Team 8

Student A
123 Street
Town, State 45678
April 25, 2018
Professor 1
Chemical Engineering
University
Any Town, USA 12345
Dear Professor 1:
Analyses were performed between March 26 and April 25, 2018 per your request to design a
facility to produce 250,000 US gallons of dimethyl ether (DME) per day as a fuel alternative for
diesel trucks. The design team consisted of Student D, Student B, Student C, and myself.
The DME design, detailed in the attached report, produces 27,777 kg/h of DME through the
consumption of 38,771 kg/hr of methanol, 25.8 kg/h of lubricant, and 1.43 g/h of odor. In
addition, 109 kg/h of nitrogen is added to the process for inerting. Without government
subsidies, this process is not profitable. With subsidies of $1/gal (consistent with those of
biodiesel), a profitability analysis was performed, and the net present value (NPV), discounted
payback period (DPBP), and discounted cash flow rate of return (DCFROR) of this process were
determined to be $83 million, 0.43 years, and 117.3%, respectively. These values indicate a very
profitable process. The risk of this process was evaluated using the Monte Carlo simulation,
which determined that this process has a 97% probability of being profitable, or very low risk. In
addition, an extensive safety analysis including a hazards and operability study (HAZOP), worst
case scenario consequence analysis and estimation of carbon footprint was performed to ensure
that the environmental, health, and safety impacts of the design were mitigated.
It is recommended that, if government subsidies comparable to those of biodiesel are available,

this DME design be implemented, as it is not only economically attractive, but the proper
measures have been implemented to ensure that the process poses no negative impact to the
public or plant operators. It is recommended, however, that the process be re-evaluated or shut
down after 12 years, as it is losing money at this point. If you have any questions or concerns,
please contact me at student-a@university.edu.
Sincerely,
Student A
AIChE 2018 Student Design Competition
Dimethyl Ether for Transportation
Submitted By:
Student A
Student B
Student C
Student D
Submitted To:
Professor 1
Professor 2
TA1
TA2
Submitted On:
April 25, 2018
University
Anytown, USA 12345
Table of Contents
Table of Tables .............................................................................................................................. iii
Table of Figures ............................................................................................................................. iv
Abstract ........................................................................................................................................... 1
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 3
Process Flow Diagram (PFD) and Material Balances .................................................................... 8
Process Description....................................................................................................................... 11
Energy Balance and Utility Requirements.................................................................................... 13
Equipment List and Unit Descriptions.......................................................................................... 15
Equipment Specification Sheets ................................................................................................... 16
Equipment Cost Summary ............................................................................................................ 20
Fixed Capital Investment Summary.............................................................................................. 22
Safety, Health and Environmental Considerations ....................................................................... 23
Health and Safety ...................................................................................................................... 23
Prevention ................................................................................................................................. 35
Worst-Case Scenario Consequences ......................................................................................... 41
Environmental Considerations .................................................................................................. 55
Inherent Safety .......................................................................................................................... 58
Minimize ............................................................................................................................... 58
Substitute............................................................................................................................... 59
Moderate ............................................................................................................................... 60
Simplify................................................................................................................................. 61
Other Important Considerations.................................................................................................... 62
Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs) ........................................................................ 63
Plant Location ........................................................................................................................... 70
Plant Layout .............................................................................................................................. 72
Startup ....................................................................................................................................... 74
Truck Modifications.................................................................................................................. 75
Manufacturing Costs ..................................................................................................................... 75
Economic Analysis ....................................................................................................................... 81
Discounted Cash Flow Diagram ............................................................................................... 84
Risk Evaluation ......................................................................................................................... 91
Conclusions and Recommendations ............................................................................................. 94
Acknowledgments......................................................................................................................... 98
Bibliography ................................................................................................................................. 99
ii
Table of Tables
Table 1: Comparison of the various DME production methods. .................................................... 6
Table 2: Amberlyst 35 catalytic characteristics (AIChE, 2018); (Dow, 2016). ............................. 7
Table 3: The stream table for the DME Process at 100% production capacity. ........................... 10
Table 4: Overall material balance for the DME process at 100% production capacity. ............... 10
Table 5: The overall energy balance for the system. .................................................................... 13
Table 6: Utility properties and costs (Turton, Bailie, Whiting, Shaeiwitz, & Bhattacharyya,
2012). ............................................................................................................................................ 14
Table 7: Utility usage per hour for each process unit. .................................................................. 14
Table 8: Summarized annual utility costs for all utilities at both 100% and 50% production
capacity. ........................................................................................................................................ 15
Table 9: Equipment list with unit descriptions. ............................................................................ 16
Table 10: Equipment summary for all process units, where CS is carbon steel and SS is stainless
steel. .............................................................................................................................................. 19
Table 11: Packing specifications for T-101. ................................................................................. 20
Table 12: The bare module costs for each piece of equipment in the DME process. ................... 21
Table 13: The additional safety bare module costs for the DME process. ................................... 22
Table 14: The extra capital costs due to the required safety devices. ........................................... 23
Table 15: The NFPA ratings for chemicals in the DME production process (Airgas, 2018);
(Science Lab, 2017); (Lubrizol , 2017)......................................................................................... 25
Table 16: The LFL, UFL, FP, AIT, TWA, STEL, and C limits of chemicals to be used in the
process. An asterisk* denotes that the given values for the lubricant Lubrizol came from the
largest component in Lubrizol, petroleum naphtha, rather than the mixture as no data was able to
be found on the mixture (Airgas, 2018); (Science Lab, 2017); (Lubrizol , 2017)). ..................... 27
Table 17: A summary of the most dangerous scenarios for each piece of process equipment
where L denotes low, M denotes medium and H denotes high. ................................................... 33
Table 18: Summary of the flow rates from a punctured tank in three different scenarios for the
methanol tank, the lubricant and mercaptan tank, and the DME tank with two different orifice
sizes for release (lb/hr). ................................................................................................................. 42
Table 19: A summary of release rate scenarios from ruptured pipes. Both liquid and vapor flow
rates are shown as they apply for piping from the first heat exchanger, following the towers and
from the final product tank. .......................................................................................................... 43
Table 20: A summary of gas flammability testing done on various parts of the process. This test
determines the minimum concentration of oxygen required to make the mixtures flammable as
well as the lower flammability limit of the mixture and the combustion potential. ..................... 43
Table 21: Chemical specific information on the fireball/BLEVE diameter, duration, burn rate,
heat release and surface emissive power ...................................................................................... 50
Table 22: Reportable quantities for chemicals stored on site (GPO, 2018).................................. 56
Table 23: A summary of the largest sources of carbon emissions within the DME facility and the
total acreage required to support it (Carbon Fund, 2018; Lean Six Sigma, 2012) ....................... 57
Table 24: Comparison of Lake Charles to Kalama (NWIW, 2018), (Lake Charles Methanol,
LLC, 2017), (Nolo, 2018), (Access Washington, 2018)............................................................... 71
Table 25: Key for the facility and plant layout maps.................................................................... 74
Table 26: The manufacturing costs for the DME process operating at 100% production. ........... 77
Table 27: The forecasted price of methanol, total cost of methanol, and cost of manufacturing for
each year of operation for the DME process at 100% production. ............................................... 79
iii
Table 28: The manufacturing costs for the DME process operating at 50% production. ............. 80
Table 29: The forecasted price of methanol, cost of methanol, and cost of manufacturing for each
year of operation for the DME process at 50% production. ......................................................... 81
Table 30: The forecasted price of DME and its corresponding revenue for each year of operation
for the DME process at 100% production..................................................................................... 83
for the DME process at 50% production....................................................................................... 84
Table 32: Depreciation schedule for MACRS method for a 5-year recovery period (Turton,
Bailie, Whiting, Shaeiwitz, & Bhattacharyya, 2012).................................................................... 86
Table 33: Range of variation of the parameters that affect the profitability of a chemical process
(Turton, Bailie, Whiting, Shaeiwitz, & Bhattacharyya, 2012). .................................................... 92
Table of Figures
Figure 1: Production pathways for DME (Sun, Yang, Yoneyama, & Tsubaki, 2014). .................. 4
Figure 2: The Process Flow Diagram (PFD) of the DME production design. ............................... 9
Figure 3: NFPA ratings where health ratings denote level of hazard to human health,
flammability hazards denote flash points of the chemical, reactivity hazards denote the instability
of the chemical, and specific hazards denote additional notable hazards (Riddle, 2014). ........... 25
Figure 4: A chemical reactivity worksheet generated for the DME process, highlighting chemical
mixtures that could be dangerous. ................................................................................................ 30
Figure 5: An aerial view of the plant site and the worst-case scenarios for downwind release
where each square represents a square mile (Google, 2018). The components methanol, DME,
Lubrizol and mercaptan were analyzed at 0 m elevation, 0.5 m/s wind speed and night conditions
as a worst-case scenario, from the perspective of ERPGs, TWAs, and odor thresholds. ............. 46
Figure 6: An aerial view of the facility site in the event of a bursting vessel (Google, 2018). Each
of the storage tanks were tested and the overpressure of several events are mapped, where one
square is equivalent to one square mile. ....................................................................................... 48
Figure 7: Overpressure at a distance in meters from various bursting vessel scenarios. The
overpressure is shown in a logarithmic scale due to the large range in values............................. 49
Figure 8: An aerial view of the facility site showing the ranges of damage due to a fireball or
BLEVE, where each square represents a square mile (Google, 2018). ........................................ 51
Figure 9: The surface intensity at various ranges from the center of a fireball produced by
chemicals utilized in the DME process. ........................................................................................ 52
Figure 10: An aerial view of the plant facility showing the ranges of damage following a vapor
cloud explosion involving chemicals in the storage tanks for the DME process (Google, 2018). 54
Figure 11: The overpressure at various distances following a vapor cloud explosion due to the
ignition of vapor in each of the storage tanks. .............................................................................. 55
Figure 12: The P&ID for T-101 and E-102. ................................................................................. 63
Figure 13: The P&ID for T-102 and E-104. ................................................................................. 65
Figure 14: The P&ID for E-101. ................................................................................................... 66
Figure 17: The P&ID for the methanol storage tank. ................................................................... 68
Figure 18: The P&ID for the lubricant and lubricant/odor storage tanks ..................................... 69
iv
Figure 19: The P&ID for the DME product storage tank. ............................................................ 70
Figure 20: Percentage of adults by county who support research into renewable energy sources
(Marlon, Howe, Mildenberger, & Leiserowitz, 2016) .................................................................. 72
Figure 21: Layout of the main production rooms of the facility................................................... 73
Figure 22: The historical price of methanol from 2001 to 2017 (Methanex, 2018). .................... 78
Figure 23: The forecasted prices for diesel (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2017). ... 82
Figure 24: The cumulative cash flow diagram for the DME process operating at 100%
production. .................................................................................................................................... 87
production, including government subsidies. ............................................................................... 88
Figure 26: The cumulative cash flow diagram for the DME process operating at 50% production,
with government subsidies............................................................................................................ 90
Figure 27: The Monte Carlo simulation inputs on CAPCOST. .................................................... 93
Figure 28: The NPV probability distribution for the DME process, determined using the Monte
Carlo simulation. ........................................................................................................................... 94
v
Abstract
A process for the production of dimethyl ether (DME) as a fuel alternative for diesel in
transportation has been designed, per the request of the American Institute of Chemical
Engineers (AIChE). The preliminary design for this process has been optimized to account for
the economic feasibility and to mitigate the potential safety hazards of the process. A detailed
process flow diagram (PFD) for this process was created; the major process unit is the catalytic
distillation column, which acts as both the reactor and the first separation unit. One recycle
stream and several heat integrations were added to the process to increase its efficiency. This
process produces 27,777 kg/hr of DME using 38,771 kg/hr of methanol, 25.8 kg/h of lubricant,
and 1.43 g/h of odor. In addition, 109 kg/h of nitrogen was added to the process for inerting.
It was determined that the total fixed capital investment for the DME process was $8.5
million. At capacity, the annual cost of manufacturing changes each year with the cost of
methanol, and ranges from $212.6 million to $308 million throughout the 20-year lifetime of the
facility. The annual revenue also changes year-to-year with the price of diesel, ranging from
$154 million to $188 million. Without government subsidies, this process is not profitable,
producing a negative annual net profit each year. Therefore, government subsidies must be
secured in order to ensure the profitability of this process. It is assumed that government
subsidies of $1/gal of DME are available, similar to that of biodiesel. Upon analyzing the
profitability with $1/gal subsidies, it is recommended that the plant stops operation after 12
years. The price of methanol rises at a higher rate than the price of DME, so the net profit from
years 13 to 20 is negative. After 12 years of operation, it is recommended that the trends of
methanol prices be re-evaluated. If they are lower than expected, the economic feasibility of the
process should be recalculated. If the process shows future profitability, then operation should
continue.
A profitability analysis for this process was performed for the recommended process
utilizing government subsidies with 12 years of operation, and the net present value (NPV),
discounted payback period (DPBP), and discounted cash flow rate of return (DCFROR) for the
process operating at capacity were determined to be $83 million, 0.43 years and 117.3%,
respectively. These values indicate that the process is profitable and it will start yielding a profit
within six months. Due to potential variations in the parameters used to perform the profitability
analysis, the potential risk of this process was quantified using the Monte Carlo simulation. It
1
was determined that this process has a 97% probability of being profitable. If government
subsidies and reasonable patent royalty rates (assumed to be 25% for this analysis) can be
secured before construction, it is recommended that the company moves forward with
implementing this design.
As with any chemical process, safety and the environment must be held paramount. An
extensive safety analysis including a hazards and operability study (HAZOP), worst case
scenario consequences and an estimation of carbon footprint was completed to determine the
proper measures that must be taken to ensure the safety of the environment, plant operators, and
the public. These studies revealed that the greatest risk involved the flammability of the
reactants, products and additives. The HAZOP exposed that the storage vessels, which contained
large quantities of flammables, could be sites for fires and explosions in the event of control
failure. The most dangerous worst-case scenario event involves a boiling liquid expanding vapor
explosion (BLEVE) in the DME storage tank, which would lead to a 99% lethality zone for 0.31
miles. To prevent this and other hazards, controls (flow, temperature, pressure, and composition),
pressure relief devices, sprinklers, nitrogen blanketing, personal protective equipment (PPE),
strict training, security gates, and permitting (confinement, lock/tag/try, hot work, grounding and
bonding, emergency planning, and management of change) will be utilized. To mitigate
environmental hazards, Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) was used in
construction cost estimations. Additionally, a carbon footprint estimation was completed using
parameters of shipping, commuting, water, waste, electricity and paper use to determine ways in
which the 5,833 tons of carbon emitted yearly could be reduced further.
In addition, inherently safer design principles (minimize, substitute, moderate and
simplify) were applied to this process to mitigate the effects of potential hazards. Minimization
techniques involved reducing transportation via proximity to a methanol facility and minimizing
storage of flammables on site. Substitution methods involved substituting the reaction type and
recommendations for a lower pressure steam substitution. Instead of creating methanol on site, it
was purchased from a nearby plant, decreasing on site flammables. Moderation techniques
included using a low temperature process to moderate temperatures and pressures. Simplification
methods were achieved through the minimization of process equipment, the gravity transfer for
liquid transport, and plant layout simplifications.
2
Introduction
It has been requested that a process be designed to produce dimethyl ether (DME) for the
use as a transportation fuel alternative to diesel. With DME’s low emissions, it has been
identified as a potential solution to decrease the environmental impact of diesel vehicles. The
production process must be capable of producing 250,000 US gal/day, while maintaining
operation at 50% turn down (AIChE, 2018). The desired product is required to contain at least
98.5 wt% DME, and no more than 0.05 wt% methanol and 0.03 wt% water. The design process
investigates the economic potential, environmental impact, and safety considerations involved in
the production of DME.
DME’s attractiveness as a transportation fuel stems from its ability to address
environmental issues, as well as addressing issues with limited fuel resources. DME production
resolves the issue of the current dependency on non-renewable energy sources by possessing the
capability to be produced from renewable bio-resources, such as biomass, or solid wastes (Sun,
Yang, Yoneyama, & Tsubaki, 2014). DME contains less emissions than low sulfur diesel fuels.
Due to its improved level of environmental cleanliness, the United States Federal Government
subsidizes diesel alternatives, and the assumption is made that the same subsidies available for
biodiesel ($1/gal) will be available for DME as well (Lane, 2018).
When DME combustion is operating optimally, the fuel burns clear without any
particulate matter. DME does require the addition of lubricant, specified at 900 ppm, to be able
to run without inflicting damage to the engine (AIChE, 2018); (McKone, et al., 2015). DME is
compatible with diesel engines that are currently being used, while also allowing the extra
filtration attachments required in diesel engines to be removed. The removal of these filtration
systems decreases the weight of the engines and allows diesel trucks to transport more product
while maintaining the weight limits (McKone, et al., 2015).
DME possesses great potential because it can be produced from natural gas, biomass,
coal, or waste, as shown in Figure 1. DME can be produced from syngas converting directly to
DME, or through a two-step reaction of syngas to methanol followed by methanol to DME.
Within the two-step reaction, numerous variations exist within the catalyst type and reaction
parameters (Sun, Yang, Yoneyama, & Tsubaki, 2014). If the two-step reaction is utilized, it may
be more cost-effective and environmentally friendly to purchase methanol from a supplier who
more is knowledgeable about the process.
3
Figure 1: Production pathways for DME (Sun, Yang, Yoneyama, & Tsubaki, 2014).
While the direct reaction of syngas to DME has the benefit of not producing wastewater
as the major by-product and eliminating the need to purchase methanol, the disadvantages of
converting syngas directly to DME outweigh the advantages. Even though wastewater is not
produced, carbon dioxide is the main byproduct. With DME and carbon dioxide present in the
product, the separation becomes more expensive because DME and carbon dioxide both have
low, similar boiling points. One of the main reasons DME is being considered as an alternative
fuel is its significant improvement over other fuels in terms of environmental impact. Therefore,
using a method to produce DME that also produces more carbon dioxide emissions is
counterproductive. Additionally, methyl formate is produced as a minor byproduct. It is very
flammable as well as toxic to the nervous system and upper respiratory tract (Science Lab,
2017). When possible, it is recommended to eliminate use or production in facilities.
Regardless of the variations involved in the dehydration of methanol to DME, the
exothermic reaction remains the same, as shown in Equation 1:
2ଷ ↔ ଷ ଷ ଶ ∆H= -23.5 kJ/mol (1)
where the DME is produced in a one-to-one molar ratio with water (Sun, Yang, Yoneyama, &
Tsubaki, 2014). Depending on the method used for the dehydration of methanol, the conversion
of methanol to DME is either driven by the kinetic or equilibrium characteristics of the reaction.
If the kinetics of the reaction (or its speed) are desired, it is operated as a high-temperature
gaseous reaction at 250-340˚C (AIChE, 2018). With the conversion of methanol to DME driven
4
by kinetics, the reaction is faster, allowing the reactor to be smaller when compared to using a
reaction driven by equilibrium. However, even though the reactor size would be smaller, the
utilities needed to operate at the high temperatures would be more costly than using a larger
reactor that is driven by equilibrium.
The catalyst used in the low-temperature reaction, Amberlyst 35, is more expensive than
the catalyst used during the high-temperature reaction (gamma alumina catalyst); although, when
considering the lifetime of the two catalysts, the cost difference is negligible. The catalyst used
in the high temperature reaction (gamma alumina catalyst) has a lifetime of 9-12 months with
costs ranging $4.65-$5.25/lb (AIChE, 2018). In contrast, the low temperature catalyst
(Amberlyst 35) costs $15/lb with a lifetime of 3 years (Dow, 2016); (AIChE, 2018). A summary
comparing the advantages and disadvantages of the possible production methods is outlined in
Table 1.
5
Table 1: Comparison of the various DME production methods.
Production Method Advantages Disadvantages

High temperature process • Favors kinetics (smaller • Lower conversion
using a gamma alumina oxide reactor and capital cost) • High amount of
catalyst • No excess carbon wastewater
dioxide produced • High pressure
• Cheaper catalyst (increased cost for
• More research available MOC)
for the design • Requires more process
units
• Have to pay for
shipping of methanol
Low temperature liquid • Higher conversion • Decreased kinetics
process using a super-acid • No excess carbon (larger reactor and
resin dioxide produced capital cost)
• More research available • High amount of
for the design wastewater
• Decreased capital cost • Expensive catalyst
(reactor and first • High pressure
separator are combined) (increased cost for
• Longer catalyst life MOC)
• Moderate temperatures • Have to pay for
in the process (safer) shipping of methanol
Gas phase dual function • Do not have to purchase • Carbon dioxide is a
catalyst that combines both methanol major byproduct
methanol synthesis and DME • No wastewater • Expensive separation
formation steps from syngas produced of carbon dioxide and
DME (may require
environmentally
threatening refrigerant)
• Methyl formate is a
minor byproduct
(flammable and toxic)
As shown in Table 1, the advantages of the low temperature process are much greater
than the advantages posed by the other ideas because they increase both safety and economics. A
low temperature reaction lends itself well to safer design, especially in the presence of highly
flammable materials. The higher conversion achieved at these conditions also increases the
profitability of the process. In addition to the desirability of the advantages, the disadvantages are
much less detrimental to the process, profit, safety or the environment. For example, in the low
temperature reaction, the capital cost is higher, but the operating cost is lower. Because capital
6
costs carry less weight on economics than yearly operating costs in this design, this disadvantage
proves to be an advantage over other options. In addition, the increase in wastewater is a more
environmentally friendly alternative to the byproducts observed in a combustion reaction to form
methanol.
Ultimately, the DME production facility was designed using a low-temperature liquid
reaction at 90˚C-140˚C, where conversion is dictated by equilibrium due to the relative
advantages presented in Table 1. Using equilibrium, the low-temperature reaction has a higher
conversion than the high-temperature reaction. On the basis of Gibbs free energy, the low-
temperature reaction equilibrium constant and conversion can be modeled by Equation 2 and
Equation 3:
787.64
ln = + 1.4937 (2)

()
ℎ
% = −0.0363 ×
˚ + 95.881 (3)
where Kc is equilibrium constant for the liquid methanol conversion (AIChE, 2018). The catalyst
specifications are shown in Table 2.
Table 2: Amberlyst 35 catalytic characteristics (AIChE, 2018); (Dow, 2016).
Catalyst Void Material Max Temperature Lifetime (yr) Price ($/lb)

Name Fraction Density (g/cm3) (˚C)
Amberlyst 35 0.6 1.504 150 3 15
The methanol dehydration is designed to occur at 95˚C to eliminate the effect of the slow
denaturing of Amberlyst 35 that occurs at 120˚C in the presence of water (AIChE, 2018).
Additionally, the low temperature liquid reaction is conducted in a packed, reactive distillation
tower that combines the steps for the reaction and first separation into one process unit, thus
eliminating one. By using the low-temperature reactive distillation tower, royalties of 25% must
be paid to the patent holder for the process, which is Hsieh et al, the owners of patent number
US2012/023231A1 (Hsieh, Lee, Liang, & Tzeng, 2011). The reactive distillation column in this
patent was packed with Amberlyst 35 as well as pall rings, which are the most widely used
packing in gas, refinery, and chemical plants (Sulzer, Ltd., 2018).
7
To ensure that the methanol feed was being produced in an environmentally conscious
process, the methanol feed is being purchased from Northwest Innovation Works, LLC (NWIW)
in Kalama, Washington. Their new facility being constructed on Port of Kalama is leading the
clean-tech industry through implementing new global environmental standards to produce
methanol (NWIW, 2018). By locating the DME production facility in Kalama, WA the access to
methanol from NWIW is established. Moreover, the State of Washington does not have a
corporate income tax, but rather local business and occupation taxes that are implemented city-
to-city. The City of Kalama does not implement local business and occupation taxes. Another
consideration when investigating a prime location for the DME production facility is the local
population’s drive for environmental cleanliness, which is prevalent in Kalama.
Using the low-temperature liquid reaction in a reactive, packed distillation tower, enough
methanol is converted to produce 250,000 US gal/day. The DME production facility is designed
to optimize the economic conditions, while minimizing the environmental footprint and without
compromising the safety of the process and facility. The DME production facility is able to
create a clean, efficient fuel, through the use of renewable resources (biomass, waste, etc.), and is
a step towards environmental and economical sustainability.
Process Flow Diagram (PFD) and Material Balances

The process was designed and modeled using the ChemCAD software. Output
information from the software, including overall mass and energy balances, and detailed
specification sheets are shown in Appendix C. A process flow diagram (PFD) was then created
to show the process units and flow through them. The PFD is shown in Figure 2, and the stream
table is shown in Table 3. Additionally, material balances were performed throughout the
process to ensure the mass entering the system was equivalent to the mass exiting the system.
The overall mass balance is shown in Table 4. Additional mass balances were performed around
each process unit, and are shown in Appendix D1.
8
Figure 2: The Process Flow Diagram (PFD) of the DME production design.
9
Table 3: The stream table for the DME Process at 100% production capacity.
Stream No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Stream Name MeOH Feed Nitrogen DME Prod Odor/Lubric
Temperature (°C) 23 23.1245 23.5001 95 90 43 40 39.9859 25 82.7721 104.828
Pressure (kPa) 101.325 300 900 900 900 900 900 900 101.3 930 930
Vapor Fraction 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
Enthalpy (MJ/h) -289330.4 -289318 -289281.4 -281544.6 0 -110820 -121516 -121525.1 -9.247365 -260939.3 -81630.5
Total Flow (kg/h) 38770.82 38770.82 38770.82 38770.82 0 27750.97 27750.95 27776.74 25.79043 30059.71 19039.91
Total Flow (kmol/h) 1210 1210 1210 1210 0 602.629 602.6185 602.9132 0.2946 1047.5667 440.1864
3
Total Flow (m /h) 48.9845 48.9918 49.014 48.4274 0 41.2355 44.0203 44.0593 0.04 45.9136 1375.2441
Component Flow Rates:
Methanol (kg/h) 38770.82 38770.82 38770.82 38770.82 0 2.59E-02 0.02594727 0.02594727 0 66.15411 49.38418
Dimethyl Ether (kg/h) 0 0 0 0 0 27743.83 27743.81 27743.81 0 18324.54 18208.76
Water (kg/h) 0 0 0 0 0 7.111084 7.111075 7.111076 0 11669.02 781.7689
Nitrogen (kg/h) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Lubrizol (kg/h) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25.789 25.789 0 0
Methyl Mercaptan (kg/h) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.001430294 0.00143 0 0
Stream No. 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
Stream Name Waste Water Cooling H20 Steam Waste Water
Temperature (°C) 103.631 174.714 30 32.9928 251.525 81.089 80.5833 114.327 160 80.4264
Pressure (kPa) 900 932.9691 500 500 4079.349 4079.349 1500 932.9691 700 700
Vapor Fraction 0.9993004 0 0 0 0.098048 0 0 0 0 0
Enthalpy (MJ/h) -81664.28 -166331.3 -1.35E+07 -1.35E+07 -123846.8 -131583.6 -131601.5 -169183.3 -128755 -131607
Total Flow (kg/h) 19039.93 11019.8 855000 855000 8421.8 8421.8 8421.799 11019.81 8421.8 8421.8
Total Flow (kmol/h) 440.1867 607.3799 47460.4492 47460.4492 467.4882 467.4882 467.4882 607.3802 467.4882 467.7882
3
Total Flow (m /h) 27.9023 12.6582 859.0018 859.8 51.6403 8.6759 8.6731 11.7845 9.2848 8.6722
Component Flow Rates:
Methanol (kg/h) 49.38419 16.76994 0 0 0 0 0 16.76994 0 0
Dimethyl Ether (kg/h) 18208.77 115.7945 0 0 0 0 0 115.7945 0 0
Water (kg/h) 781.769 10887.24 855000 855000 8421.8 8421.8 8421.799 10887.25 8421.8 8421.8
Nitrogen (kg/h) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Lubrizol (kg/h) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Methyl Mercaptan (kg/h) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 4: Overall material balance for the DME process at 100% production capacity.
Overall In Out
Methanol (kg/h) 38770.820 16.79588727
Dimethyl Ether (kg/h) 0 27859.6045
Water (kg/h) 863421.8 874316.1611
Nitrogen (kg/h) 0 0
Lubrizol (kg/h) 25.789 25.789
Methyl Mercaptan (kg/h) 0.00143 0.001430294
TOTAL (kg/h) 902218.4104 902218.3519
Difference (kg/h) 0.059
Difference (%) 0.00%
10
The overall material balance shows 0.059 kg/h more mass entering the system than
leaving. This is due to rounding errors in ChemCAD, and results in less than a 0.00% difference
between the mass going in and coming out, which is insignificant. Additionally, the material
balances around each process unit shown in Appendix D1 all show less than 0.00% difference
between the flow in and out. The stream table and overall material balance show the flow rates
and compositions at 100% operation of approximately 250,000 gal DME/day production. The
design request required that the process be able to turn down production to 50%, or 125,000 gal
DME/day.
To ensure quality and safety during production quantity changes, ratio control was added
to the process. These ratio control loops, as well as others to mitigate safety concerns, were
added to piping and instrumentation diagrams (P&IDs) for the process, which were created using
the Visio software and are shown in the Other Considerations section. The P&IDs for T-101 and
its condenser and T-102 and its reboiler are shown in Figures 12 and 13, respectively. The
remaining heat exchanger control loops are shown in Figures 14-16. The control loops for the
storage tanks for methanol, lubricant and odor, and the DME product are shown in Figures 17-
19, respectively. These are all described in more detail in the Other Considerations section.
Process Description
The process is shown in detail in the PFD, Figure 2 and the compositions and properties
for each stream are shown in Table 3. This production of DME design begins with a liquid
methane feed at standard temperature and pressure (25°C, 101.3 kPa). This is fed from a storage
vessel which is blanketed with nitrogen at less than 1% oxygen concentration in the tank. This is
done to ensure that oxygen does not enter the system in any appreciable amount, as most of the
components are extremely flammable. The controls system for this blanketing is shown in Figure
17 in the Other Considerations section. The methane is then fed through two pumps (P-101 A/B
and P-102 A/B) to increase the pressure to 900 kPa, which is the optimal operating pressure for
the low-temperature DME reaction. The use of two pumps allows for smaller pump duties, and
the ability to shut one down for maintenance if needed. Then a steam-fed heat exchanger, E-101,
is used to increase the temperature to 95°C, which is the desired reaction temperature. If the feed
amount is adjusted, the steam utility for the heat exchanger also adjusts according to the
incoming flow and outgoing temperature, as shown in Figure 14.
11
The process fluid, now at the desired temperature and pressure, enters T-101, which is a
catalytic distillation tower. This tower performs the reaction, which is the dehydration of
methanol as shown in Equation 1, and the initial separation of DME from the other species. After
passing through a condenser, the distillate (99.97 wt% DME) is still a vapor at 43°C and 900
kPa. Therefore, cooling water is passed through E-103 to cool the DME to 40°C, where it
condenses to a liquid state. It then passes through a mixer, where lubricant and odor are added
from a mixed storage tank at 900 ppm and 0.5 ppm, respectively. The lubricant is added in order
to make the fuel less viscous in the engine and odor is added as a safety precaution to make the
fuel scented and noticeable in the event of a leak. The lubricant and lubricant/odor storage tanks
are also blanketed in nitrogen, as shown in Figure 18. After exiting the mixer, the final product is
transferred to a storage tank for the filling station. The final product comes out at 99.881 wt%
DME, 0.093 wt% Lubrizol, 0.026 wt% water, 0.00009 wt% methanol, 0.000005 wt% ethyl
mercaptan, which well exceeds standards set. The control loops on this storage tanks ensure the
pressure and temperature remain constant and set off an alarm if oxygen is introduced, as shown
in Figure 19.
The bottoms of T-101 exit at 83°C and 930 kPa and contain 0.2 wt% unreacted methanol,
61.0 wt% DME, and 38.8 wt% wastewater which is generated as a byproduct of dehydration.
This is then sent to T-102 to separate the wastewater from a recycle stream for methanol and
DME. The distillate of this tower exits at 104.8°C and 930 kPa. It does not pass through a
condenser, and goes directly to an expander to decrease the pressure to 900 kPa (and the
temperature to 103.6°C) before entering T-101 again. The bottoms of T-101, which is the
wastewater stream, exit the reboiler at 174.7°C and 933 kPa, and are 98.8% water. They are then
passed through another heat exchanger, E-105, where the temperature is dropped to 114.3°C.
This is then sent to wastewater treatment offsite.
Heat integration and energy conservation were used throughout the process to ensure
efficiency. High pressure steam is purchased and run through the reboiler, E-104, first. Then it is
used in E-101 to heat the feed methanol before the catalytic distillation column, T-101. It then
passes through two expanders (C-102 and C-103) to drop the pressure, and a heat exchanger with
the wastewater (E-105) to reach the temperature and pressure of low pressure steam (500 kPa
and 160°C). This can then be resold for a utility credit. The expanders also produce electricity,
which can be used to power other portions of the process. Similarly, the cooling water was
12
reused. First, it is run through E-103 to cool the DME product until it is a liquid. Then it is
recycled through the condenser on T-101 (E-102). It exits the condenser at 40°C and can be sold
back as a credit to be used in a cooling tower. The control loops for these heat exchangers,
shown in Figures 12-16, are more involved because they allow for both heat integration and
process quantity changes.
Energy Balance and Utility Requirements

It is necessary to perform energy balances on the process to ensure that the results are
physically possible. In this case, energy was added to the process via heating, electrical power,
and chemical reaction, and was removed via cooling and electric power generation. The total
energy balance is shown in Table 5, and the difference between the energy in and energy out is
0.00%. The small difference in energy likely comes from the reaction, which as shown in
Equation 1, has a negative enthalpy and is exothermic. Energy balances were also performed
around each process unit, and are shown in Table 34 in Appendix D2. They all show an energy
difference of 0.00%.
Table 5: The overall energy balance for the system.
Overall In Out
Feed Streams (MJ/h) -13954500 0
Product Streams (MJ/h) 0 13950100
Total Heating (MJ/h) 12977.5 0
Total Cooling (MJ/h) -8550.75 0
Power Added (MJ/h) 48.9439 0
Power Generated (MJ/h) -57.1922 0
TOTAL (MJ/h) -13950081.5 13950100
Difference (MJ/h) 18.5017
One of the primary costs for this process is the annual utility cost. The costs and
conditions for each of the utilities were assumed to be the same as those listed in Analysis,
Synthesis, and Design of Chemical Processes (Turton, Bailie, Whiting, Shaeiwitz, &
Bhattacharyya, 2012). They are summarized in Table 6. It is assumed that any utilities that are
created can be sold back for credits at the same price as their purchase price.
13
Table 6: Utility properties and costs (Turton, Bailie, Whiting, Shaeiwitz, & Bhattacharyya,
2012).
P T Cost
(kPa) (°C) ($/1000 kg)
Steam: HP 4100 254 29.97
Steam: MP 1000 184 29.59
Steam: LP 500 160 29.29
Cost
($/kW-h)
Electric Power 0.06
P T Cost
3
(kPa) (°C) ($/1000 m )
Cooling Water 500 30 14.8
The list of process units and the amount of utilities charged to each is shown in Table 7.
Optimization and heat integration were added to the design to ensure efficiency. The utilities
were then completely charged to one process unit, even if they powered more than one. The
other unit(s) therefore are listed as “Recycled” in Table 7, because they are using the utility flow
purchased for a different unit. The high-pressure steam is converted into low-pressure steam and
resold for credit. These total annual utility requirements for each utility type was summed and is
presented in Table 8 for both 100% production and 50% production.
Table 7: Utility usage per hour for each process unit.
Electric Power Steam: HP Steam: MP Steam: LP Cooling

Equipment 3
(MJ/h) (kg/h) (kg/h) (kg/h) Water (m /h)
E-101 (Recycled)
E-102 (Recycled)
E-103 859.80
E-104 8,421.80
E-105 (8,421.80)
T-101
T-102
V-101
P-101 12.170
P-102 36.7700
C-101 (33.7800)
C-102 (17.8700)
C-103 (5.5400)
14
Table 8: Summarized annual utility costs for all utilities at both 100% and 50% production
capacity.
Annual Cost -100% Annual Cost - 50%

Electric Power $ 6,436 $ 3,217.93
Steam: HP $ 1,989,932 $ 994,966.11
Steam: MP $ - $ -
Steam: LP $ (1,944,782) $ (972,390.97)
Cooling Water $ 100,324 $ 50,162.11
Total Utilities $ 2,090,256 $ 1,045,128
Utilites Credits $ 1,938,346 $ 969,173
Difference $ 151,910 $ 75,955
The total annual utility cost at 100% production was determined to be approximately $2.1
million before utility credits are applied, and $152,000 after utility credits. This highlights the
necessity of heat integration and energy conservation in the facility.
Equipment List and Unit Descriptions

The equipment shown in the PFD, Figure 2, is listed and described in Table 9. There are
two pumps, three expanders, five heat exchangers, two towers, and one mixer. One tower (T-
101) serves as a reactor and a separator in the process, saving space in the production area and
money. Additionally, it is important to note that the towers each only have one heat exchanger
with T-101 only have a condenser (E-102) and T-102 only having a reboiler (E-104). The
specification sheets, which include the process conditions and sizing, are shown in the
Equipment Specification Sheets section and Appendix C3. The cost of each process unit is
shown in the Equipment Cost Summary Section (Table 12) with the most expensive pieces of
equipment being C-102 and C-103 which are liquid expanders in the process.
15
Table 9: Equipment list with unit descriptions.
Process Unit Unit Description

P-101A/B Methanol Pump
P-102A/B Methanol Pump
E-101 Reaction Preheater
T-101 Methanol Dehydration Tower
E-102 T-101 Condenser
E-103 DME Cooler
V-101 Lubrication & Odor Mixer
T-102 Waste Water Separator
E-104 T-102 Reboiler
C-101 DME/ Methanol Recycle Compressor
C-102 Steam Turbine
C-103 Steam Turbine
E-105 Steam Reheat/ Waste Water Cooler
Equipment Specification Sheets

One of the key factors of capital cost is the cost of equipment. In order to cost equipment,
two key conditions must be determined: the size of equipment needed and the material of
construction (MOC). Therefore, the equipment analysis began with equipment sizing. For
towers, the diameter and height of the tower must be known for cost estimation. ChemCAD
software can be used to determine the tower diameter and the number of stages. Using the
number of stages, the height of the tower can be determined using Equation 4:
ℎ௧ = ௧ − 1 × 0.6096 (4)
where ht is the height of the tower and nt is the number of stages. This relationship assumes that
the spacing between each tray/stage is 0.6096 (2 ft) and provides the height in units of meters
(Turton, Bailie, Whiting, Shaeiwitz, & Bhattacharyya, 2012).
The sizing of all vessels can be calculated with a known ratio of length-to-diameter (L/D)
between 2 and 5. First, the volume of the process fluid in the tank was calculated using Equation
5:
௉ி = ∗ (5)
where ௉ி is the volume of the process fluid in the tank, is the volumetric flow rate, and is
time. The time was assumed to be five minutes for the mixing vessel and seven days of
16
production at capacity for storage tanks. Next, the volume of the tank was calculated, assuming a
headspace of 80% for the nitrogen blanket at capacity, as shown in Equation 6:
௉ி
் = (6)
0.8
where ் is the volume of the tank. This volume was then used to calculate the length of the tank
at a certain diameter using Equation 7:
4்
= (7)
ଶ
where is the length and is the diameter. The Goal Seek function in Excel was then be used to
find the length and diameter necessary for a ratio between 2 and 5.
The sizing on the catalytic distillation column, and calculation of catalyst weight, was
done differently. First, the column was designed with five sections, each of which was 4 m tall.
The middle section, and the one below it, were packed with catalyst. With a known diameter
from ChemCAD, Equation 7 can be rearranged and used to solve for the volume of the packed
sections. Then the volume of catalyst was solved for using Equation 8:
௖௔௧ = ௉௔௖௞௘ௗ ∗ ∗ (1 − ) (8)
where ௖௔௧ is the volume of catalyst, ௉௔௖௞௘ௗ is the volume of the two packed sections, is the
free space in the packing (0.95) and is the void fraction of the catalyst (0.6). The weight of
catalyst is then calculated using Equation 9:
௖௔௧ = ௖௔௧ ∗ ௖௔௧ (9)
where ௖௔௧ is the weight of catalyst and ௖௔௧ is the density of the catalyst (1.504 g/cm3).
For reactors, vessels, and towers, the orientation must be specified as horizontal or
vertical. For equipment containing only liquids, the appropriate orientation is horizontal. A
vertical orientation should be used if there is a gas-liquid mixture in the equipment (Professor 5,
Equipment Sizing Lecture, 2017) (Mubeen, Equipment Sizing Lecture, 2017).
All the key sizing information for the heat exchanger can be determined using the
ChemCAD software. This software calculates the required area of the heat exchanger using the
relationship shown in Equation 10:
!
= (10)
"∆௅ெ
17
where A is the area, Q is the heat transfer, U is the overall heat transfer coefficient, and ∆௅ெ is
the log mean temperature difference. In addition, the ChemCAD software details the duty of the
heat exchangers and the phase changes occurring in either the shell or tube (Turton, Bailie,
Whiting, Shaeiwitz, & Bhattacharyya, 2012).
Another key factor for each piece of equipment is its material of construction (MOC).
The choice of MOC depends on the corrosion potential of the chemicals that are in contact with
the walls of the equipment, and the operating temperature and pressure. The most common
MOCs are carbon steel and stainless steel. Carbon steel is the cheapest option, but it is
incompatible with many chemicals, due to their corrosive qualities. It also cannot handle high
temperature and pressure situations. Stainless steel is often used in these applications. It is
important that a materials engineer investigates each piece of equipment to determine the
appropriate MOC that is economically feasible and will maintain the equipment’s structure under
the operating conditions. For this analysis, basic research has been conducted to determine
reasonable MOCs for the conditions of this process. Since corrosion is not a significant concern
in the process units prior to the catalytic distillation tower and the temperatures used are
moderate, the primary concern is the high pressures. Following the catalytic distillation unit
stainless steel was used in order to mitigate potential losses in the event the catalyst denatures
and flows downstream. In cases where the pressure is above 950 kPa, stainless steel was
designed as the MOC.
Equipment specification sheets were generated in ChemCAD software for all of the units,
and are shown in Appendix C4. This information has been summarized and is shown in Table
10.
18
Table 10: Equipment summary for all process units, where CS is carbon steel and SS is stainless
steel.
Heat Exchangers E-101 E-102 E-103 E-104 E-105

Type Floating Head Condenser Floating Head Reboiler Floating Head
2
Area (m ) 30.14 19.88 10.57 84.37 173.66
Duty (MJ/h) 7736.80 -650.00 310.88 12977.50 2851.96
Shell
Temp (°C) 251.53-81.09 58.71 - 42.31 42.31 - 40.00 254-251.53 80.43-160
Pressure (kPa) 4079.35 930 - 900 900 4100-4079.35 700
Vapor Mole Fraction .098-0 0 - 0.377 1-0 1-.098 0
MOC SS CS CS SS SS
Tube
Temp (°C) 23.5 - 95.00 32.12 - 36.57 30.00 - 32.12 166.68-174.71 174.46-114.33
Pressure (kPa) 900 500 500 932.38-932.97 932.97
Vapor Mole Fraction 0 500 - 479.32 0 0-0.365 0
MOC CS CS CS CS CS
Towers/ Vessels T-101 T-102 V-101

Temp (°C) 95 174.45 39.99
Pressure (kPa) 930 931.79 900
Orientation Vertical Vertical Vertical
MOC CS CS CS
Size
Height/Length (m) 20 3.05 3.48
Diameter (m) 0.929 0.91 1.16
Packed with
Internals 6 valve trays N/A
Amberlyst 35
Pumps/Expanders P-101 P-102 C-101 C-102 C-103

Temp (°C) 23.00 - 23.12 23.12 - 23.5 68.87 - 67.64 81.09-80.58 80.58-80.43
Pressure In (kPa) 101.325 300 930 4079.35 1500
Pressure Out (kPa) 300 900 900 1500 700
MOC CS CS CS SS SS
Power (MJ/h) 12.174 36.772 -42.2272 -22.3335 -6.92963
Storage Tanks Tk-101 Tk-102 Tk-103 Tk-104

Temp (°C) 25 25 25 40
Pressure (kPa) 110 110 110 900
MOC CS CS CS CS
Size
Height (m) 37.42 11.88 11.88 39.82
Diameter (m) 18.71 3 3 17.2
The internals of T-101, the catalytic distillation column, are more complex due to the
catalyst packing. Therefore, the details of the packing are shown separately, in Table 11. These
parameters were based primarily on packing research.
19
Table 11: Packing specifications for T-101.
T-101 Packing Parameter Specification

Packing Type Dumped
Packing Name Pall Ring
Packing Material Metal
Packing Size (mm) 50
Packed Sections 2
Packing Height (m/section) 4
Free Space 0.95
-1
Packing Factor (m ) 80
2 3
Packing surface (m /m ) 112.6
The packing material used is a metal pall ring. Pall rings were chosen for this catalytic
distillation column because they are a very common packing in the chemical and petrochemical
industry and they are economical. They are generally sold as either metal or plastic rings, and
metal was chosen due to the presence of an acidic catalyst. The packing type is dumped (also
called random), which was chosen due to the ease of setup (Sulzer, Ltd., 2018). The standard pall
ring sizes are 16 mm, 25 mm, 38 mm, 50 mm and 90 mm (The Pall Ring Company Limited,
2013). After testing all of these sizes in the ChemCAD simulation, the best purity of the DME
product occurred with the 50 mm pall rings, so these were used in the design. The free space,
packing factor, and packing surface were then set by the packing size, and were given by the
manufacturer (The Pall Ring Company Limited, 2013). The two sections, each 4 m tall, was
chosen so the diameter of the tower was within specifications, while maintaining the necessary
flowrate and quality of product.
Equipment Cost Summary

Using the equipment specifications provided in Table 10, the purchased costs and bare
module costs of each piece of equipment were estimated using the CAPCOST software, which is
an Excel spreadsheet that allows the user to input equipment specifications and then reports the
estimated cost of the equipment. In order to adjust for inflation, the Chemical Engineering Plant
Cost Index (CEPCI) in this program was updated to the most recent value for 2016, which is
541.7 (Access Intelligence, LLC, 2017). The bare module costs for each piece of equipment are
20
outlined in Table 12; these costs account for the MOC listed in Table 10. The detailed output
from the CAPCOST software can be found in Appendix E.
Table 12: The bare module costs for each piece of equipment in the DME process.
Equipment Name Type of Equipment Bare Module Cost

E-101 Heat Exchanger $ 131,000.00
V-101 Mixer $ 42,800.00
T-101 Packed distillation column $ 144,000.00
T-102 Distillation column $ 43,100.00
P-101 Centrifugal Pump $ 31,400.00
P-102 Centrifugal Pump $ 43,200.00
C-101 Liquid Expander $ 375,000.00
Tk-101 Storage Tank $ 575,000.00
In addition, various safety measures have been implemented into this process to reduce
the risk for hazards in the process. The rationale for each of these safety measures will be
discussed further in the Safety, Health, and Environmental Considerations section. Table 13
includes the cost of each of these required safety devices that must be included in the total bare
module cost for this process. The foam sprinkler system, explosion proof walls, security gate,
and barbed wire fencing will be installed in the plant to protect the plant operators from any
potential fire, explosion, or toxic release and to stay in accordance with governmental
regulations.
21
Table 13: The additional safety bare module costs for the DME process.
Safety Equipment Bare Module Cost Source

Explosion proof walls $ 84,000 (Springer Link, n.d.)
Barbed wire fencing $ 27,474 (CraftJack, n.d.)
Security gate $ 9,500 (Fixr, 2018)
(Lyons Industrial Properties, 2018)
Foam sprinkler system $ 473,186
(Grainger, n.d.)
Storage tank sprinkler
$118,000 (Kauffman Co., 2012)
systems
It was assumed that the main production room containing the process was 50 ft by 70 ft
(15 m by 21 m); therefore, the explosion proof walls and foam sprinkler system costs were
calculated based on the production area of 3,500 ft2 (325 m2) . It was assumed that the sprinkler
systems for the storage tanks would require a total of two pumps (priced at $50,000 each) and the
water would need to cover 9,000 ft2 (836 m2) of area. In addition, it was assumed that the
barbed wire fencing will need to enclose 3.5 acres of the plant; therefore, 1,446 ft (441 m) of 6-ft
tall chain link fencing will need to be purchased. More detailed sample calculations for the safety
costs in Table 13 can be found in Appendix G2. Using the costs for each piece of equipment
presented in Tables 12 and 13, the total bare module cost for this process is $5 million.
Fixed Capital Investment Summary

This design is for a new production facility; therefore, the fixed capital investment must
include the costs for site development, auxiliary buildings, and off-site utilities. In order to
include these extra costs, the fixed capital investment for the DME process was determined using
the grassroots costing method, shown in Equation 11 (Turton, Bailie, Whiting, Shaeiwitz, &
Bhattacharyya, 2012):
௡ ௡
ீோ = 1.18 # ஻ெ,௜ + 0.5 # ஻ெ,௜

°
(11)
௜ୀଵ ௜ୀଵ
where CGR is the grassroots cost, n is the number of individual pieces of equipment, CBM,i is the
bare module cost for an individual piece of equipment, i, obtained from the CAPCOST program,
°
and ஻ெ,௜ is the bare module cost for the piece of equipment operating at standard conditions
22
(298 K and 1 atm). Using the bare module costs presented in Tables 12 and 13 and Equation 11,
the grassroots cost for this process was determined to be $8.45 million.
Additional safety measures have been added to this process, but the costs of these devices
do not affect the installation and construction costs, so they can be added to the grassroots cost
instead of the total bare module cost. The costs for these safety devices are shown in Table 14.
Fusible links, rupture discs, and spring-loaded relief devices will be included on each of the
storage tanks. In addition, the engineering team recommends that the plant acquires a Leadership
in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) 1.0 Gold Certification in order to ensure that the
plant is more environmentally friendly through sustainable practices.
Table 14: The extra capital costs due to the required safety devices.
Safety Equipment Unit Cost Source

Fusible link (4 @ $2635 each) $ 10,540.00 (Assured Automation, 2018)
Rupture disc (4 @ $233.50 each) $ 934.00 (Grainger, 2018)
Spring-loaded relief device (4@ $1,160 each) $ 4,640.00 (Ferguson, 2018)
LEED 1.0 Gold Certification $ 37,200.00 (Mapp, Nobe, & Dunbar, 2012)
Accounting for the grassroots cost and the additional costs provided by the safety
measures in Table 14, the total fixed capital investment for this process is $8.5 million. The
sample calculations for the fixed capital investment can be found in Appendix G2.
Safety, Health and Environmental Considerations

Health and Safety
Health and safety are at the forefront of this project. As a result an in-depth investigation
of chemical and process safety was completed to ensure the safety of both workers and
surrounding citizens. First, National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) ratings were analyzed
from the perspective of health, flammability, reactivity and special hazards. In addition, because
most of the chemicals used in this process were highly flammable, the upper flammability limit,
lower flammability limit, flash point, and auto-ignition temperature were determined for each
chemical. Toxicity information was also established in this analysis in terms of time weighted
average, short term exposure limits and ceiling limits. Additionally, a chemical reactivity
worksheet (CRW) was completed to identify potentially dangerous mixing scenarios and
determine the safest storage methods. Lastly, a hazards and operability study (HAZOP) was
23
completed to outline potentially dangerous operational scenarios and decrease the probability of
hazardous occurrences.
In order to perform a comprehensive safety analysis, the safety of the chemicals in use
must first be analyzed. The basic safety hazards of an individual chemical can be determined
using the NFPA ratings. These are generally represented in the form of a diamond, with blue on
the left indicating health, red on the top indicating flammability, yellow on the right indicating
reactivity or stability, and white on the bottom indicating any additional warnings. Each
chemical is assigned a number for each category, with 0 being the least dangerous and 4 being
the most dangerous. Health hazards are rated based on the injury level attained by exposure; a 4
indicates a chemical that may have the ability to penetrate rubber clothing and can be fatally and
easily absorbed through the skin. Fire hazards are based on flash points, where a 4 indicates a
material that flashes at or below room temperature. Reactivity hazards are rated based on their
ability to detonate, where a 4 is a chemical that both easily and violently explodes at room
temperature (Riddle, 2014). The specific requirements for each number designation are shown in
Figure 3. Additionally, the special warnings in the white section are denoted with a symbol. The
NFPA diamond is generally displayed in the Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) information, as
well as on the outside of bins and containers of dangerous chemicals.
24
Figure 3: NFPA ratings where health ratings denote level of hazard to human health,
flammability hazards denote flash points of the chemical, reactivity hazards denote the instability
of the chemical, and specific hazards denote additional notable hazards (Riddle, 2014).
The chemicals used in this process include the reactant (methanol), the products (DME
and water), the additives (nitrogen, mercaptan, and Lubrizol 9040GX), and the catalyst
(Amberlyst 35). First, the hazards for each individual chemical for this process were investigated
using the information on the MSDS, shown in Appendix L. From this information, it becomes
apparent that some of the larger risks are flammability and health concerns, with DME and
mercaptan both having flammability ratings of 4. In addition, it is important to note that three of
the chemicals – methanol, mercaptan and Lubrizol – have health ratings of 2, indicating
hazardous materials. The complete NFPA ratings are shown in Table 15.
Table 15: The NFPA ratings for chemicals in the DME production process (Airgas, 2018);
(Science Lab, 2017); (Lubrizol , 2017).
Chemical Health Flammability Reactivity
Methanol 2 3 0
Dimethyl Ether 1 4 1
Mercaptan 2 4 1
Water 0 0 0
Nitrogen 0 0 0
Lubrizol 2 2 0
Amberlyst 35 1 1 0
25
The first column of Table 15 is dedicated to the health impacts of the chemicals used in
this DME process. Health ratings of the chemicals used in this process are all either at or below a
health rating of 2. As shown in Figure 3, a heath rating of 2 corresponds to a slight hazard and
can create adverse health effects to operators in the plant; therefore, this hazardous condition
should be mitigated whenever possible. It should be noted that while the health hazard for
nitrogen is 0, it still presents major health risks because, in large quantities, it can displace air
and cause suffocation (also known as asphyxiation). Some of the measures taken to mitigate
chemical exposure include proper training, safe handling techniques, personal protective
equipment (PPE) training, use of controls, alarms, monitors and other safety devices, and
emergency planning. Additional preventative measures are discussed in the Prevention section.
The next section in Table 15 is the flammability ratings, which is the most concerning.
Two of the materials are at a flammability level of 4, one at a level 3 and another at level 2,
indicating extreme fire hazards. As shown in Figure 3, a flammability rating of 4 indicates a flash
point at or below room temperature. Because these ratings are for the main product, which will
be in excess on site, strict safety measures must be enforced. Since the purpose of this process is
to create a fuel, which releases energy when used, this is unsurprising. Still, precautions must be
taken in a plant such as this one to ensure that ignition sources are mitigated, oxidizers are kept
away from reactants, and the product is stored safely. Additional fire, explosion and flammability
information are provided in Table 16 and preventative measures such as storage and emergency
planning, sprinkler foam systems and procedures for change/hot work will be discussed in the
Prevention section. The next column in Table 15 indicates the instability or reactivity, where
DME and mercaptan have a rating of one. As shown in Figure 3, this indicates that these
compounds become unstable when heated and, as a result, over-heating should be avoided.
The next primary source of information necessary to evaluate the safety of a process is
the flammability and toxicity information of the materials, especially since these materials
proved to be highly flammable. The lower flammability limit (LFL) gives the minimum
concentration of a flammable substance necessary for ignition. Below this concentration, the
substance is too lean for a fire to occur. Similarly, the upper flammability limit (UFL) is the
maximum concentration of a flammable substance necessary for ignition. Above this
concentration, the substance is too rich for a fire to occur. The flash point (FP) is the temperature
at which a vapor will ignite (Crowl & Louvar, 2011). This can be tested using an open-cup or
26
closed-cup method, with the closed-cup yielding the most conservative value. The auto-ignition
temperature (AIT) is the temperature at which a substance will spontaneously combust without
any outside interference.
Finally, toxic chemicals have threshold limit values (TLVs), which are the maximum
concentration of substance a person can be exposed to for a set period of time. The time
weighted average (TWA) is the regulatory amount to which a person can be exposed to for eight
hours per day for a lifetime before experiencing adverse effects. The short-term exposure limit
(STEL) is the maximum concentration a person can be exposed to for 15 minutes before
experiencing adverse effects, and the ceiling is the instantaneous concentration at which there are
immediate hazards to health (Crowl & Louvar, 2011). The flammability and toxicity information
of each material were investigated and are shown in Table 16.
Table 16: The LFL, UFL, FP, AIT, TWA, STEL, and C limits of chemicals to be used in the
process. An asterisk* denotes that the given values for the lubricant Lubrizol came from the
largest component in Lubrizol, petroleum naphtha, rather than the mixture as no data was able
to be found on the mixture (Airgas, 2018); (Science Lab, 2017); (Lubrizol , 2017)).
TLV-TWA TLV-STEL TLV-C

Chemical LFL UFL FP ( ) AIT ( ) (ppm) (ppm) (ppm)
Methanol 6% 36.50% 16 464 200 250 N/A
Dimethyl Ether 3.30% 26.20% -41 350 1000 N/A N/A
Mercaptan 2.80% 18% -30 299 0.5 N/A 10
Lubrizol 1.4%* 7.6%* 67 225* 10* N/A N/A
Amberlyst 35 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
The LFL, UFL, FP, and AIT all deal with the flammability of the material. It is important
to note that water and nitrogen are not combustible chemicals themselves, and therefore were not
listed in Table 16. Additionally, it is notable that the Amberlyst catalyst does not have available
specific flammability or toxicity information available, but only has NFPA flammability and
health ratings of 1, and therefore should not pose significant risks. The flammability data
available support the 4 rating from the NFPA for mercaptan and DME, showing low flash points
for both. This process operates at about 95 which is well above all of the flash point data. This
means that in the event of a spark and in the presence of an oxidizer these chemicals could easily
flash into a fire or explosion. To prevent oxidizers from entering the process and to keep
flammability limits in safe ranges, a nitrogen blanket will be utilized in the feed tanks for every
reactant, additive and product. To prevent sparks from occurring, proper grounding and bonding
techniques will be utilized in the facility as well. It is notable that at least one of these chemicals,
27
Amberlyst catalyst, requires a foam spray in the event of a fire. Therefore, foam sprinklers will
be available for utilization in the production area. Other measures in place to prevent fires,
including firefighting information and emergency protocols, are further discussed in the
Prevention section.
Additionally, the TLVs are shown in Table 16 for toxic chemicals, whose toxic effects
increase with increased exposure. Of significant note is the low level of mercaptan required to be
dangerous. In order to minimize dangers of toxicity and flammability, this chemical will always
be stored in small quantities and mixed with the lubricant to dilute it. In addition to the danger
posed to workers, this chemical poses threats to wildlife in the event of a leak, as discussed in the
Environmental Considerations section. The reason mercaptan is so toxic is its ease of uptake into
the human body. Mercaptan is easily absorbed though inhalation, where it binds to blood cells
and proteins, interfering with bodily functions by slowing or stopping both catalase activities,
and sodium-potassium ATPase, as well as inhibiting cytochrome C oxidase. Inhalation exposures
can lead to nausea, vomiting, loss of olfactory senses, and in extreme cases, central nervous
system depression, pulmonary edema, liver and kidney damage, tachycardia and hypertension
(Kansas Health System , n.d.). Luckily, this chemical can be detected by human smell at levels
as low as 0.009 ppb and, as such, will only be added in small amounts to the product (0.5 ppm)
(Sela & Sobel, 2010). For additional safety, detectors will be placed on site in the event that
olfactory senses do not detect this dangerous chemical. Despite this risk, the risk of explosion or
fire during a leak of DME is more dangerous; thus, this chemical has been added to give a scent-
warning in the event of a leak in the process or at the gas station.
Other health and toxicity risks include exposures to methanol, DME, Lubrizol and
Amberlyst 35. Methanol is extremely dangerous in high quantities, as the substance is a possible
mutagen, toxic to the eyes, blood, kidneys, liver, brain, nervous system, respiratory system and
optic nerve. Methanol is particularly dangerous because it is metabolized to formaldehyde in the
body (which is toxic), followed by formic acid and formate salts. Formate acts similarly to
mercaptan in the body, inhibiting cytochrome C oxidase function and essentially starving the
cells for oxygen (Totland, 2014). DME poses a suffocation risk, as it can displace air, causing
individuals to lose consciousness when present in large quantities. The main component of
Lubrizol, petroleum naphtha, is a central nervous system depressant, meaning function can be
reduced and drowsiness can occur if exposed. Naphtha has the added danger of being an irritant
28
to respiratory membranes (Toxnet, 2009). Amberlyst is an irritant and strong acid; as such, it
should be handled carefully. However, the catalyst poses no large toxicity risk. Again,
concentration monitors to measure the amount of methanol, mercaptan and Lubrizol in the air
should be installed in the plant so that concentrations reaching the TLV-TWA will set off an
alarm, alerting operators to exit the area. In addition, the proper PPE, especially respirators,
should be worn whenever exposure to chemicals is likely (filling, maintenance, emergencies) to
prevent these adverse health effects.
Next, the compatibility and reactivity of the chemicals used in the DME process were
investigated using the CRW software. This software provides a chart including which chemicals
coexist well with one another, and which are dangerous due to their reactivity with one another.
This chart is commonly referred to as the compatibility table, where a green Y indicates a safe
mixture, a yellow C indicates a mixture that requires caution and a red N indicates a dangerous
mixture. Additionally, the CRW provides a printout, which details the predicted hazards and
potential gases for each pair of chemicals. All of the chemicals, including the reactants,
additives, and products were entered into the CRW software. Some of the additives of the DME
process (e.g. Lubrizol) were not present in the CRW software, so they were represented by
adding each of the chemicals that are mixed to make them (1,2,4-trimethylbenzene, 1,3,5-
trimethylbenzene, 2-ethylhexanol, naphthalene and petroleum naphtha). This software then
created a compatibility chart, shown in Figure 4.
29
Figure 4: A chemical reactivity worksheet generated for the DME process, highlighting chemical
mixtures that could be dangerous.
The CRW compatibility chart shows the large flammability dangers in the DME process.
Although nitrogen blanketing will be used to make the production devoid of oxygen, oxygen was
still included in this CRW as a means to show what could happen if these chemicals come into
contact with air. Many incompatibilities occur with oxygen, as it is a very strong oxidizer and a
major contributor to combustion, posing a danger to flammable chemicals, which are abundant in
this process. When these flammable materials are in contact with oxygen and an ignition source,
they are highly susceptible to fire and explosion. Of special note are the reactions between
oxygen and the trimethylbenzene components, oxygen and petroleum naphtha, oxygen and
naphthalene, and oxygen and ethyl mercaptan. All these reactions are exothermic and explosive,
sensitive to shock and friction, cause pressurization, and are toxic. Incompatibilities between 2-
ethylhexanol and oxygen, and methanol and oxygen also exothermically create products which
are corrosive, explosive, flammable and toxic. These incompatibilities are reflected in the CRW
by red Ns. The other main incompatibility is present between water and ethyl mercaptan because
their reaction products may be flammable, toxic and could cause pressurization.
Additionally, the CRW detailed the predicted hazards associated with chemical pairings.
Information from this report is shown in Appendix K. From this report, it is important to note
30
that almost none of the safe pairings led to the creation of gases upon their combination.
However, many of the dangerous pairings led to potential creation for gases such as carbon
dioxide (oxygen and trimethylbenzene, petroleum naphtha, or naphthalene), carbon monoxide,
chlorine, chlorine dioxide, hydrogen, chloride, and hydrogen halides (oxygen paired with 2-
ethylhexanol or methanol), halogen oxides (oxygen and DME), and sulfur oxides (oxygen and
ethyl mercaptan). While none of these gases are safe in large quantities, perhaps the most
dangerous one is the creation of chlorine gas. Chlorine is particularly hazardous because upon
contact with membrane or skin, it quickly forms hydrochloric acid, burning the skin or
respiratory tract. Of additional note is the possibility of hydrogen sulfides being formed with the
combination of water and mercaptan, which can cause coughing, loss of smell in 2-15 minutes,
eye irritation and even death (OSHA, n.d.)
After the hazards of the materials used in the process are accessed, the hazards of the
complete process should be analyzed. One of the key safety analyses that should be performed is
a HAZOP, which utilizes brainstorming to identify and mitigate potential process hazards. This
must always be performed in a team. A series of guidewords are used to identify potential
deviations from the normal operating conditions of a process and the corresponding
consequences of the deviations. Common guidewords are none, more of, less of, more than, etc.
(Turton, Bailie, Whiting, Shaeiwitz, & Bhattacharyya, 2012). For example, one possible
deviation could be no cooling water flow. One consequence of this could be an overheated
product going into the next stage of the process. A HAZOP analysis is best performed by people
who have experience in a plant, and should be done periodically. It is especially important to do
this before a plant is constructed, to ensure safety issues are thoroughly thought out and
preventive measures are put in place. This analysis helps to decide what relief and control
systems should be implemented in the process to reduce the effect of these potential deviations.
For each major piece of equipment, including the catalytic distillation column, pumps, heat
exchangers, other distillation columns, mixers and storage tanks, a complete HAZOP table was
completed.
The complete HAZOP analysis can be found in the Appendix I and the most significant
hazards are listed in Table 17. In the HAZOP completed for the DME production facility the
parameters used included flow, temperature, pressure, and concentration with guidewords of no,
less, more and as well as to create over 100 scenarios throughout the plant layout. Of the
31
scenarios, 41% presented a high severity hazard, however, 100% had a low probability of
occurring. The highly hazardous scenarios mostly revolved around the flammability of the
reactants and products so it is logical that high temperature or increased oxygen concentrations
presented the largest hazards. Other hazards presented included high pressures and increased
flow of flammable or toxic components. In almost all scenarios, the controls structure in the
facility is relied on to protect equipment and workers. For example, in perhaps the largest hazard,
higher temperature and higher concentration of oxygen in the DME tank, the only possible way
for this to occur with the current controls structures is total control failure. Upstream of the DME
tank, the mixer has pressure and temperature transmitters and the DME tank itself has relief
devices, and a composition analyzer to ensure that the oxygen concentration remains at a safe
concentration.
32
Table 17: A summary of the most dangerous scenarios for each piece of process equipment where
L denotes low, M denotes medium and H denotes high.
33
In the pump, the most dangerous scenario is the possibility of higher temperature and a
higher concentration of oxygen. For this to occur multiple controllers would have to fail,
including the composition controls on nitrogen upstream of the methanol storage tank and the
temperature and pressure transmitters on the tank. However, if this somehow did occur, an
emergency shut down procedure could be used to stop dangers upstream at the alert of high
temperature or nitrogen blanketing loss. The major dangers that could occur in the event that the
shutdown procedure was incomplete or the control structure failed would involve damage to the
pump through explosion or fire, or damage downstream.
The storage vessels for methanol, DME, and Lubrizol and mercaptan all contain
flammables. As a result, most of the hazards include the introduction of oxygen or a higher
temperature in the tank. These hazards are well prevented in the design because each tank is
equipped with flow, temperature, composition and pressure controls as well as nitrogen
blanketing. Alarms upstream of all tanks, with the exception of DME, also protect from the
hazards in the event that the first control systems in these tanks fail. The only difference is in the
Lubrizol/mercaptan storage vessel, where the other major hazard is no flow of lubricant. No flow
of lubricant presents an additional hazard in the Lubrizol/mercaptan tank because the mercaptan
has additional health hazards and thus if a disproportionate amount was added to the product,
consumers would be at risk for exposure beyond safe levels. The mixer operates similarly and
has similar hazards. In addition, all of the storage tanks and mixers are equipped pressure relief
devices in the form of a balanced bellows spring loaded relief device, a burst disk to a scrubber,
condenser and blow down tank.
In heat exchangers throughout the facility, the greatest hazards include higher
temperatures, more flow of flammables, like DME, and higher pressures. Because the two heat
exchangers are upstream of the catalytic distillation column, the pressure and temperature need
to be closely monitored through transmitters in the controls system. In the distillation tower’s
reboiler, the greatest hazard is posed when an increase of DME is present, which can modify the
expected flammability range in the tower. The largest hazard for the condenser is higher
temperature in the exchanger which would lead to poor separations and pressurization
downstream. The explosion and fire risks are mitigated in the towers by use of controls structures
directly on the tower, including flow transmitters and high and low temperature and pressure
alarms. The towers are also fitted with pressure relief devices to remove excess pressure.
34
Within the distillation towers, the major risks included higher temperature and higher
concentration of oxygen. These threats to process safety were mitigated by use of temperature
transmitters and controllers down and upstream as well as alarms on the towers to alert workers
of possible dangers to the equipment or catalyst. To protect against the inclusion of oxygen in the
towers, composition analyzers and air purge streams are used in the feed tank to the tower, and
within the tower additional nitrogen is supplied if needed. A major consequence of a control
failure in these pieces of process equipment is the destruction of the catalyst, which could make
corrosive and dangerous downstream products, fire, or explosion in a worst-case scenario.
Most of the dangerous scenarios have risk of explosion, fire, runaway reaction or damage
to catalyst. Importantly, if the catalyst becomes overheated or denatured, it has the ability to
travel downstream as a corrosive product. To prevent damage from this hazard, every process
unit downstream of the catalytic distillation column is stainless steel. Other prevention methods
utilized in this design include a nitrogen blanket controlled with a composition analyzer, and an
emergency pressure relief valve, utilized in all storage tanks. More information on the relief
devices, nitrogen blanketing, and controls can be found in the Prevention section. In addition,
information on the worst-case scenarios including, bursting vessel, toxic release, fires and
explosions Worst Case Scenario Consequences section.
Prevention
One of the most important methods to protect oneself from chemical exposure is through
the use of PPE. Site-wide safety signs will be used to educate operators and visitors about what
kinds of protective gear will be required in what area of the plant. PPE will be product specific,
although general PPE will be required at all times in the facility, including a hard hat, safety
glasses, steel toed boots and hearing protection. When filling or completing maintenance on a
methanol, Lubrizol or DME line, operators and maintenance personnel will be wearing splash
googles, a full slicker suit, vapor respirator, boots, and gloves (Science Lab, 2017). To handle the
mercaptan, an additional layer of protection must be utilized through the use of a full-face shield.
Handling of the Amberlyst catalyst will require all of the aforementioned PPE as well as the use
of butyl gloves, for added protection from the strong acid. As an added precaution, sensors will
be placed throughout the facility to monitor for the presence of flammable gases and excess
nitrogen and will turn on alarm and light warnings in the event of a release. PPE and ventilators
35
will be stored in all locations where chemicals could be present so upon alarm sound, workers
would be able to quickly put on additional PPE, and evacuate. Emergency isolation control
valves and shut down controls are in a displaced location so in the event of an emergency
workers do not have to stay in a hazardous area for shut down.
Additional regulations in place for worker safety include the use of a lunch room; no
food, gum or drinks will be allowed outside of this room. Smoking and the use of cellphones will
also be strictly prohibited on site to mitigate ignition sources. Facility supervisors will be
provided with explosion proof cell phones in order to communicate on site. The production
building is the most hazardous area of the facility in regards to chemical exposure due to the
confinement of multiple process units under one roof. As a result, additional safety measures will
be taken in methods of construction. At the front of the building a large safety sign will be
present along with three lights. Green will indicate filling from the methanol tank or other
potential hazards are not currently in operation, but that caution should be still taken when
entering. Yellow will indicate filling, maintenance or another hazard will be occurring in the next
fifteen minutes and red means do not enter as filling, maintenance, or other potential dangerous
activities are currently occurring. These will work similarly in the event that flammables are
detected in the area and an additional light will flash red to show it is unsafe to enter. In addition,
an alarm will sound indicating presence of flammables The final product also has an odor
additive, ethyl mercaptan, which will alert employees to leaks. To protect the capital in a worst-
case scenario explosion, explosion and fire-proof walls will be used and all vessels within the
building will have fire-resistant coatings to protect vessel integrity. A foam sprinkler system to
suppress fire will also be in place due to the catalyst, which requires foam spray to safely
extinguish.
Storage vessels pose a large threat in this facility because the contents are highly
flammable and in the presence of air could produce a dangerous explosion. Each of the storage
vessels onsite will be blanketed in nitrogen and contain composition analyzers to ensure that
there is never more than 1% oxygen within the tank. This ensures safety within the vessel
because minimum oxygen concentrations for combustion are 9.0% for methanol and greater for
all other components and mixtures. In addition, each of the vessels will be fitted with a fusible
link valve which would turn off flow in the event of an external fire. This ensures that the fluid
within the vessel cannot act as a fuel source for the external fire. As an added precaution, the
36
storage tanks will be placed on raised, sloping pads and their exteriors will be coated in a fire-
resistant layer to ensure that in the event of a leak, the flammables would flow away from the
storage tank. Additionally, a pressure relief valve will be placed flowing away from the tanks in
order to de-pressurize in the event of an emergency. Sprinkler systems will also be placed
outside the vessels to remove heat in an emergency situation. Various relief devices, including
rupture disks and balanced bellows spring loaded relief valves, will be used for every storage
vessel and major process unit that runs the risk of dangerous pressurization.
There are several types of relief devices, each of which serve a specific purpose. The
rupture disk is a much cheaper piece of safety equipment, and can provide protection to the more
expensive spring-loaded device. The spring-loaded device is a more advanced piece of safety
equipment, and is then the primary relief system. These relief devices send the material to a
knock-out drum. If there ever is a buildup of pressure in the equipment and the relief device goes
off, it is important that the material in the vessel is not released into the environment/plant, which
is why the knock-out drum is necessary to mitigate the environmental effects, discussed further
in the Environmental Considerations section. This piece of equipment also has a condenser
which is designed to save as much product as possible by condensing it down to a liquid. Any
fuel which remains gaseous after the knock-out drum should be sent to a flare before release to
the atmosphere in order to mitigate the effects of flammables and toxics (Professor 3, 2017)
(Murhammer, 2017). This rupture disk, spring-loaded device, knock-out drum, and flare design
should be applied to each storage tank and major piece of equipment. These are shown further in
Figures 12-19, with controls structures. Relief systems should also be applied to other pieces of
equipment, which may experience very high pressures. This allows for pressure relief if needed.
In some cases, valves or heat exchangers can become plugged, and the pressure within the piping
builds very quickly. This could also cause a potential explosion within the plant, which could
damage other equipment or hurt workers in the area. If the fluid is water, piping from the relief
device can be sent directly to the atmosphere, as there is no need to run it through a knock-out
drum or flare system. These relief systems should help to protect plant property, as well as the
surrounding public and environment.
In addition, various control loops were applied to this process in order to prevent the
possible process deviations presented in the HAZOP analysis in Appendix I. The major control
schemes applied included controlling temperatures, pressures, flow rates and composition of the
37
flow. This allowed for precise temperature and pressure conditions as well as a low oxygen
condition within the storage tanks and process. Alarms were also set at various points in the
process in order to ensure that the pressures and temperatures are in a safe range. This is
especially important for the catalytic distillation column where the catalyst stored inside is highly
temperature dependent. The specific P&IDs for these control structures can be found in the Other
Considerations section (Figures 12-19). The plant layout also lends itself to safety by design and
by the use of emergency planning and escape routes, and can be found in the Plant Layout
section (Figure 21).
Permitting and regulations will be essential to the safety of this facility. Emergency
evacuation routes are shown in Figure 21 and will be posted in every facility building. These
routes were selected in the opposite direction of the storage tanks and production area, which is
where most hazards are likely to be present. In the event of an emergency, an alarm will sound
throughout the entire site to signal a hazard (over-pressure, fire, explosion, and release) and the
emergency evacuation routes will be used to safely evacuate personnel. Using the posted routes
workers will look to the wind socks on site in order to stay upwind of potential releases and
escape safely. On each shift, two designated individuals will be first aid and rescue trained, and
these people will evacuate to the emergency controls room with any injured individuals. The
facility is designed with the controls room offset from the process area and the storage tanks, and
is equipped with explosion and fire proof walls, as well as emergency first aid supplies and
respirators. This will allow the two designated workers to enter the emergency controls room,
initiate emergency shut down procedures and begin de-pressurization of vessels or ramp up
nitrogen supplies to the process area, if required. In order to train and plan for emergency events
such as this one the fire department and police force will be provided with documentation about
the chemicals on site, potential dangers and fire-fighting techniques. In addition to this, they will
be required to participate in emergency training with the staff once every three months and any
time a major process change is made where the emergency plan must change.
Security will also be a top priority at this site as mercaptan and DME are chemicals of
interest as denoted by the Department of Homeland Security. This program was put into place in
order to prevent terrorism in the United States and involves security planning and auditing for
sites with chemicals of interest. As a result of the flammability dangers of the chemicals, there
will be two main gates which will serve as a main entrance and exits (DHS, n.d.). One will be
38
from the parking lot area and will require a badge in order to gain entrance. The second gate will
also be guarded but will serve the purpose of shipping and receiving. Truckers entering to fill
tanks or remove cylinders will require a visitor tag and the original order form to gain entrance.
The last gate can only be opened from the inside and will sound an emergency alarm in the event
that it opens; this gate will serve as an emergency exit and is placed next to the emergency
controls room. The rest of the facility will be surrounded in 6-ft tall fences with barbed wire to
prevent entrance.
Other regulations to be utilized on site will include, but are not be limited to,
management of change practices and permitting, confined space permits, lock out/tag out
practices, grounding and bonding practices, and hot work permitting. Management of change
will be utilized any time a process or piece of equipment is modified. A form will be supplied to
the personnel wishing to make the modification and will involve determining why the practice
was originally done a different way and what possible hazards could be involved in the new
process. In order to finalize these changes, signatures from the head engineers and safety staff
will be required.
Confined space permitting will be utilized in the facility any time operations requiring
entrance into a vessel are to be completed (e.g. maintenance and cleaning). Within this permit
will be a check to ensure the individual entering has been properly trained and that someone will
be outside the vessel watching the entire time with access to a respirator. This permit also
requires completion of a checklist to ensure the equipment has been properly evacuated prior to
entrance and the use of an oxygen monitor to ensure that the oxygen concentration stays above
19.5%. This permit will be signed by the supervisor and manager on site and posted to alert that
the equipment is not in use. As an added precaution, most piping to the equipment will either be
disconnected or blocked prior to entry (Crowl & Louvar, 2011).
Lock out/tag out procedures or “lock-tag-try” involves the use of locks or tags on
equipment in order to warn that it should not be used or to physically lock something into
position. In this facility, lock out/tag out will be used when cleaning or maintenance is required
on machinery that has physical moving parts which could hurt employees or has safety devices
which must be off to work on it. The first step of this procedure is to complete a form
determining which steps must be taken to properly shut down the equipment and ensure it is fully
off. This may include unplugging; releasing pressure, process fluid, or utility fluid; or locking
39
agitators into place. Once completed, a supervisor should sign off to ensure safety of the area.
Next, a physical lock or tag is placed on the equipment or the device to prevent another person
from entering the scene and changing the set-up. Maintenance, operators and supervisors should
all sign off in order to remove tags or locks to protect against possible failure or improper start-
up following completed lock out/tag out. Lock out/tag out practices can also be used when a
valve must always be open and can lock a valve into place, or tag that the valve position must not
be changed (Crowl & Louvar, 2011).
As previously discussed, the DME process utilizes all flammables in the process and as a
result strict grounding and bonding procedures will be utilized within the facility. The voltage
difference between materials and the charge build up between materials can have dangerous
consequences as this creates an ignition source, or spark in dry conditions. By bonding materials
to the ground (grounding and bonding), the voltage between the two is reduced to zero
eliminating spark potential. Other methods utilized to decrease the possibility of charge build-up
or ignition sources include the use of relaxation techniques which will be used because reactants
are directly pumped into the process area from the storage tanks. Relaxation involves the use of a
slightly larger diameter pipe immediately outside vessels or major process equipment. This
reduces streaming current building up in the liquid by providing time for charge reduction by
“relaxation” (Crowl & Louvar, 2011).
Hot work permitting will be used in this facility whenever welding, sand blasting or any
other maintenance which requires tools that could spark will need to be used in the production
area or near tanks. These permits will only be used for one shift at a time in the facility in order
to ensure that everyone on each shift is aware of the possible hazards. To begin, a form must be
completed to determine that all flammables have been removed from the area. This could involve
emptying and cleaning tanks, inerting process lines, or physically moving containers. Because
the chemicals on site are so dangerously flammable, a 50-ft radius is required to be clear of
flammables in the event of hot work. Two individuals should survey the area using flammables
detectors and sign off that it is clear. Next, access to fire extinguishers, sprinklers and flammable
alarms should be checked and double checked. The hot work permit can then be posted and
should be placed at every entrance in a building or in at least four locations outside of the 50-ft
radius, if outside. It is important to note that many power tools can inadvertently cause sparks,
40
meaning maintenance must be aware of what tools may or may not be used in the facility (Crowl
& Louvar, 2011).
Within the maintenance department, special preventative measures will be taken to
ensure maximum safety. The use of spark and explosion proof tools will be required on site,
unless a hot work permit is completed. In addition, preventative maintenance (PM) checklists
will be used in the facility to preserve mechanical integrity. The PM checklists will include
checking vessel and pipe thickness to ensure that the catalyst, which is corrosive, is not causing
damage. The storage vessel thickness will also be periodically checked to ensure that mechanical
integrity is not becoming compromised over time. Safety relief devices and burst disks will also
be checked as part of the PM checklist to ensure that they have recently been certified and tested.
In the event the tag is not able to be read or the last test was too long ago, the device will be
changed out. Other portions of the PM checklist include checking valves for leaks, valve seating,
conducting valve counts, and completing a general facility inspection once a month.
Worst-Case Scenario Consequences

Worst-case scenarios and their consequences are something that no facility ever wishes to
experience but must be completely planned for to ensure proper preventative measures are taken
in the event that an unlikely, but deadly situation occurs. In order to estimate hazards from toxic
releases, downwind concentrations, overpressures from bursting vessels, fire balls and other
hazardous scenarios, the American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE) consequence
analyzer was utilized (Mody, 2017). It is important to understand possible rates of release in
order to plan for exposures and possible fire/explosions. To estimate the worst-case scenario, the
release rates of the storage tanks were determined depending on the size of the hole in the tank.
As a comparison, a very small hole (0.125 inches in diameter) was compared to a larger hole (1
inch in diameter), as shown in Table 18. Additional release rates for different hole sizes are
shown in Appendix J1. It is important to note that for some of these storage tanks, the storage
tank would run out of material quickly at these release rates and the effects would be much less
than the effects shown in these calculations. For example, in the mixer, the tank would be empty
in less than 20 minutes. However, in worst-case scenario calculations it is essential to assume the
worst and be prepared.
41
Table 18: Summary of the flow rates from a punctured tank in three different scenarios for the
methanol tank, the lubricant and mercaptan tank, and the DME tank with two different orifice
sizes for release (lb/hr).
Liquid flow Square edge Nozzle Vapor
0.125 inch rate (lb/hr) vapor flow flow (lb/hr)
methanol 136 132 132
DME 1,191 769 547
Mixer 1,191 769 547

Lubricant 126 122 122
Liquid flow Square edge Nozzle Vapor
1 inch rate (lb/hr) vapor flow flow (lb/hr)
methanol 8,700 8,438 8,438
DME 76,248 49,184 35,026
Mixer 76,248 49,184 35,026

Lubricant 8,047 7,795 7,795
Another possible release scenario could occur from a bursting pipe. To analyze this
further, four locations in the facility were selected and the release rates of liquid and vapor from
the pipes were determined, as shown in Table 19. The process fluid from the first heat
exchanger, the catalytic distillation tower, the second distillation tower and the final product
stream were all analyzed. This information would allow engineers to determine which workers
would be at risk for exposure and if flammability hazards exist in the event of a leak. In order to
prevent these release situations in the facility, the thickness of pipes and storage vessels will be
estimated and closely watched by the maintenance team and inspections of these vessels will be
done on a schedule according to the PM checklist. Pressure relief devices will also utilized on
many pieces of equipment and should relieve pressure in the event of a buildup. In addition to
this, the facility will be fenced in to prevent deliberate sabotage of the equipment. In the event
that a leak does occur, flammable detectors will be placed all over the facility and would quickly
detect the leak. Flow transmitters will also be placed on various locations on the process lines,
allowing for the detection of no flow due to a leak. Pressure and temperature transmitters will
play a similar role and would detect a pipe or vessel entering a dangerous pressurization or
temperature rise. Once a leak is detected, the facility would be evacuated and two operators
would immediately begin emergency shut down procedures in the emergency controls room.
Following the release, the calculations completed in Tables 18 and 19 would be used to estimate
the loss and report it to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
42
Table 19: A summary of release rate scenarios from ruptured pipes. Both liquid and vapor flow
rates are shown as they apply for piping from the first heat exchanger, following the towers and
from the final product tank.
Liq flow rate (lb/hr) vapour flow (lb/hr)
From E-101 391572 X
From T-101 381449 24663
From T-102 440131 21537
From final product 367479 X
In the event of a release it is vital to understand the properties of the material released.
The toxicity and flammability of each specific chemical were discussed in the Health and Safety
section, but combustion possibility of mixtures needs to be more closely analyzed in the event of
a release. Five different locations were utilized in this analysis, the process fluid in the methanol
storage tank, the catalytic distillation tower, the final product, the fluid from the second tower
and the fluid from the lubricant odor storage. As shown in Table 20, the minimum oxygen
concentrations required to fuel a fire range from 9-26.6%, meaning that these materials are not
combustible while alone. Conversely, when in air, these all become deadly vapor clouds, which
could easily be ignited and cause a fire or explosion. The concentration of combustibles is only
less than 100% within the storage tanks, as shown in the methanol storage tank. All storage tanks
in the facility are 20% by volume nitrogen and contain less than 1% oxygen. The lower
flammability limit or LFL, of each of the mixtures was also estimated and ranged from 2.8%-6%.
The LFL provides important information in the event of a fire because between this value and the
UFL, a mixture could be flammable.
Table 20: A summary of gas flammability testing done on various parts of the process. This test
determines the minimum concentration of oxygen required to make the mixtures flammable as
well as the lower flammability limit of the mixture and the combustion potential.
Minimum Combustible by self

Oxygen (with 30% safety Combustible concentration of
Concentration factor) mixture in air? combustibles LFL
Methanol storage tank 9% No Yes 80% 6%
Catalytic distillation 9.90% No yes 100% 3.30%
Final product 9.90% No Yes 100% 3.30%
T-102 9.90% No Yes 100% 3.40%
lubricant odor storage 26.60% No Yes 100% 2.80%
In order to prevent these components from combusting in the process equipment and
pipes, a strict control structure will be utilized in all of the feed and effluent tanks. Sensors detect
43
the percent composition of oxygen within the tank and if at any time the oxygen is greater than
1%, a purge valve will open and nitrogen will be added to the vessel via a control valve. The
methods previously discussed will be utilized to stop leaks or ruptures in the lines from occurring
but if they do, an alarm will sound and the emergency shut down procedure will initiate. It is
important to note that in the event of any release, a number of scenarios could occur so
evacuation is required to ensure safety of workers. Once in the emergency controls room, the
explosion proof walls and respirators should protect the workers completing the safe shut down
procedure. In the event of a release, several different consequences could occur, including a toxic
release, overpressure from a bursting vessel, explosion or fire from a fireball.
Downwind concentrations in the event of a release were first analyzed for the four
storage tanks. Release rates from Table 18 were used assuming the highest release rate would be
constant. In reality, these concentrations would be highly mitigated because the storage tanks
would run out of chemical and the highest release rate is somewhat unlikely. For emergency
planning and evacuation, it is vital to know the absolute farthest the chemicals could travel and
as a result over-estimation leads to safer practice. To analyze the downwind concentration ranges
elevations of 0-40 meters were used with wind speeds ranging from 0.5-50 m/s. The danger of
the chemicals was evaluated using the emergency planning response guidelines (ERPG) system,
the time weighted average (TWA), odor threshold, asphyxiation range, and LFL. The ERPG
system was developed by the American Industrial Hygiene Association and provides three main
ranges in ppm of chemicals. ERPG–1 denotes the airborne concentration in which the general
population could be exposed for up to 1 hour with no deleterious health effects other than mild
health effects or odor. ERPG-2 is the concentration below which the general population could be
exposed to without experiencing irreversible side-effects or symptoms which could alter
judgement. ERPG -3 is the concentration below which it is believed the general population could
be exposed to without experiencing life-threatening health effects (Crowl & Louvar, 2011).
Only some chemicals have been evaluated in terms of ERPG and therefore chemicals not
on this list, including DME and petroleum naphtha (the main component in Lubrizol), were
evaluated using their TWA concentration. The odor threshold range was also determined in order
to calculate who would smell the release, a topic that is especially important due to the safety
concerns associated with breathing in the chemicals used in this process. The odor thresholds of
the chemicals are 5900, 161, 1, and 0.0005 ppm for methanol, DME, Lubrizol and mercaptan,
44
respectively (American Industrial Hygiene Association, 2013); (U.S Department of Health and
Human Services, 1978). It is important to note that the odor from ethyl mercaptan may be able to
be detected as low as 0.009 ppb but for this purpose, a higher concentration was used to
determine at what point everyone would be able to detect it (Sela & Sobel, 2010). The
asphyxiation range is the range in which the component displaces enough air to asphyxiate a
worker. Any time oxygen is lower than 19.5%, the risk for asphyxiation is present (Malesky,
2018). Lastly, the LFL range was determined because above this range the mix is flammable.
Understanding where the range extends will allow precautions to be taken with respect to
ignition sources. Tables 52-61 in the Appendix J2 contain ranges in meters for each specific
chemical release in each tank. In order to estimate a worst-case scenario, the percent component
of each chemical was rounded up to the nearest whole number.
To better visualize the danger ranges of a release, any category which spread between 0.1
and 6 in the event of a worst-case scenario release is shown in Figure 5. This analysis was
completed at 0 m elevation, which means that the highest concentration of chemical is at the
elevation of the workers. It was also conducted on a day with almost no wind (0.5 m/s), making
the dispersion and dilution of the release difficult. Finally, it was completed at night, when the
temperature variation with height in the atmosphere prevents natural mixing and, as a result,
chemicals stay concentrated near the surface. It is also important to note these calculations were
completed using the assumption of continuous release, neutral buoyancy and urban ground type.
A continuous release model, sometimes called a plume, is worst case scenario because it assumes
the release continues to happen and no action is taken to stop it, creating a continuous cloud.
Neutral buoyancy describes the atmospheric conditions during the release and involves a
scenario where the air above the ground warms and wind speed increases but does not affect
atmospheric turbulence. Urban ground type was used in this model, because as the plume spreads
it will hit an industrialized area, shown in the top left corner of Figure 5. Ground conditions
greatly affect mixing, which changes the distribution that chemicals are dispersed (Crowl &
Louvar, 2011).
45
Figure 5: An aerial view of the plant site and the worst-case scenarios for downwind release
where each square represents a square mile (Google, 2018). The components methanol, DME,
Lubrizol and mercaptan were analyzed at 0 m elevation, 0.5 m/s wind speed and night conditions
as a worst-case scenario, from the perspective of ERPGs, TWAs, and odor thresholds.
As shown in Figure 5, the largest range is given by the odor threshold of the mercaptan
because some individuals can detect it at very low concentrations. Additional information on the
downwind concentrations of each component can be found in Appendix J2. The most dangerous
category, ERPG-3 is largest for the mercaptan as well, due to small concentrations presenting a
large danger. The LFL and asphyxiation range are not shown because they are less than 0.1 miles
in all categories. The range for ERPG-1 dispersion extends 18.14 miles from the source for
mercaptan release. Therefore, this is the radius from the facility which must be evacuated within
one hour following a release to ensure there are no adverse health effects to anyone in the
46
community. In the emergency planning meetings with local law enforcement and firefighting
departments, evacuation plans will be created to keep the public calm and help ensure that no
one is exposed for greater than one hour. To prevent releases such as this and detect them if they
occur, the measures discussed previously will be utilized including the use of flow, pressure,
temperature and composition controllers as well as mechanical integrity checks and general plant
security. Detection methods will involve flammables sensors, smell, which employees will be
reminded they should not rely on, and controls sensors. In the event of a release, the emergency
alarms and shut down procedure will be set into action as previously discussed.
Another scenario that could occur in the event of a release is a bursting vessel. In this
scenario only the pressure of the burst was considered, not the effect of the gas or the liquid
burning or any additional explosions. These scenarios will be covered more in depth later. It was
assumed that the storage vessels on site would burst at 1500 kPa, that the explosion converted
80% of its energy to a blast wave, and that the vapor space was approximately 20% of the tank
volume. In this calculation, the methanol tank, lubricant/odor tank and DME tank were tested
using these parameters as the mixer would yield similar results to the DME tank and the
lubricant tank would yield similar results to the lubricant/odor tank. In this calculation, the
amount of TNT equivalent, overpressure and hazards associated with the overpressure were
determined. Complete scenario analysis including ranges for various types of window damage,
noise, various types of structural damage, rupture of tanks, demolition, size of crater, lethality,
lung damage, and ear drum rupture ranges can be found in Tables 62-67 in Appendix J3. To
summarize this damage the ranges for 95% probability of no serious damage, window shattering,
total destruction, lethality, lung damage and ear drum rupture are shown in Figure 6.
47
Figure 6: An aerial view of the facility site in the event of a bursting vessel (Google, 2018). Each
of the storage tanks were tested and the overpressure of several events are mapped, where one
square is equivalent to one square mile.
Importantly, only two storage tanks present enough energy to cause damage larger than
0.1 mile in range and as shown in Figure 6, this area immediately surrounding the facility is
largely rural. The most common type of damage includes non-serious structure damage and
windows shattering with ranges stretching to about 0.2 miles. Even in a worst-case scenario, the
high lethality range is very small, which is good. The overpressure in psi is shown in Figure 7 at
specific distances from the explosion. At a distance of about 100 meters, the overpressure
decreases below 1 psia, which means there would be a small range in which workers would be
exposed to physical hazard. Though the risks are low in this scenario, prevention is still vital as
any explosion could injure employees, damage equipment and expose the public to chemicals.
The main preventative measure used to stop over-pressurization that could lead to an explosion is
the use of spring loaded relief devices and rupture disks. Pressure and temperature are also
closely monitored in the vessels along with the vessel integrity, which is monitored through the
mechanical integrity program. In the event of an explosion, as with all emergencies in the
48
facility, the emergency shut down procedure would begin along with an alarm sound and an
evacuation to the emergency controls room and eventually out of the plant site.
100000
Overpressure (psi)
10000
1000
DME Tank
100
Lubricant/Odor Tank
10
Methanol Tank
1
0.5
1
2
5
10
25
100
500
1609
Distance from explosion (m)
Figure 7: Overpressure at a distance in meters from various bursting vessel scenarios. The
overpressure is shown in a logarithmic scale due to the large range in values.
The next release scenario analyzed was the possibility of a boiling liquid expanding
vapor explosion (BLEVE) or a fireball. A BLEVE is especially dangerous because it releases a
lot of toxic and flammable materials. A BLEVE occurs when a tank, like the storage tanks on
site at the DME facility, containing flammable liquid above its atmospheric pressure boiling
point bursts. In an instance like this, the liquid vaporizes quickly and explodes causing
considerable damage. The most common reason for a BLEVE is an external fire. When the fire
begins, the walls of the tank are heated, heating the liquid and causing pressurization of the
vessel. When the flames reach a height in which there is no liquid on the other side of the tank to
absorb the heat, the tank’s mechanical integrity begins to fail and the tank ruptures, creating a
BLEVE. In the calculations completed for this scenario it was assumed that over 35% of the
liquid was vaporized in the BLEVE and all four of the main chemicals on site were tested to
determine their effects (Crowl & Louvar, 2011).
The storage tanks on site will all contain seven days’ worth of material at their highest
capacity, presenting a large fuel source for fire or explosion. For each of the chemicals on site,
the size of the fireball was first estimated using the amount in a full tank and the corresponding
heat of combustion of the fuel. Next, the duration of the burn, burn rate, heat release rate and
surface emissive power were estimated. The diameter of largest fireball is produced in a BLEVE
involving the methanol tank, at almost 0.7 miles wide, as shown in Table 21. While a BLEVE
49
would occur quickly in 0.3-35.52 seconds, its destruction would be vast and modeling of the
lethality was required to better understand the serious consequences involved with a scenario
such as this.
Table 21: Chemical specific information on the fireball/BLEVE diameter, duration, burn
rate, heat release and surface emissive power
Fireball Heat release rate Surface emissive power
Tank diameter (m) Fireball diameter (ft) Duration (s) Burn rate (kg/s) (BTU/hr sq ft) (BTU/hr sq ft)
Methanol 1082.4 3550.3 35.52 182996 4.24E+12 107,158
Lubrizol/Odor:
Lubrizol 94 310 7.3 590 2.43E+10 80,479
Lubrizol/Odor:
Ethyl Mercaptan 4 6 0.3 1 3.06E+07 69,804
DME: DME 970 3180 33.6 138942 4.51E+12 141,850
To better understand the effect of a BLEVE on people in surrounding communities and at

the plant site, ranges for lethality, first degree burns, exposures, ignition of buildings and other
scenario ranges at which these would occur were calculated. A complete table of damages from
BLEVEs and their corresponding ranges can be found in Tables 68-69 in Appendix J4. In Figure
8, the 99% mortality range and the 50% mortality range are shown on an aerial view of the plant
site. From this information, it becomes clear that the two most dangerous tanks are the methanol
and DME tanks and in the event that one is destroyed in a BLEVE, it is likely the other would
also be destroyed, leading to an additional explosion. The 99% mortality range stretches over a
third of a mile and the 50% mortality range over 0.8 miles. First degree burns for individuals
subjected to the blast would extend to over a 3-mile range in the event that either the methanol or
DME tank would be involved in a BLEVE.
50
Figure 8: An aerial view of the facility site showing the ranges of damage due to a fireball or
BLEVE, where each square represents a square mile (Google, 2018).
The surface intensity is a means to describe the energy per area given off from the
explosion and was modeled for each chemical at a range of distances as shown in Figure 9.
Because some the values of surface intensity were extremely large, a logarithmic plot was
chosen and it is important to note that the methanol tank plotted line falls almost directly behind
the DME tank. As a comparison, the surface intensity given off by the sun is roughly 435
BTU/hr sq ft (Cushman-Roisin, 2018). This intensity, which can still cause burns, is not reached
until a distance of 1000 feet is reached from the center of the fireball again proving the
catastrophic dangers of a BLEVE.
51
Figure 9: The surface intensity at various ranges from the center of a fireball produced by
chemicals utilized in the DME process.
While these effects are large in range, they do not stretch into highly urbanized areas,
mitigating some of the health effects and potential losses. However, the damages are
considerable, so multiple devices will be utilized in order to ensure the risk of a BLEVE is as
close to zero percent as possible. The first few devices in place are aimed at preventing an
external fire. These include the placement of the tanks on raised, fire-proof, concrete pads which
slope away from the tanks; the use of sprinklers; and flammables detectors. In the event of
flammables being present in liquid form, the raised pads should prevent accumulation around the
tanks and if fire occurs, keep flames at a distance from the tank that would allow time for fire
suppression. The use of sprinklers will also be in place for this reason and would suppress
external fires as they occurred, removing heat from the outside of the tank. Lastly, flammable
detectors would alert employees of the possibility of a fire in the area and prompt action.
In the event a fire is detected and propagates due to failure of the other devices,
temperature and pressure transmitters will alert workers of dangers in the tank and an emergency
pressure relief valve can be used to remove the contents of the tank from the dangerous area. If
the fire is being fueled by the contents of any of the tanks in the facility, fusible link valves will
automatically close shut, cutting off the fire from the fuel source and hopefully giving employees
time to use the pressure relief valve. If both of these fail in addition to the previously mentioned
devices, two pressure relief devices are fitted to each tank and in the event of over-
pressurization, these would evacuate process vapor through the top of the tank. A strict
mechanical integrity program would also include checking the tank thickness and the fire-proof
52
insulation on the tank frequently to ensure that if all else fails, a two-hour fire safe window
would be provided before catastrophic danger occurs.
If the vessel is overheated, with no external fire present, then a BLEVE will not occur
and the possibility for a vapor cloud explosion (VCE) increases. The presence of a VCE is the
next scenario analyzed. VCEs are often the most destructive and dangerous explosions. They
occur similarly to the BLEVE, and include a sudden release of vapor, which usually occurs due
to pressurization or temperature increase. The vapor cloud is then ignited either on site, or at a
distance away from the facility when an ignition source is reached. The risk for a traveling VCE
was the reasoning behind determining the range of LFL concentration level releases in the
downwind concentration calculations. As shown in Figure 10, several parameters were used to
gauge the damage that could be caused by a VCE for each specific chemical on site in its greatest
storage quantity. Fortunately, the largest ranges shown in Figure 10 are ranges for 95%
probability of no serious damage and for shattering windows. However, it should be noted that
ear drum rupture could occur up to a quarter of a mile from the facility and this would largely
impair individuals.
53
Figure 10: An aerial view of the plant facility showing the ranges of damage following a vapor
cloud explosion involving chemicals in the storage tanks for the DME process (Google, 2018).
The overpressure resulting from a VCE is large, as expected from the amount of fuel
available on site. As shown in Figure 11, which uses the logarithmic scale in order to show the
magnitude of the overpressure at close distances, zero overpressure is not reached until nearly
10,000 feet for the most dangerous storage tanks. The risk associated with mercaptan is much
less, likely due to the small amounts kept on site. VCEs are largely defended against and
prevented by the same measures as previously discussed for BLEVEs. Through the use of these
devices, emergency planning, and controls, it is believed that all of the worst-case scenarios that
could occur on site are well planned for, but are thankfully, extremely unlikely.
54
Figure 11: The overpressure at various distances following a vapor cloud explosion due to the
ignition of vapor in each of the storage tanks.
Environmental Considerations
To begin determining possible environmental effects of this process, the MSDS, provided
in Appendix L, were reviewed to determine the most hazardous chemicals. DME presents a
significant hazard from the perspective of flammability and can harm wildlife if it enters a water
supply. However, there is a low potential for bioaccumulation and no long-term studies have
been completed on the persistence of the chemical or the mobility in soil and as a result, extreme
caution should be used (Airgas, 2018). Methanol has toxic effects on animals when exposed
through the skin, or through inhalation. Although short term degradation products are not likely,
long term products may be dangerous. However, methanol has a short half-life in the
environment and is quickly degraded and volatilized (Science Lab, 2017). Ethyl mercaptan poses
a much larger hazard because it is toxic to small animals through inhalation at a lower
concentration. Ethyl mercaptan is also considered a marine pollutant, but has a low potential for
bioaccumulation (Airgas, 2018). Lubrizol, the lubricant, also presents a chronic hazard risk to
aquatic environments and some of its components are not readily biodegradable such as
petroleum naphtha. This chemical should be used with care as it presents danger to fish, aquatic
invertebrates and plants (Lubrizol , 2017). As with all of these chemicals, spills should be
quickly cleaned up to minimize environmental impacts, as well as examined to determine if the
quantity released must be reported.
55
Reportable quantities and their corresponding amounts are under the jurisdiction of the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Originally, under the Superfund (CERCLA) and the
Clean Water Act (CWA), reportable quantities of release were established at one pound.
However, the EPA soon updated this list to more accurately determine the amount at which a
danger is present. Chemicals that require reporting in the event of release and their quantities are
shown in Table 22. In the facility, any time a release occurs, operators will report the estimated
quantity and complete a full report on the event to ensure it does not occur again. Supervisors
will then work with engineering staff in order to check that the amount released is below these
reportable quantities (EPA, 2018). Additional monitoring of possible releases will be estimated
using valve counts and water will be treated as needed before sending it to a water treatment
plant in the event it contains flammables, further preventing release.
Table 22: Reportable quantities for chemicals stored on site (GPO, 2018).
Chemical Reportable Quantity (lbs)

Methanol 5000
Lubrizol 100
Ethyl Mercaptan 100
DME 100
In order to reduce the potentially negative environmental effects resulting from the
creation of the facility, LEED was utilized in construction. LEED adds a slight cost to
construction as discussed in the Fixed Capital Investment Summary section, however the
benefits far surpass the added expense. LEED buildings reduce the amount of energy and water
required for construction and general operation, and generate less waste, reducing impact on the
environment. By using LEED in the building process, energy efficiency is increased by 5%,
meaning less will be required and often renewable sources such as solar will be utilized on site
(U.S Green Building Council, 2018). In addition to having sustainable construction, the energy
this facility will purchase will be largely generated from hydroelectric sources as it accounts for
about two thirds of the total electricity produced in Washington (Energy Northwest, 2018).
As with all environmentally sustainable processes, the carbon footprint and ecological
footprint should be calculated to determine where the plant could increase sustainability. These
measures are usually estimated in tons of carbon dioxide per year, as carbon dioxide has the
largest effect on global warming and climate change. As shown in Table 23, the environmental
56
impact of the facility included utilities, waste treatment, commuting, paper needs, and shipping
needs. No means for accurate estimate of raw material footprints was able to be acquired and as a
result was omitted from the estimation. This is considered acceptable because there would be no
way to reduce these amounts and still meet production goals. By contrast, the other variables
listed in Table 23 have the ability to be mitigated. Currently, this facility requires 10% of the
earth in order to fulfill the needs of the process and absorb the amount of carbon acquired in the
process, without negative effects or accumulation.
Table 23: A summary of the largest sources of carbon emissions within the DME facility and the
total acreage required to support it (Carbon Fund, 2018; Lean Six Sigma, 2012)
Activity Carbon Estimation (Tons CO2)
Electricity needs 149.98
Employee Commuting
(Assuming 50 total
employees commuting an
average of 50 miles in one
direction) 457.79
Paper printing needs
(Assuming 10 reams per
year) 0.71
Shipping needs (Assuming
200 shipments per year
via rail, traveling an
average distance of 500
miles and carrying the
average weight of 7 day
supply of the reactants 5203.23
Cleaning waste water 8.56
Supplying steam/cooling
water 13.22
Total 5833.48
Global acres required to
support 4036157406
Earths required 0.11
Some possible methods for decreasing the carbon footprint and making the process more
environmentally friendly include creating a ride sharing program, increasing energy efficiency of
compressors and heat exchangers, switching to energy efficient light bulbs and decreasing
shipping needs. Ride sharing could be accomplished by creating a ride-share board where
workers on the same shift could take turns picking each other up for work and driving each other
home. If just ten people did this per day, the carbon footprint could be reduced by almost 100
tons per year. Increasing the efficiency of everything within the process is always the goal of the
engineer, however doing it safely can be a challenge. As a result, while some shipments could be
done more efficiently (and should be), only 7 days’ worth of reactants should be stored on site.
57
Due to the flammability of the reactants, limiting shipping decreases the carbon footprint of the
facility. It is important to note that this carbon footprint is primarily for estimation purpose and
once the facility is running, more accurate estimations can be made. In reality, these values will
decrease as the electricity from renewable sources, electricity produced in compressors, actual
amount of paper used and actual commuting and shipping distances are determined and
incorporated.
Inherent Safety
Inherently safer design (ISD) is a key technique often used to mitigate the risk of a
certain process. This approach relies on chemistry, physics, quantity and conditions of use in
order to minimize accidents. This involves designing the plant for easier and effective
maintainability and with less waste. There are four main ISD strategies: minimize, substitute,
moderate, and simplify, all of which were applied to the DME process to minimize accidents
(Professor 3, 2017) (Murhammer, 2017).
Minimize
A process can be minimized by using smaller quantities of hazardous materials (Professor
3, 2017) (Murhammer, 2017). There are multiple ways that the DME synthesis can utilize
minimization strategies to make the process inherently safer. Within the catalytic distillation
column (T-101), DME is produced via the gas phase condensation reaction of methanol. This
reactant is very flammable, as indicated by its NFPA rating in Table 15; therefore, the amount of
methanol stored on site should be minimized. The recommended location for this DME plant is
in Kalama, Washington, which has a local methanol plant (NWIW, 2018) This reduces the
necessity of storing excess methanol in the plant, because it can be shipped quickly from the
neighboring methanol plant. In addition, all storage tanks have been designed to hold a
maximum of seven days’ worth of chemical, minimizing the amount being held on site. In the
current DME process design, the unconverted methanol is recycled back into T-101, which also
helps to reduce the required amount of methanol storage.
Ethyl mercaptan, which is a chemical mixed into the DME product to enhance safety by
adding a noticeable scent, is also a very hazardous material, as indicated by its NFPA ratings
shown in Table 15. Therefore, its presence on the plant site must be minimized. In the current
58
design, the odor is never stored in bulk on site in order to reduce its flammability and toxicity
hazards. This ensures that in the event of release the concentration of mercaptan is lower than the
TWA and the LFL, minimizing any hazardous effects at low levels.
Utilities used in the facility are also minimized in order to decrease the strain on the
environment. Steam and cooling water needs are decreased by recycling within the facility. This
minimization led to a decrease of 50% of the original water needs in the plant. Waste and
electricity were also minimized in the design and construction of the facility through the use of
LEED.
Substitute
Substitution occurs by replacing dangerous materials with less hazardous substances
(Professor 3, 2017) (Murhammer, 2017). There are a few opportunities for substitution in the
DME process. A large consideration of this design was whether or not to create methanol on site,
or buy it from another facility. For the recommended design, the methanol is purchased from a
nearby methanol plant. This significantly reduces the hazards associated with the process.
Syngas (carbon monoxide and hydrogen) is commonly used to produce methanol, but this
combination of chemicals adds a great level of hazard to this process, as carbon monoxide is
very toxic and hydrogen creates flammability risks. In addition, performing this reaction before
the methanol dehydration step creates the byproduct methyl formate, which is very flammable
and toxic. By substituting purchased methanol for the syngas-to-methanol reaction, the hazards
associated with this process are significantly decreased.
Other substitution opportunities are present with the odor and catalyst used in this
process. The odor added to the DME product, ethyl mercaptan, is very hazardous. Currently,
effective minimization strategies are being utilized to reduce this hazard by having no bulk
storage on the plant site. However, potentially safer substitutes for this odor should be
investigated in order to further reduce the hazards of this process. Currently, no feasible
alternatives were found on the market and even though ethyl mercaptan is hazardous, a greater
hazard is present if leaks are not easily detectable. Additionally, local jurisdictions in many states
require the addition of odor to fuels and in order to be in compliance, ethyl mercaptan will be
used until an alternative can be used.
59
The catalyst used in this process, Amberlyst 35, is hazardous as well. Therefore, catalyst
substitution should be considered. However, for the low-temperature process being utilized in the
current DME design, Amberlyst 35 provides the highest conversion and efficiency for the
reaction. As a result, it is not economically feasible to utilize another catalyst at this time. In
addition, the interaction between catalyst and workers will be limited, as the catalyst will only be
replaced every three years, reducing possible hazards.
In addition, the high-pressure steam used as the utility stream for the kettle reboiler (E-
104) could be substituted for a lower pressure steam. This alternative would create less
hazardous conditions, because it would be fed into the process at a lower temperature and
pressure. However, this substitution is not economically attractive, because it would increase the
annual cost of utilities. In addition, it would increase the equipment size significantly, increasing
the total capital cost of the process. Alternatively, substitution of building materials and inclusion
of more renewable energy sources are used to minimize waste and effects on the environment
using LEED.
Moderate
Applying less hazardous conditions, using less hazardous forms of materials, and
utilizing facilities that minimize the effects of material or energy release can moderate a process
(Professor 3, 2017) (Murhammer, 2017). Multiple moderation techniques were applied to the
DME process in order to minimize accidents. There were several potential production methods
and conditions for this DME process. The two considered processes were a low-temperature
liquid process utilizing a super-acid polymer resin and a high-temperature process utilizing a
gamma alumina oxide catalyst (AIChE, 2018). The recommended design utilizes the low-
temperature process, which operates at moderate and safer temperatures and pressures, with the
highest process temperature and pressure around 175˚C and 900 kPa, respectively. In addition,
the flammables in this process are never heated to temperatures above 105˚C, which greatly
reduces the risk for fires and explosions.
The process pressures and temperatures should be as low as practical to reduce the
potential for runaway reactions. The reaction in the catalytic distillation column is highly
exothermic, making runaway reactions a main concern for this process. Therefore, the equipment
must be designed to withstand the maximum pressure the reaction can produce, thereby
60
preventing hazardous enlargement of the vessel. It is also important to control the temperature of
this process and to efficiently remove the heat that is generated from the exothermic reaction.
The adverse temperature effects can be mitigated through the MOC on each piece of equipment
and the adverse pressure effects can be mitigated through the wall thickness.
Another technique used to moderate the process was the facility layout, which minimized
effects of material release and increased worker safety by design. In the plant layout, the
methanol tank and the DME tank are on opposite sides of the facility to decrease the chances that
one release, fire, or explosion would impact the other large flammables storage on site. In
addition, an emergency controls room was placed on another side of the facility in order to
ensure that in the event of fire, pressures and temperatures could safely be mitigated from a
distance. Other preventative devices such as sprinklers, fire-proof insulation, sloped concrete
pads and fusible links were used on site to moderate effects of material or energy release.
Simplify
Simplification of a process occurs by eliminating unnecessary complexity and reducing
the likelihood for errors. The DME process can be simplified utilizing various techniques. The
liquid transfer equipment, used to move the finished fuel product to trucks for shipping to
consumers, should be designed to minimize leakage potential. This can be done by reducing the
number of moving parts or seals in the design. The safest liquid transfer method is gravity
(Professor 3, 2017) (Murhammer, 2017). If possible, the liquid fuel should be transferred from
the process using an inclined pipe. This can be done by creating the fuel on an upper level and
transferring down to a load-out dock for the trucks below. This system eliminates some of the
need for pumping, thus simplifying the process. Lack of pumping yields a lower probability of
failure and less need for additional active safety systems. This ultimately leads to a safer and
more efficient plant. A system such as this one is also economically favored, as it eliminates the
initial capital cost, continuous operating costs, and regular maintenance costs for the pump.
In addition, the valves throughout the process should be designed to fail closed to prevent
the uncontrolled release of materials throughout the process. This could be as simple as having
the valve close if the handle goes downwards, following gravity. If this downward position of the
valve opened it, the potential for disaster greatly increases within the plant. In addition, another
simplification technique involves the separation of process steps. Splitting up a complicated
61
piece of equipment into a simpler process with more pieces of equipment mitigates hazards. If an
accident occurs, the process is safer when the accident can be contained to one piece of
equipment, rather than inherently disrupting other parts of the process. This also makes it easier
to seclude the piece of equipment in question, cutting off other heating elements or reactants.
The current DME process only has 11 pieces of equipment, so it is relatively simple. The most
complicated piece of equipment in this design is the catalytic distillation column (T-101). This
piece of equipment performs both the methanol dehydration reaction and the first separation.
There is a possibility for the disengagement of the reaction and separation steps to create a
simpler process; however, this is not economically appealing because it would increase the
capital cost and decrease the efficiency of the low temperature catalytic reaction. Therefore,
special attention must be paid to this piece of equipment to make sure that the operators fully
understand its operation to minimize the potential for a hazardous accident.
Finally, care should be taken when designing the specific layout of the process plant.
First, consideration should be taken about where to place storage for materials. If materials are
stored far away from where they are actually being used, there is much more potential for human
error to occur in the day-to-day operations. Additionally, the order and layout of piping for the
reactors, separators, heat exchangers, and other pieces of equipment should be carefully
considered. If this is not done effectively, it introduces the potential for human error in the plant,
as well as propagation of disaster should one process fail. Finally, all pieces of equipment and all
piping should be specifically labeled. If the process is not simple and clear to anyone who could
walk into the plant, then accidents become much more likely. It should be clear to contractors
and maintenance personnel, as well as the line operators, which materials are in each pipe and
reactor, so they can all act accordingly. This forethought and planning in the initial design stages
of the process plant will pay off in years to come with a safer process.
Other Important Considerations

There are other considerations that should be taken into account as part of the design as
well. For all safety and controls considerations, it is necessary that P&IDs be created to outline
the measures in place. Though a location (Lake Charles, LA) was given in the design request, it
was stated that other locations could be considered as well. As a result, other locations with
desirable attributes such as close proximity to methanol facilities, positive community
62
perceptions of alternative fuels and proximity to rail, cargo ship and vehicular traffic were
considered. The layout of the plant was also considered and planned carefully to improve both
functionality and safety. Startup of the process also requires additional planning to ensure proper
checklists and drawings have been created to mitigate hazards. Finally, there are some
differences in utilizing DME as a fuel instead of diesel. These differences for trucks are
considered as well.
Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs)

P&IDs were created for the main process units in the design, as well as the storage tanks.
These were updated throughout the design process to address concerns identified in the HAZOP
analysis. The first diagram created was for T-101, which presents some of the most dangerous
conditions in the process and determines the conversion of the reactants to products. For these
reasons, it is pertinent that this catalytic distillation tower and its condenser (E-102) are well
controlled. This P&ID is shown as Figure 12.
Figure 12: The P&ID for T-101 and E-102.
63
The tower itself has several sensors. First, a concentration sensor (which is a type of
analyzing transmitter, or AT) measures the concentration of oxygen in the tower. If it is greater
than 1%, an alarm will sound. Since the methanol storage tank is held at less than 1% oxygen
concentration and methanol is taken from the bottom of the tank, this should not occur unless
there is a leak or other control system failure. This alarm will alert management to investigate
further. Additionally, if this concentration is reached, it will indicate to a flow controller (FIC) to
open the valve for emergency nitrogen addition to the tower until the oxygen concentration is
within an acceptable range once again. This mitigates the risk of a fire or explosion in T-101,
which contains flammables at temperatures and pressures high enough for ignition with oxygen.
Additionally, temperature and pressure transmitters (TT and PT, respectively) signal and set off
alarms if too high. This ensures that plant personnel are aware when dangerous conditions are
occurring in the tower and can perform the appropriate corrective actions or commence
emergency shut down. The level of process fluid in the bottom is measured by a level transmitter
(LT) and is controlled (by the LIC) by adjusting the valve on the bottoms process fluid out.
Finally, a relief device is on the tower in case of emergencies.
The condenser, E-102, has additional controls. The flow rates of both the process fluid
and recycle stream entering the tower are measured using flow transmitters (FT) and added
together. They are then used, along with a measured flow rate (via FT) of cooling water utility
for the condenser, by a ratio controller (FIC) to open or close an extra utility removal control
valve. The set point is 0.0526 kg of total process fluid into the tower per kilogram of cooling
water into the tower. This utility is recycled from a heat exchanger later in the process. If the
production quantity is lowered, the amount of utility needed in the condenser will decrease
before the amount of utility needed for the heat exchanger later in the process. This allows for
the utility to exit the system before it disrupts the process in the tower. If the converse happens
and production is increased, the recycled cooling utility will not be sufficient for the condenser.
Therefore, the temperature of the flow exiting E-101 is measured and a flow controller, with a set
point of 42°C, adjusts a control valve for additional cooling water utility. Finally, if there is no
flow exiting E-102 while production is running, significant problems could occur. Therefore, a
flow transmitter was placed on this stream to set off an alarm if there is no flow. Next, the P&ID
for T-102 and its reboiler, E-104, was created. This tower has many controls similar to that of T-
101. The P&ID is shown in Figure 13.
64
Figure 13: The P&ID for T-102 and E-104.
Temperature, pressure, and oxygen concentration sensors were again placed on T-102 to
set off alarms in circumstances that are unusual and more dangerous. An emergency nitrogen
supply is available and the valve is opened if the concentration of oxygen is greater than 1% to
mitigate the conditions in the tower. A relief device is present at the top of the tower in case of
emergencies. Level control was added to ensure that enough process fluid is at the bottom of the
tower and running through the kettle reboiler. This is an important safety feature, as a kettle
reboiler with utility flow but no process fluid flow creates dangerously hot conditions.
Additionally, if the flow into the reboiler changes, it is sensed and a flow controller adjusts a
valve on the steam inlet. Finally, a temperature transmitter on the outlet of the reboiler signals
and eventually sets off an alarm if the temperature is not high enough. If the outlet temperature is
low, more flammables will go out in the wastewater, and it would no longer meet regulations and
agreements with the water treatment center.
65
After the creation of the P&IDs for the towers, the P&IDs for the remaining heat
exchangers were created. These controls are similar to those of the reboiler and condenser, but
are still pertinent to ensure the safety of the system. The first heat exchanger examined was E-
101, followed by E-103 and E-105. This heat exchanger preheats the methanol before it enters T-
101 and its P&ID is shown in Figure 14.
Figure 14: The P&ID for E-101.
The flow rate entering E-101 is measured and put in ratio control with the flow rate of the
steam entering. This steam is recycled from E-104 downstream, and therefore may not be
providing the exact amount of steam needed at any point in time. If production is decreased,
there will be more steam provided than is necessary, which could create dangerous conditions.
Therefore, the ratio control will adjust the valve for extra utility removal if the mass ratio of
process fluid to steam is less than 4.60:1. If the production is increased, more steam is needed
than that is provided. The temperature of the process fluid out of E-101 is measured, and a
setpoint of 95°C is fixed. This adjusts the extra utility flow rate in as needed.
The next heat exchanger in the process, E-103, is placed after the DME product stream
has left the condenser of T-101 and before it enters the mixer. This heat exchanger is used to
bring the temperature of the process fluid down from 42°C to 40°C, which condenses it. The
P&ID for E-103 is shown as Figure 15. It utilizes fresh cooling water (as opposed to recycled
cooling water), so the controls are simple. A flow transmitter on the process fluid into the heat
66
exchanger measures the flow rate and a controller adjusts the utility inlet valve so that 31.25 kg
of utility is added for every kilogram of process fluid. The control system, and therefore P&ID,
for the final heat exchanger (E-105) is shown in Figure 16. This heat exchanger is used to both
cool the wastewater exiting the facility, as well as heat the steam so it can be resold as low-
pressure steam. A temperature transmitter on the steam outlet stream has a signal if the
temperature is too low to be used as steam, so it can be diverted.
Other major process units requiring controls due to safety concerns are the storage tanks
for methanol, lubricant and odor, and DME. The controls for each of these tanks are very similar,
and are shown in Figures 17-19. All of the tanks have a nitrogen blanket, and less than 1%
oxygen concentration. Sensors on the tops of the tanks open purge valves on the feed storage
67
tanks and set off an alarm on the DME tank if the concentration of oxygen is too high.
Additionally, temperature transmitters set off alarms if any of the tanks reach temperatures
greater than 50°C or 55°C. This would occur before catastrophic temperatures are reached. Each
tank has a fusible link valve connecting it to the process, which will close off the tank if
temperatures reach dangerous levels. This is done to ensure that more flammables are not fueling
a fire in a disaster, as discussed further in the Worst-Case Scenario Consequences section. Each
of the tanks also has a pressure transmitter which controls the nitrogen fed to the tank, so the
pressure remains consistent during both filling and emptying. This ensures that there is neither a
large pressure buildup during filling, nor a vacuum pulled during emptying. Additionally, the
storage tanks are hazardous if they do not have adequate headspace. Therefore, valves on the
feed tanks shut the supply off if the level reaches 80%. Similarly, there is a signal when the DME
storage tank is 75% full, and the process is shut down if it reaches 80% full.
Figure 17: The P&ID for the methanol storage tank.
68
Figure 18: The P&ID for the lubricant and lubricant/odor storage tanks
69
Figure 19: The P&ID for the DME product storage tank.
Plant Location
The original location considered in the request for design was Lake Charles, LA, near the
soon-to-open Lake Charles Methanol facility. This location was selected because the methanol
plant was going to be environmentally friendly, and there is good access to both rail and
highways. These were all considered minimum requirements when looking at other potential
locations. The locations were also compared on taxes, availability of water, and local support for
environmental causes. The final comparison was narrowed down to Lake Charles, LA and
Kalama, WA, and the comparison details are shown in Table 24.
70
Table 24: Comparison of Lake Charles to Kalama (NWIW, 2018), (Lake Charles Methanol,
LLC, 2017), (Nolo, 2018), (Access Washington, 2018).
Lake Charles, LA Kalama, WA

MeOH Supplier
Lake Charles Methanol, LLC Northwest Innovation Works (NWIW)
Company
"LCM’s project utilizes innovative, NWIW is "leading the clean-tech
ultra-clean technology licensed by industry by setting new global
MeOH Facility: GE to gasify its feedstock into a environmental standards in the
Environmental syngas, and which is subsequently production of methanol and significantly
Impact converted into marketable products reducing global greenhouse gas
through the use of other emissions compared to coal-based
technologies and licenses." methanol"
https://www.google.com/maps/place/222+
https://www.google.ca/maps/place/La Kalama+River+Rd,+Kalama,+WA+98625/@
ke+Charles,+LA/@30.2123853,- 46.0941572,-
Land Location 93.3240263,16z/data=!4m5!3m4!1s0x8 122.8922989,1235m/data=!3m1!1e3!4m5!
63b842b00bdcb27:0x42b98dd6b9a773 3m4!1s0x549441ee971dc4b5:0x3d8fa1180
82!8m2!3d30.2265949!4d-93.2173758 6207cb9!8m2!3d46.0421002!4d-
122.8741177
Rail Available near site Available near site
Water Available - Lake Charles Available - Columbia River
Trucking/ Interstate 10 (between Houston and Interstate 5 (between Seattle and
Nearby Roads Baton Rouge) Portland)
State/Local
4-8% 0%
Taxes
Local Support
for Green Moderate High
Energy
As shown in Table 24, the two locations are comparable in regard to the methanol
facility’s environmental friendliness and the availability of rail, water, and trucking. Kalama is
preferable, however in terms of taxes and local support for green energy. This was used as the
basis for the decision to move the facility to Kalama, WA. More information on the local support
for environmental programs is shown in Figure 20, where the percent of adults who support
regulating carbon dioxide as a pollutant is highlighted by county. This analysis assumes that
counties who support regulations on carbon dioxide are in general more environmentally
conscientious, and will support DME production as an alternative fuel source for diesel, which
has high carbon dioxide emissions.
71
Figure 20: Percentage of adults by county who support research into renewable energy sources
(Marlon, Howe, Mildenberger, & Leiserowitz, 2016)
From Figure 20 it becomes evident that Washington is more concerned about carbon
dioxide emissions than Louisiana as a whole. By direct comparison the area of Washington
where the facility will be located (Kalama) has 74% support of regulation on carbon dioxide,
whereas Lake Charles, Louisiana has only 68% which is 6% lower than the national average
(Marlon, Howe, Mildenberger, & Leiserowitz, 2016). Another benefit of the new facility is the
position on major highway routes, which reach other environmentally friendly cities such as
Seattle, Portland, San Francisco, Los Angeles and San Diego. In comparison, the highway in
which Lake Charles is close to reaches lighted colored cities like San Antonio, Houston, New
Orleans, Tallahassee, and Jacksonville.
Plant Layout
The layout of the facility is a necessary part of the design process. This is especially
pertinent in this design, as the economics and safety portions of the design are heavily reliant
upon the size and layout of the facility. The layout of the entire grounds purchased for the site is
shown in Figure 21. The egress is also shown as red dotted lines for emergency evacuation of the
72
facility. The layouts of the main production and office buildings are also shown in Figure 21.
Finally, a key for the symbols and abbreviations used on both maps is shown as Table 25.
Figure 21: Layout of the main production rooms of the facility.
73
Table 25: Key for the facility and plant layout maps.
Symbol/Abbreviation Meaning
Sensor and Alarm
Δ Emergency Phone
CR Control Room
SS Safety Shower
EW Eyewash Station
FP Feed Preparation
PP Final Product Processing
T1 T-101
T2 T-102
FS Foam Suppressant
EICR Emergency Isolation Control Room
The feed storage tanks were stored on the opposite side of the grounds as the finished
product storage tanks, so that disasters could be mitigated. This was also why the emergency
isolation room (shown as EICR) was placed on the opposite end of the gated facility from the
storage tanks. The production floor building is also built with explosion-proof walls to mitigate
any disasters in processing. Sensors and alarms for nitrogen and flammables are placed
throughout the facilities to alert against asphyxiation or fire dangers. Emergency phones were
placed in each part of the facility to allow for paging and alerts. A safety shower and eyewash
are in the production room to be used in an emergency. A fire suppressant foam machine and
supplies were placed on the production floor to act as emergency response on the production
floor.
Startup
Special attention must be payed to startup, to ensure it goes smoothly. Once construction
has been completed, a team consisting of plant engineers, operators, quality staff, safety
personnel, and members of the construction team must walk through the facility with PFD(s) and
As Built P&ID(s) to ensure all necessary equipment, piping, and instruments are in place.
Additionally, the DME storage tank should be filled with nitrogen until the concentration of
oxygen is less than 1%. This is generally referred to as redlining, and highlights any changes
which must be made before production may begin. After the appropriate changes have been
made, a secondary walk-through should be conducted before startup.
74
One of the other concerns with startup and shutdown for this process is the recycling of
utilities. This can make changes in production quantity very difficult. To counteract these
difficulties, control loops were placed on all of the heat exchangers. Additional steam or cooling
water may be added if needed, and extra steam or cooling water can be removed if needed. This
is done through ratio and temperature control loops. The P&IDs detailing these control loops are
shown in Figures 12-19.
Truck Modifications
An additional consideration to note is the impact that utilizing DME instead of diesel fuel
will have on the trucks. The DME product this facility is producing has adequate lubricant to be
used in diesel engines. However, if a truck would like to travel the same distance on a tank of
DME as it would on a tank of diesel, the fuel tank would have to be twice the size. This is due to
differences in both the physical density and energy density of DME compared to diesel.
Additionally, the diesel truck would be able to remove heavy filters if using only DME. This is
likely not practical unless other facilities are being added along the same highway. The engine
and other primary components of the diesel truck could remain the same, however (U.S.
Department of Energy, 2015).
There may be challenges implementing DME as a fuel alternative to diesel, so the market
in the local area should be carefully considered. In particular, it is recommended that the DME
company reach out to local trucking companies or corporations who own their trucking fleet and
see if they would support this facility. It is recommended that the DME company appeals to the
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) of many major companies to win their support. This may
allow the DME facility to thrive, even with lower government subsidies.
Manufacturing Costs
Another important consideration is the cost of manufacturing for the process. While the
capital cost determines the initial investment, the manufacturing cost determines the annual cost
of the process after the plant is up and running. The annual cost of manufacturing includes direct
manufacturing costs, fixed manufacturing costs, and general expenses; these costs account for
operating labor, utilities, waste treatment, and raw materials. The total cost of operating labor can
75
be determined using Equation 12:
ை௅ = 4.5 × × [6.29 + 31.7ଶ + 0.23௡௣ ]଴.ହ (12)
where OS is the annual operator salary, P is the number of processing steps that involve the
handling of solids, and Nnp is the total number of process units, which can be determined from
the PFD (Professor 5, Cost of Manufacturing Lecture, 2017) (Mubeen, Cost of Manufacturing
Lecture, 2017). The annual mean wage for a chemical plant operator in Washington is between
$52,900 and $57,170 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2017). For this facility, the operators will be
paid an annual salary of $57,000. In order to be in accordance with the Department of Homeland
Security, the plant must include the proper security measures, which includes the full-time
staffing of a security guard. Therefore, the plant should hire four security guards to cover the
shifts. The security guards will be paid the median annual salary for security in Washington,
which is $34,310 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2015).
The annual costs for the utilities are detailed in Table 8. Due to environmental
regulations, all wastewater created in this process must be treated. For this process, the cost of
wastewater treatment is $41.8/1000 m3 produced (Turton, Bailie, Whiting, Shaeiwitz, &
Bhattacharyya, 2012). The annual cost of waste treatment can be determined by multiplying the
yearly flow rate of wastewater by this cost.
The primary raw materials for this process are methanol, Amberlyst 35, Lubrizol, and
ethyl mercaptan. In addition, nitrogen is added in order to inert the process. Using the flow rates
of the raw materials into the process (obtained from ChemCAD) and their respective costs, the
annual cost of raw materials can be calculated with Equation 13:
ோெ = ௜ ௜ (13)
where Ci is the cost of component i and Fi is the flow rate of component i (Professor 5, Cost of
Manufacturing Lecture, 2017) (Mubeen, Cost of Manufacturing Lecture, 2017). The shelf life for
Amberlyst 35 is three years; therefore, it was assumed that the lifetime for the catalyst was three
years (Dow, 2016).
The DME process has been designed to produce 250,000 gal of DME/day, with turn
down to 50%. Most of the manufacturing costs are variable and depend on the level of
production; therefore, the manufacturing costs have been determined for 100% production and
50% production. Table 26 details the manufacturing costs for this process when it operates at
76
100% production.
Table 26: The manufacturing costs for the DME process operating at 100% production.
Cost Classification Amount Unit Cost Total Cost

Operators 6/shift, 29 total $57,000/operator/yr $1,633,000/yr
Security Guards 1/shift, 4 total $34,310/guard/yr $137,240/yr
Waste Treatment 11,020 kg/hr $41.8/1000 m3 $4,004/yr
High-pressure steam 8,422 kg/hr $29.97/1000 kg $1,989,900/yr

Utilities
Cooling water 859.8 m3/hr $14.8/1000 m3 $100,324/yr

Electricity 48.94 MJ/hr $0.06/kW-h $6,436/yr
Price varies ($0.02/gal for
Methanol 38,771 kg/hr Annual cost varies
shipping)
Nitrogen 109 kg/hr $8/304 ft3 $687,580/yr
Raw Materials
$96,165 (Paid
Amberlyst 35 Catalyst 2908 kg $15/lb
every 3 years)
$1.65/lb including
Lubrizol (Lubricant) 25.8 kg/hr $741,270/yr
$0.02/gal for shipping
$1.12/g including
Ethyl Mercaptan (Odor) 0.0014 kg/hr $12,627/yr
Using the values presented in Table 26, the annual manufacturing costs can be calculated
using Equation 14:
ௗ = 0.18 + 2.73ை௅ + 1.23
௎் + ௐ் + ோெ + ௌீ (14)
where COMd is the cost of manufacturing without depreciation, COL is the cost of operating
labor, CUT is the cost of utilities (calculated using the values in the utilities summary table), CWT
is the cost of waste water treatment, CRM is the cost of raw materials, and CSG is the annual cost
for security guards (Turton, Bailie, Whiting, Shaeiwitz, & Bhattacharyya, 2012). The annual cost
for security guards is included in the cost of manufacturing, because it is pertinent to ensuring
the safety of the plant.
However, the manufacturing costs for this plant will vary for each year of operation,
because the methanol prices vary due to the volatile market for this chemical. In order to
77
determine the future trend of the price of methanol, the historical prices for methanol were
plotted with respect to time, as shown in Figure 22.
Figure 22: The historical price of methanol from 2001 to 2017 (Methanex, 2018).
Based on the trend shown in Figure 22, the price of methanol has a high amount of
fluctuation. However, the general trend shows that the price is increasing. Therefore, the price of
methanol was calculated using the trend line shown in Figure 22 assuming that this plant will
begin operation in 2021. The price of methanol for each year of operation is detailed in Table 27,
along with the corresponding cost of methanol. This cost accounts for the shipping cost of
$0.02/gal (AIChE, 2018). The cost of manufacturing, accounting for the variations in the cost of
methanol, is also detailed in Table 27. The manufacturing costs were calculated using Equation
14 with a stream factor of 0.9, meaning the plant is operating for 90% of the year.
78
Table 27: The forecasted price of methanol, total cost of methanol, and cost of manufacturing for
each year of operation for the DME process at 100% production.
Year Price of Methanol ($/gal) Cost of Methanol Cost of Manufacturing
1 $ 1.59 $ 164,253,556 $ 212,624,567
2 $ 1.63 $ 168,334,390 $ 217,525,710
3 $ 1.67 $ 172,415,224 $ 222,545,135
4 $ 1.71 $ 176,496,057 $ 227,682,843
5 $ 1.75 $ 180,576,891 $ 232,583,986
6 $ 1.79 $ 184,657,725 $ 237,603,411
7 $ 1.83 $ 188,738,558 $ 242,741,120
8 $ 1.87 $ 192,819,392 $ 247,642,262
9 $ 1.91 $ 196,900,226 $ 252,661,688
10 $ 1.95 $ 200,981,059 $ 257,799,396
11 $ 1.99 $ 205,061,893 $ 262,700,539
12 $ 2.03 $ 209,142,727 $ 267,719,964
13 $ 2.07 $ 213,223,561 $ 272,857,672
14 $ 2.11 $ 217,304,394 $ 277,758,815
15 $ 2.15 $ 221,385,228 $ 282,778,240
16 $ 2.19 $ 225,466,062 $ 287,915,949
17 $ 2.23 $ 229,546,895 $ 292,817,091
18 $ 2.27 $ 233,627,729 $ 297,836,517
19 $ 2.31 $ 237,708,563 $ 302,974,225
20 $ 2.35 $ 241,789,396 $ 307,875,368
In order to compare the cost of turn down, the annual manufacturing costs for the process
operating at 50% production were calculated and are detailed in Table 28.
79
Table 28: The manufacturing costs for the DME process operating at 50% production.
Cost Classification Amount Unit Cost Total Cost
Operators 6/shift, 29 total $57,000/operator/yr $1,633,000/yr
Security Guards 1/shift, 4 total $34,310/guard/yr $137,240/yr
Waste Treatment 5,510 kg/hr $41.8/1000 m3 $2,002/yr
High-pressure steam 4,211 kg/hr $29.97/1000 kg $995,000/yr

Utilities
Cooling water 430 m3/hr $14.8/1000 m3 $50,160/yr
Electricity 24.47 MJ/hr $0.06/kW-h $3,218/yr

Price varies ($0.02/gal
Methanol 19,385 kg/hr Annual cost varies
for shipping)
Nitrogen 54.66 kg/hr $8/304 ft3 $343,792/yr

Raw Materials
$96,165 (Paid
Amberlyst 35 Catalyst 2908 kg $15/lb
every 3 years)
$1.65/lb including
Lubrizol (Lubricant) 12.9 kg/hr $370,635/yr
$1.12/g including
Ethyl Mercaptan (Odor) 0.0007 kg/hr $6,314/yr
The manufacturing costs for each year of the plant’s operation at a production level of
50% are detailed in Table 29.
80
Table 29: The forecasted price of methanol, cost of methanol, and cost of manufacturing for
each year of operation for the DME process at 50% production.
Year Price of Methanol ($/gal) Cost of Methanol Cost of Manufacturing

1 1.59 $ 82,126,778 $ 109,434,150
2 1.63 $ 84,167,195 $ 111,825,580
3 1.67 $ 86,207,612 $ 114,335,292
4 1.71 $ 88,248,029 $ 116,963,288
5 1.75 $ 90,288,445 $ 119,354,718
6 1.79 $ 92,328,862 $ 121,864,430
7 1.83 $ 94,369,279 $ 124,492,426
8 1.87 $ 96,409,696 $ 126,883,856
9 1.91 $ 98,450,113 $ 129,393,569
10 1.95 $ 100,490,530 $ 132,021,564
11 1.99 $ 102,530,947 $ 134,412,994
12 2.03 $ 104,571,363 $ 136,922,707
13 2.07 $ 106,611,780 $ 139,550,702
14 2.11 $ 108,652,197 $ 141,942,132
15 2.15 $ 110,692,614 $ 144,451,845
16 2.19 $ 112,733,031 $ 147,079,841
17 2.23 $ 114,773,448 $ 149,471,270
18 2.27 $ 116,813,864 $ 151,980,983
19 2.31 $ 118,854,281 $ 154,608,979
20 2.35 $ 120,894,698 $ 157,000,408
The manufacturing costs at 50% production are slightly more than 50% of the
manufacturing costs at 100% production, presented in Table 27. They are not exactly 50% of the
total manufacturing costs, because they consider the fixed capital investment of the plant, which
will remain constant with respect to the level of production. The manufacturing costs for the
lifetime of the plant will fall between the values presented for 50% to 100% production. The
sample calculations for all of the manufacturing costs can be found in Appendix G2.
Economic Analysis
In order to determine the economic feasibility of the DME design, an extensive
profitability analysis was performed. First, the annual revenue of the process was calculated. The
main product produced in this process is DME. This is being produced as an environmentally
friendly alternative to diesel; therefore, its price should follow the same trends as diesel prices.
81
However, DME has half the energy density of diesel (U.S. Department of Energy, 2015).
Therefore, for this process, the DME will be sold at 50% of the price of diesel. Similar to
methanol, the market for diesel is volatile; therefore, the price will change throughout the
lifetime of the plant. The projected prices for diesel from 2021 to 2040, as determined by the
U.S. Energy Information Administration, were plotted with respect to time, as shown in Figure
23.
Figure 23: The forecasted prices for diesel (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2017).
Using the prices shown in Figure 23, the selling price for DME for each year of operation
was determined by multiplying the price of diesel by 0.5. The selling price for the DME, along
with its revenue are detailed in Table 30. At 100% production, the process produces 27,777 kg/hr
of DME. At this level of production, the process is also creating 57.2 MJ/h of electricity and
8,422 kg/h of low-pressure steam, which can be sold for annual revenues of $7,521 and $1.94
million, respectively. For 100% production, the total revenue (including revenue from DME and
utilities) for each year of operation is detailed in Table 30.
82
for the DME process at 100% production.
Price of diesel Price of DME

Year Revenue from DME Annual Revenue
($/gal) ($/gal)
1 $ 3.31 $ 1.66 $ 152,001,861 $ 153,940,207
2 $ 3.37 $ 1.68 $ 154,468,031 $ 156,406,377
3 $ 3.42 $ 1.71 $ 156,910,616 $ 158,848,962
4 $ 3.51 $ 1.75 $ 161,049,149 $ 162,987,495
5 $ 3.55 $ 1.77 $ 162,846,594 $ 164,784,940
6 $ 3.56 $ 1.78 $ 163,463,653 $ 165,401,999
7 $ 3.60 $ 1.80 $ 165,329,558 $ 167,267,904
8 $ 3.65 $ 1.82 $ 167,341,881 $ 169,280,227
9 $ 3.70 $ 1.85 $ 169,707,380 $ 171,645,726
10 $ 3.73 $ 1.86 $ 171,127,743 $ 173,066,090
11 $ 3.78 $ 1.89 $ 173,458,829 $ 175,397,175
12 $ 3.80 $ 1.90 $ 174,190,920 $ 176,129,266
13 $ 3.84 $ 1.92 $ 175,999,974 $ 177,938,320
14 $ 3.88 $ 1.94 $ 178,022,025 $ 179,960,371
15 $ 3.90 $ 1.95 $ 178,986,569 $ 180,924,915
16 $ 3.92 $ 1.96 $ 179,756,746 $ 181,695,092
17 $ 3.98 $ 1.99 $ 182,755,638 $ 184,693,984
18 $ 4.00 $ 2.00 $ 183,692,559 $ 185,630,906
19 $ 4.03 $ 2.01 $ 184,907,313 $ 186,845,660
20 $ 4.05 $ 2.03 $ 186,009,283 $ 187,947,629
The revenue at the turn down of 50% production was also determined. At this level of
production, the process produces 13,888 kg/hr DME. It also creates 28.6 MJ/h of electricity and
4,211 kg/h of low-pressure steam, which can be sold for annual revenues of $3,760 and
$972,400, respectively. The total revenue for 50% production are detailed in Table 31.
83
for the DME process at 50% production.
Price of diesel Price of DME
Year Revenue from DME Annual Revenue
($/gal) ($/gal)
1 $ 3.31 $ 1.66 $ 76,000,930.52 $ 76,970,104
2 $ 3.37 $ 1.68 $ 77,234,015.47 $ 78,203,189
3 $ 3.42 $ 1.71 $ 78,455,308.03 $ 79,424,481
4 $ 3.51 $ 1.75 $ 80,524,574.48 $ 81,493,748
5 $ 3.55 $ 1.77 $ 81,423,296.95 $ 82,392,470
6 $ 3.56 $ 1.78 $ 81,731,826.29 $ 82,700,999
7 $ 3.60 $ 1.80 $ 82,664,778.81 $ 83,633,952
8 $ 3.65 $ 1.82 $ 83,670,940.52 $ 84,640,114
9 $ 3.70 $ 1.85 $ 84,853,689.86 $ 85,822,863
10 $ 3.73 $ 1.86 $ 85,563,871.72 $ 86,533,045
11 $ 3.78 $ 1.89 $ 86,729,414.25 $ 87,698,587
12 $ 3.80 $ 1.90 $ 87,095,460.18 $ 88,064,633
13 $ 3.84 $ 1.92 $ 87,999,987.08 $ 88,969,160
14 $ 3.88 $ 1.94 $ 89,011,012.58 $ 89,980,186
15 $ 3.90 $ 1.95 $ 89,493,284.68 $ 90,462,458
16 $ 3.92 $ 1.96 $ 89,878,372.79 $ 90,847,546
17 $ 3.98 $ 1.99 $ 91,377,818.96 $ 92,346,992
18 $ 4.00 $ 2.00 $ 91,846,279.74 $ 92,815,453
19 $ 4.03 $ 2.01 $ 92,453,656.72 $ 93,422,830
20 $ 4.05 $ 2.03 $ 93,004,641.30 $ 93,973,814
Discounted Cash Flow Diagram

Using the costs and revenue of the DME process, the profitability of the process can be
determined through the creation and analysis of a discounted cash flow diagram. This diagram
tracks the cash transactions made throughout the life of the project. It was assumed that this
project has a two-year construction period (in years -1 and 0). At the start of the project (in year -
1), 60% of the fixed capital investment and the full land value are present as negative cash flow
transactions. It is recommended that four acres of land be purchased for this plant, which will
cost approximately $140,000 (CoStar Realty Information, Inc., 2018). In year 0, the remaining
40% of the fixed capital investment and the working capital are charged as negative transactions.
For this process, it was assumed that the working capital is 15% of the fixed capital investment
(Turton, Bailie, Whiting, Shaeiwitz, & Bhattacharyya, 2012). Then, as the plant begins operation
(year 1), the cash flows are dependent on the revenue made from the products, the cost of
84
manufacturing, patent royalty fees, equipment depreciation, and the tax rate, and can be
calculated using Equation 15:
= − ௗ − − ௞ 1 − + ௞ (15)
where CF is the cash flow, PRF are the patent royalty fees, t is the tax rate, and dk is the
depreciation (Professor 5, Economic Analysis Lecture, 2017) (Mubeen, Economic Analysis
Lecture, 2017). This annual cash flow value should be positive in order for the process to
eventually be profitable. All of the revenues and expenses will be calculated using a stream
factor of 0.9, meaning that the plant is running for 90% of the year.
This process utilizes the low temperature catalytic process detailed in the patent owned
by Cheng-Ting Hsieh and his partners (Hsieh, Lee, Liang, & Tzeng, 2011). Therefore, the cost of
licensing this patent should be considered. It is assumed that annual royalty fees will be paid in
order to license this patent. These royalties will be 25% of the before-tax annual profit (KMPG
International, 2012). Therefore, the patent royalty fees included in Equation 15 can be calculated
using Equation 16:
= 0.25 − ௗ (16)
For this process, the tax rate includes the federal and local corporate tax rate. The federal
corporate tax rate is 21%, according to the new Republican Tax Bill (Andrews & Parlapiano,
2017). The state of Washington has no local corporate tax rate, but some businesses may be
subject to a business and occupation tax, depending on their city of operation (Washington State
Department of Revenue, 2017). This plant will be built in Kalama, Washington, which has no
business and occupation tax (Access Washington, 2018). Therefore, the tax rate charged for this
process is 21%. In addition, the depreciation was calculated using the Modified Accelerated Cost
Recovery System (MACRS) depreciation schedule, assuming a five-year recovery period, which
is shown in Table 31.
85
Table 32: Depreciation schedule for MACRS method for a 5-year recovery period (Turton,
Bailie, Whiting, Shaeiwitz, & Bhattacharyya, 2012).
Year Depreciation Allowance

(% of Capital Investment)
1 20
2 32
3 19.2
4 11.52
5 11.52
6 5.76
The time value of money states that “money today is worth more than money in the
future” (Turton, Bailie, Whiting, Shaeiwitz, & Bhattacharyya, 2012). Therefore, it is beneficial
to create a discounted cash flow diagram to account for the effect of time value of money on the
cash transactions. In order to determine the discounted cash flow, a discount rate is usually used.
For this process, the discount rate is 8% (AIChE, 2018). Using this interest rate, the discounted
cash flow can be calculated with Equation 17:

= (17)
(1 + )௡
where DCF is the discounted cash flow, i is the interest (discount) rate, and n is the year (Turton,
Bailie, Whiting, Shaeiwitz, & Bhattacharyya, 2012). The cumulative cash flow for each year can
be determined by summing the discounted cash flows produced each year. At the end of the
project’s life (year 20 for this process), the working capital is added back to the process. This
cumulative cash flow should eventually become positive if the process is profitable.
Using the specifications mentioned above, the discounted cash flow was calculated for
each year of the plant’s operation. Table 35 in Appendix F1 details the annual cash flows and
discounted cash flows for this process operating at 100% production. The sample calculations for
each value presented in this table can be found in Appendix G2. Using the results shown in Table
35 in Appendix F1, the cumulative discounted cash flow was plotted with respect to time. This
cumulative discounted cash flow diagram is shown in Figure 24.
86
production.
As shown in Figure 24, this process is not profitable and it continues to lose money
throughout its lifetime. This is due to the low price charged for DME. However, it is not practical
to increase the price of DME, because if it is raised to a profitable value, consumers will not have
an incentive to purchase this greener fuel. Consumers have to purchase twice as much DME
compared diesel in order to drive the same distance, so if the price is raised to higher than 50%
of the price of diesel, they will purchase the diesel, as it is a more economic option. Therefore,
the demand for the DME will decrease and the process will continue to lose money. In order for
this design to be economically feasible, it is recommended that the company requests
government subsidies.
Currently, the state of Washington provides many alternative fuel tax credits. DME
production is mainly on a lab scale, so no concrete tax credits are currently in place. However, it
was assumed that the alternative fuel tax credits currently provided for biodiesel would also be
provided for the production of DME, because it has similar environmental effects. One of the tax
credits provided by Washington is an infrastructure tax credit. Equipment used to produce
biodiesel and other alternative fuels are eligible for a tax credit up to $30,000 (Amiton, 2018).
87
Therefore, $30,000 was detracted from the overall fixed capital investment for the process. In
addition, biodiesel manufacturers also receive a tax credit of $1/gal from the federal government
(Lane, 2018). Assuming this process would receive the same tax credit, $1/gal was added to the
current selling price for DME and the revenue was recalculated and is detailed in Table 37 in
Appendix F2, along with the net profit for each year of operation. It should be noted that the
customer will still be paying the same price for the DME as detailed in Table 31 and the
company would receive the additional $1/gal directly from the government. In addition, a new
cumulative discounted cash flow table was prepared, as shown in Table 38 in Appendix F2.
Using this data, the new cumulative discounted cash flow diagram for the government subsidized
DME process was created, as shown in Figure 25.
production, including government subsidies.
As shown in Figure 25, there is a peak in the cumulative cash flow produced by this
process in year 12. After year 12, the net profit becomes negative and the process loses money.
This is because the forecasted methanol price is increasing at a faster rate than the DME price.
Therefore, it is recommended that the company stops this process after 12 years. It should be
88
noted that the DME and methanol prices are estimated based on the current trends. It is
recommended that the company re-evaluates the trends of these volatile prices throughout the
lifetime of the plant. If the methanol prices are showing a decreasing trend in year 12, then the
company can re-evaluate the profitability of the process and continue production for the full 20
years.
There are multiple ways to analyze the profitability of a process, based on the discounted
cash flow diagram. The three criteria that are used for a profitability analysis are time, cash, and
interest rate. The time criterion is investigated through the discounted payback period (DPBP),
which is the time required after start up to recover the fixed capital investment of the project. A
shorter DPBP is desired. The cash criterion can be determined with the net present value (NPV),
which is the cumulative discounted cash position at the end of the project. It is desired to have a
large (and positive) NPV. Finally, the interest rate criterion can be investigated through the
discounted cash flow rate of return (DCFROR), which is the interest rate where the NPV of the
project is equal to zero (project breaks even). Ideally, the DCFROR should be greater than the
internal interest rate for the process to be profitable (Turton, Bailie, Whiting, Shaeiwitz, &
Bhattacharyya, 2012).
Using the information presented in Figure 25, these key profitability criteria were
determined for the recommended lifetime of 12 years and the full lifetime of 20 years. First, the
DPBP was determined to be 0.43 years for both plant lifetimes. This means that this process
recovers its FCI very quickly, in less than 6 months of operation. The NPV of this process was
determined to be $83 million and $64.5 million for the 12-year life and 20-year life, respectively.
The positive NPVs indicate a profitable process; however, the NPV for the 12-year operation is
approximately $20 million greater than the NPV if the plant were to continue production through
the full 20 years. The DCFROR of the plant was determined to be 117.3% for both lifetimes.
This DCFROR is much greater than the assumed acceptable rate of return (MARR) of 30%;
therefore, with government subsidies, this process is an acceptable investment for the company,
and it is advised that the company moves forward with the designs for this plant if the proper
government subsidies can be secured.
In addition, the profitability was analyzed for the turn down to 50% production. Table 36
and Figure 29 in Appendix F1 detail the cumulative discounted cash flow for the 50% production
process without the government subsidies. Similar to Figure 24, the process is unprofitable and
89
shows a continually decreasing cash flow. Therefore, the analysis was completed with the same
government subsidies mentioned above ($30,000 infrastructure credit and $1/gal credit). Tables
39 and 40 in Appendix F2 detail the annual revenue, net profit, cash flow and discounted cash
flow for the turned down production rate with the government subsidies. Using these results, the
cumulative discounted cash flow was plotted with respect to time. This cumulative discounted
cash flow diagram is shown in Figure 26.
production, with government subsidies.
The cumulative cash flow for the turned down process has a peak at year 10. Therefore, if
the process were ran at 50% production, it would be recommended to stop production after 10
years. Using the information presented in Figure 26, the key profitability criteria were
determined for the process operating at 50% production for recommended lifetime of 10 years
and the full lifetime of 20 years. First, the DPBP was determined to be 1.8 years for both plant
lifetimes. This means that this process recovers its FCI very quickly, in less than two years of
operation. The NPV of this process was determined to be $24.24 million and $10 million for the
10-year life and 20-year life, respectively. The positive NPVs indicate a profitable process;
however, the NPV for the 12-year operation is approximately $14 million greater than the NPV
if the plant were to continue production through the full 20 years. The DCFROR of the plant was
determined to be 54.75% and 54.52% for the 10-year life and 20-year life, respectively. These
90
DCFRORs are greater than the assumed MARR of 30%; therefore, with government subsidies,
this process continues to be an acceptable investment for the company, even at 50% production.
For this process, the profitability criteria will fall between the criteria presented for 100% and
50% production. Fortunately, the profitability criteria at both of these production rates indicate
that this process is profitable. Therefore, it is still advised that the company moves forward with
the designs for this plant if the proper government subsidies can be secured. It is still
recommended to end production after year 12, unless the methanol prices are lower than
expected. If the company plans to run the plant at 50% production consistently, then it is
recommended to end production after year 10.
The evaluated profitability criteria and recommendations depend highly on the available
government subsidies. It is important that the company secures these subsidies before the plant is
built. If these subsidies are not secured, the process will not be profitable. If the available
subsidies are different than the assumed subsidy values, the economic analysis should be
repeated in order to confirm the profitability of the process. In addition, it is important to secure
the intellectual property licensing before construction of the plant. The royalty rates used in this
economic analysis were assumed based on current rates. However, these rates may change based
on the owners of the patent. The company must negotiate with Cheng-Ting Hsieh and his
partners to confirm that the plant can utilize their patent and to negotiate the patent licensing
fees. When the proper patent costs are decided, the economic analysis should be repeated to
ensure the economic feasibility of the process.
Risk Evaluation
Many of the costs used to determine the profitability of a chemical process are
susceptible to error. Most of these factors change throughout the lifetime of the plant. It is
important to quantify these changes when analyzing the profitability of a process and to
determine if the relative risk associated with a process is worth it. Kenneth Humphreys estimated
the potential variations of the parameters affecting the profitability of a process with a lifetime
over 10 years. These variations are outlined in Table 33.
91
Table 33: Range of variation of the parameters that affect the profitability of a chemical process
(Turton, Bailie, Whiting, Shaeiwitz, & Bhattacharyya, 2012).
The two most important parameters in Table 33 that need to be closely monitored are
sales volume and price of the product (Turton, Bailie, Whiting, Shaeiwitz, & Bhattacharyya,
2012). All of these parameters can achieve a large variation from the expected forecast, so it is
important to determine the probable risk of these variations. One method that can be used to
quantify the risk of a chemical process is the Monte Carlo simulation. This simulation assigns a
probability distribution for each parameter using a triangular distribution. The triangular
cumulative probability function can be calculated using Equations 18 and 19:
( − )ଶ
= ≤ (18)
( − )( − )
− ( − )(2 − − ) (19)
= + >
( − ) ( − )( − )
where b is the most likely value, a is the lowest value, c is the highest value, and x is the value of
the parameter (Turton, Bailie, Whiting, Shaeiwitz, & Bhattacharyya, 2012).
This probability distribution can be determined using the CAPCOST program, which
92
uses Equations 18 and 19 to produce the cumulative triangular probability distribution for the
parameters. The variation lower and upper limits and the base values for each parameter can be
inputted into the software, then an Excel VBA macro creates the cumulative probability
distribution for the NPV, DCFROR, DPBP, cumulative cash position, payback period, and rate
of return on investment. Using this analysis, the probability of this process being profitable can
be determined (Turton, Bailie, Whiting, Shaeiwitz, & Bhattacharyya, 2012). The company must
decide the minimum probability of profitability (and the associated risk) that it is willing to
accept this will determine if the company will choose to implement the process.
The current profitability analysis was determined based on the assumption that most of
the costing parameters have no variation during the life of the plant. Therefore, the potential risk
of this process was quantified using the Monte Carlo simulation in the CAPCOST program. This
risk was analyzed for the recommended process with the government subsidies and 12-year
lifetime operating at 100% production. The lower and upper limits for the variations and the base
values for each parameter were inputted into the CAPCOST software, as shown in Figure 27.
The prices of product and raw material were determined by taking the average revenue from
DME and average cost of raw materials for the first 12 years of the 100% production process.
Figure 27: The Monte Carlo simulation inputs on CAPCOST.
Using these inputs, the CAPCOST program created cumulative triangular probability
distributions for NPV, DCFROR, DPBP, cumulative cash position, payback period, and rate of
return on investment. The probability distribution for NPV is shown in Figure 28.
93
Figure 28: The NPV probability distribution for the DME process, determined using the Monte
Carlo simulation.
The results from the CAPCOST software indicated that the lower limit for the NPV is -
$51.9 million and the upper limit is $212.3 million. It was determined that the NPV for this
process is $83 million, which falls within the range provided by the CAPCOST software. There
is approximately 60% probability that the NPV of the DME process will be $83 million or
higher. Based on the results shown in Figure 28, there is a 3.2% chance that this process will not
be profitable (i.e. have an NPV less than 0). The risk associated with this process is very low and
it is advised that the company moves forward with the design for the DME process using
government subsidies and ending production after 12 years. The probability distributions for the
rest of the profitability parameters can be found in Appendix H. Based on these distributions, the
conclusion of low risk for this process stands. The DME process has a very high likelihood of
being profitable.
Conclusions and Recommendations

A design has been created for a DME production facility, per AIChE’s request. Three
methods of DME production were considered however, the reaction in the final design is
conducted using the low-temperature catalyst in a catalytic distillation column. This distillation
was designed to have two packed sections where 50 mm metal pall rings are packed with
Amberlyst 35 for maximum conversion. The total process design has 13 process units and 4
94
storage tanks. This equipment was sized to meet the demands of the process, and storage tanks
designed to hold seven days’ worth of chemicals. Specification sheets were created and are
available in the Appendix C3. This process uses 1,130 kg/hr of methanol, 727 g/h of lubricant,
0.04 g/h of odor, and 109 kg/h of nitrogen in order to produce the required 250,000 gal/day of
DME in a safe manner. It has been designed to allow efficient and safe turn down to 50%
production, and back up to capacity. The product is 99.88 wt% DME, with Lubrizol and ethyl
mercaptan added as a lubricant and an odor, respectively. This product far exceeds the quality
requirements. The process utilizes cooling water, high-pressure steam, and electricity as utilities.
Economic efficiency was increased by keeping the cooling water at temperatures low enough for
it to be sent to a cooling tower as a credit, and, after utilized, the high-pressure steam was
expanded and heated to be resold as low-pressure steam. Additionally, the utilities were recycled
and heat integration was utilized to minimize the cost of manufacturing.
An extensive profitability analysis was performed for the DME process in order to
evaluate its economic feasibility. It was determined that the total fixed capital investment for the
process was $8.5 million. The price of methanol is subject to variability due to its volatile
market; therefore, the cost of manufacturing varies each year. At 100% production the annual
cost of manufacturing ranges from $212.6 million to $308 million throughout the 20-year
lifetime of the facility. The annual revenue also changes year-to-year with the price of diesel.
Without government subsidies, this process is not profitable, with revenues ranging from $77
million to $94 million, which is significantly less than the cost of manufacturing. This leads to a
negative annual net profit throughout the facility’s operation. Therefore, in order to achieve a
profitable process, the company must secure government subsidies. It was assumed that
government subsidies of $1/gal are available, similar to that of biodiesel. At 100% production,
this results in annual revenues ranging from $246 million to $280 million.
With government subsidies, this process has a positive net profit until year 12. The price
of methanol rises at a higher rate than the price of DME, so the net profit from years 13 to 20 is
negative. Therefore, it is recommended that the plant ends operation after 12 years. A
profitability analysis for this process was performed for the recommended process utilizing
government subsidies with 12 years of operation. The NPV, DPBP, and DCFROR for the
process operating at 100% production were determined to be $83 million, 0.43 years and
117.3%, respectively. These values indicate that the process is profitable and it will start yielding
95
a profit within six months. This process is also designed to operate at 50% production. At this
level of production, the process yields a positive annual net profit for the first 10 years. If
operation ends after 10 years at 50% production, the NPV, DPBP, and DCFROR are $24 million,
1.8 years, and 54.75%, respectively. At both production levels, this process will be profitable.
Due to potential variations in the parameters used to perform the profitability analysis,
the potential risk of this process was quantified using the Monte Carlo simulation. It was
determined that this process has a 97% probability of being profitable if it is operated at 100%
production for 12 years. However, it is imperative that the company secures the rights to license
the appropriate DME patent and that they negotiate reasonable rates for the royalty fees. In
addition, the company must obtain government subsidies before the plant is built. If these are not
secured, the plant will not be profitable. For this profitability analysis, the patent royalty fees
were assumed to be 25% and the government subsidies were assumed to be the same as the
current biodiesel subsidy. When the company completes the appropriate negotiations, they
should perform the economic analysis again to ensure that this process is still profitable. In
addition, the company should continue to evaluate the trends in the market for methanol and
diesel. The prices of methanol and DME were estimated based on the current market trends, but
there is a possibility that the trends will be different than expected. The company should
continuously confirm the profitability of this process using current market data to ensure that
operation is ended at the appropriate time.
Other considerations in this process included the use and mapping of controls within the
process, determination of a plant location and layout, and consideration of start-up issues and
required truck modifications. The use of controls was vital for safety and efficiency in turn down
of the process. P&IDs are shown in Figures 12-19. Some of the methods of controls involve the
use of flow controllers in and out of process units to accurately modify the utilities needs;
composition analyzers to ensure less than 1% oxygen was in process equipment; and temperature
and pressure controls and alarms to alert for abnormalities. Two locations were compared in
determining the plant location and, in the end, the best choice was Kalama, WA due to its
desirable highway location, access to rail and waterways, community support of greener fuels,
low tax rates, and access to a brand new, green methanol production facility. It is recommended
that a community partner be identified to ensure there is a market for this greener fuel source.
96
Lastly, the facility layout was created to ensure ease of shipments and maximize safety by
keeping the two most dangerous chemical storage tanks on opposite ends of the facility.
Safety, health and the environment are a top priority in the DME facility design, and a
full safety analysis was completed to mitigate loss and hazards. To begin, NFPA ratings were
reviewed, which revealed that the largest risks included the health hazards of methanol and
mercaptan, the asphyxiation risk of nitrogen and the flammability of all the reactants, additives
and final product. This corresponded well to the HAZOP review, which showed that the most
dangerous pieces of equipment in the facility included the storage tanks, due to their high volume
of flammable components. The largest risks were produced under a scenario of high oxygen
concentration and increased temperature, but were largely mitigated through the use of control
systems in the facility involving temperature, flow, pressure and composition analyzers to safely
blanket reactant, additive, and final product tanks.
Preventative measures in the facility included the use of PPE, strict training, control
systems, security gates, regulations and permitting, nitrogen blanketing, sprinkler systems,
explosion proof walls, site planning and relief devices. Control systems in the process increased
safety in every piece of equipment and controlled aspects of temperatures, pressures, flow, and
composition to achieve changes in production safely and alert workers in the event of danger.
Importantly, the regulations and permitting structures used in the facility include, but are not
limited to, hot work permitting, grounding and bonding practices, emergency training and
planning, management of change practices and permitting, confined space permits, and lock
out/tag out practices. In the event of a worst-case scenario event on site the emergency training
plan would initiate with the sound of an alarm leading to evacuation along pre-planned routes
and emergency shut-down in an emergency controls room.
Through worst-case scenario consequence analysis, calculations were conducted to
determine release rates, flammability of mixtures, and downwind concentrations, as well as
determine the risk posed by explosions and fires. It was determined that a boiling liquid
expanding vapor explosion (BLEVE) in the DME tank would be the most dangerous scenario. In
the event of a BLEVE in the DME tank, the range of 99% lethality would stretch nearly a third
of a mile. However, this extreme risk is well mitigated with the use of emergency pressure relief
devices, sloped concrete pads, fire-proof insulation, a sprinkler system, and pressure and
temperature controls to prevent overheating from ever occurring.
97
From an environmental perspective, this process not only provides an environmentally
friendly alternative to diesel fuel, it is also produced sustainably. Leadership in Energy and
Engineering Design (LEED) principles were used in the construction of the facility to reduce
waste, water and electricity both during construction and in use of the finished facility. While
some of the chemicals in the process were found to be aquatic hazards, none of them
accumulated within the environment over time. In estimating the carbon footprint, aspects of the
facility including shipping, electricity, paper, commuting, wastewater, and process water were
analyzed to determine that the total tons carbon dioxide emitted per year was 5,833. Overall,
these could be mitigated by considering the alternative renewable electricity sources used in the
facility, and by creating a ride-share program.
This process was also analyzed in for inherently safer design, where recommendations
for a safer process are made in terms of minimization, substitution, moderation and
simplification. Minimization was achieved in the facility by building it close to the methanol
plant, which reduced shipping needs, and by storing only seven days’ worth of reactant on site.
Substitution was utilized in the original process design and in the construction of the facility. A
reaction in which methanol is both created and used was originally considered, but was
substituted for a low temperature reaction. This acts as both a substitution technique and a
moderation technique because the temperature and pressure conditions are lowered. This process
is also highly simplified, as it includes few process units and a simplistically designed plant
layout. In any process there are risks but the DME design is inherently safer and includes in-
depth safety planning to reduce these risks, has high economic potential, and a forward-thinking
environmental strategy, thereby making it a success.
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank the American Institute of Chemical Engineers for the design
request. In addition, we would like to thank Professor 3, Professor 4, Professor 5, and Professor 1
for providing us with the appropriate chemical process safety, controls, and design education in
order to complete this project.
98
Bibliography
Access Intelligence, LLC. (2017, June). CEPCI . Retrieved from Chemical Engineering:
https://www.scribd.com/document/352561651/CEPCI-June-2017-Issue
Access Washington. (2018). Doing Business in the City of Kalama. Retrieved from Access
Washington: http://access.wa.gov/topics/business/City/Business/License/Kalama.html
AIChE. (2018). 2018 Student Design Competition.
Airgas. (2018). SDS Search . Retrieved from Airgas: https://www.airgas.com/sds-search
American Industrial Hygiene Association. (2013). Odor Threshold Values. Retrieved from Odor
Threshold Values:
http://www.pdo.co.om/hseforcontractors/Health/Documents/HRAs/ODOR%20THRESH
OLDS.pdf
Amiton, L. (2018). The Signing of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 Retroactively Extends
Many Alternative Fuel Tax Credits. Retrieved from Lone Star Clean Fuels Alliance:
http://lonestarcfa.org/the-signing-of-the-bipartisan-budget-act-of-2018-retroactively-
extends-many-alternative-fuel-tax-credits/
Andrews, W., & Parlapiano, A. (2017, December). What's in the Final Republican Tax Bill.
Retrieved from The New York Times:
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/12/15/us/politics/final-republican-tax-bill-
cuts.html
Assured Automation. (2018). FM Fire-Safe Series. Retrieved from Assured Automation:
https://assuredautomation.com/firesafe/index.php?p=buy&pn=CF90SPF150CT165C&gcl
id=Cj0KCQjwh7zWBRCiARIsAId9b4ovtpbeat7oLOvEah5msm6CI5HgCh89e2npfmwP
H7SJi0mSfa-zbfIaAhQtEALw_wcB
Brush, L., Xiong, Y., Garner, J., Ismail, A., & Roselle, G. (n.d.). Consumption of Carbon
Dioxide by Precipitation of Carbonate Minerals Resulting from Dissolution of Sulfate
Minerals in the Salado Formation In Response to Microbial Sulfate Reduction in the
WIPP. Retrieved from United States Environmental Protection Agency:
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-05/documents/brush_caco3_mgo.pdf
Bureau of Labor Statistics. (2015, May). Security Guards. Retrieved from Occupational
Employment Statistics: https://www.bls.gov/oes/2015/may/oes339032.htm
Bureau of Labor Statistics. (2017, May). Chemical Plant and System Operators. Retrieved from
Occupational Employment Statistics: https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes518091.htm#st
Carbon Fund. (2018). Buisness carbon footprint estimating. Retrieved from CarbonFund:
https://carbonfund.org/business-calculator/
CoStar Realty Information, Inc. (2018). Kalama, Cowiltz County, Southwest, Washington Land
for Sale. Retrieved from Land Watch:
https://www.landwatch.com/default.aspx?ct=R&type=5,80;6,635;268,6843;361,90475&p
g=2
CraftJack. (n.d.). How Much Does It Cost to Install a Barbed Wire Fence? Retrieved from
ImproveNet: https://www.improvenet.com/r/costs-and-prices/barbed-wire-fencing
Crowl, D., & Louvar, J. (2011). Chemical Process Safety. Boston, MA.
CSIMarket, Inc. (2017). Chemical Manufacturing Industry. Retrieved from CSI Market:
https://csimarket.com/Industry/industry_Efficiency.php?ind=101
Cushman-Roisin, B. (2018). Solar Energy. Retrieved from Engineering Dartmouth:
https://engineering.dartmouth.edu/~d30345d/courses/engs44/solar-energy.pdf
99
DHS. (n.d.). DHS: Chemicals of Interest. Retrieved from DHS:
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/appendix-a-to-part-27-508.pdf
Dow. (2016). Dow Ion Exchange Resins.
Energy & Environmental Research Center. (2017). What is CO2 Sequestration? Retrieved from
Plains CO2 Reduction (PCOR) Partnership:
https://www.undeerc.org/pcor/sequestration/WhatIsSequestration.aspx
Energy Northwest. (2018). Renewable Energy. Retrieved from Energy Northwest:
https://www.energy-northwest.com/energy101/energysources/Pages/Renewable.aspx
EPA. (2018). CERCLA and EPCRA Continuous Release Reporting. Retrieved from EPA:
https://www.epa.gov/epcra/cercla-and-epcra-continuous-release-reporting
Ferguson. (2018). Relief Valves. Retrieved from Ferguson Enterprises Inc.:
https://www.ferguson.com/category/valves/relief-valves/_/N-zbq54fZzbqj7j
Fixr. (2018). Driveway Gate Installation Cost. Retrieved from Fixr:
https://www.fixr.com/costs/driveway-gate-install
Google. (2018). Google Maps. Retrieved from Google Maps:
https://www.google.com/maps/place/Kalama,+WA+98625/@46.0844727,-
122.9162975,11963m/data=!3m1!1e3!4m5!3m4!1s0x54944166cc6ff7ed:0x9ebb197dcf9
2449d!8m2!3d46.0084472!4d-122.8445508
GPO. (2018). Reportable Quantites. Retrieved from Government Publishing Office:
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CFR-2016-title40-vol30/pdf/CFR-2016-title40-
vol30-sec302-4.pdf
Grainger. (2018). Rupture Discs. Retrieved from Grainger:
https://www.grainger.com/category/rupture-discs/pressure-and-temperature-control-
valves/plumbing-valves/plumbing/ecatalog/N-rgt
Grainger. (n.d.). Fire Suppression Foam. Retrieved from Grainger:
https://www.grainger.com/product/BUCKEYE-Fire-Suppression-Foam-19UC57
Green, D. W., & Perry, R. H. (2008). Perry's Chemical Engineer's Handbook (8th ed.). New
York: McGraw-Hill.
Hsieh, C.-T., Lee, H.-M., Liang, K.-C., & Tzeng, C.-C. (2011). Method for Making Dimethyl
Ether by Reactive-Distillation.
International Programme on Chemical Safety (IPCS). (2004, October). DIESEL FUEL No. 2.
Retrieved from INCHEM: Chemical Safety Information from Intergovernmental
Organizations: http://www.inchem.org/documents/icsc/icsc/eics1561.htm
Kansas Health System . (n.d.). Poison Facts. Retrieved from Medium Chemicals: Methyl
Mercaptan :
https://www.kansashealthsystem.com/~/media/Imported/kumed/documents/kdhe-
20methyl-20mercaptan.ashx?la=en
Kauffman Co. (2012). How Much Does a Fire Sprinkler System Cost? Retrieved from Fire and
Life Safety: https://www.kauffmanco.net/blog/fire-sprinkler-costs/
KMPG International. (2012). Profitability and Royalty Rates Across Industries: Some
Preliminary Evidence. Retrieved from KMPG International:
https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/pdf/2015/09/gvi-profitability.pdf
Lake Charles Methanol, LLC. (2017). Retrieved from Lake Charles Methanol:
https://www.lakecharlesmethanol.com/
100
Lane, J. (2018). Biodiesel Tax Credit Back in US Budget Deal. Retrieved from Biofuels Digest:
http://www.biofuelsdigest.com/bdigest/2018/02/09/biodiesel-tax-credit-back-in-us-
budget-deal/
Lean Six Sigma. (2012). HOW MUCH IMPACT DOES ONE GALLON OF WATER IN YOUR
HOME OR BUSINESS HAVE ON THE ENVIRONMENT? Retrieved from Lean Six
Sigma: http://leansixsigmaenvironment.org/index.php/how-much-impact-does-one-
gallon-of-water-in-your-home-or-business-have-on-the-environment/
Lubrizol . (2017). Safety Data Sheet . 1.1.
Lyons Industrial Properties. (2018). Sprinkler System Terms for Industrial Buildings. Retrieved
from Lyons Industrial Properties: http://www.lyonsindustrial.com/sprinkler-system-
terms-for-industrial-buildings
Malesky, M. (2018). Minimum Oxygen Concentration for human breathin. Retrieved from
Sciencing: https://sciencing.com/minimum-oxygen-concentration-human-breathing-
15546.html
Mapp, C., Nobe, M. C., & Dunbar, B. (2012). The Cost of LEED—An Analysis of the
Construction Costs of LEED and Non-LEED Banks. Retrieved from The Journal of
Sustainable Real Estate: The Cost of LEED—An Analysis of
Marlon, J., Howe, P., Mildenberger, M., & Leiserowitz, A. (2016). Yale Climate Opinion Maps.
Retrieved from Yale Program on Climate Change.
McKone, T., Rice, D., Ginn, T., Bastani, M., Levy, A., Lenhart, A., . . . Boudreaux, R. (2015).
California Dimethyl Ether Multimedia Evaluation Tier I. University of California.
California Environmental Protection Agency Multimedia Working Group.
Methanex. (2018, March). Methanex Monthly Average Regional Posted Contract Price History.
Retrieved from Methanex: https://www.methanex.com/sites/default/files/methanol-
price/MxAvgPrice_Mar%2029%2C%202018.pdf
Mody, D. (2017, January 5). Consequence Analyzer for 2018 AIChE Design Problem. Retrieved
from http://www.cheedesign.net/consequence/ConsequenceAnalyser.xls.
Professor 5. (2017, September). Cost of Manufacturing Lecture.
Professor 5. (2017, September). Economic Analysis Lecture.
Professor 5. (2017, September). Equipment Sizing Lecture.
Professor 3. (2017). Chemical Process Safety Lectures.
National Academy of Sciences. (1996). Permissible Exposure Levels for Selected Military Fuel
Vapors. Retrieved from National Center for Biotechnology Information:
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK231234/
New Mexico State University. (2016). NMSU Chemical Container Labeling Procedures.
Retrieved from New Mexico State University: Environmental Health & Safety:
https://safety.nmsu.edu/chemical-waste-management/hazard-communication/nmsu-
chemical-labeling-procedure/
Nolo. (2018). Louisiana State Business Income Tax. Retrieved from Nolo:
https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/louisiana-state-business-income-tax.html
NWIW. (2018). Projects: Port of Kalama. Retrieved April 22, 2018, from Northwest Innovation
Works: https://nwinnovationworks.com/project/
OSHA. (n.d.). Hydrogen Sulfide. Retrieved from OSHA:
https://www.osha.gov/SLTC/hydrogensulfide/hazards.html
101
Riddle, L. (2014). The Think Tank Blog. Retrieved from Fischer Tank Company :
https://www.fishertank.com/blog/bid/392723/NFPA-s-HazCom-Diamond-Learn-The-
Labels
Science Lab. (2017). Material Safety Data Sheet Listing. Retrieved from Science Lab :
http://www.sciencelab.com/msdsList.php
Sela, L., & Sobel, N. (2010). NCBI. Retrieved from Human Olfaction: A constant state of change
- blindness: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2908748/
Shell Global. (2017). Gas-to-Liquids. Retrieved December 14, 2017, from Shell Global:
http://www.shell.com/energy-and-innovation/natural-gas/gas-to-liquids.html
Specialty Steel Industry of North America. (n.d.). High Temperature Properties. Retrieved from
The Stainless Steel Information Center:
http://www.ssina.com/composition/temperature.html
Springer Link. (n.d.). Equipment Cost Estimates. Retrieved from Springer Link:
https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/bbm%3A978-94-011-6544-0%2F1.pdf
State of Washington. (2018). Doing Business in the City of Kalama. Retrieved from Access
Washington: http://access.wa.gov/topics/business/City/Business/License/Kalama.html
Stranges, A. N. (2007). Studies in Surface Science and Catalysis. Elsevier B.V. Retrieved from
Science Direct.
Sulzer, Ltd. (2018). Wide Portfolio of Rings for your Needs. Retrieved April 13, 2018, from
Conventional Random Packings:
https://www.sulzer.com/en/shared/products/2017/04/26/13/09/conventional-random-
packings
Sun, J., Yang, G., Yoneyama, Y., & Tsubaki, N. (2014, August 21). Cataylsis Chemistry of
Dimethyl Ether Synthesis. Retrieved April 3, 2018, from ACS Catalysis:
https://pubs.acs.org/doi/pdf/10.1021/cs500967j
TCI America. (n.d.). Ethyl Mercaptan. Retrieved from TCI America:
http://www.tcichemicals.com/eshop/en/us/commodity/E0036/
The Engineering ToolBox. (n.d.). Piping Materials and Cost Ratios. Retrieved from Engineering
ToolBox: https://www.engineeringtoolbox.com/piping-materials-cost-ratios-d_864.html
The Pall Ring Company Limited. (2013, May). Tower Packings and Internals. Retrieved from
The Pall Ring Company: http://www.pallrings.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/The-
Pall-Ring-Company-Virtual-Brochure.pdf
Totland, W. (2014). Why is methanol toxic. Retrieved from Chemistry stack exchange :
https://chemistry.stackexchange.com/questions/21915/why-is-methanol-
toxic?utm_medium=organic&utm_source=google_rich_qa&utm_campaign=google_rich
_qa
Toxnet. (2009). NAPTHA. Retrieved from Toxnet: https://toxnet.nlm.nih.gov/cgi-
bin/sis/search/a?dbs+hsdb:@term+@DOCNO+2892
Turton, R., Bailie, R. C., Whiting, W. B., Shaeiwitz, J. A., & Bhattacharyya, D. (2012). Analysis,
Synthesis, and Design of Chemical Processes. Prentice Hall.
U.S Department of Health and Human Services. (1978). Occupational Health Guideline for
Methyl Alcohol. Retrieved from CDC: https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docs/81-
123/pdfs/0397.pdf
U.S Green Building Council. (2018). LEED is green building. Retrieved from LEED:
https://new.usgbc.org/leed
102
U.S. Department of Energy. (2015, May 12). Dimethyl Ether. Retrieved from Alternative Fuels
Data Center: https://www.afdc.energy.gov/fuels/emerging_dme.html
U.S. Energy Information Administration. (2017). Annual Projections to 2050. Retrieved from
Analysis and Projections: https://www.eia.gov/analysis/projection-data.php#annualproj
United States Environmental Protection Agency. (2017). Carbon Dioxide Emissions. Retrieved
from Greenhouse Gas Emissions: https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/overview-
greenhouse-gases
University of Massachusetts Amherst. (n.d.). Compressed, Specialty and Liquid Gases. Retrieved
from University of Massachusetts Amherst:
http://www.umass.edu/procurement/contracts/CA11-RH-4042%20-
%20Pricing%20Recap%20for%20Air%20Gas.pdf
Washington State Department of Revenue. (2017). Business Tax Structure in Washington State.
Retrieved from Washington State Department of Revenue and Its Licensors:
https://dor.wa.gov/doing-business/business-types/industry-guides/mortgage-
brokers/business-tax-structure-washington-state
Ziskin, M. (2013). Select Appropriate Chemical Protective Clothing. Retrieved from AIChE
Chemical Engineering Progress: https://www.aiche.org/system/files/cep/20130926.pdf
103
Supplemental Documentation: Appendices
AIChE 2018 Student Design Competition

Dimethyl Ether for Transportation
Submitted By:
Student A
Student B
Student C
Student D
Submitted To:
Professor 1
Professor 2
TA1
TA2
Submitted On:
April 25, 2018
University
Anytown, USA 12345
Table of Contents
Table of Tables ........................................................................................................................... 106
Table of Figures .......................................................................................................................... 108
Appendices .................................................................................................................................. 109
Appendix A: Project Premises ................................................................................................ 109
Appendix B: Nomenclature .................................................................................................... 111
Appendix C: Simulation Software .......................................................................................... 114
Appendix C1: Decision Trees ............................................................................................. 114
Appendix C2: Overall Mass and Energy Balance .............................................................. 115
Appendix C3: Unit Specification Sheets ............................................................................ 116
Appendix D: Mass and Energy Balances................................................................................ 132
Appendix D1: Mass Balances for each Unit Op ................................................................. 132
Appendix D2: Energy Balances for each Unit Op .............................................................. 133
Appendix E: CAPCOST Software Output .............................................................................. 134
Appendix F: Supplementary Economics Information ............................................................ 135
Appendix F1: Original (Without Subsidies) ....................................................................... 135
Appendix F2: Government Subsidies ................................................................................. 137
Appendix G: Sample Calculations .......................................................................................... 139
Appendix G1: Process Design ............................................................................................ 139
Appendix G2: Economics ................................................................................................... 141
Appendix H: Monte Carlo Probability Distributions .............................................................. 147
Appendix I: HAZOP ............................................................................................................... 149
Appendix I1: HAZOP, Pumps ............................................................................................ 149
Appendix I2: HAZOP, Methanol Storage Tanks ................................................................ 150
Appendix I3: HAZOP, Catalytic Distillation Tower .......................................................... 151
Appendix I4: HAZOP, Reboiler ......................................................................................... 152
Appendix I5: HAZOP, Condenser ...................................................................................... 153
Appendix I6: HAZOP, Water/DME Tower ........................................................................ 154
Appendix I7: HAZOP, Lubricant/ethyl mercaptan Tank ................................................... 155
Appendix I8: HAZOP, Final Product Mixer....................................................................... 156
Appendix I9: HAZOP, DME storage tank .......................................................................... 157
Appendix I10: HAZOP, Heat Exchanger ........................................................................... 158
Appendix J: Worst Case Scenario Consequences ................................................................... 159
Appendix J1: Release Rates ................................................................................................ 159
Appendix J2: Downwind Concentrations ........................................................................... 160
Appendix J3: Vessel Burst Energy ..................................................................................... 165
105
Appendix J4: Fireball/BLEVE Consequences .................................................................... 168
Appendix J5: VCE Consequences ...................................................................................... 169
Appendix K: CRW Information.............................................................................................. 170
Appendix L: MSDS ................................................................................................................ 176
Appendix M: Communication with Company Representatives ............................................. 182
Appendix M1: Lubrizol ...................................................................................................... 182
Appendix M2: Dow Chemical ............................................................................................ 182
Table of Tables
Table 34: The energy balances around each process unit. The merged utility streams are the
duties for the process unit rather than stream enthalpies. ........................................................... 133
Table 35: The cumulative cash flow table for the DME process operating at 100% production.
..................................................................................................................................................... 135
Table 36: The cumulative cash flow table for the DME process operating at 50% production. 135
Table 37: The forecasted price of DME, annual revenue, and net profit for the DME process
operating at 100% production, with governmental subsidies. .................................................... 137
Table 38: The cumulative cash flow diagram for the DME process operating at 100% production,
with governmental subsidies. ...................................................................................................... 137
Table 39: The forecasted price for DME, the annual revenue, and net profit for the DME process
operating at 50% production, with governmental subsidies. ...................................................... 138
Table 40: The cumulative cash flow table for the DME process operating at 50% production,
with governmental subsidies. ...................................................................................................... 138
Table 41: A HAZOP analysis of the pump systems within the DME facility using parameters of
flow, temperature, pressure, and concentration and guide words of no, more, less and as well as.
..................................................................................................................................................... 149
Table 42: A HAZOP analysis of the methanol storage tank within the DME facility using
parameters of flow, temperature, pressure, and concentration and guide words of no, more, less
and as well as. ............................................................................................................................. 150
Table 43: A HAZOP analysis of the catalytic distillation tower within the DME facility using
and as well as. ............................................................................................................................. 151
Table 44: A HAZOP analysis of the reboiler system within the DME facility using parameters of
flow, temperature, pressure, and concentration and guide words of no, more, less and as well as
..................................................................................................................................................... 152
Table 45: A HAZOP analysis of the condenser systems within the DME facility using parameters
of flow, temperature, pressure, and concentration and guide words of no, more, less and as well
as. ................................................................................................................................................ 153
Table 46: A HAZOP analysis of the water/DME separation tower within the DME facility using
and as well as .............................................................................................................................. 154
Table 47: A HAZOP analysis of the lubricant/ethyl mercaptan storage tank within the DME
facility using parameters of flow, temperature, pressure, and concentration and guide words of
no, more, less and as well as ....................................................................................................... 155
106
Table 48: A HAZOP analysis of the final product mixer within the DME facility using
and as well as .............................................................................................................................. 156
Table 49: A HAZOP analysis of the DME storage tank within the DME facility using parameters
as ................................................................................................................................................. 157
Table 50: A HAZOP analysis of the heat exchanger systems within the DME facility using
and as well as .............................................................................................................................. 158
Table 51: A summary of the various release rates that would be achieved by varying pressure
vessel hole sizes for each of the major storage tanks on site. ..................................................... 159
Table 52: Downwind concentration distances in meters for daytime release from the methanol
tank at varied elevations and wind speeds .................................................................................. 160
Table 53: Downwind concentration distances in meters for nighttime release from the methanol
tank at varied elevations and wind speeds .................................................................................. 160
Table 54: Downwind concentration distances in meters for daytime release from the DMEl tank
at varied elevations and wind speeds .......................................................................................... 161
Table 55: Downwind concentration distances in meters for nighttime release from the DME tank
Table 56: Downwind concentration distances in meters for daytime release from the DME tank
Table 58 :Downwind concentration distances in meters for daytime release from the
lubricant/odor tank at varied elevations and wind speeds .......................................................... 163
Table 59: Downwind concentration distances in meters for nighttime release from the
Table 60: Downwind concentration distances in meters for daytime release from the
Table 62: Damage from a burst methanol storage tank showing a variety of scenarios including
damage to building and threats to health. ................................................................................... 165
Table 63: Overpressure following a methanol tank burst at various distances........................... 165
Table 64: Damage from a burst lubricant/odor storage tank showing a variety of scenarios
including damage to building and threats to health .................................................................... 166
Table 65:Overpressure following a lubricant/odor tank burst at various distances .................... 166
Table 66:Damage from a burst DME storage tank showing a variety of scenarios including
damage to building and threats to health .................................................................................... 167
Table 67: Overpressure following a DME tank burst at various distances................................. 167
Table 68: Fireball/BLEVE damage scenarios and their corresponding ranges, for various
chemicals in the DME process .................................................................................................... 168
Table 69: Surface intensities at various distances from the fireball/BLEVE center in the event of
an ignition of the chemicals used in the DME process ............................................................... 168
Table 70: Various scenarios for the overpressure from a vapor cloud explosion of methanol,
lubricant, odor, or DME. ............................................................................................................. 169
107
Table 71: The overpressure at various distances in the event of a vapor cloud explosion ......... 169
Table of Figures
Figure 29: The cumulative cash flow diagram for the DME process operating at 50% production.
..................................................................................................................................................... 136
108
Appendices
Appendix A: Project Premises
1. The basis for the design is a feed rate of 250,000 gal/day DME, with the ability to turn
down 50%.
2. ChemCAD provides accurate physical property data for process streams and components.
3. It has been assumed that the cooling water tower and associated pumps for supplying the
process with water exist as a portion of the company’s accessible utility grid. Therefore,
they will not be costed or sized as part of the scope of this project. Any additional
operating costs associated with the load placed on this equipment by the plant is assumed
to be incorporated into the material purchase price.
4. CAPCOST provides accurate bare module cost data and risk evaluation (Monte Carlo)
data.
a. To adjust for inflation, the CEPCI of 541.7 was used (Access Intelligence, LLC,
2017).
5. It is assumed that the additional safety measures (fusible link, rupture disc, spring-loaded
relief device, LEED 1.0 Gold Certification) do not affect the installation and construction
costs, so they were not included in the bare module cost.
6. The following parameters were assumed for the manufacturing costs:
a. Chemical plant operators are paid an annual salary of $57,000 (Bureau of Labor
Statistics, 2017). It is assumed the plant will require four security guards for 24/7
surveillance. Security guards are paid annual salaries of $34,310 (Bureau of Labor
Statistics, 2015).
b. Waste treatment costs $41.8/1000 m3 (Turton, Bailie, Whiting, Shaeiwitz, &
c. High-pressure steam costs $29.97/1000 kg (Turton, Bailie, Whiting, Shaeiwitz, &
d. Cooling water costs $14.8/1000 m3 (Turton, Bailie, Whiting, Shaeiwitz, &
e. Electricity costs $0.06/kW-h (Turton, Bailie, Whiting, Shaeiwitz, &
f. The forecasted price of methanol follows the same trend as the historical prices
(Methanex, 2018).
g. Nitrogen costs $/304 ft3 (University of Massachusetts Amherst, n.d.).
h. Amberlyst 35 costs $15/lb (AIChE, 2018). It is assumed that the Amberlyst 35
catalyst has a lifetime of three years (Dow, 2016)
i. Lubrizol costs $1.65/lb, with $0.02/gal shipping cost (AIChE, 2018).
j. Ethyl mercaptan costs $1.12/g and has the same shipping cost as the Lubrizol,
$0.02/gal (TCI America, n.d.).
7. For the cash flow diagram, the following assumptions were made:
a. A typical construction period of 2 years has been assumed (Turton, Bailie,
Whiting, Shaeiwitz, & Bhattacharyya, 2012) with the capital being divided 60/40
between the first two years, respectively.
b. The equipment is depreciated by the MACRS depreciation schedule.
c. The company would need to buy 4 acres of land, and fence 3.5 acres.
109
d. Working capital is 15% of the fixed capital investment (Turton, Bailie, Whiting,
Shaeiwitz, & Bhattacharyya, 2012).
e. The salvage value of the plant is near zero, and is relatively negligible in the
scope of the project economics.
f. The patent royalty rates are 25% of the before-tax profit (KMPG International,
2012).
g. The tax rate for this process is 21% (Andrews & Parlapiano, 2017).
h. An average discount rate of 8% (AIChE, 2018).
8. It is assumed that the federal government would provide the same alternative fuel tax
credits for the production of DME as they currently provide for biodiesel.
9. It is assumed that the internal minimum allowable rate of return (MARR) of the company
is 30%.
10. A stream factor of 0.9 (90%) was used for this plant.
11. The K-value and enthalpy models used to simulate the processes in ChemCAD were non-
random two-liquid (NRTL) model and the latent heat (LATE) model, respectively. These
are based on the decision trees in Appendix C1.
12. Flow rate release calculations were assumed to be applicable for this facility (L/D <4)
13. In the release rate calculations cp/cv was assumed to be 1.3 (liquid) and 1.4 (gas) for the
vessel explosion safety calculations.
14. For bursting vessel safety calculations the amount of gas was estimated to be the volume
of the headspace (20% of tank volume) and vessels were assumed to burst at a pressure of
1500kPa.
15. Explosion energy conversions were expected to be 80% in the calculation of a bursting
vessel and 2% in a vapor cloud explosion.
16. BLEVE calculations were completed assuming 35% or more of the liquid involved in the
fire flashes.
110
Appendix B: Nomenclature
Variable Description Units

Δ Emergency phone -
∆TLM Log mean temperature difference °C
a Lowest value -
ε Void fraction -
ρcat Density of the catalyst g/cm3
Sensor and Alarm -

AIChE American Institute for Chemical Engineers -
AIHA American Industrial Hygiene Association -
AIT Auto-ignition temperature °C
AT Analyzer transmitter -
b Most likely value -
BLEVE Boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion -
c Highest value -
C Ceiling -
CBM,i Bare module cost of equipment i $
CEPCI Chemical Engineering Plant Cost Index -
Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and

CERCLA Liability Act -
CF Annual cash flow $
CGR Grass roots cost $
Ci Cost of component i $/kg
COL Cost of operating labor $
COMd Cost of manufacturing $
CR Control room -
CRM Cost of raw materials $
CRW Chemical Reactivity Worksheet -
CSG Cost of security guards $
CUT Cost of utilities $
CWA Clean Water Act -
CWT Cost of waste treatment $
d Diameter m
DCF Discounted cash flow $
DCFROR Discounted cash flow rate of return %
111
dk Annual depreciation $
DME Dimethyl ether -
DPBP Discounted payback period yr
EICR Emergency isolation control room -
EPA Environmental Protection Agency -
ERPG Emergency planning response guidelines -
EW Eyewash -
FCI Fixed capital investment $
Fi Flow rate of component i kg/hr
FIC Flow indicating controller -
FP Flash point °C
FP Feed preparation -
FS Free Space in packing -
FS Foam suppressant -
FT Flow transmitter -
HAZOP Hazards and operability study -
HP High-pressure -
ht Height of tower m
i Discount rate %
ISD Inherently safer design -
L Length (height) m
LC Level controller -
LEED Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design -
LFL Lower flammability limit %
LP Low-pressure -
LT Level transmitter
MACRS Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery System -
MARR Minimum acceptable rate of return %
MeOH Methanol -
MOC Material of construction -
MP Medium-pressure -
MSDS Material Safety Data Sheet -
N2 Nitrogen -
NFPA National Fire Protection Agency -
Nnp Total number of process units -
NPV Net present value $
nt Stages in the tower -
NWIW Northwest Innovation Works, LLC -
O2 Oxygen -
OS Annual operator salary $
112
OX Oxidizer -
P Pressure kPa
P Process steps that involve solids -
P&ID Piping & instrumentation diagram -
P(x) Triangular cumulative probability function -
PFD Process flow diagram -
PM Preventative maintenance -
PP Final product processing -
PPE Personal protective equipment -
ppm Parts per million -
PRF Patent royalty rates $
PT Pressure transmitter -
Q Heat transfer MJ/hr
R Annual revenue $
SA Simple asphyxiate -
SP Set Point -
SS Safety shower -
STEL Short-term exposure limit -
T Temperature °C
t Time h
t Tax rate %
T1 T-101 -
T2 T-102 -
TLV Threshold limit value ppm
TNT Trinitrotoluene -
TT Temperature transmitter -
TWA Time weighted average -
W/hr-m2-
U Overall heat transfer coefficient °C
UFL Upper flammability limit %
Vcat Volume of catalyst m3
VCE Vapor cloud explosion -
Volumetric flow rate m3/h

Vpacked Volume of the packed sections m3
VPF Volume of process fluid m3
VT Volume of tank m3
wcat Weight of catalyst g
x Value of the parameter -
113
Appendix C: Simulation Software
Appendix C1: Decision Trees
114
Appendix C2: Overall Mass and Energy Balance
Calculation mode: Sequential
Flash algorithm: Normal
Equipment Calculation Sequence

2 3 4 9 11 1 6 5 8 10 7
Equipment Recycle Sequence

1 6 5
Recycle Cut Streams

12
Recycle Convergence Method: Direct Substitution
Max. loop iterations 40
Recycle Convergence Tolerance
Flow rate 1.000E-003

Temperature 1.000E-003
Pressure 1.000E-003
Enthalpy 1.000E-003
Vapor frac. 1.000E-003
Recycle calculation has converged.
115
Overall Mass Balance kmol/h kg/h
Input Output Input Output
Methanol 1210.000 0.524 38770.816 16.796
Dimethyl Ether 0.000 604.737 0.000 27859.607
Water 47927.938 48532.676 863422.000 874316.000
Nitrogen 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Lubrizol 0.295 0.295 25.789 25.789
Methyl Mercaptan 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
Total 49138.230 49138.230 902218.000 902218.000
Overall Energy Balance MJ/h

Input Output
Feed Streams -1.39545e+007
Product Streams -1.39501e+007
Total Heating 12977.5
Total Cooling -8550.75
Power Added 48.9439
Power Generated -57.1922
Total -1.39501e+007 -1.39501e+007
CHEMCAD 7.1.0 4/17/2018 2:32

PM
Appendix C3: Unit Specification Sheets

P-101A/B
P-102A/B
116
117
E-101
118
119
T-101
120
E-102
121
E-103
122
123
V-101
124
T-102
125
E-104
126
C-101
127
C-102
128
C-103
129
E-105
130
131
Appendix D: Mass and Energy Balances
Appendix D1: Mass Balances for each Unit Op
P-101 A/B In Out P-102 A/B In Out

Methanol (kg/h) 38770.82 38770.82 Methanol (kg/h) 38770.82 38770.82
Dimethyl Ether (kg/h) 0 0 Dimethyl Ether (kg/h) 0 0
Water (kg/h) 0 0 Water (kg/h) 0 0
Nitrogen (kg/h) 0 0 Nitrogen (kg/h) 0 0
Lubrizol (kg/h) 0 0 Lubrizol (kg/h) 0 0
Methyl Mercaptan (kg/h) 0 0 Methyl Mercaptan (kg/h) 0 0
TOTAL (kg/h) 38770.82 38770.82 TOTAL (kg/h) 38770.82 38770.82
Difference (kg/h) 0.000 Difference (kg/h) 0.000
Difference (%) 0.00% Difference (%) 0.00%
E-101 In Out T-101 In Out

Methanol (kg/h) 38770.82 38770.82 Methanol (kg/h) 0 0
Dimethyl Ether (kg/h) 0 0 Dimethyl Ether (kg/h) 38820.20419 66.1800573
Water (kg/h) 0 0 Water (kg/h) 18208.77 46068.37
Nitrogen (kg/h) 0 0 Nitrogen (kg/h) 781.769 11676.13108
E-103 In Out V-101 In Out

Methanol (kg/h) 0.0259473 0.02594727 Methanol (kg/h) 0 0
Dimethyl Ether (kg/h) 27743.83 27743.81 Dimethyl Ether (kg/h) 0.02594727 0.02594727
Water (kg/h) 7.111084 7.111075 Water (kg/h) 27743.81 27743.81
Nitrogen (kg/h) 0 0 Nitrogen (kg/h) 7.111075 7.111076
Methyl Mercaptan (kg/h) 0 0 Methyl Mercaptan (kg/h) 25.789 25.789
Difference (kg/h) 0.02000903 Difference (kg/h) 1E-06
T-102 In Out C-101 In Out

Methanol (kg/h) 66.15411 0 Methanol (kg/h) 49.38418 49.38419
Dimethyl Ether (kg/h) 18324.54 66.15412 Dimethyl Ether (kg/h) 18208.76 18208.77
Nitrogen (kg/h) 0 11669.0089 Nitrogen (kg/h) 0 0
132
C-102 In Out C-103 In Out
Methanol (kg/h) 0 0 Methanol (kg/h) 0 0
Dimethyl Ether (kg/h) 0 0 Dimethyl Ether (kg/h) 0 0
Nitrogen (kg/h) 0 0 Nitrogen (kg/h) 0 0
E-105 In Out
Methanol (kg/h) 0 0
Dimethyl Ether (kg/h) 0 0
Water (kg/h) 8421.8 8421.8
Nitrogen (kg/h) 0 0
Lubrizol (kg/h) 0 0
Methyl Mercaptan (kg/h) 0 0
TOTAL (kg/h) 8421.8 8421.8
Difference (kg/h) 0
Appendix D2: Energy Balances for each Unit Op
Table 34: The energy balances around each process unit. The merged utility streams are the
duties for the process unit rather than stream enthalpies.
Enthalpy (MJ/h) Process In Process Out Utility Utility In Utility Out Difference Diff. %
P-101 A/B -289330.4 -289318 Electric 12.17 0.230 0.00%
P-102 A/B -289318 -289281.4 Electric 36.77 0.170 0.00%
E-101 -289281.4 -281544.6 Steam -123846.8 -131583.6 0.000 0.00%
T-101 -363208.88 -371759.3 Cooling Water -8550.7461 0.326 0.00%
E-103 -110820 -121516 Cooling Water -13541340 -13530650 6.000 0.00%
V-101 -121525.247 -121525.1 -- 0 0 0.147 0.00%
T-102 -260939.3 -247961.8 Steam 12977.542 0.042 0.00%
C-101 -81630.5 -81664.28 Electric -33.78 0.000 0.00%
C-102 -131583.6 -131601.5 Electric -17.87 0.030 0.00%
C-103 -131601.5 -131607 Electric -5.54 0.040 0.00%
133
Appendix E: CAPCOST Software Output
134
Appendix F: Supplementary Economics Information
Appendix F1: Original (Without Subsidies)
Cumulative
Cost of Discounted Cash
Year Investment Depreciation FCI-∑dk Revenue Patent Royalty Fees Cash Flow DCF (in
Manufacturing Flow
millions)
-1 $ (5,242,591) $ 8,504,319 $ - $ - $ (5,242,591) $ (5,661,998) $ (5.66)
0 $ (4,677,375) $ - $ 8,504,319 $ - $ - $ - $ (4,677,375) $ (4,677,375) $ (10.34)
1 $ 1,700,864 $ 6,803,455 $ 153,940,207 $ 212,624,567 $ (14,671,089.99) $ (34,413,301.90) $ (31,864,168) $ (42.20)
2 $ 2,721,382 $ 4,082,073 $ 156,406,377 $ 217,525,710 $ (15,279,833.14) $ (35,641,714) $ (30,557,025) $ (72.76)
3 $ 1,632,829 $ 2,449,244 $ 158,848,962 $ 222,545,135 $ (15,924,043.23) $ (37,397,088) $ (29,687,014) $ (102.45)
4 $ 979,697 $ 1,469,546 $ 162,987,495 $ 227,682,843 $ (16,173,837.10) $ (38,126,257) $ (28,023,937) $ (130.47)
5 $ 979,697 $ 489,849 $ 164,784,940 $ 232,583,986 $ (16,949,761.49) $ (39,965,198) $ (27,199,642) $ (157.67)
6 $ 489,849 $ - $ 165,401,999 $ 237,603,411 $ (18,050,353.18) $ (42,676,469) $ (26,893,414) $ (184.56)
7 $ - $ 167,267,904 $ 242,741,120 $ (18,868,304.01) $ (44,717,881) $ (26,092,454) $ (210.66)
8 $ - $ 169,280,227 $ 247,642,262 $ (19,590,508.78) $ (46,429,506) $ (25,084,417) $ (235.74)
9 $ - $ 171,645,726 $ 252,661,688 $ (20,253,990.48) $ (48,001,957) $ (24,012,930) $ (259.75)
10 $ - $ 173,066,090 $ 257,799,396 $ (21,183,326.64) $ (50,204,484) $ (23,254,390) $ (283.01)
11 $ - $ 175,397,175 $ 262,700,539 $ (21,825,841.00) $ (51,727,243) $ (22,184,928) $ (305.19)
12 $ - $ 176,129,266 $ 267,719,964 $ (22,897,674.40) $ (54,267,488) $ (21,550,366) $ (326.74)
13 $ - $ 177,938,320 $ 272,857,672 $ (23,729,838.04) $ (56,239,716) $ (20,679,227) $ (347.42)
14 $ - $ 179,960,371 $ 277,758,815 $ (24,449,610.92) $ (57,945,578) $ (19,728,212) $ (367.15)
15 $ - $ 180,924,915 $ 282,778,240 $ (25,463,331.23) $ (60,348,095) $ (19,024,236) $ (386.18)
16 $ - $ 181,695,092 $ 287,915,949 $ (26,555,214.27) $ (62,935,858) $ (18,370,377) $ (404.55)
17 $ - $ 184,693,984 $ 292,817,091 $ (27,030,776.81) $ (64,062,941) $ (17,314,224) $ (421.86)
18 $ - $ 185,630,906 $ 297,836,517 $ (28,051,402.78) $ (66,481,825) $ (16,637,012) $ (438.50)
19 $ - $ 186,845,660 $ 302,974,225 $ (29,032,141.39) $ (68,806,175) $ (15,943,221) $ (454.44)
20 $ 1,275,647.78 $ - $ 187,947,629 $ 307,875,368 $ (29,981,934.72) $ (69,781,538) $ (14,971,504) $ (469.41)
Cumulative
Cost of Discounted Cash DCF (in
Year Investment Depreciation FCI-∑dk Revenue Manufacturing Patent Royalty Fees Cash Flow Flow millions)
-1 $ (5,242,591) $ 8,504,319 $ - $ - $ (5,242,591) $ (5,661,998) $ (5.66)
0 $ (4,677,375) $ - $ 8,504,319 $ - $ - $ - $ (4,677,375.21) $ (4,677,375) $ (10.34)
1 $ 1,700,864 $ 6,803,455 $ 76,970,104 $ 109,434,150 $ (8,116,011.54) $ (18,877,765.98) $ (17,479,413) $ (27.82)
2 $ 2,721,382 $ 4,082,073 $ 78,203,189 $ 111,825,580 $ (8,405,597.75) $ (19,349,776.46) $ (16,589,315) $ (44.41)
3 $ 1,632,829 $ 2,449,244 $ 79,424,481 $ 114,335,292 $ (8,727,702.79) $ (20,341,761.49) $ (16,147,946) $ (60.56)
4 $ 979,697 $ 1,469,546 $ 81,493,748 $ 116,963,288 $ (8,867,385.10) $ (20,809,966.20) $ (15,295,946) $ (75.85)
5 $ 979,697 $ 489,849 $ 82,392,470 $ 119,354,718 $ (9,240,561.92) $ (21,694,395.28) $ (14,764,841) $ (90.62)
6 $ 489,849 $ - $ 82,700,999 $ 121,864,430 $ (9,790,857.77) $ (23,101,464.67) $ (14,557,841) $ (105.17)
7 $ - $ 83,633,952 $ 124,492,426 $ (10,214,618.55) $ (24,208,645.97) $ (14,125,512) $ (119.30)
8 $ - $ 84,640,114 $ 126,883,856 $ (10,560,935.57) $ (25,029,417.30) $ (13,522,615) $ (132.82)
9 $ - $ 85,822,863 $ 129,393,569 $ (10,892,676.42) $ (25,815,643.11) $ (12,914,249) $ (145.74)
10 $ - $ 86,533,045 $ 132,021,564 $ (11,372,129.87) $ (26,951,947.78) $ (12,483,967) $ (158.22)
11 $ - $ 87,698,587 $ 134,412,994 $ (11,678,601.68) $ (27,678,285.98) $ (11,870,742) $ (170.09)
12 $ - $ 88,064,633 $ 136,922,707 $ (12,214,518.38) $ (28,948,408.55) $ (11,495,811) $ (181.59)
13 $ - $ 88,969,160 $ 139,550,702 $ (12,645,385.57) $ (29,969,563.80) $ (11,019,746) $ (192.61)
14 $ - $ 89,980,186 $ 141,942,132 $ (12,990,486.64) $ (30,787,453.33) $ (10,481,928) $ (203.09)
15 $ - $ 90,462,458 $ 144,451,845 $ (13,497,346.79) $ (31,988,711.90) $ (10,084,176) $ (213.17)
16 $ - $ 90,847,546 $ 147,079,841 $ (14,058,073.68) $ (33,317,634.62) $ (9,725,100) $ (222.90)
17 $ - $ 92,346,992 $ 149,471,270 $ (14,281,069.58) $ (33,846,134.91) $ (9,147,559) $ (232.05)
18 $ - $ 92,815,453 $ 151,980,983 $ (14,791,382.57) $ (35,055,576.69) $ (8,772,624) $ (240.82)
19 $ - $ 93,422,830 $ 154,608,979 $ (15,296,537.24) $ (36,252,793.26) $ (8,400,210) $ (249.22)
20 $ 1,275,647.78 $ - $ 93,973,814 $ 157,000,408 $ (15,756,648.54) $ (36,067,609.25) $ (7,738,241) $ (256.96)
135
production.
136
Appendix F2: Government Subsidies
Table 37: The forecasted price of DME, annual revenue, and net profit for the DME process
operating at 100% production, with governmental subsidies.
Year Price of diesel ($/gal) Price of DME ($/gal) Revenue from DME Annual Revenue Net Profit
1 3.31 $ 2.66 $ 243,771,444 $ 245,709,790 $ 33,085,223
2 3.37 $ 2.68 $ 246,237,614 $ 248,175,960 $ 30,650,251
3 3.42 $ 2.71 $ 248,680,199 $ 250,618,545 $ 28,073,410
4 3.51 $ 2.75 $ 252,818,732 $ 254,757,078 $ 27,074,235
5 3.55 $ 2.77 $ 254,616,177 $ 256,554,523 $ 23,970,537
6 3.56 $ 2.78 $ 255,233,236 $ 257,171,582 $ 19,568,171
7 3.60 $ 2.80 $ 257,099,141 $ 259,037,487 $ 16,296,367
8 3.65 $ 2.82 $ 259,111,464 $ 261,049,810 $ 13,407,548
9 3.70 $ 2.85 $ 261,476,963 $ 263,415,309 $ 10,753,621
10 3.73 $ 2.86 $ 262,897,327 $ 264,835,673 $ 7,036,277
11 3.78 $ 2.89 $ 265,228,412 $ 267,166,758 $ 4,466,219
12 3.80 $ 2.90 $ 265,960,504 $ 267,898,850 $ 178,886
13 3.84 $ 2.92 $ 267,769,557 $ 269,707,904 $ (3,149,769)
14 3.88 $ 2.94 $ 269,791,608 $ 271,729,955 $ (6,028,860)
15 3.90 $ 2.95 $ 270,756,153 $ 272,694,499 $ (10,083,742)
16 3.92 $ 2.96 $ 271,526,329 $ 273,464,675 $ (14,451,274)
17 3.98 $ 2.99 $ 274,525,221 $ 276,463,567 $ (16,353,524)
18 4.00 $ 3.00 $ 275,462,143 $ 277,400,489 $ (20,436,028)
19 4.03 $ 3.01 $ 276,676,897 $ 278,615,243 $ (24,358,982)
20 4.05 $ 3.03 $ 277,778,866 $ 279,717,212 $ (28,158,156)
Table 38: The cumulative cash flow diagram for the DME process operating at 100%
production, with governmental subsidies.
Cumulative
Cost of Discounted Cash DCF (in
Year Investment Depreciation FCI-∑dk Revenue Manufacturing Patent Royalty Fees Cash Flow Flow millions)
-1 $ (5,224,591) $ 8,474,319 $ - $ - $ (5,224,591) $ (5,642,558) $ (5.64)
0 $ (4,660,875) $ - $ 8,474,319 $ - $ - $ - $ (4,660,875) $ (4,660,875) $ (10.30)
1 $ 1,694,864 $ 6,779,455 $ 245,709,790 $ 212,624,567 $ 8,271,306 $ 19,958,916 $ 18,480,478 $ 8.18
2 $ 2,711,782 $ 4,067,673 $ 248,175,960 $ 217,525,710 $ 7,662,563 $ 18,729,748 $ 16,057,740 $ 24.23
3 $ 1,627,069 $ 2,440,604 $ 250,618,545 $ 222,545,135 $ 7,018,353 $ 16,975,180 $ 13,475,445 $ 37.71
4 $ 976,241 $ 1,464,362 $ 254,757,078 $ 227,682,843 $ 6,768,559 $ 16,246,495 $ 11,941,659 $ 49.65
5 $ 976,241 $ 488,121 $ 256,554,523 $ 232,583,986 $ 5,992,634 $ 14,407,554 $ 9,805,539 $ 59.46
6 $ 488,121 $ - $ 257,171,582 $ 237,603,411 $ 4,892,043 $ 11,696,646 $ 7,370,871 $ 66.83
7 $ - $ 259,037,487 $ 242,741,120 $ 4,074,092 $ 9,655,598 $ 5,633,948 $ 72.46
8 $ - $ 261,049,810 $ 247,642,262 $ 3,351,887 $ 7,943,972 $ 4,291,881 $ 76.75
9 $ - $ 263,415,309 $ 252,661,688 $ 2,688,405 $ 6,371,521 $ 3,187,347 $ 79.94
10 $ - $ 264,835,673 $ 257,799,396 $ 1,759,069 $ 4,168,994 $ 1,931,051 $ 81.87
11 $ - $ 267,166,758 $ 262,700,539 $ 1,116,555 $ 2,646,235 $ 1,134,925 $ 83.01
12 $ - $ 267,898,850 $ 267,719,964 $ 44,721 $ 105,990 $ 42,090 $ 83.05
13 $ - $ 269,707,904 $ 272,857,672 $ (787,442) $ (1,866,238) $ (686,212) $ 82.36
14 $ - $ 271,729,955 $ 277,758,815 $ (1,507,215) $ (3,572,100) $ (1,216,161) $ 81.15
15 $ - $ 272,694,499 $ 282,778,240 $ (2,520,935) $ (5,974,617) $ (1,883,448) $ 79.26
16 $ - $ 273,464,675 $ 287,915,949 $ (3,612,818) $ (8,562,380) $ (2,499,277) $ 76.76
17 $ - $ 276,463,567 $ 292,817,091 $ (4,088,381) $ (9,689,463) $ (2,618,761) $ 74.15
18 $ - $ 277,400,489 $ 297,836,517 $ (5,109,007) $ (12,108,346) $ (3,030,102) $ 71.12
19 $ - $ 278,615,243 $ 302,974,225 $ (6,089,746) $ (14,432,697) $ (3,344,230) $ 67.77
20 $ 1,271,148 $ - $ 279,717,212 $ 307,875,368 $ (7,039,539) $ (15,412,559) $ (3,306,737) $ 64.46
137
Table 39: The forecasted price for DME, the annual revenue, and net profit for the DME process
operating at 50% production, with governmental subsidies.
Year Price of diesel ($/gal) Price of DME ($/gal) Revenue from DME Annual Revenue Net Profit
1 $ 3.31 $ 2.66 $ 121,885,722.17 $ 122,854,895 $ 13,420,745.48
2 $ 3.37 $ 2.68 $ 123,118,807.12 $ 124,087,980 $ 12,262,400.66
3 $ 3.42 $ 2.71 $ 124,340,099.68 $ 125,309,273 $ 10,973,980.49
4 $ 3.51 $ 2.75 $ 126,409,366.13 $ 127,378,539 $ 10,415,251.27
5 $ 3.55 $ 2.77 $ 127,308,088.60 $ 128,277,262 $ 8,922,543.97
6 $ 3.56 $ 2.78 $ 127,616,617.94 $ 128,585,791 $ 6,721,360.59
7 $ 3.60 $ 2.80 $ 128,549,570.47 $ 129,518,744 $ 5,026,317.45
8 $ 3.65 $ 2.82 $ 129,555,732.18 $ 130,524,905 $ 3,641,049.38
9 $ 3.70 $ 2.85 $ 130,738,481.51 $ 131,707,655 $ 2,314,085.99
10 $ 3.73 $ 2.86 $ 131,448,663.37 $ 132,417,836 $ 396,272.19
11 $ 3.78 $ 2.89 $ 132,614,205.91 $ 133,583,379 $ (829,615.06)
12 $ 3.80 $ 2.90 $ 132,980,251.83 $ 133,949,425 $ (2,973,281.85)
13 $ 3.84 $ 2.92 $ 133,884,778.73 $ 134,853,952 $ (4,696,750.62)
14 $ 3.88 $ 2.94 $ 134,895,804.23 $ 135,864,977 $ (6,077,154.90)
15 $ 3.90 $ 2.95 $ 135,378,076.33 $ 136,347,249 $ (8,104,595.52)
16 $ 3.92 $ 2.96 $ 135,763,164.45 $ 136,732,337 $ (10,347,503.07)
17 $ 3.98 $ 2.99 $ 137,262,610.61 $ 138,231,784 $ (11,239,486.68)
18 $ 4.00 $ 3.00 $ 137,731,071.39 $ 138,700,244 $ (13,280,738.62)
19 $ 4.03 $ 3.01 $ 138,338,448.38 $ 139,307,621 $ (15,301,357.30)
20 $ 4.05 $ 3.03 $ 138,889,432.96 $ 139,858,606 $ (17,141,802.50)
Table 40: The cumulative cash flow table for the DME process operating at 50% production,
with governmental subsidies.
Cumulative
Cost of Discounted Cash
Year Investment Depreciation FCI-∑dk Revenue Patent Royalty Fees Cash Flow DCF (in
Manufacturing Flow
millions)
-1 $ (5,224,591) $ 8,474,319 $ - $ - $ (5,224,591) $ (5,642,558) $ (5.64)
0 $ (4,660,875) $ - $ 8,474,319 $ - $ - $ - $ (4,660,875.21) $ (4,660,875) $ (10.30)
1 $ 1,694,864 $ 6,779,455 $ 122,854,895 $ 109,434,150 $ 3,355,186.37 $ 8,307,713.08 $ 7,692,327 $ (2.61)
2 $ 2,711,782 $ 4,067,673 $ 124,087,980 $ 111,825,580 $ 3,065,600.16 $ 7,834,946.60 $ 6,717,204 $ 4.11
3 $ 1,627,069 $ 2,440,604 $ 125,309,273 $ 114,335,292 $ 2,743,495.12 $ 6,843,767.96 $ 5,432,804 $ 9.54
4 $ 976,241 $ 1,464,362 $ 127,378,539 $ 116,963,288 $ 2,603,812.82 $ 6,376,047.09 $ 4,686,585 $ 14.23
5 $ 976,241 $ 488,121 $ 128,277,262 $ 119,354,718 $ 2,230,635.99 $ 5,491,618.02 $ 3,737,503 $ 17.96
6 $ 488,121 $ - $ 128,585,791 $ 121,864,430 $ 1,680,340.15 $ 4,084,911.50 $ 2,574,187 $ 20.54
7 $ - $ 129,518,744 $ 124,492,426 $ 1,256,579.36 $ 2,978,093.09 $ 1,737,689 $ 22.27
8 $ - $ 130,524,905 $ 126,883,856 $ 910,262.34 $ 2,157,321.76 $ 1,165,534 $ 23.44
9 $ - $ 131,707,655 $ 129,393,569 $ 578,521.50 $ 1,371,095.95 $ 685,889 $ 24.13
10 $ - $ 132,417,836 $ 132,021,564 $ 99,068.05 $ 234,791.27 $ 108,754 $ 24.24
11 $ - $ 133,583,379 $ 134,412,994 $ (207,403.76) $ (491,546.92) $ (210,816) $ 24.02
12 $ - $ 133,949,425 $ 136,922,707 $ (743,320.46) $ (1,761,669.50) $ (699,583) $ 23.32
13 $ - $ 134,853,952 $ 139,550,702 $ (1,174,187.66) $ (2,782,824.74) $ (1,023,239) $ 22.30
14 $ - $ 135,864,977 $ 141,942,132 $ (1,519,288.72) $ (3,600,714.28) $ (1,225,903) $ 21.08
15 $ - $ 136,347,249 $ 144,451,845 $ (2,026,148.88) $ (4,801,972.84) $ (1,513,782) $ 19.56
16 $ - $ 136,732,337 $ 147,079,841 $ (2,586,875.77) $ (6,130,895.57) $ (1,789,550) $ 17.77
17 $ - $ 138,231,784 $ 149,471,270 $ (2,809,871.67) $ (6,659,395.86) $ (1,799,828) $ 15.97
18 $ - $ 138,700,244 $ 151,980,983 $ (3,320,184.66) $ (7,868,837.64) $ (1,969,169) $ 14.00
19 $ - $ 139,307,621 $ 154,608,979 $ (3,825,339.33) $ (9,066,054.20) $ (2,100,714) $ 11.90
20 $ 1,271,147.78 $ - $ 139,858,606 $ 157,000,408 $ (4,285,450.63) $ (8,885,370.20) $ (1,906,340) $ 10.00
138
Appendix G: Sample Calculations
Appendix G1: Process Design
Chemical Process Calculations to determine the amount of lubricant and odor to add:
139
Sizing of storage vessels to be used in the facility:
140
Appendix G2: Economics
141
142
143
144
145
146
Appendix H: Monte Carlo Probability Distributions
147
148
Appendix I: HAZOP
Appendix I1: HAZOP, Pumps
Table 41: A HAZOP analysis of the pump systems within the DME facility using parameters of
flow, temperature, pressure, and concentration and guide words of no, more, less and as well as.
149
Appendix I2: HAZOP, Methanol Storage Tanks
Table 42: A HAZOP analysis of the methanol storage tank within the DME facility using
and as well as.
150
Appendix I3: HAZOP, Catalytic Distillation Tower
Table 43: A HAZOP analysis of the catalytic distillation tower within the DME facility using
and as well as.
151
Appendix I4: HAZOP, Reboiler
Table 44: A HAZOP analysis of the reboiler system within the DME facility using parameters of
flow, temperature, pressure, and concentration and guide words of no, more, less and as well as
152
Appendix I5: HAZOP, Condenser
Table 45: A HAZOP analysis of the condenser systems within the DME facility using parameters
as.
153
Appendix I6: HAZOP, Water/DME Tower
Table 46: A HAZOP analysis of the water/DME separation tower within the DME facility using
and as well as
154
Appendix I7: HAZOP, Lubricant/ethyl mercaptan Tank
Table 47: A HAZOP analysis of the lubricant/ethyl mercaptan storage tank within the DME
facility using parameters of flow, temperature, pressure, and concentration and guide words of
no, more, less and as well as
155
Appendix I8: HAZOP, Final Product Mixer
Table 48: A HAZOP analysis of the final product mixer within the DME facility using
and as well as
156
Appendix I9: HAZOP, DME storage tank
Table 49: A HAZOP analysis of the DME storage tank within the DME facility using parameters
as
157
Appendix I10: HAZOP, Heat Exchanger
Table 50: A HAZOP analysis of the heat exchanger systems within the DME facility using
and as well as
158
Appendix J: Worst Case Scenario Consequences
Appendix J1: Release Rates
Table 51: A summary of the various release rates that would be achieved by varying pressure
vessel hole sizes for each of the major storage tanks on site.
Square edge
Liquid flow rate vapor flow Nozzle Vapor
0.125 inch (lb/hr) (lb/hr) flow (lb/hr)
DME 1,191 769 547
Mixer 1,191 769 547
Square edge
Liquid flow rate vapor flow Nozzle Vapor
0.25 inch (lb/hr) (lb/hr) flow (lb/hr)
DME 4,766 3,074 2,189

Mixer 4,766 3,074 2,189
Liquid flow rate Square edge Nozzle Vapor
0.5 inch (lb/hr) vapor flow flow (lb/hr)
methanol 2,175 2,109 2,109
DME 19,062 12,296 8,756

Mixer 19,062 12,296 8,756
Lubricant 2012 1949 1949
0.75 inch (lb/hr) vapor flow flow (lb/hr)
methanol 4,894 4,746 4,746
DME 42,890 27,666 19,702
Mixer 42,890 27,666 19,702
Lubricant 4,526 4,384 4,384
1 inch (lb/hr) vapor flow flow (lb/hr)
methanol 8,700 8,438 8,438
DME 76,248 49,184 35,026
Mixer 76,248 49,184 35,026
Lubricant 8,047 7,795 7,795
159
Appendix J2: Downwind Concentrations
Table 52: Downwind concentration distances in meters for daytime release from the methanol
tank at varied elevations and wind speeds
Methanol Tank - Day Chemical: Methanol
Elevation 0m
Wind Speed (m/s) Asphyxiant (m) ERPG 3 (m) ERPG 2 (m) ERPG 1 (m) Odor Threshold (m) LFL (m)
0.5 5 68 153 342 63 20
1 4 48 108 241 44 14
5 2 22 48 108 20 6
10 1 15 34 76 14 4
20 1 11 24 54 10 3
50 1 7 15 34 6 2
Elevation 20m
0.5 5 68 153 342 63 20

1 4 48 108 241 44 14
5 2 22 48 108 20 6
10 1 15 34 76 14 4
20 1 11 24 54 10 3
50 1 7 15 34 6 2
Elevation 40m
0.5 5 68 153 342 63 20
1 4 48 108 241 44 14
5 2 22 48 108 20 6
10 1 15 34 76 14 4
20 1 11 24 54 10 3
50 1 7 15 34 6 2
Table 53: Downwind concentration distances in meters for nighttime release from the methanol
tank at varied elevations and wind speeds
Methanol Tank - Night Chemical: Methanol
Elevation 0m
0.5 10 128 287 645 118 37
1 7 85 189 423 78 24
5 3 32 72 161 30 9
10 2 21 48 106 20 6
20 1 14 31 70 13 4
50 1 8 18 41 7 2
Elevation 20m
0.5 10 128 287 645 118 37

1 7 85 189 423 78 24
5 3 32 72 161 30 9
10 2 21 48 106 20 6
20 1 14 31 70 13 4
50 1 8 18 41 7 2
Elevation 40m
0.5 10 128 287 645 118 37
1 7 85 189 423 78 24
5 3 32 72 161 30 9
10 2 21 48 106 20 6
20 1 14 31 70 13 4
50 1 8 18 41 7 2
160
Table 54: Downwind concentration distances in meters for daytime release from the DMEl tank
at varied elevations and wind speeds
DME Tank - Day Chemical: DME
Elevation 0m
Wind Speed (m/s) Asphyxiant (m) TWA (m) Odor Threshold (m) LFL (m)
0.5 11 301 766 52
1 7 213 544 37
5 3 95 237 17
10 2 67 168 12
20 2 48 119 8
50 1 30 75 5
Elevation 20m
0.5 11 301 854 52
1 7 213 488 37
5 3 95 237 17
10 2 67 168 12
20 2 48 119 8
50 1 30 75 5
Elevation 40m
0.5 11 301 603 52
1 7 213 384 37
5 3 95 237 17
10 2 67 168 12
20 2 48 119 8
50 1 30 75 5
DME Tank - Night Chemical: DME
Elevation 0m
0.5 20 538 2,039 99
1 13 374 1273 65
5 5 142 355 25
10 3 94 234 16
20 2 62 154 11
50 1 36 89 6
Elevation 20m
0.5 20 301 1,142 99
1 13 374 713 65
5 5 142 355 25
10 3 94 234 16
20 2 62 154 11
50 1 36 89 6
Elevation 40m
0.5 20 538 2,039 99
1 13 374 1273 65
5 5 142 355 25
10 3 94 234 16
20 2 62 154 11
50 1 36 89 6
161
Table 56: Downwind concentration distances in meters for daytime release from the DME tank
DME Tank - Day Chemical: Lubrizol
Elevation 0m
0.5 1 167 540 4
1 0 118 373 3
5 0 53 167 1
10 0 37 118 1
20 0 26 83 1
50 0 17 53 0
Elevation 20m
0.5 1 167 485 4
1 0 118 373 3
5 0 53 167 1
10 0 37 118 1
20 0 26 83 1
50 0 17 53 0
Elevation 40m
0.5 1 167 381 4
1 0 118 373 3
5 0 53 167 1
10 0 37 118 1
20 0 26 83 1
50 0 17 53 0
DME Tank - Night Chemical: Lubrizol
Elevation 0m
0.5 1 314 1220 8
1 1 207 761 6
5 0 79 249 2
10 0 52 164 1
20 0 34 109 1
50 0 20 63 1
Elevation 20m
0.5 1 314 1025 8
1 1 207 639 6
5 0 79 249 2
10 0 52 164 1
20 0 34 109 1
50 0 20 63 1
Elevation 40m
0.5 1 314 683 8
1 1 207 426 6
5 0 79 249 2
10 0 52 164 1
20 0 34 109 1
50 0 20 63 1
162
Table 58 :Downwind concentration distances in meters for daytime release from the
lubricant/odor tank at varied elevations and wind speeds
Lubricant/Odor - Day Chemical: Lubrizol
Elevation 0m
0.5 2 728 3254 18
1 2 470 2074 13
5 1 210 728 6
10 1 149 470 4
20 0 105 332 3
50 0 66 210 2
Elevation 20m
0.5 2 656 2922 18
1 2 470 1862 13
5 1 210 654 6
10 1 149 470 4
20 0 105 332 3
50 0 66 210 2
Elevation 40m
0.5 2 514 2297 18
1 2 470 1464 13
5 1 210 514 6
10 1 149 470 4
20 0 105 332 3
50 0 66 210 2
Lubricant/odor - night Chemical: Lubrizol
Elevation 0m
0.5 4 1707 9167 33
1 3 1065 5722 22
5 1 314 1915 8
10 1 207 1195 6
20 0 137 432 4
50 0 79 249 2
Elevation 20m
0.5 4 1434 7700 33
1 3 895 4806 22
5 1 314 1609 8
10 1 207 1004 6
20 0 137 432 4
50 0 79 249 2
Elevation 40m
0.5 4 956 5134 33
1 3 597 3204 22
5 1 314 1073 8
10 1 207 669 6
20 0 137 432 4
50 0 79 249 2
163
Table 60: Downwind concentration distances in meters for daytime release from the
Lubricant/Odor - Day Chemical: Ethyl Mercaptan
Elevation 0m
Wind Speed (m/Asphyxiant (m) ERPG 3 (m) ERPG 2 (m) ERPG 1 (m) Odor Threshold (m) LFL (m)
0.5 1 104 208 9127 40770 6
1 0 23 46 5817 25982 1
5 0 10 21 2043 9127 1
10 0 7 15 1302 5817 0
20 0 5 10 830 3707 0
50 0 3 7 465 2043 0
Elevation 20m
0.5 0 33 66 8196 36611 2
1 0 23 46 5223 23332 1
5 0 10 21 1835 8196 1
10 0 7 15 1169 5223 0
20 0 5 10 745 3329 0
50 0 3 7 465 1835 0
Elevation 40m
0.5 0 33 66 6444 28784 2
1 0 23 46 4107 18343 1
5 0 10 21 1443 6444 1
10 0 7 15 919 4107 0
20 0 5 10 586 2617 0
50 0 3 7 465 1443 0
Lubricant/odor - night Chemical: Ethyl Mercaptan
Elevation 0m
0.5 3 246 492 29,193 156,775 15
1 0 41 82 18221 97853 2
5 0 16 31 6099 32755 1
10 0 10 20 3807 20444 1
20 0 7 14 2376 12761 0
50 0 4 8 1274 6843 2
Elevation 20m
0.5 1 62 124 24522 131691 4
1 0 41 82 15306 82197 2
5 0 16 31 5123 27514 1
10 0 10 20 3198 17173 1
20 0 7 14 1996 10719 0
50 0 4 8 1070 5749 2
Elevation 40m
0.5 1 62 124 16348 87794 4
1 0 41 82 10204 54798 2
5 0 16 31 3416 18343 1
10 0 10 20 2132 11449 1
20 0 7 14 1331 7146 0
50 0 4 8 714 3832 2
164
Appendix J3: Vessel Burst Energy
Table 62: Damage from a burst methanol storage tank showing a variety of scenarios including
damage to building and threats to health.
Methanol Tank Burst
Damage/Hazards Distance from Explosion (ft) (m) (mi)
TNT Equivalent = 1557 lbs
Large glass windows which are already under
strain are broken 7927.7 2416.4 1.5
Loud Noise. Sonic boom glass failure 5952.0 1814.2 1.1
Typical pressure for glass failure 1737.2 529.5 0.3
95% probability of no serious damage 963.3 293.6 0.2
large and small windows very likely to shatter 639.4 194.9 0.1
large and small windows are l00% shattered 2497.1 761.1 0.5
Minor damage to house structures 493.8 150.5 0.1
Partial demolition of houses, made
uninhabitable 379.2 115.6 0.1
Steel frame of clad building slightly distorted 314.3 95.8 0.1

Non-reinforced concrete or cinder walls start
to shatter 233.7 71.2 0.0
Non-reinforced concrete or cinder walls
completely shattered 179.3 54.6 0.0
Lower limit of serious structural damage 213.0 64.9 0.0
Steel frame building distorted and pulled from
foundations 179.3 54.6 0.0
Rupture of oil storage tanks begins 179.3 54.6 0.0
Rupture of oil storage tanks is complete 149.7 45.6 0.0
Wooden Utility poles snapped 130.8 39.9 0.0
Nearly complete destruction of houses (lower
range) 130.8 39.9 0.0
Nearly complete destruction of houses (upper
range) 107.5 32.8 0.0
Loaded trainwagons overturned 107.5 32.8 0.0
Loaded train boxcars completely demolished 93.4 28.5 0.0

Probable total destruction of buildings 88.2 26.9 0.0
Limit of crater lip 22.3 6.8 0.0
Lethality (low) 31.4 9.6 0.0
Lethality (high) 25.0 7.6 0.0
lung damage (low) 51.1 15.6 0.0
lung damage (high) 46.6 14.2 0.0
ear drum rupture 131.9 40.2 0.0
Table 63: Overpressure following a methanol tank burst at various distances

Methanol Tank Burst Overpressure (PSI)
Overpressure at 0.5 m 102209.9666
Overpressure at 1 m 15963.33796
Overpressure at 500m 0.148
Overpressure at 1609 m ~ 1 mile 0.044284967
165
Table 64: Damage from a burst lubricant/odor storage tank showing a variety of scenarios
including damage to building and threats to health
Lubricant/Odor Tank Burst
Damage/Hazards Distance from Explo(m) (mi)
TNT Equivalent = 12.7 lbs
Large glass windows which are already
under strain are broken 1596.51 486.62 0.30
Loud Noise. Sonic boom glass failure 1198.64 365.34 0.23
Typical pressure for glass failure 349.85 106.63 0.07
95% probability of no serious damage 194.00 59.13 0.04
large and small windows very likely to
shatter 128.77 39.25 0.02
large and small windows are l00%
shattered 502.87 153.27 0.10
Minor damage to house structures 99.44 30.31 0.02
uninhabitable 76.36 23.28 0.01
Steel frame of clad building slightly
distorted 63.30 19.29 0.01
start to shatter 47.07 14.35 0.01
completely shattered 36.11 11.00 0.01
Lower limit of serious structural damage 42.89 13.07 0.01
Steel frame building distorted and pulled
from foundations 36.11 11.00 0.01
Rupture of oil storage tanks begins 36.11 11.00 0.01
Rupture of oil storage tanks is complete 30.15 9.19 0.01
Nearly complete destruction of houses
(lower range) 26.34 8.03 0.00
Nearly complete destruction of houses
(upper range) 21.65 6.60 0.00
Loaded trainwagons overturned 21.65 6.60 0.00
Loaded train boxcars completely
demolished 18.81 5.73 0.00
Probable total destruction of buildings 17.76 5.41 0.00
Lethality (low) 6.32 1.93 0.00
lung damage (low) 10.29 3.14 0.00
Table 65:Overpressure following a lubricant/odor tank burst at various distances

Lubricant/Odor Tank Burst Overpressure (PSI)
Overpressure at 0.5 m 1658
Overpressure at 1609 m ~ 1 mile 0.015
166
Table 66:Damage from a burst DME storage tank showing a variety of scenarios including
damage to building and threats to health
DME Tank Burst
Damage/Hazards Distance from Explosion (ft) (m) (mi)
TNT Equivalent = 1404 lbs
Large glass windows which
are already under strain are 7652.32 2332.43 1.45
Loud Noise. Sonic boom glass 5745.25 1751.15 1.09
Typical pressure for glass 1676.89 511.12 0.32
95% probability of no serious 929.89 283.43 0.18
large and small windows very
likely to shatter 617.23 188.13 0.12
large and small windows are
l00% shattered 2410.33 734.67 0.46
Minor damage to house 476.64 145.28 0.09
Partial demolition of houses,
made uninhabitable 366.03 111.56 0.07
Steel frame of clad building
slightly distorted 303.38 92.47 0.06
Non-reinforced concrete or
cinder walls start to shatter 225.61 68.77 0.04
Non-reinforced concrete or
cinder walls completely 173.06 52.75 0.03
Lower limit of serious 205.59 62.66 0.04
Steel frame building distorted
and pulled from foundations 173.06 52.75 0.03
Rupture of oil storage tanks 173.06 52.75 0.03
Rupture of oil storage tanks is 144.53 44.05 0.03
Nearly complete destruction of
houses (lower range) 126.27 38.49 0.02
houses (upper range) 103.77 31.63 0.02
Loaded trainwagons 103.77 31.63 0.02
Loaded train boxcars
completely demolished 90.16 27.48 0.02
Probable total destruction of 85.13 25.95 0.02
Lethality (low) 30.31 9.24 0.01
lung damage (low) 49.30 15.03 0.01
Table 67: Overpressure following a DME tank burst at various distances

DME Tank Burst Overpressure (PSI)
Overpressure at 0.5 m 92720.1645
Overpressure at 1609 m ~ 1 mil 0.045
167
Appendix J4: Fireball/BLEVE Consequences
Table 68: Fireball/BLEVE damage scenarios and their corresponding ranges, for various
chemicals in the DME process
Methanol Tank
Calculated Distance from fireball
center Dose Dose Duration Result
miles ft kJ / m2 BTU / sq ft sec ref: Lees table 16.79
0.336 1775.2 838 73.8 1.43 mortality of 99% of people
0.812 4285.6 580 51.1 10 mortality of 50% of people
3.028 15989.5 125 11.0 30 1st degree burns (onset of blisters)
4.887 25803.0 1.6 0.1 1 Continuous Exposure to People Okay
1.009 5329.8 37.5 3.3 1 Damage caused to process equipment
1.129 5959.0 30 2.6 1 spontaneous ignition of wood
1.418 7487.8 19 1.7 1 cable insulation degrades
1.596 8427.2 15 1.3 1 Ignition of wood
Lubrizol/Odor Tank: Lubrizol
Calculated Distance from fireball Dose Dose Duration Result
0.121 637.5 15 1.3 1 Ignition of wood
Lubrizol/Odor Tank: Ethyl Mercaptan
0.004 22.6 15 1.3 1 Ignition of wood
DME storage: DME
1.645 8684.5 15 1.3 1 Ignition of wood
Table 69: Surface intensities at various distances from the fireball/BLEVE center in the event of
an ignition of the chemicals used in the DME process
Distance from fireball center
Methanol Lubrizol/Odor: Lubrizol/Odor:
Surface Lubrizol Surface Ethyl
Intensity Intensity Mercaptan DME: DME
(ft) (m) (miles) (BTU/hr sq ft) (BTU/hr sq ft) Surface (BTU/hr sq ft)
5.28 1.609 0.001 12112445456.7 69318618.39 87439.1 ############
528 160.9 0.1 1211245.0 6932 8.7 1286322.2
1320 402.25 0.25 193799.1 1109 1.4 205811.6
2640 804.5 0.5 48449.8 277 0.3 51452.9
3960 1206.75 0.75 21533.2 123 0.2 22868.0
5280 1609 1 12112.4 69 12863.2
6600 2011.25 1.25 7752.0 44 8232.5
7920 2413.5 1.5 5383.3 31 5717.0
9240 2815.75 1.75 3955.1 23 4200.2
10560 3218 2 3028.1 17 3215.8
11880 3620.25 2.25 2392.6 14 2540.9
13200 4022.5 2.5 1938.0 11 2058.1
14520 4424.75 2.75 1601.6 9 1700.9
15840 4827 3 1345.8 8 1429.2
17160 5229.25 3.25 1146.7 7 1217.8
18480 5631.5 3.5 988.8 6 1050.1
19800 6033.75 3.75 861.3 5 914.7
21120 6436 4 757.0 4 804.0
22440 6838.25 4.25 670.6 4 712.2
23760 7240.5 4.5 598.1 3 635.2
25080 7642.75 4.75 536.8 3 570.1
26400 8045 5 484.5 3 514.5
168
Appendix J5: VCE Consequences
Table 70: Various scenarios for the overpressure from a vapor cloud explosion of methanol,
lubricant, odor, or DME.
Methanol Methanol Lubricant/Od Lubricant/Odo Lubricant/Od Lubricant/Od
Tank Tank or: Lubricant r: Lubricant or: Odor or: Odor DME: DME DME: DME
TNT Amount (lb) 1384463.777 1635.314875 0.1 1391482.8
Distance (ft) Distance (m) Distance (ft) Distance (m) Distance (ft) Distance (m) Distance (ft) Distance (m)
Large glass windows which are
already under strain are broken 76219.0 23231.5 8056.9 2455.8 293.0 89.3 76347.6 23270.7
Loud Noise. Sonic boom glass 57224.1 17441.9 6049.0 1843.7 220.0 67.1 57320.6 17471.3
Typical pressure for glass failure 16702.3 5090.8 1765.6 538.1 64.2 19.6 16730.4 5099.4
95% probability of no serious 9261.9 2823.0 979.1 298.4 35.6 10.9 9277.5 2827.8
large and small windows very likely
to shatter 6147.8 1873.8 649.9 198.1 23.6 7.2 6158.2 1877.0
large and small windows are l00%
shattered 24007.5 7317.5 2537.8 773.5 92.3 28.1 24048.0 7329.8
Minor damage to house structures 4747.5 1447.0 501.8 153.0 18.3 5.6 4755.5 1449.5
uninhabitable 3645.7 1111.2 385.4 117.5 14.0 4.3 3651.9 1113.1
Steel frame of clad building slightly
distorted 3021.8 921.0 319.4 97.4 11.6 3.5 3026.9 922.6
Non-reinforced concrete or cinder
walls start to shatter 2247.1 684.9 237.5 72.4 8.6 2.6 2250.9 686.1
Non-reinforced concrete or cinder
walls completely shattered 1723.7 525.4 182.2 55.5 6.6 2.0 1726.6 526.3
Lower limit of serious structural
damage 2047.8 624.2 216.5 66.0 7.9 2.4 2051.2 625.2
Steel frame building distorted and
pulled from foundations 1723.7 525.4 182.2 55.5 6.6 2.0 1726.6 526.3
Rupture of oil storage tanks begins 1723.7 525.4 182.2 55.5 6.6 2.0 1726.6 526.3
Rupture of oil storage tanks is
complete 1439.6 438.8 152.2 46.4 5.5 1.7 1442.0 439.5
Wooden Utility poles snapped 1257.6 383.3 132.9 40.5 4.8 1.5 1259.8 384.0
houses (lower range) 1257.6 383.3 132.9 40.5 4.8 1.5 1259.8 384.0
houses (upper range) 1033.6 315.0 109.3 33.3 4.0 1.2 1035.3 315.6
Loaded trainwagons overturned 1033.6 315.0 109.3 33.3 4.0 1.2 1035.3 315.6
Loaded train boxcars completely
demolished 898.0 273.7 94.9 28.9 3.5 1.1 899.5 274.2
Probable total destruction of 847.9 258.4 89.6 27.3 3.3 1.0 849.3 258.9
Limit of crater lip 214.5 65.4 22.7 6.9 0.8 0.3 214.8 65.5
Lethality (low) 301.9 92.0 31.9 9.7 1.2 0.4 302.4 92.2
Lethality (high) 240.5 73.3 25.4 7.8 0.9 0.3 241.0 73.4
lung damage (low) 491.1 149.7 51.9 15.8 1.9 0.6 491.9 149.9
lung damage (high) 447.6 136.4 47.3 14.4 1.7 0.5 448.4 136.7
ear drum rupture 1267.9 386.4 134.0 40.9 4.9 1.5 1270.0 387.1
Table 71: The overpressure at various distances in the event of a vapor cloud explosion
Lubrizol/Odor: Lubrizol/Odor: Ethyl
Methanol tank Methanol tank Lubrizol Mercaptan DME Tank: DME
Distance mi Distance m Distance ft Overpressure (PSI) Overpressure (PSI) Overpressure (PSI) Overpressure (PSI)
0.00 0.30 1 506839308.2 431792.8 112.468 509761358.2
0.00 1.52 5 2843239.7 5678.9 5.197 2857804.4
0.00 3.05 10 368119.5 1061.2 1.669 369903.4
0.01 15.24 50 4944.4 33.4 0.185 4965.2
0.02 30.48 100 932.4 9.1 0.086 936.0
0.03 45.72 150 370.3 4.5 371.7
0.04 60.96 200 196.9 2.8 197.6
0.06 91.44 300 83.6 1.5 83.8
0.09 152.40 500 30.0 0.7 30.1
0.15 243.84 800 12.3 0.4 12.4
0.19 304.80 1000 8.2 0.3 8.3
0.38 609.60 2000 2.5 0.1 2.5
0.57 914.40 3000 1.3 0.1 1.3
0.76 1219.20 4000 0.9 0.1 0.9
0.95 1524.00 5000 0.6 0.0 0.6
1.14 1828.80 6000 0.5 0.0 0.5
1.33 2133.60 7000 0.4 0.4
1.51 2438.40 8000 0.3 0.3
1.70 2743.20 9000 0.3 0.3
1.89 3048.00 10000 0.3 0.3
169
Appendix K: CRW Information
170
171
172
173
174
175
Appendix L: MSDS
176
177
178
179
180
181
Appendix M: Communication with Company Representatives
Appendix M1: Lubrizol
Appendix M2: Dow Chemical
182
183
184
185

Team 8

Загружено:

Сведения о документе

Авторское право

Доступные форматы

Поделиться этим документом

Поделиться или встроить документ

Параметры публикации

Этот документ был вам полезен?

Это неприемлемый материал?

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

Team 8

Загружено:

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

Student A

April 25, 2018

It is recommended that, if government subsidies comparable to those of biodiesel are available,

Production Method Advantages Disadvantages

Table 2: Amberlyst 35 catalytic characteristics (AIChE, 2018); (Dow, 2016).

Catalyst Void Material Max Temperature Lifetime (yr) Price ($/lb)

Amberlyst 35 0.6 1.504 150 3 15

Process Flow Diagram (PFD) and Material Balances

Energy Balance and Utility Requirements

Table 7: Utility usage per hour for each process unit.

Electric Power Steam: HP Steam: MP Steam: LP Cooling

Annual Cost -100% Annual Cost - 50%

Equipment List and Unit Descriptions

Process Unit Unit Description

Equipment Specification Sheets

Heat Exchangers E-101 E-102 E-103 E-104 E-105

Towers/ Vessels T-101 T-102 V-101

Pumps/Expanders P-101 P-102 C-101 C-102 C-103

Storage Tanks Tk-101 Tk-102 Tk-103 Tk-104

T-101 Packing Parameter Specification

Equipment Cost Summary

Equipment Name Type of Equipment Bare Module Cost

Safety Equipment Bare Module Cost Source

Fixed Capital Investment Summary

ீோ = 1.18 # ஻ெ,௜ + 0.5 # ஻ெ,௜

Safety Equipment Unit Cost Source

Safety, Health and Environmental Considerations

TLV-TWA TLV-STEL TLV-C

Worst-Case Scenario Consequences

Mixer 1,191 769 547

Mixer 76,248 49,184 35,026

Minimum Combustible by self

To better understand the effect of a BLEVE on people in surrounding communities and at

Chemical Reportable Quantity (lbs)

Other Important Considerations

Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs)

Figure 12: The P&ID for T-101 and E-102.

Figure 14: The P&ID for E-101.

Figure 15: The P&ID for E-103.

Figure 16: The P&ID for E-105.

Figure 17: The P&ID for the methanol storage tank.

Lake Charles, LA Kalama, WA

Figure 21: Layout of the main production rooms of the facility.

ை௅ = 4.5 × × [6.29 + 31.7ଶ + 0.23௡௣ ]଴.ହ (12)

Cost Classification Amount Unit Cost Total Cost

Waste Treatment 11,020 kg/hr $41.8/1000 m3 $4,004/yr

High-pressure steam 8,422 kg/hr $29.97/1000 kg $1,989,900/yr

Cooling water 859.8 m3/hr $14.8/1000 m3 $100,324/yr

High-pressure steam 4,211 kg/hr $29.97/1000 kg $995,000/yr

Cooling water 430 m3/hr $14.8/1000 m3 $50,160/yr

Electricity 24.47 MJ/hr $0.06/kW-h $3,218/yr

Nitrogen 54.66 kg/hr $8/304 ft3 $343,792/yr

Year Price of Methanol ($/gal) Cost of Methanol Cost of Manufacturing

Price of diesel Price of DME

Discounted Cash Flow Diagram

 = 0.25 − ௗ  (16)

Year Depreciation Allowance

Figure 27: The Monte Carlo simulation inputs on CAPCOST.

Conclusions and Recommendations

AIChE 2018 Student Design Competition

Variable Description Units

Sensor and Alarm -

Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and

Volumetric flow rate m3/h

ீோ = 1.18 # ஻ெ,௜ + 0.5 # ஻ெ,௜

ை௅ = 4.5 × × [6.29 + 31.7ଶ + 0.23௡௣ ]଴.ହ (12)

= 0.25 − ௗ (16)