Analysis
December 15, 2009
Summary: In early Decem-
ber, Turkish Prime Minister
Erdoğan made an official
visit to Washington to meet
with President Obama. Both
sides are likely to have come
away convinced that some
potentially difficult issues have
been managed. Yet, the visit
did little to bridge substantial
differences in perception and
approach on key issues, above
all, Iran, the Palestinian issue,
and the complex of disputes
in the Caucasus. Policymakers
and observers on both sides
are left with a list of unre-
solved open questions that
could shape the course of the
new model partnership in the
near to medium term.
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Decoding the Erdoğan Visit
by Dr. Ian O. Lesser*
From official Turkish and American
perspectives, the recent visit of Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to
Washington is likely to be seen as a
success. The atmosphere between
U.S. President Barack Obama and the
Turkish leader was positive. On the sub-
stance, there were no striking disagree-
ments, although perspectives on some of
the key issues, including Iran and Turk-
ish-Armenian rapprochement, clearly
differ. With little in the official discourse
to spur debate, discussion about the visit
has inevitably emphasized the remarks
given to wider policy audiences, includ-
ing the German Marshall Fund of the
United States, on the margins of the
White House visit. Overall, the experi-
ence has produced more open questions
than answers regarding the future of
U.S.-Turkish relations.
From geopolitics to geoeconomics?
One of the few obvious products from
the Obama-Erdoğan meeting was a
commitment from both sides to rein-
force the traditionally under-developed
economic side of the bilateral relation-
ship. Turkish trade with the United
States currently accounts for less than
5 percent of total Turkish trade. This
is a strikingly small figure, and stands
in stark contrast to the rapid growth of
Turkish trade with Middle Eastern and
Eurasian neighbors in recent years. The
global economic crisis has deepened this
trend, as Western markets have con-
*
Dr. Ian O. Lesser is a senior transatlantic fellow with the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF). The views expressed
here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of GMF.
tracted and commercial relations with
Syria, Iran, and Iraq have expanded. The
commitment to a stronger economic
relationship is not new, and giving it
operational meaning, through the use
of Qualified Industrial Zones and other
mechanisms, will not be easy under
current conditions.
Both sides recognize the limitations of a
relationship based overwhelmingly on
geopolitics and security cooperation—a
key element of U.S.-Turkish relations for
decades. This distortion acquires greater
meaning in the context of Turkey’s
new regional activism. Commercial
engagement is one of the key features
of the new approach, and economic ties
are at the heart of Turkey’s enhanced
relations with the Middle East and
Russia. Europe as a whole retains
substantial weight in Turkish economic
relations. But what can the United States
offer to a Turkish leadership increasingly
focused on commercial interests? The
Turkish relationships that have provoked
the greatest concern among American
observers, those with Iran and Russia,
are largely driven by economic interde-
pendence. Erdoğan was very clear on
this point in his remarks to Washing-
ton audiences, underlining Turkey’s
reliance on both countries for energy
security. As a result, the American and
Turkish narratives on Iran, Russia, and
the Gulf have very different vocabu-
laries and very different measures of
success. When the United States talks
Analysis
about sanctions, Turkey hears economic disruption and risk.
When Turkey talks about energy security, American audi-
ences hear economic appeasement of strategic competitors.
The Prime Minister’s visit to Washington underscores this
significant and perhaps growing perceptions gap on key
regional issues. For all the talk of globalization and economic
interdependence, the American foreign policy discourse
about Turkey and its neighborhood remains firmly rooted in
security and geopolitics.
A model (and lower maintenance) partnership
Inevitably, American analyses of U.S.-Turkish relations focus
heavily on what is new in Turkey. But American society and
foreign policy are also in flux. Washington is not a fixed vari-
able in the bilateral equation. The Obama administration has
devoted considerable time and effort to the task of repairing
a relationship badly tarnished since 2003. At the same time,
Washington faces an extraordinary combination of domestic
and international challenges, including the management of
two costly and controversial wars. In this context, the notion
of U.S.-Turkish relations as a “model partnership” takes on
special meaning. The idea of Turkey as a model was badly
received by Turks during the Bush years. Today, the model
partnership vocabulary seems to have been fully embraced by
the Turkish leadership, and Erdoğan made numerous refer-
ences to it during his visit. What does it mean? Presumably, it
is meant to suggest that the range and character of coopera-
tion, rather than the nature of the Turkish system itself, is the
real measure of why Turkey matters. It might also suggest a
more flexible standard of cooperation than the harder-edged
notion of “strategic” partnership. After years of big trans-
formational projects in Turkey’s neighborhood, and many
competing demands, it is not surprising that the Obama
administration seeks a lower maintenance foreign policy with
Ankara and other transatlantic partners.
Four issues, three open questions
The agenda for the Erdoğan-Obama meeting seems to have
been driven by four issues. One, Afghanistan, is relatively
straightforward. The others, Iran, the Middle East peace
process, and rapprochement with Armenia, are far more
complex and uncertain. On Afghanistan, the U.S. side has
rightly made clear that Turkey’s knowledge and experience
in the country is valued. Ankara will continue to make an
important contribution to economic development and train-
ing efforts. But Turkey will be no more willing than most of
2
its NATO partners to commit new combat forces. At the same
time, Ankara will need to adjust its own policy to a strategy
increasingly focused on exits and opportunity costs. The
discourse on Afghanistan suggests that on this issue, at least,
Ankara is firmly in the European mainstream.
On Iran, the potential for U.S.-Turkish friction is substantial
and unaltered by the dialogue in Washington. Apart from
possible differences in assessment regarding the pace and
direction of Iran’s nuclear program, the Turkish leadership
seems increasingly at odds with its partners in the West and
the Gulf (and perhaps even Russia and China) on Iran policy.
To be sure, Turkey has no interest in seeing a nuclear-armed
Iran on its borders, with all the regional risks this would
entail. Ankara and Washington are also on the same page
regarding the desirability of dialogue with Tehran—
if it can be managed. Beyond these basic points of agreement,
perceptions of the strategic context and next steps seem to
differ sharply. With the very real prospect of a vote in the
UN Security Council on Iran sanctions sometime over the
next month or so, Ankara is likely to face tough choices, and
the prospect of new pressures from diverse quarters. More
broadly, the tendency of the ruling Justic and Development
Party (AK P) leadership to discuss Iran’s nuclear ambi-
tions in the context of Israel’s nuclear arsenal is distinctive
in transatlantic circles, but common in Turkey’s neighbor-
hood. This outlook is not entirely incompatible with the U.S.
approach—a nuclear free Middle East has been a key goal
for the multilateral track of the Middle East peace process
for years. In practical terms, it will be hard to reconcile with
renewed containment and even nuclear roll-back of Iran. The
use of force to set back the clock on Iran’s nuclear program
could easily push these U.S.-Turkish differences into crisis
mode—unless Turkey itself was directly threatened by Iran,
in which case Ankara could be expected to line up behind a
more forward leaning strategy.
Previous On Turkey analyses have explored the roots of dete-
rioration in Turkish-Israeli relations. These relations may not
have been an explicit focus of the Prime Minister’s Washing-
ton visit, but the question of Turkey’s posture toward Israel is
never far from the surface in the current debate over Turkish
foreign policy. Certainly, the Prime Minister addresses the
Palestinian issue with a degree of emotion absent from his
approach to other topics. Turkish public opinion and the AK
party leadership are strongly sympathetic to the Palestinian
view, and this is now a structural feature of the Turkish scene.
Analysis

Taken together with the change in relations with Israel, the

potential for a new crisis on the order of the Gaza conflict, Dr. Ian O. Lesser, Senior Transatlantic Fellow, GMF
holds the potential for another sharp demonstration of Turk-
Dr. Lesser is a GMF senior transatlantic fellow in Washington, DC,
ish divergence from prevailing attitudes across the Atlantic.
where he focuses on Mediterranean affairs, Turkey, and international
American foreign policy elites and opinion shapers are highly
security issues. Prior to joining GMF, he was vice president of the
attentive to the tone as well as the substance of Turkey’s
Pacific Council on International Policy and spent over a decade at the
behavior on Middle Eastern issues. That said, the Washing-
RAND Corporation. From 1994 to 1995, Dr. Lesser was a member of
ton visit highlighted the Obama administration’s continued
the U.S. State Department’s Policy Planning staff.
openness to Turkish facilitation, even mediation in Arab-
Israeli affairs, where the parties are willing to accept this role. About GMF

Finally, the Washington visit underscored the centrality of The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) is a nonpartisan
Turkish-Armenian rapprochement in bilateral relations. Not American public policy and grantmaking institution dedicated to pro-
surprisingly, the Administration pressed Turkey to complete moting greater cooperation and understanding between North America
the process of normalization envisioned in recent Turkish- and Europe. Founded in 1972 through a gift from Germany, as a per-
Armenian accords. But the ratification of these accords by the manent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong
Turkish parliament is hardly assured, and Ankara is inclined presence on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters in
to link their implementation to movement on the long-run- Washington, DC, GMF has seven offices in Europe: Berlin, Bratislava,
ning Nagorno-Karabagh dispute. Washington, strongly con- Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, and Bucharest.
vinced of the wider regional value of an open border between
About the On Turkey Series
Turkey and Armenia, prefers to decouple these issues. Failure
to implement the accords could easily spell new friction in GMF’s On Turkey is an ongoing series of analysis briefs about Turkey’s
Turkish-American relations, and the Erdoğan visit appears to current political situation and its future. GMF provides regular analysis
have produced no new commitments on this score. briefs by leading Turkish, European, and American writers and intellec-
tuals, with a focus on dispatches from on-the-ground Turkish observers.
The atmospherics of the Washington visit were positive, To access the latest briefs, please visit our web site at
and both sides are likely to have come away convinced that www.gmfus.org/turkey or subscribe to our mailing list at
some potentially difficult issues have been managed. Yet, http://database.gmfus.org/reaction.
the visit did little to bridge substantial differences in
perception and approach on key issues, above all, Iran,
the Palestinian issue, and the complex of disputes in the
Caucasus. The commitment to bolster the underdeveloped
economic side of the relationship is useful, but the challenges
in this area are formidable. Policymakers and observers on
both sides are left with a list of unresolved open questions
that could shape the course of the new model partnership in
the near to medium term.