A.
CONCEPT OF ACT AND TEST OF NEGLIGENCE The Cuasos alleged that had Corinthian exercised diligence in performing
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission:
1. causes damage to another,
2. there being fault or negligence,
3. is obliged to pay for the damage done.
4. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed
by the provisions of this Chapter.
1. CORINTHIAN GARDENS ASSOCIATION, INC vs. SPOUSES
REYNALDO and MARIA LUISA TANJANGCO, and SPOUSES FRANK
and TERESITA CUASO, G.R. No. 160795, June 27, 2008
Doctrine: In sum, Corinthians failure to prevent the encroachment of the
Cuasos perimeter wall into Tanjangcos property despite the inspection
conducted constitutes negligence and, at the very least, contributed to
the injury suffered by the Tanjangcos.
Facts: Respondent spouses adjacent lot owners in the Corinthian
Gardens Subdivision. The Cuasos constructed their house, the perimeter
fence of which encroached the lot of Tanjangcos. The lot owners were
not able to reach to an amicable settlement. Thus, the Tanjangcos
demanded that the Cuasos demolish the perimeter fence but the latter
failed and refused, prompting the Tanjangcos to file with the RTC a suit
against the Cuasos for Recovery of Possession with Damages.
Eventually, the Cuasos filed a Third-Party Complaint against
Corinthian, C.B. Paraz and Engr. De Dios. The Cuasos ascribed
negligence to C.B. Paraz for its failure to ascertain the proper
specifications of their house, and to Engr. De Dios for his failure to
undertake an accurate relocation survey, thereby, exposing them to
litigation. The Cuasos also faulted Corinthian for approving their
relocation survey and building plans without verifying their accuracy and
in making representations as to Engr. De Dios' integrity and competence.
its duty, they would not have been involved in a boundary dispute with
the Tanjangcos. Thus, the Cuasos opined that Corinthian should also be
held answerable for any damages that they might incur as a result of
such construction.
Issue: WON Corinthian Gardens is negligent.
Ruling: YES. Corinthian Gardens is negligent.
The instant case is obviously one for tort, as governed by Article 2176 of
the Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
In every tort case filed under this provision, plaintiff has to prove by a
preponderance of evidence:
(1) the damages suffered by the plaintiff;
(2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person for
whose act he must respond; and
(3) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence
and the damages incurred.
A negligent act is an inadvertent act; it may be merely carelessly
done from a lack of ordinary prudence and may be one which creates a
situation involving an unreasonable risk to another because of the
expectable action of the other, a third person, an animal, or a force of
nature. A negligent act is one from which an ordinary prudent person in
the actor's position, in the same or similar circumstances, would foresee
such an appreciable risk of harm to others as to cause him not to do the
act or to do it in a more careful manner.
The test to determine the existence of negligence in a particular
case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in committing the
alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an
ordinary person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is
guilty of negligence.

By this test, we find Corinthian negligent.

Indeed, it is clear that Corinthian failed to exercise the requisite

diligence in insuring that the Cuasos abide by its Manual of Rules and
Regulations, thereby resulting in the encroachment on the Tanjangcos
property.

We agree with the CA when it aptly held:

Corinthian cannot and should not be allowed to justify or excuse its

negligence by claiming that its approval of the Cuasos building plans was
only limited to a so-called table inspection; and not actual site
measurement. To accept some such postulate is to put a premium on
negligence. Corinthian was not organized solely for the defendants
Cuasos. It is also the subdivision of the plaintiffs-spouses Tanjangcos -
and of all others who have their dwelling units or abodes therein. It is not
just or equitable to relieve Corinthian of any liability when, by its very own
rules, it imposes its authority over all its members to the end that no new
construction can be started unless the plans are approved by the
Association and the appropriate cash bond and pre-construction fees are
paid. Moreover, Corinthian can impose sanctions for violating these rules.
Thus, the proposition that the inspection is merely a table inspection and,
therefore, should exempt Corinthian from liability, is unacceptable. After
all, if the supposed inspection is merely a table inspection and the
approval granted to every member is a mere formality, then the purpose
of the rules would be defeated. Compliance therewith would not be
mandatory, and sanctions imposed for violations could be disregarded.
Corinthian's imprimatur on the construction of the Cuasos' perimeter wall
over the property of the Tanjangcos assured the Cuasos that everything
was in order.

In sum, Corinthians failure to prevent the encroachment of the

Cuasos perimeter wall into Tanjangcos property despite the inspection
conducted constitutes negligence and, at the very least, contributed to
the injury suffered by the Tanjangcos.
2. Porfirio P. Cinco v. Hon. Mateo Canonoy Et Al. (1979)
Doctrine: Independent Civil Action; Article 2176 of the Civil Code is so
broad that it includes not only injuries to persons but also damage to
property. The word "damage" is used in two concepts: the "harm" done
and "reparation" for the harm done. It makes no distinction between
"damage to persons" and "damage to property". And with respect to harm
it is plain that it includes both injuries to person and property since "harm"
is not limited to personal but also to property injuries.
Facts: Porfirio P. Cinco filed a complaint in the City Court of Mandaue
City, Cebu for the recovery of damages (damage to property) on account
of a vehicular accident involving his automobile and against a jeepney
driven by Romeo Hilot and operated by Valeriana Pepito and Carlos
Pepito.
Subsequent thereto, a criminal case was filed against the driver, Romeo
Hilot, arising from thesame accident.
At the pre-trial in the civil case, counsel for private respondents moved to
suspend the civilaction pending the final determination of the criminal
suit, invoking Rule 111, Section 3 (b) ofthe Rules of Court, which
provides:
(b) After a criminal action has been commenced. no civil action
arising from the same offense can be prosecuted, and the same
shall be suspended, in whatever stage it may be found, until final
judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered.
City Court: ordered the suspension of the civil case
CFI by certiorari: dismissed the Petition for certiorari on the ground that
there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the City Court in
suspending the civil action since damage to property is not one of the
instances when an independent civil action is proper.
That petitioner has another plain, speedy, and adequate remedy under
the law, which is to submit his claim for damages in the criminal case.
ISSUE: Whether or not there can be an independent civil action for
damage to property during the pendency of the criminal action
RULING:
It is evident based from the complaint that his action was quasi-delict
predicated principally on Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code, which
provide:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such
fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties, is called quasi-delict.
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only
for one's own acts oromissions but also for those of persons for whom
one is responsible.
xxxxxxxxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages cause by their employees and
household helpers actingwithin the scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
The responsibility shall cease when the persons mentioned prove that
they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damage.
Liability being predicated on quasi-delict the civil case may
proceed as a separate and independent civil action, as specifically
provided for in Article 2177 of the Civil Code. Art. 2177.
Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
In construing the laws, courts have endeavored to shorten and facilitate
the pathways of right and justice. True, there is such a remedy under our
laws, but there is also a more expeditious way, which is based on the
primary and direct responsibility of the defendant under article 1903 of
the Civil Code.
The primary and direct responsibility of employers and their presumed
negligence are principles calculated to protect society. Workmen and
employees should be carefully chosen and supervised in order to avoid
injury to the public. It is the masters or employers who principally reap the
profits resulting from the services of these servants and employees. It is
but right that they should guarantee the latter's careful conduct for the
personnel and patrimonial safety of others.
The separate and independent civil action for a quasi-delict is also clearly
recognized in section 3, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 3. When civil action may proceed independently.—In the cases
provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended
party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the
offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission
charged in the criminal action.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code is so broad that it includes not only
injuries to persons but also damage to property. The word "damage" is
used in two concepts: the "harm" done and "reparation" for the harm
done. It makes no distinction between "damage to persons" and "damage
to property". And with respect to harm it is plain that it includes both
injuries to person and property since "harm" is not limited to personal but
also to property injuries.
WHEREFORE, granting the Writ of certiorari prayed for, the Decision of
the Court of First
Instance of Cebu sought to be reviewed is hereby set aside, and the City
Court of Mandaue City,
Cebu, is hereby ordered to proceed with the hearing of Civil Case of that
Court.

Secs. 3(a) and 3(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which should be
suspended after thecriminal action has been instituted is that arising from
the criminal offense not the civil action based on quasi-delict

Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from
the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may
proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the
result of the latter.

For obviously, the jural concept of a quasi-delict is that of an

independent source of obligation "not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony." Article 1157 of the Civil Code bolsters this
conclusion when it specifically recognizes that:

Art. 1157. Obligations arise from:

(1) Law;

(2) Contracts;

(3) Quasi-contracts;

(4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and

(5) Quasi-delicts. (1089a)

 B. ELEMENTS OF QUASI DELICT
NATIVIDAD V. ANDAMO and EMMANUEL R. ANDAMO, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (First Civil Cases Division) and
MISSIONARIES OF OUR LADY OF LA SALETTE, INC., respondents.
It is axiomatic that the nature of an action filed in court is determined by
the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting the cause of action.
A careful examination of the complaint in the civil case shows that the
civil action is one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on
quasi-delicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit:

TOPIC: Elements of Quasi-delict (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff,

FACTS: (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for
whose acts he must respond; and
Within the land of Missionaries of Our Lady of La Sallete (Respondent
Corporation), waterpaths and contrivances, including an artificial lake, (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or
were constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded adjacent negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.
Spouses Andamo’s (Petitioner Spouses) land, caused a young man to
Clearly, from petitioner's complaint, the waterpaths and
drown, damaged petitioners' crops and plants, washed away costly
contrivances built by respondent corporation are alleged to have
fences, endangered the lives of petitioners and their laborers during rainy
inundated the land of petitioners. There is therefore, an assertion of a
and stormy seasons, and exposed plants and other improvements to
causal connection between the act of building these waterpaths and the
destruction.
damage sustained by petitioners. Such action if proven constitutes fault
Petitioner spouses instituted a criminal action against Respondent or negligence which may be the basis for the recovery of damages.
corporation for destruction by means of inundation. Thereafter, a civil
case for damages was filed by the petitioners.

Respondent corporation moved to dismiss the civil case pursuant to Sec.

3(a) of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court which provides that "criminal and civil
actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately, but
after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action cannot be
instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action."

The trial court granted Respondent corporation’s motion. The Appellate

Court affirmed the trial court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the civil case is a separate civil action under Article 2176
and 2177, thus can proceed notwithstanding the pending criminal case.

RULING: Yes.
 C. MODALITIES OF AN ACT DELIA R. SIBAL, petitioner,
vs.
1. CONTRARY TO LAW, MORALS, GOOD CUSTOMS AND PUBLIC NOTRE DAME OF GREATER MANILA, NATIONAL LABOR
POLICY (Arts. 20 and 21 NCC) RELATIONS COMMISSION, respondents

Art. 20. Every person who: G.R. No. 75093 February 23, 1990

1. contrary to law, Facts: Petitioner Delia R. Sibal was employed as school nurse by private
respondent Notre Dame of Greater Manila starting January 1973. Prior to
2. wilfully or negligently school year 1976-1977, she was compensated on a 12-month basis,
although she worked only during the ten-month period of classes. She
3. causes damage to another,
was not required to report for work for the entire Christmas and summer
4. shall indemnify the latter for the same. vacations. However, on March 10, 1976, respondent's director, Fr.
Enrique Gonzales, requested her to shorten her summer vacation, from
two weeks after the last day of classes to two weeks before the first day
of classes of the next school year. Petitioner acceded to the request.
Art. 21. Any person who:
Sometime in April 1980, Fr. Gonzales required petitioner to report during
1. wilfully that summer to help in the library. In a letter dated April 11, 1980,
petitioner contested the order, stating that it will necessitate a change in
2. causes loss or injury to another
the terms and conditions of her employment and that library work is alien
3. in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public to her profession as nurse Fr. Gonzales relented.
policy
Fr. Gonzales was replaced by Fr. Pablo Garcia, an American, as new
4. shall compensate the latter for the damage. director. Fr. Garcia required petitioner to report for work during the
summer before the beginning of school year 1981-1982. Petitioner
informed him that her contract does not require her to report for work
during the summer vacation.

During school year 1981-1982, petitioner was assigned to teach health

subjects to 900 students spread out in nineteen (19) sections of the entire
high school department. This situation came about because the two (2)
teachers of the health subjects had left the school. Petitioner, however,
was not given compensation for teaching, notwithstanding the fact that
other teachers were duly compensated for extra work done.

Fr. Garcia again required petitioner to work during that summer to update
all the clinical records of the students. In a letter dated April 7, 1982,
petitioner objected to the order by reiterating that her contract does not
require her to report for work during summer. In addition, she reminded
Fr. Garcia that she had not received any compensation for teaching
health subjects the past school year. On the same day, Fr. Garcia replied
in a letter to the effect that it was imperative for her to report for work
during the summer because it is the best time to update the clinical
records when no students could disturb her. Also, petitioner was not
entitled to extra compensation for teaching because teaching was
allegedly part of her regular working program as a school nurse.
Petitioner then filed a complaint for non-payment of the following; (1)
vacation pay for four (4) summer months; (2) compensation for teaching
health subjects; and (3) deficiency in the 13th month pay.
impossible for them to work harmoniously again. And the NLRC affirmed
such finding which is untrue and merely speculative.
Petitioner had been the subject of discrimination for over a year before
she was ultimately dismissed. When she justifiably refused to obey the
order to report for work for two summers, she was not given her vacation
pay for both occasions. Unlike her, the doctor and dentist who worked in
the same clinic, were not required to report during summer and were
given their respective vacation pay.

Respondent school then served petitioner her letter of termination

effective immediately and it also submitted a copy of the termination
paper to the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE).

NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter granting Petitioner

separation pay and dismissing petitioner on the basis of her perception
that petitioner and the director could no longer work harmoniously.

Issue: WON the act of the Respondent dismissing Petitioner without due
process is a violation under Article 20 and 21 of the NCC.

Held: Yes. Employment, profession, trade or calling is a "property right",

and the wrongful interference therewith is an actionable wrong. The right
is considered to be property within the protection of a constitutional
guaranty of due process of law.

In this case, Petitioner was dismissed immediately when she filed

a complaint against respondent. The latter even did not comply with the
two fold notice rule, which are pre-notice and post-notice. Hence,
Petitioner was deprived of her right to be heard. Therefore, due process
of law was violated.

The Labor Arbiter herself had found that the termination of petitioner was
not supported by any just cause or reason. Yet, she erroneously ordered
separation pay instead of reinstatement with backwages based on the
alleged reason that petitioner's working relations with the former director,
Father Garcia, had become so strained and deteriorated that it became
CONRADO BUNAG, JR. vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, First
Division, and ZENAIDA B. CIRILO, G.R. No. 101749 July 10, 1992
Facts: Conrado and Zenaida were sweet hearts. They had a quarrel.
Wanting to talk with Zenaida, Conrado abducted her and brought her to
a motel Zenaida was raped. Later that evening, Bunag brought Zenaida
to the house of his grandmother where they lived together as husband
and wife for 21 days. Soon after, they applied for a marriage license with
the Office of the Local Civil Registrar. However, Bunag left and never
returned. A complaint for damages for alleged breach of promise to
marry was filed by Zenaida against Bunag. Meanwhile, the complaint for
forcible abduction with rape was dismissed in the fiscal’s office.
Issue: Whether or not Bunag is liable.
Held: Yes.
Generally, a breach of promise to marry per se is not actionable,
except where the plaintiff has actually incurred expenses for the
wedding and the necessary incidents thereof. However, the award of
moral damages is allowed in cases specified in or analogous to those
provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Correlatively, under Article 21
of said Code, in relation to paragraph 10 of said Article 2219, any person
who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate
the latter for moral damages. Article 21 was adopted to remedy the
countless gaps in the statutes which leave so many victims of moral
wrongs helpless even though they have actually suffered material and
moral injury, and is intended to vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that
untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight
to specifically provide for in the statutes.
Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, the acts of
petitioner in forcibly abducting private respondent and having carnal
knowledge with her against her will, and thereafter promising to marry her
in order to escape criminal liability, only to thereafter renege on such
promise after cohabiting with her for twenty-one days, irremissibly
constitute acts contrary to morals and good customs. These are grossly
insensate and reprehensible transgressions which indisputably warrant
and abundantly justify the award of moral and exemplary damages,
pursuant to Article 21 in relation to paragraphs 3 and 10, Article 2219,
and Article 2229 and 2234 of Civil Code.
Petitioner would, however, belabor the fact that said damages were
awarded by the trial court on the basis of a finding that he is guilty of
forcible abduction with rape, despite the prior dismissal of the complaint
therefor filed by private respondent with the Pasay City Fiscal's Office.
Generally, the basis of civil liability from crime is the fundamental
postulate of our law that every person criminally liable for a felony is also
civilly liable. In other words, criminal liability will give rise to civil liability ex
delicto only if the same felonious act or omission results in damage or
injury to another and is the direct and proximate cause thereof. Hence,
extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of civil
liability unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.
In the instant case, the dismissal of the complaint for forcible
abduction with rape was by mere resolution of the fiscal at the
preliminary investigation stage. There is no declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil case might arise did not
exist. Consequently, the dismissal did not in any way affect the right of
herein private respondent to institute a civil action arising from the
offense because such preliminary dismissal of the penal action did not
carry with it the extinction of the civil action.
The reason most often given for this holding is that the two proceedings
involved are not between the same parties. Furthermore, it has long been
emphasized, with continuing validity up to now, that there are different
rules as to the competency of witnesses and the quantum of evidence in
criminal and civil proceedings. In a criminal action, the State must prove
its case by evidence which shows the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, while in a civil action it is sufficient for the plaintiff to
sustain his cause by preponderance of evidence only. Thus, in Rillon, et
al. vs. Rillon, we stressed that it is not now necessary that a criminal
prosecution for rape be first instituted and prosecuted to final
judgment before a civil action based on said offense in favor of the
offended woman can likewise be instituted and prosecuted to final
judgment.
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
MARILOU T. GONZALES
FACTS:
Petitioner was a medicine student at Lyceum Northwestern Colleges at
Dagupan City. He was an Iranian exchange student and was 29 years
old and was residing at Lozano Apartments. Respondent on the other
hand, was a former waitress on a luncheonette, and was 22 years old.
The Petitioner courted and proposed to marry her; and she accepted his
love on the condition that they would get married after the end of the
school semester (August 1987), which convinced her to live with him in
his apartment.
Respondent alleges that she was a virgin before she began living with
him; and a week before the filing of the complaint, petitioner's attitude
towards her started to change; he maltreated and threatened to kill her;
as a result of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries; during a
confrontation with a representative of the barangay captain of Guilig a
day before the filing of the complaint, petitioner repudiated their marriage
agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and; the petitioner
is already married to someone living in Bacolod City.
PETITIONER claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to
be married with the private respondent; he neither sought the consent
and approval of her parents nor forced her to live in his apartment; he did
not maltreat her, but only told her to stop coming to his place because he
discovered that she had deceived him by stealing his money and
passport; and finally, no confrontation took place with a representative of
the barangay captain.
Private respondent filed an action for damages at RTC Pangasinan,
praying for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages in the
amount of not less than P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual expenses
amounting to P600.00, attorney's fees.
RTC ruled in favor of the respondent, citing Article 21 of the Civil code as
its basis. It averred that the Petitioner and the private respondent were
lovers, and through the former’s machinations, false pretenses and deceit
of marrying the latter, was able to deflower and besmirch her reputation.
By reason also of the deceitful promise, the parents already made some
preparations for the wedding to no avail, thus abusing the Philippine
tradition and hospitality.
CA affirmed IN TOTO the ruling of the RTC. Hence this petition.
It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he
had not committed any moral wrong or injury or violated any good custom
or public policy; he has not professed love or proposed marriage to the
private respondent; and he has never maltreated her. He criticizes the
trial court for liberally invoking Filipino customs, traditions and culture,
and ignoring the fact that since he is a foreigner, he is not conversant
with such Filipino customs, traditions and culture. As an Iranian Moslem,
he is not familiar with Catholic and Christian ways.
Finally, petitioner asseverates that even if it was to be
assumed arguendo that he had professed his love to the private
respondent and had also promised to marry her, such acts would not be
actionable in view of the special circumstances of the case. The mere
breach of promise is not actionable
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the petitioner is to be held liable for damages for
breach of promise to marry.
2. Whether or not the principle of in pare delicto applies in the case
at bar
HELD: A breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable
wrong. This court held that where a man’s promise to marry is in fact the
proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his
representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate
cause of the giving of herself in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in
reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a
subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him
and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of
damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but
because of fraud and deceit and the willful injury to her honor and
reputation which followed thereafter. Such act done by the petitioner is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.

In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's
"fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry
plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to
live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said
promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's
part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with
him preparatory to their supposed marriage." 24 In short, the private
respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every
single Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral seduction. The
petitioner could not be held liable for criminal seduction punished under
either Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code because the
private respondent was above eighteen (18) years of age at the time of
the seduction.

2. Furthermore, the contention of the Petitioner that even for the sake of
argument that that he did promise to marry the private respondent, the
latter is nevertheless also at fault. According to him, both parties are
in pari delicto; and the private respondent cannot recover damages from
the petitioner. The latter even goes as far as stating that if the private
respondent had "sustained any injury or damage in their relationship, it is
primarily because of her own doing, as the PRIVATE RESPONDENT is a
plain high school graduate and a waitress, and her family is in dire need
of financial assistance.

SC said that the pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while
indeed, the private respondent may not have been impelled by the purest
of intentions, she eventually submitted to the petitioner in sexual
congress not out of lust, but because of moral seduction. In fact, it is
apparent that she had qualms of conscience about the entire episode for
as soon as she found out that the petitioner was not going to marry her
after all, she left him. She is not, therefore, in pari delicto with the
petitioner. Pari delicto means "in equal fault; in a similar offense or crime;
equal in guilt or in legal fault.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the

instant petition is hereby DENIED, with costs against the petitioner.
AMELITA CONSTANTINO and MICHAEL CONSTANTINO, the latter
represented herein by the former, his mother and natural guardian,
petitioners, vs. IVAN MENDEZ and the HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents. (1992)
Facts: Petitioner filed an action for acknowledgment, support and
damages against private respondent.
The parties met at a restaurant where Amelita was a waitress. Ivan
courted and professed love to Amelita. One evening, Amelita asked Ivan
to bring her home to which the latter agreed, that on the pretext of getting
something, Ivan brought Amelita inside his hotel room and through a
promise of marriage succeeded in having sexual intercourse with the
latter; that after the sexual contact, Ivan confessed to Amelita that he is a
married man; that they repeated their sexual contact in the months of
September and November, 1974, whenever Ivan is in Manila, as a result
of which Amelita got pregnant; that her pleas for help and support fell on
deaf ears; that Amelita had no sexual relations with any other man except
Ivan who is the father of the child yet to be born at the time of the filing of
the complaint; that because of her pregnancy, Amelita was forced to
leave her work as a waitress; that Ivan is a prosperous businessman of
Davao City with a monthly income of P5,000 to P8,000. As relief, Amelita
prayed for the recognition of the unborn child, the payment of actual,
moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees plus costs.
Amelita filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint, impleading as
co-plaintiff her son Michael Constantino who was one month old. In its
order dated September 4, 1975, the trial court admitted the amended
complaint.
Trial Court: Ruled in favor of Amelita. Damages to be paid by Ivan.
CA: reversed the trial court ruling.
Issue: whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in
setting aside the decision of the trial court and in dismissing the
complaint.
Held: NO.
It is the conclusion of the Court of Appeals, which the SC affirms, based
on the evidence on record, that Amelita Constantino has not proved by
clear and convincing evidence her claim that Ivan Mendez is the father of
her son Michael Constantino.
xxx
As regards Amelita's claim for damages which is based on Articles
19 & 21 of the Civil Code on the theory that through Ivan's promise
of marriage, she surrendered her virginity, we cannot but agree with
the Court of Appeals that mere sexual intercourse is not by itself a
basis for recovery. Damages could only be awarded if sexual
intercourse is not a product of voluntariness and mutual desire. At
the time she met Ivan at Tony's Restaurant, Amelita was already 28
years old and she admitted that she was attracted to Ivan. Her attraction
to Ivan is the reason why she surrendered her womanhood. Had she
been induced or deceived because of a promise of marriage, she could
have immediately severed her relation with Ivan when she was informed
after their first sexual contact sometime in August, 1974, that he was a
married man. Her declaration that in the months of September, October
and November, 1974, they repeated their sexual intercourse only
indicates that passion and not the alleged promise of marriage was the
moving force that made her submit herself to Ivan.
MICHAEL LONDON for and in behalf of his minor son NICHOLAS
FREDERICK LONDON, petitioner, vs. BAGUIO COUNTRY CLUB
CORPORATION, ANTHONY DE LEON and FRANCIS BASTIANO
SIMALONG, respondents. (2002)
Facts: Nicholas London was playing video games at the recreation center
of the club, when Simalong (bowling mechanic), then obviously drunk,
placed his hand around Nicholas and touched the latter’s penis.
Frightened, Nicholas immediately informed by telephone his parents
about it. Forthwith, his parents fetched him, and the three proceeded to
the police station to report the matter.
Assisted by his father, Michael London, Nicholas executed and
filed before the Office of the City Prosecutor in Baguio City a complaint-
affidavit for Sexual Harassment and/or Child Abuse and/or Acts of
Lasciviousness and Unjust Vexation against respondent Simalong. The
prosecutor ruled that there was probable cause, thus, an information was
filed in the Family Court.
Afterwards a complaint for damages before RTC, against the
Baguio Country Club, the club’s General Manager Anthony de Leon, and
Francis Simalong was filed by the petitioner. The civil action, was
predicated on the civil liability of defendants for culpa acquiliana under
the provisions of the Civil Code. The Baguio Country Club and Anthony
de Leon filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the
Verification/Certification against forum shopping attached to the
complaint did not disclose the existence and status of the pending
criminal case.
Issue: WON the petitioner committed forum shopping.
Held: No.
Forum shopping is the institution of two (2) or more actions or
proceedings grounded on the same cause upon the supposition that one
or the other court would make a favorable disposition. For forum
shopping to exist, the actions must involve the same transaction,
including the essential facts and circumstances thereof, and must raise
identical causes of actions, subject matter and issues. The mere filing of
two or more cases based on the same incident does not necessarily
constitute forum-shopping. In fine, there should be (a) identity of parties
or at least such parties who represent the same interests in both actions,
(b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, such relief being
founded on the same circumstances, and (c) the identity of the two
preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other
action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res
judicata in the action under consideration, said requisites being likewise
constitutive of the elements of auter action pendent or litis pendencia.
While, in this instance, both the criminal action and the civil
complaint for quasi-delict have arisen from an act of lasciviousness
claimed to have been committed by Simalong against the person of
Nicholas Frederick London, there are, however, material differences
between the two actions. In the criminal case, the real party plaintiff is
the People of the Philippines and the defendant is accused
Simalong alone. In the civil case, the parties are plaintiff Michael
London, for and in behalf of his minor son Nicholas Frederick
London, and the defendants include not only Simalong but also the
Baguio Country Club and its general manager Anthony de
Leon. Given the circumstances, a judgment of conviction or
acquittal in the criminal case against Simalong cannot at all be
invoked as being one of res judicata in the independent suit for
damages.
It may not be amiss to reiterate that rules of procedure are mere tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice; thus, their strict and rigid
application that would tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial
justice are well to be avoided. Indeed, the Rules of Civil Procedure on
forum shopping are not always applied with inflexibility.
2. Negligent (Arts, 20 and 1173, New Civil Code) 3. Willful or Intentional

Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently Art. 20. Every person who:
causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
1. contrary to law,
Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the
omission of that diligence which is required by: 2. wilfully or negligently

1. the nature of the obligation and 3. causes damage to another,

2. corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time 4. shall indemnify the latter for the same.
and of the place.

When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of Articles 1171

Art. 21. Any person who:
and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.
1. wilfully
If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be
observed in the performance, that which is expected of a good 2. causes loss or injury to another
father of a family shall be required.
3. in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
Art. 1171. Responsibility arising from fraud is demandable in all policy
obligations. Any waiver of an action for future fraud is void.
4. shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Art. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which
the obligor who acted in good faith is liable shall be those that are:
1. the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the
obligation, and

2. which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably

foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted.
B.F. METAL (CORPORATION), petitioners, vs.SPS. ROLANDO M.
LOMOTAN and LINAFLOR LOMOTAN and RICO UMUYON,
respondents. (2008)
Facts: Umuyon was driving the owner-type jeep owned by Sps. Lomotan
along Felix Avenue in Cainta at a moderate speed. At the opposite lane,
the speeding ten-wheeler truck driven by Onofre Rivera overtook a car by
invading the lane being traversed by the jeep and rammed into the jeep.
The jeep was a total wreck while Umuyon suffered "blunt thoracic injury
with multiple rib fracture, fractured scapula (L), with pneumohemothorax,"
which entailed his hospitalization for 19 days. Also in view of the injuries
he sustained, Umuyon could no longer drive, reducing his daily income.
Respondents instituted a separate and independent civil action
for damages against petitioner BF Metal Corporation ("petitioner") and
Rivera before the Regional Trial Court. The complaint essentially alleged
that defendant Rivera’s gross negligence and recklessness was the
immediate and proximate cause of the vehicular accident and that
petitioner failed to exercise the required diligence in the selection and
supervision of Rivera. The complaint prayed for the award of actual,
exemplary and moral damages and attorney’s fees in favor of
respondents.
Meanwhile, Rivera was already found guilty of reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property with physical injuries in the
separate criminal case.
The CA, in affirmation of the RTC, ruled that Rivera’s negligence
was the proximate cause of the accident and that petitioner was liable
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code for its negligence in the selection and
supervision of its employees.
Issue: Whether or not Petitioner is liable for moral damages.
Held: Petitioner is liable for moral damages to Umoyan but not to the Sps
Lomota.
Petitioner also argues that the award of moral damages was premised on
the resulting physical injuries arising from the quasi-delict; since only
respondent Umuyon suffered physical injuries, the award should pertain
solely to him. Correspondingly, the award of exemplary damages should
pertain only to respondent Umuyon since only the latter is entitled to
moral damages, petitioner adds.
In the case of moral damages, recovery is more an exception rather than
the rule. Moral damages are not punitive in nature but are designed to
compensate and alleviate the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock,
social humiliation, and similar harm unjustly caused to a person. In order
that an award of moral damages can be aptly justified, the claimant must
be able to satisfactorily prove that he has suffered such damages and
that the injury causing it has sprung from any of the cases listed in
Articles 221916 and 222017 of the Civil Code. Then, too, the damages
must be shown to be the proximate result of a wrongful act or omission.
The claimant must establish the factual basis of the damages and its
causal tie with the acts of the defendant. In fine, an award of moral
damages would require, firstly, evidence of besmirched reputation or
physical, mental or psychological suffering sustained by the claimant;
secondly, a culpable act or omission factually established; thirdly, proof
that the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause
of the damages sustained by the claimant; and fourthly, that the case is
predicated on any of the instances expressed or envisioned by Article
2219 and Article 2220 of the Civil Code.18
I. In culpa aquiliana, or quasi-delict:
(a) when an act or omission causes physical injuries, or
(b) where the defendant is guilty of intentional tort,
moral damages may aptly be recovered.
II. This rule also applies, as aforestated, to breaches of contract
where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith (or when
there is death as in contract of carriage).
III. In culpa criminal, moral damages could be lawfully due when the
accused is found guilty of physical injuries, lascivious acts, adultery
or concubinage, illegal or arbitrary detention, illegal arrest, illegal
search, or defamation.
 Undoubtedly, petitioner is liable for the moral damages suffered
by respondent Umuyon. Its liability is based on a quasi-delict or on its
negligence in the supervision and selection of its driver, causing the
vehicular accident and physical injuries to respondent Umuyon. Rivera is
also liable for moral damages to respondent Umuyon based on either
culpa criminal or quasi-delict. Since the decision in the criminal case,
which found Rivera guilty of criminal negligence, did not award moral
damages, the same may be awarded in the instant civil action for
damages.

Jurisprudence show that in criminal offenses resulting to the

death of the victim, an award within the range of P50,000.00 to
P100,000.00 as moral damages has become the trend. Under the
circumstances, because respondent Umuyon did not die but had become
permanently incapacitated to drive as a result of the accident, the award
of P30,000.00 for moral damages in his favor is justified.

However, there is no legal basis in awarding moral damages

to Spouses Lomotan whether arising from the criminal negligence
committed by Rivera or based on the negligence of petitioner under
Article 2180. Article 2219 speaks of recovery of moral damages in case
of a criminal offense resulting in physical injuries or quasi-delicts causing
physical injuries, the two instances where Rivera and petitioner are liable
for moral damages to respondent Umuyon. Article 2220 does speak of
awarding moral damages where there is injury to property, but the
injury must be willful and the circumstances show that such
damages are justly due. There being no proof that the accident was
willful, Article 2220 does not apply.
4. Meaning of Gross Negligence in Tort
CONCEPCION ILAO-ORETA v. SPOUSES EVA MARIE and
BENEDICTO NOEL RONQUILLO, et al (2007).
Respondent spouses Eva Marie Ronquillo and Noel Benedicto
Ronquillo had not been blessed with a child despite several years of
marriage. They thus consulted petitioner Dr. Concepcion Ilao-Oreta, an
obstetrician-gynecologist-consultant and chief of the Reproductive
Endocrinology and Infertility Section at the St. Luke‘s Medical Center. Dr.
Ilao-Oreta advised Eva Marie to undergo a laparoscopic procedure
whereby a laparascope would be inserted through the patient‘s
abdominal wall to get a direct view of her internal reproductive organ in
order to determine the real cause of her infertility.
The procedure was scheduled on April 5, 1999 at 2:00 p.m.
to be performed by Dr. Ilao-Oreta. Eva Marie, accompanied by Noel,
checked in at the St. Luke‘s Medical Center and underwent pre-operative
procedures including the administration of intravenous fluid and enema.
However, Dr. Ilao-Oreta did not arrive at the scheduled time for the
procedure and no prior notice of its cancellation was received. It turned
out that the doctor was on a return flight from Hawaii to, and arrived at
10:00 p.m. of April 5, 1999 in, Manila.
The Ronquillo spouses filed a complaint against Dr. Ilao-Oreta
and the St. Luke‘s Medical Center for breach of professional and service
contract and for damages before the Regional Trial Court of Batangas
City. They prayed for the award of actual damages including alleged loss
of income of Noel while accompanying his wife to the hospital, moral
damages, exemplary damages, costs of litigation, attorney‘s fees, and
other available reliefs and remedies. The RTC decided in favor of
Ronquillo spouses and awarded Eva Marie actual damages but ruled that
the failure of the doctor to arrive on time was not intentional. It found no
adequate proof that Noel had been deprived of any job contract while
attending to his wife in the hospital. The spouses appealed to the Court
of Appeals and found that Dr. Ilao-Oreta grossly negligent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Dr. Ilao-Oreta is guilty of gross negligence for her failure
to arrive at the scheduled time for the procedure
HELD:NO
Gross negligence implies a want or absence of or failure to exercise
slight care or diligence, or the entire absence of care. It evinces a
thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to
avoid them. It is characterized by want of even slight care, acting or
omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently
but willfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to
consequences in so far as other persons may be affected.
The records show that before leaving for Hawaii, Dr. Ilao-Oreta left an
admitting order with her secretary for one of the spouses to pick up,
apprised Eva Marie of the necessary preparations for the procedure, and
instructed the hospital staff to perform pre-operative treatments. These
acts of the doctor reflect an earnest intention to perform the procedure on
the day and time scheduled.
The evidence then shows that Dr. Ilao-Oreta, who had traveled more
than twice to the United States where she obtained a fellowship in
Reproductive Endocrinology and Infertility was indeed negligent when
she scheduled to perform professional service at 2:00 p.m. on April 5,
1999 without considering the time difference between
the Philippines and Hawaii.
The doctors act did not, however, reflect gross negligence as defined
above. Her argument that:
Although petitioner failed to take into consideration the time
difference between the Philippines and Hawaii, the situation then
did not present any clear and apparent harm or injury that even a
careless person may perceive. Unlike in situations where the
Supreme Court had found gross negligence to exist, petitioner
could not have been conscious of any foreseeable danger that
may occur since she actually believed that she would make it to
the operation that was elective in nature, the only purpose of
 which was to determine the real cause of infertility and not to treat
and cure a life threatening disease. Thus, in merely fixing the
date of her appointment with respondent Eva Marie Ronquillo,
petitioner was not in the pursuit or performance of conduct which
any ordinary person may deem to probably and naturally result in
injury,[19] (Underscoring in original)

thus persuades.

It bears noting that when she was scheduling the date of her
performance of the procedure, Dr. Ilao-Oreta had just gotten married and
was preparing for her honeymoon,[20] and it is of common human
knowledge that excitement attends its preparations. Her negligence could
then be partly attributed to human frailty which rules out its
characterization as gross.

The doctors negligence not being gross, the spouses are not entitled to
recover moral damages.

Neither are the spouses entitled to recover exemplary damages in the

absence of a showing that Dr. Ilao-Oreta acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.
 CHAPTER IV: PROXIMATE OR LEGAL CAUSE
CAUSE AND EFFECT
A. CONCEPT
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and
is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)
Art. 2179. When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate
and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But
if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and
proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due
care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall
mitigate the damages to be awarded. (n)
B. PROXIMATE CAUSE DEFINED
LAMBERT S. RAMOS v. C.O.L. REALTY CORPORATION (2009)
Facts: Petitioner Ramos is the employer of Rodel Ilustrisimo. While
Rodel was driving the Ford Expedition of petitioner an accident ensued,
wherein it bumped with a Corrolla Altis driven by Aquilino Larin and
owned by Respondent COL Realty. Due to the impact of the vehicular
mishap, the passenger of the sedan was injured.
A case was filed against Ramos making him solidarily liable with his
driver. Ramos in his opposition argued that he cannot be held solidarily
liable since it is Aquilino's negligence that is the proximate cause of the
accident. He further argued that when the accident happened, Aquilino
violated an MMDA order, i.e. prohibiting crossing.
Issue: Whether or not Ramos may be held liable since the proximate
cause of the accident is his employee's negligence.
Ruling: No. There is no doubt that Aquilino’s violation of the MMDA
prohibition against crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda
Street was the proximate cause of the accident.
Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred. And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that
acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other
events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of
events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury
as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under
such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should,
as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to
expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person
might probably result therefrom.
If Aquilino heeded the MMDA prohibition against crossing
Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda, the accident would not have
happened. This specific untoward event is exactly what the MMDA
prohibition was intended for. Thus, a prudent and intelligent person who
resides within the vicinity where the accident occurred, Aquilino had
reasonable ground to expect that the accident would be a natural and
probable result if he crossed Katipunan Avenue since such crossing is
considered dangerous on account of the busy nature of the thoroughfare
and the ongoing construction of the Katipunan-Boni Avenue
underpass. It was manifest error for the Court of Appeals to have
overlooked the principle embodied in Article 2179 of the Civil Code,
that when the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages.
As to the alleged Rodel's contributory negligence- the court finds it
unnecessary to delve into it, since it cannot overcome or defeat Aquilino’s
recklessness which is the immediate and proximate cause of the
accident. Rodel’s contributory negligence has relevance only in the event
that Ramos seeks to recover from respondent whatever damages or
injuries he may have suffered as a result; it will have the effect of
mitigating the award of damages in his favor.
 C. TWO ELEMENTS OF PROXIMATE CAUSE
i. CAUSE IN FACT
1. SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN and the minors
NORMA, LUZVIMINDA, ELENITA, OSCAR and ALFREDO
BATACLAN, represented by their Natural guardian, SALUD
VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs. MARIANO MEDINA, defendant-appellant (1957)
On September 13, 1952, bus no. 30 of the Medina Transportation (driven
by Conrado Saylon and owned by Mariano Medina) was on its way to
Pasay City. At about 2:00 o'clock in the morning, while the bus was
running within Imus, Cavite, one of the front tires burst and the vehicle
began to zig-zag until it fell into a canal or ditch on the right side of the
road and turned turtle. Some of the passengers managed to leave the
bus the best way they could, others had to be helped or pulled out, while
the three passengers seated beside the driver, named Juan Bataclan,
Felipe Lara and the Visayan and Natalia Villanueva, could not get out of
the overturned bus. After half an hour, help came. But one of the ten men
who came to help carried a lighted torch made of bamboo, fueled by
petroleum, and almost immediately upon approaching the bus, a fierce
fire consumed the latter, including the four passengers trapped inside it. It
would appear that as the bus overturned, gasoline began to leak and
escape from the gasoline tank on the side of the chassis, spreading over
and permeating the body of the bus and the ground under and around it,
and that the lighted torch brought by one of the men who answered the
call for help set it on fire.
By reason of Juan Bataclan’s death, his widow, Salud Villanueva, in her
name and in behalf of her five minor children, brought the present suit to
recover from Mariano Medina compensatory, moral, and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of P87,150.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Cavite awarded P1,000 to the
plaintiffs plus P600 as attorney's fee, plus P100, the value of the
merchandise being carried by Bataclan to Pasay City for sale and which
was lost in the fire.
The plaintiffs and the defendants appealed the decision to the Court of
Appeals, but the latter endorsed the appeal to the Supreme Court
because of the value involved in the claim in the complaint.
ISSUE: Whether or not the proximate cause of Bataclan’s death was the
overturning of the bus, which would make the carrier liable for his death
and not just for physical injuries.
RULING:
YES. There is no question that under the circumstances, the defendant
carrier is liable. The trial court was of the opinion that the proximate
cause of the death of Bataclan was not the overturning of the bus, but
rather, the fire that burned the bus, including himself and his co-
passengers who were unable to leave it; that at the time the fire started,
Bataclan, though he must have suffered physical injuries, perhaps
serious, was still alive, and so damages were awarded, not for his death,
but for the physical injuries suffered by him.
The Supreme Court disagrees. A satisfactory definition of proximate
cause is as follows:
. . . 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which
the result would not have occurred.' And more comprehensively, 'the
proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural
and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection
with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately
effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which
first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the
first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an
injury to some person might probably result therefrom.
It may be that ordinarily, when a passenger bus overturns, and pins down
a passenger, merely causing him physical injuries, if through some event,
unexpected and extraordinary, the overturned bus is set on fire, say, by
lightning, or if some highwaymen after looting the vehicle sets it on fire,
and the passenger is burned to death, one might still contend that the
proximate cause of his death was the fire and not the overturning of the
vehicle. But in the present case under the circumstances obtaining in the
same, we do not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause was the
overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle turned
not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline
from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the
men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not
only by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the
conductor themselves, and that because it was dark (about 2:30 in the
morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them, and coming as they
did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available;
and what was more natural than that said rescuers should innocently
approach the vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested
from them. In other words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be
expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the
trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside help.

In view of the foregoing, with the modification that the damages awarded
by the trial court are increased from ONE THOUSAND (P1,000) PESOS
TO SIX THOUSAND (P6,000) PESOS, and from SIX HUNDRED PESOS
TO EIGHT HUNDRED (P800) PESOS, for the death of Bataclan and for
the attorney's fees, respectively, the decision appealed is from hereby
affirmed, with costs.

2. MERCEDES M. TEAGUE, petitioner, vs. ELENA FERNANDEZ, et
al., respondent (1973)
FACTS: The Realistic Institute, owned and operated by Teague was a
vocational school for hair and beauty culture situated on the second floor
of the Gil-Armi Building, a two-storey, semi-concrete edifice. The said
second floor was unpartitioned, had a total area of about 400 square
meters, and although it had only one stairway, of about 1.50 meters in
width, it had eight windows, each of which was provided with two fire-
escape ladders, and the presence of each of said fire-exits was indicated
on the wall.
At about four o'clock in the afternoon of October 24, 1955, a fire broke
out in a store for surplus materials located about ten meters away from
the institute. Upon seeing the fire, some of the students of the school
shouted 'Fire! Fire!' and thereafter, a panic ensued. Although there were
our instructresses and six assistant instructresses present who tried to
calm down the students (who numbered about 180 at the time) and
ordered them not to rush and to go down the stairway two by two,the
panic, however, could not be subdued and the students, with the
exception of the few who made use of fire-escapes kept on rushing and
pushing their way through the stairs, thereby causing stampede therein.
No part of the Gil-Armi Building caught fire. But, after the panic was over,
four students, including Lourdes Fernandez, a sister of plaintiffs-
appellants, were found dead and several others injured on account of the
stampede.The cause of death of Lourdes, according to the autopsy
report, was "Shock due to traumatic fractures of the ribs with perinephric
hematoma and lacerations of the conjunctiva of both eyes."
The deceased's five brothers and sisters filed an action for damages
against Teague as owner and operator of Realistic Institute. The Court of
First Instance of Manila found for the defendant and dismissed the case.
The plaintiffs thereupon appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
rendered a judgment of reversal and sentenced the defendant to pay
damages to the plaintiffs in the sum of P11,000.00. CA declared that
Teague was negligent and that such negligence was the proximate cause
of the death of Lourdes Fernandez. This finding of negligence is based
primarily on the fact that the provision of Section 491 Of the Revised
Ordinances of the City of Manila had not been complied with in
connection with the construction and use of the Gil-Armi building where
the petitioner's vocational school was housed. The alleged violation of the
ordinance consisted in the fact that the second storey of the Gil-Armi
building had only one stairway, 1.5 meters wide, instead of two of at least
1.2 meters each, although at the time of the fire the owner of the building
had a second stairway under construction.
In ruling that such non-compliance with the City Ordinances was an act of
negligence and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the
death of Lourdes, reliance is based on a number of authorities in the
American jurisdiction, if the very injury has happened which was intended
to be prevented by the statute, it has been held that violation of the
statute will be deemed to be proximate cause of the injury.
Petitioner argued that the violation of the ordinance was only a remote
cause, if at all, and cannot be the basis of liability since there intervened
a number of independent causes which produced the injury complained
of. According to the petitioner "the events of fire, panic and stampede
were independent causes with no causal connection at all with the
violation of the ordinance."
ISSUE: Whether or not the failure to comply with the requirement of the
ordinance was the proximate cause of the death of Lourdes
HELD: YES.
The weakness in the argument springs from a faulty juxtaposition of the
events which formed a chain and resulted in the injury. It is true that the
petitioner's non-compliance with the ordinance in question was ahead of
and prior to the other events in point of time, in the sense that it was
coetaneous with its occupancy of the building.But the violation was a
continuing one, since the ordinance was a measure of safety designed to
prevent a specific situation which would pose a danger to the occupants
of the building. That situation was undue overcrowding in case it should
become necessary to evacuate the building, which, it could be
reasonably foreseen, was bound to happen under emergency conditions
if there was only one stairway available. It is true that in this particular
case there would have been no overcrowding in the single stairway if
there had not been a fire in the neighborhood which caused the students
to panic and rush headlong for the stairs in order to go down. But it was
precisely such contingencies or event that the authors of the ordinance
had in mind, for under normal conditions one stairway would be adequate
for the occupants of the building.

"The general principle is that the violation of a statute or ordinance is not

rendered remote as the cause of an injury by the intervention of another
agency if the occurrence of the accident, in the manner in which it
happened, was the very thing which the statute or ordinance was
intended to prevent." To consider the violation of the ordinance as the
proximate cause of the injury does not portray the situation in its true
perspective; it would be more accurate to say that the overcrowding at
the stairway was the proximate cause and that it was precisely what the
ordinance intended to prevent by requiring that there be two stairways
instead of only one.

The decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs.

 C. TWO ELEMENTS OF PROXIMATE CAUSE
i. Foreseeability
1. TOMAS BERNAL and FORTUNATA ENVERSO, plaintiffs-
appellants, vs. J. V. HOUSE and TACLOBAN ELECTRIC and ICE
PLANT, LTD., defendants-appellee. (1930)
Purificacion Bernal, a 5 year old child and daughter of plaintiffs,
participated in a procession. While in front of the offices of the Tacloban
Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., an automobile appeared from the opposite
direction which so frightened the child that she turned to run, with the
result that she fell into the street gutter. At that time there was hot water
in this gutter or ditch coming from the Electric Ice Plant of J.V. House.
When the mother and her companions reached the child, they found her
face downward in the hot water. Her clothes were immediately removed
and, then covered with a garment, the girl was taken to the provincial
hospital. There she was attended by the resident physician, Dr.
Victoriano A. Benitez. Despite his efforts, the child died that same night at
11:40 o'clock.
with the case of Astudillo where the cause of injury can be foreseen)
the coincidence of an automobile appearing and of a frightened
child running and falling into a ditch filled with hot water. The
doctrines announced in the much debated case of Rakes vs. Atlantic,
Gulf and Pacific Co. ([1907], 7 Phil., 359), still rule. Article 1902 of the
Civil Code must again be enforced. The contributory negligence of the
child and her mother, if any, does not operate as a bar to recovery,
but in its strictest sense could only result in reduction of the
damages.
Ultimately, the cause of the death of the child Purificacion Bernal
was the result of fault and negligence in permitting hot water to flow
through the public streets, there to endanger the lives of passers-by
who were unfortunately enough to fall into it

The trial judge dismissed the action because of the contributory

negligence of the plaintiffs.

Issue: Whether or not the proximate cause of the death was the burns
suffered from the hot water.

Held: YES. the sudden death of the child Purification Bernal was due
principally to the nervous shock and organic calefaction produced by the
extensive burns from the hot water. "The danger from burns is
proportional rather to the extent of surface involved than to the depth of
the burn". The same authority continues. "Burns of the first degree,
covering two-thirds of the body surface, are rarely recovered from. . . .
Children seem especially susceptible to the effect of burns."

The court does not sustain the dismissal of the case by the trial
judge. The mother and her child had a perfect right to be on the principal
street of Tacloban, Leyte, on the evening when the religious procession
was held. There was nothing abnormal in allowing the child to run along a
few paces in advance of the mother. No one could foresee (compare
Astudillo vs. Manila Electric Co. (1930)

Facts: In August, 1928, a young man by the name of Juan Astudillo met
his death through electrocution, when he placed his right hand on a wire
connected with an electric light pole situated near Sta Lucia Gate,
Intramuros, in the City of Manila. Shortly thereafter, the mother of the
deceased instituted an action in the CFI Mla to secure from the
defendant, Manila Electric Company, damages. After trial, judgment was
rendered in favor of the plaintiff.

Issue: WON defendant did not exercise due care and diligence so as to
render it liable for damages.

Ruling: The SC concludes that the plaintiff is entitled to damages.

It is well established that the liability of electric light companies for

damages for personal injuries is governed by the rules of negligence.
Such companies are, however, not insurers of the safety of the public.
But considering that electricity is an agency, subtle and deadly, the
measure of care required of electric companies must be commensurate
with or proportionate to the danger. The duty of exercising this high
degree of diligence and care extends to every place where persons have
a right to be.

In the case at bar, the cause of the injury was one which could have
been foreseen and guarded against. The negligence came from the act
of the defendant in so placing its pole and wires as to be w/n proximity to
a place frequented by many people, with the possibility ever present of
one of them losing his life by coming in contact with a highly charged and
defectively insulated wire.
 D. PROXIMATE CAUSE: WHEN APPLICABLE
VICENTE CALALAS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ELIZA
JUJEURCHE SUNGA and FRANCISCO SALVA, respondents. (2000)
FACTS: At 10 o'clock in the morning of August 23, 1989, private
respondent Sunga, then a college freshman majoring in Physical
Education at the Siliman University, took a passenger jeepney owned
and operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was filled to
capacity of about 24 passengers, Sunga was given by the conductor an
"extension seat," a wooden stool at the back of the door at the rear end of
the vehicle.
On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros Occidental, the jeepney
stopped to let a passenger off. As she was seated at the rear of the
vehicle, Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger. Just as she was
doing so, an Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by
Francisco Salva bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney. As a result,
Sunga was injured.
On October 9, 1989, Sunga filed a complaint for damages against
Calalas, alleging violation of the contract of carriage by the former in
failing to exercise the diligence required of him as a common carrier.
Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-party complaint against Francisco
Salva, the owner of the Isuzu truck.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
1. RTC – Dumaguete – rendered judgment against Salva holding that the
driver of the Isuzu truck was responsible
It took cognizance of another case (Civil Case No. 3490), filed by Calalas
against Salva and Verena, for quasi-delict, in which Branch 37 of the
same court held Salva and his driver Verena jointly liable to Calalas for
the damage to his jeepney.
2. CA – reversed the RTC, awarding damages instead to Sunga as
plaintiff in an action for breach of contract of carriage since the cause of
action was based on such and not quasi delict.
Hence, current petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:Whether (per ruling in Civil Case) negligence of Verena was the
proximate cause of the accident negates his liability and that to rule
otherwise would be to make the common carrier an insurer of the safety
of its passengers
In relation thereto, does the principle of res judicata apply?
RULING:
No.
The issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was whether Salva and his driver
Verena were liable for quasi-delict for the damage caused to petitioner's
jeepney. On the other hand, the issue in this case is whether petitioner is
liable on his contract of carriage.
Quasi-delict / culpa aquiliana / culpa extra contractual
1. Has as its source the negligence of the tortfeasor
2. negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is the basis
of the action
3. doctrine of proximate cause is applicable
(device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation
between him and another party, obligation is created by law itself)
Breach of contract / culpa contractual
1. premised upon the negligence in the performance of a contractual
obligation
2. action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the
contract and the fact that the obligor (here, the common carrier) failed to
transport his passenger safely to his destination
3. doctrine of proximate cause is not available; it is the parties
themselves who create the obligation and the function of the law is
merely to regulate the relation thus created. Insofar as contracts of
carriage are concerned, some aspects regulated by the Civil Code are
those respecting the diligence required of common carriers with regard to
the safety of passengers as well as the presumption of negligence in
cases of death or injury to passengers.

In case of death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil

Code provides that common carriers are presumed to have been at fault
or to have acted negligently unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code.
This provision necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden of
proof.

Hence, Vicente Calalas (operator) is liable since he did not exercise

utmost diligence.

1. Jeepney was not properly parked;

2. Overloading of passengers.
 E. PROXIMATE CAUSE DISTINGUISHED FROM INTERVENING bridle was slipped entirely off, when the horse, feeling himself free from
CAUSE control, started to go away as previously stated.

1. CONSOLACION GABETO, in her own right and as guardian ad

litem of her three children, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. AGATON ARANETA, defendant-appellant. (1921)

FACTS: In 1918, Basilio Ilano and Proceso Gayetano took a carromata

with a view to going to a cockpit. When the driver of the carromata had
started in the direction indicated, the defendant, Agaton Araneta, stopped
the horse, at the same time protesting to the driver that he himself had
called this carromata first. The driver, Julio Pagnaya, replied that he had
not heard or seen the call of Araneta. Pagnaya pulled on the reins of the
bridle to free the horse from the control of Araneta, in order that the
vehicle might pass on. Owing to the looseness of the bridle on the
horse's head or to the rottenness of the material of which it was made,
the bit came out of the horse's mouth; and it became necessary for the
driver to get out in order to find the bridle. Meanwhile one of the
passengers, Ilano, had alighted but the other, Gayetano, had
unfortunately retained his seat, and after the runaway horse had
proceeded up the street Gayetano jumped or fell from the rig, and in so
doing received injuries from which he soon died.

ISSUE: W/N the proximate cause of the accident was the stopping of the
horse by Araneta.

RULING: Judgement reversed and defendant absolved from the

complaint.

RATIO: The stopping of the rig by Araneta was too remote from the
accident that presently ensued to be considered the legal or proximate
cause thereof. Moreover, by getting out and taking his post at the head of
the horse, the driver was the person primarily responsible for the control
of the animal, and the defendant cannot be charged with liability for the
accident resulting from the action of the horse thereafter. The evidence
indicates that the bridle was old, and the leather of which it was made
was probably so weak as to be easily broken. According to the witnesses
for the defendant, it was Julio who jerked the rein, thereby causing the bit
to come out of the horse's mouth; and that after alighting, led the horse
over to the curb, and proceeded to fix the bridle; and that in so doing the
2. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, Petitioner, vs. SOTERO
REMOQUILLO, in his own behalf and as guardian of the minors
MANUEL, BENJAMIN, NESTOR, MILAGROS, CORAZON, CLEMENTE
and AURORA, all surnamed MAGNO, SALUD MAGNO, and the
COURT OF APPEALS (Second Division), Respondents. (1956)
Facts:
Efren Magno went to repair a “media agua” of the three-story house of
his stepbrother. While making the repair, a galvanized iron roofing which
Magno was holding came into contact with the electric wire of the
petitioner Manila Electric Co. strung parallel by 2 and a half feet from the
edge of the “media agua”. He was electrocuted and died as a result
thereof.
An action for damages for the death of Magno against the petitioner
company was brought before the trial court. The trial court ruled in favor
of the plaintiffs and awarded the following : P10,000 as compensatory
damages; P784 as actual damages; P2,000 as moral and exemplary
damages; and P3,000 as attorney’s fees, with costs. On appeal to the
Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed the judgment with slight modification
by reducing the attorney’s fees from P3,000 to P1,000 with costs.
Hence, this petition.
Issue: WON Manila Electric Co. shall be held liable for damages
Held:
NO. Manila Electric Co., shall not be held liable for damages.
To us it is clear that the principal and proximate cause of the
electrocution was not the electric wire, evidently a remote cause, but
rather the reckless and negligent act of Magno in turning around and
swinging the galvanized iron sheet without taking any precaution, such as
looking back toward the street and at the wire to avoid its contacting said
iron sheet, considering the latter’s length of 6 feet. For a better
understanding of the rule on remote and proximate cause with respect to
injuries, we find the following citation helpful:
“A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such
remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to
the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened
between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive,
unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would
not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger
existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such
condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent
act or defective condition sets into operation the circumstances which
result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent
act or condition is the proximate cause.”
3. Vda. De Gregorio et al v. Go Chong Bing (1957)
Facts: Defendant, owner of trucks, had a driver and a "cargador" by the
name of Francisco Romera. In the afternoon of June 2, 1952, defendant
ordered Romera to drive his tuck with instructions that he follow another
truck which was to be driven by the defendant's driver. On its way, some
persons boarded the truck, one of them was a uniformed policeman by
the name of Venana Orfanel. After a while, Orfanel asked and insisted on
driving the truck. Romera, out of respect and belief that Orfanel knew
how to drive well, allowed Orfanel to take the wheel. While Orfanel was
driving, they came near a truck that was about to park on the left side of
the road. To avoid collision, Orfanel swerved to the right and hit two
pedestrians and ran over one of them named Quirico Gregorio. Orfanel
was prosecuted for homicide with reckless imprudence. He pleaded guilty
and was sentenced accordingly.
The heirs of Gregorio brought present case for damages against
the defendant, owner of the truck that ran over Gregorio. The CFI
dismissed the case on the ground that the death of Gregorio was caused
by a negligent act/omission of a person that is not, in any way, related to
the defendant.
Plaintiffs’ witness claims that Romera gave the truck voluntarily to
the policeman. On the other hand, defendant testified that he gave
positive instructions to Romera not to allow anybody to drive the truck,
and Romera himself testified that he had warned Orfanel that his master
prohibited him from allowing anybody to drive the truck, but that as
Orfanel was a uniformed policeman and insisted that he drive the truck,
and that as he believed that the policeman knew how to drive, he let him
drive the truck.
Issue: WON defendant may be held liable for damages.
Ruling: No. Defendant is not liable for damages.
We are of the belief that defendant's claim that Romera gave the
wheel to the policeman for fear of, or out of respect for, the latter, has
been proved by a preponderance of the evidence. The testimony of
plaintiffs’ witness is not corroborated by any other testimony. As he
testified that he was two meters behind Romera, he could not have
noticed with exactness the circumstances under which the policeman
was able to get hold of the wheel and drive the truck and his testimony in
that respect cannot be believed. We are, therefore, forced to the
conclusion that Romera gave the wheel to Orfanel out of respect for the
latter, who was a uniformed policeman and because he believed that the
latter had both the ability and the authority to drive the truck, especially
as he himself had only a student's permit and not a driver's license.
The court a quo dismissed the action on the ground that as the
death or accident was caused by an act or omission of a person who is
not in any way related to the defendant, and as such act or omission was
punishable by law, and as a matter of fact he had already been punished
therefor, no civil liability should be imposed upon the defendant. Against
this decision the plaintiffs have appealed to this Court, contending that
when defendant permitted his cargador, who was not provided with a
driver's license, to drive the truck, he thereby violated the provisions of
the Revised Motor Vehicle Law (section 28., Act No. 3992), and that this
constitutes negligence per se. (People vs. Santos, et al., CA-G.R. No.
1088-1089R.) But admitting for the sake of argument that the defendant
had so violated the law, or may be deemed negligent in entrusting the
truck to one who is not provided with a driver's license, it is clear that he
may not be declared liable for the accident because his negligence was
not the direct and proximate cause thereof.
It is evident that the proximate, immediate and direct cause of the death
of the plaintiffs' intestate was the negligence of Orfanel, a uniformed
policeman, who took the wheel of the truck from defendant's cargador, in
spite of the protest of the latter. The reason for absolving the defendant
therefor is not because the one responsible for the accident had already
received indemnification for the accident, but because there is no direct
and proximate causal connection between the negligence or violation of
the law by the defendant to the death of the plaintiff's intestate.
4. NAKPIL & SONS v. CA (1986)
To be exempt from liability due to an act of God, the
engineer/architect/contractor must not have been negligent in the
construction of the building.
FACTS:
Private respondents – Philippine Bar Association (PBA) – a non-profit
organization formed under the corporation law decided to put up a
building in Intramuros, Manila. Hired to plan the specifications of the
building were Juan Nakpil & Sons, while United Construction was hired to
construct it. The proposal was approved by the Board of Directors and
signed by the President, Ramon Ozaeta. The building was completed in
1966.
In 1968, there was an unusually strong earthquake which caused the
building heavy damage, which led the building to tilt forward, leading the
tenants to vacate the premises. United Construction took remedial
measures to sustain the building.
PBA filed a suit for damages against United Construction, but United
Construction subsequently filed a suit against Nakpil and Sons, alleging
defects in the plans and specifications.
Technical Issues in the case were referred to Mr. Hizon, as a court
appointed Commissioner. PBA moved for the demolition of the building,
but was opposed. PBA eventually paid for the demolition after the
building suffered more damages in 1970 due to previous earthquakes.
The Commissioner found that there were deviations in the specifications
and plans, as well as defects in the construction of the building.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an act of God (fortuitous event) exempts from liability
parties who would otherwise be due to negligence?
HELD:
Art. 1723 dictates that the engineer/architect and contractor are liable for
damages should the building collapse within 15 years from completion.
Art. 1174 of the NCC, however, states that no person shall be
responsible for events, which could not be foreseen. But to be exempt
from liability due to an act of God, the ff must occur:
1) cause of breach must be independent of the will of the debtor
2) event must be unforeseeable or unavoidable
3) event must be such that it would render it impossible for the debtor to
fulfill the obligation
4) debtor must be free from any participation or aggravation of the
industry to the creditor.
When the negligence of a person concurs with an act of God in producing
a loss, such person is not exempt from liability by showing that the
immediate cause of the damage was the act of God. To be exempt from
liability for loss because of an act of God, he must be free from any
previous negligence or misconduct by which that loss or damage may
have been occasioned.
In the case at bar, although the damage was ultimately caused by
the earthquake which was an act of God, the defects in the
construction, as well as the deviations in the specifications and
plans aggravated the damage, and lessened the preventive
measures that the building would otherwise have had.
5. FILOMENO URBANO, petitioner, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE (People v. Cardenas, supra) And since we are dealing with a criminal
APPELLATE COURT AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must
respondents. (1988) convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt.

Urbano is a farmer. One day, he found out that his palay was flooded
with water from the irrigation canal which had overflowed. He asked
Javier and Erfe whether they know the person responsible for opening
the irrigation canal and Javier admitted he was the one. Urbano then got
angry and demanded that Javier pay for his soaked palay. A quarrel
between them ensued. Urbano unsheathed his bolo (about 2 feet long,
including the handle, by 2 inches wide) and hacked Javier hitting him on
the right palm of his hand, which was used in parrying the bolo hack.
Javier who was then unarmed ran away from Urbano but was overtaken
by Urbano who hacked him again hitting Javier on the left leg with the
back portion of said bolo, causing a swelling on said leg. When Urbano
tried to hack and inflict further injury, his daughter embraced and
prevented him from hacking Javier.
The two reached an amicable settlement where Urbano who
shoulder (sic) all the expenses in his medical treatment, and promising to
him and to this Office that this will never be repeated anymore and not to
harbour any grudge against each other.
Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the
remote cause and its subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary
precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier's
death with which the petitioner had nothing to do.
xxx if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into
operation the instances which result in injury because of the prior
defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate
cause.
It strains the judicial mind to allow a clear aggressor to go scot free of
criminal liability. At the very least, the records show he is guilty of
inflicting slight physical injuries. However, the petitioner's criminal liability
in this respect was wiped out by the victim's own act. After the hacking
incident, Urbano and Javier used the facilities of barangay mediators to
effect a compromise agreement where Javier forgave Urbano while
Urbano defrayed the medical expenses of Javier.

27 days from the day of the incident, Javier was rushed to the
Nazareth General Hospital in a very serious condition. Dr. Edmundo
Exconde who personally attended to Javier found that the latter's serious
condition was caused by tetanus toxin. He noticed the presence of a
healing wound in Javier's palm which could have been infected by
tetanus. He eventually died.

Filomeno Urbano was then charged with the crime of homicide.

Issue: Whether or not there was an efficient intervening cause from the
time Javier was wounded until his death which would exculpate Urbano
from any liability for Javier's death

Held: YES

The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and
logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused.
6. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION VS. CA
i. SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR TEST disobedient to this order does not bar his recovery of damages though;
The Supreme Court instead reduced the award of damages to P2,500.
M. H. Rakes v. The Atlantic Gulf And Pacific Company (1907)

Facts: Rakes was a black man working as a laborer for Atlantic Gulf in
the early 1900s. One day, they were working in the company’s yard and
they were transporting heavy rails using two cars (“karitons”?) each car
carrying the opposite ends of the rails. The cars were pulled by rope from
the front and other workers are pushing the cars from behind. There were
no side guards installed on the sides of the cars but the rails were
secured by ropes.

The track where the cars move were also weakened by a

previous typhoon. It was alleged that Atlantic’s foreman was notified of
said damage in the tracks but the same were left unrepaired. (While the
cars were being moved and when it reached the depressed portion of the
track, and while Rakes was beside one of the cars, the ropes gave in and
the rails slipped thereby crushing his leg and causing it to be amputated.
Rakes sued Atlantic Gulf and he won; he was awarded 5,000 pesos for
damages.

Atlantic assailed the decision of the lower court alleging that they
specifically ordered their workers to be walking only before or after the
cars and not on the side of the cars because the cars have no side
guards to protect them in case the rails would slip. Atlantic also alleged
that Rakes should be suing the foreman as it was him who neglected to
have the tracks repaired; that Rakes himself was negligent for having
known of the depression on the track yet he continued to work.

Issue: Whether or not Atlantic is civilly liable.

Held:

Yes. Rakes as per the evidence could not have known of the damage in
the track as it was another employee who swore he notified the foreman
about said damage. -Further, his lack of caution in continuing to work is
not of a gross nature as to constitute negligence on his part. On the other
hand though, Rakes contributory negligence can be inferred from the fact
that he was on the side of the cars when in fact there were orders from
the company barring workers from standing near the side of the cars. His
ii. CONCURRENT CAUSES
PROSPERO SABIDO and ASER LAGUNDA, petitioners, vs. CARLOS
CUSTODIO, BELEN MAKABUHAY CUSTODIO and THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents (1966).
Facts:
The case stemmed when the truckowned by petitioner Prospero Sabido
and being driven by his co-petitioner Aser Lagunda, while transversing a
sharp curve, sideswiped the bus owned by Laguna-Tayabas Bus Co.
(LTB) being driven by its employee Nicasio Mudales. The accident
caused the demise of Agripino Custodio, the husband of respondent
Belen Custodio, who was hanging at the left side of the LTB buswhen the
accident happened.
A complaint was filed with the CFI of Lagunaagainst both the LTB Co.
and Sabido and Lagunda. The lower court later ruled that both the
company and the petitioners were negligent in causing the death of
Custodio. It was later elevated to the CA which affirmed the decision of
the trial court. The appellate court foundthe bus company liable because
of the fact that they allowed Custodio to hang on the side of thebus while
transporting load of passengers. Likewise, CA also found the petitioners
liable sincethe truck was running fast when it met the LTB bus and that
driver Lagunda had the opportunity to avoid the mishap if he had been
more careful and cautious.Thus, the Courtof Appealsconcluded that
thebus Company and its driver Nicasio Mudales (none of whom has
appealed), had violated the contract of carriage with Agripino Custodio,
whereas petitioners Sabido and Lagunda were guilty of a quasi delict, by
reason of which all of them were held solidarity liable.
Petitioners are now contending that they should not be liable because the
death of Custodio was exclusively due tothe negligence of the bus
company. Petitioners also argued that they should not be held solidarily
liable with the carrier and the driverbecause the latter's liability arose from
a breach of contract whereas the former sprung froma quasi delict.
Issue:Whether or not petitionersshould be held solidarily liable with the
bus company in view of the demise of the latter's passenger despite the
difference as to the basis of their respective liability
Ruling:
YES. The petitioners are liable. (Petitioners and respondents are
solidarily liable being joint tort feasors)
While it is true that the bus company and the driver were gulity of
negligencefor having allowed Custodio to ride on the running board of the
bus which was the proximate cause of the Agripino's death, it must be
noted that the petitioners were likewise guilty of contributory negligence,
which was as much a proximate cause of the accident as the carrier's
negligenceas their truck was running at aconsiderable speed, despite the
fact that it was negotiating a sharp curve, and, instead of being close to
right side ofthe road, said truck was driven on its middle portion and so
near the passenger bus coming from theopposite direction as to
sideswipe a passenger riding on its running board.
Although the negligence of the carrier and its driver is independent,
in its execution, of the negligence of the truck driver and its owner,
both acts of negligence are the proximate cause of the death of
Custodio. In fact, the negligence of the first two (2) would not
have produced this result without the negligence of the
petitioners. As such, petitioners had the ample time to prevent or
avoid the accident and thus they had the last clear chance.
As to petitioners' contention that they should not be held solidarily
liable with the bus company and its driver, because the latter's
liability arises from a breach of contract, whereas that of the
former springs from a quasi delict. The rule is, however, that:
"According to the great weight of authority, where the concurrent or
successive negligent acts or omission of two or more persons,
although acting independently of each other, are, in combination,
the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person,
and it is impossible to determine in what proportion each
contributed to the injury, either is responsible for the whole injury,
even though his act alone might not have caused the entire injury,
or the same damage might have resulted from the acts of the
other tort-feasor..."
ii. NATURAL AND PROBABLE CAUSE
UMALI vs. BACANI and SAYNES (1976)
FACTS: a storm with strong rain hit the Municipality of Alcala
Pangasinan. During the storm, the banana plants standing on an
elevated ground along the barrio of said municipality and near the
transmission line of the Alcala Electric Plant were blown down and fell on
the electric wire. As a result, the live electric wire was cut, one end of
which was left hanging on the electric post and the other fell to the
ground under the fallen banana plants.
On the following morning, the barrio captain who was passing by saw the
broken electric wire and so he warned the people in the place not to go
near the wire for they might get hurt. He also saw Baldomero, a laborer of
the Alcala Electric Plant near the place and notified him right then and
there of the broken line and asked him to fix it, but the latter told the
barrio captain that he could not do it but that he was going to look for the
lineman to fix it.
Sometime after the barrio captain and Baldomero had left the place, a
small boy of 3 years and 8 months old whose house is just on the
opposite side of the road, went to the place where the broken line wire
was and got in contact with it. The boy was electrocuted and he
subsequently died. It was only after the electrocution of the child that the
broken wire was fixed on the same morning by the lineman of the electric
plant.
Petitioner claims that he could not be liable under the concept of quasi-
delict or tort as owner and manager of the Alcala Electric Plant because
the proximate cause of the boy’s death electrocution could not be due to
any negligence on his part, but rather to a fortuitous event-the storm that
caused the banana plants to fall and cut the electric line-pointing out the
absence of negligence on the part of his employee Baldomero who tried
to have the line repaired and the presence of negligence of the parents of
the child in allowing him to leave his house during that time.
HELD: WON petitioner is guilty of negligence for the death of the child
ISSUE: WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court is affirmed.
A careful examination of the record convinces Us that a series of
negligence on the part of defendants’ employees in the Alcala Electric
Plant resulted in the death of the victim by electrocution.
First, by the very evidence of the defendant, there were big and tall
banana plants at the place of the incident standing on an elevated ground
and which were higher than the electric post supporting the electric line,
and yet the employees of the defendant who, with ordinary foresight,
could have easily seen that even in case of moderate winds the electric
line would be endangered by banana plants being blown down, did not
even take the necessary precaution to eliminate that source of danger to
the electric line.
Second, even after the employees of the Alcala Electric Plant were
already aware of the possible damage the storm could have caused their
electric lines, thus becoming a possible threat to life and property, they
did not cut off from the plant the flow of electricity along the lines, an act
they could have easily done pending inspection of the wires to see if they
had been cut.
Third, employee Baldomero was negligent on the morning of the incident
because even if he was already made aware of the live cut wire, he did
not have the foresight to realize that the same posed a danger to life and
property, and that he should have taken the necessary precaution to
prevent anybody from approaching the live wire.
On defendants’ argument that the proximate cause of the victim’s death
could be attributed to the parents’ negligence in allowing a child of tender
age to go out of the house alone, We could readily see that because of
the aforementioned series of negligence on the part of defendants’
employees resulting in a live wire lying on the premises without any
visible warning of its lethal character, anybody, even a responsible grown
up or not necessarily an innocent child, could have met the same fate
that befell the victim.. Stated otherwise, even if the child was allowed to
leave the house unattended due to the parents’ negligence, he would not
have died that morning where it not for the cut live wire he accidentally
touched.
Art. 2179 of the Civil Code provides that if the negligence of the plaintiff
(parents of the victim in this case) was only contributory, the immediate
and proximate cause of the injury being the defendants’ lack of due care,
the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the
damages to be awarded. This law may be availed of by the petitioner but
does not exempt him from liability. Petitioner’s liability for injury caused by
his employees negligence is well defined in par. 4, of Article 2180 of the
Civil Code, which states:

The owner and manager of an establishment or enterprise are likewise

responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the
branches in which the latter are employed or on tile occasion of their
functions.

The negligence of the employee is presumed to be the negligence of the

employer because the employer is supposed to exercise supervision over
the work of the employees. This liability of the employer is primary and
direct. In fact the proper defense for the employer to raise so that he may
escape liability is to prove that he exercised, the diligence of the good
father of the family to prevent damage not only in the selection of his
employees but also in adequately supervising them over their work. This
defense was not adequately proven as found by the trial Court.
 4. PROXIMATE CAUSE IN NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION vs. LIM SIO WAN,
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST CO., and PRODUCERS BANK
(2008)
On November 14, 1983, respondent Lim Sio Wan deposited with
petitioner Allied Banking Corporation (Allied) a money market placement
of PhP 1,152,597.35 for a term of 31 days to mature on December 15,
1983.
On December 5, 1983, a person claiming to be Lim Sio Wan called up
Cristina So, an officer of Allied, and instructed the latter to pre-terminate
Lim Sio Wans money market placement, to issue a managers check
representing the proceeds of the placement, and to give the check to one
Deborah Dee Santos (employee of Producers Bank) who would pick up
the check. Lim Sio Wan described the appearance of Santos so that So
could easily identify her.
Later, Santos arrived at the bank and signed the application form for a
managers check to be issued. The bank issued Managers Check No.
035669 for PhP 1,158,648.49, representing the proceeds of Lim Sio
Wans money market placement in the name of Lim Sio Wan, as payee.
The check was cross-checked For Payees Account Only and given
to Santos.
Thereafter, the managers check was deposited in the account of
Filipinas Cement Corporation (FCC) at respondent Metropolitan Bank
and Trust Co. (Metrobank),[10] with the forged signature of Lim Sio Wan
as indorser. The Allied check was deposited with Metrobank in the
account of FCC as Producers Banks payment of its obligation to FCC.
To clear the check and in compliance with the requirements of the
Philippine Clearing House Corporation (PCHC) Rules and Regulations,
Metrobank stamped a guaranty on the check, which reads: All prior
endorsements and/or lack of endorsement guaranteed.[18]
The check was sent to Allied through the PCHC. Upon the presentment
of the check, Allied funded the check even without checking the
authenticity of Lim Sio Wans purported indorsement. Thus, the amount
on the face of the check was credited to the account of FCC.[19]
On December 9, 1983, Lim Sio Wan deposited with Allied a second
money market placement to mature on January 9, 1984.[20]
On December 14, 1983, upon the maturity date of the first money market
placement, Lim Sio Wan went to Allied to withdraw it.[21] She was then
informed that the placement had been pre-terminated upon her
instructions. She denied giving any instructions and receiving the
proceeds thereof. She desisted from further complaints when she was
assured by the banks manager that her money would be recovered.[22]
When Lim Sio Wans second placement matured on January 9, 1984, So
called Lim Sio Wan to ask for the latters instructions on the second
placement. Lim Sio Wan instructed So to roll-over the placement for
another 30 days.[23] On January 24, 1984, Lim Sio Wan, realizing that the
promise that her money would be recovered would not materialize, sent a
demand letter to Allied asking for the payment of the first
placement.[24] Allied refused to pay Lim Sio Wan, claiming that the latter
had authorized the pre-termination of the placement and its subsequent
release to Santos.[25]
Consequently, Lim Sio Wan filed with the RTC a Complaint dated to
recover the proceeds of her first money market placement from Allied.
Sometime in February 1984, she withdrew her second placement from
Allied.
Allied filed a third party complaint[27] against Metrobank and Santos. In
turn, Metrobank filed a fourth party complaint against FCC. FCC for its
part filed a fifth party complaint[29] against Producers Bank. Summonses
were duly served upon all the parties except for Santos, who was no
longer connected with Producers Bank.[30]
Issues: WON Allied Bank and Metrobank is negligent.
Ruling: YES
This Court has held that the matter of negligence is also a factual
question. Thus, the finding of the RTC, affirmed by the CA, that the
respective parties were negligent in the exercise of their obligations is
also conclusive upon this Court.
The Liability of the Parties
As to the liability of the parties, we find that Allied is liable to Lim
Sio Wan. Fundamental and familiar is the doctrine that the relationship
between a bank and a client is one of debtor-creditor.
Articles 1953 and 1980 of the Civil Code provide:
Art. 1953. A person who receives a loan of money or any other fungible
thing acquires the ownership thereof, and is bound to pay to the creditor
an equal amount of the same kind and quality.
Art. 1980. Fixed, savings, and current deposits of money in banks and
similar institutions shall be governed by the provisions concerning simple
loan.
Thus, we have ruled in a line of cases that a bank deposit is in the nature
of a simple loan or mutuum.[42] More succinctly, in Citibank,
N.A. (Formerly First National City Bank) v. Sabeniano, this Court ruled
that a money market placement is a simple loan or mutuum.[43] Further,
we defined a money market in Cebu International Finance Corporation v.
Court of Appeals, as follows:
[A] money market is a market dealing in standardized short-term
credit instruments (involving large amounts) where lenders and borrowers
do not deal directly with each other but through a middle man or dealer in
open market. In a money market transaction, the investor is a lender who
loans his money to a borrower through a middleman or dealer.
In the case at bar, the money market transaction between the
petitioner and the private respondent is in the nature of a loan.
Lim Sio Wan, as creditor of the bank for her money market placement, is
entitled to payment upon her request, or upon maturity of the placement,
or until the bank is released from its obligation as debtor. Until any such
event, the obligation of Allied to Lim Sio Wan remains unextinguished.
From the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts that Lim Sio
Wan did not authorize the release of her money market placement to
Santos and the bank had been negligent in so doing, there is no question
that the obligation of Allied to pay Lim Sio Wan had not been
extinguished. Art. 1240 of the Code states that payment shall be
made to the person in whose favor the obligation has been
constituted, or his successor in interest, or any person authorized
to receive it. As commented by Arturo Tolentino:
Payment made by the debtor to a wrong party does not extinguish the
obligation as to the creditor, if there is no fault or negligence which can be imputed to
the latter. Even when the debtor acted in utmost good faith and by mistake as to the
person of his creditor, or through error induced by the fraud of a third person, the
payment to one who is not in fact his creditor, or authorized to receive such payment,
is void, except as provided in Article 1241. Such payment does not prejudice the
creditor, and accrual of interest is not suspended by it.
Since there was no effective payment of Lim Sio Wans money
market placement, the bank still has an obligation to pay her at six
percent (6%) interest from March 16, 1984 until the payment thereof.
Allied Bank’s negligence is the proximate cause of the legal injury
Allied claims that the negligence of Metrobank is the proximate cause of
the loss of Lim Sio Wans money. It points out that Metrobank guaranteed
all prior indorsements inscribed on the managers check, and without
Metrobanks guarantee, the present controversy would never have
occurred. According to Allied:
Failure on the part of the collecting bank to ensure that the proceeds of the
check is paid to the proper party is, aside from being an efficient intervening
cause, also the last negligent act, x x x contributory to the injury caused in
the present case, which thereby leads to the conclusion that it is the
collecting bank, Metrobank that is the proximate cause of the alleged loss of
the plaintiff in the instant case.[46]
THE COURT IS NOT PERSUADED BY THIS ARGUMENT.
Proximate cause is that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury and without which the result would not have occurred.[47] Thus,
there is an efficient supervening event if the event breaks the sequence
leading from the cause to the ultimate result. To determine the proximate
cause of a controversy, the question that needs to be asked is: If the
event did not happen, would the injury have resulted? If the answer
is NO, then the event is the proximate cause.
In the instant case, Allied avers that even if it had not issued the check
payment, the money represented by the check would still be lost because
of Metrobanks negligence in indorsing the check without verifying the
genuineness of the indorsement thereon.
Section 66 in relation to Sec. 65 of the Negotiable Instruments Law provides:
Section 66. Liability of general indorser.Every indorser who indorses without
qualification, warrants to all subsequent holders in due course;
a) The matters and things mentioned in subdivisions (a), (b) and (c) of the
next preceding section; and
b) That the instrument is at the time of his indorsement valid and subsisting;
And in addition, he engages that on due presentment, it shall be accepted or paid, or
both, as the case may be according to its tenor, and that if it be dishonored, and the
necessary proceedings on dishonor be duly taken, he will pay the amount thereof to
the holder, or to any subsequent indorser who may be compelled to pay it.
Section 65. Warranty where negotiation by delivery, so forth.Every person negotiating
an instrument by delivery or by a qualified indorsement, warrants:
a) That the instrument is genuine and in all respects what it purports to be;
b) That he has a good title of it;
c) That all prior parties had capacity to contract;
d) That he has no knowledge of any fact which would impair the validity of the
instrument or render it valueless.
But when the negotiation is by delivery only, the warranty extends in favor of no
holder other than the immediate transferee.
The provisions of subdivision (c) of this section do not apply to persons negotiating
public or corporation securities, other than bills and notes. (Emphasis supplied.)
The warranty that the instrument is genuine and in all respects
what it purports to be covers all the defects in the instrument affecting the
validity thereof, including a forged indorsement. Thus, the last indorser
will be liable for the amount indicated in the negotiable instrument even if
a previous indorsement was forged. We held in a line of cases that a
collecting bank which indorses a check bearing a forged indorsement and
presents it to the drawee bank guarantees all prior indorsements,
including the forged indorsement itself, and ultimately should be held
liable therefor.[48]
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions. One such
exception is when the issuance of the check itself was attended with
negligence. Thus, in the cases cited above where the collecting bank is
generally held liable, in two of the cases where the checks were
negligently issued, this Court held the institution issuing the check just as
liable as or more liable than the collecting bank.
In the instant case, the trial court correctly found Allied negligent
in issuing the managers check and in transmitting it to Santos without
even a written authorization.[54] In fact, Allied did not even ask for the
certificate evidencing the money market placement or call up Lim Sio
Wan at her residence or office to confirm her instructions. Both actions
could have prevented the whole fraudulent transaction from unfolding.
Allied’s negligence must be considered as the proximate cause of the
resulting loss.
To reiterate, had Allied exercised the diligence due from a
financial institution, the check would not have been issued and no loss of
funds would have resulted. In fact, there would have been no issuance of
indorsement had there been no check in the first place.
Concurrent liability of Metrobank
The liability of Allied, however, is concurrent with that of
Metrobank as the last indorser of the check. When Metrobank indorsed
the check in compliance with the PCHC Rules and Regulations without
verifying the authenticity of Lim Sio Wans indorsement and when it
accepted the check despite the fact that it was cross-checked payable to
payees account only, its negligent and cavalier indorsement contributed
to the easier release of Lim Sio Wans money and perpetuation of the
fraud. Given the relative participation of Allied and Metrobank to the enrichment when (1) a person is unjustly benefited, and (2) such benefit
instant case, both banks cannot be adjudged as equally liable. Hence, is derived at the expense of or with damages to another.[59]
the 60:40 ratio of the liabilities of Allied and Metrobank, as ruled by the
CA, must be upheld. In the instant case, Lim Sio Wans money market placement in Allied
Bank was pre-terminated and withdrawn without her consent. Moreover,
the proceeds of the placement were deposited in Producers Banks
account in Metrobank without any justification. In other words, there is no
FCC, having no participation in the negotiation of the check and in the reason that the proceeds of Lim Sio Wans placement should be
forgery of Lim Sio Wans indorsement, can raise the real defense of deposited in FCCs account purportedly as payment for FCCs money
forgery as against both banks.[57] market placement and interest in Producers Bank. With such payment,
Producers Banks indebtedness to FCC was extinguished, thereby
As to Producers Bank, Allied Banks argument that Producers Bank must
benefitting the former. Clearly, Producers Bank was unjustly enriched
be held liable as employer of Santos under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code is
at the expense of Lim Sio Wan. Based on the facts and circumstances of
erroneous. Art. 2180 pertains to the vicarious liability of an employer for
the case, Producers Bank should reimburse Allied and Metrobank for the
quasi-delicts that an employee has committed. Such provision of law
amounts the two latter banks are ordered to pay Lim Sio Wan.
does not apply to civil liability arising from delict.
It cannot be validly claimed that FCC, and not Producers Bank, should be
One also cannot apply the principle of subsidiary liability in Art. 103 of
considered as having been unjustly enriched. It must be remembered
the Revised Penal Code in the instant case. Such liability on the part of
that FCCs money market placement with Producers Bank was already
the employer for the civil aspect of the criminal act of the employee is
due and demandable; thus, Producers Banks payment thereof was
based on the conviction of the employee for a crime. Here, there has
justified. FCC was entitled to such payment. As earlier stated, the fact
been no conviction for any crime.
that the indorsement on the check was forged cannot be raised
As to the claim that there was unjust enrichment on the part of against FCC which was not a part in any stage of the negotiation of the
Producers Bank, the same is correct. Allied correctly claims in its petition check. FCC was not unjustly enriched.
that Producers Bank should reimburse Allied for whatever judgment that
From the facts of the instant case, we see that Santos could be the
may be rendered against it pursuant to Art. 22 of the Civil Code, which
architect of the entire controversy. Unfortunately, since summons had not
provides: Every person who through an act of performance by another, or
been served on Santos, the courts have not acquired jurisdiction over
any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the
her.[60] We, therefore, cannot ascribe to her liability in the instant case.
expense of the latter without just cause or legal ground, shall return the
same to him. Clearly, Producers Bank must be held liable to Allied and Metrobank for
the amount of the check plus 12% interest per annum, moral damages,
The above provision of law was clarified in Reyes v. Lim, where we ruled
attorneys fees, and costs of suit which Allied and Metrobank are
that [t]here is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit
adjudged to pay Lim Sio Wan based on a proportion of 60:40.
to the loss of another, or when a person retains money or property of
another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good
conscience.[58]

In Tamio v. Ticson, we further clarified the principle of unjust

enrichment, thus: Under Article 22 of the Civil Code, there is unjust
 5. PROXIMATE CAUSE IN A CRIMINAL CASE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FERNANDO
ILIGAN y JAMITO, EDMUNDO ASIS y ILIGAN and JUAN MACANDOG
(at large), Defendants, FERNANDO ILIGAN y JAMITO and EDMUNDO
ASIS y ILIGAN, Defendants-Appellants. (1990)
At around 2:00 o’clock in the morning, EsmeraldoQuiñones, Jr. and his
companions,ZaldyAsis and Felix Lukban, were walking homeafter attending
a barrio fiesta dance. They met the accused Fernando Iligan, his nephew,
Edmundo Asis, and Juan Macandog. Edmundo Asis pushed them aside
thereby prompting ZaldyAsis to box him.Felix Lukban quickly told the group
of the accused that they had no desire to fight. Fernando Iligan, upon seeing
his nephew fall, hacked ZaldyAsiswith a bolo but missed. Terrified, the trio
ran and were able to flee. After about half an hour, the three accused
suddenly emerged on the roadside and without a word, Fernando Iligan
hacked Quiñones, Jr. with his bolo hitting him on the forehead and causing
him to fall down.Horrified, Felix Lukban and ZaldyAsis fled but returned
walking after they heard shouts of people.On the spot where Quiñones, Jr.
was hacked, ZaldyAsis and Felix Lukban saw him already dead with his head
busted.
Subsequently, an information for murder against herein appellants were filed.
The defendants denied having perpetrated the crime. They alleged that they
were in their respective houses at the time the crime was committed. During
the trial, the defense made capital of the testimony of prosecution witness Dr.
Abas who swore that the multiple fracture on the head of Quiñones, Jr. was
caused by a vehicular accident which opinion was earlier put in writing by the
same witness in the postmortem examination. The trial court convicted the
appellants stating the fact of the alleged vehicular accident has not been fully
established, that the photograph of the victim taken immediately after his
body had been brought home shows that the entire head was not crushed by
any vehicle.The lower court also found that Iligan’s group conspired to kill
anyone or all members of the group of the victim to vindicate the boxing on
the face of Edmundo Asis. It appreciated the aggravating circumstances of
evident premeditation and treachery.
ISSUE:WON herein appellants Iligan et. al are guilty of murder.
RULING: Not murder but guilty of homicide. The Court is convinced that
indeed, after Quiñones, Jr. had fallen from the bolo-hacking perpetrated by
Iligan, he was run over by a vehicle (the incident happened in a national
highway). This finding, however, does not in any way exonerate Iligan from
liability for the death of Quiñones, Jr.
Under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability shall be
incurred "by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful
act done be different from that which he intended." Based on the doctrine
that "el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado" (he who is the
cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused), the essential requisites
of Article 4 are: (a) that an intentional felony has been committed, and (b)
that the wrong done to the aggrieved party be the direct, natural and logical
consequence of the felony committed by the offender. Theserequisites are
present in this case. The Court held that while Iligan’s hacking of Quiñones,
Jr.’s head might not have been the direct cause, it was the proximate cause
of the latter’s death. Proximate legal cause is defined as "that acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion,
all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close
causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause
which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for
the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury
to some person might probably result therefrom.
As to the aggravating circumstances of treachery and premeditation,
the Court ruled that there was no showing of such circumstances.
Suddenness of such attackdoes not by itself show treachery. There must be
evidence that the mode of attack was consciously adopted by the appellant
to make it impossible or hard for the person attacked to defend himself. In
this case, the hacking of Edmundo Asis by Iligan followed by the chasing of
the trio by the group of Iligan was a warning to the deceased and his
companions of the hostile attitude of the appellants.The requisites necessary
to appreciate evident premeditation have likewise not been met in this case.
Thus, the prosecution failed to prove all of the following: (a) the time when
the accused determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating
that the accused had clung to their determination to commit the crime; and
(c) the lapse of sufficient length of time between the determination and
execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act.
 F. OTHER ILLUSTRATIVE CASES
PLDT v. CA and Sps. Antonio and Gloria Esteban (1989)
FACTS: Sps. Esteban were riding their jeep along the inside lane of Lacson
Street where they resided [at 25km/hr as Antonio Esteban claimed; CA said
jeep ran fast; if the jeep braked at that speed, the spouses would not have
been thrown against the windshield]. The jeep abruptly swerved from the
inside lane, then it ran over a mound of earth and fell into an open trench, an
excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its
underground conduit system. Antonio failed to notice the open trench which
was left uncovered because of the darkness and the lack of any warning light
or signs. The spouses were thrown against the windshield. Gloria Esteban
allegedly sustained injuries on her arms, legs and face, leaving a permanent
scar on her cheek, while Antonio suffered cut lips. The jeep’s windshield was
also shattered.
PLDT denies liability, contending that the injuries sustained by the
spouses were due to their own negligence, and that it should be the
independent contractor L.R. Barte and Co. [Barte] who should be held liable.
PLDT filed a third-party complaint against Barte, alleging that under the
terms of their agreement, PLDT should not be answerable for any accident or
injuries arising from the negligence of Barte or its employees. Barte claimed
that it was not aware, nor was it notified of the accident, and that it complied
with its contract with PLDT by installing the necessary and appropriate signs.
RTC ruled in favor of the spouses. CA reversed RTC and dismissed
the spouses’ complaint, saying that the spouses were negligent. Later, it set
aside its earlier decision and affirmed in totoRTC’s decision. (SC declared
this later decision null and void. The first decision already became final and
executory because no appeal was taken seasonably.)
ISSUE AND HOLDING :WON PLDT is liable for the injuries sustained by
Sps. Esteban. NO
RATIO
The accident which befell the spouses was due to the lack of diligence of
Antonio, and was not imputable to the negligent omission on the part of
PLDT. If the accident did not happen because thejeep was running quite fast
on the inside lane and for some reason or other it had to swerve suddenly to
the right and had to climb over the accident mound, then Antonio had not
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the accident.
With the drizzle, he should not have run on dim lights, but should have put on
his regular lights which should have made him see the accident mound in
time. The mound was relatively big and visible, being 2-3 ft high and 1-1/2 ft
wide. Also, he knew of the existence and location of the mound, having seen
it many previous times.
The negligence of Antonio was not only contributory to his and his
wife’s injuries but goes to thevery cause of the occurrence of the accident, as
one of its determining factors, and therebyprecludes their right to recover
damages. The perils of the road were known to the spouses. By exercising
reasonable care and prudence, Antonio could have avoided the injurious
consequences of his act, even assuming arguendo that there was some
alleged negligence on the part of PLDT.
The omission to perform a duty, such as the placing of warning signs
on the site of the excavation, constitutes the proximate cause only when the
doing of the said omitted act would have prevented the injury. As a resident
of Lacson Street, he passed on that street almost everyday and had
knowledge of the presence and location of the excavations there; hence, the
presence of warning signs could not have completely prevented the accident.
Furthermore, Antonio had the last clear chance to avoid the accident,
notwithstanding the negligence he imputes to PLDT.
A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the
burden of proving the existence of such fault or negligence causative thereof,
otherwise, his action must fail. The facts constitutive of negligence must be
affirmatively established by competent evidence. In this case, there was
insufficient evidence to prove any negligence on the part of PLDT. What was
presented was just the self-serving testimony of Antonio and the unverified
photograph of a portion of the scene of the accident. The absence of a police
report and the non-submission of a medical report from the hospital where
the spouses were allegedly treated have not even been explained.
St. Mary’s Academy vs. Carpetanos damages for the death of Sherwin. Case was remanded to the trial court
for determination of the liability of the defendants excluding herein
GR No. 143363, February 6, 2002 petitioner.
FACTS:

Herein petitioner, conducted an enrollment drive for the school year

1995-1996 They visited schools from where prospective enrollees were
studying. Sherwin Carpitanos joined the campaign. Along with the other
high school students, they rode a Mitsubishi jeep owned by Vivencio
Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School. Such jeep was
driven by James Daniel II, a 15 year old student of the same school. It
was alleged that he drove the jeep in a reckless manner which resulted
for it to turned turtle. Sherwin died due to this accident.

ISSUE: WON petitioner should be held liable for the damages.

HELD:

CA held petitioner liable for the death of Sherwin under Article 218 and
219 of the Family Code where it was pointed that they were negligent in
allowing a minor to drive and not having a teacher accompany the minor
students in the jeep. However, for them to be held liable, the act or
omission to be considered negligent must be the proximate cause of the
injury caused thus, negligence needs to have a causal connection to the
accident. It must be direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by
any efficient intervening causes. The parents of the victim failed to show
such negligence on the part of the petitioner. The spouses Villanueva
admitted that the immediate cause of the accident was not the reckless
driving of James but the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the
jeep. Futhermore, there was no evidence that petitioner allowed the
minor to drive the jeep of Villanueva. The mechanical defect was an
event over which the school has no control hence they may not be held
liable for the death resulting from such accident.

The registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service,
would primarily be responsible to the public or to 3rd persons for injuries
caused while it is being driven on the road. It is not the school, but the
registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for
ROLLIE CALIMUTAN, PETITIONER, VS.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., RESPONDENTS. (2006)
FACTS: The victim Cantre and his companion, Sañano were heading
back home from a videoke bar when they met petitioner Calimutan and
his helper Bulalacao along the road. Cantre, of big built and at 26 years
old, had a grudge against Bulalacao, of small built and of 15 years old
due to the latter allegedly stoning the former’s house. Thus, upon seeing
Bulalacao, Cantre punched him. Calimutan came to his helper’s rescue
and picked up a stone, as big as a man’s fist, and threw it to Cantre
which hit the left side of his back. Sañano came to pacify the two.
Afterwards, they proceeded to their respective destinations.
After the incident, at home, Cantre complained of pain on his back. He
suffered fever and alternate feeling of warmness and coldness. The next
day, Cantre died. Right after, the corpse of Cantre was examined by Dr.
Ulanday, Municiapl Doctor, who made a report that Cantre died due to
food poisoning. He was buried.
Not satisfied, the family of Cantre requested for exhumation and autopsy
of the body. The autopsy was conducted Dr. Mendez of the NBI which
concluded that the cause of the death was traumatic injury of the
abdomen due to internal hemorrhage and massive accumulation of blood
in his abdominal cavity due to his lacerated spleen.
Petitioner argued that due to the inconsistent findings of the two
government physicians, he cannot be convicted beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Homicide.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the stoning of Calimutan is the proximate cause of
the death of Cantre.
(2) Whether or not Cantre can be convicted of Homicide beyond
reasonable doubt.
RULING:
(1) Yes.
Before the encounter with petitioner Calimutan and Bulalacao, the victim
Cantre seemed to be physically fine. However, after being hit at the back
by the stone thrown at him by petitioner Calimutan, the victim Cantre had
continuously complained of backache. Subsequently, his physical
condition rapidly deteriorated, until finally, he died. Other than being
stoned by petitioner Calimutan, there was no other instance when the
victim Cantre may have been hit by another blunt instrument which could
have caused the laceration of his spleen.
Dr. Mendez was presented by the prosecution as an expert witness,
whose "competency and academic qualification and background" was
admitted by the defense itself.As a Senior Medico-Legal Officer of the
NBI, Dr. Mendez is presumed to possess sufficient knowledge of
pathology, surgery, gynecology, toxicology, and such other branches of
medicine germane to the issues involved in a case.
(2) No.
Calimutan can only be convicted of Reckless Imprudence resulting to
Homicide. Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code classifies felonies
according to the means by which they are committed, in particular: (1)
intentional felonies, and (2) culpable felonies. These two types of
felonies are distinguished from each other by the existence or absence of
malicious intent of the offender.
The Court cannot attribute to petitioner Calimutan any malicious intent to
injure, much less to kill, the victim Cantre; and in the absence of such
intent, this Court cannot sustain the conviction of petitioner Calimutan for
the intentional crime of homicide. The meeting between the parties was a
chance encounter as the two parties were on their way to different
destinations. That he threw the stone at the back of the victim Cantre
does not automatically imply treachery on the part of petitioner Calimutan
as it is highly probable that in the midst of the fray, he threw the stone
rashly and impulsively, with no regard as to the position of the victim
Cantre.
AMADOR CORPUZ and ROMEO GONZALES, Petitioners, vs.
EDISON LUGUE and CATHERINE BALUYOT, Respondents (2005).
On 14 September 1984, at around 7:15 in the morning, while an Isuzu
KC-20 passenger jeep (KC-20), then being driven by Jimmy Basilio, was
traversing the right side of the Roman Highway in Barangay Pias, Orion,
Bataan, it collided with a tanker truck driven by Gerardo Lim, which was
then moving from the right shoulder of the highway. As a result of the
collision, the KC-20 was thrown towards the left lane of the highway
where it was bumped by a Mazda minibus (minibus) being driven by
herein petitioner Gonzales who was then trying to overtake the KC-20. At
that point, the KC-20 spun and bumped a Transcon service truck parked
on the left side of the highway. As a result of the impact, the KC-20 was
thrown across the highway where it was again hit by the minibus pushing
the former towards a deep portion on the left side of the road. As a
consequence of the accident, passengers of the KC-20, including
respondent Lugue, suffered physical injuries.
Respondent Lugue then filed an action for damages arising from the
vehicular incident before the Bataan RTC, against herein petitioners
Amador Corpuz and Romeo Gonzales, owner and driver of the minibus,
respectively, and Oscar Jaring and Gerardo Lim, owner and driver of the
tanker truck, respectively. Therein defendants filed a third-party complaint
against Ricardo Santiago and Jimmy Basilio, owner/operator and driver
of the KC-20, respectively.
After trial, the lower court rendered a decision holding jointly and
severally liable Ricardo Santiago, Jimmy Basilio, Oscar Jaring, Gerardo
Lim, Amador Corpuz, and Romeo Gonzales.
The Court of Appeals granted the appeal of Oscar Jaring and Gerardo
Lim, while it dismissed that of plaintiffs Santiago and Basilio.
ISSUE: whether or not the appellate court erred in holding them liable for
damages based on the findings of facts adduced by the trial court.
HELD: It is clear that the proximate cause of the injuries suffered by
respondent Lugue was the collision between the KC-20 and the tanker
truck. As correctly pointed out by the lower court, proximate legal cause
is that acting first and producing the injury either immediately or by
setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous
chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting
the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted,
under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event
should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable
ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to
some person might probably result therefrom.
This conclusion of the appellate court of recklessness on the part of
petitioner Gonzales is, however, unwarranted. Based on the
unchallenged testimony of petitioner Gonzales, he signaled to overtake
the KC-20 because the way was clear. That despite his best effort to do
everything to avoid hitting the KC-20, petitioner failed to do so because
the KC-20 had moved to a position blocking the way of the minibus as a
result of the tanker bumping the KC-20. Furthermore, based on the
unrebutted testimony of both Remigio Gervacio and Patrocinio Carillo, at
the time when the minibus hit the KC-20, the former was already moving
towards the middle portion of the highway, occupying the left portion of
the road, a little beyond the center line. Certainly, even assuming that
petitioner Gonzales had a few seconds before actual collision, he no
longer had any opportunity to avoid it. Petitioner Gonzales cannot be
deemed negligent for failing to prevent the collision even after applying all
means available to him within the few instants when he had discovered
the impending peril. In a similar case where a jeepney bound for Isabela
collided with a bus on its regular route to Manila when the latter
encroached upon the jeepney’s lane while it was negotiating a curve, the
Court declared that:
Even assuming that the jeepney driver perceived the danger a few
seconds before the actual collision, he had no opportunity to avoid it. This
Court has held that the last clear chance doctrine "can never apply where
the party charged is required to act instantaneously, and if the injury
cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril
is or should have been discovered.
 CHAPTER V: LEGAL INJURY
A. CONCEPT OF LEGAL INJURY
1. EQUITABLE BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. JOSE T.
CALDERON, respondent. (2004)
Doctrine: Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss,
hurt or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the
recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus,
there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss
or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases the
consequences must be borne by the injured person alone, the law affords
no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a
legal injury or wrong. These situations are often called damnum absque
injuria. (Recovery for damages presupposes a legal injury)
Plaintiff Jose T. Calderon (Calderon for brevity), is a businessman
engaged in several business activities here and abroad, either in his
capacity as President or Chairman of the Board thereon. In addition
thereto, he is a stockholder of PLDT and a member of the Manila Polo
Club, among others. He is a seasoned traveler, who travels at least
seven times a year in the U.S., Europe and Asia. On the other hand, the
defendant-appellant [now petitioner] Equitable Banking Corporation (EBC
for brevity), is one of the leading commercial banking institutions in the
Philippines, engaged in commercial banking, such as acceptance of
deposits, extension of loans and credit card facilities, among others.
xxx xxx xxx
Sometime in September 1984, Calderon applied and was issued an
Equitable International Visa card (Visa card for brevity). The said Visa
card can be used for both peso and dollar transactions within and outside
the Philippines. The credit limit for the peso transaction is TWENTY
THOUSAND (P20,000.00) PESOS; while in the dollar transactions,
Calderon is required to maintain a dollar account with a minimum deposit
of $3,000.00, the balance of dollar account shall serve as the credit limit.
In April 1986, Calderon together with some reputable business friends
and associates, went to Hongkong for business and pleasure trips.
Specifically on 30 April 1986, Calderon accompanied by his friend, Ed De
Leon went to Gucci Department Store located at the basement of the
Peninsula Hotel (Hongkong). There and then, Calderon purchased
several Gucci items (t-shirts, jackets, a pair of shoes, etc.). The cost of
his total purchase amounted to HK$4,030.00 or equivalent to US$523.00.
Instead of paying the said items in cash, he used his Visa card (No. 4921
6400 0001 9373) to effect payment thereof on credit. He then presented
and gave his credit card to the saleslady who promptly referred it to the
store cashier for verification. Shortly thereafter, the saleslady, in the
presence of his friend, Ed De Leon and other shoppers of different
nationalities, informed him that his Visa card was blacklisted. Calderon
sought the reconfirmation of the status of his Visa card from the
saleslady, but the latter simply did not honor it and even threatened to cut
it into pieces with the use of a pair of scissors.
Deeply embarrassed and humiliated, and in order to avoid further
indignities, Calderon paid cash for the Gucci goods and items that he
bought.
Upon his return to the Philippines, and claiming that he suffered much
torment and embarrassment on account of EBCs wrongful act of
blacklisting/suspending his VISA credit card while at the Gucci store in
Hongkong, Calderon filed with the Regional Trial Court at Makati City a
complaint for damages against EBC.
In its Answer,[3] EBC denied any liability to Calderon, alleging that the
latters credit card privileges for dollar transactions were earlier placed
under suspension on account of Calderons prior use of the same card in
excess of his credit limit, adding that Calderon failed to settle said prior
credit purchase on due date, thereby causing his obligation to become
past due. Corollarily, EBC asserts that Calderon also failed to maintain
the required minimum deposit of $3,000.00.
Issue: WON Calderon suffered legal injury which would entitle him to
moral damages.
Held: No.
In law, moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock,
social humiliation and similar injury.[8]However, to be entitled to the award
thereof, it is not enough that one merely suffered sleepless nights, mental
anguish or serious anxiety as a result of the actuations of the other party.
An award of moral damages would require, firstly, evidence of
besmirched reputation, or physical, mental or psychological suffering
sustained by the claimant; secondly, a culpable act or omission factually
established; thirdly, proof that the wrongful act or omission of the
defendant is the proximate cause of the damages sustained by the
claimant; and fourthly, that the case is predicated on any of the instances
expressed or envisioned by Articles 2219 and 2220 of the Civil Code.
Particularly, in culpa contractual or breach of contract, as here, moral
damages are recoverable only if the defendant has acted fraudulently or
in bad faith, or is found guilty of gross negligence amounting to bad faith,
or in wanton disregard of his contractual obligations. Verily, the breach
must be wanton, reckless, malicious or in bad faith, oppressive or
abusive.[
Here, the CA ruled, and rightly so, that no malice or bad faith attended
petitioners dishonor of respondents credit card. For, as found no less by
the same court, petitioner was justified in blacklisting the visa card of
Calderon under the provisions of its Credit Card Agreement with
respondent, paragraph 3 of which states:
xxx the CARDHOLDER agrees not to exceed his/her approved credit limit, otherwise,
all charges incurred including charges incurred through the use of the extension
CARD/S, if any in excess of credit limit shall become due and demandable and the
credit privileges shall be automatically suspended without notice to the
CARDHOLDER in accordance with Section 11 hereof.
Quite evidently, in holding petitioner liable for moral damages, the CA
justified the award on its assessment that EBC was negligent in not
informing Calderon that his credit card was already suspended even
before he left for Hongkong, ratiocinating that petitioners right to
automatically suspend a cardholders privileges without notice should not
have been indiscriminately used in the case of respondent because the
latter has already paid his past obligations and has an existing dollar
deposit in an amount more than the required minimum for credit card at
the time he made his purchases in Hongkong. But, as explained by the
petitioner in the memorandum it filed with this Court, which explanations
were never controverted by respondent:
xxx prior to the incident in question (i.e., April 30, 1986 when the
purchases at the Gucci store in Hongkong were made), respondent made
credit purchases in Japan and Hongkong from August to September
1985 amounting to US$14,226.12, while only having a deposit of
US$3,639.00 in his dollar account as evidenced by the pertinent monthly
statement of respondents credit card transactions and his bank
passbook, thus exceeding his credit limit; these purchases were
accommodated by the petitioner on the condition that the amount needed
to cover the same will be deposited in a few days as represented by
respondents secretary and his companys general manager a certain Mrs.
Zamora and Mr. F.R. Oliquiano; respondent however failed to make good
on his commitment; later, respondent likewise failed to make the required
deposit on the due date of the purchases as stated in the pertinent
monthly statement of account; as a consequence thereof, his card
privileges for dollar transactions were suspended; it was only four months
later on 31 January 1986, that respondent deposited the sum
of P14,501.89 in his dollar account to cover his purchases; the said
amount however was not sufficient to maintain the required minimum
dollar deposit of $3,000.00 as the respondents dollar deposit stood at
only US$2,704.94 after satisfaction of his outstanding accounts; a day
before he left for Hongkong, respondent made another deposit of
US$14,000.00 in his dollar account but did not bother to request the
petitioner for the reinstatement of his credit card privileges for dollar
transactions, thus the same remained under suspension.
It may be so that respondent, a day before he left for Hongkong,
made a deposit of US$14,000.00 to his dollar account with
petitioner. The sad reality, however, is that he never verified the
status of his card before departing for Hongkong, much less
requested petitioner to reinstate the same.
And, certainly, respondent could not have justifiably assumed that
petitioner must have reinstated his card by reason alone of his having
deposited US$14,000.00 a day before he left for Hongkong. As issuer of
the card, petitioner has the option to decide whether to reinstate or
altogether terminate a credit card previously suspended on
considerations which the petitioner deemed proper, not the least of which
are the cardholders payment record, capacity to pay and compliance with
any additional requirements imposed by it. That option, after all, is
expressly embodied in the same Credit Card Agreement, paragraph 12 of
which unmistakably states:
The issuer shall likewise have the option of reinstating the card holders
privileges which have been terminated for any reason whatsoever upon
submission of a new accomplished application form if required by the
issuer and upon payment of an additional processing fee equivalent to
annual fee.
Even on the aspect of negligence, therefore, petitioner could not have
been properly adjudged liable for moral damages.
Unquestionably, respondent suffered damages as a result of the
dishonor of his card. There is, however, a material distinction
between damages and injury.
Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt or
harm which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or
compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be
damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm
was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases the
consequences must be borne by the injured person alone, the law affords
no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a
legal injury or wrong. These situations are often called damnum absque
injuria.
In other words, in order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the
injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such injuries
resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff-
a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the
person causing it. The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is
the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus,
there must first be a breach of some duty and the imposition of liability
for that breach before damages may be awarded; and the breach of such
duty should be the proximate cause of the injury. (Emphasis supplied).
In the situation in which respondent finds himself, his is a case
of damnum absque injuria.
We do not take issue with the appellate court in its observation
that the Credit Card Agreement herein involved is a contract of adhesion,
with the stipulations therein contained unilaterally prepared and imposed
by the petitioner to prospective credit card holders on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis. As said by us in Polotan, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals:[20]
A contract of adhesion is one in which one of the contracting parties
imposes a ready-made form of contract which the other party may accept
or reject, but cannot modify. One party prepares the stipulation in the
contract, while the other party merely affixes his signature or his
adhesion thereto giving no room for negotiation and depriving the latter of
the opportunity to bargain on equal footing.
On the same breath, however, we have equally ruled that such a contract
is as binding as ordinary contracts, the reason being that the party who
adheres to the contract is free to reject it entirely.[21]
Moreover, the provision on automatic suspension without notice
embodied in the same Credit Card Agreement is couched in clear and
unambiguous term, not to say that the agreement itself was entered into
by respondent who, by his own account, is a reputable businessman
engaged in business activities here and abroad.
On a final note, we emphasize that moral damages are in the category of
an award designed to compensate the claim for actual injury suffered and
not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer.[22]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED and the decision
under review REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
2. EMMANUEL B. AZNAR, Petitioner, vs. CITIBANK, N.A., Issue: Whether or not Aznar is entitled to moral damages.
(Philippines), Respondent. (2007)
Held: No.
Facts: Emmanuel B. Aznar (Aznar), a known businessman in Cebu, is a
holder of a Preferred Master Credit Card (Mastercard) by Citibank with a *Remedial Law – The electronic document (print out from Ingtan Agency)
credit limit of P150,000.00. As he and his wife, Zoraida, planned to take was not authenticated. On the other hand, the court gave credence to the
their two grandchildren, Melissa and Richard Beane, on an Asian tour, electronic evidence of Citibank for having been properly authenticated.
Aznar made a total advance deposit of P485,000.00 with Citibank with
xxx
the intention of increasing his credit limit to P635,000.00.
The Court agrees with Aznar that the terms and conditions of Citibank’s
Petitioner claims that when he presented his credit card in some
Mastercard constitute a contract of adhesion. It is settled that contracts
establishments in Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, the same was not
between cardholders and the credit card companies are contracts of
honored. And when he tried to use the same in Ingtan Tour and Travel
adhesion, so-called, because their terms are prepared by only one party
Agency (Ingtan Agency) in Indonesia to purchase plane tickets to Bali, it
while the other merely affixes his signature signifying his adhesion
was again dishonored for the reason that his card was blacklisted by the
thereto.
respondent bank.
In this case, paragraph 7 of the terms and conditions states that
Aznar filed a complaint for damages against Citibank at RTC Cebu City,
"[Citibank is] not responsible if the Card is not honored by any merchant
claiming that Citibank fraudulently or with gross negligence blacklisted his
affiliate for any reason x x x". While it is true that Citibank may have no
Mastercard which forced him, his wife and grandchildren to abort
control of all the actions of its merchant affiliates, and should not be held
important tour destinations and prevented them from buying certain items
liable therefor, it is incorrect, however, to give it blanket freedom from
in their tour. He further claimed that he suffered mental anguish, serious
liability if its card is dishonored by any merchant affiliate for any reason.
anxiety, wounded feelings, besmirched reputation and social humiliation
Such phrase renders the statement vague and as the said terms and
due to the wrongful blacklisting of his card. To prove that respondent
conditions constitute a contract of adhesion, any ambiguity in its
blacklisted his credit card, Petitioner presented a computer print-out,
provisions must be construed against the party who prepared the
denominated as ON-LINE AUTHORIZATIONS FOREIGN ACCOUNT
contract, in this case Citibank.
ACTIVITY REPORT, issued to him by Ingtan Agency with the signature
of one Victrina Elnado Nubi which shows that his card in question was Citibank also invokes paragraph 15 of its terms and conditions
“DECL OVERLIMIT” or declared over the limit. which limits its liability to P1,000.00 or the actual damage proven,
whichever is lesser.
Citibank denied the allegation that it blacklisted Aznar’s card. It also
contended that under the terms and conditions governing the issuance Again, such stipulation cannot be considered as valid for being
and use of its credit cards, Citibank is exempt from any liability for the unconscionable as it precludes payment of a larger amount even though
dishonor of its cards by any merchant affiliate, and that its liability for any damage may be clearly proven. This Court is not precluded from ruling
action or incident which may be brought against it in relation to the out blind adherence to the terms of a contract if the attendant facts and
issuance and use of its credit cards is limited to P1,000.00 or the actual circumstances show that they should be ignored for being obviously too
damage proven whichever is lesser. To prove that they did not blacklist one-sided.
Aznar’s card, Citibank’s Credit Card Department Head, Dennis Flores,
presented Warning Cancellation Bulletins which contained the list of its
canceled cards covering the period of Aznar’s trip.
The invalidity of the terms and conditions being invoked by We do not dispute the findings of the lower court that private respondent
Citibank, notwithstanding, the Court still cannot award damages in suffered damages as a result of the cancellation of his credit card.
favor of petitioner. However, there is a material distinction between damages and injury.
Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or
It is settled that in order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the harm which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or
injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such injuries compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be
resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the damage without injury to those instances in which the loss or harm was
plaintiff – a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the
responsibility by the person causing it. The underlying basis for the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone, the law affords
award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a
contemplation of law; thus there must first be a breach before damages legal injury or wrong. These situations are often called damnum absque
may be awarded and the breach of such duty should be the injuria.
proximate cause of the injury.
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit.
It is not enough that one merely suffered sleepless nights, mental
anguish or serious anxiety as a result of the actuations of the other party.
It is also required that a culpable act or omission was factually
established (not just a mere allegation), that proof that the wrongful act or
omission of the defendant is shown as the proximate cause of the
damage sustained by the claimant and that the case is predicated on any
of the instances expressed or envisioned by Arts. 2219 and 2220 of the
Civil Code.

In culpa contractual or breach of contract, moral damages are

recoverable only if the defendant has acted fraudulently or in bad faith, or
is found guilty of gross negligence amounting to bad faith, or
in wanton disregard of his contractual obligations. The breach must
be wanton, reckless, malicious or in bad faith, oppressive or abusive.

While the Court commiserates with Aznar for whatever undue

embarrassment he suffered when his credit card was dishonored by
Ingtan Agency, especially when the agency’s personnel insinuated that
he could be a swindler trying to use blacklisted cards, the Court cannot
grant his present petition as he failed to show by preponderance of
evidence that Citibank breached any obligation that would make it
answerable for said suffering.

As the Court pronounced in BPI Express Card Corporation v. Court of

Appeals,62
 B. VIOLATION OF RIGHT OR LEGAL INJURY
[G.R. No. 141880. September 27, 2004]
ZENAIDA F. DAPAR alias ZENAIDA D. BIASCAN petitioner, vs.
GLORIA LOZANO BIASCAN and MARIO BIASCAN respondents.
Spouses Gloria and Mario Biascan were married in civil rights in Quezon
City.[4] They were, thereafter, blessed with four (4) children, namely,
Robert, Edward, Glomary, and Eric.[5]
Mario Biascan, an electrician by profession, worked in Saudi Arabia as
an overseas contract worker from 1977 to 1981. It was in 1979 when he
met Zenaida Dapar, who was then working as a domestic helper. That
first meeting ripened into an intimate relationship. Both being lonely in a
foreign land, Zenaida and Mario became lovers, which resulted in the
latters failure to give support to his wife and family.
Zenaida returned to the Philippines in 1981. Upon Marios return to the
country, he joined Zenaida to live in a rented house in Pag-asa
Subdivision, Karuhatan, Valenzuela, Metro Manila. They opened a joint
account with the Philippine National Bank (PNB), Valenzuela Branch,
under Savings Account No. 498-514587-9[6] on March 30, 1982. Mario
returned to Saudi Arabia in February 1984, while Zenaida stayed behind
and worked in a garment factory. He remitted his earnings to Zenaida,
and the latter deposited the said amounts in the PNB joint savings
account through the Barclay Bank, PLS Athens. These remittances were
credited in the said account, as well as others coming from Zenaidas
relatives who were also working abroad. As of May 21, 1901, the balance
of the bank account was P257,225.[7]
In the meantime, on July 8, 1985, a contract to sell was executed by and
between State Land Investment Corporation, on the one hand, and Sps.
Mario M. Biascan/ & Zenaida D. Biascan, on the other, over a parcel of
land consisting of 150 square meters, described as Lot 11, Block 2, Narra
St., Hillcrest Village, Camarin Road, Novaliches, Caloocan City
for P177,189.00.[8] A Deed of Sale[9] was, thereafter, executed in favor of
the Sps. Mario M. Biascan and Zenaida D. Biascan, as vendees, as a
result of which Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 207197 was issued
by the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City under their names on
February 8, 1990.[10]
On November 15, 1993, Gloria L. Biascan filed a complaint against
Zenaida for annulment of title, reconveyance, and damages in the RTC of
Caloocan City, Branch 120, docketed as Civil Case No. C-16184. She
made the following allegations:
4. That said Mario M. Biascan, then an overseas worker, and with the
use of his earnings, purchased a lot and house situated at Bo. Camarin,
Caloocan City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 207197, a
copy of which is hereto attached as Annex A and made [an] integral part
hereof; said properties have a total value of P104,000.00 per Tax
Declaration No. 196644, a copy of which is hereto attached as Annex B
and made integral part hereof;
5. That said Transfer Certificate of Title No. 207197 (Annex A) and Tax
Declaration No. 196644 (Annex B), were issued to Spouses Mario M.
Biascan and Zenaida D. Biascan, thru the fraudulent misrepresentation of
defendant that she is the legal wife of Mario M. Biascan;
6. That the inclusion of the name of defendant in the said transfer
certificate of title and tax declaration, is without any legal basis
whatsoever, because defendant is not the legal wife of Mario M. Biascan,
and that the money used in acquiring the lot and house belonged to
Mario M. Biascan;
7. That the defendants use of the surname Biascan is a usurpation of
surname under Article 377 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines, and
as such, plaintiff, who is the legal wife of Mario M. Biascan, is entitled to
recover damages from defendant;
8. That by reason of defendants illegal acts in causing the inclusion of her
name in the aforesaid transfer certificate of title and tax declaration,
plaintiff, the legal wife of Mario M. Biascan, is unduly deprived of her right
over the property covered by said title and declaration, and to vindicate
such right, she is constrained to institute the instant action and retain the
services of counsel to which she has agreed to pay the sum
of P20,000.00 for and as attorneys fees and the sum of P1,000.00 as
appearance fee.[11]
Gloria prayed that judgment be rendered in her favor, as follows:
1) Declaring as null and void the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 207197 in favor of Spouses Mario M. Biascan and Zenaida D.
Biascan, including Tax Declaration No. 196644;
2) Defendant to recover the undivided one-half (1/2) portion of the lot in
question to plaintiff, who is the legal wife of Mario M. Biascan;
3) Defendant to pay to plaintiff the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00) Philippine Currency, as damages for usurping the surname
Biascan which rightfully belongs to the plaintiff;
4) Defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00) Philippine Currency, for and as attorneys fees; and
5) To pay the costs of this suit.
Plaintiff further prays for such other relief this Honorable Court may deem
just and equitable in the premises.[12]
Zenaida filed a Motion to Dismiss[13] on January 20, 1994, principally on
the ground that, under Article 113 of the Civil Code and Section 4, Rule 3
of the Rules of Court, a married woman cannot sue or be sued alone
without joining her husband, and that, as registered co-owner of the
subject property, the latter was an indispensable party. She also alleged
that she had no idea that Mario was a married man; that she tried to
leave him when such fact came to her knowledge; and that Mario made
repeated promises of marriage.
According to Zenaida, she was fraudulently and maliciously forced by
Mario and his family to vacate the house and lot in question. Thus, on
January 14, 1992, she instituted an action for partition before Branch 129
of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, docketed as Civil Case No.
C-259. Zenaida, likewise, alleged that she instituted an action for the
enforcement of the Amicable Settlement made before the barangay,
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City for the recovery of
personal properties. Thereafter, on May 3, 1993, the RTC of Caloocan
City rendered its Decision[14] in Civil Case No. C-259, declaring that she
was a co-owner of the subject lot. She averred that, after receipt of the
decision, Mario and Gloria sent her a Letter[15] dated May 18, 1993,
persuading her to agree to a very unreasonable settlement.
Zenaida claimed that Mario filed a petition for certiorari before the Court
of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 32512, which was
dismissed[16] on December 17, 1993 on the ground that the decision
rendered by the RTC of Caloocan City had long since become final and
executory; thus, based on the doctrine of res judicata, her ownership of
the one-half portion of the lot covered by TCT No. 207197 could no
longer be questioned. Zenaida posited that pursuant to paragraph (c),
Sec. 3 of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the facts and conclusions
contained in the said decision are conclusively presumed to be true.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss in an Order[17] dated March
23, 1994.
In her answer, Zenaida alleged that the trial court had no jurisdiction over
the case, as the cause of action therein was barred by prior judgment.
She, likewise, alleged that aside from her savings from her work in Saudi
Arabia, she had other sources of income: her earnings from working as a
dressmaker at the Flores Garment International Corporation; income from
buying and selling jewelry; a dollar pension from her brother who was
with the U.S. Navy; and financial support from her mother and older
brothers. She averred that most of the money used for the amortization
and purchase of the subject lot, as well as the construction of the
improvements thereon, was sourced from her earnings and income and
not solely from Mario Biascan. She further alleged that Mario was, in fact,
unemployed from the later part of 1985 to the early part of 1988, and that
they had to secure a loan in the total amount of P80,000 from her mother,
which was used to pay part of the amortization of the property and, which
to date, has remained unpaid.
She further alleged the following by way of counterclaim:
18. That the institution of the instant case is tainted with malice, for
plaintiff know[s] for a fact that the defendant is a lawful co-owner of the
subject lot and the house erected thereon, because said plaintiff was
always present during the hearing of the Partition case filed by the
defendant before Branch 129 of this Honorable Court, docketed under
Civil Case No. C-259, and of the fact that said case had already been
decided in favor of the defendant;
19. That plaintiff and Mario Biascan even tried to convince to settle the
case although [the said] decision was already rendered, showing plaintiff
knowledge of the fact that the defendant is indeed entitled to one-half of
the property;
20. That obviously, the institution of the case was made to delay and
frustrate the immediate enforcement of the decision in Civil Case No. C-
259 because plaintiff and her children, and Mario Biascan, are enjoying
the use of the subject property to the prejudice of the defendant;
21. That because of the baseless and malicious institution of the instant
case, the defendant suffered serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feeling[s] and sleepless nights to which plaintiff should be held
answerable in the sum of not less than P50,000.00 plus P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages;
22. That for her protection, the defendant is constrained to secure the
services of the undersigned counsel at an agreed attorneys fees
of P20,000.00 plus P1,000.00 per court appearances (sic) to which
plaintiff should, likewise, be held answerable;
23. That plaintiff, in connivance with Mario Biascan, has forcibly ousted
the defendant from the premises through strategy and stealth, and
because plaintiff, Mario Biascan and their children are presently
occupying that portion owned by the defendant, it is but just and fair that
they be adjudged to pay reasonable rent of P2,500.00 per month from
date of the decision in Civil Case No. C-259 for the use thereof, up to the
time said portion is surrendered to the defendant.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed to the
Honorable Court that after due hearing judgment be rendered in favor of
the defendant and against the plaintiff, DISMISSING the complaint and
GRANTING all the counterclaim[s] interposed by the defendant.
Defendant further prays for such other reliefs as are just and equitable
under the premises.[18]
After the parties submitted their respective pre-trial briefs, Gloria filed an
amended complaint,[19] impleading her husband Mario as party-
defendant. Thereafter, in an Order[20] dated July 6, 1994, the RTC,
Branch 120, issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining and
enjoining the enforcement of the writ of execution[21] issued by the RTC,
Branch 129 in Civil Case No. C-259. Gloria then filed a bond in the
amount of P50,000 which was duly approved by the RTC, Branch 120.[22]
After trial, the court ruled in favor of defendant Zenaida and dismissed
the complaint on October 28, 1997. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complaint is dismissed. On the
counterclaim, plaintiff is ordered to pay co-defendant Zenaida Dapar:
1. Attorneys fees in the sum of P20,000.00, plus P1,000.00 per court
appearance
2. Exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00; and
3. To pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[23]
The trial court ruled that the law on co-ownership governed the property
relations of Mario and Zenaida, who were living in an adulterous
relationship or in a state of concubinage at the time the house and lot in
question was acquired. The trial court further explained that under Article
148 of the Family Code, properties acquired by both of the parties
through their actual joint contribution of money shall be owned in
common in proportion to their respective contributions, and in the event
that the amount of such contributions could not be determined, as in the
present case, they shall be presumed to be equal. The trial court
concluded that the shares of Mario and Zenaida as described in TCT No.
207197 was in accordance with the sharing prescribed in Article 148. As
such, there was no legal basis to order the reconveyance of the one-half
share of the petitioner in favor of Gloria Biascan.
Anent Zenaidas use of the surname Biascan, the trial court ruled that
Gloria was not entitled to damages since Mario consented thereto.
On appeal, however, the appellate court reversed the decision of the trial
court and ruled in favor of Gloria as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated October 28,
1997 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and in lieu thereof, another
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the appellant and against the
appellee as follows:
1. declaring the Transfer Certificate of Title No. 207197 of the Register of
Deeds for Caloocan City, registered in the name of the spouses Mario M.
Biascan and Zenaida D. Biascan, null and void;
2. ordering appellee to reconvey in favor of the appellant one-half (1/2)
undivided portion of the property described in said title, she being the
legal wife of Mario M. Biascan;
3. ordering the appellee to pay the appellant attorneys fee in the amount
of P20,000.00
4. ordering the appellee to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[24]
The appellate court ruled that Zenaidas contention that Mario was
unemployed from 1985 to 1988, and that she had savings and substantial
earnings from her jewelry business was untenable. The appellate court
also ruled that the remittances from relatives as claimed by Zenaida were
not meant for her, as they were either unsigned or addressed to
someone else. Clearly, the appellate court ruled, such remittances were
not intended to increase Zenaidas resources to support her claim that
she contributed to the payment of the house and lot in question from her
own funds. The appellate court noted that the appellees income was so
meager that it was not even enough for her, and that she failed to
establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that her savings and/or the
remittances of her mother and brothers were deposited to the PNB joint
savings account. The appellate court further ratiocinated as follows:
For failure of the appellee to prove by satisfactory evidence that she
contributed money to the purchase price of the house and lot in question,
there is no basis to justify her co-ownership; the same must revert to the
conjugal partnership [of] Mario Biascan and his lawful wife, the appellant
(Agapay v. Palang, 276 SCRA 340). The entry in the Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 207197, the word Spouses Mario M. Biascan and Zenaida D.
Biascan, where the latter is not legally married to the former, is no proof
that she contributed her money for the purchase of the property in
question. In the case at bar, no iota of evidence was adduced to prove
contribution. In the determination of the nature of the property acquired
during their live-in partner status, the controlling factor is the source of
the money utilized in the purchase.
Evidently, from the Contract to Sell (Exh. 2), Mario M. Biascan was in
Saudi Arabia and the appellee was probably of the impression that is she
made it appear that they are spouses, the same belong to both of them.
Regrettably, there is no law to support such belief.
Indeed, there was fraud, deceit and misrepresentation in the acquisition
of the property in question, depriving the lawful wife, the appellant herein,
the property acquired during the marriage which forms part of the
conjugal partnership between Mario M. Biascan and Gloria Lozano
Biascan.[25]
Zenaidas motion for reconsideration was, likewise, denied in a Resolution
dated February 4, 2000.
The Present Petition
Zenaida, now the petitioner, raises the following issues for the resolution
of the Court in the instant petition:
I. The subject properties are acquired thru (sic) the common funds of
petitioner and respondent Mario Biascan;
II. Petitioner has source of income and had contributed in the purchase of
the subject properties (sic);
III. The subject properties (sic) were acquired in good faith by petitioner
and not with fraudulent means;
IV. There are (sic) no proper and legal basis in the annulment of title and
reconveyance of the subject properties (sic);
V. No proper basis for the award of attorneys fees against petitioner; and
VI. The decision in Civil Case No. C-259 must be respected for being res
judicata.[26]
The petitioner catalogues the deposits made in the PNB account from
1985 to November 1988,[27] and avers that such deposits could not
possibly be considered as remittances of respondent Mario Biascan
because he was jobless in 1983, and, thereafter, from 1985 to 1988, and
was then in the Philippines wholly dependent upon her for support. The
petitioner also avers that the alleged remittances cannot be considered
as respondent Mario Biascans record of employment abroad, and that
based on the evidence on record, he could not have paid even one-half ()
of the purchase price of the subject property. However, since the
contribution of the petitioner and respondent could not be determined,
considering that no specific amounts were properly identified as actual
deposits of the parties in the joint account, such shares are presumed
equal.
The petitioner also points out that Article 148 of the Family Code does
not provide for an annulment of title of any of the properties acquired
during an illicit relationship, but merely provides for forfeiture of the
properties of the party in bad faith in accordance with the said provision.
According to the petitioner, it is, likewise, evident from the evidence
presented that respondent Gloria Biascan had knowledge of the
petitioners illicit relationship with her husband, did nothing to stop it, and,
in fact, benefited from such relationship. The petitioner contends that the
award of attorneys fees in favor of such respondent cannot be allowed,
as the appellate court made no express findings or reasons in its decision
to justify such award.
Finally, the petitioner points out that the decision in Civil Case No. C-259,
which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 32512,
already became final and executory, and that the court a quo issued a
writ of execution on September 24, 1993. The petitioner cites the ruling of
the Court in Mendiola v. Court of Appeals[28] to bolster her claim.
For their part, the respondents allege that the decision rendered in Civil
Case No. C-259 is not res judicata in the instant case. While the
petitioner filed a motion to dismiss invoking the defense of bar by former
judgment, such motion was denied by the court a quo. According to the
respondents, the petitioner did not file a motion for reconsideration or
appeal, much less raise the same as an error before the appellate court.
The respondents allege that the silence of the petitioner on the matter
of res judicata before the Court of Appeals is an indication of her
conformity to the correctness of the ruling of the lower court.
The respondents also posit that the petitioner employed fraud, deceit and
misrepresentation in her inclusion as a co-owner of the property, as a
result of which the lawful wife, respondent Gloria Biascan, was deprived
of the property in question; thus, the annulment of the title and
reconveyance of the property in question was legal and proper.
Furthermore, due to such fraudulent and deceitful acts of the petitioner,
respondent Gloria Biascan, the aggrieved party, is legally entitled to the
award of attorneys fees.
The issue in the present case is whether or not the action of respondent
Gloria Biascan is barred by the decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. C-
259. A secondary issue is whether or not the petitioner is liable to
respondent Gloria Biascan for damages for usurpation of the surname of
respondent Mario Biascan under Article 377 of the Civil Code.
The Courts Ruling
We find and so hold that the action of respondent Gloria Biascan was
barred by the decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. C-259.
For res judicata to bar the institution of subsequent action, the following
requisites must concur: (1) the former judgment must be final; (2) it must
have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter
and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there
must be, between the first and second actions (a) identity of parties, (b)
identity of subject matter, and (c) identity of cause of action.[29] The
foundation principle upon which the doctrine of res judicata rests is that
parties ought not to be permitted to litigate the same issue more than
once; that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by
a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed,
should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in
law or estate.[30] As we ruled in Oropeza Marketing Corporation v. Allied
Banking Corporation:[31]
Res judicata literally means a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted
upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment. Res judicata lays
the rule that an existing final judgment or decree rendered on the merits,
and without fraud or collusion, or by a court of competent jurisdiction,
upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the
parties or their privies, in all other actions or suits in the same or any
other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on the points and matters
in issue in the first suit. The principle of res judicata has two aspects,
namely: (a) bar by prior judgment as enunciated in Rule 39, Section 49(b)
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; and (b) conclusiveness of judgment
which is contained in Rule 39, Section 47(c).
There is bar by prior judgment when, as between the first case where the
judgment was rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred,
there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. In this
instance, the judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the
second action. Otherwise put, the judgment or decree of the court of
competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation between the
parties, as well as their privies, and constitutes a bar to a new action or
suit involving the same cause of action before the same or other tribunal.
But where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no
identity of causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive only as to
those matters actually and directly controverted and determined and not
as to matters merely involved therein. This is the concept of res
judicata known as conclusiveness of judgment. Stated differently, any
right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved
in the determination of an action before a competent court in which
judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the
judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and
their privies whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter
of the two actions is the same.[32]
Contrary to the contentions of the respondents, the petitioner consistently
invoked the finality of the judgment of the RTC of Caloocan City, Branch
129, in Civil Case No. C-259 for partition of the property covered by TCT
No. 207197, as well as a 1976 model Toyota car. Eighty-three (83) days
after learning of the said decision,[33] respondent Mario Biascan filed a
petition for relief from judgment, which the trial court dismissed, and
which dismissal was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
32512 promulgated on December 17, 1993. The decision in Civil Case
No. C-259 became final and executory, thus satisfying the first requisite.
Furthermore, such judgment was on the merits and was rendered by a
court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties.
In the meantime, on October 27, 1993, respondent Gloria Biascan filed
Civil Case No. C-16184 for annulment of TCT No. 207197, reconveyance
and damages.
It is clear that there is identity of subject matter between the two cases;
that is, the parcel of land in Caloocan City covered by TCT No. 207197.
Such property was adjudicated in favor of the petitioner and the
respondent, as co-owners in equal shares. It must be stressed that in a
complaint for partition, the plaintiff seeks, first, a declaration that he is a
co-owner of the subject properties; and second, the conveyance of his
lawful shares. An action for partition is at once an action for declaration of
co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determinate
portion of the properties involved.[34] As we ruled in a recent case:[35]
To split the proceedings into declaration of nullity of the deed of sale and
trial for the partition case, or to hold in abeyance the partition case
pending resolution of the nullity case would result in the multiplicity of
suits, duplicitous procedure and unnecessary delay, as the lower court
observed. The conduct of separate trials of the parties respective claims
would entail a substantial duplication of effort and time not only of the
parties but also of the courts concerned. On the other hand, it would be in
the interest of justice of the partition court hears all the actions and
incidents concerning the properties subject of the partition in a single and
complete proceeding.
After all, the issue of nullity can be properly ventilated before the partition
court. Thus, even with the dismissal of the action for nullity, petitioner is
not without recourse. She can still dispute the execution of the deed of
absolute sale and assert her rights to the properties subject of the said
instrument in the partition case. There is no need for a separate case to
resolve the matter.[36]
Indeed, the difference in form and nature of the two actions is immaterial
and is not a reason for exemption from the effects of res judicata. The
philosophy behind this rule prohibits the parties from litigating the same
issue more than once. When a right or fact has been judicially tried and
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction or an opportunity for such
trial has been given, the judgment of the court, as long as it remains
unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity
with them.[37] Whatever has once been irrevocably established as the
controlling legal principle in an earlier final judgment continues to be the
law of the case between the same parties in another suit, as long as the
facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of
the dispute before the court.[38]
It may be argued that there is no identity of parties in the first and second
case. In the first case for partition, the plaintiff was the petitioner, while
the defendant was respondent Mario Biascan; in the second case for
annulment of title and reconveyance of the same property, respondent
Gloria Biascan was the plaintiff, while the defendants were the petitioner
and respondent Mario Biascan. However, absolute identity of parties is
not required for the principle of res judicata to apply. Mere substantial
identity of parties, or a community of interests between a party in the first
case and a party in the subsequent case, even if the latter was not
impleaded in the first case, is sufficient.[39]
It cannot be ignored that the evidence presented in the two cases were
substantially the same: among others, the PNB Bank account, the
Contract to Sell, the Deed of Sale, and the certificates of remittances. In
fact, both trial courts made similar findings, and adjudicated the property
in favor of both respondent Mario Biascan and the petitioner. This cannot
be done without violating the rule on finality of judgments. The Court
reiterates the following pronouncement in Gallardo-Corro v. Gallardo:[40]
Nothing is more settled in law than that once a judgment attains finality it
thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be
modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what
is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless
of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court
rendering it or by the highest court of the land. Just as the losing party
has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning
party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of
his case. The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on fundamental
considerations of public policy and sound practice, and that, at the risk of
occasional errors, the judgments or orders of courts must become final at
some definite time fixed by law; otherwise, there would be no end to
litigation, thus setting to naught the main role of courts of justice which is
to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance of
peace and order by settling justiciable controversies with finality.[41]
Indeed, it is readily apparent that the action for annulment of judgment
was, in effect, a second cycle of review regarding a subject matter which
has already been finally decided.[42] It is, likewise, not lost upon this Court
that respondent Gloria Biascan resorted to filing the second case for
annulment of title as an afterthought, after realizing her husbands failure
to appeal Civil Case No. C-259, and the inevitable dismissal of the
petition for relief from judgment by the trial court and, thereafter, the
petition for certiorari before the appellate court.
Anent respondent Gloria Biascans claim for damages for the petitioners
alleged usurpation of her husbands name, we rule that she is not entitled
to an award therefor.
The usurpation of name under Article 377 of the Civil Code[43] implies
some injury to the interests of the owner of the name. It consists in the
possibility of confusion of identity between the owner and the usurper,
and exists when a person designates himself by another name. The
elements are as follows: (1) there is an actual use of anothers name by
the defendant; (2) the use is unauthorized; and (3) the use of anothers
name is to designate personality or identify a person.[44] None of the
foregoing exist in the case at bar. Respondent Gloria Biascan did not
claim that the petitioner ever attempted to impersonate her. In fact, the
trial court found that respondent Mario Biascan allowed the petitioner to
use his surname, viz:
On the other cause of action referring to the use by Zenaida of the family
name Biascan for which damages is prayed for by the plaintiff, there is
evidence to show that defendant Mario Biascan was the one who
suggested, and in fact authorized Zenaida Dapar to use said family
name. It would appear that the very first time that Zenaida Dapars name
had the surname Biascan was when defendant Mario Biascan had
executed the affidavit of undertaking in connection with his employment
in Saudi Arabia, wherein he designated as his beneficiary Zenaida
Dapar Biascan. The undertaking was sworn to by the defendant on April
7, 1982 and which also showed that his effective date of employment in
Saudi Arabia was April 1982 and to expire on February 1984 (Exhibit A).
This is an extrajudicial admission that would not allow proof to the
contrary. Zenaida appeared to have no participation in the preparation of
said document. Moreover, when the contract to sell and the deed of sale
of the property in question were executed, Zenaida Dapar used the
surname Biascan and defendant Mario Biascan did not object to the use
of such surname. Also, in the joint bank account with the PNB
Valenzuela, the name Zenaida Dapar Biascan is described as a joint
depositor.

Defendant Zenaida Dapar testified that she used the surname Biascan
because she was instructed by her co-defendant to do so and she
thought the latter was not married. She only became aware of his civil
status a few years later after their living together in 1981.

The use by Zenaida Dapar of the surname of her co-defendant Mario

Biascan was allowed by the latter and in no case could it be considered
usurpation of surname. Accordingly, co-defendant Zenaida Dapar can no
longer be held liable for damages for the use thereof.[45]

The mere use of a surname cannot be enjoined; it is the use thereof

coupled with the representation that one is the lawful wife, or the
usurpation of the wifes status, which gives rise to an action for
damages.[46]

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 57306 is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The
complaint of respondent Gloria Biascan is DISMISSED on the ground
of res judicata. The counterclaims of the petitioner against respondent
Gloria Biascan are DISMISSED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concur.

Chico-Nazario, J., on leave.