Family Cases

REPUBLIC VS CA
The case at bench originated from a petition filed by private respondent Angelina M. Castro in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage to Edwin F. Cardenas. 1 As ground therefor, Castro claims that no
marriage license was ever issued to them prior to the solemnization of their marriage.
Despite notice, defendant Edwin F. Cardenas failed to file his answer. Consequently, he was declared in default. Trial proceeded in his
absence.
The controlling facts are undisputed:
On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony performed by Judge Pablo M.
Malvar, City Court Judge of Pasay City. The marriage was celebrated without the knowledge of Castro's parents. Defendant Cardenas
personally attended to the processing of the documents required for the celebration of the marriage, including the procurement of the
marriage, license. In fact, the marriage contract itself states that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued in the name of the
contracting parties on June 24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro Manila.
The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife since the marriage was unknown to Castro's parents. Thus, it was
only in March 1971, when Castro discovered she was pregnant, that the couple decided to live together. However, their cohabitation
lasted only for four (4) months. Thereafter, the couple parted ways. On October 19, 1971, Castro gave birth. The baby was adopted by
Castro's brother, with the consent of Cardenas.
The baby is now in the United States. Desiring to follow her daughter, Castro wanted to put in order her marital status before leaving
for the States. She thus consulted a lawyer, Atty. Frumencio E. Pulgar, regarding the possible annulment of her marriage. Through her
lawyer's efforts, they discovered that there was no marriage license issued to Cardenas prior to the celebration of their marriage.
As proof, Angelina Castro offered in evidence a certification from the Civil Register of Pasig, Metro Manila. It reads:
February 20, 1987
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that the names EDWIN F. CARDENAS and ANGELINA M. CASTRO who were allegedly married in the Pasay
City Court on June 21, 1970 under an alleged (s)upportive marriage license
no. 3196182 allegedly issued in the municipality on June 20, 1970 cannot be located as said license no. 3196182 does not appear
from our records.
Issued upon request of Mr. Ed Atanacio.
(Sgd) CENONA D. QUINTOS

Senior Civil Registry Officer
Castro testified that she did not go to the civil registrar of Pasig on or before June 24, 1970 in order to apply for a license. Neither did
she sign any application therefor. She affixed her signature only on the marriage contract on June 24, 1970 in Pasay City.
The trial court denied the petition. 2 It held that the above certification was inadequate to establish the alleged non-issuance of a
marriage license prior to the celebration of the marriage between the parties. It ruled that the "inability of the certifying official to
locate the marriage license is not conclusive to show that there was no marriage license issued."
Unsatisfied with the decision, Castro appealed to respondent appellate court. She insisted that the certification from the local civil
registrar sufficiently established the absence of a marriage license.
As stated earlier, respondent appellate court reversed the Decision of the trial court. 3 It declared the marriage between the contracting
parties null and void and directed the Civil Registrar of Pasig to cancel the subject marriage contract.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines urges that respondent appellate court erred when it ruled that the certification issued by the civil
registrar that marriage license no. 3196182 was not in their record adequately proved that no such license was ever issued. Petitioner
also faults the respondent court for relying on the self-serving and uncorroborated testimony of private respondent Castro that she had
no part in the procurement of the subject marriage license. Petitioner thus insists that the certification and the uncorroborated
testimony of private respondent are insufficient to overthrow the legal presumption regarding the validity of a marriage.
Petitioner also points that in declaring the marriage between the parties as null and void, respondent appellate court disregarded the
presumption that the solemnizing officer, Judge Pablo M. Malvar, regularly performed his duties when he attested in the marriage
contract that marriage license no. 3196182 was duly presented to him before the solemnization of the subject marriage.
The issues, being interrelated, shall be discussed jointly.
The core issue presented by the case at bench is whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private
respondent are sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig prior to the celebration of the
marriage of private respondent to Edwin F. Cardenas.
We affirm the impugned Decision.
At the time the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law governing marital relations was the New Civil Code. The
law 4 provides that no marriage shall be solemnized without a marriage license first issued by a local civil registrar. Being one of the
essential requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a license would render the marriage void ab initio. 5
Petitioner posits that the certification of the local civil registrar of due search and inability to find a record or entry to the effect that
marriage license no. 3196182 was issued to the parties is not adequate to prove its non-issuance.
We hold otherwise. The presentation of such certification in court is sanctioned by Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
Sec. 29. Proof of lack of record. — A written statement signed by an officer having custody of an official record or by his deputy, that
after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate
as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such record or entry.
The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent search, a particular document does not exist in
his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil
registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all
applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and such other
relevant data. 6
The certification of "due search and inability to find" issued by the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value, he being the officer
charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Unaccompanied by any circumstance
of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of "due search and inability to find" sufficiently
proved that his office did not issue marriage license no. 3196182 to the contracting parties.
The fact that private respondent Castro offered only her testimony in support of her petition is, in itself, not a ground to deny her
petition. The failure to offer any other witness to corroborate her testimony is mainly due to the peculiar circumstances of the case. It
will be remembered that the subject marriage was a civil ceremony performed by a judge of a city court. The subject marriage is one
of those commonly known as a "secret marriage" — a legally non-existent phrase but ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage
celebrated without the knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of either or both of the contracting parties. The records show that the
marriage between Castro and Cardenas was initially unknown to the parents of the former.
Surely, the fact that only private respondent Castro testified during the trial cannot be held against her. Her husband, Edwin F.
Cardenas, was duly served with notice of the proceedings and a copy of the petition. Despite receipt thereof, he chose to ignore the
same. For failure to answer, he was properly declared in default. Private respondent cannot be faulted for her husband's lack of interest
to participate in the proceedings. There was absolutely no evidence on record to show that there was collusion between private
respondent and her husband Cardenas.
It is noteworthy to mention that the finding of the appellate court that the marriage between the contracting parties is null and void for
lack of a marriage license does not discount the fact that indeed, a spurious marriage license, purporting to be issued by the civil
registrar of Pasig, may have been presented by Cardenas to the solemnizing officer.
In fine, we hold that, under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private respondent
Castro sufficiently established the absence of the subject marriage license.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED there being no showing of any reversible error committed by respondent appellate
court. SO ORDERED.
SY VS CA
For review is the decision1 dated May 21, 1996 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 44144, which affirmedthe decision2 of the
Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, denying the petition3 for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of the spouses
Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy.
Petitioner Filipina Y. Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy contracted marriage on November 15, 1973 at the Church of Our Lady
of Lourdes in Quezon City. 4 Both were then 22 years old. Their union was blessed with two children, Frederick and Farrah Sheryll
who were born on July 8, 1975 and February 14, 1978, respectively. 5
The spouses first established their residence in Singalong, Manila, then in Apalit, Pampanga, and later at San Matias, Sto. Tomas,
Pampanga. They operated a lumber and hardware business in Sto. Tomas, Pampanga.6
On September 15, 1983, Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. Since then, the spouses lived separately, and their two children were in
the custody of their mother. However, their son Frederick transferred to his father's residence at Masangkay, Tondo, Manila on May
15, 1988, and from then on, lived with his father. 7
On February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a petition for legal separation, docketed as Civil Case No. 7900 before the Regional Trial Court
of San Fernando, Pampanga. Later, upon motion of petitioner, the action was later amended to a petition for separation of property on
the grounds that her husband abandoned her without just cause; that they have been living separately for more than one year; and that
they voluntarily entered into a Memorandum of Agreement dated September 29, 1983, containing the rules that would govern the
dissolution of their conjugal partnership.8 Judgment was rendered dissolving their conjugal partnership of gains and approving a
regime of separation of properties based on the Memorandum of Agreement executed by the spouses. 9 The trial court also granted
custody of the children to Filipina. 10
In May 1988, Filipina filed a criminal action for attempted parricide against her husband, docketed as Criminal Case No. 88-68006,
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Filipina testified that in the afternoon of May 15, 1988, she went to the dental clinic at
Masangkay, Tondo, Manila, owned by her husband but operated by his mistress, to fetch her son and bring him to San Fernando,
Pampanga. While she was talking to her son, the boy ignored her and continued playing with the family computer. Filipina got mad,
took the computer away from her son, and started spanking him. At that instance, Fernando pulled Filipina away from their son, and
punched her in the different parts of her body. Filipina also claimed that her husband started choking her when she fell on the floor,
and released her only when he thought she was dead. Filipina suffered from hematoma and contusions on different parts of her body
as a result of the blows inflicted by her husband, evidenced by a Medical Certificate issued by a certain Dr. James Ferraren. She said it
was not the first time Fernando maltreated her. 11
The Regional Trial Court of Manila, however, in its decision 12 dated April 26, 1990, convicted Fernando only of the lesser crime of
slight physical injuries, and sentenced him to 20 days imprisonment.
Petitioner later filed a new action for legal separation against private respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 8273, on the following
grounds: (1) repeated physical violence; (2) sexual infidelity; (3) attempt by respondent against her life; and (4) abandonment of her
by her husband without justifiable cause for more than one year. The Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, in its
decision 13 dated December 4, 1991, granted the petition on the grounds of repeated physical violence and sexual infidelity, and issued
a decree of legal separation. It awarded custody of their daughter Farrah Sheryll to petitioner, and their son Frederick to respondent.
On August 4, 1992, Filipina filed a petition 14 for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to Fernando on the ground of
psychological incapacity. She points out that the final judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court in her favor, in her petitions for
separation of property and legal separation, and Fernando's infliction of physical violence on her which led to the conviction of her
husband for slight physical injuries are symptoms of psychological incapacity. She also cites as manifestations of her husband's
psychological incapacity the following: (1) habitual alcoholism; (2) refusal to live with her without fault on her part, choosing to live
with his mistress instead; and (3) refusal to have sex with her, performing the marital act only to satisfy himself. Moreover, Filipina
alleges that such psychological incapacity of her husband existed from the time of the celebration of their marriage and became
manifest thereafter. 15
The Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, in its decision 16 dated December 9, 1993, denied the petition of Filipina Sy for
the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to Fernando. It stated that the alleged acts of the respondent, as cited by petitioner,
do not constitute psychological incapacity which may warrant the declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the trial court. In the decision 17 of the Court of Appeals
dated May 21, 1996, it ruled that the testimony of petitioner concerning respondent's purported psychological incapacity falls short of
the quantum of evidence required to nullify a marriage celebrated with all the formal and essential requisites of law. Moreover, the
Court of Appeals held that petitioner failed to show that the alleged psychological incapacity of respondent had existed at the time of
the celebration of their marriage in 1973. It reiterated the finding of the trial court that the couple's marital problems surfaced only in
1983, or almost ten years from the date of the celebration of their marriage. And prior to their separation in 1983, they were living
together harmoniously. Thus, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the lower court which it found to be in accordance with
law and the evidence on record. 18
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, 19 which the Court of Appeals denied in its resolution dated November 21, 1996. 20
Hence, this appeal by certiorari 21 wherein petitioner now raises the following issues:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MANIFESTLY OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT ON THE
DATE OF THE CELEBRATION OF THE PARTIES' MARRIAGE ON NOVEMBER 15, 1973, NOT DISPUTED BY
RESPONDENT FERNANDO, THERE WAS NO MARRIAGE LICENSE THERETO;
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS BY

STATING THAT THE GROUNDS RELIED UPON BY APPELLANT [herein petitioner] DO NOT CONSTITUTE
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY AS WOULD JUSTIFY NULLIFICATION OF HER MARRIAGE TO APPELLEE [herein
respondent];
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS BY

STATING THAT APPELLANT FAILED TO SHOW THAT THE ALLEGED UNDESIRABLE ACTUATIONS OF APPELLEE
HAD EXISTED OR WERE PRESENT AT THE TIME THEIR MARRIAGE WAS CELEBRATED IN 1973;
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
AFFIRMING THE ERRONEOUS RULING OF THE LOWER COURT THAT THERE IS A REDEEMING ATTITUDE SHOWN
TO THE COURT BY RESPONDENT FERNANDO WITH RESPECT TO HIS CHILDREN AND ALSO BELIEVES THAT
RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES IS NOT A REMOTE POSSIBILITY WHICH IS ERRONEOUS; AND
5. WHETHER OR NOT THE CASE OF SANTOS V. COURT OF APPEALS (240 SCRA 20) IS APPLICABLE HERETO. 22
In sum, two issues are to be resolved:
1. Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the beginning for lack of a marriage license at
the time of the ceremony; and
2. Whether or not private respondent is psychologically incapacitated at the time of said marriage celebration to warrant a declaration
of its absolute nullity.
Petitioner, for the first time, raises the issue of the marriage being void for lack of a valid marriage license at the time of its
celebration. It appears that, according to her, the date of the actual celebration of their marriage and the date of issuance of their
marriage certificate and marriage license are different and incongruous.
Although we have repeatedly ruled that litigants cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal, as this would contravene the basic
rules of fair play and justice, 23 in a number of instances, we have relaxed observance of procedural rules, noting that technicalities are
not ends in themselves but exist to protect and promote substantive rights of litigants. We said that certain rules ought not to be
applied with severity and rigidity if by so doing, the very reason for their existence would be defeated. 24 Hence, when substantial
justice plainly requires, exempting a particular case from the operation of technicalities should not be subject to cavil. 25 In our view,
the case at bar requires that we address the issue of the validity of the marriage between Filipina and Fernando which petitioner claims
is void from the beginning for lack of a marriage license, in order to arrive at a just resolution of a deeply seated and violent conflict
between the parties. Note, however, that here the pertinent facts are not disputed; and what is required now is a declaration of their
effects according to existing law.
Petitioner states that though she did not categorically state in her petition for annulment of marriage before the trial court that the
incongruity in the dates of the marriage license and the celebration of the marriage itself would lead to the conclusion that her
marriage to Fernando was void from the beginning, she points out that these critical dates were contained in the documents she
submitted before the court. The date of issue of the marriage license and marriage certificate, September 17, 1974, is contained in their
marriage contract which was attached as Annex "A" in her petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court,
and thereafter marked as Exhibit "A" in the course of the trial. 26 The date of celebration of their marriage at Our Lady of Lourdes, Sta.
Teresita Parish, on November 15, 1973, is admitted both by petitioner and private respondent, as stated in paragraph three of
petitioner's petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court, and private respondent's answer admitting
it. 27 This fact was also affirmed by petitioner, in open court, on January 22, 1993, during her direct examination, 28 as follows:
ATTY. RAZON: In the last hearing, you said that you were married on November 15, 1973?
FILIPINA SY: Yes, Sir.
November 15, 1973, also appears as the date of marriage of the parents in both their son's and daughter's birth certificates, which are
also attached as Annexes "B" and "C" in the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court, and thereafter
marked as Exhibits "B" and "C" in the course of the trial. 29 These pieces of evidence on record plainly and indubitably show that on
the day of the marriage ceremony, there was no marriage license. A marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence renders the
marriage void ab initio. In addition, the marriage contract shows that the marriage license, numbered 6237519, was issued in
Carmona, Cavite, yet, neither petitioner nor private respondent ever resided in Carmona. 30
Carefully reviewing the documents and the pleadings on record, we find that indeed petitioner did not expressly state in her petition
before the trial court that there was incongruity between the date of the actual celebration of their marriage and the date of the issuance
of their marriage license. From the documents she presented, the marriage license was issued on September 17, 1974, almost one year
after the ceremony took place on November 15, 1973. The ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted without a
marriage license. Nowhere do we find private respondent denying these dates on record. Article 80 of the Civil Code 31 is clearly
applicable in this case. There being no claim of an exceptional character, the purported marriage between petitioner and private
respondent could not be classified among those enumerated in Articles 72-79 32 of the Civil Code. We thus conclude that under Article
80 of the Civil Code, the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the beginning.
We note that their marriage certificate and marriage license are only photocopies. So are the birth certificates of their son Frederick
and daughter Farrah Sheryll. Nevertheless, these documents were marked as Exhibits during the course of the trial below, which
shows that these have been examined and admitted by the trial court, with no objections having been made as to their authenticity and
due execution. Likewise, no objection was interposed to petitioner's testimony in open court when she affirmed that the date of the
actual celebration of their marriage was on November 15, 1973. We are of the view, therefore, that having been admitted in evidence,
with the adverse party failing to timely object thereto, these documents are deemed sufficient proof of the facts contained therein. 33
The remaining issue on the psychological incapacity of private respondent need no longer detain us. It is mooted by our conclusion
that the marriage of petitioner to respondent is void ab initio for lack of a marriage license at the time their marriage was solemnized.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, dated December 9,
1993 as well as the Decision promulgated on May 21, 1996 by the Court of Appeals and its Resolution dated November 21, 1996 in
CA-G.R. No. 44144 are set aside. The marriage celebrated on November 15, 1973 between petitioner Filipina Yap and private
respondent Fernando Sy is hereby declared void ab initio for lack of a marriage license at the time of celebration. No pronouncement
as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
SEVILLA VS CARDENAS
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74416 dated 20
December 2004 which set aside the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, in Civil Case No. 94-1285 dated 25
January 2002.
In a Complaint3 dated 28 March 1994 filed by Jaime O. Sevilla before the RTC, he claimed that on 19 May 1969, through
machinations, duress and intimidation employed upon him by Carmelita N. Cardenas and the latter's father, retired Colonel Jose
Cardenas of the Armed forces of the Philippines, he and Carmelita went to the City Hall of Manila and they were introduced to a
certain Reverend Cirilo D. Gonzales, a supposed Minister of the Gospel. On the said date, the father of Carmelita caused him and
Carmelita to sign a marriage contract before the said Minister of the Gospel. According to Jaime, he never applied for a marriage
license for his supposed marriage to Carmelita and never did they obtain any marriage license from any Civil Registry, consequently,
no marriage license was presented to the solemnizing officer.
For her part, Carmelita refuted these allegations of Jaime, and claims that she and Jaime were married civilly on 19 May 1969, 4 and in
a church ceremony thereafter on 31 May 1969 5 at the Most Holy Redeemer Parish in Quezon City. Both marriages were registered
with the local civil registry of Manila and the National Statistics Office. He is estopped from invoking the lack of marriage license
after having been married to her for 25 years.
The trial court made the following findings:
In support of his complaint, plaintiff [Jaime] testified that on May 19, 1969, he and defendant [Carmelita] appeared before a certain
Rev. Cirilo D. Gonzales, a Minister of the Gospel, at the city hall in Manila where they executed a Marriage Contract (Exh. "A") in
civil rites. A certain Godofredo Occena who, plaintiff alleged, was an aide of defendant's father accompanied them, and who, together
with another person, stood as witness to the civil wedding. That although marriage license no. 2770792 allegedly issued in San Juan,
Rizal on May 19, 1969 was indicated in the marriage contract, the same was fictitious for he never applied for any marriage license,
(Ibid., p. 11). Upon verifications made by him through his lawyer, Atty. Jose M. Abola, with the Civil Registry of San Juan, a
Certification dated March 11, 1994 (Exh. "E") was issued by Rafael D. Aliscad, Jr., Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, that "no
marriage license no. 2770792 was ever issued by said office." On May 31, 1969, he and defendant were again wed, this time in church
rites, before Monsignor Juan Velasco at the Most Holy Redeemer Parish Church in Brixton Hills, Quezon City, where they executed
another marriage contract (Exh. "F") with the same marriage license no. 2770792 used and indicated. Preparations and expenses for
the church wedding and reception were jointly shared by his and defendant's parents. After the church wedding, he and defendant
resided in his house at Brixton Hills until their first son, Jose Gabriel, was born in March 1970. As his parents continued to support
him financially, he and defendant lived in Spain for some time, for his medical studies. Eventually, their marital relationship turned
bad because it became difficult for him to be married he being a medical student at that time. They started living apart in 1976, but
they underwent family counseling before they eventually separated in 1978. It was during this time when defendant's second son was
born whose paternity plaintiff questioned. Plaintiff obtained a divorce decree against defendant in the United States in 1981 and later
secured a judicial separation of their conjugal partnership in 1983.
Atty. Jose M. Abola, then counsel for the plaintiff, himself manifested that when his service was engaged by plaintiff, and after the
latter narrated to him the circumstances of his marriage, he made inquiries with the Office of Civil Registry of San Juan where the
supposed marriage license was obtained and with the Church of the Most Holy Redeemer Parish where the religious wedding
ceremony was celebrated. His request letters dated March 3, 1994 (Exh. "J"), March 7, 1994 (Exh. "L"), March 9, 1994 (Exh. "M")
and March 11, 1994 (Exh. "K") were all sent to and received by the Civil Registrar of San Juan, who in reply thereto, issued
Certifications dated March 4, 1994 (Exh. "I"), and March 11, 1994 (Exh. "E") and September 20, 1994 (Exh. "C"), that "no marriage
license no. 2770792 was ever issued by that office." Upon his inquiry, the Holy Redeemer Parish Church issued him a certified copy
of the marriage contract of plaintiff and defendant (Exh. "F") and a Certificate of Marriage dated April 11, 1994 (Exh. "G"), wherein it
noted that it was a "purely religious ceremony, having been civilly married on May 19, 1969 at the City Hall, Manila, under Marriage
License No. 2770792 issued at San Juan, Rizal on May 19, 1969."
Perlita Mercader, Registration Officer III of the Local Registry of San Juan, identified the Certificates dated March 4, 1994, March 11,
1994 and September 20, 1994 issued by Rafael Aliscad, Jr., the Local Civil Registrar, and testified that their office failed to locate the
book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 may have been registered (TSN, 8-6-96, p. 5).
Defendant Carmelita Cardenas testified that she and plaintiff had a steady romantic relationship after they met and were introduced to
each other in October 1968. A model, she was compelled by her family to join the Mutya ng Pilipinas beauty pageant when plaintiff
who was afraid to lose her, asked her to run away with him to Baguio. Because she loved plaintiff, she turned back on her family and
decided to follow plaintiff in Baguio. When they came back to Manila, she and plaintiff proceeded to the latter's home in Brixton Hills
where plaintiff's mother, Mrs. Sevilla, told her not to worry. Her parents were hostile when they learned of the elopement, but Mrs.
Sevilla convinced them that she will take care of everything, and promised to support plaintiff and defendant. As plaintiff was still
fearful he may lose her, he asked her to marry him in civil rites, without the knowledge of her family, more so her father (TSN, 5-28-
98, p. 4) on May 19, 1969, before a minister and where she was made to sign documents. After the civil wedding, they had lunch and
later each went home separately. On May 31, 1969, they had the church wedding, which the Sevilla family alone prepared and
arranged, since defendant's mother just came from hospital. Her family did not participate in the wedding preparations. Defendant
further stated that there was no sexual consummation during their honeymoon and that it was after two months when they finally had
sex. She learned from Dr. Escudero, plaintiff's physician and one of their wedding sponsors that plaintiff was undergoing psychiatric
therapy since age 12 (TSN, 11-2-98, p. 15) for some traumatic problem compounded by his drug habit. She found out plaintiff has
unusual sexual behavior by his obsession over her knees of which he would take endless pictures of. Moreover, plaintiff preferred to
have sex with her in between the knees which she called "intrafemural sex," while real sex between them was far and between like 8
months, hence, abnormal. During their marriage, plaintiff exhibited weird sexual behavior which defendant attributed to plaintiff's
drug addiction (TSN, 11-5-98, pp. 5-8). A compulsive liar, plaintiff has a bad temper who breaks things when he had tantrums.
Plaintiff took drugs like amphetamines, benzedrine and the like, "speed" drugs that kept him from sleep and then would take
barbiturates or downers, like "mogadon." Defendant tried very hard to keep plaintiff away from drugs but failed as it has become a
habit to him. They had no fixed home since they often moved and partly lived in Spain for about four and a half years, and during all
those times, her mother-in-law would send some financial support on and off, while defendant worked as an English teacher. Plaintiff,
who was supposed to be studying, did nothing. Their marriage became unbearable, as plaintiff physically and verbally abused her, and
this led to a break up in their marriage. Later, she learned that plaintiff married one Angela Garcia in 1991 in the United States.
Jose Cardenas, father of defendant, testified that he was not aware of the civil wedding of his daughter with the plaintiff; that his
daughter and grandson came to stay with him after they returned home from Spain and have lived with him and his wife ever since.
His grandsons practically grew up under his care and guidance, and he has supported his daughter's expenses for medicines and
hospital confinements (Exhs. "9" and "10").
Victoria Cardenas Navarro, defendant's sister, testified and corroborated that it was plaintiff's family that attended to all the
preparations and arrangements for the church wedding of her sister with plaintiff, and that she didn't know that the couple wed in civil
rites some time prior to the church wedding. She also stated that she and her parents were still civil with the plaintiff inspite of the
marital differences between plaintiff and defendant.
As adverse witness for the defendant, plaintiff testified that because of irreconcilable differences with defendant and in order for them
to live their own lives, they agreed to divorce each other; that when he applied for and obtained a divorce decree in the United States
on June 14, 1983 (Exh. "13"), it was with the knowledge and consent of defendant who in fact authorized a certain Atty. Quisumbing
to represent her (TSN, 12-7-2000, p. 21). During his adverse testimony, plaintiff identified a recent certification dated July 25, 2000
(Exh. "EE") issued by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, that the marriage license no. 2770792, the same marriage license
appearing in the marriage contract (Exh. "A"), is inexistent, thus appears to be fictitious. 6
In its Decision dated 25 January 2002, declaring the nullity of the marriage of the parties, the trial court made the following
justifications:
Thus, being one of the essential requisites for the validity of the marriage, the lack or absence of a license renders the marriage void ab
initio. It was shown under the various certifications (Exhs. "I", "E", and "C") earlier issued by the office of the Local Civil Registrar of
the Municipality of San Juan, and the more recent one issued on July 25, 2000 (Exh. "EE") that no marriage license no. 2770792 was
ever issued by that office, hence, the marriage license no. 2770792 appearing on the marriage contracts executed on May 19, 1969
(Exh. "A") and on May 31, 1969 (Exh. "F") was fictitious. Such a certification enjoys probative value under the rules on evidence,
particularly Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, x x x.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the civil marriage between Jaime O. Sevilla and Carmelita N. Cardenas solemnized by Rev.
Cirilo D. Gonzales at the Manila City Hall on May 19, 1969 as well as their contract of marriage solemnized under religious rites by
Rev. Juan B. Velasco at the Holy Redeemer Parish on May 31, 1969, NULL and VOID for lack of the requisite marriage license. Let
the marriage contract of the parties under Registry No. 601 (e-69) of the registry book of the Local Civil Registry of Manila be
cancelled.
Let copies of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper civil and property registries in accordance with Article 52 of the Family
Code. Likewise, let a copy hereof be forwarded the Office of the Solicitor General for its record and information. 7
Carmelita filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 20 December 2004, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the
trial court and held:
In People v. De Guzman (G.R. No. 106025, February 9, 1994), the Supreme Court explained that: "The presumption of regularity of
official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The presumption, however, prevails
until it is overcome by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes
conclusive."
In this case, We note that a certain Perlita Mercader of the local civil registry of San Juan testified that they "failed to locate the
book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is registered," for the reason that "the employee handling is already retired." With
said testimony We cannot therefore just presume that the marriage license specified in the parties' marriage contract was not issued for
in the end the failure of the office of the local civil registrar of San Juan to produce a copy of the marriage license was attributable not
to the fact that no such marriage license was issued but rather, because it "failed to locate the book wherein marriage license no.
2770792 is registered." Simply put, if the pertinent book were available for scrutiny, there is a strong possibility that it would have
contained an entry on marriage license no. 2720792.
xxxx
Indeed, this Court is not prepared to annul the parties' marriage on the basis of a mere perception of plaintiff that his union with
defendant is defective with respect to an essential requisite of a marriage contract, a perception that ultimately was not substantiated
with facts on record.8
Jaime filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 6 January 2005 which the Court of Appeals denied in a Resolution dated 6 April 2005.
This denial gave rise to the present Petition filed by Jaime.
He raises the following issues for Resolution.
1. Whether or not a valid marriage license was issued in accordance with law to the parties herein prior to the celebration of the
marriages in question;
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly applied and relied on the presumption of regularity of officials acts, particularly the
issuance of a marriage license, arising solely from the contents of the marriage contracts in question which show on their face that a
marriage license was purportedly issued by the Local Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, and
3. Whether or not respondent could validly invoke/rely upon the presumption of validity of a marriage arising from the admitted "fact
of marriage.
At the core of this controversy is the determination of whether or not the certifications from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan
stating that no Marriage License No. 2770792 as appearing in the marriage contract of the parties was issued, are sufficient to declare
their marriage as null and void ab initio.
We agree with the Court of Appeals and rule in the negative.
Pertinent provisions of the Civil Code which was the law in force at the time of the marriage of the parties are Articles 53, 58 and 80.
Based on the foregoing provisions, a marriage license is an essential requisite for the validity of marriage. The marriage between
Carmelita and Jaime is of no exception.
At first glance, this case can very well be easily dismissed as one involving a marriage that is null and void on the ground of absence
of a marriage license based on the certifications issued by the Local Civil Registar of San Juan. As ruled by this Court in the case
of Cariño v. Cariño13:
[A]s certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license. In Republic
v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that such a certification is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license. Absent any
circumstance of suspicion, as in the present case, the certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys probative value, he being
the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all date relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the deceased has been sufficiently overcome. It then
became the burden of petitioner to prove that their marriage is valid and that they secured the required marriage license. Although she
was declared in default before the trial court, petitioner could have squarely met the issue and explained the absence of a marriage
license in her pleadings before the Court of Appeals and this Court. But petitioner conveniently avoided the issue and chose to refrain
from pursuing an argument that will put her case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their marriage cannot stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, having been solemnized without the
necessary marriage license, and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab
initio.
The foregoing Decision giving probative value to the certifications issued by the Local Civil Registrar should be read in line with the
decision in the earlier case of Republic v. Court of Appeals,14 where it was held that:
The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent search, a particular document does not exist
in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As custodians of public documents,
civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all
relevant data. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the certification to be issued by the Local Civil Registrar must categorically state that the document does not exist in his office
or the particular entry could not be found in the register despite diligent search. Such certification shall be sufficient proof of lack or
absence of record as stated in Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. – a written statement signed by an officer having the custody of an official record or by his deputy
that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a
certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such record or entry.
We shall now proceed to scrutinize whether the certifications by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan in connection with Marriage
License No. 2770792 complied with the foregoing requirements and deserved to be accorded probative value.
The first Certification15 issued by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, was dated 11 March 1994. It reads:
No Marriage License Number 2770792 were (sic) ever issued by this Office. With regards (sic) to Marriage License Number
2880792,16 we exert all effort but we cannot find the said number.
Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating the above problem.
San Juan, Metro Manila
March 11, 1994
(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.

Local Civil Registrar
The second certification17 was dated 20 September 1994 and provides:
This is to certify that no marriage license Number 2770792 were ever issued by this Office with regards to Marriage License Number
2880792, we exert all effort but we cannot find the said number.
Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating the above problem.
September 20, 1994

The third Certification,18 issued on 25 July 2000, states:
This is to certify that according to the records of this office, no Marriage License Application was filed and no Marriage License No.
2770792 allegedly dated May 19, 1969 was issued by this Office to MR. JAIME O. SEVILLA and MS. CARMELITA CARDENAS-
SEVILLA.
This is to further certify that the said application and license do not exist in our Local Civil Registry Index and, therefore, appear to be
fictitious.
This certification is being issued upon the request of the interested party for whatever legal intent it may serve.
July 25, 2000

Note that the first two certifications bear the statement that "hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force
locating the above problem." It could be easily implied from the said statement that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar could not
exert its best efforts to locate and determine the existence of Marriage License No. 2770792 due to its "loaded work." Likewise, both
certifications failed to state with absolute certainty whether or not such license was issued.
This implication is confirmed in the testimony of the representative from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Ms.
Perlita Mercader, who stated that they cannot locate the logbook due to the fact that the person in charge of the said logbook had
already retired. Further, the testimony of the said person was not presented in evidence. It does not appear on record that the former
custodian of the logbook was deceased or missing, or that his testimony could not be secured. This belies the claim that all efforts to
locate the logbook or prove the material contents therein, had been exerted.
As testified to by Perlita Mercader:
Q Under the subpoena duces tecum, you were required to bring to this Court among other things the register of application of/or (sic)
for marriage licenses received by the Office of the :Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Province of Rizal, from January 19, 1969 to
May 1969. Did you bring with you those records?
A I brought may 19, 1969, sir.
Q Is that the book requested of you under no. 3 of the request for subpoena?
A Meron pang January. I forgot, January . . .
Q Did you bring that with you?
A No, sir.
Q Why not?
A I cannot locate the book. This is the only book.
Q Will you please state if this is the register of marriage of marriage applications that your office maintains as required by the manual
of the office of the Local Civil Registrar?
COURT
May I see that book and the portion marked by the witness.
xxxx
COURT
Why don't you ask her direct question whether marriage license 2880792 is the number issued by their office while with respect to
license no. 2770792 the office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan is very definite about it it was never issued. Then ask him how
about no. 2880792 if the same was ever issued by their office. Did you ask this 2887092, but you could not find the record? But for
the moment you cannot locate the books? Which is which now, was this issued or not?
A The employee handling it is already retired, sir.19
Given the documentary and testimonial evidence to the effect that utmost efforts were not exerted to locate the logbook where
Marriage License No. 2770792 may have been entered, the presumption of regularity of performance of official function by the Local
Civil Registrar in issuing the certifications, is effectively rebutted.
According to Section 3(m),20 Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed is among
the disputable presumptions.
In one case, it was held:
A disputable presumption has been defined as a species of evidence that may be accepted and acted on where there is no other
evidence to uphold the contention for which it stands, or one which may be overcome by other evidence. One such
disputable/rebuttable presumption is that an official act or duty has been regularly performed. x x x. 21
The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty.22
The presumption of regularity of performance of official duty is disputable and can be overcome by other evidence as in the case at
bar where the presumption has been effectively defeated by the tenor of the first and second certifications.
Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance of Marriage License No. 2770792. It can also mean, as
we believed true in the case at bar, that the logbook just cannot be found. In the absence of showing of diligent efforts to search for the
said logbook, we cannot easily accept that absence of the same also means non-existence or falsity of entries therein.
Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage, the indissolubility of the
marriage bonds.23 The courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the
presumption is of great weight.24
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social
institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.25
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and lived together for several years producing two offsprings, 26 now
adults themselves. It took Jaime several years before he filed the petition for declaration of nullity. Admittedly, he married another
individual sometime in 1991.27 We are not ready to reward petitioner by declaring the nullity of his marriage and give him his freedom
and in the process allow him to profit from his own deceit and perfidy. 28
Our Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social institution. Our family law is based on the
policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State can find no
stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break-up of families weakens our social and moral fabric; hence, their
preservation is not the concern of the family members alone. 29
"The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is x x x marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract,
but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of
the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any
counterpresumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and
if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of
law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is `that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife
have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.' Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio – Always presume marriage."30
This jurisprudential attitude towards marriage is based on the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves
as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. 31
By our failure to come to the succor of Jaime, we are not trifling with his emotion or deepest sentiments. As we have said in Carating-
Siayngco v. Siayngco,32 regrettably, there are situations like this one, where neither law nor society can provide the specific answers to
every individual problem.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 20 December
2004 and the Resolution dated 6 April 2005 are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
SILVERIO VS REPUBLIC
When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the law recognize the changes made by a physician using
scalpel, drugs and counseling with regard to a person’s sex? May a person successfully petition for a change of name and sex
appearing in the birth certificate to reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery?
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth
certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. The petition, docketed as SP Case No. 02-105207, impleaded the civil
registrar of Manila as respondent.
Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino
Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth
certificate). His sex was registered as "male."
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female" and that he had
always identified himself with girls since childhood. 1 Feeling trapped in a man’s body, he consulted several doctors in the United
States. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a
"woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery2 in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter
examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate
attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name in his birth
certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female."
An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the People’s Journal Tonight, a newspaper of general circulation in Metro
Manila, for three consecutive weeks.3 Copies of the order were sent to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil registrar
of Manila.
On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No opposition to the petition was made.
During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his American fiancé, Richard P. Edel, as
witnesses.
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision4 in favor of petitioner. Its relevant portions read:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely
for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his present sex.
The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.
The court rules in the affirmative.
Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in consonance with the principles of justice and equity.
With his sexual [re-assignment], petitioner, who has always felt, thought and acted like a woman, now possesses the physique of a
female. Petitioner’s misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is not his own doing and should not be in any way taken against him.
Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be caused to anybody or the community in granting the petition.
On the contrary, granting the petition would bring the much-awaited happiness on the part of the petitioner and her [fiancé] and the
realization of their dreams.
Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny the present petition despite due notice and publication
thereof. Even the State, through the [OSG] has not seen fit to interpose any [o]pposition.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and ordering the Civil Registrar of Manila to change the entries
appearing in the Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner, specifically for petitioner’s first name from "Rommel Jacinto" to MELY and
petitioner’s gender from "Male" to FEMALE. 5
On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of
Appeals.6 It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.
On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals7 rendered a decision8 in favor of the Republic. It ruled that the trial court’s decision
lacked legal basis. There is no law allowing the change of either name or sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of sex
reassignment through surgery. Thus, the Court of Appeals granted the Republic’s petition, set aside the decision of the trial court and
ordered the dismissal of SP Case No. 02-105207. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied. 9 Hence, this petition.
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the
Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048. 10
The petition lacks merit.
A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex Reassignment
Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for change of name and sex. As found by the trial court:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely
for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his present sex. (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female, he became entitled to the civil registry changes sought.
We disagree.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification.11 A change of name is a
privilege, not a right.12 Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes. 13 In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code
provides:
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1 of RA 9048 provides:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname. – No entry in a civil
register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or
nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with
the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.14 It vests the power and authority to entertain petitions for change of first name to the
city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first
name is now primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the
change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil
Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently
denied.15 It likewise lays down the corresponding venue,16 form17 and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating
change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. – The petition for change of first name or nickname may be allowed in
any of the following cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known by
that first name or nickname in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.

Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He intended to make his first name compatible
with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through surgery. However, a change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or
civil status.18 RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion,
changing petitioner’s first name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public
interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying
such change.19 In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. 20 In this case, he failed to
show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner’s first name was not within that court’s primary
jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an
improper remedy because the proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong
venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it
had no merit since the use of his true and official name does not prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals
correctly dismissed petitioner’s petition in so far as the change of his first name was concerned.
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of Sex Reassignment
The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to the statutes.21 In this
connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048 in so far as clerical or typographical errors are
involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a
judicial order. In effect, RA 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors.22 Rule 108
now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register. 23
Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work in writing, copying,
transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of
birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to
other existing record or records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve the change of nationality, age, status or sex of
the petitioner. (emphasis supplied)
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a
substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in
Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:24
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from
the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12)
recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and
(16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those that occur after
birth.25 However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of
sex reassignment.
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from" while to change means "to replace something with
something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute." 26 The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error.
All entries therein, including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts (such as legitimations, acknowledgments of
illegitimate children and naturalization), events (such as births, marriages, naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as
legal separations, annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of
citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and changes of name). These acts, events and judicial decrees produce
legal consequences that touch upon the legal capacity, status and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the
laws. In contrast, sex reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor even
mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.
"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of capacities and incapacities) of a person in
view of his age, nationality and his family membership.27
The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily
terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not. The comprehensive term status…
include such matters as the beginning and end of legal personality, capacity to have rights in general, family relations, and its various
aspects, such as birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes even succession. 28 (emphasis supplied)
A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person’s legal capacity and civil status. In this
connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special laws.
But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to petitioner’s cause.
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:
SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. – The declaration of the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default
thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil register. Such
declaration shall be exempt from documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty days after the
birth, by the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either parent of the newborn child.
In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a) date and hour of birth; (b) sex and
nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship and religion of parents or, in case the father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil
status of parents; (e) place where the infant was born; and (f) such other data as may be required in the regulations to be issued.
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of birth.29Thus, the sex of a
person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant.
Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or
her birth, if not attended by error,30 is immutable.31
When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary meaning in the absence of a contrary
legislative intent. The words "sex," "male" and "female" as used in the Civil Register Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and
even all other laws) should therefore be understood in their common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to the
contrary. In this connection, sex is defined as "the sum of peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a male from a
female"32 or "the distinction between male and female." 33Female is "the sex that produces ova or bears young" 34 and male is "the sex
that has organs to produce spermatozoa for fertilizing ova." 35 Thus, the words "male" and "female" in everyday understanding do not
include persons who have undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, "words that are employed in a statute which had at the time a
well-known meaning are presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context compels to the contrary." 36 Since the statutory
language of the Civil Register Law was enacted in the early 1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term "sex" as
used then is something alterable through surgery or something that allows a post-operative male-to-female transsexual to be included
in the category "female."
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the intervention of modern
surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition
for the correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate.
Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be Changed on the Ground of Equity
The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the principles of justice and equity. It believed that allowing
the petition would cause no harm, injury or prejudice to anyone. This is wrong.
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy consequences. First, even the trial court
itself found that the petition was but petitioner’s first step towards his eventual marriage to his male fiancé. However, marriage, one of
the most sacred social institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman.37 One of its essential
requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female.38 To grant the changes sought by petitioner
will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another
man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply
particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women, 39 certain felonies under the Revised Penal
Code40 and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,41 among others. These laws
underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be substantially affected if petitioner’s petition were to be granted.
It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence,
obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a license for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is
to apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend it.
In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine what guidelines should govern the
recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines becomes particularly important in this case where
the claims asserted are statute-based.
To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for correction or change of entries in the civil
registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what proof must be presented and what procedures shall be
observed. If the legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and
sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that
privilege.
It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be recognized as having successfully
changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to fashion a law on that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a
law where no law exists. It can only apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of government, Congress.
Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment and [the] realization of their dreams." No
argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are people whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly
recognized parameters of social convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks
involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
COSCA VS PALAYPAYON
Complainants Juvy N. Cosca, Edmundo B. Peralta, Ramon C. Sambo, and Apollo Villamora, are Stenographer I, Interpreter I, Clerk
II, and Process Server, respectively, of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Respondents Judge Lucio P.
Palaypayon, Jr. and Nelia B. Esmeralda-Baroy are respectively the Presiding Judge and Clerk of Court II of the same court.
In an administrative complaint filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on October 5, 1992, herein respondents were charged
with the following offenses, to wit: (1) illegal solemnization of marriage; (2) falsification of the monthly reports of cases; (3) bribery
in consideration of an appointment in the court; (4) non-issuance of receipt for cash bond received; (5) infidelity in the custody of
detained prisoners; and (6) requiring payment of filing fees from exempted entities. 1
Pursuant to a resolution issued by this Court respondents filed their respective Comments. 2 A Reply to Answers of Respondents was
filed by complainants. 3 The case was thereafter referred to Executive Judge David C. Naval of the Regional Trial Court, Naga City,
for investigation report and recommendation. The case was however transferred to First Assistant Executive Judge Antonio N. Gerona
when Judge Naval inhibited himself for the reason that his wife is a cousin of respondent Judge Palaypayon, Jr. 4
The contending versions of the parties regarding the factual antecedents of this administrative matter, as culled from the records
thereof, are set out under each particular charge against respondents.
1. Illegal solemnization of marriage
Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized marriages even without the requisite marriage license. Thus, the following
couples were able to get married by the simple expedient of paying the marriage fees to respondent Baroy, despite the absence of a
marriage license, viz.: Alano P. Abellano and Nelly Edralin, Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido, Eddie Terrobias and Maria Gacer,
Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga, Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario, and Sammy Bocaya and Gina Bismonte. As a
consequence, their marriage contracts (Exhibits B, C, D, F, G, and A, respectively) did not reflect any marriage license number. In
addition, respondent judge did not sign their marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of solemnization, the reason being that he
allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be submitted by the parties which was usually several days after the ceremony.
Indubitably, the marriage contracts were not filed with the local civil registrar. Complainant Ramon Sambo, who prepares the
marriage contracts, called the attention of respondents to the lack of marriage licenses and its effect on the marriages involved, but the
latter opted to proceed with the celebration of said marriages.
Respondent Nelia Baroy claims that when she was appointed Clerk of Court II, the employees of the court were already hostile to her,
especially complainant Ramon Sambo who told her that he was filing a protest against her appointment. She avers that it was only
lately when she discovered that the court had a marriage Register which is in the custody of Sambo; that it was Sambo who failed to
furnish the parties copies of the marriage contract and to register these with the local civil registrar; and that apparently Sambo kept
these marriage contracts in preparation for this administrative case. Complainant Sambo, however, claims that all file copies of the
marriage contracts were kept by respondent Baroy, but the latter insists that she had instructed Sambo to follow up the submission by
the contracting parties of their marriage licenses as part of his duties but he failed to do so.
Respondent Judge Palaypayon, Jr. contends that the marriage between Alano P. Abellano and Nelly Edralin falls under Article 34 of
the Civil Code, hence it is exempt from the marriage license requirement; that he gave strict instructions to complainant Sambo to
furnish the couple a copy of the marriage contract and to file the same with the civil registrar, but the latter failed to do so; that in
order to solve the problem, the spouses subsequently formalized their marriage by securing a marriage license and executing their
marriage contract, a copy of which was filed with the civil registrar; that the other five marriages alluded to in the administrative
complaint were not illegally solemnized because the marriage contracts were not signed by him and they did not contain the date and
place of marriage; that copies of these marriage contracts are in the custody of complainant Sambo; that the alleged marriage of
Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido, Eddie Terrobias and Maria Emma Gaor, Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga, and of Arsenio
Sabater and Margarita Nacario were not celebrated by him since he refused to solemnize them in the absence of a marriage license;
that the marriage of Samy Bocaya and Gina Bismonte was celebrated even without the requisite license due to the insistence of the
parties in order to avoid embarrassment to their guests but that, at any rate, he did not sign their marriage contract which remains
unsigned up to the present.
2. Falsification of monthly report for July, 1991 regarding the number of marriages solemnized and the number of documents
notarized.
It is alleged that respondent judge made it appear that he solemnized seven (7) marriages in the month of July, 1992, when in truth he
did not do so or at most those marriages were null and void; that respondents likewise made it appear that they have notarized only six
(6) documents for July, 1992, but the Notarial Register will show that there were one hundred thirteen (113) documents which were
notarized during that month; and that respondents reported a notarial fee of only P18.50 for each document, although in fact they
collected P20.00 therefor and failed to account for the difference.
Respondent Baroy contends, however, that the marriage registry where all marriages celebrated by respondent judge are entered is
under the exclusive control and custody of complainant Ramon Sambo, hence he is the only one who should be held responsible for
the entries made therein; that the reported marriages are merely based on the payments made as solemnization fees which are in the
custody of respondent Baroy. She further avers that it is Sambo who is likewise the custodian of the Notarial Register; that she cannot
be held accountable for whatever alleged difference there is in the notarial fees because she is liable only for those payments tendered
to her by Sambo himself; that the notarial fees she collects are duly covered by receipts; that of the P20.00 charged, P18.50 is remitted
directly to the Supreme Court as part of the Judiciary Development Fund and P150 goes to the general fund of the Supreme Court
which is paid to the Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Respondent theorizes that the discrepancies in the monthly
report were manipulated by complainant Sambo considering that he is the one in charge of the preparation of the monthly report.
Respondent Judge Palaypayon avers that the erroneous number of marriages celebrated was intentionally placed by complainant
Sambo; that the number of marriages solemnized should not be based on solemnization fees paid for that month since not all the
marriages paid for are solemnized in the same month. He claims that there were actually only six (6) documents notarized in the
month of July, 1992 which tallied with the official receipts issued by the clerk of court; that it is Sambo who should be held
accountable for any unreceipted payment for notarial fees because he is the one in charge of the Notarial Register; and that this case
filed by complainant Sambo is merely in retaliation for his failure to be appointed as the clerk of court. Furthermore, respondent judge
contends that he is not the one supervising or preparing the monthly report, and that he merely has the ministerial duty to sign the
same.
3. Bribery in consideration of an appointment in the court
Complainants allege that because of the retirement of the clerk of court, respondent judge forwarded to the Supreme Court the
applications of Rodel Abogado, Ramon Sambo, and Jessell Abiog. However, they were surprised when respondent Baroy reported for
duty as clerk of court on October 21, 1991. They later found out that respondent Baroy was the one appointed because she gave a
brand-new air-conditioning unit to respondent judge.
Respondent Baroy claims that when she was still in Naga City she purchased an air-conditioning unit but when she was appointed
clerk of court she had to transfer to Tinambac and, since she no longer needed the air conditioner, she decided to sell the same to
respondent judge. The installation and use thereof by the latter in his office was with the consent of the Mayor of Tinambac.
Respondent judge contends that he endorsed all the applications for the position of clerk of court to the Supreme Court which has the
sole authority over such appointments and that he had no hand in the appointment of respondent Baroy. He contends that the air-
conditioning unit was bought from his
co-respondent on installment basis on May 29, 1992, eight (8) months after Baroy had been appointed clerk of court. He claims that he
would not be that naive to exhibit to the public as item which could not be defended as a matter of honor and prestige.
4. Cash bond issued without a receipt
It is alleged that in Criminal Case No. 5438, entitled "People vs. Mendeza, et al., "bondswoman Januaria Dacara was allowed by
respondent judge to change her property bond to cash bond; that she paid the amount of P1,000.00 but was never issued a receipt
therefor nor was it made to appear in the records that the bond has been paid; that despite the lapse of two years, the money was never
returned to the bondswoman; and that it has not been shown that the money was turned over to the Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac.
Respondent Baroy counters that the cash bond was deposited with the former clerk of court, then turned over to the acting clerk of
court and, later, given to her under a corresponding receipt; that the cash bond is deposited with the bank; and that should the
bondswoman desire to withdraw the same, she should follow the proper procedure therefor.
Respondent judge contends that Criminal Case No. 5438 was archieved for failure of the bondsman to deliver the body of the accused
in court despite notice; and that he has nothing to do with the payment of the cash bond as this is the duty of the clerk of court.
5. Infidelity in the custody of prisoners
Complainants contend that respondent judge usually got detention prisoners to work in his house, one of whom was Alex Alano, who
is accused in Criminal Case No. 5647 for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act; that while Alano was in the custody of respondent
judge, the former escaped and was never recaptured; that in order to conceal this fact, the case was archived pursuant to an order
issued by respondent judge dated April 6, 1992.
Respondent judge denied the accusation and claims that he never employed detention prisoners and that he has adequate household
help; and that he had to order the case archived because it had been pending for more than six (6) months and the accused therein
remained at large.
6. Unlawful collection of docket fees
Finally, respondents are charged with collecting docket fees from the Rural Bank of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, Inc. although such
entity is exempt by law from the payment of said fees, and that while the corresponding receipt was issued, respondent Baroy failed to
remit the amount to the Supreme Court and, instead, she deposited the same in her personal account.
Respondents Baroy contends that it was Judge-Designate Felimon Montenegro (because respondent judge was on sick leave) who
instructed her to demand payment of docket fees from said rural bank; that the bank issued a check for P800.00; that she was not
allowed by the Philippine National Bank to encash the check and, instead, was instructed to deposit the same in any bank account for
clearing; that respondent deposited the same in her account; and that after the check was cleared, she remitted P400.00 to the Supreme
Court and the other P400.00 was paid to the Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac.
On the basis of the foregoing contentions, First Vice-Executive Judge Antonio N. Gerona prepared and submitted to us his Report and
Recommendations dated May 20, 1994, together with the administrative matter. We have perspicaciously reviewed the same and we
are favorably impressed by the thorough and exhaustive presentation and analysis of the facts and evidence in said report. We
commend the investigating judge for his industry and perspicacity reflected by his findings in said report which, being amply
substantiated by the evidence and supported by logical illations, we hereby approve and hereunder reproduce at length the material
portions thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
The first charge against the respondents is illegal solemnization of marriage. Judge Palaypayon is charged with having solemnized
without a marriage license the marriage of Sammy Bocaya and Gina Besmonte (Exh. A). Alano Abellano and Nelly Edralin (Exh. B),
Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido (Exh. C), Eddie Terrobias and Maria Emma Gaor (Exh. D), Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga
(Exh. F) and Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario (Exh. G).
In all these aforementioned marriages, the blank space in the marriage contracts to show the number of the marriage was solemnized
as required by Article 22 of the Family Code were not filled up. While the contracting parties and their witnesses signed their marriage
contracts, Judge Palaypayon did not affix his signature in the marriage contracts, except that of Abellano and Edralin when Judge
Palaypayon signed their marriage certificate as he claims that he solemnized this marriage under Article 34 of the Family Code of the
Philippines. In said marriages the contracting parties were not furnished a copy of their marriage contract and the Local Civil Registrar
was not sent either a copy of the marriage certificate as required by Article 23 of the Family Code.
The marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte is shown to have been solemnized by Judge Palaypayon without a marriage license. The
testimonies of Bocay himself and Pompeo Ariola, one of the witnesses of the marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte, and the photographs
taken when Judge Palaypayon solemnized their marriage (Exhs. K-3 to K-9) sufficiently show that Judge Palaypayon really
solemnized their marriage. Bocaya declared that they were advised by Judge Palaypayon to return after ten (10) days after their
marriage was solemnized and bring with them their marriage license. In the meantime, they already started living together as husband
and wife believing that the formal requisites of marriage were complied with.
Judge Palaypayon denied that he solemnized the marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte because the parties allegedly did not have a
marriage license. He declared that in fact he did not sign the marriage certificate, there was no date stated on it and both the parties
and the Local Civil Registrar did not have a copy of the marriage certificate.
With respect to the photographs which show that he solemnized the marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte, Judge Palaypayon explains
that they merely show as if he was solemnizing the marriage. It was actually a simulated solemnization of marriage and not a real one.
This happened because of the pleading of the mother of one of the contracting parties that he consent to be photographed to show that
as if he was solemnizing the marriage as he was told that the food for the wedding reception was already prepared, visitors were
already invited and the place of the parties where the reception would be held was more than twenty (20) kilometers away from the
poblacion of Tinambac.
The denial made by Judge Palaypayon is difficult to believe. The fact alone that he did not sign the marriage certificate or contract, the
same did not bear a date and the parties and the Local Civil Registrar were not furnished a copy of the marriage certificate, do not by
themselves show that he did not solemnize the marriage. His uncorroborated testimony cannot prevail over the testimony of Bocaya
and Ariola who also declared, among others, that Bocaya and his bride were advised by Judge Palaypayon to return after ten (10) days
with their marriage license and whose credibility had not been impeached.
The pictures taken also from the start of the wedding ceremony up to the signing of the marriage certificate in front of Judge
Palaypayon and on his table (Exhs. K-3, K-3-a, K-3-b, K-3-c, K-4, K-4-a, K-4-b, K-4-c,
K-4-d, K-5, K-5-a, K-5-b, K-6, K-7, K-8, K-8-a and K-9), cannot possibly be just to show a simulated solemnization of marriage. One
or two pictures may convince a person of the explanation of Judge Palaypayon, but not all those pictures.
Besides, as a judge it is very difficult to believe that Judge Palaypayon would allows himself to be photographed as if he was
solemnizing a marriage on a mere pleading of a person whom he did not even know for the alleged reasons given. It would be highly
improper and unbecoming of him to allow himself to be used as an instrument of deceit by making it appear that Bocaya and
Besmonte were married by him when in truth and in fact he did not solemnize their marriage.
With respect to the marriage of Abellano and Edralin (Exh. B), Judge Palaypayon admitted that he solemnized their marriage, but he
claims that it was under Article 34 of the Family Code, so a marriage license was not required. The contracting parties here executed a
joint affidavit that they have been living together as husband and wife for almost six (6) years already (Exh. 12; Exh. AA).
In their marriage contract which did not bear any date either when it was solemnized, it was stated that Abellano was only eighteen
(18) years, two (2) months and seven (7) days old. If he and Edralin had been living together as husband and wife for almost six (6)
years already before they got married as they stated in their joint affidavit, Abellano must ha(ve) been less than thirteen (13) years old
when he started living with Edralin as his wife and this is hard to believe. Judge Palaypayon should ha(ve) been aware of this when he
solemnized their marriage as it was his duty to ascertain the qualification of the contracting parties who might ha(ve) executed a false
joint affidavit in order to have an instant marriage by avoiding the marriage license requirement.
On May 23, 1992, however, after this case was already filed, Judge Palaypayon married again Abellano and Edralin, this time with a
marriage license (Exh. BB). The explanation given by Judge Palaypayon why he solemnized the marriage of the same couple for the
second time is that he did not consider the first marriage he solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code as (a) marriage at all
because complainant Ramon Sambo did not follow his instruction that the date should be placed in the marriage certificate to show
when he solemnized the marriage and that the contracting parties were not furnished a copy of their marriage certificate.
This act of Judge Palaypayon of solemnizing the marriage of Abellano and Edralin for the second time with a marriage license already
only gave rise to the suspicion that the first time he solemnized the marriage it was only made to appear that it was solemnized under
exceptional character as there was not marriage license and Judge Palaypayon had already signed the marriage certificate. If it was
true that he solemnized the first marriage under exceptional character where a marriage license was not required, why did he already
require the parties to have a marriage license when he solemnized their marriage for the second time?
The explanation of Judge Palaypayon that the first marriage of Abellano and Edralin was not a marriage at all as the marriage
certificate did not state the date when the marriage was solemnized and that the contracting parties were not furnished a copy of their
marriage certificate, is not well taken as they are not any of those grounds under Article(s) 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the Family Code
which declare a marriage void from the beginning. Even if no one, however, received a copy of the marriage certificate, the marriage
is still valid (Jones vs. H(o)rtiguela, 64 Phil. 179). Judge Palaypayon cannot just absolve himself from responsibility by blaming his
personnel. They are not the guardian(s) of his official function and under Article 23 of the Family Code it is his duty to furnish the
contracting parties (a) copy of their marriage contract.
With respect to the marriage of Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido (Exh. C), and Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario (Exh. G),
Selpo and Carrido and Sabater and Nacarcio executed joint affidavits that Judge Palaypayon did not solemnize their marriage (Exh.
13-A and Exh. 1). Both Carrido and Nacario testified for the respondents that actually Judge Palaypayon did not solemnize their
marriage as they did not have a marriage license. On cross-examination, however, both admitted that they did not know who prepared
their affidavits. They were just told, Carrido by a certain Charito Palaypayon, and Nacario by a certain Kagawad Encinas, to just go to
the Municipal building and sign their joint affidavits there which were already prepared before the Municipal Mayor of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur.
With respect to the marriage of Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga (Exh. f), their marriage contract was signed by them and by their
two (2) witnesses, Atty. Elmer Brioso and respondent Baroy (Exhs. F-1 and F-2). Like the other aforementioned marriages, the
solemnization fee was also paid as shown by a receipt dated June 7, 1992 and signed by respondent Baroy (Exh. F-4).
Judge Palaypayon also denied having solemnized the marriage of Gamay and Belga allegedly because there was no marriage license.
On her part, respondent Baroy at first denied that the marriage was solemnized. When she was asked, however, why did she sign the
marriage contract as a witness she answered that she thought the marriage was already solemnized (TSN, p. 14; 10-28-93).
Respondent Baroy was, and is, the clerk of court of Judge Palaypayon. She signed the marriage contract of Gamay and Belga as one of
the two principal sponsors. Yet, she wanted to give the impression that she did not even know that the marriage was solemnized by
Judge Palaypayon. This is found very difficult to believe.
Judge Palaypayon made the same denial of having solemnized also the marriage of Terrobias and Gaor (Exh. D). The contracting
parties and their witnesses also signed the marriage contract and paid the solemnization fee, but Judge Palaypayon allegedly did not
solemnize their marriage due to lack of marriage license. Judge Palaypayon submitted the affidavit of William Medina, Vice-Mayor of
Tinambac, to corroborate his testimony (Exh. 14). Medina, however, did not testify in this case and so his affidavit has no probative
value.
Judge Palaypayon testified that his procedure and practice have been that before the contracting parties and their witnesses enter his
chamber in order to get married, he already required complainant Ramon Sambo to whom he assigned the task of preparing the
marriage contract, to already let the parties and their witnesses sign their marriage contracts, as what happened to Gamay and Belga,
and Terrobias and Gaor, among others. His purpose was to save his precious time as he has been solemnizing marriages at the rate of
three (3) to four (4) times everyday (TSN, p. 12;
2-1-94).
This alleged practice and procedure, if true, is highly improper and irregular, if not illegal, because the contracting parties are
supposed to be first asked by the solemnizing officer and declare that they take each other as husband and wife before the solemnizing
officer in the presence of at least two (2) witnesses before they are supposed to sign their marriage contracts (Art. 6, Family Code).
The uncorroborated testimony, however, of Judge Palaypayon as to his alleged practice and procedure before solemnizing a marriage,
is not true as shown by the picture taken during the wedding of Bocaya and Besmonte (Exhs. K-3 to K-9) and by the testimony of
respondent Baroy herself who declared that the practice of Judge Palaypayon ha(s) been to let the contracting parties and their
witnesses sign the marriage contract only after Judge Palaypayon has solemnized their marriage (TSN, p. 53;
10-28-93).
Judge Palaypayon did not present any evidence to show also that he was really solemnizing three (3) to four (4) marriages everyday.
On the contrary his monthly report of cases for July, 1992 shows that his court had only twenty-seven (27) pending cases and he
solemnized only seven (7) marriages for the whole month (Exh. E). His monthly report of cases for September, 1992 shows also that
he solemnized only four (4) marriages during the whole month (Exh. 7).
In this first charge of having illegally solemnized marriages, respondent Judge Palaypayon has presented and marked in evidence
several marriage contracts of other persons, affidavits of persons and certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar (Exhs. 12-B to
12-H). These persons who executed affidavits, however, did not testify in this case. Besides, the marriage contracts and certification
mentioned are immaterial as Judge Palaypayon is not charged of having solemnized these marriages illegally also. He is not charged
that the marriages he solemnized were all illegal.
The second charge against herein respondents, that of having falsified the monthly report of cases submitted to the Supreme Court and
not stating in the monthly report the actual number of documents notarized and issuing the corresponding receipts of the notarial fees,
have been sufficiently proven by the complainants insofar as the monthly report of cases for July and September, 1992 are concerned.
The monthly report of cases of the MTC of Tinambac, Camarines Sur for July, 1992 both signed by the respondents, show that for
said month there were six (6) documents notarized by Judge Palaypayon in his capacity as Ex-Officio Notary Public (Exhs. H to H-1-
b). The notarial register of the MTC of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, however, shows that there were actually one hundred thirteen (113)
documents notarized by Judge Palaypayon for the said month (Exhs. Q to Q-45).
Judge Palaypayon claims that there was no falsification of the monthly report of cases for July, 1992 because there were only six (6)
notarized documents that were paid (for) as shown by official receipts. He did not, however, present evidence of the alleged official
receipts showing that the notarial fee for the six (6) documetns were paid. Besides, the monthly report of cases with respect to the
number of documents notarized should not be based on how many notarized documents were paid of the notarial fees, but the number
of documents placed or recorded in the notarial register.
Judge Palaypayon admitted that he was not personally verifying and checking anymore the correctness of the monthly reports because
he relies on his co-respondent who is the Clerk of Court and whom he has assumed to have checked and verified the records. He
merely signs the monthly report when it is already signed by respondent Baroy.
The explanation of Judge Palaypayon is not well taken because he is required to have close supervision in the preparation of the
monthly report of cases of which he certifies as to their correctness. As a judge he is personally responsible for the proper discharge of
his functions (The Phil. Trial Lawyer's Asso. Inc. vs. Agana, Sr., 102 SCRA 517). In Nidera vs. Lazaro, 174 SCRA 581, it was held
that "A judge cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency or mismanagement of his court personnel."
On the part of respondent Baroy, she puts the blame of the falsification of the monthly report of cases on complainant Sambo whom
she allegedly assigned to prepare not only the monthly report of cases, but the preparation and custody of marriage contracts, notarized
documents and the notarial register. By her own admission she has assigned to complainant Sambo duties she was supposed to
perform, yet according to her she never bother(ed) to check the notarial register of the court to find out the number of documents
notarized in a month (TSN, p. 30; 11-23-93).
Assuming that respondent Baroy assigned the preparation of the monthly report of cases to Sambo, which was denied by the latter as
he claims that he only typed the monthly report based on the data given to him by her, still it is her duty to verify and check whether
the report is correct.
The explanation of respondent Baroy that Sambo was the one in custody of marriage contracts, notarized documents and notarial
register, among other things, is not acceptable not only because as clerk of court she was supposed to be in custody, control and
supervision of all court records including documents and other properties of the court (p. 32, Manual for Clerks of Court), but she
herself admitted that from January, 1992 she was already in full control of all the records of the court including receipts (TSN, p. 11;
11-23-93).
The evidence adduced in this cases in connection with the charge of falsification, however, also shows that respondent Baroy did not
account for what happened to the notarial fees received for those documents notarized during the month of July and September, 1992.
The evidence adduced in this case also sufficiently show that she received cash bond deposits and she did not deposit them to a bank
or to the Municipal Treasurer; and that she only issued temporary receipts for said cash bond deposits.
For July, 1992 there were only six (6) documents reported to have been notarized by Judge Palaypayon although the documents
notarized for said month were actually one hundred thirteen (113) as recorded in the notarial register. For September, 1992, there were
only five (5) documents reported as notarized for that month, though the notarial register show(s) that there were fifty-six (56)
documents actually notarized. The fee for each document notarized as appearing in the notarial register was P18.50. Respondent
Baroy and Sambo declared that what was actually being charged was P20.00. Respondent Baroy declared that P18.50 went to the
Supreme Court and P1.50 was being turned over to the Municipal Treasurer.
Baroy, however, did not present any evidence to show that she really sent to the Supreme Court the notarial fees of P18.50 for each
document notarized and to the Municipal Treasurer the additional notarial fee of P1.50. This should be fully accounted for considering
that Baroy herself declared that some notarial fees were allowed by her at her own discretion to be paid later. Similarly, the
solemnization fees have not been accounted for by Baroy considering that she admitted that even (i)n those instances where the
marriages were not solemnized due to lack of marriage license the solemnization fees were not returned anymore, unless the
contracting parties made a demand for their return. Judge Palaypayon declared that he did not know of any instance when
solemnization fee was returned when the marriage was not solemnized due to lack of marriage license.
Respondent Baroy also claims that Ramon Sambo did not turn over to her some of the notarial fees. This is difficult to believe. It was
not only because Sambo vehemently denied it, but the minutes of the conference of the personnel of the MTC of Tinambac dated
January 20, 1992 shows that on that date Baroy informed the personnel of the court that she was taking over the functions she assigned
to Sambo, particularly the collection of legal fees (Exh. 7). The notarial fees she claims that Sambo did not turn over to her were for
those documents notarized (i)n July and September, 1992 already. Besides there never was any demand she made for Sambo to turn
over some notarial fees supposedly in his possession. Neither was there any memorandum she issued on this matter, in spite of the fact
that she has been holding meetings and issuing memoranda to the personnel of the court (Exhs. V, W, FF, FF-1, FF-2, FF-3; Exhs. 4-A
(supplement(s), 5-8, 6-S, 7-S and 8-S).
It is admitted by respondent Baroy that on October 29, 1991 a cash bond deposit of a certain Dacara in the amount of One Thousand
(P1,000.00) Pesos was turned over to her after she assumed office and for this cash bond she issued only a temporary receipt (Exh. Y).
She did not deposit this cash bond in any bank or to the Municipal Treasurer. She just kept it in her own cash box on the alleged
ground that the parties in that case where the cash bond was deposited informed her that they would settle the case amicably.
Respondent Baroy declared that she finally deposited the aforementioned cash bond of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos with the
Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) in February, 1993, after this administrative case was already filed (TSN, pp. 27-28; 12-22-93).
The Pass Book, however, shows that actually Baroy opened an account with the LBP, Naga Branch, only on March 26, 1993 when she
deposited an amount of Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos (Exhs. 8 to 8-1-a). She claims that One Thousand (P1,000.000) Pesos of the
initial deposit was the cash bond of Dacara. If it were true, it was only after keeping to herself the cash bond of One Thousand
(P1,000.00) Pesos for around one year and five months when she finally deposited it because of the filing of this case.
On April 29, 1993, or only one month and two days after she finally deposited the One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos cash bond of
Dacara, she withdrew it from the bank without any authority or order from the court. It was only on July 23, 1993, or after almost
three (3) months after she withdrew it, when she redeposited said cash bond (TSN, p. 6; 1-4-94).
The evidence presented in this case also show that on February 28, 1993 respondent Baroy received also a cash bond of Three
Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos from a certain Alfredo Seprones in Crim. Case No. 5180. For this cash bond deposit, respondent Baroy
issued only an annumbered temporary receipt (Exh. X and X-1). Again Baroy just kept this Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos cash
bond to herself. She did not deposit it either (in) a bank or (with) the Municipal Treasurer. Her explanation was that the parties in
Crim. Case No. 5180 informed her that they would settle the case amicably. It was on April 26, 1993, or almost two months later
when Judge Palaypayon issued an order for the release of said cash bond (Exh. 7).
Respondent Baroy also admitted that since she assumed office on October 21, 1991 she used to issue temporary receipt only for cash
bond deposits and other payments and collections she received. She further admitted that some of these temporary receipts she issued
she failed to place the number of the receipts such as that receipt marked Exhibit X (TSN, p. 35; 11-23-93). Baroy claims that she did
not know that she had to use the official receipts of the Supreme Court. It was only from February, 1993, after this case was already
filed, when she only started issuing official receipts.
The next charge against the respondents is that in order to be appointed Clerk of Court, Baroy gave Judge Palaypayon an air
conditioner as a gift. The evidence adduced with respect to this charge, show that on August 24, 1991 Baroy bought an air conditioner
for the sum of Seventeen Thousand Six Hundred (P17,600.00) Pesos (Exhs. I and I-1). The same was paid partly in cash and in check
(Exhs. I-2 and I-3). When the air conditioner was brought to court in order to be installed in the chamber of Judge Palaypayon, it was
still placed in the same box when it was bought and was not used yet.
The respondents claim that Baroy sold it to Judge Palaypayon for Twenty Thousand (P20,00.00) Pesos on installment basis with a
down payment of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos and as proof thereof the respondents presented a typewritten receipt dated May
29, 1993 (Exh. 22). The receipt was signed by both respondents and by the Municipal Mayor of Tinambac, Camarines Sur and another
person as witness.
The alleged sale between respondents is not beyond suspicion. It was bought by Baroy at a time when she was applying for the vacant
position of Clerk of Court (to) which she was eventually appointed in October, 1991. From the time she bought the air conditioner on
August 24, 1991 until it was installed in the office of Judge Palaypayon it was not used yet. The sale to Judge Palaypayon was only
evidenced by a mere typewritten receipt dated May 29, 1992 when this case was already filed. The receipt could have been easily
prepared. The Municipal Mayor of Tinambac who signed in the receipt as a witness did not testify in this case. The sale is between the
Clerk of Court and the Judge of the same court. All these circumstances give rise to suspicion of at least impropriety. Judges should
avoid such action as would subject (them) to suspicion and (their) conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety
(Jaagueta vs. Boncasos, 60 SCRA 27).
With respect to the charge that Judge Palaypayon received a cash bond deposit of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos from Januaria
Dacara without issuing a receipt, Dacara executed an affidavit regarding this charge that Judge Palaypayon did not give her a receipt
for the P1,000.00 cash bond she deposited (Exh. N). Her affidavit, however, has no probative value as she did not show that this cash
bond of P1,000.00 found its way into the hands of respondent Baroy who issued only a temporary receipt for it and this has been
discussed earlier.
Another charge against Judge Palaypayon is the getting of detention prisoners to work in his house and one of them escaped while in
his custody and was never found again. To hide this fact, the case against said accused was ordered archived by Judge Palaypayon.
The evidence adduced with respect to this particular charge, show that in Crim. Case No. 5647 entitled People vs. Stephen Kalaw,
Alex Alano and Allan Adupe, accused Alex Alano and Allan Adupe were arrested on April 12, 1991 and placed in the municipal jail
of Tinambac, Camarines Sur (Exhs. 0, 0-1, 0-2 and 0-3; Exh. 25). The evidence presented that Alex Alano was taken by Judge
Palaypayon from the municipal jail where said accused was confined and that he escaped while in custody of Judge Palaypayon is
solely testimonial, particularly that of David Ortiz, a former utility worker of the MTC of Tinambac.
Herein investigator finds said evidence not sufficient. The complainants should have presented records from the police of Tinambac to
show that Judge Palaypayon took out from the municipal jail Alex Alano where he was under detention and said accused escaped
while in the custody of Judge Palaypayon.
The order, however, of Judge Palaypayon dated April 6, 1992 in Crim. Case No. 5047 archiving said case appears to be without basis.
The order states: "this case was filed on April 12, 1991 and the records show that the warrant of arrest (was) issued against the
accused, but up to this moment there is no return of service for the warrant of arrest issued against said accused" (Exh. 0-4). The
records of said case, however, show that in fact there was a return of the service of the warrant of arrest dated April 12, 1991 showing
that Alano and Adupe were arrested (Exh. 0-3).
Judge Palaypayon explained that his order dated April 6, 1992 archiving Crim. Case No. 5047 referred only to one of the accused who
remained at large. The explanation cannot be accepted because the two other accused, Alano and Adupe, were arrested. Judge
Palaypayon should have issued an order for the arrest of Adupe who allegedly jumped bail, but Alano was supposed to be confined in
the municipal jail if his claim is true that he did not take custody of Alano.
The explanation also of Judge Palaypayon why he ordered the case archived was because he heard from the police that Alano escaped.
This explanation is not acceptable either. He should ha(ve) set the case and if the police failed to bring to court Alano, the former
should have been required to explain in writing why Alano was not brought to court. If the explanation was that Alano escaped from
jail, he should have issued an order for his arrest. It is only later on when he could not be arrested when the case should have been
ordered archived. The order archiving this case for the reason that he only heard that Alano escaped is another circumstance which
gave rise to a suspicion that Alano might have really escaped while in his custody only that the complainants could not present records
or other documentary evidence to prove the same.
The last charge against the respondents is that they collected filing fees on collection cases filed by the Rural Bank of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur which was supposed to be exempted in paying filing fees under existing laws and that the filing fees received was
deposited by respondent Baroy in her personal account in the bank. The evidence presented show that on February 4, 1992 the Rural
Bank of Tinambac filed ten (10) civil cases for collection against farmers and it paid the total amount of Four Hundred (P400.00)
Pesos representing filing fees. The complainants cited Section 14 of Republic Act 720, as amended, which exempts Rural Banks
(from) the payment of filing fees on collection of sums of money cases filed against farmers on loans they obtained.
Judge Palaypayon, however, had nothing to do with the payment of the filing fees of the Rural Bank of Tinambac as it was respondent
Baroy who received them and besides, on February 4, 1992, he was on sick leave. On her part Baroy claims that the bank paid
voluntarily the filing fees. The records, however, shows that respondent Baroy sent a letter to the manager of the bank dated January
28, 1992 to the effect that if the bank would not pay she would submit all Rural Bank cases for dismissal (Annex 6, comment by
respondent Baroy).
Respondent Baroy should have checked whether the Rural Bank of Tinambac was really exempt from the payment of filing fees
pursuant to Republic Act 720, as amended, instead of threatening the bank to have its cases be submitted to the court in order to have
them dismissed. Here the payment of the filing fees was made on February 4, 1992, but the Four Hundred (P400.00) Pesos was only
turned over to the Municipal Treasurer on March 12, 1992. Here, there is an undue delay again in complying with her obligation as
accountable officer.
In view of the foregoing findings that the evidence presented by the complainants sufficiently show that respondent Judge Lucio P.
Palaypayon, Jr. had solemnized marriages, particularly that of Sammy Bocaya and Gina Besmonte, without a marriage license, and
that it having been shown that he did not comply with his duty in closely supervising his clerk of court in the preparation of the
monthly report of cases being submitted to the Supreme Court, particularly for the months of July and September, 1992 where it has
been proven that the reports for said two (2) months were falsified with respect to the number of documents notarized, it is
respectfully recommended that he be imposed a fine of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS with a warning that the same or
similar offenses will be more severely dealt with.
The fact that Judge Palaypayon did not sign the marriage contracts or certificates of those marriages he solemnized without a marriage
license, there were no dates placed in the marriage contracts to show when they were solemnized, the contracting parties were not
furnished their marriage contracts and the Local Civil Registrar was not being sent any copy of the marriage contract, will not absolve
him from liability. By solemnizing alone a marriage without a marriage license he as the solemnizing officer is the one responsible for
the irregularity in not complying (with) the formal requ(i)sites of marriage and under Article 4(3) of the Family Code of the
Philippines, he shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
Judge Palaypayon is likewise liable for his negligence or failure to comply with his duty of closely supervising his clerk of court in the
performance of the latter's duties and functions, particularly the preparation of the monthly report of cases (Bendesula vs. Laya, 58
SCRA 16). His explanation that he only signed the monthly report of cases only when his clerk of court already signed the same,
cannot be accepted. It is his duty to closely supervise her, to check and verify the records if the monthly reports prepared by his clerk
of court do not contain false statements. It was held that "A judge cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency or incompetence of court
personnel (Nidua vs. Lazaro, 174 SCRA 158).
In view also of the foregoing finding that respondent Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy, the clerk of court of the Municipal Trial Court of
Tinambac, Camarines Sur, has been found to have falsified the monthly report of cases for the months of July and September, 1992
with respect to the number of documents notarized, for having failed to account (for) the notarial fees she received for said two (2)
months period; for having failed to account (for) the solemnization fees of those marriages allegedly not solemnized, but the
solemnization fees were not returned; for unauthorized issuance of temporary receipts, some of which were issued unnumbered; for
receiving the cash bond of Dacara on October 29, 1991 in the amount of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos for which she issued only a
temporary receipt (Exh. Y) and for depositing it with the Land Bank of the Philippines only on March 26, 1993, or after one year and
five months in her possession and after this case was already filed; for withdrawing said cash bond of One Thousand (P1,000.00)
Pesos on April 29, 1993 without any court order or authority and redepositing it only on July 23, 1993; for receiving a cash bond of
Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos from Alfredo Seprones in Crim. Case No. 5180, MTC, Tinambac, Camarines Sur, for which she
issued only an unnumbered temporary receipt (Exhs. X and X-1) and for not depositing it with a bank or with the Municipal Treasurer
until it was ordered released; and for requiring the Rural Bank of Tinambac, Camarines Sur to pay filing fees on February 4, 1992 for
collection cases filed against farmers in the amount of Four Hundred (P400.00) Pesos, but turning over said amount to the Municipal
Treasurer only on March 12, 1992, it is respectfully recommended that said respondent clerk of court Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy be
dismissed from the service.
It is provided that "Withdrawal of court deposits shall be by the clerk of court who shall issue official receipt to the provincial, city or
municipal treasurer for the amount withdrawn. Court deposits cannot be withdrawn except by order of the court, . . . ." (Revised
Manual of Instructions for Treasurers, Sec. 183, 184 and 626; p. 127, Manual for Clerks of Court). A circular also provides that the
Clerks of Court shall immediately issue an official receipt upon receipt of deposits from party litigants and thereafter deposit intact the
collection with the municipal, city or provincial treasurer and their deposits, can only be withdrawn upon proper receipt and order of
the Court (DOJ Circular No. 52, 26 April 1968; p. 136, Manual for Clerks of Court). Supreme Court Memorandum Circular No. 5, 25
November 1982, also provides that "all collections of funds of fiduciary character including rental deposits, shall be deposited
immediately by the clerk of court concerned upon receipt thereof with City, Municipal or Provincial Treasurer where his court is
located" and that "no withdrawal of any of such deposits shall be made except upon lawful order of the court exercising jurisdiction
over the subject matter.
Respondent Baroy had either failed to comply with the foregoing circulars, or deliberately disregarded, or even intentionally violated
them. By her conduct, she demonstrated her callous unconcern for the obligations and responsibility of her duties and functions as a
clerk of court and accountable officer. The gross neglect of her duties shown by her constitute(s) a serious misconduct which
warrant(s) her removal from office. In the case of Belen P. Ferriola vs. Norma Hiam, Clerk of Court, MTCC, Branch I, Batangas City;
A.M. No. P-90-414; August 9, 1993, it was held that "The clerk of court is not authorized to keep funds in his/her custody; monies
received by him/her shall be deposited immediately upon receipt thereof with the City, Municipal or Provincial Treasurer. Supreme
Court Circular Nos. 5 dated November 25, 1982 and 5-A dated December 3, 1982. Respondent Hiam's failure to remit the cash bail
bonds and fine she collected constitutes serious misconduct and her misappropriation of said funds constitutes dishonesty.
"Respondent Norma Hiam was found guilty of dishonesty and serious misconduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and
(the Court) ordered her immediate dismissal (from) the service.
xxx xxx xxx
We here emphasize once again our adjuration that the conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the
dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility.
His conduct, at all times, must not only be characterized by propriety and decorum but, above all else, must be beyond suspicion.
Every employee should be an example of integrity, uprightness and honesty. 5 Integrity in a judicial office is more than a virtue, it is a
necessity. 6 It applies, without qualification as to rank or position, from the judge to the least of its personnel, they being standard-
bearers of the exacting norms of ethics and morality imposed upon a Court of justice.
On the charge regarding illegal marriages the Family Code pertinently provides that the formal requisites of marriage are, inter alia, a
valid marriage license except in the cases provided for therein. 7 Complementarily, it declares that the absence of any of the essential
or formal requisites shall generally render the marriage void ab initio and that, while an irregularity in the formal requisites shall not
affect the validity of the marriage, the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively
liable. 8
The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting parties and those affected by the illegal marriages, and what we are providing for
herein pertains to the administrative liability of respondents, all without prejudice to their criminal responsibility. The Revised Penal
Code provides that "(p)riests or ministers of any religious denomination or sect, or civil authorities who shall perform or authorize any
illegal marriage ceremony shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the Marriage Law." 9 This is of course, within the
province of the prosecutorial agencies of the Government.
The recommendation with respect to the administrative sanction to be imposed on respondent judge should, therefore, be modified.
For one, with respect to the charge of illegal solemnization of marriages, it does appear that he had not taken to heart, but actually
trifled with, the law's concern for the institution of marriage and the legal effects flowing from civil status. This, and his undeniable
participation in the other offenses charged as hereinbefore narrated in detail, approximate such serious degree of misconduct and of
gross negligence in the performance of judicial duties as to ineludibly require a higher penalty.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby imposes a FINE of P20,000.00 on respondent Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon. Jr., with a stern warning
that any repetition of the same or similar offenses in the future will definitely be severely dealt with. Respondent Nelia Esmeralda-
Baroy is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to employment in any
branch, agency or instrumentality of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
Let copies of this decision be spread on their records and furnished to the Office of the Ombudsman for appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.
ARANES VS OCCIANO
Petitioner Mercedita Mata Arañes charges respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law via a sworn Letter-Complaint dated 23
May 2001. Respondent is the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. Petitioner alleges that on 17
February 2000, respondent judge solemnized her marriage to her late groom Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage
license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction.
They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this marriage until her husband passed away. However, since the marriage
was a nullity, petitioner's right to inherit the "vast properties" left by Orobia was not recognized. She was likewise deprived of
receiving the pensions of Orobia, a retired Commodore of the Philippine Navy.1âwphi1.nêt
Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent judge for his illegal acts and unethical misrepresentations which
allegedly caused her so much hardships, embarrassment and sufferings.
On 28 May 2001, the case was referred by the Office of the Chief Justice to then Acting Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepaño for
appropriate action. On 8 June 2001, the Office of the Court Administrator required respondent judge to comment.
In his Comment dated 5 July 2001, respondent judge averred that he was requested by a certain Juan Arroyo on 15 February 2000 to
solemnize the marriage of the parties on 17 February 2000. Having been assured that all the documents to the marriage were complete,
he agreed to solemnize the marriage in his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. However, on 17 February
2000, Arroyo informed him that Orobia had a difficulty walking and could not stand the rigors of travelling to Balatan which is
located almost 25 kilometers from his residence in Nabua. Arroyo then requested if respondent judge could solemnize the marriage in
Nabua, to which request he acceded.
Respondent judge further avers that before he started the ceremony, he carefully examined the documents submitted to him by
petitioner. When he discovered that the parties did not possess the requisite marriage license, he refused to solemnize the marriage and
suggested its resetting to another date. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors, and the delivery of
provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human compassion. He also feared that if he reset the
wedding, it might aggravate the physical condition of Orobia who just suffered from a stroke. After the solemnization, he reiterated
the necessity for the marriage license and admonished the parties that their failure to give it would render the marriage void. Petitioner
and Orobia assured respondent judge that they would give the license to him in the afternoon of that same day. When they failed to
comply, respondent judge followed it up with Arroyo but the latter only gave him the same reassurance that the marriage license
would be delivered to his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur.
Respondent judge vigorously denies that he told the contracting parties that their marriage is valid despite the absence of a marriage
license. He attributes the hardships and embarrassment suffered by the petitioner as due to her own fault and negligence.
On 12 September 2001, petitioner filed her Affidavit of Desistance dated 28 August 2001 with the Office of the Court Administrator.
She attested that respondent judge initially refused to solemnize her marriage due to the want of a duly issued marriage license and
that it was because of her prodding and reassurances that he eventually solemnized the same. She confessed that she filed this
administrative case out of rage. However, after reading the Comment filed by respondent judge, she realized her own shortcomings
and is now bothered by her conscience.
Reviewing the records of the case, it appears that petitioner and Orobia filed their Application for Marriage License on 5 January
2000. It was stamped in this Application that the marriage license shall be issued on 17 January 2000. However, neither petitioner nor
Orobia claimed it.
It also appears that the Office of the Civil Registrar General issued a Certification that it has no record of such marriage that allegedly
took place on 17 February 2000. Likewise, the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur issued another
Certification dated 7 May 2001 that it cannot issue a true copy of the Marriage Contract of the parties since it has no record of their
marriage.
On 8 May 2001, petitioner sought the assistance of respondent judge so the latter could communicate with the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur for the issuance of her marriage license. Respondent judge wrote the Local Civil Registrar of
Nabua, Camarines Sur. In a letter dated 9 May 2001, a Clerk of said office, Grace T. Escobal, informed respondent judge that their
office cannot issue the marriage license due to the failure of Orobia to submit the Death Certificate of his previous spouse.
The Office of the Court Administrator, in its Report and Recommendation dated 15 November 2000, found the respondent judge
guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a duly issued marriage license and for doing so outside his territorial jurisdiction. A fine of
P5,000.00 was recommended to be imposed on respondent judge.
We agree.
Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P. 129, the authority of the regional trial court judges and judges of inferior
courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court.1âwphi1.nêt
The case at bar is not without precedent. In Navarro vs. Domagtoy,1 respondent judge held office and had jurisdiction in the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. However, he solemnized a wedding at his residence in the
municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte which did not fall within the jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and
Burgos. We held that:
"A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinance to marry the faithful is authorized to do so only within the area or
diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines
to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied with. However, judges who are
appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes
a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which
while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability."2 (Emphasis
supplied.)
In said case, we suspended respondent judge for six (6) months on the ground that his act of solemnizing a marriage outside his
jurisdiction constitutes gross ignorance of the law. We further held that:
"The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in the law they are sworn to apply, more than
the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and competent in understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they be
conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved in the instant case. x x x While magistrates may at times make mistakes
in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area
which has greatly prejudiced the status of married persons." 3
In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of
solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to
administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human
compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage.
Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage license. In People vs. Lara,4 we
held that a marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of such license
cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that
gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he
solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law.1âwphi1.nêt
Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of Desistance filed by petitioner. This Court has consistently held in a
catena of cases that the withdrawal of the complaint does not necessarily have the legal effect of exonerating respondent from
disciplinary action. Otherwise, the prompt and fair administration of justice, as well as the discipline of court personnel, would be
undermined.5 Disciplinary actions of this nature do not involve purely private or personal matters. They can not be made to depend
upon the will of every complainant who may, for one reason or another, condone a detestable act. We cannot be bound by the
unilateral act of a complainant in a matter which involves the Court's constitutional power to discipline judges. Otherwise, that power
may be put to naught, undermine the trust character of a public office and impair the integrity and dignity of this Court as a
disciplining authority.6
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, is
fined P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with more
severely.
SO ORDERED.
MORIGO VS PEOPLE
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the decision1 dated October 21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 20700, which affirmed the judgment2 dated August 5, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol, Branch 4, in Criminal
Case No. 8688. The trial court found herein petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy and sentenced
him to a prison term of seven (7) months of prision correccionalas minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
maximum. Also assailed in this petition is the resolution3 of the appellate court, dated September 25, 2000, denying Morigo’s motion
for reconsideration.
The facts of this case, as found by the court a quo, are as follows:
Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for
a period of four (4) years (from 1974-1978).
After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each other.
In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore. The former replied and after an exchange
of letters, they became sweethearts.
In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. While in Canada, they maintained constant
communication.
In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus
they were married on August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.
On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind.
On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a petition for divorce against appellant which was granted
by the court on January 17, 1992 and to take effect on February 17, 1992.
On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago 4 at the Virgen sa Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City,
Bohol.
On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol,
docketed as Civil Case No. 6020. The complaint seek (sic) among others, the declaration of nullity of accused’s marriage with Lucia,
on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place.
On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an Information 5 filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran [City], with
the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.6
The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for judicial nullification of his marriage with
Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. His motion was granted, but subsequently denied upon motion for
reconsideration by the prosecution. When arraigned in the bigamy case, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 8688, herein
petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial thereafter ensued.
On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol handed down its judgment in Criminal Case No. 8688, as follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court finds accused Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Bigamy and sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from Seven (7) Months of Prision Correccional as
minimum to Six (6) Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayoras maximum.
SO ORDERED.7
In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court discounted petitioner’s claim that his first marriage to Lucia was null and void ab initio.
Following Domingo v. Court of Appeals,8 the trial court ruled that want of a valid marriage ceremony is not a defense in a charge of
bigamy. The parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first
secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again.
Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia, the trial court cited Ramirez v. Gmur,9 which held that the court of a country in which
neither of the spouses is domiciled and in which one or both spouses may resort merely for the purpose of obtaining a divorce, has no
jurisdiction to determine the matrimonial status of the parties. As such, a divorce granted by said court is not entitled to recognition
anywhere. Debunking Lucio’s defense of good faith in contracting the second marriage, the trial court stressed that following People
v. Bitdu,10 everyone is presumed to know the law, and the fact that one does not know that his act constitutes a violation of the law
does not exempt him from the consequences thereof.
Seasonably, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 20700.
Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 was pending before the appellate court, the trial court rendered a
decision in Civil Case No. 6020 declaring the marriage between Lucio and Lucia void ab initiosince no marriage ceremony actually
took place. No appeal was taken from this decision, which then became final and executory.
On October 21, 1999, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.11
In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the appellate court stressed that the subsequent declaration of nullity of Lucio’s
marriage to Lucia in Civil Case No. 6020 could not acquit Lucio. The reason is that what is sought to be punished by Article 349 12 of
the Revised Penal Code is the act of contracting a second marriage before the first marriage had been dissolved. Hence, the CA held,
the fact that the first marriage was void from the beginning is not a valid defense in a bigamy case.
The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce decree obtained by Lucia from the Canadian court could not be accorded
validity in the Philippines, pursuant to Article 15 13 of the Civil Code and given the fact that it is contrary to public policy in this
jurisdiction. Under Article 1714 of the Civil Code, a declaration of public policy cannot be rendered ineffectual by a judgment
promulgated in a foreign jurisdiction.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision, contending that the doctrine in Mendiola v. People,15 allows
mistake upon a difficult question of law (such as the effect of a foreign divorce decree) to be a basis for good faith.
On September 25, 2000, the appellate court denied the motion for lack of merit. 16 However, the denial was by a split vote.
The ponente of the appellate court’s original decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, joined in the opinion
prepared by Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis. The dissent observed that as the first marriage was validly declared void ab initio, then
there was no first marriage to speak of. Since the date of the nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage and since herein
petitioner was, in the eyes of the law, never married, he cannot be convicted beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy.
The present petition raises the following issues for our resolution:
A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT IN CRIMES PENALIZED
UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE, CRIMINAL INTENT IS AN INDISPENSABLE REQUISITE. COROLLARILY,
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE [THE] PETITIONER’S LACK OF
CRIMINAL INTENT WHEN HE CONTRACTED THE SECOND MARRIAGE.
B.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RULING IN PEOPLE VS. BITDU (58
PHIL. 817) IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
C.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT EACH AND EVERY
CIRCUMSTANCE FAVORING THE INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. 17
To our mind, the primordial issue should be whether or not petitioner committed bigamy and if so, whether his defense of good faith is
valid.
The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for relying in good faith upon the divorce decree of the Ontario court. He
highlights the fact that he contracted the second marriage openly and publicly, which a person intent upon bigamy would not be doing.
The petitioner further argues that his lack of criminal intent is material to a conviction or acquittal in the instant case. The crime of
bigamy, just like other felonies punished under the Revised Penal Code, is mala in se, and hence, good faith and lack of criminal
intent are allowed as a complete defense. He stresses that there is a difference between the intent to commit the crime and the intent to
perpetrate the act. Hence, it does not necessarily follow that his intention to contract a second marriage is tantamount to an intent to
commit bigamy.
For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that good faith in the instant case is a convenient but flimsy
excuse. The Solicitor General relies upon our ruling in Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,18 which held that bigamy can be successfully
prosecuted provided all the elements concur, stressing that under Article 40 19 of the Family Code, a judicial declaration of nullity is a
must before a party may re-marry. Whether or not the petitioner was aware of said Article 40 is of no account as everyone is presumed
to know the law. The OSG counters that petitioner’s contention that he was in good faith because he relied on the divorce decree of
the Ontario court is negated by his act of filing Civil Case No. 6020, seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lucia.
Before we delve into petitioner’s defense of good faith and lack of criminal intent, we must first determine whether all the elements of
bigamy are present in this case. In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,20 we laid down the elements of bigamy thus:
(1) the offender has been legally married;
(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially
declared presumptively dead;
(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and
(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first.
Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we note that during the pendency of CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, the RTC of Bohol
Branch 1, handed down the following decision in Civil Case No. 6020, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the annulment of the marriage entered into by petitioner
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete on August 23, 1990 in Pilar, Bohol and further directing the Local Civil Registrar of Pilar, Bohol to
effect the cancellation of the marriage contract.
SO ORDERED.21
The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer.
Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The
trial court thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 322 and 423 of the Family Code. As the dissenting
opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it, "This simply means that there was no marriage to begin with; and that such
declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of
the declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused was, under the eyes
of the law, never married."24 The records show that no appeal was taken from the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 6020,
hence, the decision had long become final and executory.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the
petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a
marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married "from the beginning." The contract of marriage is null; it bears no
legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he
contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the
crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of.
The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant charge.
The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v. Tan.25 In the latter case, the judicial declaration of nullity
of the first marriage was likewise obtained after the second marriage was already celebrated. We held therein that:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters
into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the
earlier union is characterized by statutes as "void."26
It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually solemnized not just once, but twice: first before a judge
where a marriage certificate was duly issued and then again six months later before a priest in religious rites. Ostensibly, at least, the
first marriage appeared to have transpired, although later declared void ab initio.
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner and
Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance
to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an
ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity
before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal statute in favor of an accused and weigh every
circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to ensure that justice is done. Under the circumstances of the present case, we
held that petitioner has not committed bigamy. Further, we also find that we need not tarry on the issue of the validity of his defense of
good faith or lack of criminal intent, which is now moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision, dated October 21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 20700, as well as the resolution of the appellate court dated September 25, 2000, denying herein petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho is ACQUITTED from the charge of
BIGAMY on the ground that his guilt has not been proven with moral certainty.
SO ORDERED.
ALCANTARA VS ALCANTARA
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Restituto Alcantara assailing the Decision1of the Court of
Appeals dated 30 September 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 66724 denying petitioner’s appeal and affirming the decision 2 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 143, in Civil Case No. 97-1325 dated 14 February 2000, dismissing his petition for
annulment of marriage.
The antecedent facts are:
A petition for annulment of marriage3 was filed by petitioner against respondent Rosita A. Alcantara alleging that on 8 December
1982 he and respondent, without securing the required marriage license, went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a
person who could arrange a marriage for them. They met a person who, for a fee, arranged their wedding before a certain Rev.
Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC BR Chapel. 4They got married on the same day, 8 December 1982. Petitioner
and respondent went through another marriage ceremony at the San Jose de Manuguit Church in Tondo, Manila, on 26 March 1983.
The marriage was likewise celebrated without the parties securing a marriage license. The alleged marriage license, procured in
Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party was a resident of Carmona, and they never went to
Carmona to apply for a license with the local civil registrar of the said place. On 14 October 1985, respondent gave birth to their child
Rose Ann Alcantara. In 1988, they parted ways and lived separate lives. Petitioner prayed that after due hearing, judgment be issued
declaring their marriage void and ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel the corresponding marriage contract 5 and its entry on file.6
Answering petitioner’s petition for annulment of marriage, respondent asserts the validity of their marriage and maintains that there
was a marriage license issued as evidenced by a certification from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite. Contrary to
petitioner’s representation, respondent gave birth to their first child named Rose Ann Alcantara on 14 October 1985 and to another
daughter named Rachel Ann Alcantara on 27 October 1992. 7 Petitioner has a mistress with whom he has three children.8 Petitioner
only filed the annulment of their marriage to evade prosecution for concubinage. 9 Respondent, in fact, has filed a case for concubinage
against petitioner before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 60. 10 Respondent prays that the petition for
annulment of marriage be denied for lack of merit.
On 14 February 2000, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 143, rendered its Decision disposing as follows:The foregoing considered,
judgment is rendered as follows:
1. The Petition is dismissed for lack of merit;
2. Petitioner is ordered to pay respondent the sum of twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00) per month as support for their two (2)
children on the first five (5) days of each month; and
3. To pay the costs.11
As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the petitioner’s appeal. His Motion for Reconsideration was
likewise denied in a resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 6 April 2005. 12
The Court of Appeals held that the marriage license of the parties is presumed to be regularly issued and petitioner had not presented
any evidence to overcome the presumption. Moreover, the parties’ marriage contract being a public document is a prima facie proof of
the questioned marriage under Section 44, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.13
In his Petition before this Court, petitioner raises the following issues for resolution:
a. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it ruled that the Petition for Annulment has no legal and factual
basis despite the evidence on record that there was no marriage license at the precise moment of the solemnization of the marriage.
b. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it gave weight to the Marriage License No. 7054133 despite the
fact that the same was not identified and offered as evidence during the trial, and was not the Marriage license number appearing on
the face of the marriage contract.
c. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it failed to apply the ruling laid down by this Honorable Court
in the case of Sy vs. Court of Appeals. (G.R. No. 127263, 12 April 2000 [330 SCRA 550]).
d. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it failed to relax the observance of procedural rules to protect
and promote the substantial rights of the party litigants. 14
We deny the petition.
Petitioner submits that at the precise time that his marriage with the respondent was celebrated, there was no marriage license because
he and respondent just went to the Manila City Hall and dealt with a "fixer" who arranged everything for them.15 The wedding took
place at the stairs in Manila City Hall and not in CDCC BR Chapel where Rev. Aquilino Navarro who solemnized the marriage
belongs.16 He and respondent did not go to Carmona, Cavite, to apply for a marriage license. Assuming a marriage license from
Carmona, Cavite, was issued to them, neither he nor the respondent was a resident of the place. The certification of the Municipal
Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, cannot be given weight because the certification states that "Marriage License number 7054133
was issued in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario" 17 but their marriage contract bears the number 7054033 for
their marriage license number.
The marriage involved herein having been solemnized on 8 December 1982, or prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the
applicable law to determine its validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration.
A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of which renders the marriage void
ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3)18 in relation to Article 58 of the same Code.19
Article 53 of the Civil Code20 which was the law applicable at the time of the marriage of the parties states:
Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.
The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the State’s demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage,
in the maintenance of which the general public is interested. 21
Petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn the validity of his marriage. The cases where the court
considered the absence of a marriage license as a ground for considering the marriage void are clear-cut.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,22 the Local Civil Registrar issued a certification of due search and inability to find a
record or entry to the effect that Marriage License No. 3196182 was issued to the parties. The Court held that the certification of "due
search and inability to find" a record or entry as to the purported marriage license, issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, enjoys
probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Based on said certification, the Court held that there is absence of a marriage license that would render the marriage void ab initio.
In Cariño v. Cariño,23 the Court considered the marriage of therein petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased Santiago S. Carino as
void ab initio. The records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as
certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license. The court held
that the certification issued by the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of the marriage license. Their marriage
having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license
requirement, the marriage of the petitioner and the deceased is undoubtedly void ab initio.
In Sy v. Court of Appeals,24 the marriage license was issued on 17 September 1974, almost one year after the ceremony took place on
15 November 1973. The Court held that the ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted without a marriage
license.
In all these cases, there was clearly an absence of a marriage license which rendered the marriage void.
Clearly, from these cases, it can be deduced that to be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires
that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification
from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties. In this case, the marriage contract between the
petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license number. A certification to this effect was also issued by the local civil registrar of
Carmona, Cavite.25 The certification moreover is precise in that it specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license was
issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein.
The certification of Municipal Civil Registrar Macrino L. Diaz of Carmona, Cavite, reads:
This is to certify that as per the registry Records of Marriage filed in this office, Marriage License No. 7054133 was issued in favor of
Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario on December 8, 1982.
This Certification is being issued upon the request of Mrs. Rosita A. Alcantara for whatever legal purpose or intents it may serve.26
This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed and the issuance of the marriage license was
done in the regular conduct of official business.27 The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative
evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. However, the presumption prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive. Every reasonable intendment
will be made in support of the presumption and, in case of doubt as to an officer’s act being lawful or unlawful, construction should be
in favor of its lawfulness.28 Significantly, apart from these, petitioner, by counsel, admitted that a marriage license was, indeed, issued
in Carmona, Cavite.29
Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the marriage license, claims that neither he nor respondent is a resident
of Carmona, Cavite. Even then, we still hold that there is no sufficient basis to annul petitioner and respondent’s marriage. Issuance of
a marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license
despite the absence of publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period for publication are considered mere irregularities
that do not affect the validity of the marriage.30 An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity
but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and administratively liable. 31
Again, petitioner harps on the discrepancy between the marriage license number in the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar,
which states that the marriage license issued to the parties is No. 7054133, while the marriage contract states that the marriage license
number of the parties is number 7054033. Once more, this argument fails to sway us. It is not impossible to assume that the same is a
mere a typographical error, as a closer scrutiny of the marriage contract reveals the overlapping of the numbers 0 and 1, such that the
marriage license may read either as 7054133 or 7054033. It therefore does not detract from our conclusion regarding the existence and
issuance of said marriage license to the parties.
Under the principle that he who comes to court must come with clean hands, 32 petitioner cannot pretend that he was not responsible or
a party to the marriage celebration which he now insists took place without the requisite marriage license. Petitioner admitted that the
civil marriage took place because he "initiated it."33 Petitioner is an educated person. He is a mechanical engineer by profession. He
knowingly and voluntarily went to the Manila City Hall and likewise, knowingly and voluntarily, went through a marriage ceremony.
He cannot benefit from his action and be allowed to extricate himself from the marriage bond at his mere say-so when the situation is
no longer palatable to his taste or suited to his lifestyle. We cannot countenance such effrontery. His attempt to make a mockery of the
institution of marriage betrays his bad faith.34
Petitioner and respondent went through a marriage ceremony twice in a span of less than one year utilizing the same marriage license.
There is no claim that he went through the second wedding ceremony in church under duress or with a gun to his head. Everything
was executed without nary a whimper on the part of the petitioner.lavvphi1
In fact, for the second wedding of petitioner and respondent, they presented to the San Jose de Manuguit Church the marriage contract
executed during the previous wedding ceremony before the Manila City Hall. This is confirmed in petitioner’s testimony as follows—
WITNESS
As I remember your honor, they asked us to get the necessary document prior to the wedding.
COURT
What particular document did the church asked you to produce? I am referring to the San Jose de Manuguit church.
WITNESS
I don’t remember your honor.

COURT
Were you asked by the church to present a Marriage License?
WITNESS
I think they asked us for documents and I said we have already a Marriage Contract and I don’t know if it is good enough for the
marriage and they accepted it your honor.
COURT
In other words, you represented to the San Jose de Manuguit church that you have with you already a Marriage Contract?
WITNESS
Yes your honor.
COURT
That is why the San Jose de Manuguit church copied the same marriage License in the Marriage Contract issued which Marriage
License is Number 7054033.
WITNESS
Yes your honor.35
The logical conclusion is that petitioner was amenable and a willing participant to all that took place at that time. Obviously, the
church ceremony was confirmatory of their civil marriage, thereby cleansing whatever irregularity or defect attended the civil
wedding.36
Likewise, the issue raised by petitioner -- that they appeared before a "fixer" who arranged everything for them and who facilitated the
ceremony before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC Br Chapel -- will not strengthen his posture.
The authority of the officer or clergyman shown to have performed a marriage ceremony will be presumed in the absence of any
showing to the contrary.37 Moreover, the solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to investigate whether or not a marriage license has
been duly and regularly issued by the local civil registrar. All the solemnizing officer needs to know is that the license has been issued
by the competent official, and it may be presumed from the issuance of the license that said official has fulfilled the duty to ascertain
whether the contracting parties had fulfilled the requirements of law. 38
Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in favor of the validity of the marriage.39 Every intendment of the law
or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage bonds. The Courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly
repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.
Wherefore, premises considered, the instant Petition is Denied for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30
September 2004 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 143 of Makati City, dated 14 February 2000, are
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
NOLLORA JR VS PEOPLE
The Case
G.R. No. 191425 is a petition for review1 assailing the Decision2 promulgated on 30 September 2009 as well as the
Resolution3 promulgated on 23 February 2010 by the Court of Appeals (appellate court) in CA-G.R. CR No. 31538. The appellate
court affirmed the 19 November 2007 Decision4 of Branch 215 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (trial court) in Criminal
Case No. Q-04-129031.
The trial court found accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. (Nollora) guilty of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code and
sentenced him to suffer imprisonment. Co-accused Rowena Geraldino (Geraldino) was acquitted for the prosecution’s failure to prove
her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The Facts
The appellate court recited the facts as follows:
On August 24, 2004, Assistant City Prosecutor Raymond Jonathan B. Lledo filed an Information against Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
("Nollora") and Rowena P. Geraldino ("Geraldino") for the crime of Bigamy. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
"That on or about the 8th day of December 2001 in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused ATILANO O. NOLLORA,
JR., being then legally married to one JESUSA PINAT NOLLORA, and as said marriage has not been legally dissolved and still
subsisting, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a subsequent or second marriage with her [sic] co-accused
ROWENA P. GERALDINO, who knowingly consented and agreed to be married to her co-accused ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR.
knowing him to be a married man, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party JESUSA PINAT NOLLORA."
Upon his arraignment on April 18, 2005, accused Nollora assisted by counsel, refused to enter his plea. Hence, a plea of not guilty was
entered by the Court for him. Accused Geraldino, on the other hand, entered a plea of not guilty when arraigned on June 14, 2005. On
even date, pre-trial conference was held and both the prosecution and defense entered the following stipulation of facts:
"1. the validity of the first marriage between Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. and Jesusa Pinat Nollora solemnized on April 6, 1999 at Sapang
Palay, San Jose del Monte;
2. that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. contracted the second marriage with Rowena P. Geraldino on December 8, 2001 in Quezon City;
3. that in the Counter-Affidavit of Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., he admitted that he contracted the second marriage to Rowena P. Geraldino;
4. that Rowena P. Geraldino attached to her Counter-Affidavit the Certificate of Marriage with Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. dated December
8, 2001;
5. the fact of marriage of Rowena P. Geraldino with Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. as admitted in her Counter-Affidavit."
The only issue thus proffered by the prosecution for the RTC’s resolution is whether or not the second marriage is bigamous.
Afterwards, pre-trial conference was terminated and the case was set for initial hearing. Thereafter, trial ensued.
Evidence for the Prosecution
As culled from the herein assailed Decision, the respective testimonies of prosecution witnesses were as follows:
"xxx (W)itness Jesusa Pinat Nollora xxx testified that she and accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. met in Saudi Arabia while she was
working there as a Staff Midwife in King Abdulah Naval Base Hospital. Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. courted her and on April 6, 1999, they
got married at the [IE]MELIF Chruch [sic] in Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan (Exhibit ‘A’). While working in said
hospital, she heard rumors that her husband has another wife and because of anxiety and emotional stress, she left Saudi Arabia and
returned to the Philippines (TSN, October 4, 2005, page 10). Upon arrival in the Philippines, the private complainant learned that
indeed, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. contracted a second marriage with co-accused Rowena P. Geraldino on December 8, 2001 (Exhibit ‘B’)
when she secured a certification as to the civil status of Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. (Exhibit ‘C’) from the National Statistics Office (NSO)
sometime in November 2003.
Upon learning this information, the private complainant confronted Rowena P. Geraldino at the latter’s workplace in CBW, FTI,
Taguig and asked her if she knew of the first marriage between complainant and Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. to which Rowena P. Geraldino
allegedly affirmed and despite this knowledge, she allegedly still married Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. because she loves him so much and
because they were neighbors and childhood friends. Private complainant also knew that Rowena P. Geraldino knew of her marriage
with Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., because when she (private complainant) was brought by Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. at the latter’s residence in
Taguig, Metro Manila and introduced her to Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.’s parents, Rowena P. Geraldino was there in the house together
with a friend and she heard everything that they were talking about.
Because of this case, private complainant was not able to return to Saudi Arabia to work as a Staff Midwife thereby losing income
opportunity in the amount of ₱34,000.00 a month, more or less. When asked about the moral damages she suffered, she declared that
what happened to her was a tragedy and she had entertained [thoughts] of committing suicide. She added that because of what
happened to her, her mother died and she almost got raped when Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. left her alone in their residence in Saudi
Arabia. However, she declared that money is not enough to assuage her sufferings. Instead, she just asked for the return of her money
in the amount of ₱50,000.00 (TSN, July 26, 2005, pages 4-14).
Prosecution witness Ruth Santos testified that she knew of the marriage between the private complainant and Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.,
because she was one of the sponsors in said wedding. Sometime in November 2003, she was asked by the private complainant to
accompany the latter to the workplace of Rowena P. Geraldino in FTI, Taguig, Metro Manila. She declared that the private
complainant and Rowena P. Geraldino had a confrontation and she heard that Rowena P. Geraldino admitted that she (Rowena) knew
of the first marriage of Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. and the private complainant but she still went on to marry Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
because she loves him very much (TSN, October 24, 2005, pages 3-5).
Evidence for the Defense
The defense’s version of facts, as summarized in the herein assailed Decision, is as follows:
"Accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. admitted having contracted two (2) marriages, the first with private complainant Jesusa Pinat and the
second with Rowena P. Geraldino. He, however, claimed that he was a Muslim convert way back on January 10, 1992, even before he
contracted the first marriage with the private complainant. As a [M]uslim convert, he is allegedly entitled to marry four (4) wives as
allowed under the Muslim or Islam belief.
To prove that he is a Muslim convert even prior to his marriage to the private complainant, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. presented a
Certificate of Conversion dated August 2, 2004 issued by one Hadji Abdul Kajar Madueño and approved by one Khad Ibrahim A.
Alyamin wherein it is stated that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. allegedly converted as a Muslim since January 19, 1992 (Exhibit ‘2,’ ‘3’ and
‘4’). Aside from said certificate, he also presented a Pledge of Conversion dated January 10, 1992 issued by the same Hadji Abdul
Kajar Madueño and approved by one Khad Ibrahim A. Alyamin (Exhibit ‘7’).
He claimed that the private complaint knew that he was a Muslim convert prior to their marriage because she [sic] told this fact when
he was courting her in Saudi Arabia and the reason why said private complainant filed the instant case was due to hatred having
learned of his second marriage with Rowena P. Geraldino. She [sic] further testified that Rowena P. Geraldino was not aware of his
first marriage with the private complainant and he did not tell her this fact because Rowena P. Geraldino is a Catholic and he does not
want to lose her if she learns of his first marriage.
He explained that in his Marriage Contract with Jesusa Pinat, it is indicated that he was a ‘Catholic Pentecostal’ but that he was not
aware why it was placed as such on said contract. In his Marriage Contract with Rowena P. Geraldino, the religion ‘Catholic’ was also
indicated because he was keeping as a secret his being a Muslim since the society does not approve of marrying a Muslim. He also
indicated that he was ‘single’ despite his first marriage to keep said first marriage a secret (TSN, January 30, 2006, pages 2-13).
Defense witness Hadji Abdul Qasar Madueño testified that he is the founder and president of Balik Islam Tableegh Foundation of the
Philippines and as such president, he has the power and authority to convert any applicant to the Muslim religion. He alleged that
sometime in 1992, he met accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. in Mabini (Manila) who was then going abroad. Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
applied to become a Muslim (Exhibit ‘14’) and after receiving the application, said accused was indoctrinated regarding his
obligations as a Muslim. On January 10, 1992, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. embraced the Muslim faith. He was then directed to report
every Sunday to monitor his development.
In the year 2004, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. visited him and asked for a certification because of the filing of the instant case. On October
2, 2004, he issued a Certificate of Conversion wherein it is stated that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. is a Muslim convert since January 10,
1992. Apart from the above-mentioned document, their ‘Imam’ also issued a Pledge of Conversion (Exhibit ‘7’). He declared that a
Muslim convert could marry more than one according to the Holy Koran. However, before marrying his second, third and fourth
wives, it is required that the consent of the first Muslim wife be secured. Thus, if the first wife is not a Muslim, there is no necessity to
secure her consent (TSN, October 9, 2006, pages 2-12).
During his cross-examinations, he declared that if a Muslim convert gets married not in accordance with the Muslim faith, the same is
contrary to the teachings of the Muslim faith. A Muslim also can marry up to four times but he should be able to treat them equally.
He claimed that he was not aware of the first marriage but was aware of the second. Since his second marriage with Rowena P.
Geraldino was not in accordance with the Muslim faith, he advised Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. to re-marry Rowena P. Geraldino in
accordance with Muslim marriage celebration, otherwise, he will not be considered as a true Muslim (TSN, June 25, 2007, pages 3-7).
Accused Rowena P. Geraldino alleged that she was only a victim in this incident of bigamous marriage. She claimed that she does not
know the private complainant Jesusa Pinat Nollora and only came to know her when this case was filed. She insists that she is the one
lawfully married to Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., having been married to the latter since December 8, 2001. Upon learning that Atilano O.
Nollora, Jr. contracted a first marriage with the private complainant, she confronted the former who admitted the said marriage. Prior
to their marriage, she asked Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. if he was single and the latter responded that he was single. She also knew that her
husband was a Catholic prior to their marriage but after she learned of the first marriage of her husband, she learned that he is a
Muslim convert. She also claimed that after learning that her husband was a Muslim convert, she and Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., also got
married in accordance with the Muslim rites. She also belied the allegations of the private complainant that she was sought by the
private complainant and that they had a confrontation where she admitted that she knew that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. was married to the
private complainant and despite this knowledge, she went on to marry him because she loved him very much. She insisted that she
only came to know the private complainant when she (private complainant) filed this case (TSN, August 14, 2007, pages 2-8)."5
The Trial Court’s Ruling
In its Decision6 dated 19 November 2007, the trial court convicted Nollora and acquitted Geraldino.
The trial court stated that there are only two exceptions to prosecution for bigamy: Article 417 of the Family Code, or Executive Order
No. 209, and Article 1808 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, or Presidential Decree No. 1083. The trial court
also cited Article 27 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, which provides the qualifications for allowing Muslim
men to have more than one wife: "[N]o Muslim male can have more than one wife unless he can deal with them in equal
companionship and just treatment as enjoined by Islamic Law and only in exceptional cases."
In convicting Nollora, the trial court’s Decision further stated thus:
The principle in Islam is that monogamy is the general rule and polygamy is allowed only to meet urgent needs. Only with the
permission of the court can a Muslim be permitted to have a second wife subject to certain requirements. This is because having
plurality of wives is merely tolerated, not encouraged, under certain circumstances (Muslim Law on Personal Status in the Philippines
by Amer M. Bara-acal and Abdulmajid J. Astir, 1998 First Edition, Pages 64-65). Arbitration is necessary. Any Muslim husband
desiring to contract subsequent marriages, before so doing, shall notify the Shari’a Circuit Court of the place where his family resides.
The clerk of court shall serve a copy thereof to the wife or wives. Should any of them objects [sic]; an Agama Arbitration Council
shall be constituted. If said council fails to secure the wife’s consent to the proposed marriage, the Court shall, subject to Article 27,
decide whether on [sic] not to sustain her objection (Art. 162, Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines).
Accused Atilano Nollora, Jr., in marrying his second wife, co-accused Rowena P. Geraldino, did not comply with the above-
mentioned provision of the law. In fact, he did not even declare that he was a Muslim convert in both marriages, indicating his
criminal intent. In his converting to the Muslim faith, said accused entertained the mistaken belief that he can just marry anybody
again after marrying the private complainant. What is clear, therefore, is [that] a Muslim is not given an unbridled right to just marry
anybody the second, third or fourth time. There are requirements that the Shari’a law imposes, that is, he should have notified the
Shari’a Court where his family resides so that copy of said notice should be furnished to the first wife. The argument that notice to the
first wife is not required since she is not a Muslim is of no moment. This obligation to notify the said court rests upon accused Atilano
Nollora, Jr. It is not for him to interpret the Shari’a law. It is the Shari’a Court that has this authority.
In an apparent attempt to escape criminal liability, the accused recelebrated their marriage in accordance with the Muslim rites.
However, this can no longer cure the criminal liability that has already been violated.
The Court, however, finds criminal liability on the person of accused Atilano Nollora, Jr., only. There is no sufficient evidence that
would pin accused Rowena P. Geraldino down. The evidence presented by the prosecution against her is the allegation that she knew
of the first marriage between private complainant and Atilano Nollora, Jr., is insufficient[,] being open to several interpretations.
Private complainant alleged that when she was brought by Atilano Nollora, Jr., to the latter’s house in Taguig, Metro Manila, Rowena
P. Geraldino was there standing near the door and heard their conversation. From this incident, private complainant concluded that
said Rowena P. Geraldino was aware that she and Atilano Nollora, Jr., were married. This conclusion is obviously misplaced since it
could not be reasonably presumed that Rowena P. Geraldino understands what was going on between her and Atilano Nollora, Jr. It is
axiomatic that "(E)very circumstance favoring accused’s innocence must be taken into account, proof against him must survive the
test of reason and the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment" (People vs. Austria, 195 SCRA 700). This Court,
therefore, has to acquit Rowena P. Geraldino for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:
a) Finding accused ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy punishable under Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code. This court hereby renders judgment imposing upon him a prison term of two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum of his indeterminate sentence, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor, as maximum, plus accessory penalties provided by law.
b) Acquitting accused ROWENA P. GERALDINO of the crime of Bigamy for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
Costs against accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
SO ORDERED.9
Nollora filed a notice of appeal and moved for the allowance of his temporary liberty under the same bail bond pending appeal. The
trial court granted Nollora’s motion.
Nollora filed a brief with the appellate court and assigned only one error of the trial court:
The trial court gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty of the crime charged despite the prosecution’s failure to establish
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.10
The Appellate Court’s Ruling
On 30 September 2009, the appellate court dismissed Nollora’s appeal and affirmed the trial court’s decision.11
The appellate court rejected Nollora’s defense that his second marriage to Geraldino was in lawful exercise of his Islamic religion and
was allowed by the Qur’an. The appellate court denied Nollora’s invocation of his religious beliefs and practices to the prejudice of
the non-Muslim women who married him pursuant to Philippine civil laws.1avvphi1Nollora’s two marriages were not conducted in
accordance with the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, hence the Family Code of the Philippines should apply. Nollora’s claim of
religious freedom will not immobilize the State and render it impotent in protecting the general welfare.
In a Resolution12 dated 23 February 2010, the appellate court denied Nollora’s motion for reconsideration. The allegations in the
motion for reconsideration were a mere rehash of Nollora’s earlier arguments, and there was no reason for the appellate court to
modify its 30 September 2009 Decision.
Nollora filed the present petition for review before this Court on 6 April 2010.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether Nollora is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy.
The Court’s Ruling
Nollora’s petition has no merit. We affirm the rulings of the appellate court and of the trial court.
Elements of Bigamy
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 349. Bigamy. ‒ The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are:
1. That the offender has been legally married.
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed
dead according to the Civil Code.
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage.
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.13
The circumstances in the present case satisfy all the elements of bigamy. (1) Nollora is legally married to Pinat; 14(2) Nollora and
Pinat’s marriage has not been legally dissolved prior to the date of the second marriage; (3) Nollora admitted the existence of his
second marriage to Geraldino;15 and (4) Nollora and Geraldino’s marriage has all the essential requisites for validity except for the
lack of capacity of Nollora due to his prior marriage. 16
The marriage certificate17 of Nollora and Pinat’s marriage states that Nollora and Pinat were married at Sapang Palay IEMELIF
Church, Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan on 6 April 1999. Rev. Jonathan De Mesa, Minister of the IEMELIF Church
officiated the ceremony. The marriage certificate18 of Nollora and Geraldino’s marriage states that Nollora and Geraldino were
married at Max’s Restaurant, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, Metro Manila on 8 December 2001. Rev. Honorato D. Santos officiated
the ceremony.
A certification dated 4 November 2003 from the Office of the Civil Registrar General reads:
We certify that ATILANO JR O. NOLLORA who is alleged to have been born on February 22, 1968 from ATILANO M. NOLLORA
SR and FLAVIANA OCLARIT, appears in our National Indices of Marriage for Groom for the years 1973 to 2002 with the following
information:
Date of Marriage Place of Marriage
a) April 06, 1999 b) SAN JOSE DEL MONTE, BULACAN

a) December 08, 2001 b) QUEZON CITY, METRO MANILA (2nd District) 19
Before the trial and appellate courts, Nollora put up his Muslim religion as his sole defense. He alleged that his religion allows him to
marry more than once. Granting arguendo that Nollora is indeed of Muslim faith at the time of celebration of both
marriages,20 Nollora cannot deny that both marriage ceremonies were not conducted in accordance with the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws, or Presidential Decree No. 1083. The applicable Articles in the Code of Muslim Personal Laws read:
Art. 14. Nature. - Marriage is not only a civil contract but a civil institution. Its nature, consequences and incidents are governed by
this Code and the Shari’a and not subject to stipulation, except that the marriage settlements to a certain extent fix the property
relations of the spouses.
Art. 15. Essential Requisites. - No marriage contract shall be perfected unless the following essential requisites are complied with:
(a) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(b) Mutual consent of the parties freely given;
(c) Offer (ijab) and acceptance (qabul) duly witnessed by at least two competent persons after the proper guardian in marriage (wali)
has given his consent; and
(d) Stipulation of the customary dower (mahr) duly witnessed by two competent persons.
Art. 16. Capacity to contract marriage. - (1) Any Muslim male at least fifteen years of age and any Muslim female of the age of
puberty or upwards and not suffering from any impediment under the provisions of this Code may contract marriage. A female is
presumed to have attained puberty upon reaching the age of fifteen.
x x x.
Art. 17. Marriage Ceremony. - No particular form of marriage ceremony is required but the ijab and the qabul in marriage shall be
declared publicly in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage and the two competent witnesses. The declaration shall be set
forth in an instrument in triplicate, signed or marked by the contracting parties and said witnesses, and attested by the person
solemnizing the marriage. One copy shall be given to the contracting parties and another sent to the Circuit Registrar by the
solemnizing officer who shall keep the third.
Art. 18. Authority to solemnize marriage. - Marriage maybe solemnized:
(a) By the proper wali by the woman to be wedded;
(b) Upon the authority of the proper wali, by any person who is competent under Muslim law to solemnize marriage; or
(c) By the judge of the Shari’a District Court or Shari’a Circuit Court or any person designated by the judge, should the
proper wali refuse without justifiable reason, to authorize the solemnization.
Art. 19. Place of solemnization. - Marriage shall be solemnized publicly in any mosque, office of the Shari’a judge, office of the
Circuit Registrar, residence of the bride or her wali, or at any other suitable place agreed upon by the parties.
Art. 20. Specification of dower. - The amount or value of dower may be fixed by the contracting parties (mahr-musamma) before,
during or after the celebration of marriage. If the amount or the value thereof has not been so fixed, a proper dower (mahr-mithl) shall,
upon petition of the wife, be determined by the court according to the social standing of the parties.
Indeed, Article 13(2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states that "[i]n case of a marriage between a Muslim and a non-
Muslim, solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law or this Code, the [Family Code of the Philippines, or Executive Order
No. 209, in lieu of the Civil Code of the Philippines] shall apply." Nollora’s religious affiliation is not an issue here. Neither is the
claim that Nollora’s marriages were solemnized according to Muslim law. Thus, regardless of his professed religion, Nollora cannot
claim exemption from liability for the crime of bigamy. 21
Nollora asserted in his marriage certificate with Geraldino that his civil status is "single." Moreover, both of Nollora’s marriage
contracts do not state that he is a Muslim. Although the truth or falsehood of the declaration of one’s religion in the marriage
certificate is not an essential requirement for marriage, such omissions are sufficient proofs of Nollora’s liability for bigamy. Nollora’s
false declaration about his civil status is thus further compounded by these omissions.
[ATTY. CALDINO:]
Q: In your marriage contract, Mr. Witness, with Jesusa Pinat, you indicated here as your religion, Catholic Pentecostal, and you were
saying that since January 10, 1992, you are already a [M]uslim convert. . . you said, Mr. Witness, that you are already a [M]uslim
convert since January 10, 1992. However, in your marriage contract with Jesusa Pinat, there is no indication here that you have
indicated your religion. Will you please go over your marriage contract?
[NOLLORA:]
A: When we got married, they just placed there Catholic but I didn’t know why they did not place any Catholic there.
xxx
Q: Now, Mr. Witness, I would like to call your attention with respect to your marriage contract with your co-accused in this
case, Rowena Geraldino, x x x will you please tell us, Mr. Witness, considering that you said that you are already a [M]uslim
convert on January 10, 1992, why in the marriage contract with Rowena Geraldino, you indicated there your religion as
Catholic, Mr. Witness?
A: Since I was a former Catholic and since I was then keeping, I was keeping it as a secret my being my Balik-Islam, that’s
why I placed there Catholic since I know that the society doesn’t approve a Catholic to marry another, that’s why I placed
there Catholic as my religion, sir.
Q: How about under the column, "civil status," why did you indicate there that you’re single, Mr. Witness?
A: I also kept it as a secret that I was married, earlier married. 22 (Emphasis supplied)
xxx
[PROSECUTOR TAYLOR:]
Q: Would you die for your new religion, Mr. Nollora?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: If you would die for your new religion, why did you allow that your faith be indicated as Catholic when in fact you were already as
you alleged [M]uslim to be put in your marriage contract?
xxx
[A:] I don’t think there is anything wrong with it, I just signed it so we can get married under the Catholic rights [sic] because after
that we even got married under the [M]uslim rights [sic], your Honor.
xxx
Q: Under your Muslim faith, if you marry a second wife, are you required under your faith to secure the permission of your first wife
to get married?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: Did you secure that permission from your first wife, Jesusa Nollora?
A: I was not able to ask any permission from her because she was very mad at me, at the start, she was always very mad, ma’am.23
In his petition before this Court, Nollora casts doubt on the validity of his marriage to Geraldino.1avvphi1 Nollora may not impugn his
marriage to Geraldino in order to extricate himself from criminal liability; otherwise, we would be opening the doors to allowing the
solemnization of multiple flawed marriage ceremonies. As we stated in Tenebro v. Court of Appeals:24
There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal
consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the State’s
penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some
manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the
promise of futurity and commitment.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31538 promulgated on 30
September 2009 and the Resolution promulgated on 23 February 2010 are AFFIRMED. Petitioner Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Bigamy in Criminal Case No. Q-04-129031 and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment with a
term of two years, four months and one day of prision correccional as minimum to eight years and one day of prision mayor as
maximum of his indeterminate sentence, as well as the accessory penalties provided by law.
Costs against petitioner Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC VS ALBIOS
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules t of Court assailing the September 29, 2011 Decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414, which affirmed the April 25, 2008Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court, Imus,
Cavite (RTC). declaring the marriage of Daniel Lee Fringer (Fringer) and respondent Liberty Albios (A/bios) as void from the
beginning.
The facts
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before Judge Ofelia I. Calo of the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch59, Mandaluyong City (MeTC), as evidenced by a Certificate of Marriage with Register No. 2004-1588.3
On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity 4 of her marriage with Fringer. She alleged that
immediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and wife because they never really had any intention of
entering into a married state or complying with any of their essential marital obligations. She described their marriage as one made in
jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio .
Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios filed a motion to set case for pre-trial
and to admit her pre-trial brief. The RTC ordered the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to conduct an investigation and determine the
existence of a collusion. On October 2, 2007, the Assistant Prosecutor complied and reported that she could not make a determination
for failure of both parties to appear at the scheduled investigation.
At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the hearing despite being duly notified of
the schedule. After the pre-trial, hearing on the merits ensued.
Ruling of the RTC
In its April 25, 2008 Decision,5 the RTC declared the marriage void ab initio, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage of Liberty Albios and Daniel Lee Fringer as
void from the very beginning. As a necessary consequence of this pronouncement, petitioner shall cease using the surname of
respondent as she never acquired any right over it and so as to avoid a misimpression that she remains the wife of respondent.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.6
The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for convenience only. Giving credence to the testimony of Albios, it
stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire American citizenship; that in consideration thereof,
she agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties went their separate ways; that Fringer returned to the
United States and never again communicated with her; and that, in turn, she did not pay him the $2,000.00 because he never processed
her petition for citizenship. The RTC, thus, ruled that when marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the establishment of a
conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should not be recognized from its inception.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration.
The RTC issued the Order, 7 dated February 5, 2009, denying the motion for want of merit. It explained that the marriage was
declared void because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it
and used it only as a means to acquire American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00.
Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.
Ruling of the CA
In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling which found that the essential requisite of consent
was lacking. The CA stated that the parties clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of getting married and that their
case was similar to a marriage in jest. It further explained that the parties never intended to enter into the marriage contract and never
intended to live as husband and wife or build a family. It concluded that their purpose was primarily for personal gain, that is, for
Albios to obtain foreign citizenship, and for Fringer, the consideration of $2,000.00.
Hence, this petition.
Assignment of Error
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAWWHEN IT HELD THAT A MARRIAGE CONTRACTED FOR
THEPURPOSE OF OBTAINING FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP WAS DONEIN JEST, HENCE, LACKING IN THE ESSENTIAL
ELEMENT OFCONSENT.8
The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to acquire American citizenship and for Fringer to be paid $2,000.00, both
parties freely gave their consent to the marriage, as they knowingly and willingly entered into that marriage and knew the benefits and
consequences of being bound by it. According to the OSG, consent should be distinguished from motive, the latter being
inconsequential to the validity of marriage.
The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within the concept of a marriage in jest. The parties here intentionally
consented to enter into a real and valid marriage, for if it were otherwise, the purpose of Albios to acquire American citizenship would
be rendered futile.
On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment9 to the petition, reiterating her stand that her marriage was similar to a marriage by
way of jest and, therefore, void from the beginning.
On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply10 reiterating its arguments in its petition for review on certiorari.
Ruling of the Court
The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question of law: Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American
citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?
The Court resolves in the negative.
Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall first examine the phenomenon of marriage fraud for the purposes of immigration.
Marriage Fraud in Immigration
The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits. This has led to the development of marriage fraud for the sole purpose
of availing of particular benefits. In the United States, marriages where a couple marries only to achieve a particular purpose or
acquire specific benefits, have been referred to as "limited purpose" marriages.11 A common limited purpose marriage is one entered
into solely for the legitimization of a child.12 Another, which is the subject of the present case, is for immigration purposes.
Immigration law is usually concerned with the intention of the couple at the time of their marriage,13 and it attempts to filter out those
who use marriage solely to achieve immigration status.14
In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 15 established the principal test for determining the
presence of marriage fraud in immigration cases. It ruled that a "marriage is a sham if the bride and groom did not intend to establish a
life together at the time they were married. "This standard was modified with the passage of the Immigration Marriage Fraud
Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now requires the couple to instead demonstrate that the marriage was not "entered into for the
purpose of evading the immigration laws of the United States." The focus, thus, shifted from determining the intention to establish a
life together, to determining the intention of evading immigration laws. 16 It must be noted, however, that this standard is used purely
for immigration purposes and, therefore, does not purport to rule on the legal validity or existence of a marriage.
The question that then arises is whether a marriage declared as a sham or fraudulent for the limited purpose of immigration is also
legally void and in existent. The early cases on limited purpose marriages in the United States made no definitive ruling. In 1946, the
notable case of
United States v. Rubenstein17 was promulgated, wherein in order to allow an alien to stay in the country, the parties had agreed to
marry but not to live together and to obtain a divorce within six months. The Court, through Judge Learned Hand, ruled that a
marriage to convert temporary into permanent permission to stay in the country was not a marriage, there being no consent, to wit:
x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never married at all. Mutual consent is necessary to every contract; and no matter what
forms or ceremonies the parties may go through indicating the contrary, they do not contract if they do not in fact assent, which may
always be proved. x x x Marriage is no exception to this rule: a marriage in jest is not a marriage at all. x x x It is quite true that a
marriage without subsequent consummation will be valid; but if the spouses agree to a marriage only for the sake of representing it as
such to the outside world and with the understanding that they will put an end to it as soon as it has served its purpose to deceive, they
have never really agreed to be married at all. They must assent to enter into the relation as it is ordinarily understood, and it is not
ordinarily understood as merely a pretence, or cover, to deceive others.18
(Italics supplied)
On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines, 19 which declared as valid a marriage entered into
solely for the husband to gain entry to the United States, stating that a valid marriage could not be avoided "merely because the
marriage was entered into for a limited purpose." 20 The 1980 immigration case of Matter of McKee,21 further recognized that a
fraudulent or sham marriage was intrinsically different from a non subsisting one.
Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of consent has, therefore, been recognized as problematic. The problem being that
in order to obtain an immigration benefit, a legal marriage is first necessary. 22 At present, United States courts have generally denied
annulments involving" limited purpose" marriages where a couple married only to achieve a particular purpose, and have upheld such
marriages as valid.23
The Court now turns to the case at hand.
Respondent’s marriage not void
In declaring the respondent’s marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the
establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should not be recognized from its inception. In its resolution denying
the OSG’s motion for reconsideration, the RTC went on to explain that the marriage was declared void because the parties failed to
freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means for the
respondent to acquire American citizenship. Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that the essential requisite of consent was lacking.
It held that the parties clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of getting married. As in the Rubenstein case, the CA
found the marriage to be similar to a marriage in jest considering that the parties only entered into the marriage for the acquisition of
American citizenship in exchange of $2,000.00. They never intended to enter into a marriage contract and never intended to live as
husband and wife or build a family.
The CA’s assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the parties’ supposed lack of consent. Under Article 2 of the Family Code,
consent is an essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the same Code provides that the absence of any essential requisite shall
render a marriage void ab initio.
Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing officer. A
"freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in
the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles45 and 46 of the Family Code, such
as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence. 24Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of
intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act. 25 Their understanding
should not be affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism. 26
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real consent because it was not vitiated
nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the
beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was freely
given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates
that they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to
fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that
would be created between them, since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
In ruling that Albios’ marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA characterized such as akin to a marriage by way of jest. A
marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as a joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual
marriage status, and with a clear understanding that the parties would not be bound. The ceremony is not followed by any conduct
indicating a purpose to enter into such a relation.27 It is a pretended marriage not intended to be real and with no intention to create any
legal ties whatsoever, hence, the absence of any genuine consent. Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or
unintelligent consent, but for a complete absence of consent. There is no genuine consent because the parties have absolutely no
intention of being bound in any way or for any purpose.
The respondent’s marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest.1âwphi1 Albios and Fringer had an undeniable intention to be
bound in order to create the very bond necessary to allow the respondent to acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to
be married would allow them to further their objective, considering that only a valid marriage can properly support an application for
citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention to enter into the actual marriage status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited
purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly present.
The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to establish a conjugal and family life. The
possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no real intention to establish a life together is, however, insufficient to nullify a
marriage freely entered into in accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides that the nature, consequences, and incidents of
marriage are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. A marriage may, thus, only be declared void or voidable under the
grounds provided by law. There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the
Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal requisites
prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid. 28
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot dictate on the kind of life that a couple
chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious
constitutional questions.29 The right to marital privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in almost any way they see
fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love one another or not, and so on. 30 Thus, marriages entered into
for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with
all the legal requisites,31are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for
marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.
Although the Court views with disdain the respondent’s attempt to utilize marriage for dishonest purposes, It cannot declare the
marriage void. Hence, though the respondent’s marriage may be considered a sham or fraudulent for the purposes of immigration, it is
not void ab initio and continues to be valid and subsisting.
Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud under Article 45 (3) of the Family Code. Only the
circumstances listed under Article 46 of the same Code may constitute fraud, namely, (1) non- disclosure of a previous conv1ctwn
involving moral turpitude; (2) concealment by the wife of a pregnancy by another man; (3) concealment of a sexually transmitted
disease; and (4) concealment of drug addiction, alcoholism, or homosexuality. No other misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute
fraud as a ground for an action to annul a marriage. Entering into a marriage for the sole purpose of evading immigration laws does
not qualify under any of the listed circumstances. Furthermore, under Article 47 (3), the ground of fraud may only be brought by the
injured or innocent party. In the present case, there is no injured party because Albios and Fringer both conspired to enter into the
sham marriage.
Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage. Allowing her marriage with Fringer to be declared void
would only further trivialize this inviolable institution. The Court cannot declare such a marriage void in the event the parties fail to
qualify for immigration benefits, after they have availed of its benefits, or simply have no further use for it. These unscrupulous
individuals cannot be allowed to use the courts as instruments in their fraudulent schemes. Albios already misused a judicial institution
to enter into a marriage of convenience; she should not be allowed to again abuse it to get herself out of an inconvenient situation.
No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State.32 It must, therefore, be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. This Court cannot
leave the impression that marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily nullified when no
longer needed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414 is
ANNULLED, and Civil Case No. 1134-06 is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
ABBAS VS ABBAS
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, questioning the Decision 1 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) dated March 11, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760, which reversed the Decision2 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM
dated October 5, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 109, Pasay City, and the CA Resolution dated July 24, 2008,
denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the CA Decision.
The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas (Syed) for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to
Gloria Goo-Abbas (Gloria) with the RTC of Pasay City, docketed as Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM, and raffled to RTC Branch 109.
Syed alleged the absence of a marriage license, as provided for in Article 4, Chapter I, Title 1 of Executive Order No. 269, otherwise
known as the Family Code of the Philippines, as a ground for the annulment of his marriage to Gloria.
In the Marriage Contract3 of Gloria and Syed, it is stated that Marriage License No. 9969967, issued at Carmona, Cavite on January 8,
1993, was presented to the solemnizing officer. It is this information that is crucial to the resolution of this case.
At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria, a Filipino citizen, in Taiwan in 1991, and they were married on
August 9, 1992 at the Taipei Mosque in Taiwan.4 He arrived in the Philippines in December of 1992. On January 9, 1993, at around 5
o’clock in the afternoon, he was at his mother-in-law’s residence, located at 2676 F. Muñoz St., Malate, Manila, when his mother-in-
law arrived with two men. He testified that he was told that he was going to undergo some ceremony, one of the requirements for his
stay in the Philippines, but was not told of the nature of said ceremony. During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a document. He
claimed that he did not know that the ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told him later. He further testified that he did not go to
Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage license, and that he had never resided in that area. In July of 2003, he went to the Office of
the Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to check on their marriage license, and was asked to show a copy of their marriage contract
wherein the marriage license number could be found. 5 The Municipal Civil Registrar, Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a
certification on July 11, 2003 to the effect that the marriage license number appearing in the marriage contract he submitted, Marriage
License No. 9969967, was the number of another marriage license issued to a certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. 6 Said
certification reads as follows:
11 July 2003
This is to certify as per Registry Records of Marriage License filed in this office, Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued in favor
of MR. ARLINDO GETALADO and MISS MYRA MABILANGAN on January 19, 1993.
No Marriage License appear [sic] to have been issued to MR. SYED AZHAR ABBAS and MISS GLORIA F. GOO on January 8,
1993.
This certification is being issued to Mr. Syed Azhar Abbas for whatever legal purpose or intents it may serve. 7
On cross-examination, Syed testified that Gloria had filed bigamy cases against him in 2001 and 2002, and that he had gone to the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite to get certification on whether or not there was a marriage license on advice of his
counsel.8
Petitioner also presented Norberto Bagsic (Bagsic), an employee of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite. Bagsic
appeared under a letter of authority from the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, and brought documents pertaining to
Marriage License No. 9969967, which was issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 20, 1993. 9
Bagsic testified that their office issues serial numbers for marriage licenses and that the numbers are issued chronologically.10 He
testified that the certification dated July 11, 2003, was issued and signed by Leodivina Encarnacion, Registrar of the Municipality of
Carmona, Cavite, certifying that Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued for Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January
19, 1993, and that their office had not issued any other license of the same serial number, namely 9969967, to any other person.11
For her part, Gloria testified on her own behalf, and presented Reverend Mario Dauz, Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez, Felicitas Goo and May
Ann Ceriola.
Reverend Mario Dauz (Rev. Dauz) testified that he was a minister of the Gospel and a barangay captain, and that he is authorized to
solemnize marriages within the Philippines.12 He testified that he solemnized the marriage of Syed Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo at the
residence of the bride on January 9, 1993. 13 He stated that the witnesses were Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez (Atty. Sanchez) and Mary Ann
Ceriola.14 He testified that he had been solemnizing marriages since 1982, and that he is familiar with the requirements. 15 Rev. Dauz
further testified that Atty. Sanchez gave him the marriage license the day before the actual wedding, and that the marriage contract
was prepared by his secretary.16 After the solemnization of the marriage, it was registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Manila,
and Rev. Dauz submitted the marriage contract and copy of the marriage license with that office.17
Atty. Sanchez testified that he was asked to be the sponsor of the wedding of Syed Abbas and Gloria Goo by the mother of the bride,
Felicitas Goo.18 He testified that he requested a certain Qualin to secure the marriage license for the couple, and that this Qualin
secured the license and gave the same to him on January 8, 1993.19 He further testified that he did not know where the marriage
license was obtained.20 He attended the wedding ceremony on January 9, 1993, signed the marriage contract as sponsor, and witnessed
the signing of the marriage contract by the couple, the solemnizing officer and the other witness, Mary Ann Ceriola.21
Felicitas Goo testified that Gloria Goo is her daughter and Syed Azhar Abbas is her son-in-law, and that she was present at the
wedding ceremony held on January 9, 1993 at her house.22 She testified that she sought the help of Atty. Sanchez at the Manila City
Hall in securing the marriage license, and that a week before the marriage was to take place, a male person went to their house with
the application for marriage license.23 Three days later, the same person went back to their house, showed her the marriage license
before returning it to Atty. Sanchez who then gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer. 24 She further testified that she did not read
all of the contents of the marriage license, and that she was told that the marriage license was obtained from Carmona. 25 She also
testified that a bigamy case had been filed by Gloria against Syed at the Regional Trial Court of Manila, evidenced by an information
for Bigamy dated January 10, 2003, pending before Branch 47 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. 26
As to Mary Ann Ceriola’s testimony, the counsels for both parties stipulated that: (a) she is one of the sponsors at the wedding of
Gloria Goo and Syed Abbas on January 9, 1993; (b) she was seen in the wedding photos and she could identify all the persons
depicted in said photos; and (c) her testimony corroborates that of Felicitas Goo and Atty. Sanchez.
The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is her husband, and presented the marriage contract bearing their signatures as proof. 27 She
and her mother sought the help of Atty. Sanchez in securing a marriage license, and asked him to be one of the sponsors. A certain
Qualin went to their house and said that he will get the marriage license for them, and after several days returned with an application
for marriage license for them to sign, which she and Syed did. After Qualin returned with the marriage license, they gave the license to
Atty. Sanchez who gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer. Gloria testified that she and Syed were married on January 9, 1993 at
their residence.28
Gloria further testified that she has a daughter with Syed, born on June 15, 1993. 29
Gloria also testified that she filed a bigamy case against Syed, who had married a certain Maria Corazon Buenaventura during the
existence of the previous marriage, and that the case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 02A-03408, with the RTC of Manila.30
Gloria stated that she and Syed had already been married on August 9, 1992 in Taiwan, but that she did not know if said marriage had
been celebrated under Muslim rites, because the one who celebrated their marriage was Chinese, and those around them at the time
were Chinese.31
The Ruling of the RTC
In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no valid marriage license was issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed, as Marriage License No. 9969967 had been issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra
Mabilangan, and the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite had certified that no marriage license had been issued for Gloria
and Syed.32 It also took into account the fact that neither party was a resident of Carmona, Cavite, the place where Marriage License
No. 9969967 was issued, in violation of Article 9 of the Family Code. 33 As the marriage was not one of those exempt from the license
requirement, and that the lack of a valid marriage license is an absence of a formal requisite, the marriage of Gloria and Syed on
January 9, 1993 was void ab initio.
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner, and against the respondent declaring as follows:
1. The marriage on January 9, 1993 between petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas is hereby annulled;
2. Terminating the community of property relations between the petitioner and the respondent even if no property was acquired during
their cohabitation by reason of the nullity of the marriage of the parties.
3. The Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the Civil Registrar General, National Statistics Office, are hereby ordered to cancel from
their respective civil registries the marriage contracted by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas on January
9, 1993 in Manila.
SO ORDERED.34
Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 7, 2005, but the RTC denied the same, prompting her to appeal the
questioned decision to the Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the CA
In her appeal to the CA, Gloria submitted the following assignment of errors:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT AS
NULL AND VOID DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF A MARRIAGE LICENSE DESPITE EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWING THAT
THERE WAS ONE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING, AS A REQUISITE OF A VALID MARRIAGE, THE
OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT A MARRIAGE CEREMONY TOOK PLACE WITH THE APPEARANCE OF
THE CONTRACTING PARTIES BEFORE THE SOLEMNIZING OFFICER AND THEIR PERSONAL DECLARATION THAT
THEY TOOK EACH OTHER AS HUSBAND AND WIFE IN THE PRESENCE OF NOT LESS THAN TWO WITNESSES OF
LEGAL AGE.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE ISSUE OF ESTOPPEL BY LACHES ON THE PART OF THE
PETITIONER, AN ISSUE TIMELY RAISED IN THE COURT BELOW. 35
The CA gave credence to Gloria’s arguments, and granted her appeal. It held that the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar
failed to categorically state that a diligent search for the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was conducted, and thus held that said
certification could not be accorded probative value.36 The CA ruled that there was sufficient testimonial and documentary evidence
that Gloria and Syed had been validly married and that there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by law.37
It gave weight to the fact that Syed had admitted to having signed the marriage contract. The CA also considered that the parties had
comported themselves as husband and wife, and that Syed only instituted his petition after Gloria had filed a case against him for
bigamy.38
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 05 October 2005 and Order dated 27 January
2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109, in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is DISMISSED. The marriage between Shed [sic] Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo
Abbas contracted on 09 January 1993 remains valid and subsisting. No costs.
SO ORDERED.39
Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1, 2008 40 but the same was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated July 24,
2008.41
Hence, this petition.
Grounds in Support of Petition
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN CITING REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF
APPEALS AS THE SAME IS DIAMETRICALLY INCONSISTENT AND CONTRARY TO THE COURT’S OWN FINDINGS
AND CONCLUSIONS IN THIS CASE.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE, WITHOUT ANY
FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS, THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRANTING THE PETITION FOR
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.42
The Ruling of this Court
The petition is meritorious.
As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on January 9, 1993, Executive Order No. 209, or the Family Code of the
Philippines, is the applicable law. The pertinent provisions that would apply to this particular case are Articles 3, 4 and 35(3), which
read as follows:
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their
personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article
35(2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article 45.
An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the
irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxxx
(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding Chapter.
There is no issue with the essential requisites under Art. 2 of the Family Code, nor with the formal requisites of the authority of the
solemnizing officer and the conduct of the marriage ceremony. Nor is the marriage one that is exempt from the requirement of a valid
marriage license under Chapter 2, Title I of the Family Code. The resolution of this case, thus, hinges on whether or not a valid
marriage license had been issued for the couple. The RTC held that no valid marriage license had been issued. The CA held that there
was a valid marriage license.
We find the RTC to be correct in this instance.

Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy thereof, and relied on the marriage contract as well as the
testimonies of her witnesses to prove the existence of said license. To prove that no such license was issued, Syed turned to the office
of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly issued said license. It was there that he requested
certification that no such license was issued. In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals 43 such certification was allowed, as permitted
by Sec. 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. – A written statement signed by an officer having the custody of an official record or by his deputy
that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a
certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such record or entry.
In the case of Republic, in allowing the certification of the Civil Registrar of Pasig to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license, the
Court held:
The above Rule authorized the custodian of the documents to certify that despite diligent search, a particular document does not exist
in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil
registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all
relevant data.44
The Court held in that case that the certification issued by the civil registrar enjoyed probative value, as his duty was to maintain
records of data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was allegedly issued, issued a
certification to the effect that no such marriage license for Gloria and Syed was issued, and that the serial number of the marriage
license pertained to another couple, Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. A certified machine copy of Marriage License No.
9969967 was presented, which was issued in Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the names of Gloria and Syed do not appear in the
document.
In reversing the RTC, the CA focused on the wording of the certification, stating that it did not comply with Section 28, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court.
The CA deduced that from the absence of the words "despite diligent search" in the certification, and since the certification used stated
that no marriage license appears to have been issued, no diligent search had been conducted and thus the certification could not be
given probative value.
To justify that deduction, the CA cited the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals. 45 It is worth noting that in that particular case, the
Court, in sustaining the finding of the lower court that a marriage license was lacking, relied on the Certification issued by the Civil
Registrar of Pasig, which merely stated that the alleged marriage license could not be located as the same did not appear in their
records. Nowhere in the Certification was it categorically stated that the officer involved conducted a diligent search, nor is a
categorical declaration absolutely necessary for Sec. 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court to apply.
Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that an official duty has been regularly performed,
absent contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. We held, "The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by
affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty." 46 No such affirmative evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil
Registrar was lax in performing her duty of checking the records of their office, thus the presumption must stand. In fact, proof does
exist of a diligent search having been conducted, as Marriage License No. 996967 was indeed located and submitted to the court. The
fact that the names in said license do not correspond to those of Gloria and Syed does not overturn the presumption that the registrar
conducted a diligent search of the records of her office.
It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a copy thereof to the court. She failed to explain why the marriage
license was secured in Carmona, Cavite, a location where, admittedly, neither party resided. She took no pains to apply for the license,
so she is not the best witness to testify to the validity and existence of said license. Neither could the other witnesses she presented
prove the existence of the marriage license, as none of them applied for the license in Carmona, Cavite. Her mother, Felicitas Goo,
could not even testify as to the contents of the license, having admitted to not reading all of its contents. Atty. Sanchez, one of the
sponsors, whom Gloria and Felicitas Goo approached for assistance in securing the license, admitted not knowing where the license
came from. The task of applying for the license was delegated to a certain Qualin, who could have testified as to how the license was
secured and thus impeached the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar as well as the testimony of her representative. As Gloria
failed to present this Qualin, the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar still enjoys probative value.
It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that the marriage contract and a copy of the marriage license were submitted to the
Local Civil Registrar of Manila. Thus, a copy of the marriage license could have simply been secured from that office and submitted
to the court. However, Gloria inexplicably failed to do so, further weakening her claim that there was a valid marriage license issued
for her and Syed.
In the case of Cariño v. Cariño,47 following the case of Republic,48 it was held that the certification of the Local Civil Registrar that
their office had no record of a marriage license was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license. The case of Cariño further held
that the presumed validity of the marriage of the parties had been overcome, and that it became the burden of the party alleging a valid
marriage to prove that the marriage was valid, and that the required marriage license had been secured.49 Gloria has failed to discharge
that burden, and the only conclusion that can be reached is that no valid marriage license was issued. It cannot be said that there was a
simple irregularity in the marriage license that would not affect the validity of the marriage, as no license was presented by the
respondent. No marriage license was proven to have been issued to Gloria and Syed, based on the certification of the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite and Gloria’s failure to produce a copy of the alleged marriage license.
To bolster its ruling, the CA cited other evidence to support its conclusion that Gloria and Syed were validly married. To quote the
CA:
Moreover, the record is replete with evidence, testimonial and documentary, that appellant and appellee have been validly married and
there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by law. Both parties are legally capacitated to marry. A certificate of legal
capacity was even issued by the Embassy of Pakistan in favor of appellee. The parties herein gave their consent freely. Appellee
admitted that the signature above his name in the marriage contract was his. Several pictures were presented showing appellant and
appellee, before the solemnizing officer, the witnesses and other members of appellant’s family, taken during the marriage ceremony,
as well as in the restaurant where the lunch was held after the marriage ceremony. Most telling of all is Exhibit "5-C" which shows
appellee signing the Marriage Contract.
xxxx
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and has [sic] one offspring, Aliea Fatima Goo Abbas, who was born on
15 June 1993. It took appellee more than ten (10) years before he filed on 01 August 2003 his Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage under Article 4 of the Family Code. We take serious note that said Petition appears to have been instituted by him only after
an Information for Bigamy (Exhibit "1") dated 10 January 2003 was filed against him for contracting a second or subsequent marriage
with one Ma. Corazon (Maryam) T. Buenaventura. We are not ready to reward (appellee) by declaring the nullity of his marriage and
give him his freedom and in the process allow him to profit from his own deceit and perfidy. 50
All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a marriage contract was signed does not
operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage license. Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, "The absence of any of the
essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2)." Article 35(3) of the Family
Code also provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the beginning, except those exempt from the license
requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same Code.51 Again, this marriage cannot be characterized as among the
exemptions, and thus, having been solemnized without a marriage license, is void ab initio.1âwphi1
As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it may well be that his motives are less than pure, that he seeks to
evade a bigamy suit. Be that as it may, the same does not make up for the failure of the respondent to prove that they had a valid
marriage license, given the weight of evidence presented by petitioner. The lack of a valid marriage license cannot be attributed to
him, as it was Gloria who took steps to procure the same. The law must be applied. As the marriage license, a formal requisite, is
clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab initio.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated March 11, 2008 and
Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay City dated October 5, 2005 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM annulling the
marriage of petitioner with respondent on January 9, 1993 is hereby REINSTATED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
GO-BANGAYAN VS BANGAYAN
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 17 August 2011 Decision2 and the 14 March 2012 Resolution3 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.
The Antecedent Facts
On 15 March 2004, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. (Benjamin) filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration
of nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43 (trial court). The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
04109401. Benjamin alleged that on 10 September 1973, he married Azucena Alegre (Azucena) in Caloocan City. They had three
children, namely, Rizalyn, Emmamylin, and Benjamin III.
In 1979, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally GoBangayan (Sally) who was a customer in the auto parts and
supplies business owned by Benjamin’s family. In December 1981, Azucena left for the United States of America. In February 1982,
Benjamin and Sally lived together as husband and wife. Sally’s father was against the relationship. On 7 March 1982, in order to
appease her father, Sally brought Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig City where they signed a purported marriage contract. Sally,
knowing Benjamin’s marital status, assured him that the marriage contract would not be registered.
Benjamin and Sally’s cohabitation produced two children, Bernice and Bentley. During the period of their cohabitation, they acquired
the following real properties:
(1) property under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 61722 registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally as spouses;
(2) properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the name of Benjamin, married to Sally;
(3) properties under Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) Nos. 8782 and 8783 registered in the name of Sally, married to
Benjamin; and
(4) properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 registered in the name of Sally as a single individual.
The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994 when Sally left for Canada, bringing Bernice and Bentley with her. She then
filed criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of public documents against Benjamin, using their simulated marriage contract as
evidence. Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before
the trial court on the ground that his marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the formal requisites to a valid marriage.
Benjamin also asked the trial court for the partition of the properties he acquired with Sally in accordance with Article 148 of the
Family Code, for his appointment as administrator of the properties during the pendency of the case, and for the declaration of Bernice
and Bentley as illegitimate children. A total of 44 registered properties became the subject of the partition before the trial court. Aside
from the seven properties enumerated by Benjamin in his petition, Sally named 37 properties in her answer.
After Benjamin presented his evidence, Sally filed a demurrer to evidence which the trial court denied. Sally filed a motion for
reconsideration which the trial court also denied. Sally filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals and asked for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or injunction which the Court of Appeals never issued. Sally then refused to present any
evidence before the trial court citing the pendency of her petition before the Court of Appeals. The trial court gave Sally several
opportunities to present her evidence on 28 February 2008, 10 July 2008, 4 September 2008, 11 September 2008, 2 October 2008, 23
October 2008, and 28 November 2008. Despite repeated warnings from the trial court, Sally still refused to present her evidence,
prompting the trial court to consider the case submitted for decision.
The Decision of the Trial Court
In a Decision4 dated 26 March 2009, the trial court ruled in favor ofBenjamin. The trial court gave weight to the certification dated 21
July 2004 from the Pasig Local Civil Registrar, which was confirmed during trial, that only Marriage License Series Nos. 6648100 to
6648150 were issued for the month of February 1982 and the purported Marriage License No. N-07568 was not issued to Benjamin
and Sally.5 The trial court ruled that the marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office
because it could not be registered due to Benjamin’s subsisting marriage with Azucena.
The trial court ruled that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not bigamous. The trial court ruled that the second marriage
was void not because of the existence of the first marriage but because of other causes, particularly, the lack of a marriage license.
Hence, bigamy was not committed in this case. The trial court did not rule on the issue of the legitimacy status of Bernice and Bentley
because they were not parties to the case. The trial court denied Sally’s claim for spousal support because she was not married to
Benjamin. The trial court likewise denied support for Bernice and Bentley who were both of legal age and did not ask for support.
On the issue of partition, the trial court ruled that Sally could not claim the 37 properties she named in her answer as part of her
conjugal properties with Benjamin. The trial court ruled that Sally was not legally married to Benjamin. Further, the 37 properties that
Sally was claiming were owned by Benjamin’s parents who gave the properties to their children, including Benjamin, as advance
inheritance. The 37 titles were in the names of Benjamin and his brothers and the phrase "married to Sally Go" was merely descriptive
of Benjamin’s civil status in the title. As regards the two lots under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860, the trial court found that they were
bought by Benjamin using his own money and that Sally failed to prove any actual contribution of money, property or industry in their
purchase. The trial court found that Sally was a registered co-owner of the lots covered by TCT Nos. 61722, N-193656, and 253681 as
well as the two condominium units under CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783. However, the trial court ruled that the lot under TCT No. 61722
and the two condominium units were purchased from the earnings of Benjamin alone. The trial court ruled that the properties under
TCT Nos. 61722, 61720, and 190860 and CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were part of the conjugal partnership of Benjamin and Azucena,
without prejudice to Benjamin’s right to dispute his conjugal state with Azucena in a separate proceeding.
The trial court further ruled that Sally acted in bad faith because she knew that Benjamin was married to Azucena. Applying Article
148 of the Family Code, the trial court forfeited Sally’s share in the properties covered under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 in
favor of Bernice and Bentley while Benjamin’s share reverted to his conjugal ownership with Azucena.
The dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the marriage of BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR. and SALLY S. GO on March 7, 1982 at Santolan, Pasig, Metro
Manila is hereby declared NULL and VOID AB INITIO. It is further declared NONEXISTENT.
Respondent’s claim as co-owner or conjugal owner of the thirtyseven (37) properties under TCT Nos. 17722, 17723, 17724, 17725,
126397, RT-73480, and RT-86821; in Manila, TCT Nos. 188949, 188950, 188951, 193035, 194620, 194621, 194622, 194623,
194624, 194625, 194626, 194627, 194628, 194629, 194630, 194631, 194632, 194633, 194634, 194635, 194636, 194637, 194638,
194639, 198651, 206209, 206210, 206211, 206213 and 206215 is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The registered owners, namely:
Benjamin B. Bangayan, Jr., Roberto E. Bangayan, Ricardo B. Bangayan and Rodrigo B. Bangayan are the owners to the exclusion of
"Sally Go" Consequently, the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City and Manila are directed to delete the words "married to Sally Go"
from these thirty-seven (37) titles.
Properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720 and 190860, CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 are properties acquired from petitioner’s money
without contribution from respondent, hence, these are properties of the petitioner and his lawful wife. Consequently, petitioner is
appointed the administrator of these five (5) properties. Respondent is ordered to submit an accounting of her collections of income
from these five (5) properties within thirty (30) days from notice hereof. Except for lot under TCT No. 61722, respondent is further
directed within thirty (30) days from notice hereof to turn over and surrender control and possession of these properties including the
documents of title to the petitioner.
On the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and N-253681, these properties are under co-ownership of the parties shared by them
equally. However, the share of respondent is declared FORFEITED in favor of Bernice Go Bangayan and Bentley Go Bangayan. The
share of the petitioner shall belong to his conjugal ownership with Azucena Alegre. The liquidation, partition and distribution of these
two (2) properties shall be further processed pursuant to Section 21 of A.M. No. 02-11-10 of March 15, 2003.
Other properties shall be adjudicated in a later proceeding pursuant to Section 21 of A.M. No. 02-11-10.
Respondent’s claim of spousal support, children support and counterclaims are DISMISSED for lack of merit. Further, no declaration
of the status of the parties’ children.
No other relief granted.
Furnish copy of this decision to the parties, their counsels, the Trial Prosecutor, the Solicitor General and the Registry of Deeds in
Manila, Quezon City and Caloocan.
SO ORDERED.6
Sally filed a Verified and Vigorous Motion for Inhibition with Motion for Reconsideration. In its Order dated 27 August 2009, 7 the
trial court denied the motion. Sally appealed the trial court’s decision before the Court of Appeals.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 17 August 2011 Decision, the Court of Appeals partly granted the appeal. The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court did not
err in submitting the case for decision. The Court of Appeals noted that there were six resettings of the case, all made at the instance of
Sally, for the initial reception of evidence, and Sally was duly warned to present her evidence on the next hearing or the case would be
deemed submitted for decision. However, despite the warning, Sally still failed to present her evidence. She insisted on presenting
Benjamin who was not around and was not subpoenaed despite the presence of her other witnesses.
The Court of Appeals rejected Sally’s allegation that Benjamin failed to prove his action for declaration of nullity of marriage. The
Court of Appeals ruled that Benjamin’s action was based on his prior marriage to Azucena and there was no evidence that the
marriage was annulled or dissolved before Benjamin contracted the second marriage with Sally. The Court of Appeals ruled that the
trial court committed no error in declaring Benjamin’s marriage to Sally null and void.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally was governed by Article 148 of the Family Code. The
Court of Appeals ruled that only the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contribution. The Court of Appeals ruled that the 37
properties being claimed by Sally rightfully belong to Benjamin and his siblings.
As regards the seven properties claimed by both parties, the Court of Appeals ruled that only the properties under TCT Nos. 61720
and 190860 registered in the name of Benjamin belong to him exclusively because he was able to establish that they were acquired by
him solely. The Court of
Appeals found that the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 and under CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were exclusive
properties of Sally in the absence of proof of Benjamin’s actual contribution in their purchase. The Court of Appeals ruled that the
property under TCT No. 61722 registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally shall be owned by them in common, to be shared
equally. However, the share of Benjamin shall accrue to the conjugal partnership under his existing marriage with Azucena while
Sally’s share shall accrue to her in the absence of a clear and convincing proof of bad faith.
Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that Sally failed to present clear and convincing evidence that would show bias and prejudice on
the part of the trial judge that would justify his inhibition from the case.
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals’ decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Order dated March 26,
2009 and August 27, 2009, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43, in Civil Case No. 04-109401 are hereby
AFFIRMED with modification declaring TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 to be exclusively owned by the petitioner-appellee while the
properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 as well as CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 shall be solely owned by the respondent-
appellant. On the other hand, TCT No. 61722 shall be owned by them and common and to be shared equally but the share of the
petitioner-appellee shall accrue to the conjugal partnership under his first marriage while the share of respondent-appellant shall
accrue to her. The rest of the decision stands.
SO ORDERED.8
Sally moved for the reconsideration of the Court of Appeals’ decision. In its 14 March 2012 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied
her motion.
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issues
Sally raised the following issues before this Court:
(1) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the trial court’s ruling that Sally had waived her right to
present evidence;
(2) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the trial court’s decision declaring the marriage between
Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and non-existent; and
(3) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming with modification the trial court’s decision regarding the
property relations of Benjamin and Sally.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has no merit.
Waiver of Right to Present Evidence
Sally alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s ruling that she waived her right to present her evidence. Sally
alleges that in not allowing her to present evidence that she and Benjamin were married, the trial court abandoned its duty to protect
marriage as an inviolable institution.
It is well-settled that a grant of a motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of right but is addressed to the discretion of
the trial court.9 In this case, Sally’s presentation of evidence was scheduled on28 February 2008. Thereafter, there were six resettings
of the case: on 10 July 2008, 4 and 11 September 2008, 2 and 28 October 2008, and 28 November 2008. They were all made at Sally’s
instance. Before the scheduled hearing of 28 November 2008, the trial court warned Sally that in case she still failed to present her
evidence, the case would be submitted for decision. On the date of the scheduled hearing, despite the presence of other available
witnesses, Sally insisted on presenting Benjamin who was not even subpoenaed on that day. Sally’s counsel insisted that the trial court
could not dictate on the priority of witnesses to be presented, disregarding the trial court’s prior warning due to the numerous
resettings of the case. Sally could not complain that she had been deprived of her right to present her evidence because all the
postponements were at her instance and she was warned by the trial court that it would submit the case for decision should she still fail
to present her evidence on 28 November 2008.
We agree with the trial court that by her continued refusal to present her evidence, she was deemed to have waived her right to present
them. As pointed out by the Court of Appeals, Sally’s continued failure to present her evidence despite the opportunities given by the
trial court showed her lack of interest to proceed with the case. Further, it was clear that Sally was delaying the case because she was
waiting for the decision of the Court of Appeals on her petition questioning the trial court’s denial of her demurrer to evidence, despite
the fact that the Court of Appeals did not issue any temporary restraining order as Sally prayed for. Sally could not accuse the trial
court of failing to protect marriage as an inviolable institution because the trial court also has the duty to ensure that trial proceeds
despite the deliberate delay and refusal to proceed by one of the parties. 10
Validity of the Marriage between Benjamin and Sally
Sally alleges that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals recognized her marriage to Benjamin because a marriage could not be
nonexistent and, at the same time, null and void ab initio. Sally further alleges that if she were allowed to present her evidence, she
would have proven her marriage to Benjamin. To prove her marriage to Benjamin, Sally asked this Court to consider that in acquiring
real properties, Benjamin listed her as his wife by declaring he was "married to" her; that Benjamin was the informant in their
children’s birth certificates where he stated that he was their father; and that Benjamin introduced her to his family and friends as his
wife. In contrast, Sally claims that there was no real property registered in the names of Benjamin and Azucena. Sally further alleges
that Benjamin was not the informant in the birth certificates of his children with Azucena.
First, Benjamin’s marriage to Azucena on 10 September 1973 was duly established before the trial court, evidenced by a certified true
copy of their marriage contract. At the time Benjamin and Sally entered into a purported marriage on 7 March 1982, the marriage
between Benjamin and Azucena was valid and subsisting.
On the purported marriage of Benjamin and Sally, Teresita Oliveros (Oliveros), Registration Officer II of the Local Civil Registrar of
Pasig City, testified that there was no valid marriage license issued to Benjamin and Sally. Oliveros confirmed that only Marriage
Licence Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were issued for the month of February 1982. Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the
series issued for the month. Oliveros further testified that the local civil registrar of Pasig City did not issue Marriage License No. N-
07568 to Benjamin and Sally. The certification from the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage
license and absent any suspicious circumstance, the certification enjoys probative value, being issued by the officer charged under the
law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. 11 Clearly, if indeed Benjamin and Sally entered into a
marriage contract, the marriage was void from the beginning for lack of a marriage license. 12
It was also established before the trial court that the purported marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not recorded with the local
civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. The lack of record was certified by Julieta B. Javier, Registration Officer IV of the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Pasig; 13 Teresita R. Ignacio, Chief of the Archives Division of the Records
Management and Archives Office, National Commission for Culture and the Arts; 14 and Lourdes J. Hufana, Director III, Civil
Registration Department of the National Statistics Office.15 The documentary and testimonial evidence proved that there was no
marriage between Benjamin and Sally. As pointed out by the trial court, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally "was made only in
jest"16 and "a simulated marriage, at the instance of Sally, intended to cover her up from expected social humiliation coming from
relatives, friends and the society especially from her parents seen as Chinese conservatives." 17 In short, it was a fictitious marriage.
The fact that Benjamin was the informant in the birth certificates of Bernice and Bentley was not a proof of the marriage between
Benjamin and Sally. This Court notes that Benjamin was the informant in Bernice’s birth certificate which stated that Benjamin and
Sally were married on 8 March 198218 while Sally was the informant in Bentley’s birth certificate which also stated that Benjamin and
Sally were married on 8 March 1982.19 Benjamin and Sally were supposedly married on 7 March 1982 which did not match the dates
reflected on the birth certificates.
We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and, at the same time, non-
existent. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a license, except those covered by Article 34 where no
license is necessary, "shall be void from the beginning." In this case, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was solemnized
without a license. It was duly established that no marriage license was issued to them and that Marriage License No. N-07568 did not
match the marriage license numbers issued by the local civil registrar of Pasig City for the month of February 1982. The case clearly
falls under Section 3 of Article 3520 which made their marriage void ab initio. The marriage between Benjamin and Sally was also
non-existent. Applying the general rules on void or inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are
absolutely simulated or fictitious are "inexistent and void from the beginning." 21 Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining
the trial court’s ruling that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was null and void ab initio and non-existent.
Except for the modification in the distribution of properties, the Court of Appeals affirmed in all aspects the trial court’s decision and
ruled that "the rest of the decision stands."22 While the Court of Appeals did notdiscuss bigamous marriages, it can be gleaned from
the dispositive portion of the decision declaring that "the rest of the decision stands" that the Court of Appeals adopted the trial court’s
discussion that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally is not bigamous.1âwphi1 The trial court stated:
On whether or not the parties’ marriage is bigamous under the concept of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the marriage is not
bigamous. It is required that the first or former marriage shall not be null and void. The marriage of the petitioner to Azucena shall be
assumed as the one that is valid, there being no evidence to the contrary and there is no trace of invalidity or irregularity on the face of
their marriage contract. However, if the second marriage was void not because of the existence of the first marriage but for other
causes such as lack of license, the crime of bigamy was not committed. In People v. De Lara [CA, 51 O.G., 4079], it was held that
what was committed was contracting marriage against the provisions of laws not under Article 349 but Article 350 of the Revised
Penal Code. Concluding, the marriage of the parties is therefore not bigamous because there was no marriage license. The daring and
repeated stand of respondent that she is legally married to petitioner cannot, in any instance, be sustained. Assuming that her marriage
to petitioner has the marriage license, yet the same would be bigamous, civilly or criminally as it would be invalidated by a prior
existing valid marriage of petitioner and Azucena.23
For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity except for the existence of a
prior marriage.24 In this case, there was really no subsequent marriage. Benjamin and Sally just signed a purported marriage contract
without a marriage license. The supposed marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. In
short, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They lived together and represented themselves as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage.
Property Relations Between Benjamin and Sally
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code
which states:
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through
their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same
rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community of
conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her
share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.
Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the properties acquired by them through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. Thus,
both the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly excluded the 37 properties being claimed by Sally which were given by
Benjamin’s father to his children as advance inheritance. Sally’s Answer to the petition before the trial court even admitted that
"Benjamin’s late father himself conveyed a number of properties to his children and their respective spouses which included Sally x x
As regards the seven remaining properties, we rule that the decision of the Court of Appeals is more in accord with the evidence on
record. Only the property covered by TCT No. 61722 was registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally as spouses. 26 The properties
under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 were in the name of Benjamin27 with the descriptive title "married to Sally." The property covered
by CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were registered in the name of Sally28 with the descriptive title "married to Benjamin" while the
properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 were registered in the name of Sally as a single individual. We have ruled that the
words "married to" preceding the name of a spouse are merely descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner. 29 Such words do
not prove co-ownership. Without proof of actual contribution from either or both spouses, there can be no co-ownership under Article
148 of the Family Code.30
Inhibition of the Trial Judge
Sally questions the refusal of Judge Roy G. Gironella (Judge Gironella) to inhibit himself from hearing the case. She cited the failure
of Judge Gironella to accommodate her in presenting her evidence. She further alleged that Judge Gironella practically labeled her as
an opportunist in his decision, showing his partiality against her and in favor of Benjamin.
We have ruled that the issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the part of the
judge.31 To justify the call for inhibition, there must be extrinsic evidence to establish bias, bad faith, malice, or corrupt purpose, in
addition to palpable error which may be inferred from the decision or order itself. 32 In this case, we have sufficiently explained that
Judge Gironella did not err in submitting the case for decision because of Sally’s continued refusal to present her evidence.
We reviewed the decision of the trial court and while Judge Gironella may have used uncomplimentary words in writing the decision,
they are not enough to prove his prejudice against Sally or show that he acted in bad faith in deciding the case that would justify the
call for his voluntary inhibition.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 17 August 2011 Decision and the 14 March 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 94226.
SO ORDERED.
KHO VS REPUBLIC
Challenged in the present petition for review on certiorari are the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), Cebu City
dated March 30, 2006 and January 14, 2009, respectively, in CA-GR. CV No. 69218. The assailed CA Decision reversed and set aside
the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch 2, in Civil Case No. 464, which ruled in
petitioner's favor in an action he filed for declaration of nullity of his marriage with private respondent, while the CA Resolution
denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The present petition arose from a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage filed by herein petitioner with the RTC of Oras,
Eastern Samar. Pertinent portions of the Petition allege as follows:
3. Sometime in the afternoon of May 31, 1972, petitioner's parents summoned one Eusebio Colongon, now deceased, then clerk in the
office of the municipal treasurer, instructing said clerk to arrange and prepare whatever necessary papers were required for the
intended marriage between petitioner and respondent supposedly to take place at around midnight of June 1, 1972 so as to exclude the
public from witnessing the marriage ceremony;
4. Petitioner and Respondent thereafter exchanged marital vows in a marriage ceremony which actually took place at around 3:00
o'clock before dawn of June 1, 1972, on account that there was a public dance held in the town plaza which is just situated adjacent to
the church whereas the venue of the wedding, and the dance only finished at around 2:00 o'clock of same early morning of June 1,
1972;
5. Petitioner has never gone to the office of the Local Civil Registrar to apply for marriage license and had not seen much less signed
any papers or documents in connection with the procurement of a marriage license;
6. Considering the shortness of period from the time the aforenamed clerk of the treasurer's office was told to obtain the pertinent
papers in the afternoon of May 31, 1972 so required for the purpose of the forthcoming marriage up to the moment the actual marriage
was celebrated before dawn of June 1, 1972, no marriage license therefore could have been validly issued, thereby rendering the
marriage solemnized on even date null and void for want of the most essential requisite;
7. For all intents and purposes, thus, Petitioner's and Respondent's marriage aforestated was solemnized sans the required marriage
license, hence, null and void from the beginning and neither was it performed under circumstances exempting the requirement of such
marriage license;
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that after due notice and hearing,
judgment be rendered:
1. Declaring the contract of marriage between petitioner and respondent held on June 1, 1972, at Arteche, Eastern Samar, null and
void ab initio and of no legal effect;
Among the pieces of evidence presented by petitioner is a Certification5 issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern
Samar which attested to the fact that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar has neither record nor copy of a marriage license issued to
petitioner and respondent with respect to their marriage celebrated on June 1, 1972.
Respondent filed her Answer6 praying that the petition be outrightly dismissed for lack of cause of action because there is no evidence
to prove petitioner's allegation that their marriage was celebrated without the requisite marriage license and that, on the contrary, both
petitioner and respondent personally appeared before the local civil registrar and secured a marriage license which they presented
before their marriage was solemnized.
Upon petitioner's request, the venue of the action was subsequently transferred to the RTC of Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch 2,
where the parties submitted their respective pleadings as well as affidavits of witnesses.
On September 25, 2000, the RTC rendered its Decision granting the petition. The dispositive portion of the said Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby declares the marriage contracted between Raquel G. Kho and Veronica
Borata on June 1, 1972 null and void ab initio, pursuant to Article 80 of the Civil Code and Articles 4 and 5 of the Family Code. The
foregoing is without prejudice to the application of Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar for proper registration of this decree
of nullity of marriage.
SO ORDERED.7
The RTC found that petitioner's evidence sufficiently established the absence of the requisite marriage license when the marriage
between petitioner and respondent was celebrated. As such, the RTC ruled that based on Articles 53(4), 58 and 80(3) of the Civil Code
of the Philippines, the absence of the said marriage license rendered the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void ab
initio.
Respondent then filed an appeal with the CA in Cebu City. On March 30, 2006, the CA promulgated its assailed Decision, disposing
thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated 25 September 2000 of Branch 2 of the Regional Trial Court of
Borongan, Eastern Samar, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage between the petitioner-appellee Raquel Kho and Veronica
Kho is declared valid and subsisting for all intents and purposes.
SO ORDERED.
The CA held that since a marriage was, in fact, solemnized between the contending parties, there is a presumption that a marriage
license was issued for that purpose and that petitioner failed to overcome such presumption. The CA also ruled that the absence of any
indication in the marriage certificate that a marriage license was issued is a mere defect in the formal requisites of the law which does
not invalidate the parties' marriage.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,9 but the CA denied it in its Resolution dated January 14, 2009.
Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues, to wit:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ASCRIBING A SO-CALLED "ETHICAL
DIMENSION" TO PETITIONER'S CAUSE, ALLUDING TO AN ALLEGED LIAISON WITH ANOTHER WOMAN AS A
FACTOR IN REVERSING THE JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT WHICH VOIDED HIS MARRIAGE IN QUESTION
WITH RESPONDENT;
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPRECIATING AGAINST PETITIONER THE
FACT THAT DESPITE THE LAPSE OF 25 YEARS HE DID NOTHING TO ATTACK, EVEN COLLATERALLY, HIS
APPARENTLY VOID MARRIAGE WITH RESPONDENT;
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ALTOGETHER DISREGARDING

PETITIONER'S OBVIOUSLY OVERWHELMING DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCES OF LACK OF MARRIAGE LICENSE AND
GIVING WEIGHT INSTEAD TO UNSUPPORTED PRESUMPTIONS IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT, IN ITS ASSAILED
DECISION; and
4 WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SETTING ASIDE OR REVERSING THE LOWER
COURT'S JUDGMENT DECLARING THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT A NULLITY FOR
ABSENCE OF THE REQUISITE MARRIAGE LICENSE.
Petitioner's basic contention in the present petition centers on the alleged failure of the CA to give due credence to petitioner's
evidence which established the absence or lack of marriage license at the time that petitioner and respondent's marriage was
solemnized. Petitioner argues that the CA erred in deciding the case not on the basis of law and evidence but rather on the ground of
what the appellate court calls as ethical considerations as well as on the perceived motive of petitioner in seeking the declaration of
nullity of his marriage with respondent.
The Court finds for the petitioner.
At the outset, the State, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), raises a procedural question by arguing that the issues
presented by petitioner in the present petition are factual in nature and it is not proper for this Court to delve into these issues in a
petition for review on certiorari.
The Court does not agree.
The issues in the instant petition involve a determination and application of existing law and prevailing jurisprudence. However,
intertwined with these issues is the question of the existence of the subject marriage license, which is a question of fact and one which
is not appropriate for a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This rule, nonetheless, is not without
exceptions, viz.:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures;
(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions
of both appellant and appellee;
(7) When the findings arc contrary to those of the trial court;
(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and
(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record.
In the present case, the findings of the RTC and the CA, on whether or not there was indeed a marriage license obtained by petitioner
and respondent, are conflicting. Hence, it is but proper for this Court to review these findings.
The marriage of petitioner and respondent was celebrated on June 1, 1972, prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. 12 Hence, the
Civil Code governs their union. Accordingly, Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential requisites of marriage as a contract,
to wit:
ART 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:
(1)Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.

Article 58 of the Civil Code makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued by the local civil
registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually resides, save marriages of an exceptional character authorized by
the Civil Code, but not those under Article 75.14 Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2,
Title 111, comprising Articles 72 to 79. These marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the point of death during peace or
war; (2) marriages in remote places; (3) consular marriages; (4) ratification of marital cohabitation; (5) religious ratification of a civil
marriage; (6) Mohammedan or pagan marriages; and (7) mixed marriages. Petitioner's and respondent's marriage does not fall under
any of these exceptions.
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code also makes it clear that a marriage performed without the corresponding marriage license is void, this
being nothing more than the legitimate consequence flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of the marriage
contract.15 The rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage license under the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by
the State to the contracting parties, after the proper government official has inquired into their capacity to contract marriage.16Stated
differently, the requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the State's demonstration of its involvement and participation in
every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested. 17
In the instant case, respondent claims that she and petitioner were able to secure a marriage license which they presented to the
solemnizing officer before the marriage was performed.
The OSG, on its part, contends that the presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage and that any doubt should be
resolved to sustain such validity. Indeed, this Court is mindful of this principle as well as of the Constitutional policy which protects
and strengthens the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.
On the other hand, petitioner insists that the Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar, coupled with the
testimony of the former Civil Registrar, is sufficient evidence to prove the absence of the subject marriage license.
The Court agrees with petitioner and finds no doubt to be resolved as the evidence is clearly in his favor.
Apropos is the case of Nicdao Cari�o v. Yee Cari�o.18 There, it was held that the certification of the Local Civil Registrar, that their
office had no record of a marriage license, was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license.19 It was further held that the
presumed validity of the marriage of the parties had been overcome, and that it became the burden of the party alleging a valid
marriage to prove that the marriage was valid, and that the required marriage license had been secured. 20
As stated above, petitioner was able to present a Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar
attesting that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar "has no record nor copy of any marriage license ever issued in favor of Raquel G.
Kho [petitioner] and Veronica M. Borata [respondent] whose marriage was celebrated on June 1, 1972." 21 Thus, on the basis of such
Certification, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and respondent has been overcome and it becomes the burden of
respondent to prove that their marriage is valid as it is she who alleges such validity. As found by the RTC, respondent was not able to
discharge that burden.
It is telling that respondent failed to present their alleged marriage license or a copy thereof to the court. In addition, the Certificate of
Marriage22 issued by the officiating priest does not contain any entry regarding the said marriage license. Respondent could have
obtained a copy of their marriage contract from the National Archives and Records Section, where information regarding the marriage
license, i.e., date of issuance and license number, could be obtained. However, she also failed to do so. The Court also notes, with
approval, the RTC's agreement with petitioner's observation that the statements of the witnesses for respondent, as well as respondent
herself, all attest to the fact that a marriage ceremony was conducted but neither one of them testified that a marriage license was
issued in favor of petitioner and respondent. Indeed, despite respondent's categorical claim that she and petitioner were able to obtain a
marriage license, she failed to present evidence to prove such allegation. It is a settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden
of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.23
Based on the Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar, coupled with respondent's failure to
produce a copy of the alleged marriage license or of any evidence to show that such license was ever issued, the only conclusion that
can be reached is that no valid marriage license was, in fact, issued. Contrary to the ruling of the CA, it cannot be said that there was a
simple defect, not a total absence, in the requirements of the law which would not affect the validity of the marriage. The fact remains
that respondent failed to prove that the subject marriage license was issued and the law is clear that a marriage which is performed
without the corresponding marriage license is null and void.
As to the sufficiency of petitioner's evidence, the OSG further argues that, on the basis of this Court's ruling in Sevilla v.
Cardenas,24 the certification issued by the local civil registrar, which attests to the absence in its records of a marriage license, must
categorically state that the document does not exist in the said office despite diligent search.
However, in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,25 this Court considered the certification issued by the Local Civil
Registrar as a certification of due search and inability to find the record or entry sought by the parties despite the absence of a
categorical statement that "such document does not exist in their records despite diligent search." The Court, citing Section 28, 26 Rule
132 of the Rules of Court, held that the certification of due search and inability to find a record or entry as to the purported marriage
license, issued by the civil registrar, enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data
relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Based on said certification, the Court held that there is absence of a marriage license that
would render the marriage void ab initio.
Moreover, as discussed in the abovestated case of Nicdao Cari�o v. Yee Cari�o,27 this Court considered the marriage of the
petitioner and her deceased husband as void ab initio as the records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased
bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the local civil registrar, their office has no record of such marriage license. The
court held that the certification issued by the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of the marriage license. Their
marriage having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license and not being one of the marriages exempt from the
marriage license requirement, the marriage of the petitioner and the deceased is undoubtedly void ab initio. This ruling was reiterated
in the more recent case of Go-Bangayan v. Bangayan, Jr.28
Furthermore, in the fairly recent case of Abbas v. Abbas,29 this Court echoed the ruling in Republic v. CA30 that, in sustaining the
finding of the lower court that a marriage license was lacking, this Court relied on the Certification issued by the local civil registrar,
which stated that the alleged marriage license could not be located as the same did not appear in their records. Contrary to petitioner's
asseveration, nowhere in the Certification was it categorically stated that the officer involved conducted a diligent search. In this
respect, this Court held that Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court does not require a categorical statement to this effect.
Moreover, in the said case, this Court ruled that:
Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that an official duty has been regularly performed,
absent contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. We held, "The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by
affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty." No such affirmative evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil
Registrar was lax in performing her duty of checking the records of their office, thus the presumption must stand. x x
In all the abovementioned cases, there was clear and unequivocal finding of the absence of the subject marriage license which
rendered the marriage void.
From these cases, it can be deduced that to be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the
absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the
local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties. 32
Indeed, all the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a marriage contract was signed does not
operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage license.33 As cited above, Article 80(3) of the Civil Code clearly provides that a
marriage solemnized without a license is void from the beginning, except marriages of exceptional character under Articles 72 to 79 of
the same Code. As earlier stated, petitioner's and respondent's marriage cannot be characterized as among the exceptions.
As to the motive of petitioner in seeking to annul his marriage to respondent, it may well be that his motives are less than pure - that
he seeks a way out of his marriage to legitimize his alleged illicit affair with another woman. Be that as it may, the same does not
make up for the failure of the respondent to prove that they had a valid marriage license, given the weight of evidence presented by
petitioner. The law must be applied. As the marriage license, an essential requisite under the Civil Code, is clearly absent, the marriage
of petitioner and respondent is void ab initio.chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, Cebu City, dated March
30, 2006 and January 14, 2009, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 69218, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch 2, dated September 25, 2000, in Civil Case No. 464 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED

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REPUBLIC VS CA

The controlling facts are undisputed:

February 20, 1987

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

Issued upon request of Mr. Ed Atanacio.

(Sgd) CENONA D. QUINTOS

Hence this petition for review on certiorari.

The issues, being interrelated, shall be discussed jointly.

We affirm the impugned Decision.

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS BY

3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS BY

In sum, two issues are to be resolved:

FILIPINA SY: Yes, Sir.

The trial court made the following findings:

This denial gave rise to the present Petition filed by Jaime.

He raises the following issues for Resolution.

We agree with the Court of Appeals and rule in the negative.

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

San Juan, Metro Manila

March 11, 1994

(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

San Juan, Metro Manila

September 20, 1994

(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

San Juan, Metro Manila

July 25, 2000

(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.

As testified to by Perlita Mercader:

A I brought may 19, 1969, sir.

A Meron pang January. I forgot, January . . .

Q Did you bring that with you?

A I cannot locate the book. This is the only book.

In one case, it was held:

The court rules in the affirmative.

The petition lacks merit.

A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex Reassignment

(3) The change will avoid confusion.

Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:

xxx xxx xxx

ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:

xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

Costs against petitioner.

1. Illegal solemnization of marriage

3. Bribery in consideration of an appointment in the court

4. Cash bond issued without a receipt

5. Infidelity in the custody of prisoners

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

(1) the offender has been legally married;

(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and

The antecedent facts are:

1. The Petition is dismissed for lack of merit;

3. To pay the costs.11

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.

I don’t remember your honor.

Were you asked by the church to present a Marriage License?