Article

Conflict Management and Peace Science

2018, Vol. 35(2) 193–203
Democratic peace versus Ó The Author(s) 2017
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DOI: 10.1177/0738894216683648
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James Lee Ray

Department of Political Science, Vanderbilt University, USA

Allan Dafoe
Department of Political Science, Yale University, USA

Abstract
If contractualism causes both democracy and peace, the correlation between democracy and
peace is spurious. But the definition of contractualism is sufficiently unclear as to create doubts
that it has such an impact. In addition, if democracy has an impact on contractualism, then, even
with an otherwise perfectly specified model, controlling for contractualism will bias estimates of
the effect of democracy on peace. International trade involves contracting behavior between
strangers in different states. In addition, unlike contracting behavior within states, trade involves
interactions in the same arena where interstate conflict needs to be deterred. Contractualist
states have existed in significant numbers only recently. This limits contractualism’s ability to com-
pete with democracy as a predictor of peace. Mousseau’s previous findings have been extraordi-
narily fragile. Finally, observational data should be complemented by multiple streams of evidence.
Some experimental data support democratic peace theory; analogous experiments would almost
certainly not provide evidence to support contractualism.

Keywords
Conflict, contractualism, democratic peace theory, economic norms, war

Michael Mousseau (e.g. 2000, 2009) has developed a theory regarding the impact of domestic
economic processes on interstate relationships. The theory claims that states with contract-
intensive economies will be less likely to engage in conflict with each other. Moreover,
Mousseau (2018) argues that contract-intensive economic processes account for both democ-
racy and interstate peace, thus rendering the relationship between joint democracy and peace
spurious.
This response continues a debate between Mousseau (2013), on the one hand, and Dafoe,
Oneal and Russett (or DOR) (Dafoe et al., 2013), as well as Ray (2013) regarding contract

Corresponding author:
James Lee Ray, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN 37203, USA.
Email: james.l.ray@vanderbilt.edu
194 Conflict Management and Peace Science 35(2)

intensity, and the implications of Mousseau’s theory (and empirical analyses) for democratic
peace theory. It responds primarily to key claims and criticisms offered in Mousseau (2018).

What is ‘‘contract intensity’’?

For Mousseau (2013: 187), an economy becomes contract intensive when most of the popu-
lation move beyond reliance on personal relationships to satisfy their economic needs.
Economies that have not reached this level of development are clientelist. In clientelist
economies, individuals rely on group leaders who evoke support by providing economic and
physical security (Mousseau, 2009: 58).
Originally, Mousseau identified contract-intensive economies by focusing on the median
value of life insurance contracts among states. Mousseau (2012a, b) reiterates this definition
of contract intensity, explaining in the latter that ‘‘this cutoff point was chosen because life
insurance data, when logged, form a strong bimodal distribution separated almost perfectly
at the median’’ (p. 476).
However, now Mousseau (2018: 178) has adopted a ‘‘more theoretically derived and rig-
orous binary measure for Contractualist Economy.’’ One possible reason for Mousseau to
move in this direction is that if states with above the median level of life insurance contracts
per capita are defined as contract intensive, then probably Germany and Austria–Hungary
qualified before the First World War (and then proceeded to fight a massive war against
other contract-intensive states such as Great Britain and the United States). In his most
recent definition of contractualism, Mousseau (2018) asserts that nations tend to increase
their per capita life insurance contracts rapidly between US$25 and US$165, and then those
growth rates level off. He defines contractualist economies as those with average life insur-
ance contracts worth more than US$165 per person.
That threshold is arbitrary. The median level of insurance contracts is also arbitrary of
course, but at least it is more akin to a prominent solution than US$165. Although
Mousseau claims that this measure is more ‘‘theoretically derived and rigorous,’’ in fact his
description of the process by which he arrived at the threshold makes it clear that it was
almost entirely inductive. Furthermore, he adds characteristics and features to this definition
of contractualism in an equally inductive fashion. He stipulates that states qualify as con-
tract intensive only if they also do not have a substantial informal sector of the economy,
operationally defined as having higher energy consumption than would be predicted from
GDP data. Missing data are assumed to be indicative of a clientelist economy only if the
proportion of GDP in investment times per capita real GDP (which reduces to investment
per capita) is below the median in the system, after 1959. In addition, Mousseau explains
that contractualist states must have a flow of immigrants that exceeds the countervailing
stream of emigrants. Finally, he relies on a set of ‘‘dummies to capture regional economic
traditions’’ (Mousseau, 2018: 190).
So what is meant by contractualism or contract intensity has been a moving target.1
However, the more fundamental problem with Mousseau’s most recent definition of con-
tract intensity stems from the emphasis in his theory that states (or more precisely, their lead-
ers, interest groups and even general populations) will consistently perceive and recognize
each other as contract intensive. Even a concept based on the median level of life insurance
contracts in a state is sufficiently subtle and esoteric as to make it hard to believe that it ani-
mates interstate interactions in the stunning fashion claimed by Mousseau’s theory. But the
Ray and Dafoe 195

operationalization of a concept based on an arbitrary level of life insurance contracts, joined

with the absence of an informal sector in the economy as indicated by deviations from a
regression line generated by a statistical analysis of the relationship between national GDPs
and electricity consumption, plus missing data taken as indicative of a clientelist economy
(after 1959), as well as the balance of immigration and emigration flows, and an allowance
for differences among economic traditions in different geographic regions, is so complex as
to detract from its face validity. Mousseau’s argument that ‘‘contract intensity’’ ostensibly
captured by such an operationalization impacts interstate interactions around the globe in
such fundamental ways necessarily implies that policymakers as well as interest groups and
the general public will consistently and accurately perceive varying degrees of contract inten-
sity. But it seems unlikely that policymakers as well as interest groups and the general public
would even become aware of contract intensity so defined, much less respond to it as predic-
tably and dramatically as contractualism suggests.

An endogeneity problem?
An endogeneity issue lies at the heart of Mousseau’s theory. Mousseau (2018: 175) asserts
‘‘I have offered theory and evidence that economic norms, specifically contractualist econ-
omy, appear to account for both the explanans (democracy) and the explanandum (peace)
in the democratic peace research program.’’ However, Mousseau (2018: 190) also claims that
‘‘Ray (2013) asserts without a citation that I have argued ‘that contract intensity typically
precedes and produces democracy.’’’
Ray’s assertion is based on the assumption that when Mousseau (2013: 186) says ‘‘the
democratic peace correlation is not significant once the potentially confounding variable that
can cause both democracy and peace, contract-intensive economy, is considered, ’’ he implies
that ‘‘contract intensity typically precedes and produces democracy.’’ In other words, typi-
cally, statements to the effect that ‘‘A causes B’’ do suggest that A precedes and produces B.
Mousseau (2009: 70) reinforces the impression he believes that when he says ‘‘economic
norms theory predicts that a contract-intensive economy will cause and stabilize democracy’’
(emphasis added). And Mousseau (2018: 183) says ‘‘we know that contractualist economy
affects democracy even after consideration of any effect of democracy on contractualist
economy.’’
However, Mousseau (2018: 182–183) also argues that ‘‘there is nothing in economic norms
theory that precludes other causes of democracy, so there is nothing in the theory that pre-
cludes democracy from sometimes or even all the time, predating contractualist economy.’’
He goes on to point out that contract intensity ‘‘most reliably predicts not democratic transi-
tions but democratic survival.’’ So, when he asserts that contract intensity causes democracy,
he means that it enables it to survive, rather than that it ‘‘precedes and produces it.’’
But more generally, Mousseau (2009: 59) believes that political factors are the primary
cause of economic changes, and that ‘‘a contract-intensive economy cannot exist unless gov-
ernment authorities make the decision to enforce contracts with impartiality.’’Acemoglu and
Robinson (2012: 82) argue similarly that ‘‘inclusive economic institutions are forged on foun-
dations laid by inclusive political institutions . Those controlling political power cannot
easily use it to set up extractive economic institutions for their own benefit.’’
In other words, there are theoretical arguments, apparently endorsed by Mousseau previ-
ously, that democratic political institutions make contract-intensive economies more likely
196 Conflict Management and Peace Science 35(2)

to emerge and survive. Mousseau (2018: 190) at least partially concedes some validity to
such arguments when he asserts that ‘‘a direct test of the relationship of contractualist econ-
omy and democracy is the next stage of the economic norms research program.’’ Moreover,
Mousseau (2018: 179) designates 40 states as having contract-intensive economies, and at
least 35 of those were democratic when their economies became contract intensive.
Mousseau (2018: 183) dismisses such evidence that democracy facilitates the transition to
contractualism because it fails to take into account the ‘‘one half of all democratic nation
years with clientelist economies from 1960 to 2000.’’
Those democratic nation years with clientelist economies are, according to Mousseau,
‘‘counter-cases’’ to the argument that democracy causes contract intensity. Yet in fact, dem-
ocratic nation years with clientelist economies cast little light on this issue.
Imagine that nation X is democratic starting in 1960, and remains clientelist until 1999,
before turning contract intensive in 2000. There are, in other words, 40 observations of this
state as democratic while being clientelist, with only one observation during which democ-
racy coincides with contract intensity. Those 41 observations provide no evidence at all that
contract intensity causes democracy, because state X was democratic before it became con-
tract intensive. The 41 observations together support the idea that democracy causes contract
intensity, because state X was democratic before and during the year in which it became con-
tract intensive.
Granted, although there are 41 observations in this example, there is really only one case,
and so any causal inference is dubious. If we were to observe 30 states with historical profiles
like that of state X, 98% of the nation-years would be democratic-clientelist, but 100% of
the observations considered together would tend to confirm the idea that democracy causes
contract intensity, because in every case, democracy would precede and ultimately lead to
contract intensity, while no single observation nor all the observations together would pro-
vide any evidence that contract intensity causes democracy, because it never precedes
democracy in any state. Furthermore, there are (in this admittedly imaginary) example no
observations that suggest that contract intensity stabilizes democracy.
If we added 15 autocratic states to this imaginary world, each of which is also clientelist
every year, the data for 2000, when all the democratic states convert to contract intensive,
would provide striking evidence that democratic states are more likely than autocratic states
to transition to contract-intensive economies, even though this set of observations would
contain almost twice as many democratic–clientelist annual observations as autocratic–
clientelist annual observations, and the proportion of democratic–clientelist observations
would be far greater than the proportion of democratic–contract-intensive observations. But
the fact that the overwhelming majority of democratic nation years in this imaginary world
were clientelist would be irrelevant to an evaluation of the hypothesis that democracy causes
contract intensity.
In short, at the heart of Mousseau’s theory is the idea that contractualism causes both
democracy and peace—even though he acknowledges that contractualism does not lead to
democratic transitions, but rather stabilizes already existing democracy. But if to any extent
democracy causes or even just stabilizes contractualism, then the relationships and the corre-
lations between contract intensity, democracy and peace are congruent with interpretations
quite different from those preferred by Mousseau. If there is even just a reciprocal relation-
ship between democracy and contract intensity, then contract intensity is to some extent a
factor that intervenes in the process leading from democracy to peace.2 The disappearance
of the correlation between democracy and peace, when contract intensity is controlled for,
Ray and Dafoe 197

then, does not necessarily support the argument that the relationship between democracy
and peace is spurious.

Where does ‘‘contractualism’’ fit into prior theoretical approaches?

‘‘Some confuse,’’ according to Mousseau (2018: 177) ‘‘the contractualist peace with the interde-
pendence peace.’’ While the two are not identical, they are similar, even overlapping, in several
important ways. They are, for example, both classically ‘‘liberal’’ ideas to the effect that market
forces tend to have beneficial impacts. They both emphasize that one of the most important of
these impacts stems from the potential for reducing conflict arising out of the reluctance by
those tied together by market forces to risk losing those benefits should conflict occur.
Mousseau (2009: 72) explains that economic norms theory predicts that governments of
contractualist states will be likely to encourage international trade. According to Mousseau
(2013: 189–190), ‘‘no leader wishing foremost to promote exports in the global marketplace
can have any interest in threatening disorder or harming another importing states economy’’
(emphases added). So, interdependence peace theory emphasizes the pacifying impact of
actual trade. Contractualism suggests that even the potential for beneficial trading ties can
have an important pacifying impact. But surely the logic of contractualism, emphasizing as
it does the pacifying impact of contracting behavior among strangers, would imply that con-
tracting behavior among strangers across interstate borders (i.e. interstate trade, or foreign
investment) would have a pacifying impact on interstate relationships at least as important
as contracting behavior among strangers within the borders of each of the interacting states.
In other words, if the probability of conflict between states is reduced by the intensity of
contracting behavior engaged in by strangers within interacting states, surely the amount of
contracting behavior between strangers in each of those states (in the form of trade or for-
eign investment) would have a more direct and important impact on the probability of con-
flict between them. Leaders, other policymakers, interest groups, and general publics might,
as Mousseau suggests, be motivated to avoid the opportunity costs created by conflict with
another state if it is possible that some day in the future a lucrative trading relationship with
that other state might be developed (even though for whatever reasons no such relationship
has yet emerged). But the leaders, policymakers, interest groups and the general publics
might be even more determined to avoid opportunity costs created by conflict with another
state with whom a lucrative trading relationship already exists.
In short, interdependence peace theory and contractualism, then, are not really competing
theoretical approaches. They are similar and complementary, both emphasizing as a basic
causal mechanism the pacifying impact of precisely the same kind of economic (market-
based) processes involving contracting behavior among strangers.3

Should ‘‘democracy’’ be replaced by ‘‘contractualism’’?

One of Mousseau’s (2018: 189) most fundamental points is that ‘‘scholars must stop describ-
ing democracy as a ‘known’ cause or correlate of peace, and . must stop tossing in a vari-
able for democracy, willy-nilly, in quantitative analyses of international conflict.’’ ‘‘The
variable to replace it,’’ according to Mousseau, ‘‘is contractualist economy.’’
One basic reason to resist that advice is that contractualism, by Mousseau’s admission, is
a phenomenon relevant only to a relatively short, recent time period. Before 1960, there were
only eight contract-intensive states. Even as late as 1989, there were by Mousseau’s count
198 Conflict Management and Peace Science 35(2)

only 23 contract-intensive economies in the entire world. (The only Latin American state to
achieve contract intensity to this day is Chile, and that only in 1996.) Mousseau (2018: 178)
acknowledges that ‘‘contractualist economy is largely a twentieth century phenomenon’’.
More specifically, it is a late-twentieth-century and early twenty-first-century phenomenon.
Democracy has repeatedly been proven to have a pacifying impact over lengthy time peri-
ods. Maoz and Abdolali (1989) analyzed the years from 1817 to 1976. Bremer (1992, 1993)
focused on the years from 1816 to 1965. Rousseau et al. (1996) generated data for the years
from 1918 to 1988. Mousseau (1998) himself did a study of the relative propensity of jointly
democratic states to reach compromises when they are involved in militarized disputes that
covered the years from 1816 to 1992. Russett and Oneal (2001) dealt with the years from
1886 to 1992. Bennett and Stam (2004) analyzed data from the years 1816 to 1992. Bueno de
Mesquita et al. (2004) relied on data from the years 1816–1993.
In any comparisons of the relative explanatory power of democracy and contractualism,
the near total absence of contract-intensive economies in the global system for all of the
nineteenth century and for most of the twentieth century puts contractualism at a severe dis-
advantage. More fundamental, comprehensive and important than comparisons of the
explanatory power of democracy and contractualism for the relatively brief period near the
end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century would focus on
time periods beginning as early as 1816. There can be little doubt about how such compari-
sons would turn out. Contract intensity for all the constituent dyads, except those containing
the United States, perhaps, would fail to vary from 1816 to 1919. A few non-zero observa-
tions would show up starting in the 1920s and 1930s. But in short, contractualism would
vary so little for such a long period of time in such analyses that it could not correlate signifi-
cantly with peace or democracy.

Robustness of the democratic peace: fragility of Mousseau’s critique

DOR (2013) is the most recent in a series of papers evaluating Mousseau’s claims about con-
tractualism (and democratic peace) (Dafoe, 2011; Russett, 2011). The authors point out that
one of the most important and dubious aspects of Mousseau (2013) involves missing data.
The analyses reported in Mousseau (2013) rely crucially on contractualism operationalized
with life insurance data, and those data were missing for 98% of the observations included in
the study. That alone is enough to raise severe reservations about Mousseau’s results.
Authoritative discussions of imputation warn about the dangers of imputing large propor-
tions of data points, with 98% far beyond even an ‘‘extreme’’ degree of missingness (Rubin,
1996: 482). Further, Mousseau (2013) singly imputes missing data (using a command in
Stata that is now obsolete, reflecting the dubious validity of this process), despite the metho-
dological consensus (at the time and still today) that single imputation, as compared with
the recommended multiple imputation, underestimates the uncertainty in the imputed val-
ues. In addition, Mousseau’s (2013) imputation model was not published anywhere, and can
only be inferred from a close review of his replication files.
In short, 98% of the data on Mousseau’s (2013) key independent variable were imputed
from a model that was not discussed or defended, and in a manner that was almost certain to
produce erroneous estimates. DOR (2013) show that multiple imputations of that life insur-
ance data produce significant coefficients for Democracy Low in virtually all plausible specifi-
cations of the models in question.
Ray and Dafoe 199

DOR (2103) discuss, in addition to the imputation of the life insurance variable, six other
design choices made by Mousseau (2013) having to do with (a) the coding of conflicts lasting
more than one year, (b) the analysis of all MIDS vs only MIDs with fatalities, (c) inclusion
of Democracy High as a control variable, (d) inclusion of an interaction term focusing on
democracy and contractualism, (e) the operationalization of Democracy, and (f) the choice
of data on life insurance.
Regarding the first of these design choices, DOR point out that for Mousseau’s outcome
measure of conflict, he set as 0 all years involving conflict after the first year. By this coding,
a 5 year MID would be coded the same as a 1 month MID (1, 0, 0, 0, 0); a year of peace is
coded the same as a year in conflict (after the first year). No scholar of whom we are aware,
other than Mousseau (2018), has argued for such a measure of ongoing conflicts, although
such authoritative sources as Bennett and Stam (2004) have argued against it. Bennett and
Stam recommend that, if conflict onset is to be the dependent variable, then years of ongoing
disputes should be excluded, rather than included as 0s, since ‘‘we should only include cases
where all values of the dependent variable could actually occur’’ (p. 53). It is worth noting
that ‘‘this one correction (to Mousseau 2013) restores the evidence for the democratic peace’’
(p \ 0.1). So, DOR did not have to go very far to reveal the fragility of Mousseau’s analyses;
the correction of a single dubious operationalization was sufficient to overturn his results.
While showing that Mousseau’s results disappear after one correction is informative,
DOR might have generated hundreds of analyses and only reported the single result that
supported their case. But in fact, they examine virtually all of the possible options dealing
with the seven design issues specified above, producing 144 different specifications. Sixty-six
percent produced highly significant coefficients for Democracy (p \ 0.01); 89% were weakly
significant (p \ 0.1). The opposite side of this coin is the fragility of Mousseau’s reported
finding regarding contractualism, democracy and peace. Almost any variation in design
choices (most of which are defensible) reveals weaknesses in that finding.
Mousseau (2018) reviews DOR’s analyses, reports that 120 of them include contractual-
ism as a variable, and argues that all but four of those analyses are invalid because of design
choices made by DOR that are (according to Mousseau) ‘‘controversial or contrary to con-
vention.’’ In order to produce the finding he prefers demonstrating that contract intensity,
not democracy, has an important pacifying impact, he rejects all the relevant design choices
regarding the seven issues in question, except the ones that he prefers.
As Simonsohn et al. (2015, Abstract) point out, ‘‘Empirical results often hinge on data
analytic decisions that are simultaneously defensible, arbitrary, and motivated.’’ They offer a
process they call ‘‘Specification-Curve Analysis’’ as a way of evaluating models according to
their sensitivity to such data analytic decisions. It gives higher marks, so to speak, to models
that prove to be more robust.
Mousseau’s own research history suggests that more than one of the available options we
are discussing here are acceptable. Analysts can choose, for example, to include or exclude
states that join in disputes after they have continued for some time. Mousseau (2018) argues
that ‘‘By convention ‘joiners’ are participants who enter a conflict after it has already started
by ‘originators.’ Standard practice is to observe only originators.’’ But Mousseau (2009: 65)
explains that ‘‘Following standard procedure, I . included joiners.’’
Another of these issues regarding which Mousseau (and many others) has been inconsis-
tent involves ongoing disputes of the type we discussed above. Mousseau (2018: 180) asserts
that DOR (2013) stipulate that years of ongoing disputes should be excluded from analyses,
and that Mousseau’s (2103) inclusion of those years was a ‘‘major error.’’ In fact, as we have
200 Conflict Management and Peace Science 35(2)

seen, what DOR criticize is not the inclusion of ongoing years of disputes. What they criticize
is the coding of years of continuing disputes (when conflict onset is the dependent variable)
as 0s rather than missing data. DOR (2013) specifically acknowledge that either including or
excluding observations of disputes that continue for more than one year is ‘‘justified.’’ But
Mousseau (2018) also concedes that in four of his papers published before 2013 (namely
Mousseau, 2009, 2012a; Mousseau et al., 2013a, b), years of ongoing disputes were excluded.
So, Mousseau and many other analysts have relied on more than one option regarding
most of the design choices under discussion here. In spite of this copious evidence that there
is considerable variety in the field regarding such design choices, Mousseau (2018) routinely
designates one option as the ‘‘standard’’ or ‘‘conventional’’ practice, and accuses DOR
(2013) of ‘‘errors’’ if they make different choices, or even just evaluate the impact of the
alternative options. Ideally, models are able to produce consistent results in spite of varia-
tion in (often both or all acceptable) design choices. DOR (2013) demonstrate that the ‘‘con-
tractualism’’ model tends to be sensitive to such variation.4
But a more fundamental point to be taken away from this debate has to do with the limits
to which one can move toward resolution by focusing on dueling regression analyses of
observational data. Those limits can be stretched to some degree by the derivation and test-
ing of novel observable implications from a rich theory and the testing of these implications
by causal process tracing, analyses of public opinion data, and micro-analyses.5 But observa-
tional data will always require substantial caution as a basis for claims about causal linkages.

Conclusion
For that reason, it is important to move the debate beyond the focus on such data. Their
shortcomings can be addressed with some success by experiments, natural or otherwise.
Natural experiments are rare opportunities in history when some process manipulated a
causal factor of interest in an as-if random way. These are extremely valuable, since (as-if)
random treatment assignment guarantees that our estimates of causal effects will not be
biased by the confounders that plague most observational studies. Natural experiments are
rare, and often require extensive ‘‘shoe-leather’’ (subject matter expertise and fieldwork) to
find them and collect the data to analyze them (Dunning 2012). But any serious research
program ought to have seriously looked for them, and many have been found to study such
elusive phenomena as the effects of extractive institutions on growth (Acemoglu et al., 2012),
of armed combat on ethnic homogeneity (Jha and Wilkinson, 2012), of proportional vs rep-
resentative government on well-being (Hinnerich and Pettersson-Lidblom, 2014), of honor
cultures on war (Dafoe and Caughey, 2016) and so forth. Where might we find a natural
experiment for contract intensity?
Another productive research strategy in international relations involves scenario-based
survey experiments. (For examples see Tomz, 2007; Trager and Vavrek, 2011; Renshon
et al., 2017.) These typically pose a foreign policy scenario to members of the public or
quasi-elites. They then ask the respondents about some relevant belief or attitude, such as
their policy preferences or approval of a policy action. This method is well suited to evaluat-
ing theories involving causal processes that go through the beliefs or attitudes of the public
or elites.
For example, some theories of the democratic peace predict that democratic publics
should be less willing to use force against other democracies. Tomz and Weeks (2013: 649)
Ray and Dafoe 201

exploit survey experiments to test that prediction, finding that Americans and British ‘‘indi-
viduals are substantially less supportive of military strikes against democracies than against
otherwise identical autocracies.’’ Further, by asking respondents about other beliefs, Tomz
and Weeks find evidence that this effect is not driven by ‘‘expectations of costs or failure’’
and plausibly by ‘‘changing perceptions of threat and morality.’’ Though while even in survey
experiments we still have to be cautious about the possibility of biases (Dafoe et al., 2016),
this study provided highly informative and novel data which complemented and extended
our empirical understanding of the democratic peace. We gain confidence in theories whose
observable implications are found in so many different domains and research designs.
Could one conduct such a survey experimental study of Mousseau’s theories? While we
find it difficult to pin down exactly what Mousseau’s theories predict, many of his arguments
seem to require that residents of contract-intensive economies should be able to identify
other contract-intensive economies. We could thus imagine employing the Tomz and Weeks
design, modifying instead whether the country is described as ‘‘contract intensive’’ or ‘‘con-
tractualist’’; or we could modify the levels of life insurance expenditures in the country. We
predict that the results would be null, for the simple reason that most people and policy-
makers do not know what it means that a country is ‘‘contract intensive’’ or ‘‘contractualist’’,
or that it is has certain level of life insurance expenditures. Mousseau might respond by stat-
ing that people do not perceive ‘‘contract intensity’’ through these terms, just as Americans
don’t understand democracy in terms of the Polity score. Fair enough, but then the question
remains: how do publics and elites perceive and understand contract intensity, and what evi-
dence do we have that they in fact do so?
Keeping in mind the likely difficulty of finding survey experimental support for contrac-
tualism, the problematic definition and measurement of contractualism, the possibility that
democracy has an impact on the probability of contract intensity, the conceptual overlap
between contractualism and interdependence peace theory, and the relatively short time
period during which there has been a significant number of states with contract intensity, an
important conclusion emerges. Contractualism as a theory and as a factor in the real world
does not supersede democratic peace theory, or democracy.

Acknowledgements
Scott Bennett, Brett Benson, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Matthew Dilorenzo, Stephen Feigen, Brenton
Kenkel, Bryan Rooney, Bruce Russett and Hye Young You all provided helpful suggestions. Such a
distinguished list is a clear indication that any errors that remain are the responsibility of the authors.
James Ray is the primary author; Allan Dafoe advised, and helped draft ‘‘Robustness of the democratic
peace’’ and ‘‘Conclusion.’’

Funding
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-
profit sectors.

Notes
1. Aytac x et al. (2016) still rely on the median as the threshold for contract intensity.
2. ‘‘In general, we should not control for an explanatory variable that is in part a consequence of our key
causal variable’’ (King et al., 1994: 173).
202 Conflict Management and Peace Science 35(2)

3. In fact, if contract intensity encourages trade, then trade is a variable that intervenes in the process
leading from contract intensity to peace, and therefore should not be controlled for in any attempt
to evaluate the pacifying impact of contract intensity. It would make more sense, according to the
logic of Mousseau’s theory, to include trade as part of an index to measure the degree of to which
contract intensity exists within interstate relationships.
4. Mousseau (2018) alludes implicitly to another kind of design choice when he cites Nieman (2016)
twice (on pp. 177 and 187) as an authoritative defender of his claim against advocates of democratic
peace that contractualist economy is the strongest non-trivial predictor of peace. Nieman (2016)
reports only system-level analyses. The system-level relationship between contractualism and peace
could be negative even if the relationships between contractualism and peace were positive for every
state and every pair of states in the system. Conversely, even if the national and dyadic-level rela-
tionships between contractualism and peace were uniformly negative, the system-level relationship
between contractualism and peace could be positive. So it is misleading and counterproductive to
base evaluations of or inferences about national or dyadic-level relationships on system-level analy-
ses if it is possible to perform the requisite national and dyadic level analyses. In short, unless they
are structured in such a way as to stipulate who did what to whom (Ray, 2001), system level analy-
ses are not relevant to debates about national or dyadic level relationships.
5. There has been movement in this direction. Contract intensity (or at least economic norms) has
been shown to be related to terrorism (Krieger and Meierrieks, 2015), civil conflict (Mousseau,
2012b) and democratization (Aytac x et al., 2016). Democracy apparently has connections to an even
wider array of phenomena (see Ray, 2003; and Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2004) owing in part
admittedly to the larger number of analysts who have focused on democracy.

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