Вы находитесь на странице: 1из 39

Gauging Criminal Harm: A Living-Standard Analysis

Author(s): Andrew von Hirsch and Nils Jareborg


Source: Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Spring, 1991), pp. 1-38
Published by: Oxford University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/764504 .
Accessed: 18/06/2014 08:13

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Oxford University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Oxford Journal
of Legal Studies.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.79 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 08:13:59 AM


All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Harm:
GaugingCriminal
A Living-Standard
Analysist
ANDREW VON HIRSCH* AND NILS JAREBORG**

HarmandCrime-Seriousness
I Introduction:
1. TheEmerging ofCrime-Seriousness
Importance
Thepresent topic,ofgauging harm,is partofa larger
criminal subjectthatwehave
beenmulling overforsometime:theseriousness ofcrime.The question ofhowto
has beengainingimportance
assesscrime-seriousness in recentyears,withthe
increasinginfluence or 'proportionalist'
of desert-oriented conceptionsof sen-
tencing--conceptionswhichmaketheseverity ofpunishment dependprincipally
on thegravityoftheoffence ofconviction.'
Thoseconceptions havefoundtheir
way into law in a numberof jurisdictions. SeveralUS stateshave adopted
sentencingguidelinesbasedin significant
parton offence Finlandand
gravity.2
Swedenhaveenactedsentencing laws(Finlandin 1976,Swedenin 1988)according
towhichpunishments aretodependprimarilyoncrimes'seriousness.3 Theselaws
(the'penalvalue'oftheoffence,
calluponjudgesto assesscrimes'gravity in the
Swedishlaw'sterminology)muchmoreexplicitly thanbefore, andtodeveloplegal

t grewoutofseveral
Thisarticle
FundFellowshipfrom
faculty attheLawFaculty,
seminars
theAmerican-Scandinavian
Foundation oneoftheauthors
enabled
A Thord-Gray
UppsalaUniversity. Memorial
toworkonthe
(vonHirsch)
inSpring
atUppsala
paper of1989.
Term
Ourthinking hasbeensubstantially
aidedbyextensive withUmaNarayan
discussions andAndrew Ashworth.We
forthecomments
arealsograteful andsuggestionsofseveral RonaldClarke,
colleagues: R. A. Duff,LenaHolmqvist,
DouglasHusak,James B. Jacobs,JohnKleinig, Sheldon AlvarNelson,DavidRichards,
Messinger, PaulRobinson,
Don E. Scheid,Richard Martha
Singer, JaneSmith, Henrik Tham,andMartin Wasik.
* Professor,SchoolofCriminal Justice,
Rutgers University,Newark, NJ,USA; Research Fellow,Law Faculty,
UppsalaUniversity,Sweden.
** ProfessorofCriminalLaw,Law Faculty, UppsalaUniversity,Sweden.
I See Andrew von Hirsch,Doing Justice(New York: Hill & Wang, 1976;reprinted, Boston:Northeastern
UniversityPress,1986);Richard
G. Singer,JustDeserts
(Cambridge,Mass:Ballinger,1979);Andrew vonHirsch,Past
orFutureCrimes(Manchester:ManchesterUniversityPress,1986);Andrew Ashworth,'Criminal andDeserved
Justice
Sentences'[1989]CrimL Rev 340; R. A. Duff,TrialsandPunishments (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress,
1986);Andrew vonHirschandNilsJareborg, ochproportionalitet'
'Straff (1987)74 Nordisk forKrimnal-
Tidsskrift
videnskab 300;Andrew vonHirsch,'Proportionalityin thePhilosophy ofPunishment: From"WhyPunish?"to
"HowMuch?"'(1990)1 Criminal Law Forum 259.
2 Forexample, Minnesota,WashingtonStateandOregon haveadapted thatemphasize
guidelines of
proportionality
sentence.See Andrew vonHirsch,Kay Knapp,andMichaelTonry,TheSentencing Commission anditsGuidelines
(Boston:Northeastern Press,1987),chs2, 5 andAppendix;
University Oregon Admin. RulesSS253-02-20 (1989).
FinnishPenalCode,ch6; Swedish Criminal Code,chs29,30.
c OxfordUniversityPress1991 Oxford Journal ofLegalStudies Vol.11,No. I

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.79 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 08:13:59 AM


All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
2 Oxford ofLegalStudies
Journal VOL. 11
doctrineson comparative offenceseriousness.4 Otherjurisdictions, including
Englandand Canada,5are considering reforms of theirsentencing law which,
through a varietyoflegalstructures,wouldplaceincreased stressuponthegravity
oftheoffence.
thejurisprudence
Nevertheless, ofcrimeseriousness is a topicthathasscarcely
beentouched.To oneunfamiliar withthecriminal law,thiswillseemsurprising.
The gravity ofthecrimehas suchobviousrelevance to thesanction, he or she
wouldthink, thatjudgesandlegalscholars surelymust have been theorizing about
it foryears.Yet thathas notbeenthecase. Apartfroma numberofempirical
studiesin theUnitedStateson popularperceptions oftheseriousness ofvarious
crimes(of whichmore,later)therehas been littlediscussioneitherin the
Anglo-American ortheContinental The dominant
literature.6
penological rationale
forsentencing, untilthelastdecadeor so, emphasized crime-prevention, rather
than offenders' deserts.7On such a preventive it
rationale, scarcely seemed
necessarytogointotheseriousness ofcrimesinmuchdetail.Crime-seriousness, it
wasthought, wasrelevant only to the broadouter bounds ofthe sentence, within
whichconcernsabout treatment, risk,or deterrence shoulddetermine the
The
punishment.8 fixing of these outer bounds--often seen as a legislative
task-couldseemingly be achievedby relyingon common-sense judgments of
crimes'approximate gravity,without needforelaborate theory ordoctrine.

2. Harmand Culpability
ofcrimehas twodimensions:
Seriousness harmand culpability.9
Harmrefersto
theinjury
doneorriskedbytheact;culpability, ofintent,
tothefactors motive
and
circumstancethatdetermine
the extentto whichtheoffendershouldbe held

See Andrewvon Hirsch,'GuidingPrinciplesforSentencing:The ProposedSwedishLaw' [1987] CrimL Rev


746; Andrewvon Hirschand Nils Jareborg, 'Sweden's SentencingStatuteEnacted'[1989] GrimL Rev 275.
s In England, the governmenthas publisheda White Paper ('Justiceand Protectingthe Public', Feb 1990),
proposinga new statutory framework forsentencingdecisions,in whichproportionalitywouldbe theprimary guiding
principle.For an analysisof this proposal, see Martin Wasik and Andrewvon Hirsch, 'StatutorySentencing
Principles:The 1990WhitePaper' (1990), 53 MLR 508. See nowtheCriminalJusticeBill 1991.
In Canada, a government-appointed studycommissionissued a comprehensive reporton sentencingpolicy,that
advocatedadoptionof desert-basedsentencingguidelines.Canadian SentencingCommission,Sentencing Reform:A
CanadianApproach(Ottowa: Government PublishingCentre,1987). For analysisof thecommission'sproposals,see
Andrewvon Hirsch,'Federal SentencingGuidelines:Do They ProvidePrincipledGuidance?'(1989) 27 American
CrimL Rev 367.
For an analysisof the politicaldynamicsof such sentencingschemes(particularly, thequestionwvhether theymay
lead to greaterseveritiesofpunishment), see Andrewvon Hirsch,'The Politicsof"JustDeserts"' (1990) 32 Canadian
JournalofCriminology 397.
6 Benthamoffers a detaileddiscussionofhowpenaltiesshouldbe 'proportioned' tooffences;thatanalysis,however,
is designedfora deterrence theoryofsanctioning.See Jeremy Bentham,An Introduction ofMoralsand
tothePrinciples
Legislation (J. H. Burnsand H. L. A. Hart,eds, London: Methuen,1980),ch 14.
7 See, eg, FrancisA. Allen,TheDeclineofTheRehabilitative Ideal (New Haven: Yale UniversityPress, 1981) chs
1-2.
8 See, eg, NorvalMoris,MadnessandtheCriminalLaw (Chicago:University ofChicagoPress,1982),ch 5; and fora
similarview in Germansanctioningjurisprudence,-see Hans-Jtlrgen Bruns,Das RechtderStrafzumessung, 2nd ed
(Cologne: Carl Heymanns, 1985), 105-10. For a critiqueof this view, see von Hirsch, Past or FutureCrimes
(Manchester: Manchester UniversityPress, 1986),chs 4, 12.
9 von Hirsch,op cit,above n 8, 64-5.

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.79 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 08:13:59 AM


All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
SPRING1991 GaugingCriminalHarm 3

accountable fortheact.Bothdimensions affectcrimeseriousness; touse familiar


examples,murderis moreseriousthanaggravated assaultbecausetheinjuryis
greater,and it is moreseriousthannegligent homicidebecausethe actor's
culpability is greater.The problemis to developcriteria forharmfulness and
culpabilitythataremoreilluminating thansimpleintuition.
Withrespectto culpability, thereis someexisting theory thatcan be drawn
It
upon. comesfromthesubstantive law:
criminal the doctrines ofcriminalintent
andexcuse.Thosedoctrines the is
addresswhether defendantculpable(andhence
criminally answerable) at all, butcomparable ideascouldbe carriedoverto an
of of
assessment degree culpability at thesentencing stage.Existing substantive
law notionsof excuse,forexample,couldbe usedto helpdevelopdoctrines of
partialexcuse (eg,partialduress,partial mental and
disability, provocation).'0
Withrespectto harm,matters areotherwise. Virtuallyno legaldoctrines have
beendeveloped onhowthegravity ofharmscanbe compared. Thesubstantive law
provides little guidance, because theoccurrence ofharm is not made
explicitly a
general condition ofcriminal The
liability. legal offence-definitionssimply describe
variouskindsof prohibited conduct-which thelegislature is assumedto have
considered harmful enoughto be criminalized." The philosophical literature
also
hasnotaddressed criminalharmfnuch, withtheexception ofa recentvolumeby
JoelFeinberg12 to whichwe willrefer.We devotethisarticleto thesubjectof
harm,becausewethink itparticularlyinneedofexploration.

II ScopeoftheAnalysis
We havelimited ofharminvariousrespects,
thescopeofouranalysis andshould
at
explain the what
outset those are.
limitations

1. Victimizing
CriminalConduct
The presentarticleaddressesonlythe harmfulness of criminal
conductwhich
injuresor threatens victims.
identifiable We are restrictingourselves
to conduct
alreadydeclaredcriminal,becauseourinterest inharmarisesinthecontext ofsen-
tencing We
policy. wish to assessharm, to see how serious theoffenceis; and we
wishtodetermine itsseriousnessforthepurposeofdetermining theseverity ofthe
punishment. Thereis, ofcourse,another context forconsideringharm-namely,
whendecidingwhether conductshouldbe declaredcriminalat all. Whether
conductis harmful,and howharmful it is, shouldbe an important factor in the
10
See MartinWasik,'Excusesat theSentencing Stage'[1983]CrimL Rev 450; Andrew vonHirschand Nils
Jareborg,'Provocationand Culpability',
in Ferdinand Schoeman Character
(ed), Responsibility, andtheEmotions
(Cambridge:Cambridge Press,1987)246.
University
" TheModelPenalCode,forexample, hasnogeneral requirementofharm, comparabletoitsgeneral
culpability
requirementsin5 2.02.Rather, kindsofconduct,
particular apparentlydeemedbythelegislaturetobeharmful,are
described:forexample,S 223.2defines
theftas thetaking
orexerciseofunlawful overthemoveable
control property
ofanother.Thereis noexpressrequirementthatthetakingbeinjurious toanyone.
12 Joel
Feinberg,HarmtoOthers (Oxford:Oxford UniversityPress,1984);seealsoJohnKleinig,
'Crimeandthe
Concept ofHarm' (1978)15 AmericanPhilosophical 27.
Quarterly

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.79 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 08:13:59 AM


All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
4 ofLegalStudies
Journal
Oxford VOL.11
consideration
legislative aboutitsproscription. However, itis nottheonlyfactor:
thelegislature shouldalso consider whatcountervailing socialvaluetheconduct
has,theextentto whichprohibition couldbe intrusive uponprivacy or personal
autonomy, thepractical feasibilityofenforcement, andso forth. Thusthefactthat
a givenspeciesofconductmightmeetoursuggested criteriaforharmfulness, and
even forgraveharmfulness, does not necessarily settlewhether it shouldbe
proscribed. Wewillbe speaking ofconductthathasbeenprohibited already.
Ourfocusis alsoon victimizing behaviour, ie, behaviour theprimary apparent
evil of whichconsistsin thatit setsback the interests of identifiablenatural
persons.Wewillthusbe speaking ofthetraditional
chiefly offences suchas theft,
burglary or assaultin whichan individual is thevictim, and theconcern is with
howmuchhe or shehas beenharmed.It is thesecrimesthataremostobviously
injuriousand constitute a logicalstarting placefora theory of harm.In thus
focusing onvictimizing conduct, wearefullyawareoftheexistence ofotherforms
ofcriminal harm.Somecrimes (eg,certain environmental offences) haveharmthat
is primarilycollectiveoraggregative: no identifiable personhashisorherinterest
setbackbyactivity ofan identifiable actor;butifa sufficiently largenumber of
personsengage in the the
conduct, public's interests are adversely affected.In
focusing on individual victimizing crimes,we do notwishto suggest theseother
crimesare necessarily any less important: only that their harmfulness is a more
complicated matter toanalyse (inways we will sketch in Part VII, below).Havinga
of
theory victimizing harms should be a useful firststep.

2. Standardization
This articlewillbe concerned chieflywiththestandard harminvolved in a given
or
category subcategory of crime. We willthusbe the
assessing injuriousnessofa
standard instanceof(say)burglary, orofburglaryofa certainkind-nottheinjury
doneto MarySmithwhenherapartment wasbrokenintoandherfavourite vase
wasstolenon 24 Juneofthisyear.
Howhurtful a givenintrusion is dependsonthesituation ofthevictim, andthe
particularvictim'ssituationvariesgreatly.The theft ofa carfroma richperson
maybenomorethana temporary thattheft
inconvenience; from a poorpersonina
ruralareamayleavehimbereft ofanymeansoftransportation. We thusneedto
assume,inrating thestandard caseofa givenspeciesofcrime,thatinjury occursto
someone whois neitherespeciallyvulnerablenorresilient.
Whythisemphasis onstandard harm?Particular actsaretoodiverse
criminal to
be ratedon an individualized basis.The analysisis aidedwhenone(1) ratesthe
standardcase of an offence,and then(2) addressesunusualcases through
principlesofaggravationandmitigation. Thefirstofthesetaskswillkeepus amply
occupied here.The second, on and
aggravation mitigation, is complexenoughto
callfora separatearticle.
In thecriminallaw,one judgesharmin orderto determine
howblameworthy the
theconduct,notin orderto compensatethevictimforhis or
actoris in committing

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.79 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 08:13:59 AM


All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
SPRING1991 Criminal
Gauging Harm 5
herloss.This actor-perspective requiresone to considerhowmuch,andwithin
whatlimits,theact'sharmful consequences canjustlybe attributed to theactor.
Culpability theory requires in
that, assessing the seriousness
ofconduct, unforesee-
ableconsequences shouldnotbe takenintoaccount.13 The standard harmin any
giventypeofcriminal conductis, ordinarily, foreseeable.However,whenoneis
talking about atypicalharms,foreseeability diminishes.The burglarmay be
expected tounderstand the typical ofa
consequences burglary, butnot,ordinarily,
MarySmith's particular the
situation---eg,extraordinary value thevasehadforher
as a giftfrom a deceasedfriend. Therulesonaggravation/mitigation willthushave
to be morecomplex,becausetheyneedto considernotonlythespecialharm
involvedin unusualcases,14but also culpability-based restrictionsconcerning
eithertheforeseeability ofsuchspecialharmortheactor'sactualawareness ofthat
harm.
Onefinalpointaboutstandardization: weshouldbe awarefrom theoutsetofthe
limitsofparticularizing ratings of seriousness.One can ratethe harm-category-
and also takecertainfeatures of the harmfulness of the particulareventinto
accountthrough theaggravation/mitigation But
principles. one cannot reasonably
expectto approximate, in legaljudgments of seriousness,theparticularity of
everyday judgments. Precisely howmuchMarySmithis injuredbythelossofher
particular vase wouldrequirea delvingintoherpersonalsituation to a degree
whichthelawcannotpossibly undertake, and shouldnottryto undertake. The
rehabilitativepenalethiclostitscredibility ii partbecauseofunrealistic claimsit
madeabouttheindividualization ofsentence.A proportionalistpenalethicshould
notmakethesamemistake. The criminallawis a system ofrules,notanarenafor
personalized judgments. If thelaw can assesscrime-seriousness in thestandard
case,and thenmakedeviations fromthatassessment forcertain typesofspecial
circumstances, thisis all onecanreasonably hopetoaccomplish.'5

3. Normative
FocusandtheQuestion
ofCultural
Variability
Ouranalysisofharmis normative:
We areoffering
a theoryonhowharmsshould
be rated.The reasonforthisnormative is thatouraccountis partofa
emphasis
13SeevonHirsch, op cit,aboven 8, 64-5.In crimes ofintent,
thedefining
elements ofthecrimemustactually be
knownto theactor.What,however, of thefurther harmfiul
consequences?How much,forexample, needthe
defendant haveknownofthehumiliating characterofan assault,forhumiliation
to be consideredin gauging
that
crime'sseriousness?A fullanswer wouldrequire an excursusintoculpability
theory, whichwewillnotutidertake
here.However, it shouldbe clearthatthoseulterior consequencesshouldat leastbe foreseeable:unforeseeable
consequenceshavenoplaceintheassessment ofthegravityoftheconduct.
14 These rulesmightdistinguish (i) casesof specialharmresulting fromvulnerabilities
sharedby significant
numbers of persons(eg, thespecialvulnerability of theaged),from(ii) casesof specialharmthatare more
to
idiosyncraticparticular individuals. a
For discussion ofthisdistinction
anditsimplications, seeUmaNarayan,
Conduct
Offensive (NewBrunswick, NJ:Rutgers University,
1990)(unpublishedPhD dissertation),
ch5.
15 Fordiscussion ofaggravation/mitigation ruleswithinthecontextofnumerical see von
sentencingguidelines,
Hirsch, and
Knapp Tonry, above
op cit, n 2, 102-5.
Ifthemitigation/aggravationapproach is used todealwithnon-standard
cases,thestatuteneedstoprovideadequate
leewayto reducethepenalty in mitigated cases.Forthatreason,thenewSwedishlawprovides thatthecourt,in
mitigatedcases,may sentence below the applicablestatutory
minimum 'whenthepenalvalue(of theoffence)
callsforit.'Swedish
obviously Criminal Code29:3.

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.79 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 08:13:59 AM


All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
6 Oxford ofLegalStudies
Journal VOL. 11

broaderjurisprudential theory: one thatclaimsthattheseverity ofpunishment


shouldbeproportionate tothegravity ofthecriminal conduct. Thegrounds forthe
proportionality-principle are thoseof fairness: thatpunishment, as a censuring
response tocriminal behaviour, shouldreflect thedegreeofblameworthiness ofthe
criminal conduct.Suchan argument standsonlyifthejudgments ofblameworthi-
nessofconduct(including thoseofharm)reflect howmuchtheoffender andhis
conduct to be
ought blamed, just not how reprehensible thisorthat decision-maker
orconstituency happenstothinktheconductis.
SinceThorstenSellin'sand MarvinWolfgang's 1964research, a numberof
American andEnglishstudieshavesurveyed of
popularperceptions seriousness.16
The studiesprovidethepersonssurveyed withbriefdescriptions ofa variety of
crimes, and ask them to rate their seriousness on a numerical rating scale. Some
consensus hasbeenfound:peoplefrom different walksoflifetend,forexample, to
give similar rank-orderings to crimes.
Interesting as suchresearch is,itdoesnotaddressourquestion-for itonlydeals
withhowvarioussegments ofthepublicinfactratecrimes.Popularratings do not
settletheharmfulness ofconduct, fortworeasons.One concerns thepossibility of
factualmisjudgment. Respondents havenotstudiedtheactualconsequences of
crimes theyareaskedtoassess,andtheirassessments7 maybe basedonerroneous
beliefsaboutthoseconsequences. People may believethatburglary typically
involvesgreater riskofviolencethanin factit does,or mayunderestimate the
injuriouseffects ofsomewhite-collar crimes.The otherreasonis thatthecriteria
forjudgingtheknownfactshavenot beenreflected on. In judgingassaultive
crimes, forexample, is itonlythephysical risksthatcount,oralsotheimpacton
thevictim's personal dignity? Ifthelatter is considered, whyso?Justaskingpeople
abouttheharmfulness ofburglary doesnotanswersuchquestions. The advantage
ofa jurisprudential theory ofharmis thatitaddresses the'why'questions.'18
We arenot,however, seeking ratings thatareinvariant worldwide. Howharmful
burglary is (in oursense,ofhowinjurious itshould be considered) dependson its
typicalimpact,and thatimpactwillvaryacrosscultures-depending on both
factualandnormative differences. The factual differences concern theunderlying
socialarrangements. In ourownculture, a burglary is an intrusion intosomeone's
home, and the home is the focus of much of theperson'spersonal Werepeople
life.
tosleepintents, andperform mostactivities incommunal theimpactofa
facilities,
burglary could be much less. Normative differences also matter. Partof our
assessment ofburglary restson theimportance accordedto privacy; in a culture
whereprivacy is lessvalued,theconductcouldhavelesssignificance. One thus
needsto examinetheconsequences oftheoffence, givencertainassumedsocial
16 See, eg, ThorstenSellin and MarvinWolfgang,The Measurement of Delinquency(Reprinted, Montclair,NJ:
PattersonSmith,1970), and studiessummarizedon x-xxiof thatvolume; RichardSparks,Hazel Genn and David
Dodd, Surveying Victims(Chichester:JohnWiley,1977), ch 7.
17 Surveyresearchconductedto datehas asked forratingsofseriousness, and usuallydoes notgenerallyelicitfrom
respondentsseparateratingsof the harmfulnessand culpabilityof the conduct.However,harm-ratings could have
beenelicitedby similarsurveytechniques.
11 One stillmightask howmuchtheharm-ratings emergingfromsuch a jurisprudential analysiswoulddifferfrom
thoseyieldedbyopinionsurveys.This is a matterwhichcan be testedbyempiricalenquiry,see n 63, below.

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.79 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 08:13:59 AM


All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
SPRING1991 GaugingCriminalHarm 7
and thenevaluatethoseconsequences
living-arrangements, in thelightofcertain
assumedbasicvalues(eg,concerningprivacy).The roleofourproposed theoryof
harmis toaidinthatevaluation.
Thatthetheory couldyielddifferent
harm-ratings
in anotherculture,wheretheliving-arrangementsand valuesare different,
is a
nota weakness.
strength,

III HarmandtheLivingStandard
In gaugingharms,thehardtaskis thatofcomparing theharmfulness ofcrimes
whichinvolvedifferent interests. Howis cartheft to be compared withburglary,
whenthe former involvesa significant property loss, and thelattera smaller
financial
setback butaninvasion ofprivacyas well?Makingsuchcomparisons calls
fora commoncriterion, or at leasta commonguidingidea, forassessingthe
interests
involved.
Theguiding ideawhichwehavecometofindmostnatural is oneconcerned with
thequalityofa person'slife.The mostimportant interests are thosecentralto
personalwell-being; and,accordingly, themostgrievous harmsarethosewhich
diminish
drastically one'sstandard ofwell-being.
Mayhem is so seriousbecauseit
makesitsvictims livein misery; burglaryseemsless serious becauseit doesnot
createsuchmiserybutstillhas a significant impact on the qualityoflifein its
intrusionon theperson'sprivacy andcomfort.
We required a termforthisidea,andcameuponAmartya Sen'susefulessay,
TheStandard ofLiving.19 Economists have
traditionally used 'livingstandard'to
referonlyto thedegreeofeconomic affluence
orwant.Sen,however, suggestsa
richeruse forthisterm,one thatincludesnotonlyeconomic meansbutother,
non-economic capabilitiesthataffect personalwell-being.We decidedtoadoptthe
term'livingstandard', understood inthisbroadersense.
Beforeembarking on thespecifics ofourproposed analysis ofharms, weneedto
setforththerationale. Whyrelyontheideaofthelivingstandard?

1. InadequaciesoftheWelfare
Interest
Criterion
Our interest in thelivingstandardgrewoutofdissatisfactionwiththe'welfare
interest'criterionwhichJoelFeinbergproposedin his 1984 book,Harmto
Others.20
Previously, oneofus (vonHirsch)hadrelieduponFeinberg's criterion,
forthepurposeofgrading crimeseriousness
forsentencing.21
Feinberg suggests
thattheimportance of interests
infringedby criminalconductcan be gauged
according tothedegreetowhichthoseinterests affect
characteristically choice.
The mostimportant accordingto Feinberg,are so-calledwelfare
interests,
interests-andhencethe mostgrievousharmsthosethatintrudeupon such
interests.
Welfare interests
aredefinedas theinterests
a personneedssatisfied
in
19AmartyaSen,TheStandard ofLiving(Cambridge: Press,1987)20-38.
Cambridge
University
op cit,aboven 12,at37-45,55-61,206-14.
2oFeinberg,
2' vonHirsch,op cit,aboven 8, at66-74.

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.79 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 08:13:59 AM


All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
8 Oxford ofLegalStudies
Journal VOL.11
ordertohaveanysignificant capacity tochooseandorderhisorherwayofliving.
Theyprovide, in his 'the
words, generalized meansto theadvancement of[the
person's] ulterior interests'.22 When those interests are intruded upon or
the
destroyed, person is foreclosed from a wide variety of other choices. Physical
safety,forexample,is a welfareinterest becausethe personis impededfrom
pursuing almostanyaimsofhis choice,whenphysically incapacitated. Nextin
importance come so-called security interests, which Feinberg defines as those
neededtoprovidea certain safetymargin to the welfare interests.Lowest-ranked
wouldbe allotherinterests, whichhe entitles 'accumulative interests'.
How plausibleis it to definetheimportance ofinterests in thewayFeinberg
does?Therearetwowaysofinterpreting histheory. One is thatit describes the
logicofassessing interests: peopleactuallyjudgeinterests to be offundamental
importance whentheyprovidethegeneralized meanstotheadvancement ofmore
concerns.
particular Sometimes, suchanaccountwouldseemplausible.Mostofus
wouldconsiderit a basic interest to possessa certainmodicumof financial
resources.Whyso? Becausethatis necessary to pursueourparticular lifeplans,
whatever theymaybe. Butcounter-examples readily cometomind,wheresuchan
accountwouldseemstrained. Considertheinterest (whichalmostall ofus would
deemveryimportant) inavoiding intense andprotracted physical pain.Suchpain
woulddoubtless interfere withthepursuit ofvariousspecific lifeplans,butdoes
thatreallyaccountforwhywe thinktheinterest so important? Is itnot,instead,
thattheavoidance ofpainis initself essential tothequalityofa person's life;thata
lifeofphysical is an
suffering awful life?
Alternately, Feinberg'swelfare-interest criterion could be explainedmore
as a
modestly, theory of stateaction. Interests are beingrankedin importance to
helpguide the coercive action of the criminal law. The law's criteria for harm
shouldmakeallowancesfordifferences in how peoplevaluelife'sgoods,and
shouldnotelevateonesetoffocalaimsaboveanother becausethatis forpersons
themselves tochoose.The attraction ofthewelfare-interest theory is thatithelps
assurethatthecriminal law, in its criteria for harm,gives due recognition and
scope to individual choice: welfare interests are valued because they are a
prerequisite to whatever way-of-life individuals themselves might choose. The
welfare-interestideathusappearstorestonthetenets ofphilosophical liberalism.23
Relying thuson autonomy canproduceoddresults, however. Muchas onemay
valuechoice,itsdiminution is notnecessarily theworstthingthatcanhappento
one who is victimized. The personwho has been maimedor made destitute
obviouslysuffersgrievousharm.But is this so merelybecausehis or her
freedom-of-choice hasbeenrestricted? It wouldseemmorestraightforward tosay
themaimedordestitute personmightsurvive butonlybarelyso, withlossofthe
mostbasichumansatisfaction. Aslongas oneregards thefateofindividual humans

22 Feinberg,op cit,above n 12, at 42.


23 This was urgedin Andrewvon Hirsch, 'Injuryand Exasperation'(1986) 84 Mich L Rev 700,
interpretation
702-6.

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.79 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 08:13:59 AM


All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
SPRING1991 GaugingCriminalHarm 9
to be important, onewouldconsider suchharmsto be serious,without needfor
invoking further assumptions about the importance ofchoice.
The ideaofliberalism alsoseemssomewhat misapplied. Whatliberalnotions of
are
autonomy chiefly concerned with is barring thestatefrom compelling an actor
toadoptoneoranother setofaimsforhisownlife.It is thought better thata person
be permitted topursuehischosenmanner ofexistence (however unconventional or
seemingly irregular) thanthathebe compelled toliveas stateauthorities deemwise
orvirtuous. In thepresent context, however, we arespeaking ofharmto others;
thestandards ofcriminal harmdo notconcern theactor'sownwayoflife,andhe
remains freeto makehisself-regarding choices.Instead,theactorhas chosento
interferewiththeinterests ofothers; andtheharmcriteria aresupposed tomeasure
thedegreeof thatintrusion. That harmmaynotmerelybe to otherpersons'
capacities tochoose,buttowhatever vitalintereststheymayhave--andthoseother
vitalinterests arenotnecessarily reducible toa capacitytochoose.24
Granted,thepotential victimsof harmhavea variety of lifeaims,and that
variety shouldbe recognized. Harmshouldthusbe defined broadly enoughso that
it is notonlythevitalinterests ofa conventional personthatareprotected. This
meansthattheharm-criteria needto be scrutinized to see if theygivesufficient
leewaytodifferences in lifestyleandlifeaimsofpotential victims. We willargue
laterthata living-standard criterionprovides thisleeway.
Besidestheseconceptual difficulties,thewelfare-interestclassification failsalso
tosupplysufficient distinctions amongharms.Thus:
i. The highest category, of welfare interests,wouldconsistofthoseconcerns
essential toa minimum ofchoice.Basicphysical healthwouldqualify, as a person
willalmostalwaysneedthattogo abouthisorherchosenbusiness. A minimum of
economicsupportwouldbe included,forsimilarreasons.Perhaps,a fewmore
interests wouldalso qualify.Feinbergnotes,however, thathis choice-criterion
does notsupplya ranking amongthewelfare interests,becausetheyare inter-
dependentand each is essentialfor choice.25(Good-health-but-destitution
debilitates, justas bad-health-but-affluence does.) This is nota problem forhis
purposes, as he is addressing thedecisiontocriminalize conduct, andaskingonly
whether theconduct is sufficientlyinjurious tobe worth proscribing. It is trouble-
someforourpurposes, however, as forsentencing purposes we requirea ranking
evenamongthemostseriousharms.
ii. The intermediate category-'security interests'-are defined as thoseneeded
to'cushion'orprovide a safety margin towelfare interests.
Thisconception seems
deficient inseveralways:
-It is so vagueas to be virtually unworkable. How does one tell,evenin
principle, whether a giveninterest isorisnotneededto'cushion'welfare interests?
-It givesmiddle-level interests, inappropriately, a purelyinstrumental role.
Consider theinterest in livingwitha modicum ofcomfort. We wouldregardthis
interest as having inherent value,becauseitis so important topersonal well-being.
24 Compare Raz,TheMorality
Joseph ofFreedom Press,1986),chs5-6.
Clarendon
(Oxford:
25
op cit,aboven 12,at37,57-8.
Feinberg,

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.79 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 08:13:59 AM


All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
10 fournalofLegal Studies
Oxford VOL.11
Itsimportance doesnotliemerely in thefactthatsuchcomfort a margin
provides
ofsecurity destitution.
against
-It allowsno distinction in importance amongmiddle-level Some
interests.
intrusionswouldputthevictimnearthesubsistence level.Otherswouldmerely
puthimjustbelowa levelofwell-being thatseemsnormal oradequate.
iii. The lowestlevel of interests in Feinberg'sclassification-'accumulative
us as a catchall.Someofthesestillwouldplaya significant
interests'-strikes role
in theperson'soverallwell-being; otherswouldbe purelyaccumulative in the
literalsense.Suchcasesneedtobe distinguished.

2. TheIdea oftheLivingStandard
The term'livingstandard' hasa narrow economic meaning, referring toaffluence.
It has,however, a broader meaning-the onewhichSenemphasizes,26 andwhich
is usedalso in quality-of-life studiessuchas a recentStockholm survey.27 This
referstothequalityofpersons'existence ina sensethatincludesnotonlymaterial
support andamenity butothernon-economic capabilitiesthataffect thequality ofa
person'slife.
The livingstandard is oneofa family ofrelatednotions, including well-being,
thatrefer to theextent ofhumanflourishing. Well-being,however, canbe highly
personalized. Thequality ofmylifedependsuponmyparticular focalaims.To the
personwhowantstodevotehislifetocontemplation andprayer, material comfort
and socialamenities maymatter little.Thus to determine a particular person's
well-being, oneordinarily needstoknowmuchabouthislifegoalsandhisreasons
foradopting them.
The livingstandard, however,does not focuson actuallifequalityor goal
achievement, but on the meansor capabilities forachieving a certainqualityof
It is also standardized,
life.28 referringto the means and capabilities thatwould
ordinarilyhelp one achieve a good life.Consider the person who is in goodhealth,
affluent,andwitha widesocialnetwork from whichtodrawfriends andacquaint-
ances.If hischiefgoalin lifeis to writegreatpoetryand he lackstherequisite
talent,he may still be frustrated and unhappy.Nevertheless, it would be
to
appropriate say thathe hasa good standard of not
living: merely because ofhis
wealthbutbecausehe has theothermeansthatpeopleordinarily canuse to live
well-whether ornothe choosestousethosemeansoractually enjoystheirfruits.
Thesefeatures areimportant forourpresent purposebecause,as notedabove,we
areprimarily concerned withstandard harms.
A givencapability orresource cansupport achievement ofa variety ofendsofa
person'schoosing. One thuscanmakeliving standard judgments without having
eitherto knowa particular person'sfocalaimsor to specify in detailwhatthe

26 See n 19.
in Transition:
27 See RobertEriksonand Rune Aberg,Welfare inSweden1968-1981
A SurveyofLivingConditions
(Oxford:ClarendonPress, 1987)ch 1.
2s See Sen, op cir,above n 19, at 30-1, 36-7.

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.79 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 08:13:59 AM


All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
SPRING1991 GaugingCriminal
Harm 11
standard person'saimsareoroughttobe. The judgments, inotherwords,assume
a certaindegreeof pluralism. One mayjudge,forexample,thatundisturbed
possessionof a person'shomehas a certaindegreeof importance to his living
standard. Thejudgment canhold,notwithstanding thevarying usesofthehomein
people'slives:thatoneindividual mayuse hisor herhomeas thelocusoffamily
life,anotheras a for
place study, anotheras a placeinwhichtoconduct orgies.One
doesnotneedtoassumewhichoftheseendsis preferable, oreventoassumethat
a personshould choosepersonalgoalsthatinvolvespending muchtimeat home.
The judgment is merely thatthehomeplaysa significant rolein a varietyoflives
peoplechoosetoliveinoursociety. Thispluralism is important forourpurposes,
forit willpermitus to makeliving-standard judgments withoutan ambitious
specificationofwhatpeople'sultimate focalaimsareoroughttobe.
Thelivingstandard differs, nevertheless,from welfare interestsinthatchoiceis
notthecriterion: themeansforachieving a certain qualityoflifeis. Manyofthe
interestsimportant topeople'slivingstandard afford,as wejustnoted,a consider-
ablerangeofchoice.Still,theultimate focusis noton theextent ofchoicebuton
thelifequalitywhichthoseinterests helpsupport.29
Whilethelivingstandard, thusconceived, includesnon-material capabilities,it
is restricted
tothosecapabilities thatareself-regarding: thosethatareinvolved in
thequality ofa person'sownlife.Altruistic satisfactionsanddissatisfactions would
notbe takenintoaccount.In Sen'swords,'one'smisery at thesorrow ofanother
... is nota reduction in . .. theperson'slivingstandard'.30

3. WhyUse theLivingStandard?
Whyrelyonthelivingstandard inordertogaugeharms? A simpleanswer
is thatit
appearstofitthewayoneordinarily judgesharms.Whyis mayhem moreharmful
thanburglary? Not becausethemaimedperson'schoiceshavebeennarrowed
more.It is becausetheoverallqualityofhislifeis moreadversely
affected.
In adoptinga living-standard we are notclaiming
criterion, thatgoodnessor
badnessofconductdepends,as a generalmatter, on theconduct'seffect
on the
qualityof people'slives.31Our claimis moremodest:thatthelivingstandard
29This distinction between(1) well-being understood as includingelements of freedom-of-choice,
and (2)
freedom-of-choiceperse, is usefullyelucidated in Amartya Sen, 'Well-Being, Agency and Freedom: The Dewey
Lectures1984'(1985)82Journal ofPhilosophy 169,esp 206-8.He suppliestheexample ofthepersoneatinghis
sandwich ontheriverbank,whoseesa mandrowning intheriver. Theeventaddstotheperson's choices-becausehe
nowhastheextraoptionofsavingthevictim ornot-butthosechoicesmerely detractfrom hiswell-being.
As Sen
notes:'Theadditionalopportunity ofsavingthedrowning person didnotgiveyoua better (orevenas gooda) wayof
pursuing yourownwell-being. In fact,inan important way,the. .. changereduced yourwell-being freedom.You
werenolonger freetoeatyoursandwich without anxiety,and,... there
was a genuinelossofopportunitytopursue
own
your well-being.' (at207).
30 Sen,op cit,aboven 19,at27. Foranexplanation oftheexclusion ofaltruistic seeid27-8.
satisfactions,
31 Harm consistsofbeingmadeworseoff.Onecangaugehowmuchoneis harmed, ie,howmuchworseoffoneis,
bytheimpact oftheconduct onthequality ofone'slife.Otherevils,however, do notnecessarily
involveharmas part
oftheirdefiningcharacteristics.
Anexample is offence.Beingtreated offensivelydoesnotnecessarilyinvolvebeing
madeworseoffinthesenseofhaving one'spersonal resourcesdiminished;itsevilresidessimplyinbeingdealtwith
without consideration
orrespect. To gaugethegravity ofoffensive conduct,onethusmayrequire a standardother
thanonethatrefers toreduction intheoffended person's
livingstandard.Fora useful analysisofoffence,
andhowit
differs
from harm, seeNarayan, op cit,aboven 14,chs1-3.Seealson 53below.

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.79 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 08:13:59 AM


All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
12 Oxford fournalofLegalStudies VOL.11
provides, nota generalized ethicalnorm,buta usefulstandard whichthelawcan
the
use in gauging harmfulness ofcriminal acts. We think this is so forseveral
reasons.
Victimizing harmsinvolveintrusion intovariouspersonal resources orinterests
people have. Ifone asks why the stateshould seek to protect such interests through
thecriminal law,themostplausibleanswerwouldbe thatpeoplerequirethose
resources to livedecentlives.Robbery, burglary andtheft areprohibited because
people need safety, shelterand certain to
possessions livetolerably. It thus makes
senseto gaugethegravity ofcriminal harmsbytheimportance thattherelevant
interests havefora person'sstandard ofliving.
Much of a modernstate'sprotective concernforits citizensis aimedat
safeguarding interests oftheirs thatconstitute thegeneralized meansforpursuit ofa
satisfactory life.Social-welfare programmes (wherethey exist) concern the pro-
visionof a minimum of economicsupportto live decently. Healthand safety
regulations serveto ensurethe physicalconditionpeoplerequireto have a
comfortable existence, andso forth. Ourconception seesthecriminal lawas having
a comparable primary role.
The living-standard approachalso has theadvantage ofa certainmodesty; no
of
'deep'theory preferred life-aims or appropriate social roles is presupposed. It
recognizes, as notedearlier, a certainpluralism intheusesandendstowhichpeople
puttheirvariousinterests.
Analternative totheliving-standard analysis couldbethemoreambitious one,of
specifying certain focalaimsorsocialrolesas pre-eminently important orvaluable;
then,harmscouldbe assessedbytheirdegreeofinterference withtheachievement
oftheselife-aims or theperformance oftheseroles.David Braybrooke takesthis
viewin hisanalysis ofneeds.The definition andimportance ofneeds,he asserts,
shoulddependupontheirfunction incarrying outcertain central socialroles,viz,
theroleofparent, householder, worker, andcitizen.32
We findsuchan approachtroublesome fora numberofreasons.Firstis the
of
problem justification: why these particular life-ends or socialroles,and not
others? Braybrooke assertsthat hislistof social roles is self-evident. In hiswords,
'having a life of minimum normal scope consists in an
just having opportunity to
perform those roles and tasks'.33 The listis not self-evident to us, however. If the
claimis thatBraybrooke's fourrolesarenormatively ofoverriding importance, it
needsto be explainedwhyso. If theclaimis descriptive (thatmostpeopledo
primarily directtheirlivestothefoursocialfunctions he lists)itwouldneedtobe
supported by empirical evidence. Such evidence would not be so easy to
supply--given thevariousandoverlapping character ofpeople'sgoals.Braybrooke
lists'householder' as oneofhisfourfunctions. Mostpeopleinoursociety establish
households, butis thisbecausetheyseehouseholdership as something valuablein
itself,orbecause(aswethink moreplausible) a household mayservevarious ulterior
If
endspeoplehave? so,why not consider these ulterior ends as pre-eminent?
Press,1987) 48.
MeetingNeeds(Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversity
32 David Braybrooke,
33 Id at 49.

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.79 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 08:13:59 AM


All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
SPRING1991 GaugingCriminalHarm 13

Second,thereis the problemof achievingsufficient specificity. A broad


enumeration ofpre-eminent focalaimsorsocialrolessuchas Braybrooke's would
nottakeus farin rating criminal harms,especially intermediate or lesserharms.
Homicideormayhem obviously interferes withthesocialrolesofwhichhespeaks,
buthowmuchdoesa purse-snatching interfere withthevictim'sroleas parent,
householder, worker, orcitizen? Braybrooke couldreplythathe neednotaddress
suchquestions sinceheis onlytrying todefine basicneeds.Buttheproblem would
becomeacuteifonetriedtoextendhisapproach, ofspecifying socialroles,tothe
assessment ofthewiderangeofinterests protected bythecriminal law.
Finally,we wonderabout the appropriateness of the preferred-social-roles
approach. Criminal harmsarebeingratedtohelpdecideupontheseverity ofstate
sanctions.Wedoubtwhether a theory ofstatesanctions, ina pluralsociety, should
attemptto specifythe ways of livingthat meritspecial respect.Consider
Braybrooke's category ofparenthood. Muchas youmight valuefamily life,others
inoursociety legitimately havedifferent life-priorities.Granted, moralpaternalism
is nottheissuehere:nooneis beingcompelled toraisea family, sincethestandards
ofcriminal harm(as notedalready)do notseekto regulate theactor'sownlife
style.Still,pluralism is a matterof concern.The standards of harmaffect the
to the
extent which stateprotects different interests peoplehave,through the
sanctions ofthecriminal law.In a society thatrespects diversity,those standards
shouldtothemaximum feasible extent acknowledge thevariability ofpeople'saims
and purposes.This theycannotdo if thosestandards reston assumptions that
certainlifeaimsor socialroleshavespecialworth.If I wishto devotemylifeto
contemplation, howaremypreferences respected ifmylegally-protected interests
arevaluedbyreference to aimsor socialfunctions as
(such child-rearing) notmy
own?
The living-standard criterion is not so vulnerable to such objections.The
securityof the home is judged to contribute to the livingstandard to a certain
degree, not because householding is deemed an intrinsicallyvalued social roleor
one thatcontributes to another preferred role such as child-rearing, but because
thehomecontributes to variouswaysa personmaychooseto livehislife(from
studythrough child-rearing to valetudinarianism); thatpotentialcontribution
makesthehomea resource having a certain role in the standard ofliving.
Sincethelivingstandard is concerned withstandard cases-withthemeansor
capabilitiesordinarilyneededto achievea goodlife-certain non-standard modes
oflifewill,it mustbe conceded,receivelessattention. The valuation givent the
homedoesnotdo muchgoodtothepersonwhooptstoliveas a travelling mendi-
cant.Butthegrounds forthistreatment ofnon-standard casesarelesstroubling. It
is notthatmendicancy is deemedlessworthy than(say)child-rearing. It is,rather,
a recognition thatthecriminal law, withits generalrulesand its emphasison
foreseeableharms, is mainly equippedtodealwithstandard cases.
In thusemphasizing thepluralism of the living-standard criterion, havewe
re-embracedthe earlier-rejectedtheoryof welfareinterests?(After all, the
supposed raisond'&re of thattheorywas choice.) We thinknot. A distinction

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.79 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 08:13:59 AM


All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
14 Oxford ofLegalStudies
Journal VOL.11
shouldbe drawnbetween theharm-standard itselfandthereasonssupporting it.
One reason,amongothers,whywe favourtheliving-standard criterion is thatit
recognizes a certain pluralismoflegitimate life-ends andsocialroles.Nevertheless,
pluralismcannotbe the harm-criterion. In assessinghow burglary affects the
livingstandard, onecertainly shouldbe mindful ofthevariety oflegitimate usesto
whichpeopleputtheirhomes.Buttoaccount fortheinjuriousness ofburglary, one
cannotmerely call attention to theextentto whichtheoccupant'schoiceshave
beennarrowed; one needsto considertheimpacttheconductalso has on his
comfort andpeace.34
The living-standard ideais a richone. It restson something we thinkaboutin
everyday existence andvariousarenasofsocialpolicy:theelements ofa goodlife.
It willbe possibletomakecomparisons: ifa typical person's standard oflivingis at
issue,theinterests protected by thecriminal law can be comparedwithother
interests. We can ask howa beatingcompares witha minoraccident, or howa
burglary compares with an accidental fire in one's apartment. We can compare
theseharmsby reference to variousgenericinterest dimensions thatmaybe
involved: forexample,thebeatingmaycomparein physical injuriousness witha
minoraccident, buthasan additional component of humiliation that theaccident
lacks.It will be possiblealso to makethe factualand value-judgments more
to
explicit: separate (1)out the factual question of the varioustypicalconsequences
ofa giventypeofcrime,from(2) thevalue-judgment abouthowsignificant those
consequences arein a
reducingperson's standard of living.
The livingstandard is also richin another sense,ofleavingroomforancillary
moraljudgments. Freedom, privacy, anda variety ofothervaluesmay(indeedas
wehaveseen,should)be considered inapplying living-standard judgments. What
thelivingstandard thusprovides is nota single,essential standard buta perspective
through whicha variety ofethicalandpractical judgments canbe madeaboutthe
impactofcriminal actson thequalityofpeople'slives.
Finally,theliving-standard analysis wouldexplicitly allowforcultural variation.
Different socialliving-arrangements canaffect theconsequences ofa criminal act;
and normative differences amongcultures can affect theimpactofthoseconse-
quenceson how well a victimlives. To cite an extremeexample,rape in
Bangladesh is stillmoredevastating thanitis intheWest,sinceittypically results
in the ostracism of thevictim.This sensitivity is an advantageof the living-
standard approach:as notedearlier,we needcriteria capableof takingcultural
variationintoaccount.

4. TheLogicofLiving-StandardJudgments
How,andfrom whoseperspective,
areliving-standard
judgmentstobemade?The
kindofanalysisweareproposing
presupposescertain ofoursociety
socialpractices
and certainassumedvaluesbut, giventhosepracticesand values,calls fora

34 See above n 29.

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.79 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 08:13:59 AM


All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
SPRING1991 Criminal
Gauging Harm 15
reasonedapplication oftheliving-standard criteriatoparticular speciesofcriminal
harm.Letus explain.
Whenone examineshow mucha givenspeciesof criminalharmtypically
intrudes uponsomeone'slivingstandard, certainfactual, butalsocertain norma-
tivejudgments are involved.The mixof factand normvariesas theanalysis
proceeds.Consider burglary again.Thisis an intrusion intothehome,requiring
one to assessthe importance of the homein a person'slivingstandard.The
assessment mightbeginwiththeinterest in healthand safety.The homehas
certain functions inproviding warmth
shelter, andrestthatarecritical tophysical
functioning. It is a factthat,in coldclimates, people'shealthdeteriorates when
theyarehomelessand notoffered substituteshelter (a facttoosadlyevidenton
thestreets of New York).This interest, however, ordinarily is notinvolvedin
burglary, as the offence intrudes upon but does not deprivethepersonof his
dwelling-place. Another kind of interestto consider would be thatof material
comfort-and, the
here, rating of the interest depends also on certainassumed
socialconventions. The importance of the homefora comfortable existence
depends, as noted already, on our way oflife:eg, on the factthat, in our society,
thehomeis thefocusofso muchofournon-working lives.Turningto another
concern,thatof privacy,bringsnormative judgments moreto the fore.A
of a
breaking-and-enteringdwelling invades the privacy thehome,but the
of
significance to is
assigned privacy ultimately a moral judgment. Thatjudgment,
too,maybe rootedincertain ethicaltraditions.35How,then, should theevaluator
(thatis, thepersonresponsible forgauging theconduct's harmfulness) makeand
justifythesevariousjudgments?
Anambitious approach wouldbefortheevaluator totrytojustify theunderlying
values:forexample,to givean accountof privacy,and derivetherefrom the
judgment ofitsimportance tothelivingstandard. Suchan accountwouldhaveto
be grounded inan articulated moraltheory, whichis beyondourpresent scope.It
is notneeded,forreasonsthatshouldbe evidentalready:we are nottrying to
developan invariant harm-analysis, butinsteadto deriveratings applicablehere,
givencertain prevailing socialpracticesandalsocertain ethicaltraditions. Nordo
weevenneedtotrytodescribe thosepractices andvaluesinfull-whichwouldbe
a formidable taskinitself. Instead,weneedmerely toincorporate certainassump-
tionsin theanalysis: eg,abouttheroleofthehomeineveryday living,andabout
theimportance of personalprivacy.Granted, themakingof suchassumptions
involvestheexerciseof judgment. The analysis, however, requiresmerelythat
suchjudgments be explicitly spelledout. Otherevaluators, who disagree,can
simply maketheirown,adjustedassumptions. Ouraim,as notedearlier, is notto

35A philosopher
mightaskwhether suchnorms arerootedintheethicaltraditions
ofourownculture,
orhavemore
universal Wedo nothavetoaddress
applicability. thequestion,however, as wearenotat themoment to
attempting
our
apply living-standardcriteria
in othercultural
settings.
Ourownviewwouldbe thata respect forotherpersons'
interests
is essential
toanyvalidsystemofethics,
butthat
theparticular
moralprinciplesthrough whichthatrespectis expressed---eg, principles
regarding
privacy-may
a
reflect
legitimately culture's
ethical
traditions.
For a somewhat comparable view,seeStuart Innocence
Hampshire,
andExperience
(Cambridge,Mass:Harvard UniversityPress,1989)ch2.

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.79 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 08:13:59 AM


All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
16 Oxford ofLegalStudies
Journal VOL.11
settlesuchdifferences ofopinion,buttopinpoint theirlocation, andthuspermit
conditionalconclusions: ifprivacy is accordedsuch-and-such a degreeofimport-
ance,thesearetheconsequences thatfollow.
What,however, of the next step,ofapplying theliving-standard principlesto
thevaluation ofparticular or of
species subspecies harm?Suppose,forexample, we
areaskinghowmucha typical homeburglary-involving a breaking-and-entering,
theftofa TV, butno ransacking-reduces thelivingstandard, considering certain
assumptions abouttheimportance of privacyand otherinterest-dimensions to
well-being. That judgment has to be made in the analysisitself,by reasoned
applicationofoursuggested principles. It cannotbe madesimplybyreference to
prevailingopinion.Whyso, should be evident already: ours is a jurisprudential
analysis,thatbeginswithcertain factual judgments abouttheconsequences ofthe
crime, andthen applies certainstated valuation principlestothose facts.The worth
of theexercise--the reasonwe haveoptedforthisapproachrather thansimply
asking members of the public for their ratingsof harm-lies precisely in the
opportunity (1) to check thefactual basis ofsuch and
judgments, (2) to scrutinize
howwell-reasoned is theapplication oftheassumedvaluation principles to those
facts.

5. WhyOurConception is Not Utilitarian


Is relianceon thelivingstandard a reversion to a utilitarian
doctrine ofpunish-
ment?After all,a deterrence-theorist mightemploy the idea ofliving standards to
estimate thesocialharmwrought by(say)theoffence ofburglary; andthenseta
penalty designed toreducethecrime's incidence andhenceitssocialinjuriousness.
The answer is (obviously)negative. A utilitarianpenaltheory is future-oriented,
preventive, andaggregative: it seeksto estimate howmuchthetotality offuture
harmsmaybe reducedthrough thisor thatpenalstrategy. Ourtheory ofharms,
and theuse to whichwe proposeto putit, is noneof thesethings.We are not
aggregating. Becausea burglar is responsibleonlyforhisownconduct, it is the
harmthathisconduct causesorrisksthatdetermines thegravity oftheoffence (not
thetotality of harmcausedby theactsof all burglars, overwhomhe has no
control).Moreover, we areassuming a past-oriented andretributive criterion for
to
howmuch punishburglary, nota future-oriented andpreventive one.We look
tothelivingstandard todecidehowmuchharma standard actofburglary did;and
looktothatharm,inordertodetermine theseriousness ofthecrimeofconviction.
The sanction-according. to desert assumptionsthat have been detailed
elsewhere36-should be proportionate in severitywiththegravity oftheoffence,
thusdetermined. Thisis wholly different from seeking a sanction forburglary that
wouldimprove citizens'futureaggregate livingstandards; sucha sanction, tohave
thedesiredpreventive effect,mighthaveto be whollydisproportionate to the
gravityoftheoffence.

36 See, eg, von Hirsch,op cit,above n 8, chs 3-4.

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.79 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 08:13:59 AM


All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
SPRING1991 GaugingCriminalHarm 17

ofa Living-Standard
IV Elements Analysis
Havingsketched our rationale,
we needto explainhowcriminal harmscan be
gradedthrougha living-standard Let us, then,sketchthemainelements
analysis.
ofthatanalysis.

Standard:
theLiving
1. Rating TheFourLevels
If harmsareto be gaugedaccordingtotheextent towhichtheyaffect someone's
livingstandard,thenthe standard
living needs to be graded.
Any gradingschemeis
bound to be somewhatarbitrary, but one shouldbe able to make rough
forexample,between
distinctions: an intrusion
suffering thataffects
an adequate
standard ofcomfortandonethatreducesthepersontothemeresubsistence level.
To accomplish scale.The fourliving-standard
this,weproposea four-level levels
maybe formulated as follows:

Level Category GeneralDescription


10 butwithmaintenance
Subsistence Survival, ofnomorethan
elementaryhumancapacities No
tofunction.
satisfactions
presupposedat thislevel.
20 Minimal Maintenanceofa minimal levelofcomfortand
well-being dignity.
30 Adequate Maintenanceofan 'adequate'levelofcomfort
and
well-being dignity.
40 Enhanced enhancement
Significant abovethe
inquality-of-life
well-being mere'adequate'level.

This scaleis designedto gaugethedegreetowhicha givenintrusion affectsthe


person'slivingstandard. If,forexample, CrimeX intrudes intointerests
required
forsubsistence level10),itqualifies
(living-standard as gravelyharmful.IfCrimeY
intrudesonlyintointerests neededtomaintain thequality oftheperson'slifeatthe
'adequate'level(level30), thisrenderstheharmless gravebut stillsignificant.
Intrusionsthatonlymarginally (or do notat all) affectthelivingstandard are
rankedthelowest.
Havingfourgradesis by no meansinevitable. Sincewe are dealingwitha
continuum, a larger orfewer number ofnotches couldhavebeencut.We propose
thesefourgradations becausethe differences betweenthemseem reasonably
a
apparent.Having larger number of living-standardgradationswouldmakeit
easierto rateharmsonce thegradation affected by the criminalconductwas
determined; but it would make the latterdetermination more as the
difficult,
differences
betweenthegradeswouldbe less easyto discern.
There will also be variationsin well-beingwithinthe fourgrades.Subsistence,
forexample,rangesfrombaresurvivalto survivalwithoutsubstantialdebilitation:

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.79 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 08:13:59 AM


All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
18 JournalofLegal Studies
Oxford VOL.11
bothhomicide andmayhem invadesubsistence, albeittodifferent degrees.Again,
thisshouldnotbe surprising, if one keepsin mindthatwe are dealingwitha
continuum, notneatly-demarcated steps.
The function of thesefourgradations is to measuretheextentto whicha
criminal acttypically intrudes intoa person'slivingstandard. The (numerically)
lowerlevelthatis involved, thegreater theintrusion. To takean obviousexample:
an aggravated assaultthreatens subsistence (1?) and thusis substantially more
harmful thana theftaffecting onlylevel4'. This explainswhywe are usinga
'positive'conception (the livingstandard)to rateharm(something negative,
involving a taking-away). Criminalharmconsistsin theintrusion intolegally-
protected interests,anditsseriousness dependsontheimportance oftheinterests
involved. We aregauging thoseinterests' importance interms oftheirsignificance
forsomeone's livingstandard.
Let us consider thefourliving-standard levelsmoreclosely,then,and givea
glosson theirmeaning.
Subsistence (1l). We havedefined subsistence as 'survival,butwithmaintenance
of no morethanelementary humancapacitiesto function'. This meansbarely
getting by.Includedwouldbe preservation ofone'smajorphysical andcognitive
functions, and preservation of a minimalcapacityforsocialfunctioning. Being
killedobviously destroys subsistence, butbeingmaimedormadedestitute would
intrude uponsubsistence also.
Criticaltoourdefinition ofsubsistence is thatnosatisfactions arepresupposedat
thislevel.Comfort thusis notpartofsubsistence--although avoidanceofintense
painwouldbe. Neitheris privacy orself-respect included:onecansurvive orget
by without and
privacy despiterepeated humiliations.
Minimalwell-being (2'). This levelwe havedefinedas 'a minimum levelof
comfort and dignity'.It meansmorethanbarelygettingby. In additionto
surviving, certainelementary humansatisfactions are assumed:somecomfort, a
modicum ofself-respect.
Partof minimal well-being is thusa certainlevelof material support:shelter
frominclement weather, nutritious food,etc. Anotherpartis somedegreeof
privacy andpersonal autonomy. Onecansubsistwithout theslightestprivacy,but
one hardlycan be saidto haveevena barelysatisfactory life.Protectionagainst
grosslydemeaning orinsulting treatment fallsinthiscategory also:onecansubsist
despitesuch treatment, but it impedesthe maintenance of any degreeof
self-respect. Nevertheless, we are speakingonlyof bare minima' of comfort,
privacy, etc:anexistence atthislevelwouldstillbe having a substandard of
quality
life.
Adequatewell-being(30). We have definedthis level as 'maintenanceof an
"adequate"level.(butno more)ofcomfort The term'adequate'is
and dignity'.
usedherenotinthesenseofbeingsatisfactory, senseof
butinthemorerestricted
beingnon-substandard.Includedwouldbea levelofmaterial neededfora
amenity
comfortable, existence.It also includesthat
but no more than just comfortable,
additionaldegreeof privacyand avoidanceofdemeaningtreatment thatwouldbe

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.79 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 08:13:59 AM


All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
SPRING
1991 Criminal
Gauging Harm 19
needed towarrant theconclusion thatoneisnotleading a substandardordeprived
existence.
Enhanced well-being(40).Thiswehavedefined as 'significant
enhancement in
quality oflifeabovethemere"adequate" level'.It addressesthoseconcerns that
improve someone's A Swedish
significantly.
quality-of-life example ofaninterest at
thislevelwouldbetheownership ofa sommarstuga-the smallcountry cabinthat
many Swedes ownanduseforthesummer holidays. Having a sommarstuga is not
neededforthethirdlevelofwell-being: oneis notplainly deprived (evenin
prosperous Sweden) ifonelacksa summer cabin.Nevertheless, thesommarstuga
doessubstantially enhance thequality ofmany Swedes'lives,anditsdestruction
wouldhavea significant impact onthequalityoftheperson's existence.
Weremain slightlyuncomfortable with the term'enhancement', as itapplies
more naturallytomaterialamenities thannon-material One
interests. might readily
saythata sommarstuga is notneededforadequatelivingbutimproves life
It
significantly. seems a bitodd totalkabout or that
privacydignity way: say,forto
example, thatfreedom from verbal harassmentisan'enhancement' oflifequality.
Whileonemaynotbeentitled toa sommarstuga,isnoteveryone entitled
tobefree
ofharassment? Remember, however, thatwhen wespeakof'enhancements' weare
notcharacterizing theinterest butrather
itself, itssignificanceforthequality of
life.It doesmakesensetosaythatfreedom from occasionalharassment is not
necessary foranadequate life,butdoesenhance one'sexistence above
significantly
themere'adequate' level.
Marginal impact. Somecriminal harms havenoimpact, oronlya marginal one,
onthequality ofa person's life.Paradigmaticofharms inthiscategory arepetty
thefts.Theconduct maycausebrief inconvenience, buttypicallyhasnosignificant
lastingimpact on theperson's well-being.

2. TheGeneric-Interest
Dimensions
A criminalactcan intrudeupona varietyofdifferentkindsofinterests.To cite
previouslymentioned examples,assaultaffects
both the and
person'ssafety his
a a
self-respect;burglary,person's materialcomfortand herprivacy.The crime
can affectthesevariousdimensions in different
degrees, and with differential
impactson thelivingstandard:theprivacy-intrusion
in a burglary,
forexample,
mayaffect thestandard oflivingmorethanthecomfort-intrusion. Our analysis
thusneedsto distinguishvariousgeneric-interest
dimensions. We suggestfour,
namely:
-Physicalintegrity
-Materialsupport
andamenity
-Freedomfromhumiliation
-Privacy/autonomy
We do notclaimthislistis complete,
andhaveusedno deeptheoryofinterests
to
deriveit.Instead,
werelyonourimpressions
ofthemainkindsoflegally-protected

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.79 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 08:13:59 AM


All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
20 Oxford ofLegalStudies
Journal VOL.11
intereststhatseemtypically involved invictimizing crimes.37 Addingsupplemental
interestdimensions wouldnotalterthemodeofanalysis.
How are theseinterest dimensions to be used?One wouldfirstidentify and
separateouttheinterest dimensions involved inan offence. Next,onewouldapply
theliving-standard criteria toeachdimension successively. To illustrate, consider
simpleresidential burglary: theoffender, during theresidents' absence,breaksinto
an apartment and stealsa television set. First,one identifies theinterest dimen-
sions.Here, thosechiefly involvedappearto be (i) materialamenity, and (ii)
privacy.Thematerial lossconsists inthelossofa usefulhomeappliance (a TV), the
inconvenience ofhavinglocksrepaired, etc.The privacy-intrusion consists ofthe
unauthorized entryintothedwelling-place itself.Second,oneappliestherating-
toeachdimension,
criteria successively. Withrespect tothecomfort dimension, the
impacton the livingstandardis not great:a workablereplacement TV, for
example, canbe obtained at modestcost.However, therating maywellbe higher
whentheprivacy/autonomy dimension is takenintoaccount, as wewillseeshortly.
Let us examine thefourinterest dimensions moreclosely.
Physical This
integrity. embraces health,safety, andavoidance ofphysical pain.
An intrusion intophysical integrity can,depending its
upon extent, affect anyof
theliving-standard gradations: froma homicide thatdestroys subsistence (living-
standard level10) to a jostling causingonlymomentary discomfort thatscarcely
disturbsthequalityofone'slife.
Material support andamenity. Thisembraces someone's material interests. These
range from the most basic ones needed for subsistence (eg, food, drink and
minimum shelter); to thevariousmaterial amenities neededfora lifeoftolerable
comfort; to variousluxuries.An intrusion intoa person'smaterial interests may
thusrangefromthosethatareveryserious(affecting living-standard level1P)to
thosethatarequitetrivial anddo notaffect thelivingstandard atall.
Freedom fromhumiliation. We haveconsidered varioustermsto describethis
dimension: eg,'self-respect' and'dignity'. These,however, seemedoverbroad-as
one'sself-respect anddignity dependon one'sownself-conceptions as wellas on
what harmbefallsone. The narrowerterm-'freedom fromhumiliation or
degrading treatment'-therefore seemedmoreapt, becauseit refersto those
injuriesto self-respect thatderivefromothers'mistreatment.38 That thisis a
dimension ofqualityoflifeshouldbe evident:oneis worseoffwhentreated in a
degrading fashion.This interest is affected by a variety of criminal acts, from
physicalassaulttoverbalharassment.
Privacylautonomy. This affects well-being notonlybecauseit promotes self-
it one
respectbutbecause helps pursuepreferences ofvarious kinds. It is affected

we thought
37 Initially, we couldderivedefinitions fromtheGerman
ofinterest-types doctrineofRechtsgilter.
However, thedoctrine didnotoffer
usmuchuseful whenweexamined
guidance ofandreferences
it.Fordiscussion to
thisdoctrine,see,WinfriedHassemer, Theorie desVerbrechens
undSoziologie (Frankfurt: Verlagsanstalt,
Europaiische
1973).
38Thisdimension a degreeofoverlapbetween
creates harmandculpability.
Humiliation
normallypresupposes
intent(orat least,apparent I amhumiliated
intent). bybeingbeaten;butnot,normally,bybeinginjuredthrough
someone's negligent ofa vehicle.
handling

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.79 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 08:13:59 AM


All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
1991
SPRING Criminal
Gauging Harm 21
by variousoffences,fromburglary through wiretappingto kidnapping. It is a
dimension whichis culturespecific:in our cultureit affects well-being con-
siderably,butanother culture
maygiveprivacy orautonomy lessweight.
A corollaryofthisdiscussionis thatsomeoftheinterest dimensions do notrun
throughthe entireliving-standard scale. Physicalintegrity relatesto all four
levels,depending
living-standard onthedegreeoftheintrusion. Materialsupport
andamenity doesalso.However,thelasttwodimensions (freedom fromhumili-
ation,andprivacy/autonomy)areconcerns thatariseonlyatliving-standard level20
(minimum well-being)orhigher.The reasonis thatlevel1' (subsistence)concerns
merely by',andnosatisfactions
'getting areassumedatthatlevel.

theLiving-Standard
3. Standardizing Impact
Estimatingtheimpactofa givenintrusion on someone'slivingstandard requires
assumptions to be made on what other resourceshe or shepossesses.The more
slenderthoseresources,themoredevastating theintrusion. How,then,shouldone
determinethestandard impact?
Our living-standardanalysisis designedto gaugeharmsaffecting a variety of
from
interests, the most to the least important. It is thus to
helpful imagine
someonewhohasvariousinterests at thevariousliving-standard levels,andthen
ask howdeprivation or intrusion intothisparticular interestwouldaffectthat
person'squalityoflife.The hypothetical victimwouldthusbe assumedto have
interests
ateachofthevariousliving-standard levels:certain orresources
interests
neededto subsist;othersneededto raisehiswell-being totheminimal andtothe
adequate level; and certain other, 'enhancing' interests. These assumptions
providea perspective forjudgingthe importance of a particular
intrusion: it
enablesone to judgehowimportant theparticular interestor resource intruded
uponis to a goodlife,compared to thevariousotherinterests and resources a
personmayhave.Notall actualvictims willhavea lowerlivingstandard to begin
with,andthussuffer disproportionately fromanygivendeprivation. Suchcasesof
to harm--coupled
greatervulnerability withquestionsof foreseeability of that
bytheoffender-should
vulnerability be addressed bytherulesonaggravation and
mitigation.

4. Temporal
Perspective
Whattemporal perspectiveshouldoneadoptwhenjudging theimpactofa crime
on someone'swell-being?The perspective makesa difference.
Considerhaving
one'spocketpicked.Ifthequestionis 'Howwasyourday?',itmakesperfect sense
toanswerthatitwasawful,becauseonelostone'swalletwitha smallsumofcash
andallone'sIDs. However, ifthequestionis howone'syearhasbeen,itis sillyto
say thatit has been awful,merelybecause one's pocketwas pickedfourmonths
ago.

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.79 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 08:13:59 AM


All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
22 OxfordfournalofLegalStudies VOL.11
Living-standard judgmentsareaddressed totheoverallqualityofsomeone's life,
and thissuggestsa considerably longertemporalperspective thanthe highly
variablequalityofexperience fromdayto day.The appropriate is a
perspective
middle-term one-something approximating 'How hasyouryear been?' orperhaps
evena slightlylongerduration. An extremely longtemporal duration, however,
wouldbe too reductive: evenawfulexperiences diminishin importance if the
question were: 'How was your last decade?'-and indeed, such questionsare
seldomaskedinordinary life.39
Our suggested temporalperspectiveis addressed,however, notto theactual
durationofthecrimeanditseffects, buttotheimportance oftheexperience from
theoverallviewpoint ofa giventime-frame. A physical
assault,and itsimmediate
trauma,maysoonbe over;yetiftheexperience waspainfulorhumiliating enough,
itmaystillloomlargeinevaluation the
of,say, quality ofa whole year'sexperience.

5. Replacement
Whatofreplaceable items?Something maybe important tothequalityofone'slife
and yetreadilyreplaced.Considerthe theftof an umbrellain rainyBergen,
Norway. Isn'tthatserious?-after all,thevictim willconstantly
bedrenched, cold,
andillwithout it. Obviously not:thepersonnormally canobtaina newumbrella
cheaply enoughso thatitmakeslittledifference, tothequalityofhisor
ordinarily,
herexistence.
Theprinciple canbestatedgenerally, as follows. Supposeanoffence damagesor
destroys an interest,X. SupposethatX canbe replacedfora certain replacement
cost,Y. If,inthestandard case,making theoutlayY wouldhavesignificantly less
impacton thelivingstandard thanthelossoftheitemX itself,thentheharm
shouldbemeasured bytheimpactonthelivingstandard ofincurringthecost,y.40
In dealingwithreplacement in thisfashion,however,we shouldkeep the
generic-interestdimensions inmind:an itemmaybe readily replaceablefromthe
perspective ofonedimension butnotanother. Considerourburglary andtheftofa
television. a the loss
From comfort-perspective, is'readily replaced.However,the
intrusion intoprivacy is notsomething whichis replacedor madewholeby the
acquisitionofan ersatzTV.
Is thisanalysisclass-biased? Afterall,someimpoverished willhavegreat
persons
difficulty a
affordingreplacement that most peopleeasily couldafford. We are,
however, speaking of the standardcase-so that should
replaceability be judgedby
howaffordable thereplacement itemordinarily is. Onecanexpectdeviationsfrom
thatnormin bothdirections: personswhocaneasilypayevenforthemostcostly
replacements, and othersforwhomeventhemostinexpensive couldrepresenta

9 Of course,theveryworstintrusions wouldremainsignificant evenfromsucha long-term


perspective-mayhem
beingan example.
40 Note we are speakinghere of the standardvictim's to
ability replacethe item-not theoffendercan
whether
affordto makerestitution.

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.79 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 08:13:59 AM


All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
SPRING1991 GaugingCriminalHarm 23
sacrifice.
financial Thesearecasesofspecialresiliency
orvulnerability,
whichthe
andmitigation
onaggravation
principles shouldaddress.

6. 'Psychological Harm'
We havenotincluded'psychological harm'as a distinct dimension inouranalysis.
The omission is intentional,
becausethetermis toomuchofa catchallto be of
help.
Emotions, likebeliefsand attitudes, are capableof beingsupported byvalid
reasons (as the literatureofmoral is
psychologycurrently exploring).41 I lose
When
a tennismatchI maybe furious atmyopponent, buthaveno reasonforbeingso.
However,if I lost becausethe opponentcheated,thenmy angerbecomes
warranted: I amentitled toresent theinjury.42
A variety ofemotional statesjustifiablyflowfrombeingcriminally victimized.
Attacks onone'ssafety elicit
(quiteproperly) fear;debasements elicitshameanda
senseofhumiliation, andso forth. Suchdistress,however, canbe considered part
oftheintrusion intotheinterest dimension involved. Indeed,thatis ourapproach:
whenexamining a crimethataffects personal safety,thefearjustifiably as
elicited
well as theactualinjurywouldbe considered in assessingthe living-standard
impact.Whenexamining conductthataffectsself-respect-as severalof the
offences discussed belowdo--thesenseofhumiliation is theinjurythatreducesthe
livingstandard.In thisfashion, we can analysethevariousformsofwarranted
distressthatvariousintrusions produce.43
Otheremotional statesmayflowfrom criminalvictimization, butwithlessgood
reason.A burglary mayput someone in greatfear of personalattack,without
regard to the actual risksor those that mightreasonably be anticipated.Some
crimesmayspecially causedispleasure becauseofaversions towhatis believedto
be the typicaloffender-for exampleto his assumedrace or lifestyle.Such
responses would be disregarded in ouranalysis, as theycannotbe ifall forms of
psychological are as
impact lumpedtogether 'psychological harm'.

V. Applying
theAnalysis:
SomeIllustrations
Havingoutlined theelementsofa living-standard itmight
analysis, be illuminating
to tryit on somehypothetical
cases.Here,then,aresomebriefoffence descrip-
tions.The actsdescribedaremeantto be typicalinstances
ofvariousgeneraof
thefts,
robberies, etc.(Thedescriptions
burglaries, arenotnecessarily
co-extensive
withthestatutoryoffence To control
definitions.44) forculpability,
weshallassume
41Fordiscussion
ofsuchissuesinthecontext
ofthecriminal
law,seeSchoeman,
op cit,aboven 10.
42 See discussion
ofthemoralpsychology
ofprovocation,
invonHirschandJareborg,
op cit,aboven 10.
43A comparableissueisthatofoffence.
Shouldtheoffensiveness
ofconduct beassessedbythedistressitcauses,or
byhowmuchtheconduct violates
norms ofrespectful
orconsideratetreatment?
Wewouldfavour thelatter
view.See
vonHirsch, above
op cit, n 23,709-12;Narayan,opcit,aboven 14,chs1,3.
4 Manyjurisdictionshave broad offence
statutory definitions.
The ModelPenalCode (art221),forexample,
defines as anyentryintoa building
burglary withintentto commit a crime;and has specialprovisions
onlyfor
residential
night-time burglary. Suchbroaddefinitions
are insufficient
forratingtheharmfulness oftheconduct, as
continued
onpage24

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.79 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 08:13:59 AM


All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
24 JournalofLegal Studies
Oxford VOL.11
thateachharmis purposely and thattheoffender
inflicted, is awareofitsusual
That
consequences. way,differencesin will
ratings be due to the degreeof
harmfulness.

1. Homicide
Our standardcase is: A killsB. The analysisis simpleenough.The conduct
destroys whichis ratedas 10. Hencetheconduct
subsistence, harm
hasthehighest
rating.

2. AssaultandBattery
The assumedstandard caseis: A beatsup B. Supposethebeating is quitepainful,
andresults in substantialbruisesandsomelacerations-but notenoughtorequire
hospitalization.
Consider, theinterest
first, dimension ofphysical integrity.Fromthisperspec-
tive,beingbeatenup is noworsethanaccidentally walking intoa solidglassdoor.
It hurtsbadlywhenithappens, onehasa blackeyeanda headachefora fewdays,
andthenitis over.Howseriousis that?
-Is theliving-standard levelinvolvedlevel1? (subsistence)? Obviouslynot.
Thereis no lossoffunctioning. It is merely uncomfortable, andcomfort, physical
ormaterial, is notpresupposed at thislevel.
-Is itlevel2' (minimal well-being),or30 (adequatewell-being)? Again,no.We
hardly think thattheperson who walks into a door
glass and getsa blackeyehashis
overalllivingstandard reducedbelowsuchlevelsofadequacy.
-Is itlevel40 (enhanced well-being)?Fora briefperiod,yes.One'squalityof
existencehasdefinitelygone down-while oneis stillsoreandblack-eyed. Butthe
period involved may be too briefto qualify from the middle-term perspectiveof
whichwearespeaking.
Let us, however,consideranotherinterest dimension: thatoffreedom from
humiliation.Here,theintrusion intothelivingstandard is potentiallymoregrave:
beingbeatenup is demeaning. Howmuchitis so is a matter ofsocialconvention.
In themoregladiatorial societies,losinga (fair)fightmaynotbe regarded as
particularlydegrading-and thisholdseveninsomeofourownsubcultures, eg,in
thevenerable American institutionofthebar-room brawl.(Buteventhere,being
victimized in an unfairfight-eg,beingambushed byseveralassailants-may be
continued
from page23
theydisregard factors
critical theliving-standard
affecting
typically impact--eg, theamount ofdestruction,ifany,
wroughttotheburglarized premises. Hence,intheabovehypotheticalcases,weconsider subspecies
separate ofthe
offence
ofburglary, viz:residential
burglarywithransacking,andordinary residential
burglary.
Sentencingguidelines or case-lawjurisprudence broadstatutory
couldsubcategorize offence
categoriesin this
fashion.
However, theadditional elements thesubcategory
identifying falloutsidethelegaldefinition
oftheoffence,
andwouldhavetobe established at thesentencing Thathearing
hearing. (intheUnitedStates,at least)hasa lower
requirementofproofthanthecriminal proceeding guilt.Thealternative
establishing (andinourviewultimately the
course)
preferable wouldbea statutory thatdrewnarrower
recodification andmorefully offence
descriptive categories.
Recodification,
however, is an ambitioustaskwhichmanyjurisdictions would be to
reluctant undertake.For fuller
see vonHirsch,KnappandTonry,op cit,aboven 2, 97-8,andMichaelTonry,'Criminal
discussion, Law: The
Missing in
Element Sentencing Reform' L Rev607.
(1982)35 Vanderbilt

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.79 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 08:13:59 AM


All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
SPRING1991 GaugingCriminalHarm 25

regarded as humiliating.) The linkbetweenbeingbeatenand beinghumiliated


probably holdsinmost cultures,andmayhavedeeperroots:evena dogcringes ifit
isbeatenandcannotdefend itself.
In ourculture,atanyrate,a beating is ordinarily
deeplyhumiliating. Whatmakesit so is notjustthephysical intrusion andpain,
but the beingput at someoneelse's mercy.The personbeatenis literally
abased-knockeddown,abused-and thebeaterestablishes directphysicaldo-
minion overhim.
So thequestionbecomes-atwhichlevelis thisdeprivation? It is definitelynot
as highas level10, becausesubsistence does notpresuppose self-respect, in our
taxonomy.
Is theintrusionatleastat30? We wouldsayso. Anadequatelevelofself-respect
is surelya partofthislevel.Andthehumiliation ofa beatingstrikes us as grave
enoughtocompromise atthe'adequate'level.
self-respect
Is theintrusion stillmoreserious,thatis, at 2??We wouldsaynot.Thereare
humiliations that are so graveas to compromise even a minimallevel of
well-being-as wewillseewhenwe discussrape.Butweremain unconvinced, for
themoment, thatthehumiliation ofa beating,
substantial
though itis,wouldbe so
devastating toa normalperson'sself-respect, thatitwouldplacethequalityofhis
lifeatminimal well-being, ie, barelyabovethesubsistence level.

3. PettyAssault
Consider thecase:A slapsB's face.Here,thematerial discomfort is trivial.
So the
is
question again one of humiliation.Having one's face is
slapped humiliating. But
oneis notbeingmadehelpless, as inthecaseofbeating. One canextricate oneself
withdignity-remonstrate, moveaway,calltheauthorities, etc.We thusdoubtit
as level
qualifies involving 30. A reasonableperson, we would think,wouldnot
regard himselfas having suffered a majordeprivation, sufficientto reducehis
wholequalityof lifeforan appreciable period to below the 'adequate'level.
the
Conceivably, humiliation involves level
40, on grounds thatthere hasbeensome
diminution of overallwell-being. However, even this conclusion is debatable,
givena middle-termtime perspective.

4. ArmedRobbery
The assumedstandard caseis: A robsB at gunpoint,
takeshiswalletanda small
amount ofcash.
The property losshereis quiteminor--ordinarily,
toosmalltohavemorethan
marginal impactonthelivingstandard.
The majorelement is thethreatenedbodilyintrusion:
towit,thethreatto kill.
Thisis a threatened
intrusionintoa level10interest:
subsistence.
However,we needa discount to reflect
thattheintrusion
is merelythreatened
and contingent.
We thereforesaythere
is a discounted
10. How suchdiscountsmight
be madewillbe discussedlater.

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.79 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 08:13:59 AM


All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
26 Oxford ofLegalStudies
Journal VOL.11
5. ForcibleRape
Ourstandard caseis theclassicstrangerrape:A rapesB atgunpointorknifepoint.
One interestdimension involved is bodilysafety. the
Here, analysis wouldbe
similarto the preceding case: sincea threatto survivalis involved,thisis a
discounted1.
The otherinterest
dimension is thatoffreedom fromhumiliation.
We hardly
needbelabourthatforcedsexis aboutthemostdemeaning imposition canbe
that
imagined-far morehumiliating than a Because
beating. of thestrength,
in our
ofthenormthatsexualfavours
culture, be
may granted onlywith forced
consent,
is an extreme
sexualintercourse formof beingsubjectedto another's
dominion.
Thuswewouldratethisatthehighest levelofintrusions
toself-respect,
namely,at
20.
This analysisexplainswhywe considerrape at gunpointworsethanthe
armedrobbery.
just-cited It supplements
thediscounted10 formenaceto bodily
withtheactual20forhumiliation.
safety,

6. 'Date Rape'
A typicalcasemightrunsomething likethis.A female student drinkstoexcessata
malestudentcluband then,withhercapacityofphysical reduced,is
resistance
madetohavesexualintercourse overherprotests.
The differencebetween thisandthepreceding caseis thatthethreatto bodily
thevictim
is eliminated:
safety is notthreatenedwithseriousinjury ifshedoesnot
consent.
However,theinterest in sexualintegrity is intrudedupon muchas in the
preceding case-with its attendant grave humiliation. For reasonsexplained
already, this
therefore, would seem toinvolvea 2'.

withRansacking
7. Burglary
The scenario is alltoofamiliar:a burglarentersa homeand,after stealing someof
thecontents, defacesthewallsandpictures, smashes furnitureandchina,etc.
Let us,first, consider theinterestdimension ofmaterial supportandamenity. In
itsextreme forms, destructionofa person'slivingspacecanbe veryserious.Ifthe
personis leftliterally
homeless, andcannotafford alternative quarters,hejoinsthe
ranksofthehomeless who-at least in oursocialenvironments and climates-live
at thesubsistence level.
Thekindofintrusion involved here,however, is lessdrastic.A ransacking is,in
its materialconsequences, aboutcomparable to havinga kitchen-fire in one's
flat-inwhichsmokedamageandfiremen's effortsresultin substantialdamageto
furnishings,clothing, etc.How much are one'sinterestsset back by such anevent?
--Certainly, oneis notreducedtothesubsistence level(1). Oneis notrendered
homeless,and stillhas warmthand shelter.

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.79 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 08:13:59 AM


All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
SPRING1991 Criminal
Gauging Harm 27
-One alsois notreducedtotheminimum well-being level(20). Byobtaining a
fewtemporary replacement furnishings anda fewitemsofreplacement clothing,
onecancontinue toliveinminimal comfort.
-Would the intrusion involve'adequate'well-being (ie, level30)? A home
furnished withbasicamenities doesappeartobe partofourconception ofadequate
well-being. Here,however, theissueof replacement costsarises.The standard
personmaywellbe abletoafford toreplacethosebasicamenities without a major
impactonhis/her standardofliving.
-In any event,the intrusion wouldinvolvelevel40-reduction in overall
existing fora
livingstandard significant period.
Let us turn,then,totheinterest dimension ofprivacylautonomy. In ourculture,
partofprivacy is havinga home of one's own, in which one spendsa substantial
portion and
ofleisuretime whichmaybe thefocus of family/social life.Thehome,
according tothisconception, be
may arranged to suitthe taste oftheoccupant, and
maybe entered onlybyinvitees. Anyresidential burglary, therefore,intrudes on
thisinterest.
Beingdeprivedaltogether of a homeof one's ownwouldbe a veryserious
intrusion.Suppose someone was involuntarily removed from hishometocollective
with
livingquarters strangers. Even ifboard, shelterand amenities wereadequate,
thelossofprivacy andautonomy wouldseema largeenoughsetbacktowell-being
to intrudeupon level 20--invasionof minimallivingstandard.(Beinginsti-
tutionalizedhasthisquality.)
Ransacking ofa homein a burglary is notso greatan intrusion, forone still
keeps a home of one'sown. However, the forced of a
entry stranger--coupled with
thedestruction/damage totheoccupant's chosenliving arrangements-would seem
to compromise an adequatelivingstandard. Thus, fromtheprivacy/autonomy
standpoint, theliving-standardlevelinvolved probably shouldbe ratedas 3".
Finally,thereis thedimension ofphysicalsecurity.Victims ofburglariesoften are
frightened thatthe burglarwill return and attack the occupant, or would have
attacked had he or shebeenpresent whenthecrimeoccurred.In fact,assaults
seldomoccurduring burglaries.

8. Common
Residential
Burglary
Here,thedwelling is entered,and a commonitemofproperty is removed. No
ransackingoccurs.
Materialamenity. The intrusion on materialcomfort is minimal.A readily-
itemofproperty
replaceable is lost.Otherwise,theliveability
ofthedwellingis not
affected.
In materialtermsthelivingstandard wouldscarcelybe affected.
Privacy/autonomy.Here, the entryconstitutes a significantintrusioninto
However,
privacy. theoccupant's preferred arrangementsofhis/her homearenot
disturbed.
significantly Ourjudgment is thatthiswouldinvolvelevel4P.

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.79 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 08:13:59 AM


All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
28 JournalofLegal Studies
Oxford VOL.11
9. AutoTheft
In autotheft,
onlymaterial
amenity is atissue.The caris nota zoneofprivacy akin
to thehome,ordinarily.
For manypeople,use ofa caris important to leisureor
evento livelihood.
However,carsareinsurable againsttheft, anda stolencarcan
be replacedby a functioning vehicle.Providedthat theft-insurance and/or
replacementcostsaremodest,thestandard on a
impact person'swell-being would
be limited.45

VI Harm-Scales, andDiscounts
Combinations,
Constructing andapplying theliving-standard helps,butdoesnotsuffice,
ratings
togradeharms.The reasonsshouldbe apparent fromthepreceding illustrations.
First,an offence maygiveriseto multipleliving-standard ratingsin different
dimensions. A beating,as justnoted,had a low ratingin thephysical-integrity
dimension,buta higher oneinthefreedom-from-humiliation dimension. We thus
needa wayofcombining intoa netharmfulness
thesediverseassessments grade.
Second,discounts need to be madeforriskedor threatened harm.An armed
robbery,forexample, so wedescribed
riskssubsistence, itas 'discounted' 10.Butit
makeslittlesensetodiscount ontotheliving-standard
directly scale:ifonereduced
therobbery ratingto 2', forexample,thatwouldnotbe sayingtheoffence risks
subsistence,butrather thatitactuallyaffects
theliving-standardlevelofminimal
well-being-which maywellnotbe an accurate characterization.

1. Creatinga Harm-Scale
anddiscounts,
To dealwithcombinations werequirean explicit This
harm-scale.
wouldgradeharmsfrom With
theverygravetotheminor. thescalein there
place,
gradations,10 to 40, should'map onto'
would be ruleson how theliving-standard
the scale. Then, adjustments could be made fordiscounts-for-risk and for
combinations.
A simpleharm-scale mighthave fivegradations of gravity:
grave,serious,
upper-intermediate, and
lower-intermediate, Each
lesser. mightbe set
gradation
as a
forth band, so as tomakeroom the
within band.Setforth
thescale look for'differentiations
like
schematically, might Figure1 (opposite).
Onecouldbemoreambitious-for example,construct numerical
a 100-point scale,
with20 pointsforeachgrade.This,however, is notnecessary,and maygivea
misleading senseofprecision.

45 Theftsbecome more difficult to analyse,however,when theyinvolvesums of money,ratherthan standard


of money,and the highlyuneven
relatesto the fungibility
possessionssuch as wallets,TVs, or cars. The difficulty
of financialresources.How a theftof X dollarsaffectssomeone'slivingstandarddependscriticallyon
distribution
whatotherfinancialresourceshe or she is assumedto have. Whetherour usual suggestedtechnique-ofjudgingthe
impactbya hypothetical is a
standardcase, and dealingwithdeviatingcases throughaggravation/mitigation-suffices,
questiondeservingoffurther discussion.

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.79 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 08:13:59 AM


All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
SPRING1991 GaugingCriminalHarm 29

I-grave

II-serious

III-upper-intermediate

IV-lower-intermediate

V-lesser

Fig 1. A simple
harm-scale

Next,one shouldestablisha ruleformappingtheliving-standard


gradations
ontothisscale.A simplerulewouldbe thatshowninFigure2:

HarmGradation LevelIntruded
Living-Standard Upon
I-grave Subsistence level
(living-standard 10)
II-serious Minimalwell-being
(level20)
III-upper-intermediateAdequatewell-being
(level30)
IV-Iower-intermediateEnhanced (level40)
well-being
V-lesser Livingstandard
notaffected
or
onlymarginally
so

Fig 2. Theharm-scale
andliving-standard
levels

Noticethismapping-rule,elementaryas itis,involves
valuejudgments,forweare
characterizingthegravity
ofvariouslevelsofintrusions intothelivingstandard.
We are, forexample,asserting thatintrusions intosubsistenceinvolvegrave
harms,etc. However,thesejudgments seemstraightforward enough(givenour
preceding torequirenoelaboration.
discussion)
In thisscale,within-category
variationscan be denotedsimplybythelocation
withina givenband: no numbersare necessary. For example,the difference
between homicide andmayhem canbe shownas in Figure3:

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.79 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 08:13:59 AM


All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
30 Oxford ofLegalStudies
Journal VOL.11

r * -- - homicide

4
grave* --- mayhem

Fig 3. Within-category
variations

2. Discounts
forThreatened
orRiskedHarms
Manycrimesonlycreatea threator riskto a giveninterest. Theirharm-rating
shoulddependnotonlyontheimportance oftheinterest butthedegreetowhichit
is risked.Themoreremote therisk,thelowerthatrating, ie,thegreater shouldbe
thediscount.
Consider thesefouroffences: homicide, attempted homicide,46armedrobbery,
anddrunken driving.Allaffectthe interest insubsistence, but in different degrees.
Homicideactuallytakesa life;an attempt mayinvolvea highriskof life-loss;
robbery threatens thevictim'slifebutthethreat is contingent (therobbermight
usethegunonlyifthevictim resists).In drunken driving, the riskismoreremote,
depending on how much alcoholthe offender hasconsumed and how crowded the
highways are.
To dealwiththesesituations, a two-step processseemsappropriate. The first
is
tomakea living-standard valuation ofthecompleted harm.In homicide, we have
donethatalready: theharmis atthehighendofthe'grave'range.Thesecondstep
is to makean appropriate discount forthreat or risk.47We might,forexample,
treatcertainattempts as constituting a sufficiently highriskto keepattempted
homicide inthe'grave'range--albeit at a pointin thatrangebelowthecompleted
harm.Next,we givethethreatened homicide thatis present in armedrobbery a
somewhat largerdiscount:perhaps,one wouldplace thatoffence in the next
('serious')harmcategory-because theriskofa killingoccurring is stillsubstan-
tial,and because of the apprehension of death the conduct can be expectedto
createin thevictim. As wedescendtomorecontingent risksto survival (eg,those
typicallyinvolved in drunken driving) the discount would be placed a lower
in
harmcategory.

46 We are
view,see
assumingthatattemptsshouldbe treatedas less seriousthancompletedcrimes.For a contrary
AndrewAshworth,'CriminalAttemptsand the Role of ResultingHarm undertheCode, and in theCommonLaw'
(1988) 19 RutgersLJ 725.
47 See also Paul Robinson,'A SentencingSystemforthe21stCentury?'(1987) 66 TexasL Rev 1, 44-5.

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.79 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 08:13:59 AM


All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
SPRING1991 GaugingCriminalHarm 31
We shallnot,here,proposea formula forsuchdiscounts.
We wishonlyto
the of
suggest principle discounting and leavethedifficult
taskofestablishing
a
metric
(whichis boundto be somewhat to
arbitrary) further
reflection.

3. Combinations
The combination problemariseswhenan offence (eg, assault,as we justsaw)
affectstwoormoreinterest dimensions.Here,a first stepcouldbe toidentify the
dimension thatyieldsthehighest harm-rating, and identify thatas the'primary
harm'.Supposethatoffence X affects
bothphysical integrity andself-respect,but
indifferentdegrees.Supposethephysical-integrity intrusion is a substantial
threat
tosubsistence-ie, a discounted
10.We might, according tothediscount principles
just outlined,rate this harmin the second('serious')category. Supposethe
self-respectintrusion involvesan actual(notjustrisked)humiliation-but only
such as to compromise living-standardlevel 30--'adequate' well-being. This,
according toour.just-describedmapping principles,wouldqualify theintrusionat
thethirdharmcategory, of'upper-intermediate'.On thisanalysis, thephysical-
integrityintrusionwouldhavethehigher rating,andthusconstitute theprimary
harm.We wouldconcludethatthe primary harm-ie, the riskto physical
integrity-would be at thesecond('serious')levelofharm.Schematically, thisis
showninFigure4:

serious * - offence
X-
harm
primary

Fig4. Primary
harm
Thenextstepwouldbe toconsider
thesecondary harms-thoseinotherinterest
features.It makesoffenceX somewhat
dimensions-aspossibleexacerbating
worsethat-besidestheprimary harmto physicalintegrity-it
also humiliates.
How muchtheexacerbation is dependson twofactors.One is how'close' the
harmis in gravity
secondary to theprimary harm.Here thesecondary harmis

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.79 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 08:13:59 AM


All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
32 Oxford ofLegalStudies
Journal VOL.11
close:onlyone gradation
fairly lowerthantheprimary. The otherfactor is how
muchthe interest dimensionsconceptuallyoverlap.Here, there is not much
overlap:physicalharmor riskis quitedistinctfromhumiliation; forexample,
dangerousdriving affects
theformerbutnotthelatter.By contrast, theideaof
humiliation
and theidea oflossofprivacy arecloselyrelated:ifone'sprivacy is
intrudedupon,oneis almostnecessarily
somewhat humiliated.
Onemightdecide
that,giventhesignificanceand conceptualdistinctness
of thesecondary harm,
thereshouldbe a substantial
premium: say,onethatraisestherating totheupper
rangeof the 'serious'harmcategory.Schematically,thiswouldbe shownby
Figure5:

serious premium - - rating


netharm
* ? -- --- harm
primary
integrity)
(physical

upper- i
intermediate harm
secondary
I (freedom
from
humiliation)

Fig5. Combining andsecondary


primary harms
Again,we offerhereno formula
forthepremiums forsecondaryharms.We are
onlythemodeofanalysis.48
suggesting
How complicatedthediscount-
andpremium-schemes of
shouldbe is a matter
judgment.We suspectsomequalitative
rulesofthumbwouldbe moreworkable
thanelaborate
formulae.

VII 'Collective'
HarmsandOtherComplications
Our analysishas been directedat the simplevictimizing
offence:defendant
or
(intentionally negligently)
injures(or an
creates riskof injuring)
unjustified
48A comparable
analysis a criminal
holdalsoforcaseswhere
might involves
transaction legalinfractions.
multiple

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.79 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 08:13:59 AM


All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
1991
SPRING Criminal
Gauging Harm 33
another ina manner
person,49 proscribed
bythecriminal
law.Ourthesis
hasbeen
thattheextent
oftheinjury
canordinarily
begaugedbytheimpactonthestandard
victim's standard.
living
Thissimpleparadigm,however,doesnotembrace theentirecriminallaw.
Varioustypesof crimeinvolve
numerous numerous
victims, harm
actors, to
or
victims,
consenting do not seem
directly toinvolve to
injury personsat all.To
whatextentdoesourconception
ofharm illuminate
suchcases?Theanswer is:it
varies.
Somecrimes differ
from ourparadigm primarilyinthatthevictims area classof
persons, rather thanan individual. The simpler variantofsuchcasesis wherethe
injuryto each or some membersof the class is substantial: forexample,a
pharmaceutical company manufactures a drugforpregnant womenthatmakes
someofthemseriously ill or deforms theirchildren.Here,thelivingstandard of
individual members of thevictimclassis measurably reduced-soouranalysis
wouldapply.It needsto be supplemented, though,by a principle concerning
multiplication ofharms,toreflect thefactthattheconducthasinjuredmorethan
onevictim.
The moredifficult variantis wheretheinjuryto eachmemberoftheclassis
slight,but theaggregate loss fromthedefendant's conductis significant.The
majorchewing-gum producersillegallymanipulate the priceof bubblegum,
doublingtheprice.Each customer suffersinjury(he or shepaysmore),butno
reduction in his or her livingstandardis involved.However,the aggregate
consumer lossis inthemillions. Onewouldneeda theory ofaggregation oflossto
dealwithsuchcases.
Consider,next,the crimesin whichthe injuryoccursonly throughthe
cumulative actionof multipleactors.Certainpublichealthcrimesfitin this
category.Ifonlyonepersonengages intheconduct, nomeasurable injury occursat
all:butifmanypeopledo,a substantial healthhazardresults.Here,theproblem is
notgaugingtheharm:thehealthhazardmaysignificantly set back theliving
standard ofpotential victims. The problem is attributing
theharmto anyofthe
multiple,independent actors.Usually,an actorshouldbe answerable onlyforhis
ownconduct-notforthatofothers overwhomhehasno control.50 Buthere,the
harmconsists onlyinthecumulative effectsofindividual acts.Whatis neededis an
excursus intoculpability theory: underwhatcircumstances, ifat all, shouldwe
holda personresponsible forharmsthatoccuronlythrough theconcurrence of
otherindependent actors;andwhatdiscount in therating oftheconductis called
fortoreflect thefactthattheactorwasonlya smallcontributor totheill?
Consider, also,another kindofcase:wheretheinjury occursonlythrough the
consentof thosevictimized. Prohibitions againsttheimportation or large-scale
distributionof certaindangerous drugsfallin thiscategory. The harmmaybe
apparentenough: consumers (or those of them thatbecome addicted)suffer a

49 Wedo nothereaddress
situations
where is a corporation
thevictim orotherlegalentity.
5oSeediscussion
atn 13,above.

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.79 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 08:13:59 AM


All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
34 Oxford ofLegalStudies
Journal VOL.11
significant deterioration intheirhealth, andhenceintheirstandard ofliving.51The
difficultyis that consent ordinarily should eliminate criminal liability.If consen-
sualconductis criminalized insuchcases,westillhavetheproblem ofhowmuch
if
discount, any, should be granted for the factthat victims voluntarily participate
intheirownvictimization.52
In thecasesjustmentioned, harm(in thesenseofreduction ofpersons'living
is
standard) present, and some other factor
complicating (eg,culpability) makesit
moredifficult to ratetheoffence. Othertypesof crimespresenta morefunda-
mentalquestion:does theobnoxiousness of theconductresidein its injurious
on
impact persons, or some other feature?53 Considercrimesinvolving dutiesof
citizenship, such as tax fraud. An act oftax cheating ordinarily has no effecton
anyone'sliving standard, because the defendant's owed contribution is so infini-
tesimal a shareofthestate'sbudget.Granted, ifenoughpersons evadedtheir taxes,
stateserviceswoulddeteriorate, so thatan indirect impacton citizens'living
standard is involved.How, then,shouldthegravity of tax fraudbe analysed:
throughthe eventualdeterioration of livingstandardsthatmightoccur?Or
through somekindof'unjustadvantage' theory-that thetaxcheateris unfairly
freeloading, becausehe acceptsthebenefit ofstateservices without contributing
hisshare?54 Andhowcouldthe'unjustadvantage' be gaugedin suchcases?
Somecrimes, finally, seemaimedatprotecting interestsotherthanchiefly those
of humanvictims.Crimesinvolving crueltyto animalsprovidean example.
Environmental offences mayalsodo so-to theextent thattheir aimis notso much
toprotect humanhealthorleisureactivities as tosafeguard valuednatural environ-
mentsperse. For suchcrimes,something otherthana living-standard analysis
wouldbe needed.
Wecouldcontinue thislist,butitsimplications shouldbe evident already. There
is no unitary accountthatcanexplaintheharmdimension in all kindsofcrimes.
Our living-standard analysishas themoremodestaim of addressing theharm
dimension in ordinary victimizing offences: offenceswhich,indeed,occupymuch
ofthecriminal process' resources and the public's concern. Otherkindsofcrimes,
including those just listed, are more complex. When we analysethem,we
sometimes findthatharm(inoursuggested senseofa reduction oflivingstandard)
is involved, butthatthereareothercomplicating factors;sometimes, onewillfind

51 Here, we are referring to the most plausiblesubspeciesof drug prohibition:when the substanceis plainly
injurioustohealth,and thesalesinvolvesubstantialquantities.Othersubspeciesofdrugprohibition wouldnotfitthis
analysis.When the health impactof the substanceis debatable (as with marijuana)it is not clear whetherany
.diminution oflivingstandardis involved.Wheretheperpetrator is thevictimhimself-ie,drug-possession crimes-it
is far fromclear what the aim is: to protectthe usei fromself-injury, or to achieve some ulterioraim such as
discouragingundesiredlifestyles.Since we do notfeelsuch conductshouldbe criminalized, it is no wonderthatwe
findit difficult
to rateits seriousness.
52 That issueis linkedto themorefundamental ofdrugs:whetherand to whatextentthe
one ofthecriminalization
criminallaw is an appropriateinstrument forpreventing thevoluntary consumptionofdeleterioussubstances.For a
reviewofthoseissues,see Douglas Husak, 'RecreationalDrugs and Paternalism'(1989) 8 Law and Philosophy 353.
53 Offensiveconduct,to theextentcriminalized, persons,butmaynotinvolveharmin thesenseof setbacks
affects
to someone'sinterests.See n 31 above.
54 One of us has suggestedthat'unjustadvantage'is a poor wayof analysing thegravityofcrimesgenerally-but
mightbe usefulforcrimessuch as tax fraud:von Hirsch,'Proportionality in thePhilosophyof Punishment',op cit,
above n 1.

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.79 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 08:13:59 AM


All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
SPRING1991 GaugingCriminalHarm 35
thatthe'injuriousness'
oftheconductmighthaveto be analysedin otherthan
terms.
living-standard

VIII Applicability
toSentencing
Law
Couldourproposedanalysisbe helpfulin actualsentencing law?Our answeris
'yes,if':it could be but
helpful, only ifa number of otherconditions aremet.One
condition is completion of thetasksdiscussedhere.We haveonlybegun,by
describing theliving-standard analysis.The additional tasks,of constructing a
harm-scale and devising rulesfordiscounts-for-risk and forcombinations, have
only been outlined.A secondconditionis that culpability be dealt with.
Ultimately, we are a
seeking jurisprudence ofcrime which
seriousness, callsnotonly
foran assessment of the harmfulness of the conductbut also of the actor's
culpability. Failinga fulltheory ofculpability, weatleastneeda wayofcontrolling
forthemoreobviousdifferences inculpability amongcrimes, so thatwecanassess
howmuchsuchcrimes'gravity is affected by variationsin theirharmfulness. The
thirdcondition is a sentencing lawwhichmakestheseriousness ofcrimecount.In
a lawwithwide-open sentencing discretion and doctrines emphasizing specialor
generalprevention, crime-seriousness may have only marginal(or at least,
uncertain) importance inscalingpunishments.
Suppose,however, thatthesethreeconditions havebeensatisfied. In whatway
couldourapproach be usefulin making sentencing decisions? The answertothis
questionwilldependon thesentencing structure ofthejurisdiction. Let us takea
lookat twostructures: sentencing guidelines, suchas Minnesota's;ss andstatutory
sentencing principles, such as thoseembodiedin Sweden'snew law.s6Both
schemes emphasize thegravity oftheoffence, butusedifferent decision-makers.
Numericalsentencing guidelinessuch as Minnesota'srelyupon a special
rule-making agency(thesentencing commission) to makestandardseriousness-
assessments. The courts'jobis only(orchiefly) todecideupontheapplicability of
aggravating ormitigating factorsinnon-standard cases.
The commission's guidelines are embodiedin a sentencing grid.The vertical
axisofthegridconstitutes a crime-seriousness score;thehorizontal, a criminal-
history score.The cellswithinthegridsetforththepresumptive sentencesor
sentence-ranges.
Sucha scheme requires thesentencing commission totakeeachstatutory offence
category andassignita numerical seriousness-grade, sayfrom'1' (leastseriousJto
'10' (mostserious).Wheretheoffence category is broadand embraceshetero-

s5 ForthetextofMinnesota'sguidelines, seeMinnesota
SentencingGuidelinesCommission, MinnesotaSentencing
Guidelines
andCommentary,
Annotated (StPaul,Minn:Minnesota CLE Press,1985and1990Supp).Foranalysis ofthe
aimsandstructure,
guidelines' seevonHirsch, and
Knapp Tonry, op cit,aboven 2, ch5.
56Swedish Criminal
Code,chs29,30. Fora description ofthelaw'sstructure,seevonHirsch, op cit,aboven 4;
vonHirschandJareborg,op cit,n 4. TheEnglish WhitePaper(aboven 5) alsoproposes useofstatutorysentencing
andseetheCriminal
principles, Justice Bill1991.

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.79 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 08:13:59 AM


All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
36 Oxford ofLegalStudies
Journal VOL. 11

geneousconduct(eg,a category suchas 'burglary') thecommission mayestablish


subcategories57 andassignthesedifferent seriousness-grades.
To date,whensentencing commissions undertook thisratingtask,theyrelied
largely ontheirmembers' intuitions.
In Minnesota, forexample, eachcommission
member wasgivena listofoffences andaskedtoassigneachoffence a seriousness-
rating. Whenthemembers agreed,thisrating wasadopted;whentheydisagreed,
discussion ensueduntilagreement wasreached.5" Thismeantthatno identifiable
theory supported theseriousness-judgments; indeed,wheretherewasagreement,
noreasonswereelicited atall.
Here, a theoryforgaugingharmwouldhave obviousutility, in providing
commission members witha method ofreasoning. Hereis a simpleprocedure for
the
applying theory:
(1) The commission wouldrankthevariousoffence categoriesin seriousness,
using themembers' sense oftheseoffences' gravity-as Minnesota did.
(2) The commission wouldselect,fromthelistofoffence categories,a shorter
listcomprising intentional,victimizingcrimes: victimizing, because that is what
thepresent is to in
analysis about;intentional,try simple a fashionto control for
variations inculpability.
(3) To thissubsetof offences, thememberswouldbe invitedto applythe
analysis we have justsuggested: make a living-standard analysisof theharms
and
involved, actually rankthe harmfulness on a simple scale.
(4) Withthisharm-analysis inmind,themembers wouldbe askedtore-rank the
offence categories in seriousness.They alsowould be asked whether the analysis
suggests a newor alteredsubcategorization: todistinguish, forexample,between
ordinary residential burglary andburglary-with-ransacking, on grounds thatthose
acts' impacton the livingstandardare different. Wheredisagreements arose,
members alsowouldbe askedtoarguetheirratings interms ofthistheory-that is,
totrytoidentify whether andhowtheirdisagreements arebasedondivergences of
viewabouttheconduct'simpacton thelivingstandard. The commission could
thusdetermine whether theanalysishelpsresolvedisagreements, andwhether and
to whatextenttheirinitial(intuitive) ratingsrequirechangeas a resultof the
analysis.
A procedure ofthiskindwoulduse ourtheory thewayit shouldbe used:as a
guideforjudgment, nota formula. Ultimately, thecommission wouldstillhaveto
relyuponitsbestjudgment inmaking theratings; onlynow,thatjudgment would
be guidedbyidentifiable, coherent principles.
The theory, ofcourse,wouldaid thecommission onlyin itsfirst seriousness-
assessment task:ratingthegravity of categories or subcategories ofcrime.The
commission wouldalsoneedtoaddressaggravation andmitigation: thatis,specify
whattypesofspecialcircumstances affect theharmfulness oftheconductor the
culpability oftheactor,andthusjustify a departure fromtheguideline ranges.
The Swedishlaw takesa somewhat different tack. Thereis no sentencing
and itsproblems,see above n 44.
57 For offencesubcategorization
5S von Hirsch,Knapp and Tonry,op cit,above n 2, at 99-101.

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.79 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 08:13:59 AM


All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
SPRING1991 GaugingCriminalHarm 37

commission, and no numerical seriousness-score. Whatthestatuteprescribes is


thatthechoiceof sentenceshoulddependprincipally on the'penalvalue'(ie,
seriousness) oftheconduct, andthatpenalvalueordinarily dependsontheharmor
risk-of-harm oftheconduct andtheculpability oftheactor.59 Thedetermination of
penal value is theresponsibility ofthe courts.
Swedishsentencing doctrinedistinguishes between'abstract'and 'concrete'
penal value. The abstractpenal value reflects the generalharmfulness and
culpability ofthetypeorsubtype ofoffence involved. Against thebackground of
theabstract penalvalue,theconcrete penalvalueoftheparticular case is then
considered-taking intoaccounttheparticular injuriousness andculpability ofthe
actor'sconduct.60To aid in thedetermination of theconcrete penalvalue,the
statute setsouta listofaggravating andmitigating factors thatincreaseordiminish
thegravity oftheconduct intheparticular case.61
In assessingtheabstract penalvalue,thecourtsare supposedto consultthe
statutory penalty-scales, thatis, themaximum andminimum forvarious
penalties
offences prescribed by law. Parliament is expected, in settingpenalty scales,to
consider thegravity oftheconduct compared tothatofothercrimes.62 Thismeans
thattwokindsofgovernment agenciesareinvolved in theassessment ofserious-
ness:theParliament andthecourts.
This makestheprocedure seemmorecumbersome thanthatofa sentencing
commission. How can thelegislature and the courts,withtheirlarge,diverse
memberships andnumerous otherduties,possibly applya theory ofharmsuchas
ours?Two features of Swedishpractice, however, mayhelpfacilitate matters.
First,majorlawchanges-suchas thoseinvolvedin altering penaltyscales-are
neverundertaken at Parliament's soleinitiative.Ordinarily, a studycommission,
aidedbyan advisory panelofexperts, prepares thelegislation. Sucha commission
or its advisory panelcoulddeliberate on harmin muchthesamemanneras a
sentencing commission.Second, sentencing doctrine(as othermajor legal
doctrines) is generally developedby the SupremeCourt.That is a reasonably
compact body,quitecapableofdeveloping doctrines ofcriminal harmbasedonthe
generalidea of the livingstandard,or of utilizingscholarly adviceon such
doctrines.
Let us emphasize, however: thepresentarticleis nota recipeforhowa sen-
tencing or a
commission, Swedish-style panelofexperts, shouldproceed.We are
onlysuggesting that our theory can have practical utility.Our aimhas beento
a
suggestway to think about victimizingcriminal harms. The practicalapplications
comelater.
Althoughthereremainimportant topicsto discuss(eg, relevantempirical

5 Swedish Criminal
Code29:1.
60 Seethereport
bythepreparatory commission, (SOU 1986:13-15).
fdrbrort
Pdfdljd
F'ingelsestraffkommittin,
61 Swedish Code29:2,29:3.
Criminal
62
Pd/bljdfbr op cit,aboven 60.
brott,

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.79 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 08:13:59 AM


All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
38 JournalofLegal Studies
Oxford VOL.11
itis timetostop.We haveputforward
research)63, a general
approach--onethat
wouldgaugecriminal harmthrough thenotionofthelivingstandard.
We invite
readerstoconsider thesoundness ofthisidea.
Letusreiteratethatweareproposinga wayofthinking harm,not
aboutcriminal
a formula.The living-standard
categorieswesketcharefarfromprecise,
andtheir
tocriminal
application harmswillleavemuchtojudgment. However,wedosupply
a systematic
conceptual framework formakingsuchjudgments-and believethat
superiortountutored intuition
andguesswork.

63 To date,twokinds ofempirical research areavailable,neither especiallyhelpful.Oneis survey research onpublic


perceptions ofcrime-seriousness, suchas Sellin'sand Wolfgang's; see textat n 16 above.The limitations ofsuch
researchhavebeensuggested already; seetextatn 17-18above.Theotherkindofresearch hasbeenliving-standard
surveyssuchas Stockholm's (see n 27). The researchers construct an 'objective'living-index thatmeasures area
residents' standard
living interms ofvarious conditionsassumed tobearontheir well-being.Housing conditions,for
example, areassessed interms ofnumber ofrooms oftheperson's residence relative
tofamily size.Whilesuchsurveys
are helpful fortheirintended purpose,of measuring changesin a population's livingconditions overtime,the
measures used(eg,housing space)werebasedonresearchers' common-sense judgments abouttheamenities important
toa goodlife,rather thanonanygeneral theoreticalperspectiveofhowsuchamenities relatetolevelsofwell-being.
Two kindsofresearch, however, might provemoreprofitable. Onewasproposed byRichard Sparks:empirical
studyofthetypeofinjury resultingfrom variousoffences;seevonHirsch, op cit,n 8 above,65-6.Sparksproposed
thattheassessment oftheharm-element shouldrelynotonopinion surveys suchas Sellin'sandWolfgang's, buton
empirical inquiryintothetypeofinjury actually involved in varioustypesofoffences. (Traditional victimization
studieshavebeenmoreconcerned withmeasuring frequency anddistribution ofcriminal acts,thanwithdetailing
injuriousconsequences.) Sparks'ssuggested kindof research wouldinquiresystematically intothe short-and
long-term consequences ofvarious criminal acts.It couldprovide a better factualbasisfor judgments aboutvarious
crimes'typicalconsequences-which could thenbe used whenapplying our suggested living-standardrating
categories.
Another of
species research would be simulated application ofthe proposed ratingcriteria.
The researcher might,
forexample, organizea smallgroupas a simulated sentencing commission, andaskittoratevarious crimes. Thefirst
stepmight betoaskthemembers toratecrimes' gravity intuitively,inthemanner thatMinnesota did(seetextatn 58
above).Next,themembers wouldbe askedtoratecrimes usingthereasoning processsuggested in thisarticle.
One
wouldidentify theextent towhich thisprocess produced ratings differingfrom theoriginal ones.Thegroup
'intuitive'
wouldthenbe askedtowhatextent itwishedtoabidebythoseoriginal ratings,andtowhatextent itpreferredthe
revised
theory-based ratings-and why.Suchresearch might suggest howhelpful theproposed ratingliving-standard
approachis indecision-making situations.

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.79 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 08:13:59 AM


All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Вам также может понравиться