing more than 5m3 of liquid HC (as per codes, in,
particular API 2218).
•This « list of source of hazard for PFP “ is not necessarily a

deliverable, but an internal document
•Fire scenario envelopes around Equipment creating a Fire Hazard are

drawn on a Plot Plan. Dimensions of envelopes are specified in the
code (API 2218).

•Equipment inside the enveloppe are screened for requirement of
Fire Proofing (criteria is that of code API RP 2218 ): flammable
inventory or domino effect.
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 Risk assessment
 PLANT Layout

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 Risk assessment
 PLANT Layout
Where shall Emergency ShutDown Valves be
 Fire & Gas Detection provided?


HERVE Emergency Shutdown System (ESD)
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 Risk assessment
 PLANT Layout

HERVE Fire & Gas detection layouts
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HERVE Fire & Gas Cause & Effects matrix
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 Risk assessment
 PLANT Layout

HERVE Hazardous area classification drawings
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HERVE Hazardous area classification
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 The referential must be defined, e.g.,
API RP 505 Recommended Practices for Classification of Locations

for Electrical Installations at Petroleum Facilities classified as Class I,
Zone 0, Zone 1 and Zone 2 (1997 Edition).
 Zone 0 location is a location at which ignitible concentration of

flammable gases or vapours are present continuously or for long
periods of time.
 Zone 1 location is a location at which ignitible concentration of

flammable gases or vapours are likely to exist under normal
operating conditions,
Zone 2 location is a location at which ignitible concentrations of


flammable gases or vapours are not likely to occur in normal
operation and if they do occur will exist only for a short period
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The Explosion protection of Electrical and Instrumentation equipment located in

Hazardous area is defined by means of:
Zone 0/1/2 - Gas Group - Temperature Class

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The Explosion protection of Electrical and Instrumentation equipment located in

Hazardous area is defined by means of:
Zone 1/2/3 - Gas Group - Temperature Class

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extent of hazardous area (API RP 505)

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Why is the inside of the

storage tank zone 1 for
the tank on the left and
zone 0 for the tank on
the right?

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What is the use of the Hazardous area classification drawing?

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 Quantitiative Risk Assessment (QRA)
 PLANT Layout

HERVE Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA)
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Step 0:
Failure cases definition
Objective: Define the scenarios of likely loss of containment
Content: Identify flammable, toxic fluids, isolatable sections

Identify possible consequence: fire, explosion, toxic etc.
Identify ignition source

Input: PFD, HMB, Plot Plan
HAZID Report
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Step 0:
Failure Case Definition
Case : Gas leak from random piping

component rupture
Cause: installation error, corrosion,

material defect…
Possible consequence: Dispersion without

ignition / jet fire / flash fire / explosion

Section considered: Compressor building
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Step 1:
Identification and characterisation of
initiating events
Σ risk components
*failure rate (from
statistics)
Gas leak inside compressor buidling due to component rupture Hole size
(% of component section)
5% 20% Full

Frequency (event/year) 1,11E-01 5,06E-04 6,83E-05
Outflow rate (kg/s) 5,7 90,8 2270,0

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Step 2: Event tree analysis

Release Frequency Immediate ESD & Fire Delayed Explosion/ Consequence Event Frequency (ev/y)
ignition Fighting Ignition Flash-fire
0,998 Jet fire ESD & FF 7,779E-03

0,070
0,002 Jet fire no ESD & FF 1,520E-05
1,11E-01
Release/yr
0,949 Dispersion 9,827E-02
0,930
0,120 Explosion 1,774E-05
0,028
0,051 0,880 Flash fire 1,301E-04
Yes Frequency (event/year)

Jet fire ESD & FF 7,779E-03
Jet fire no ESD & FF 1,520E-05
Explosion 1,774E-05

No Flash Fire 1,301E-04
Dispersion 1,034E-01
B04a/b/c/d 5%
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Probability of immediate ignition Gas detectors are provided inside the building, that
for 1-50 kg/s release rate is 7% 0,998 activate isolation and depressurization.
Jet fire ESD It& is
FFassumed 7,779E-03
(from statistical data)
0,070 that they operate 95% of the time.
Probability of explosion vs flash fire (12%) depends
1,11E-01
Release/yr
on mass of gas and degree of confinement
0,930
0,051
0,028
0,120
0,880
Explosion
Flash fire
?
1,774E-05
1,301E-04

Probability of delayed ignition (2.8%)Jet
takes into account
fire no ESD & FF 1,520E-05
equipment explosion protection (Ex) Explosion 1,774E-05

B04a/b/c/d 5%
What is the frequency of an explosion?

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Possible consequences of loss of containment

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0,998 Jet fire ESD & FF 7,779E-03

0,070
1,11E-01
Release/yr
0,930
0,120 Explosion 1,774E-05
0,028
0,051 0,880 Flash fire 1,301E-04

Jet fire no ESD & FF 1,520E-05
Explosion 1,774E-05

B04a/b/c/d 5%
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Step 3:
Consequence evalutation
Overpresssure (bar) 0.2 0.1 0.01
Distance (m) 96 167 1270
CONSEQUENCE CLASS QUANTITATIVE CRITERIA EFFECTS
MINOR ≤0.1 bar locally (within 10m) No effect, no damage

SIGNIFICANT ≤0.1 bar locally (within 50m) Limited damage to plant and
operators
SEVERE > 0.1 bar within plant Damage to plant and operators
MAJOR > 0.1 bar on populated areas Damage to plant, operators & public
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Final step:
classification of risk
Unacceptable risk area– Design change necessary
As Low As Reasonably Practicable – Plant Management measures
Acceptable risk area

?

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Final step:
Unacceptable risk area– Design change necessary
As Low As Reasonably Practicable – Plant Management measures
Acceptable risk area
1.0E-02
Probability  1.0E-03
1.0E-04
Unlikely

1.0E-05
Rare
1.0E-06 Minor Significant Severe Major
Severity 
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Final step:

MINOR ≤0.1 bar locally (within No effect, no damage

10m)
SIGNIFICANT ≤0.1 bar locally (within Limited damage to plant and
50m) operators
MAJOR > 0.1 bar on populated Damage to plant, operators &
areas public
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Final step:


10m)
50m) operators
areas public
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Final step:


10m)
50m) operators
areas public
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Outcome?


10m)
50m) operators
areas public
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QRA results:
Thermal radiation map

(>37.5 kW/m2)

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QRA outcome: Risk Reduction Measures
At FEED stage
Explosion and fire radiation curves:
 Distance between units, e.g., distance between process units and administration buildings,
relocation of CCR etc.
 Explosion resistance and fire rating of equipment, manned buildings, structures

(design for 10-4 per year likelihood: API RP 752 ; ISO19901-3 ; NORSOK Z-013, …)
At Detail Design Stage
 Addition of gas detectors

 Addition of blast/fire protection wall, e.g., between process and utility modules, for

protection of risers ESDV valves
 Relocation of muster point
 Relocation of adjacent human occupancy areas (maintenance yard, highway rest area etc.)
 Recommendation for operations, e.g., increased inspection
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• Failure cases identification and definition
• Consequence Analysis
• Frequency Analysis
• QRA Outcome

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• QRA Outcome Another example: toxic gas release

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Consequence analysis

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Consequence analysis

What conclusion would you draw?
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• QRA Outcome Another example: effect of congestion

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VCE: a flammable gas or a flashing liquid released to atmosphere, if not immediately ignited,
disperses to atmosphere creating a cloud which can develop in a Vapour Cloud Explosion
(VCE), if the burning velocity of the cloud is increased due to turbulence generated by
obstacles present in the cloud. Effects (damages) are associated to levels of overpressure
generated by pressure wave.
Explosion strength depends on level of congestion.
Congested areas are identified based on arrangement of equipment/group of equipment,

platforms, and structures within each Process Unit.
Air coolers / pipe-racks / compressor shelters are considered as roofs underneath which gas

cloud can accumulate.
Free areas between group of equipment within Process Unit reduce the size of the congested
areas.
Flammable volume/mass is estimated for each unitary congested area.
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Identification of congested areas

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HERVE COMPANY Societal Risk Criteria
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1.0E-2
Intolerable above line
Acceptable below line
1.0E-3
Frequency (/yr)
1.0E-4
1.0E-5
ALARP
Region
1.0E-6
1.0E-7

1.0E-8
1 10 100 1000
Number of Fatalities (N or more)
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 Risk assessment
 PLANT Layout

HERVE Escape, evacuation
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HERVE Escape, evacuation
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HERVE Engineering disciplines: activities and deliverables
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 PROCESS
 PLANT LAYOUT
 EQUIPMENT
 SAFETY & ENVIRONMENT
 CIVIL
 PIPING
 PIPELINE

 INSTRUMENTATION
 ELECTRICAL
HERVE Health and Environment Requirements
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Job Specification for Design
 Environmental and health aspects
 Regulatory requirements
 Air emissions
 Liquid effluents
 Soil & groundwater contamination
 Wastes
 Pollution prevention
Noise


HERVE Health and Environment Requirements
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Job Specification for Design
 Environmental and health aspects
 Regulatory requirements
 Air emissions
 Liquid effluents
 Soil & groundawter contamination
 Wastes
 Pollution prevention
Noise


HERVE ENVID
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Environment Aspects Register

HERVE Environment
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Emissions regulatory limits

HERVE Environmental Impact Assessment
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HERVE Noise study
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dB(A)

HERVE The Oil & Gas Engineering Guide
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Get all this plus the same on other disciplines and the overall picture... in
the newly published:

HERVE The Oil & Gas Engineering Guide - 2nd edition
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Table of Contents

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Table of Contents
This suite of training modules

covered the discipline
chapters of the book...

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Table of Contents
The Guide contains much more:
The overall picture, interfaces,

methods & tools, etc.

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Table of Contents

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Table of Contents

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Table of Contents

HERVE The Oil & Gas Engineering Guide
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Order direct from the publisher:
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HERVE Engineering Training

Welcome to this presentation.

It is part of a suite of Engineering training modules.

It shows the activities and deliverables of the Design Safety

Comments are most welcome (herve.baron@gmail.com),

Please download this file so that you can see my trainer’s

© 2015 – Hervé Baron

 SAFETY & ENVIRONMENT

© 2015 – Hervé Baron

The “Design Safety” discipline is to safeguard against the PLANT

© 2015 – Hervé Baron

The “Design Safety” discipline is to safeguard against the PLANT

© 2015 – Hervé Baron

The “Design Safety” discipline is to safeguard against the PLANT

© 2015 – Hervé Baron

The “Design Safety” discipline is to safeguard against the PLANT

© 2015 – Hervé Baron

The “Design Safety” discipline is to safeguard against the PLANT

© 2015 – Hervé Baron

The “Design Safety” discipline is to safeguard against the PLANT

© 2015 – Hervé Baron

The “Design Safety” discipline is to safeguard against the PLANT

© 2015 – Hervé Baron

The “Design Safety” discipline is to safeguard against the PLANT

© 2015 – Hervé Baron

The “Design Safety” discipline is to safeguard against the PLANT

© 2015 – Hervé Baron

The “Design Safety” discipline is to safeguard against the PLANT

© 2015 – Hervé Baron

© 2015 – Hervé Baron

© 2015 – Hervé Baron

© 2015 – Hervé Baron

© 2015 – Hervé Baron

 A structured, key word based Qualitative risk identification and

© 2015 – Hervé Baron

© 2015 – Hervé Baron

© 2015 – Hervé Baron

© 2015 – Hervé Baron

© 2015 – Hervé Baron

© 2015 – Hervé Baron

© 2015 – Hervé Baron

A review of the possible deviations of the process from normal

© 2015 – Hervé Baron

A review of the possible deviations of the process from normal

What are these possible deviations?

© 2015 – Hervé Baron

A review of the possible deviations of the process from normal

What are these possible deviations?

High/Low Pressure, High/Low Temperature, High/Low Flow, change

© 2015 – Hervé Baron

A review of the possible deviations of the process from normal

What are these possible deviations?

High/Low Pressure, High/Low Temperature, High/Low Flow, change

How does a HAZOP review proceed?

© 2015 – Hervé Baron

A review of the possible process deviations from normal conditions

What are these possible deviations?

High/Low Pressure, High/Low Temperature, High/Low Flow, change

How does a HAZOP review proceed?

The plant is split in nodes. For each node, each deviation is

© 2015 – Hervé Baron

A review of the possible process deviations from normal conditions

What are these possible deviations?