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2016

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 83988 September 29, 1989
RICARDO C. VALMONTE AND UNION OF LAWYERS AND
ADVOCATES FOR PEOPLE'S RIGHTS (ULAP),​petitioners,
vs.
GEN. RENATO DE VILLA AND NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION
DISTRICT COMMAND, ​respondents.
Ricardo C. Valmonte for himself and his co-petitioners.

PADILLA, ​J.:
This is a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order, seeking the declaration of checkpoints
in Valenzuela, Metro Manila or elsewhere, as unconstitutional and
the dismantling and banning of the same or, in the alternative, to
direct the respondents to formulate guidelines in the implementation
of checkpoints, for the protection of the people.
Petitioner Ricardo C. Valmonte sues in his capacity as citizen of the
Republic, taxpayer, member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP), and resident of Valenzuela, Metro Manila; while petitioner
Union of Lawyers and Advocates for People's Rights (ULAP) sues in
its capacity as an association whose members are all members of
the IBP.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command
(NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the
Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of
conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and
peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective
territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an
atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political
development of the National Capital Region. 1 As part of its duty to
maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in
various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said checkpoints,
the residents of Valenzuela are worried of being harassed and of
their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical
disposition of the military manning the checkpoints, considering that
their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and
check-ups, especially at night or at dawn, without the benefit of a
search warrant and/or court order. Their alleged fear for their safety
increased when, at dawn of 9 July 1988, Benjamin Parpon, a supply
officer of the Municipality of Valenzuela, Bulacan, was gunned down
allegedly in cold blood by the members of the NCRDC manning the
checkpoint along McArthur Highway at Malinta, Valenzuela, for
ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself to the checkpoint and for
continuing to speed off inspire of warning shots fired in the air.
Petitioner Valmonte also claims that, on several occasions, he had
gone thru these checkpoints where he was stopped and his car
subjected to search/check-up without a court order or search
warrant.
Petitioners further contend that the said checkpoints give the
respondents a blanket authority to make searches and/or seizures
without search warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution;
2
​and, instances have occurred where a citizen, while not killed, had
been harassed.
Petitioners' concern for their safety and apprehension at being
harassed by the military manning the checkpoints are not sufficient
grounds to declare the checkpoints as per se illegal. No proof has
been presented before the Court to show that, in the course of their
routine checks, the military indeed committed specific violations of
petitioners' right against unlawful search and seizure or other rights.
In a case filed by the same petitioner organization, ​Union of Lawyers
and Advocates for People's Right (ULAP) vs. Integrated National
Police, 3​ ​it was held that individual petitioners who do not allege that
any of their rights were violated are not qualified to bring the action,
as real parties in interest.
The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures
is a personal right invocable only by those whose rights have been
infringed, 4​ or threatened to be infringed. What constitutes a
reasonable or unreasonable search and seizure in any ​particular
case is purely a judicial question, determinable from a consideration
of the circumstances involved. 5​
Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the effect that he had
been stopped and searched without a search warrant by the military
manning the checkpoints, without more, i.e., without stating the
details of the incidents which amount to a violation of his right
against unlawful search and seizure, is not sufficient to enable the
Court to determine whether there was a violation of Valmonte's right
against unlawful search and seizure. Not all searches and seizures
are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A
reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but
is to be resolved according to the facts of each case. 6​
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a
vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds, 7​ or simply
looks into a vehicle, 8​ or flashes a light therein, 9​ these do not
constitute unreasonable search.
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and
probably in other areas) may be considered as a security measure to
enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective
territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of
the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart
plots to destabilize the government, in the interest of public security.
In this connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to
urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so
clearly reflected in the increased killings in cities of police and
military men by NPA "sparrow units," not to mention the abundance
of unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and
violence in such urban centers, not all of which are reported in
media, most likely brought about by deteriorating economic
conditions — which all sum up to what one can rightly consider, at
the very least, as abnormal times. Between the inherent right of the
state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an
individual's right against a warrantless search which is however
reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of
abuse by the men in uniform, in the same manner that all
governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of
occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the
citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when
conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for
an orderly society and a peaceful community.
Finally, on 17 July 1988, military and police checkpoints in Metro
Manila were temporarily lifted and a review and refinement of the
rules in the conduct of the police and military manning the
checkpoints was ordered by the National Capital Regional
Command Chief and the Metropolitan Police Director. 10 ​
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras,
Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and
Regalado, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

CRUZ, ​J., dissenting:

I dissent. The sweeping statements in the majority opinion are as
dangerous as the checkpoints it would sustain and fraught with
serious threats to individual liberty. The bland declaration that
individual rights must yield to the demands of national security
ignores the fact that the Bill of Rights was intended precisely to limit
the authority of the State even if asserted on the ground of national
security. What is worse is that the searches and seizures are
peremptorily pronounced to be reasonable even without proof of
probable cause and much less the required warrant. The improbable
excuse is that they are aimed at 'establishing an effective territorial
defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere
conducive to the social, economic and political development of the
National Capital Region." For these purposes, every individual may
be stopped and searched at random and at any time simply because
he excites the suspicion, caprice, hostility or malice of the officers
manning the checkpoints, on pain of arrest or worse, even being
shot to death, if he resists.
I have no quarrel with a policeman flashing a light inside a parked
vehicle on a dark street as a routine measure of security and
curiosity. But the case at bar is different. Military officers are
systematically stationed at strategic checkpoint to actively ferret out
suspected criminals by detaining and searching any individual who
in their opinion might impair "the social, economic and political
development of the National Capital Region." It is incredible that we
can sustain such a measure. And we are not even under martial law.
Unless we are vigilant of our rights, we may find ourselves back to
the dark era of the truncheon and the barbed wire, with the Court
itself a captive of its own complaisance and sitting at the death-bed
of liberty.
SARMIENTO, ​J., dissenting:
I join Justice Isagani Cruz in his dissent, delivered so
staightforwardly and eloquently. I am agreed that the existence
alone of checkpoints makes search done therein, unreasonable and
hence, repugnant to the Constitution.
The Charter says that the people enjoy the right of security of
person, home, and effects. (CONST., art. III, sec. 2.) It is also the
bedrock — the right of the people to be left alone — on which the
regime of law and constitutionalism rest. It is not, as the majority
would put it, a matter of "occasional inconveniences, discomfort and
even irritation." (Resolution, 4.) To say that it is, is — so I submit —
to trivialize the plain command of the Constitution.
Checkpoints, I further submit, are things of martial rule, and things of
the past. They first saw the light of day by virtue of General Order
No. 66 (AUTHORIZING THE CHIEF OF CONSTABULARY TO
ESTABLISH CHECKPOINTS, UPDATE LISTS OF WANTED
PERSONS AND CONDUCT DRAGNET OPERATIONS AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES), a martial law issuance, as amended by
General Order No. 67 (AMENDING AND AMPLIFYING
PARAGRAPH 7 OF GENERAL ORDER NO. 66 DATED
SEPTEMBER 12, 1980), yet another martial law issuance. (See
O.G. 4224-4226; 4226-4227 [Aug., 1983].) They are, so I strongly
submit, repressive measures, the same measures against which we
had fought so painstakingly in our quest for liberty, a quest that
ended at EDSA and a quest that terminated a dictatorship. How
soon we forget.
While the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, as my
brethren advance, is a right personal to the aggrieved party, the
petitioners, precisely, have come to Court because they had been,
or had felt, aggrieved. I submit that in that event, the burden is the
State's, to demonstrate the reasonableness of the search. The
petitioners, Ricardo Valmonte in particular, need not, therefore, have
illustrated the "details of the incident" (Resolution, ​supra, 4) in all
their gore and gruesomeness.
In any event, the absence alone of a search warrant, as I have
averred, makes checkpoint searches unreasonable, and by itself,
subject to constitutional challenges. (Supra.) As it is, "checkpoints",
have become "search warrants" unto themselves a roving one at
that.
That "[n]ot all searches and seizures are prohibited," the majority
points out, is fine. And so is "a reasonable search is not to be
determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to
the facts of each case." (​Supra) But the question, exactly, is: Is (are)
the search(es) in this case reasonable? I submit that it (they) is (are)
not, for one simple reason: No search warrant has been issued by a
judge.
I likewise do not find this case to be a simple matter of an "officer
merely draw(ing) aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle ... or simply
look(ing) (​supra) there, "or flash(ing) a light therein." (​Supra) What
we have here is Orwell's Big Brother watching every step we take
and every move we make.
As it also is, "checkpoints" are apparently, State policy. The
American cases the majority refers to involve routine checks
compelled by "probable cause". What we have here, however, is not
simply a policeman on the beat but armed men, CAFGU or Alsa
Masa, who hold the power of life or death over the citizenry, who fire
with no provocation and without batting an eyelash. They likewise
shoot you simply because they do not like your face. I have
witnessed actual incidents.
Washington said that militia can not be made to dictate the terms for
the nation. He can not be anymore correct here.
"Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence ...
and on individual's right against a warrantless search, which is
reasonably conducted, "so my brethren go on, the former shall
prevail. (​Supra) First, this is the same lie that the hated despot
foisted on the Filipino people. It is a serious mistake to fall for it a
second time around. Second, the checkpoint searches herein are
unreasonable: There was no warrant.
A final word. After twenty years of tyranny, the dawn is upon us. The
country is once again the "showcase of democracy" in Asia. But if in
many cases, it has been "paper democracy", let this Court anyway
bring to pass its stand, and make liberty in the land, a living reality.
I vote then, to grant the petition.

Separate Opinions
CRUZ, ​J., dissenting:
I dissent. The sweeping statements in the majority opinion are as
dangerous as the checkpoints it would sustain and fraught with
serious threats to individual liberty. The bland declaration that
individual rights must yield to the demands of national security
ignores the fact that the Bill of Rights was intended precisely to limit
the authority of the State even if asserted on the ground of national
security. What is worse is that the searches and seizures are
peremptorily pronounced to be reasonable even without proof of
probable cause and much less the required warrant. The improbable
excuse is that they are aimed at 'establishing an effective territorial
defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere
conducive to the social, economic and political development of the
National Capital Region." For these purposes, every individual may
be stopped and searched at random and at any time simply because
he excites the suspicion, caprice, hostility or malice of the officers
manning the checkpoints, on pain of arrest or worse, even being
shot to death, if he resists.
I have no quarrel with a policeman flashing a light inside a parked
vehicle on a dark street as a routine measure of security and
curiosity. But the case at bar is different. Military officers are
systematically stationed at strategic checkpoint to actively ferret out
suspected criminals by detaining and searching any individual who
in their opinion might impair "the social, economic and political
development of the National Capital Region." It is incredible that we
can sustain such a measure. And we are not even under martial law.
Unless we are vigilant of our rights, we may find ourselves back to
the dark era of the truncheon and the barbed wire, with the Court
itself a captive of its own complaisance and sitting at the death-bed
of liberty.
SARMIENTO, ​J., dissenting:
I join Justice Isagani Cruz in his dissent, delivered so
staightforwardly and eloquently. I am agreed that the existence
alone of checkpoints makes search done therein, unreasonable and
hence, repugnant to the Constitution.
The Charter says that the people enjoy the right of security of
person, home, and effects. (CONST., art. III, sec. 2.) It is also the
bedrock — the right of the people to be left alone — on which the
regime of law and constitutionalism rest. It is not, as the majority
would put it, a matter of "occasional inconveniences, discomfort and
even irritation." (Resolution, 4.) To say that it is, is — so I submit —
to trivialize the plain command of the Constitution.
Checkpoints, I further submit, are things of martial rule, and things of
the past. They first saw the light of day by virtue of General Order
No. 66 (AUTHORIZING THE CHIEF OF CONSTABULARY TO
ESTABLISH CHECKPOINTS, UPDATE LISTS OF WANTED
PERSONS AND CONDUCT DRAGNET OPERATIONS AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES), a martial law issuance, as amended by
General Order No. 67 (AMENDING AND AMPLIFYING
PARAGRAPH 7 OF GENERAL ORDER NO. 66 DATED
SEPTEMBER 12, 1980), yet another martial law issuance. (See
O.G. 4224-4226; 4226-4227 [Aug., 1983].) They are, so I strongly
submit, repressive measures, the same measures against which we
had fought so painstakingly in our quest for liberty, a quest that
ended at EDSA and a quest that terminated a dictatorship. How
soon we forget.
While the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, as my
brethren advance, is a right personal to the aggrieved party, the
petitioners, precisely, have come to Court because they had been,
or had felt, aggrieved. I submit that in that event, the burden is the
State's, to demonstrate the reasonableness of the search. The
petitioners, Ricardo Valmonte in particular, need not, therefore, have
illustrated the "details of the incident" (Resolution, ​supra,​ 4) in all
their gore and gruesomeness.
In any event, the absence alone of a search warrant, as I have
averred, makes checkpoint searches unreasonable, and by itself,
subject to constitutional challenges. (Supra.) As it is, "checkpoints",
have become "search warrants" unto themselves a roving one at
that.
That "[n]ot all searches and seizures are prohibited," the majority
points out, is fine. And so is "a reasonable search is not to be
determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to
the facts of each case." (​Supra) But the question, exactly, is: Is (are)
the search(es) in this case reasonable? I submit that it (they) is (are)
not, for one simple reason: No search warrant has been issued by a
judge.
I likewise do not find this case to be a simple matter of an "officer
merely draw(ing) aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle ... or simply
look(ing) (​supra) there, "or flash(ing) a light therein." (​Supra) What
we have here is Orwell's Big Brother watching every step we take
and every move we make.
As it also is, "checkpoints" are apparently, State policy. The
American cases the majority refers to involve routine checks
compelled by "probable cause". What we have here, however, is not
simply a policeman on the beat but armed men, CAFGU or Alsa
Masa, who hold the power of life or death over the citizenry, who fire
with no provocation and without batting an eyelash. They likewise
shoot you simply because they do not like your face. I have
witnessed actual incidents.
Washington said that militia can not be made to dictate the terms for
the nation. He can not be anymore correct here.
"Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence ...
and on individual's right against a warrantless search, which is
reasonably conducted, "so my brethren go on, the former shall
prevail. (​Supra) First, this is the same lie that the hated despot
foisted on the Filipino people. It is a serious mistake to fall for it a
second time around. Second, the checkpoint searches herein are
unreasonable: There was no warrant.
A final word. After twenty years of tyranny, the dawn is upon us. The
country is once again the "showcase of democracy" in Asia. But if in
many cases, it has been "paper democracy", let this Court anyway
bring to pass its stand, and make liberty in the land, a living reality.
I vote then, to grant the petition.
Footnotes
1 Comment of Respondents. Rollo, p. 32.
2 Article III, Section 2, 1987 Constitution provides: The right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
3 G.R. No. 80432. Minute Resolution dated 8 March 1988.
4 Section 52, 79 C.J.S. 810-811.
5 Section 8, 79 C.J.S. 786.
6 U.S. v. Robinwitz, N.Y., 70 S. Crt. 430,339 U.S. 56,94 L.Ed.
653; Harries v. U.S., Okl., 67 S.Ct. 1098 & 331 U.S. 146, 94 L.Ed.
1871; Martin v. U.S., C.A. Va., 183 F2d 436; 66, 79 C.J.S., 835-8,36.
7 Ibid., citing the case of People v. Case, 190 MW 289, 220
Mich. 379, 27 A.L.R. 686.
8 Ibid., citing the case of State v. Gaina, 97 SE 62, 111 S.C. 1
74, 3 A.L.R. 1500.
9 Ibid., citing the case of Rowland v. Commonwealth, 259 SW
33, 202 Rg 92.
10 Comment. Rollo, pp. 25-26.

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