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Abstract
doi: 10.1111/acfi.12099
We gratefully acknowledge the guidance provided by Sven Modell and Donald Stokes
on the early stages of this research and comments provided by participants at research
seminars at the University of Technology, Sydney, 2007 and 2011; Macquarie
University, 2008; Melbourne University, 2008; the EAA Annual Conference, Rotter-
dam, The Netherlands, April 2008; the AFAANZ Annual Conference, Sydney,
Australia, July 2008; AAA Annual Conference, Anaheim, USA, August 2008; and
members of the Management Accounting Research Collaborative (MARC) and the
Centre for Management and Organizational Studies (CMOS) at UTS, the editors Steven
Cahan and Mandy Cheng of Accounting and Finance, and the anonymous reviewer.
Received 8 August 2013; accepted 28 August 2014 by Mandy Cheng(Editor).
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1. Introduction
Autonomous motivation, which refers to when people act out of their own
volition and self-endorsement (Ryan and Deci, 2000a,b), has long been
recognised as the ‘sacred spark’ behind academics’ research success (Cole and
Cole, 1973), with numerous empirical studies demonstrating links between
researchers’ productivity and motivation (Pelz and Andrews, 1976; Fox, 1983;
Wood, 1990; Ramsden, 1994; Babu and Singh, 1998; Porter and Umbach,
2001; Bland et al., 2005). However, psychology theory suggests that autono-
mous motivation, in both its intrinsic and extrinsic forms,1 can be diminished
by the overt exercise of control (Deci, 1971; Deci and Ryan, 1985), such as the
forms of management control increasingly associated with university research
management.
In many countries, universities have come under increasing pressure to
produce research outcomes and have been subject to higher education reforms
that involve the introduction of competitive funding and performance
evaluation systems (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment, 1999, 2005). Researchers in management and accounting have been
highly critical of the effects such systems have on academics within universities
(e.g. Willmott, 1995; Parker et al., 1998; Neumann and Guthrie, 2002; Modell,
2003), substantiated in part by empirical studies that report negative or
dysfunctional incidences of quantitative performance evaluation systems,
competitive reward structures and more direct administrator surveillance by
university administrators (e.g. Parker and Jary, 1995; Prichard and Willmott,
1997; Anderson, 2006; Macdonald and Kam, 2007; Pop-Vasileva et al., 2011;
Ter Bogt and Scapens, 2012). Consequently, this current institutional context
appears to pose a managerial puzzle: how can universities exert management
control over research whilst still preserving and even facilitating the autono-
mous motivation of their researchers?
To address this question, we present the findings from an exploratory study
we conducted of two university faculties. To contrast several recent
university-based studies which report negative or dysfunctional management
accounts, we intentionally sought to adopt a more appreciative lens, by
studying management control systems (MCS) in the context of research
productivity to try and understand ‘what works’ (Malmi and Granlund,
2009). In management accounting research, there is a significant range of
existing work that considers the potential of MCS to enable autonomy,
creativity, flexibility and innovation (e.g. Abernethy and Stoelwinder, 1995;
1
Autonomous motivation is a broad category that encompasses several types of
motivation that drive self-regulated behaviour. The best-known ‘prototypical’ form of
autonomous motivation is intrinsic motivation, but the category also includes types of
extrinsic motivation in which people have identified with an activity’s value and
integrated it into their sense of self (Ryan, 2000; Ryan and Deci, 2000).
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2. Literature review
An academic’s own personal motivation for doing research has long been
recognised as one of the fundamental factors influencing the performance of
academic researchers (Fox, 1983). Early sociological studies of highly produc-
tive academics found them to be distinguished by a ‘sacred spark’, ‘motivated
by an inner drive to do science and by a sheer love of the work’, irrespective of
any recognition or reward (Cole and Cole, 1973, p. 62). This was supported by
a landmark study of more than 1300 researchers by Pelz and Andrews (1976)
who found productive researchers’ motivation to be characterised by high
intensity, oriented towards advancing science and driven from internal sources
such as their own ideas and curiosity.3 Others have since found strong links
between productivity and researchers’ internal source of motivation (Babu and
Singh, 1998; Bland et al., 2005), intrinsic interest in science (Wood, 1990;
Porter and Umbach, 2001), and intensity and persistence (Ramsden, 1994).
This link may be further understood in the context other research which shows
that when people engage in intrinsically motivated tasks, they display more
persistence, creativity and cognitive flexibility (Deci and Ryan, 1985; Amabile,
1997; Ryan, 2000), all of which appear integral to knowledge-intensive,
complex, cognitive tasks, like university research.
3
In comparison, scientists who depended on stimulation from supervisors (‘external
motivation’) were consistently less productive (Pelz and Andrews, 1976).
4
SDT has been widely used in psychology, education, sport and more recently
organisational research. Reviews of this work include Ryan (2000), Ryan and Deci
(2000), Deci and Ryan (2002), Sheldon et al. (2003) and Gagne and Deci (2005).
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References
Abernethy, M. A., and J. U. Stoelwinder, 1995, The role of professional control in the
management of complex organizations, Accounting, Organizations and Society 20, 1–
17.
Adler, P. S., and B. Borys, 1996, Two types of bureaucracy: enabling and coercive,
Administrative Science Quarterly 41, 61–89.
Adler, P. S., and C. X. Chen, 2011, Combining creativity and control: understanding
individual motivation in large-scale collaborative creativity, Accounting, Organiza-
tions and Society 36, 63–85.
Amabile, T. M., 1997, Motivating creativity in organizations: on doing what you love
and loving what you do, California Management Review 40, 39–58.
Anderson, G., 2006, Carving out time and space in the managerial university, Journal of
Organizational Change 19, 578–592.
Babu, A. R., and Y. P. Singh, 1998, Determinants of research productivity,
Scientometrics 43, 309–329.
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N. C. Sutton, D. A. Brown/Accounting and Finance 7
2005, p. 335). Whilst still distinct from intrinsic motivation, these autonomous
forms of extrinsic motivation have been shown to provide many of the latter’s
associated benefits, including greater engagement, commitment, performance
and persistence (Sheldon et al., 2003; Gagne and Deci, 2005).
More recent SDT explanations attend to the processes by which the
regulation of behaviours can become internalised. Significantly, SDT argues
that internalisation processes rely on the satisfaction of the same basic needs of
competence and autonomy (e.g. by providing meaningful rationale for
uninteresting tasks, offering optimal challenges and ‘effectance-promoting
feedback’), with one important addition: people’s need for ‘relatedness’,10 that
is to feel they belong and are connected to others (Deci and Ryan, 1985, 2002;
Ryan and Connell, 1989; Gagne and Deci, 2005). The logic is that ‘because
extrinsically motivated behaviours are not inherently interesting and thus must
initially be externally prompted, the primary reason people are likely to be
willing to do the behaviours is that they are valued by significant others to
whom they feel (or would like to feel) connected’ (Ryan and Deci, 2000, p. 64).
In summary, SDT provides several insights relating to how the MCS applied
by universities may preserve and possibly enhance the autonomous motivation
of researchers. The degree to which MCS facilitate rather than undermine
autonomous motivation depends on whether they are perceived as controlling
or informational and autonomy-supportive. Researchers’ perceptions are likely
to be driven by the design characteristics of salient control systems, such as
performance evaluations and extrinsic rewards, as well as the administrative
and social structures through which control is enacted. In addition, self-
regulating behaviour may also reflect the adequacy of elements, such as cultural
control, to satisfy needs for relatedness and thus support the internalisation of
more extrinsic forms of autonomous motivation.
3. Research method
Due to the lack of prior theory about the operation of MCS used within
universities, we undertook an exploratory case study method, described by
Keating (1995) as a ‘discovery case study’, to facilitate a deeper understanding
of the operational use of control systems (Otley and Berry, 1994; Sandelin,
2008). We studied two faculties within the same university,11 which were
10
Some SDT work indicates that the need for relatedness may also affect intrinsic
motivation; however, the vast majority of empirical research about intrinsic motivation
has focused only on the effects of autonomy and/or competence (Ryan, 2000).
11
Typical of most universities, this context is characterised by a metropolitan location in
Australia, a student population of over 30,000, a broad disciplinary spread, and a dual
focus on teaching and research activities.
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12
Whilst an alternative research design may have examined the operation of MCS
across variations in performance (i.e. ‘low’ vs. ‘high performance’), the difficulties in
conceptualising what ‘low performance’ constitutes (as distinct from academic settings
which are not as oriented towards research), as well as the political practicalities of
gaining access to study such areas prevented this approach.
13
These elements parallel the criteria used by government and funding bodies to assess
institutional research performance.
14
To maintain the anonymity of the interviewees, the names of the two faculties have
been changed.
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and were paid according to a fixed salary scale. Neither faculty offered staff
salary supplementation nor monetary bonuses.
The analysis method was drawn from Glaser and Strauss (1967),
Eisenhardt (1989), Yin (2003), Miles and Hubermann (1994), and Patton
(2002). Each interview was recorded, transcribed and, with the archival data,
coded, based initially on the MCS package categories (Malmi and Brown,
2008). The coded data were then compiled into a checklist matrix (Miles and
Hubermann, 1994) which included interview quotes and other observations.
From the matrices, the researchers developed case descriptions of the two
15
A list of preliminary interview questions is provided in Table 2. These questions were
used particularly early in the data collection process; however, questions were adapted
to suit the expertise and insights of the specific interviewees.
16
A point to recognize is the high quality of respondents in the case study. In this
setting, each of the respondents was able to provide considerable information and
insight about the context in which they conducted their research. This led to theoretical
saturation earlier than we had anticipated when starting the field work.
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Table 1
Interviewee listing
Number of interviewees
FSS FIST
Faculty administrators (administrator only) 1 1
Faculty administrators (research active professors) 1 2
Senior researchers 2 2
Middle career researchers 1 1
Early-career researchers 2 2
FSS, Faculty of Social Sciences; FIST, Faculty of Information Systems and Technology.
Table 2
Preliminary interview schedule
Questions
In this section, we present the empirical material from our study. We first
present the firsthand accounts by interviewees, across both faculties, about
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their motivation towards research, before then describing the MCS used in each
faculty.
I enjoy doing research, so I suppose that you’ll probably find most of the big
researchers actually really, really like research. (Researcher, FIST)
To me, research is fun; it’s about learning and if it’s not fun, I mean, do something
else. . . You know, I have students come into the lab and they’re all very serious
about research, it doesn’t take them very long before they realise that, no, it’s about
passion and just having fun. And then they fold, I can never get rid of them. . . it’s
hard work. That’s where the passion comes in, you’ve got to really want to do this
stuff because they’re, like, my students spend a lot of hours in that lab. You know,
we’re all there ‘til midnight very often. But we love it. (Researcher FIST)
Our subsequent analysis revealed a degree of heterogeneity in the researchers’
comments about their motivation, in the way different individuals spoke about
what specifically they were passionate about. Three key patterns emerged from
this analysis.17
First, some researchers, who we have labelled the ‘interested’, described their
motivation in terms of their inherent interest in their discipline, and the actual
content and ideas of their research:
I mean, certainly I prefer to engage in curiosity driven research, I mean, that’s the
really fun stuff. (Researcher, FIST)
. . . you need something that interests you vitally and will get you through the tough
periods when you’ve got masses of stuff, and what do I do with it, and I’m stressed
out, and how am I going to get through. (Researcher, FIST)
I try not to get sucked into thinking what is going to be good for my career. . .. So I
think churning out papers, because I think that I need to write 64 papers because
17
We also analysed the interview data to ascertain if there were differences between the
comments made by researchers from different faculties and could find no consistent
patterns. As the balance of interview comments from both faculties demonstrates, there
is substantial similarity in the types of motivation expressed by researchers across both
settings.
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I’m going to get promoted to senior lecturer, or something like that, well, it’s just a
ticket to a sad life. . . . I try and do interesting things and maintain high standards.
(Researcher, FIST)
Second, many researchers, who spoke of their own love for the technical
process of doing research tasks, whether it is thinking through a conceptual or
theoretical problem or the practical process of conducting an experiment, and
of doing research for its own sake. As these researchers are motivated by the
value they place on the research process itself, we categorised them as the
‘technicians’:
You know, you can sit there thinking about what you’re going to do and how
you’re going to create, and this sort of thing, but when you actually do it, this other
process happens and one thing leads to another, and ideas come and it gets formed
and it’s exciting. That’s what you like, you like creating work and being engaged
with ideas and challenged by ideas. (Researcher, FSS)
So what is interesting for me is deciding what is essential in the theory, what you can
compromise, and how much you need to compromise. And it’s in this process of, sort
of, massaging the theory, and compromising as you go, that you learn so much
because you’re really trying to map this ideal solution to a complex real world and
that’s interesting, not everybody does find that interesting. (Researcher, FIST)
Third, we also found researchers who had strong expectations for the
outcomes of their research and spoke of a need to make use of their position as
university academics, as ‘public intellectuals’, to make relevant and useful
contributions to society (e.g. new technology, community-empowering infor-
mation, policy advice, or critical perspectives of societal issues). We have
labelled researchers with this outlook as the ‘idealists’:
I also come in each day because I really do think it’s important and it’s going to
make a difference. (Researcher, FIST)
Certainly, a number one priority is to deliver to homeless people and to ensure that
the research is respectful to any homeless people who are taking part; that it was
relevant, if that’s what the project’s about; that it was performed in such a way that
it was framed to have some impact on homeless people. Otherwise, to me, there’s
no point doing it. (Researcher, FSS)
Taken together, these statements not only confirm the significance of
researchers’ work motivation to their daily activity, but also reveal different
meanings ascribed to individuals’ ‘passion for research’, which align to the
different categories of autonomous motivation in SDT. Researchers driven by
their own inherent interest in either the content (i.e. ‘the interested’), or the
process (i.e. the ‘technicians’) of research appear to be driven by intrinsic
motivation, whereas the more instrumental ‘idealists’, who are more driven by
the value the outcomes of their work have, are more representative of
autonomous forms of integrated and identified extrinsic motivation.
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18
Researchers could use these funds to hire more research assistants to do time-
consuming but less central aspects of a project, or to pay the university the equivalent of
their teaching load responsibilities.
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individual could attend, and the introduction of a tiered system which limited
the range of conferences eligible for funding.
5. Analysis
To interpret our empirical material, we used SDT to explain how the types of
autonomous motivation researchers expressed were supported by specific
features in the design and use of the faculties’ MCS (summarised in Table 3).
The results of this analysis are presented below.
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Table 3
Management control systems found in case research units
FIST FSS
FSS, Faculty of Social Sciences; FIST, Faculty of Information Systems and Technology.
designed and executed, they are likely to still feel that their research
activities are self-determined. If anything, the rewards are most salient in
controlling the stage of the research process when researchers convert
outcomes from projects into specific research outputs (e.g. by encouraging a
researcher to translate their insights and findings into a peer-reviewed
publication) – a stage which is often perceived as more instrumental activity,
peripheral to the actual ‘doing of the research’. Thus, extrinsic rewards
appear to be only loosely related to tasks which are autonomously
motivated (i.e. the doing of the research), and more directly related to an
activity which are more externally regulated. This aligns with SDT theory
which suggests that while extrinsic rewards can be harmful for autono-
mously motivated behaviours, they can enhance activities which are more
instrumentally motivated (Sheldon et al., 2003; Gagne and Deci, 2005).
Fourth, researcher choice is facilitated through the use of informed peer
review to make discipline-based judgements of the holistic merit of a
candidate or project under evaluation. While peer review potentially creates
opportunities for subjective bias, it also allows for much greater variability
in what constitutes ‘research performance’ compared with evaluations
determined by standardised criteria, indices or rankings, which, in turn,
allows academics much greater freedom to experiment in how they conduct
their research.
To illustrate, one emerging issue we observed in FIST was where researchers
were critical of the planned introduction of a tier system to the conference
scheme. This had the effect of ranking conference publications and making
some of these ineligible for attendance funding for academics. As one
researcher explained:
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. . .conferences are very very important because it wouldn’t matter what, there’s
been a lot of talk in our faculty about grades of conferences and the faculty has
been trying to force people to go to only certain approved conferences and it’s been
totally disastrous, if you look at our publication rate this year, its down and I’d say
part of it is connected with this new policy. . . (Researcher, FIST)
The underlying tension towards the tiering of conference publications stemmed
from the fact that it was seen as a management initiative that not only imposed a
restriction of what constituted adequate research output, but also threatened
their individual freedom to ‘follow their own path’ (Researcher, FIST).
Fifth, the nature of the rewards offered could have a significant self-selecting
effect, increasing the prevalence of autonomously motivated researchers.
According to the participants, the appeal of the ‘research rewards’ was that
they were instrumental in satisfying academics’ desire to engage in more
research-related activities. For example, in FIST, funding for conferences was
highly valued by IT researchers because conferences were the primary places
where they could disseminate and receive feedback on their work. Likewise, in
FSS, project funding could be used to pay for teaching relief and research
assistants to help give researchers more time to do research. In both settings,
promotion was viewed as a means towards more research-oriented workloads
and easier access to further research funding.
In other organisational settings, offering opportunities to do more work may
not be attractive to employees; for these highly successful academics, who were
autonomously motivated to do research, the provision of work-oriented
rewards were. Unless other types of rewards are also provided, then it is highly
likely that employees who do not hold work-oriented motivation will, over the
long term, leave the organisation. Thus, through self-selection pressures, the
incentives encourage the prevalence of the same ‘passion for research’
motivation it relies upon.19
19
For a resource-constrained organisation, such as a university, the linkage between
autonomous motivation and work-related rewards has an additional significant
implication: it essentially converts what would normally be resource provision into a
highly cost effective incentive system. Whereas in typical incentive schemes, monetary
rewards are often used because, as a medium of exchange, money is highly instrumental
and has a highly liquid market external to the organisation where it can be used to
acquire almost any sort of desirable good (Bonner and Sprinkle, 2002); in the academic
setting, because of the presence of work-related motivation, high external liquidity is no
longer a necessary condition of the valence of the rewards. Managers can offer rewards
that can be principally used as a medium of exchange within the bounds of a market
internal to the organisation, that is, to acquire a specified range of goods related to work
activities. Something closer to a ‘closed incentive system’ is created, whereby the
provision of rewards, involving a transfer of value from the organisation to the
employee, has less leakage from the organisational bounds (as would be the case if the
reward was enjoyed privately by the employee) as researchers ‘cash in’ their rewards
within their ‘work worlds’.
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. . . if there is a researcher out there doing fantastically innovative stuff that’s not
represented here and I’m certainly willing to give credence to what’s happening out
there more than to the metric. The metric, for me, is always a follower rather than a
leader in determining what research performance is about. (Research Administra-
tor, FSS)
The research administrator went on to explain that because there are significant
and uncertain time lags between researchers’ activities and their measurable
research output, during which, the productivity of the researcher is ‘hidden’, and
annual measures of outputs were inappropriate proxies of the activity of an
individual. Instead, to make use of annual performance information:
. . . you aggregate it up. You need patterns of outcomes over a period of time, those
patterns of outcomes at a university level measured against your actual working
knowledge. (University Research Administrator)
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interpersonal context in which they are administered which affects how they are
perceived by individuals (Ryan, 1982). Governance and surveillance, as enacted
by fellow researchers (either direct peers or research supervisors), is likely to be
perceived as more autonomy-supportive and less controlling than if it were
conducted by more bureaucratic managers.
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Abernethy, M. A., and J. U. Stoelwinder, 1995, The role of professional control in the
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17.
Adler, P. S., and B. Borys, 1996, Two types of bureaucracy: enabling and coercive,
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Adler, P. S., and C. X. Chen, 2011, Combining creativity and control: understanding
individual motivation in large-scale collaborative creativity, Accounting, Organiza-
tions and Society 36, 63–85.
Amabile, T. M., 1997, Motivating creativity in organizations: on doing what you love
and loving what you do, California Management Review 40, 39–58.
Anderson, G., 2006, Carving out time and space in the managerial university, Journal of
Organizational Change 19, 578–592.
Babu, A. R., and Y. P. Singh, 1998, Determinants of research productivity,
Scientometrics 43, 309–329.
© 2014 AFAANZ
26 N. C. Sutton, D. A. Brown/Accounting and Finance
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N. C. Sutton, D. A. Brown/Accounting and Finance 27
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