1
Northwest Orient Airlines v. CA 241 SCRA 192 [1995]
FACTS
[In 1974, an International Passenger Sales Agency Agreement was entered
into by plaintiff Northwest Orient Airlines (Northwest) and defendant C.F.
Sharp & Co. (Sharp), through its Japan branch, whereby Northwest
authorized Sharp to sell the former's airlines tickets.
Sharp failed to remit the proceeds of the ticket sales it made on behalf of
Northwest under the agreement which led the latter to sue in Tokyo for
collection of the unremitted amount, with claim for damages.
The Tokyo District Court of Japan issued a writ of sum-mons against Sharp at
its office in Yokohama, Japan but the bailiff failed twice to serve the writs.
Finally, the Tokyo District Court decided to have the writs of summons
served at Sharp's head office in Manila. Sharp accepted the writs but
despite such receipt, it failed to appear at the hearings. The District Court
proceeded to hear the complaint and rendered judgment ordering Sharp to
pay Northwest the sum of 83,158,195 Yen plus damages. Sharp failed to
appeal and the judgment became final and executory.
Northwest failed to execute the decision in Japan, hence, it filed a suit for
enforcement of the judgment before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
Sharp filed its answer averring that the judgment of the Japanese court is
null and void and unenforceable in this jurisdiction having been rendered
without due and proper notice to Sharp.
The case for enforcement of judgment was tried on the merits. Sharp filed a
Motion for Judgment on a Demurrer to Evidence. The trial court granted the
demurrer motion, hold-ing that the foreign judgment in the Japanese court
sought to be enforced is null and void for want of jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant. Northwest appealed but the Court of Appeals
sustained the trial court, holding that the process of the court has no
extraterritorial effect and no jurisdiction was acquired over the person of
the defendant by serving him beyond the boundaries of the state. Hence,
this appeal by Northwest.]
RULING
"A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from
which it comes, until the contrary is shown. It is also proper to presume the
regularity of the proceedings and the giving of due notice therein.
Under Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a judg-ment in an action in
personam of a tribunal of a foreign country having jurisdiction to pronounce
the same is pre-sumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and
their successors-in-interest by a subsequent title. The judgment may,
however, be assailed by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to
the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Also, under
Section 3 of Rule 131, a court, whether of the Philippines or elsewhere,
enjoys the presump-tion that it was acting in the lawful exercise of
jurisdiction and has regularly performed its official duty.
Consequently, the party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of
overcoming the presumption of its validity. Being the party challenging the
judgment rendered by the Japanese court, SHARP had the duty to
demonstrate the invalidity of such judgment. In an attempt to discharge
that burden, it contends that the extraterritorial service of sum-mons
effected as its home office in the Philippines was not only ineffectual but
also void, and the Japanese Court did not, therefore, acquire jurisdiction
over it.
It is settled that matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to
the service of process upon a defendant are governed by the lex fori or the
internal law of the forum. In this case, it is the procedural law of Japan
where the judgment was rendered that determines the validity of the
extraterritorial service'of process on SHARP. As to what this law is is a
question of fact, not of law. It may not be taken judicial notice of and must
be pleaded and proved like any other fact. Sections 24 and 25, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court provide that it may be evidenced by an official
publication or by a duly attested or authenticated copy thereof. It was then
incumbent upon SHARP to present evidence as to what that Japanese
procedural law is and to show taat under it, the assailed extraterritorial
service is invalid. It did not. Accord-ingly, the presumption of validity and
regularity of the service of summons and the decision thereafter rendered
by the Japanese court must stand.
 2

Alternatively, in the light of the absence of proof re-garding Japanese law,
the presumption of identity or similar-ity or the so-called processual
presumpcion may be invoked. Applying it, the Japanese law on the matter is
presumed to be similar with the Philippine law on service of summons on a
private foreign corporation doing business ir, the Philippines. Section 14 of
the Rules of Court provides that if the defendant is a foreign corporation
doing business in the Philippines, service may be made: 1) on its resident
agent designated in accordance with law for that purpose, or 2) if there is
no such resident agent, on the government official designated by law to that
effect, or 3) on any of its officers or agents within the Philippines.
other legal documents to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, which in
turn, forwarded the same to the Japanese Embassy in Manila. Thereafter,
the court processes were delivered to the Ministry (now Department) of
Foreign Affairs of the Philippines then to the Executive Judge of the Court of
First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila, who forthwith ordered
Deputy Sheriff Rolando Balingit to serve the same on SHARP at its principal
office in Manila. This service is equivalent to service on the proper
government official under Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, in
relation to Section 128 of the Corporation Code. Hence, SHARP's contention
that such manner of service is not valid under Philippine law holds no water.

If the foreign corporation has designated an agent to re-ceive summons, the
designation is exclusive, and service of summons is without force and gives
the court no jurisdiction unless made upon him.
Where the corporation has no such great agent, service shall be made on
the government official designated by law, to wit: (a) the Insurance
Commissioner, in the case of a foreign insurance company; (b) the
Superintendent of Banks, in the case of a foreign banking corporation; and
(c) the Securities and Exchange Commission, in the case of other foreign
corporations duly licensed to do business in the Philippines. Whenever
service of process is so made, the government office or official served shall
transmit by mail a copy of the sum-mons or other legal process to the
corporation at its home or principal office. The sending of such copy is a
necessary part of the service.
Inasmuch as SHARP was admittedly doing business in Japan through its four
registered branches at the time the collection suit against it was filed, then
in the light of the processual presumption, SHARP may be deemed a
resident of JAPAN, and, as such, was amenable to the jurisdiction of the
courts therein and may be deemed to have assented to the said courts'
lawful methods of serving process.
Accordingly, the extraterritorial service of summons on it by the Japanese
Court was valid not only under the proces-sual presumption but also
because of the presumption of regularity of performance of official duty.

Nowhere in its pleadings did SHARP profess to having had a resident agent
authorized to receive court processes in Japan. This silence could only
mean, or at least create an impression, that it had none. Hence, service on
the designated government official or any of its officers or agents in Japan
could be availed of.

As found by the Court of Appeals, it was the Tokyo Dis-trict Court which
ordered that summons for SHARP be served at its head office in the
Philippines after the two attempts of service had failed. The Tokyo District
Court requested the Supreme Court of Japan to cause the delivery of the
summons and other legal documents to the Philippines. Acting on that
request, the Supreme Court of Japan sent the summons together with the
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(Ching v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110844, [April 27, 2000], 387 PHIL 28- status as pleadings and cease to be judicial admissions. While they may
49) nonetheless be utilized against the pleader as extrajudicial admissions, they
must, in order to have such effect, be formally offered in evidence. If not
Petitioner was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 58, offered in evidence, the admission contained therein will not be considered.
with four counts of estafa punishable under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the Consequently, the original complaint, having been amended, lost its
Revised Penal Code, in relation to Presidential Decree 115, otherwise known character as a judicial admission, which would have required no proof, and
as the "Trust Receipts Law." Petitioner filed an "Omnibus Motion to Strike became merely an extrajudicial admission, the admissibility of which, as
Out Information, or in the Alternative to Require Public Prosecutor to evidence, required its formal offer.
Conduct Preliminary Investigation, and to Suspend in the Meantime Further
Proceedings in these Cases." Acting on the omnibus motion, the Regional
Trial Court required the prosecutor's office to conduct a preliminary
investigation and suspended further proceedings in the criminal cases.
Petitioner Ching, together with Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., filed a
case before the Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC-Manila), Branch 53, for
declaration of nullity of documents and for damages. Then Ching filed a
petition before the RTC-Makati, Branch 58, for the suspension of the
criminal proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question in a civil action.
The RTC-Makati issued an order which denied the petition for suspension
and scheduled the arraignment and pre-trial of the criminal cases. As a
result, petitioner moved to reconsider the order to which the prosecution
filed an opposition which was denied. Petitioner brought before the Court
of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition, which sought to declare
the nullity of the aforementioned orders. The Court of Appeals denied the
petition. Reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed this petition.

The Supreme Court agreed with the findings of the trial court, as affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, that no prejudicial question exists in the case. Even
on the assumption that the documents are declared null, it does not ipso
facto follow that such declaration of nullity shall exonerate the accused
from criminal prosecution and liability. Accordingly, the prosecution may
adduce evidence to prove the criminal liability of the accused for estafa,
specifically under Article 315, 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code. The assailed
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals were affirmed and the
petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

7. REMEDIAL LAW; PLEADINGS; WHEN SUPERSEDED OR AMENDED SHALL

CEASE ITS CHARACTER TO BE A JUDICIAL ADMISSION. — Under the Rules,
pleadings superseded or amended disappear from the record, lose their
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(People v. Agravante, G.R. No. 119955, [August 15, 2000], 392 PHIL 543-
552)
Accused-appellant was convicted of rape by the Regional Trial Court of Iriga
City and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The
victim was a 14-year-old mental retardate. In his appeal before the Court,
accused-appellant denied the charge of rape contending that he was
somewhere else when the alleged sexual assault happened. He was in San
Ramon, Buhi, Camarines Sur, at the house of Ernesto Martinez making coco
lumber. Further, he contended that the victim's testimony is unreliable
because of her mental capacity or state of mind. TaISEH
The Supreme Court affirmed his conviction. The Court ruled that a mental
retardate is not for said reason alone disqualified from being a witness. The
victim in the case at bar was not only capable of perceiving the facts
respecting her ordeal in the hands of accused-appellant but she was also
able to intelligently make known such perceptions or narrate them
truthfully despite the grueling examination by both prosecutor and defense
counsel. The Court also ruled that appellant's alibi cannot prevail over the
positive declaration of the victim, who in a simple and straightforward
manner, convincingly identified the accused-appellant as the one who
sexually molested her.
may achieve self-maintenance in unskilled work under guidance. She needs
supervision and guidance when under mild social stress. In her opinion,
Rowena is capable of relating events that happened in her life and for that
reason she is capable of testifying on matters that happened to her. Besides
having the mental age level of a seven to nine year old normal child would
even bolster her credibility as a witness considering that a victim at such
tender age would not publicly admit that she had been criminally abused
and ravished unless that was the truth.
2. ID.; ID.; DEFENSES OF ALIBI AND DENIAL; CANNOT PREVAIL OVER THE
POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF THE ACCUSED. — Accused-appellant raises the
defense of denial and alibi. Denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses
and, unless supported by clear and convincing evidence, the same cannot
prevail over the positive declaration of the victim, who in a simple and
straightforward manner, convincingly identified the accused-appellant who
sexually molested her.

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; DISQUALIFICATION OF WITNESSES; A

MENTAL RETARDATE IS NOT DISQUALIFIED FROM BEING A WITNESS. — A
mental retardate is not for this reason alone disqualified from being a
witness. As disclosed by the transcript of stenographic notes dated July 18,
1994 of her testimony in court, the victim was not only capable of
perceiving the facts respecting her ordeal in the hands of accused-appellant.
She was able to intelligently make known such perceptions or narrate them
truthfully despite the grueling examination by both prosecutor and defense
counsel. Furthermore, Dr. Chona Cuyos-Belmonte, Consultant Psychiatrist of
the Bicol Regional Training Hospital, examined Rowena on June 2, 6 and 8,
1994 and submitted a Report on the physical and mental condition of
Rowena Obiasca. She found Rowena to be suffering from moderate mental
retardation with an IQ of 46 and mental age level of a seven to nine year old
normal child. She is negative for any psychotic illness. Based on her IQ level,
she is capable only of learning academic skills up to grade two level and she

(People v. Agravante y Zantua, G.R. Nos. 137297 & 138547-48, [December
11, 2001], 423 PHIL 278-294)
Three informations for rape were filed against accused-appellant. The cases
were jointly tried. Accused-appellant denied having raped his daughter. He
claimed that she filed rape charges against him because he gave her lashes
on November 19, 1994. He said he did this only because she did not attend
school, joined the Iglesia ni Kristo, and seldom came home. Accused-
appellant claimed that after he had punished his daughter Maria, a friend
fetched him and his common-law wife to attend a neighbor's party.
Accused-appellant admitted that in the evening of November 5 and 19,
1994, he slept in their house. He claimed, however, that Maria slept in a
separate room, which had a lock. These cases are before the Court on
automatic appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court in Camarines
Sur, which found accused-appellant Ricardo Agravante guilty of three counts
of rape committed against his daughter and sentenced him in each case to
death.
According to the Supreme Court, accused-appellant had not shown any
compelling reason for this Court to depart from the trial court's finding that
Maria was telling the truth when she charged accused-appellant of raping
her. The inconsistencies and improbabilities in her testimony relate to
minor, trivial, and inconsequential matters which do not alter the essential
fact in the crime of rape. Maria's claim that she had been raped was
corroborated by the medical finding that she suffered hymenal lacerations.
The Court also ruled that the stipulation of facts cannot be used as evidence
of complainant's age at the time of the rapes in question, hence, there was
no sufficient evidence of complainant's age as no independent evidence was
presented by the prosecution to prove the minority of complainant.
Therefore, it was error for the trial court to find accused-appellant guilty of
qualified rape and to impose a sentence of death. The decision of the trial
court was modified by finding accused-appellant guilty of three counts of
simple rape and accordingly sentenced him in each case to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; NO WOMAN
MUCH LESS ONE OF TENDER AGE WOULD CONCOCT CHARGE OF SEXUAL
ABUSE ON HER AND ENDURE THE HUMILIATION OF PUBLIC TRIAL. — No
5
woman, much less one who is of tender age, would concoct a charge of
sexual abuse and endure the degradation and humiliation of a public trial,
where she would be forced to reveal the lurid details of her misfortune, if
she had not really been raped. This is particularly so where, as in these
cases, the accused is complainant's own father for whom, it may be
assumed, every child has the deepest reverence and respect in our culture.
aIcDCT
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; NO STANDARD REACTION COULD BE DRAWN OUT FROM
RAPE VICTIM AFTER HER HARROWING EXPERIENCE; CASE AT BAR. —
Accused-appellant contended that the fact that complainant went back to
sleep after she had been raped on November 5, 1994 as if nothing
happened to her cannot be the reaction of one who had just gone through a
harrowing experience. What accused-appellant perceives to be a cavalier
reaction (going back to sleep as if nothing happened to her) appears more
to be a desperate attempt on her part to deny what had happened. This
reaction is consistent with her other actions after the first rape, i.e., the
washing of her private parts and changing her underwear. Indeed, there is
no standard reaction of a victim to the crime of rape. Rape is both a physical
and emotional assault causing tremendous stress on the victim. After her
harrowing experience, complainant found solace in sleep.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT AFFECTED BY THE INCONSISTENCIES ON MINOR
COLLATERAL MATTERS; CASE AT BAR. — Accused-appellant contended that
complainant's claim that she did not miss any class before the rape incidents
is belied by the certification (Exh. 1) issued by her adviser showing that she
indeed incurred absences in September and October, 1994. This
inconsistency concerns only a minor collateral matter and does not detract
from complainant's testimony that she had been raped by accused-
appellant in November. For the same reason, accused-appellant's claim that
the certification (Exh. 2) of Barangay Captain Noel Gadil that there was no
dance held on November 5, 1994 contradicts complainant's testimony that
accused-appellant's common-law wife attended the said affair has little
relevance to the rape charges. In any case, Gadil himself admitted that he
issued the certification only on January 8, 1997, three years after the
supposed event, not on the basis of any record kept by him or his office but
only from memory.
 6

4. ID.; ID.; STIPULATION OF FACTS; CANNOT BE USED AS EVIDENCE OF THE

COMPLAINANT'S AGE IN CASE AT BAR. — In these cases, while the
informations allege that complainant was a "minor fourteen years of age" at
the time of the commission of the rapes and that accused-appellant is the
"father of the offended party," only the relationship of accused-appellant to
the complainant has been sufficiently established. To be sure, the minority
of complainant (14 years of age at the time of the commission of the rapes)
was the subject of the parties' stipulation of facts. However, the stipulation
of facts was not signed by accused-appellant as required by Rule 118, §2 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides that "No agreement
or admission made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be used
in evidence against the accused unless reduced to writing and signed by him
and his counsel." This requirement is mandatory. Thus, the stipulation of
facts in this case cannot be used as evidence of complainant's age at the
time of the rapes in question. DAaHET

5. ID.; ID.; PROOF OF THE MINORITY OF RAPE VICTIM; REQUIRES

INDEPENDENT EVIDENCE. — Nor is there sufficient evidence of
complainant's age. The testimonies of complainant concerning her age and
that of her father, herein accused-appellant, concerning this matter are
insufficient. In People v. Tundag, in which the complaints alleged that the
victim was 13 years old at the time of the rapes, it was held that it was error
for the trial court to take judicial notice of the victim's age even if the
defense admitted the victim's minority. The Court emphasized that there
must be independent proof, such as a birth certificate, of the age of the
victim. In People v. San Agustin, this Court held that the latter's minority had
not been sufficiently established notwithstanding the appellant's admission
that the victim was 13 years of age. Judicial notice of the victim's age may
be taken if the victim is 10 years old or below, but not where, as in this case,
the victim is alleged to be 14 years old when she was raped. As no
independent evidence was presented by the prosecution to prove the
minority of complainant, it was error for the trial court to find accused-
appellant guilty of qualified rape and to sentence him to death.

(People v. Rullepa y Guinto, G.R. No. 131516, [March 5, 2003], 446 PHIL
745-774)
Ronnie Rullepa was accused of sexually assaulting 3-year old Cyra May
Buenafe on November 17, 1995. During the trial, Cyra May narrated at the
witness stand how the accused committed the dastardly act. Her testimony
was corroborated by the findings of the examining physician that there
were abrasions on the labia minora, which he opined could have been
caused by friction with an erect penis. Accused, however, denied having
anything to do with the abrasions found in the victim's genitalia, and
claimed that prior to the alleged incident, Cyra May was already suffering
from pain urinating. He surmised that she could have scratched herself
which caused the abrasions. Finding for the prosecution, the trial court
subsequently rendered judgment convicting the accused and accordingly
sentenced him to death.
Hence, this automatic review.
In affirming the guilt of the appellant, the Supreme Court found the plain,
matter-of-fact manner by which Cyra May described her abuse in the hands
of the appellant an eloquent testament to the truth of her accusations. It
cannot believe that a victim of Cyra May's age could concoct a tale of
defloration, allow the examination of her private parts, and undergo the
expense, trouble, inconvenience, not to mention the trauma of public trial.
Thus, it accorded great weight to the assessment of the trial court regarding
the competency and credibility of Cyra May as a witness. The Court further
ruled that the crime committed by appellant was not merely acts of
lasciviousness but statutory rape. The examining physician's finding of
abrasions in the labia minora, which is "directly beneath the labia majora,"
proved that there was indeed penetration of the vagina, not just a mere
rubbing or "scrubbing" of the penis against its surface. Nonetheless, the
Court reduced the penalty to reclusion perpetua for failure of the
prosecution to establish with moral certainty that the victim was below
seven years old at the time of the commission of the offense.
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; A VICTIM OF
MINOR AGE WOULD NOT CONCOCT A TALE OF DEFLORATION, ALLOW THE
EXAMINATION OF HER PRIVATE PARTS, AND UNDERGO THE EXPENSE,
7
TROUBLE AND INCONVENIENCE, NOT TO MENTION THE TRAUMA OF PUBLIC
TRIAL. — Accused-appellant's suggestion that Cyra May merely imagined
the things of which he is accused, perhaps getting the idea from television
programs, is preposterous. It is true that "the ordinary child is a 'great
weaver of romances,"' and her "imagination may induce (her) to relate
something she has heard or read in a story as personal experience." But
Cyra May's account is hardly the stuff of romance or fairy tales. Neither is it
normal TV fare, if at all. This Court cannot believe that a victim of Cyra May's
age could concoct a tale of defloration, allow the examination of her private
parts, and undergo the expense, trouble, inconvenience, not to mention the
trauma of public trial. Besides, her testimony is corroborated by the findings
of Dr. Preyra that there were abrasions in her labia minora, which she
opined, could have been caused by friction with an erect penis.
8. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; JUDICIAL NOTICE; PROCESS BY WHICH TRIER
OF FACTS JUDGES A PERSON'S AGE FROM HER APPEARANCE CANNOT BE
CATEGORIZED AS JUDICIAL NOTICE. — Judicial notice signifies that there are
certain "facta probanda," or propositions in a party's case, as to which he
will not be required to offer evidence; these will be taken for true by the
tribunal without the need of evidence. Judicial notice, however, is a phrase
sometimes used in a loose way to cover some other judicial action. Certain
rules of Evidence, usually known under other names, are frequently referred
to in terms of judicial notice. The process by which the trier of facts judges a
person's age from his or her appearance cannot be categorized as judicial
notice. Judicial notice is based upon convenience and expediency for it
would certainly be superfluous, inconvenient, and expensive both to parties
and the court to require proof, in the ordinary way, of facts which are
already known to courts. As Tundag puts it, it "is the cognizance of certain
facts which judges may properly take and act on without proof because they
already know them." Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, where the provisions
governing judicial notice are found, is entitled "What Need Not Be Proved."
When the trier of facts observes the appearance of a person to ascertain his
or her age, he is not taking judicial notice of such fact; rather, he is
conducting an examination of the evidence, the evidence being the
appearance of the person. Such a process militates against the very concept
of judicial notice, the object of which is to do away with the presentation of
evidence.

9. ID.; ID.; OBJECT EVIDENCE; PERSON'S APPEARANCE, WHERE RELEVANT, IS
ADMISSIBLE AS OBJECT EVIDENCE IN DETERMINING HER AGE. — This is not
to say that the process is not sanctioned by the Rules of Court; on the
contrary, it does. A person's appearance, where relevant, is admissible as
object evidence, the same being addressed to the senses of the court.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; OUTWARD PHYSICAL APPEARANCE OF AN ALLEGED
MINOR MAY BE CONSIDERED IN JUDGING HER AGE. — A person's
appearance, as evidence of age (for example, of infancy, or of being under
the age of consent to intercourse), is usually regarded as relevant; and, if so,
the tribunal may properly observe the person brought before it. Experience
teaches that corporal appearances are approximately an index of the age of
their bearer, particularly for the marked extremes of old age and youth. In
every case such evidence should be accepted and weighed for what it may
be in each case worth. In particular, the outward physical appearance of an
alleged minor may be considered in judging his age; a contrary rule would
for such an inference be pedantically over-cautious. Consequently, the jury
or the court trying an issue of fact may be allowed to judge the age of
persons in court by observation of such persons. The formal offer of the
person as evidence is not necessary. The examination and cross-
examination of a party before the jury are equivalent to exhibiting him
before the jury and an offer of such person as an exhibit is properly refused.
11. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; GUIDELINES. — There can be no question,
therefore, as to the admissibility of a person's appearance in determining
his or her age. As to the weight to accord such appearance, especially in
rape cases, Pruna laid down guideline no. 3, which is again reproduced
hereunder: 3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown
to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if
clear and credible, of the victim's mother or a member of the family either
by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting
pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party
pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient
under the following circumstances: a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3
years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years
old; b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought
to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old; c. If the victim is alleged to
be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less
8
than 18 years old. Under the above guideline, the testimony of a relative
with respect to the age of the victim is sufficient to constitute proof beyond
reasonable doubt in cases (a), (b) and (c) above. In such cases, the disparity
between the allegation and the proof of age is so great that the court can
easily determine from the appearance of the victim the veracity of the
testimony. The appearance corroborates the relative's testimony.
12. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MUST BE PROVED WITH EQUAL CERTAINTY AND
CLEARNESS AS THE CRIME ITSELF. — As the alleged age approaches the age
sought to be proved, the person's appearance, as object evidence of her
age, loses probative value. Doubt as to her true age — becomes greater
and, following Agadas, supra, such doubt must be resolved in favor of the
accused. This is because in the era of modernism and rapid growth, the
victim's mere physical appearance is not enough to gauge her exact age. For
the extreme penalty of death to be upheld, nothing but proof beyond
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime must be
substantiated. Verily, the minority of the victim should be not only alleged
but likewise proved with equal certainty and clearness as the crime itself. Be
it remembered that the proof of the victim's age in the present case spells
the difference between life and death. cIECTH
13. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; WHERE REASONABLE DOUBT AS TO THE TRUE AGE OF
THE VICTIM EXISTS, APPEARANCE OF VICTIM, AS OBJECT EVIDENCE,
CANNOT BE ACCORDED MUCH WEIGHT AND THE TESTIMONY OF THE
MOTHER, BY ITSELF, INSUFFICIENT. — In the present case, the prosecution
did not offer the victim's certificate of live birth or similar authentic
documents in evidence. The victim and her mother, however, testified that
she was only three years old at the time of the rape. Because of the vast
disparity between the alleged age (three years old) and the age sought to be
proved (below twelve years), the trial court would have had no difficulty
ascertaining the victim's age from her appearance. No reasonable doubt,
therefore, exists that the second element of statutory rape, i.e., that the
victim was below twelve years of age at the time of the commission of the
offense, is present. Whether the victim was below seven years old,
however, is another matter. Here, reasonable doubt exists. A mature three
and a half-year old can easily be mistaken for an underdeveloped seven-
year old. The appearance of the victim, as object evidence, cannot be
 9

accorded much weight and, following Pruna, the testimony of the mother is,
by itself, insufficient.

(Citibank, N.A. v. Sabeniano, G.R. No. 156132, [October 16, 2006], 535 PHIL
384-480)
FACTS: Modesta Sabeniano is a client of Citibank and FNCB Finance. On
February 1978, Sabeniano obtained a loan of Php 200,000 from Citibank.
This loan was followed with several other loans – some were paid, while
some were not. Those that were not paid upon maturity were rolled over,
reflecting a total unpaid loan of Php 1,069,847.40 as of September 1979.
These loans were secured by Sabeniano’s money market placements with
FNCB Finance through a Deed of Assignment plus a Declaration of Pledge
which states that all present and future fiduciary placements held in her
personal and/or joint name with Citibank Switzerland, will secure all claims
that Citibank may have or, in the future, acquire against her.
The Deeds of Assignment were duly notarized, while the Declaration of
Pledge was not notarized and Citibank’s copy was undated, while that of
Sabeniano bore the date, September 24, 1979.
Since Sabeniano failed to pay her obligations to Citibank, the latter sent
demand letters to request payment. Her total unpaid loan initially
amounted to Php 2,123,843.20 (inclusive of interests).
Still failing to pay, Citibank executed the Deeds of Assignment and used the
proceeds of Sabeniano’s money market placement from FNCB Finance
which totaled Php 1,022,916.66 and her deposits with Citibank which
totaled Php 31,079.14 to set-off her loan.
This reduced the unpaid balance to Php 1,069,847.40 as previously
mentioned. Since the loan remains unpaid, Citibank proceeded to execute
the Declaration of Pledge and remitted a total of $149,632.99 from
Sabeniano’s Citibank-Geneva accounts to off-set the loan.
Sabeniano then filed a complaint against Citibank for damages and specific
performance (for proper accounting and return of the remitted proceeds
from her personal accounts). She also contended that the proceeds of 2
promissory notes (PN) from her money market placements with Citibank
10
were rolled over or reinvested into the petitioner bank, and these should
also be returned to her.
Regarding the execution of the pledge, the RTC declared this illegal, null and
void. Citibank was ordered to return the $149,632.99 to Sabeniano’s
Citibank-Geneva account with a legal interest of 12% per annum. The RTC
also ordered Sabeniano to pay her outstanding loan to Citibank without
interests and penalty charges.
Both parties appealed to the CA which affirmed the RTC’s decision, but
further ruled entirely in favor of Sabeniano – holding that Citibank failed to
establish her indebtedness and that all the executed deeds should be
returned to her account. The case has now reached the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Citibank’s execution of deeds and pledge to off-set
Sabeniano’s loan was valid and legal.
HELD: The Supreme Court reversed the CA’s findings regarding Sabeniano’s
Citibank loan as this was properly documented and sufficient in evidence.
Thus, the execution of deeds was valid, especially that the agreement was
duly notarized, signed and prepared in accordance with the law.
The court also ordered Citibank to return the amount of P318,897.34 and
P203,150.00 plus 14.5% per annum to Sabeniano. This is the total amount
from the 2 PNs which were executed despite being reinvested in said bank.
The bank was also ordered to pay moral damages of P300,000, exemplary
damages for P250,000, attorney’s fees of P200,000.
The SC however affirmed the RTC’s decision regarding the pledge. Being a
separate entity, Citibank cannot exercise automatic remittance from
Sabeniano’s Citibank Geneva account to off-set her outstanding loan.
The court also noted that the pledge was filled out irregularly – it was not
notarized and Citibank’s copy bore no date. The original copy was not also
produced in court.
Regarding Sabeniano’s obligation, the Supreme Court affirmed RTC’s
decision and ordered her to pay the remaining balance of her loan which

amounts to P1,069,847.40 as of 5 September 1979. These loans continue to
earn interest based on the maturity date that were agreed and stipulated
upon by the parties.
Disagreeing in the foregoing findings, the Court of Appeals stressed, in its
Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 51930, dated 26 March 2002, "that the ponente
of the herein assailed Decision is not the Presiding Judge who heard and
tried the case." 28 This brings us to the question of whether the fact alone
that the RTC Decision was rendered by a judge other than the judge who
actually heard and tried the case is sufficient justification for the appellate
court to disregard or set aside the findings in the Decision of the court a
quo?
This Court rules in the negative.
What deserves stressing is that, in this jurisdiction, there exists a disputable
presumption that the RTC Decision was rendered by the judge in the regular
performance of his official duties. While the said presumption is only
disputable, it is satisfactory unless contradicted or overcame by other
evidence. 29 Encompassed in this presumption of regularity is the
presumption that the RTC judge, in resolving the case and drafting his
Decision, reviewed, evaluated, and weighed all the evidence on record. That
the said RTC judge is not the same judge who heard the case and received
the evidence is of little consequence when the records and transcripts of
stenographic notes (TSNs) are complete and available for consideration by
the former.
In People v. Gazmen, 30 this Court already elucidated its position on such an
issue —
Accused-appellant makes an issue of the fact that the judge who penned
the decision was not the judge who heard and tried the case and concludes
therefrom that the findings of the former are erroneous. Accused-
appellant's argument does not merit a lengthy discussion. It is well-settled
that the decision of a judge who did not try the case is not by that reason
alone erroneous. DAEaTS
11
It is true that the judge who ultimately decided the case had not heard the
controversy at all, the trial having been conducted by then Judge Emilio L.
Polig, who was indefinitely suspended by this Court. Nonetheless, the
transcripts of stenographic notes taken during the trial were complete and
were presumably examined and studied by Judge Baguilat before he
rendered his decision. It is not unusual for a judge who did not try a case to
decide it on the basis of the record. The fact that he did not have the
opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses during the trial but
merely relied on the transcript of their testimonies does not for that reason
alone render the judgment erroneous.
(People vs. Jaymalin, 214 SCRA 685, 692 [1992])
Although it is true that the judge who heard the witnesses testify is in a
better position to observe the witnesses on the stand and determine by
their demeanor whether they are telling the truth or mouthing falsehood, it
does not necessarily follow that a judge who was not present during the
trial cannot render a valid decision since he can rely on the transcript of
stenographic notes taken during the trial as basis of his decision.
Accused-appellant's contention that the trial judge did not have the
opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses since he
was not the same judge who conducted the hearing is also untenable. While
it is true that the trial judge who conducted the hearing would be in a better
position to ascertain the truth and falsity of the testimonies of the
witnesses, it does not necessarily follow that a judge who was not present
during the trial cannot render a valid and just decision since the latter can
also rely on the transcribed stenographic notes taken during the trial as the
basis of his decision.
(People vs. De Paz, 212 SCRA 56, 63 [1992])
At any rate, the test to determine the value of the testimony of the witness
is whether or not such is in conformity with knowledge and consistent with
the experience of mankind (People vs. Morre, 217 SCRA 219 [1993]).
Further, the credibility of witnesses can also be assessed on the basis of the
 12

substance of their testimony and the surrounding circumstances (People v.

Gonzales, 210 SCRA 44 [1992]). A critical evaluation of the testimony of the
prosecution witnesses reveals that their testimony accords with the
aforementioned tests, and carries with it the ring of truth end perforce,
must be given full weight and credit.

Irrefragably, by reason alone that the judge who penned the RTC Decision
was not the same judge who heard the case and received the evidence
therein would not render the findings in the said Decision erroneous and
unreliable. While the conduct and demeanor of witnesses may sway a trial
court judge in deciding a case, it is not, and should not be, his only
consideration. Even more vital for the trial court judge's decision are the
contents and substance of the witnesses' testimonies, as borne out by the
TSNs, as well as the object and documentary evidence submitted and made
part of the records of the case.

People v Malimit
DOCTRINE: The non-disclosure by the witness to the police officers of
appellant's identity immediately after the occurrence of the crime is not
entirely against human experience. In fact the natural reticence of most
people to get involved in criminal prosecutions against immediate
neighbors, as in this case, is of judicial notice.
FACTS:
 At 8 pm, Onofre Malaki(victim) was attending to his store. Malaki's
houseboy Edilberto Batin, was busy cooking supper at the kitchen
located at the back of the store
 Florencio Rondon, a farmer, arrived at the store of Malaki. to purchase
chemical for his rice farm
 Batin had just finished cooking, he proceeded directly to the store to ask
Malaki if supper is to be prepared. As Batin stepped inside the store, he
saw accused Ercarnacion “Manolo” Malimit coming out of the store
with a bolo while his boss, bathed in his own blood, was sprawled on
the floor struggling for his life
 Rondon, who was outside and barely five (5) meters away from the
store, also saw accused Malimit rushing out through the front door of
Malaki's store with a blood-stained bolo
o Aided by the illumination coming from a pressure lamp
inside the store, Rondon clearly recognized Malimit
 Both Batin and Rondon rushed to the nearby house of Malaki's brother-
in-law Eutiquio Beloy and informed Beloy of the tragic incident which
befell Malaki.
 Batin, along with Beloy, went back to the store. Inside, they saw the
lifeless body of Malaki in a pool of blood lying prostrate at the floor.
Beloy readily noticed that the store's drawer was opened and ransacked
and the wallet of Malaki was missing from his pocket
TC: Convicted accused for the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide
One of the contentions of accused Malimit in this appeal is that the trial
court erred in giving credence to the testimonies of Rondon and Batin. He
13
questions the credibility of the 2 witnesses because they only revealed that
they have knowledge of the crime and identified the accused as the
perpetrator, 5 months after the incident.
Date of the crime: April 15, 1991
Witnesses pointed at accused: September 17, 1991
ISSUE:
WON the testimonies of the witnesses may be appreciated by the court?
YES
HELD:
Accused haphazardly concluded that Rondon and Batin implicated the
appellant to this gruesome crime only on September 17, 1991. The
aforementioned date however, was merely the date when Rondon and
Batin executed their respective affidavits, narrating that they saw the
appellant on the night of April 15, 1991 carrying a bolo stained with blood
and rushing out of Malaki's store.
As to his claim of delay, suffice it to state that extant from the records are
ample testimonial evidence negating his assertion, to wit:
1. After having discovered the commission of the crime, Rondon and
Batin immediately looked for Eutiquio Beloy, Malaki's brother-in-
law, and informed him that appellant was the only person they saw
running away from the crime scene;
2. Beloy and Batin reported the crime with the CAFGU detachment in
their barangay where Batin declared that it was appellant who
robbed Malaki on that fateful night; and
3. Batin again made a similar statement later at the Silago Police
Station.
Even assuming arguendo that Rondon and Batin identified the appellant
only on September 15, 1991, or after the lapse of five months from
commission of the crime, this fact alone does not render their testimony
less credible.
The non-disclosure by the witness to the police officers of appellant's
identity immediately after the occurrence of the crime is not entirely against
 14

human experience. In fact the natural reticence of most people to get
involved in criminal prosecutions against immediate neighbors, as in this
case, is of judicial notice.
At any rate, the consistent teaching of our jurisprudence is that the findings
of the trial court with regard to the credibility of witnesses are given weight
and the highest degree of respect by the appellate court. This is the
established rule of evidence, as the matter of assigning values to the
testimony of witnesses is a function best performed by the trial court which
can weigh said testimony in the light of the witness" demeanor, conduct
and attitude at the trial. And although the rule admits of certain exceptions,
namely: (1) when patent inconsistencies in the statements of witnesses are
ignored by the trial court, or (2) when the conclusions arrived at are clearly
unsupported by the evidence, we found none in this case.
Additional info:
The non-presentation by the prosecution of the police blotter which could
prove if accused was indeed implicated right away by Batin to the crime
was not necessary for the prosecution to present as evidence. Entries in the
police blotter are merely corroborative evidence of the uncontroverted
testimony of Batin that he identified the appellant as the perpetrator of the
crime before the Silago police. As such, its presentation as evidence is not
indispensable. Besides, if appellant believed that he was not identified
therein, then he should have secured a copy thereof from the Silago Police
Station and utilized the same as controverting evidence to impeach Batin's
credibility as witness. Having failed to do so, appellant cannot now pass the
blame on the prosecution for something which appellant himself should
have done.
identified the appellant as the perpetrator of the crime before the Silago
police. As such, its presentation as evidence is not indispensable. c|||
(People v. Malimit, G.R. No. 109775, [November 14, 1996], 332 PHIL 190-
206)
8. ID.; ID.; DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTIONS; THAT A PERSON FOUND IN
POSSESSION OF A THING TAKEN IN THE DOING OF A RECENT WRONGFUL
ACT IS THE TAKER AND DOER OF THE WHOLE ACT; APPLICABLE IN CASE AT
BAR. — Appellant's insistence that he merely found Malaki's wallet by
chance while gathering shells along the seashore, and that he feared being
implicated in the crime for which reason he hid the wallet underneath a
stone, hardly inspires belief. We are at a loss, just as the trial court was, as
to why appellant should fear being implicated in the crime if indeed he
merely found Malaki's wallet by chance. No inference can be drawn from
appellant's purported apprehension other than the logical conclusion that
appellant had knowledge of the crime. Besides, proof that appellant is in
possession of a stolen property gives rise to a valid presumption that he
stole the same.

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; NON-PRESENTATION OF THE POLICE BLOTTER

IN COURT AS EVIDENCE IS NOT FATAL TO THE PROSECUTION'S CASE; CASE
AT BAR. — Appellant derided the non-presentation by the prosecution of
the police blotter which could prove if appellant was indeed implicated right
away by Batin to the crime. We do not believe, however, that it was
necessary for the prosecution to present as evidence a copy of the
aforementioned police blotter. Neither was its non-presentation in court
fatal to the prosecution's case. Entries in the police blotter are merely
corroborative evidence of the uncontroverted testimony of Batin that he

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. MARIO TANDOY y
LIM, Defendant-Appellant.
[G.R. No. 80505 : December 4, 1990. CRUZ, J.:]
Doctrine: Since the aforesaid marked money was presented by the
prosecution solely for the purpose of establishing its existence and not its
contents, other substitutionary evidence, like a xerox copy thereof, is
therefore admissible without the need of accounting for the original.
Facts:
1. Mario Tandoy was accused feloniously sold eight (8) pieces of dried
marijuana flowering tops, two (2) pieces of dried marijuana
flowering tops and crushed dried marijuana flowering tops, which
are prohibited drug, for and in consideration of P20.00.
2. The accused-appellant raises the following assignment of errors in
this appeal:
3. The Court a quo erred in admitting in evidence against the accused
Exh. "E-2-A" which is merely a xerox copy of the P10.00 bill allegedly
used as buy-bust money.
4. The evidence of the prosecution may be summarized as follows:
5. One of them was the accused-appellant, who said without
preamble: "Pare, gusto mo bang umiskor?" Singayan said yes. The
exchange was made then and there — two rolls/pieces of marijuana
for one P10.00 and two P5.00 bills marked ANU (meaning Anti-
Narcotics Unit).
6. The team then moved in and arrested Tandoy.
7. The accused-appellant invokes the best evidence rule and questions
the admission by the trial court of the xerox copy only of the
marked P10.00 bill.
8. The Solicitor General, in his Comment, correctly refuted that
contention thus:
a. This assigned error centers on the trial court's admission of
the P10.00 bill marked money which, according to the
appellant, is excluded under the best evidence rule for
being a mere xerox copy.
b. Apparently, appellant erroneously thinks that said marked
money is an ordinary document falling under Sec. 2, Rule
130 of the Revised Rules of Court which excludes the
15
introduction of secondary evidence except in the five (5)
instances mentioned therein.:
9. The best evidence rule applies only when the contents of the
document are the subject of inquiry.
Issue:
Whether or not such document was actually executed, or exists, or in the
circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence
rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible.
Held:
1. Since the aforesaid marked money was presented by the
prosecution solely for the purpose of establishing its existence and
not its contents, other substitutionary evidence, like a xerox copy
thereof, is therefore admissible without the need of accounting for
the original.
2. Moreover, the presentation at the trial of the "buy-bust money"
was not indispensable to the conviction of the accused-appellant
because the sale of the marijuana had been adequately proved by
the testimony of the police officers.
3. So long as the marijuana actually sold by the accused-appellant had
been submitted as an exhibit, the failure to produce the marked
money itself would not constitute a fatal omission.
4. We are convinced from the evidence on record that the prosecution
has overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor
of the accused-appellant with proof beyond reasonable doubt of his
guilt.
5. He must therefore suffer the penalty prescribed by law for those
who would visit the scourge of drug addiction upon our people.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the challenged decision
AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the accused-appellant.:
 16

PACIFICO B. ARCEO, JR vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. G.R. No. 142641.

July 17, 2006.
FACTS:

Pacifico Arceo obtained a loan from Josefino Cenizal. He then issued a check
in favor of Cenizal, in which he promised verbally seven times that he would
replace it with cash. After not replacing the check, he encashed the check
but was dishonored due to insufficient funds.

Cenizal went to Arceo's house to inform him of the dishonor but he was not
around anymore so he went to Arceo's lawyer and gave him a letter giving
him three days to pay the check. When Arceo failed, Cenizal charged him in
violation of BP 22.

The lower court found him guilty.

Arceo contends that he should not be held liable because it was presented
beyond the 90-day period provided under the law; that he only given three
days to pay and not five banking days as per law; and that he paid his
obligation.

ISSUE: Whether Arceo is guilty.

RULING:

The SC denied Arceo's petition. The SC held that the life of a check is six
months. Cenizal presented the check within four months of issuance. The
90-day period in the law is not an element of the offense. Arceo cannot
claim that he was not given five banking days (the rule is three), because he
still remained unpaid after five days of his receipt of dishonor. Lastly, his
claim that he paid the obligation was only mere allegation as there was no
proof of his payment and that the check still remained on Arceo.

(Heirs of Sabanpan v. Comorposa, G.R. No. 152807, [August 12, 2003], 456
PHIL 161-173)
Petitioners, Heirs of Marcos Saez who allegedly was the lawful and actual
possessor of subject premises, filed a complaint for unlawful detainer with
damages against the respondents before the MTC claiming the latter had
been occupying subject premises without paying rental and through
petitioners' tolerance. Respondents refused to vacate the premises despite
demands to vacate, contending: that they occupied the premises in their
own right as true, valid and lawful possessors and owners way back in 1960
up to the present; that they acquired just and valid ownership and
possession of the premises by prescription; and that the DENR Regional
Director already upheld their possession over the land when it ruled that
they were the rightful claimant and possessors, and therefore, entitled to
the issuance of a title. The MTC rendered judgment in favor of the
petitioners, but the RTC and the CA reversed and set aside said decision.
On appeal, petitioner contested, among others, the admissibility of the
Certification which bears a facsimile of the signature of CENR Officer Jose F.
Tagorda.
In denying the petition, the Supreme Court defined facsimile signature as a
signature produced by mechanical means but recognized as valid in banking,
financial and business transactions. The Certification is not a sham because
the CENR officer has not disclaimed the Certification. In fact, the DENR
Regional Director has acknowledged it and used it as reference in his Order.
The certification stated that the controverted lot was not allocated to any
person. The Supreme Court also held that while the affidavits of petitioners'
witnesses are admissible, respondents' failure to reply does not ipso facto
render the facts set forth therein was duly proven. Petitioners also failed to
prove that respondents' possession of the premises was by mere tolerance.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; ADMISSIBILITY; PLEADINGS FILED VIA FAX
MACHINES ARE NOT ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE. — Pleadings filed via fax
machines are not considered originals and are at best exact copies. As such,
they are not admissible in evidence, as there is no way of determining
whether they are genuine or authentic.
17
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; A FACSIMILE SIGNATURE IS VALID WHEN
ACKNOWLEDGED BY THE SIGNATORY; CASE AT BAR. — The Certification, on
the other hand, is being contested for bearing a facsimile of the signature of
CENR Officer Jose F. Tagorda. The facsimile referred to is not the same as
that which is alluded to in Garvida. The one mentioned here refers to a
facsimile signature, which is defined as a signature produced by mechanical
means but recognized as valid in banking, financial, and business
transactions. Note that the CENR officer has not disclaimed the
Certification. In fact, the DENR regional director has acknowledged and used
it as reference in his Order dated April 2, 1998. If the Certification were a
sham as petitioner claims, then the regional director would not have used it
as reference in his Order. Instead, he would have either verified it or
directed the CENR officer to take the appropriate action, as the latter was
under the former's direct control and supervision.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE REQUIRING FORMAL OFFER OF EVIDENCE DURING
TRIAL FOR ADMISSIBILITY APPLIES ONLY TO ORDINARY TRIALS, NOT TO
SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS; CASE AT BAR. — As early as the pretrial
conference at the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), the CENR Certification had
already been marked as evidence for respondents as stated in the Pretrial
Order. The Certification was not formally offered, however, because
respondents had not been able to file their position paper. Neither the rules
of procedure nor jurisprudence would sanction the admission of evidence
that has not been formally offered during the trial. But this evidentiary rule
is applicable only to ordinary trials, not to cases covered by the rule on
summary procedure — cases in which no full-blown trial is held.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; DISTINGUISHED FROM PROBATIVE VALUE. — Admissibility
refers to the question of whether certain pieces of evidence are to be
considered at all, while probative value refers to the question of whether
the admitted evidence proves an issue. Thus, a particular item of evidence
may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation
within the guidelines provided by the rules of evidence.

G.R. No. 191696 April 10, 2013ROGELIO DANTIS,
Petitioner,vs.
JULIO MAGHINANG, JR.,
Respondent.
MENDOZA,
J.:
The Facts The case draws its origin from a complaint for quieting of title and
recovery of possession with damages filed by petitioner Rogelio Dantis
(Rogelio) against respondent Julio Maghinang, Jr. (Julio, Jr.) " before the
RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 280-M-2002. Rogelio alleged that he was
the registered owner of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. T-125918, with an area of 5,657 square meters, located in
Sta. Rita, San Miguel, 2ulacan3 that he acquired ownership of the property
through a deed of extraJudicial partition of the estate of his deceased
father, Emilio Dantis (Emilio), dated December 22, 1993; that he had been
paying the realty taxes on the said property; that Julio Jr. occupied and
built a house on a portion of his property without any right at all; that
demands were made upon Julio, Jr. that he vacate the premises but the
same fell on deaf ears; and that the acts of Julio,Jr. had created a cloud of
doubt over his title and right of possession of his property.
He added that he was constrained to institute an ejectment suit against
Julio, Jr.before the Municipal Trial Court of San Miguel, Bulacan (MTC), but
the complaint was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and lack of cause of
action.
Julio claimed that his father, Julio Maghinang Sr., bought the said lot from
the parents of Rogelio Dantis. He admitted that the affidavit was not signed
by the alleged vendor, Emilio Dantis, the father of Rogelio Dantis. The
receipt he presented was admittedly a mere photocopy.
RTC’s Ruling:
On March 2, 2005 the RTC rendered its decision declaring Rogelio as the
true owner of the entire -5,657 - square meter lot located in Sta. Rita, San
Miguel, Bulacan, as evidenced by his TCT over the same. The RTC ruled that
even if the purported affidavit and the receipt presented by Julio were
18
adjudged as competent evidence, still, they would only serve as proofs that
the purchase price for the sub5ect lot had not yet been completely paid
and, hence, Rogelio was not duty bound to deliver the property to Julio, Jr.
The RTC found Julio, Jr. to be a mere possessor by tolerance. The dispositive
portion of the RTC decision reads:
Julio, Jr. moved for a reconsideration of the March 2, 2005 decision, but the
motion was denied by the RTC in its May 3, 2005 Order. Feeling aggrieved,
Julio, Jr.appealed the decision to the CA.
The CA held that the receipt was an indubitable proof of the sale of the 352
square meter lot between Emilio and Julio, Sr. It also ruled that the partial
payment of the purchase price, coupled with the delivery of the res, gave
e9cacy to the oral sale and brought it outside the operation of the statute of
frauds.
The motion for reconsideration filed by Rogelio was denied by the CA,
hence this petition.
Issues:
whether there is a perfected contract of sale between Emilio and Julio, Sr.
The Court’s Ruling
There is no perfected contract of sale. First, the affidavit allegedly executed
by Ignacio Dantis (Ignacio), Rogelio’s grandfather, whereby said affiant
attested, among others, to the sale of the subject lot made by his son,
Emilio, to Julio, Sr. Second the undated handwritten receipt of initial
downpayment in the amount of P100.00 supposedly issued by Emilio to
Julio, Sr. in connection with the sale of the subject lot jurisprudence
dictates that an affidavit is merely hearsay evidence where its affiant
/maker did not take the witness stand.
The sworn statement of Ignacio is hearsay evidence. It cannot be deemed a
declaration against interest for the matter to be considered as an exception
to the hearsay rule because the declarant was not the seller (Emilio), but his
father Ignacio". On the other hand, the undated handwritten receipt is

considered secondary evidence being a mere photocopy which, in this case,
cannot be admitted to prove the contents of such receipt. The best
evidence rule requires that the highest available degree of proof must be
produced. For documentary evidence, the contents of a document are best
proved by the production of the document itself to the exclusion of
secondary or substitutionary evidence, pursuant to Rule 130, Section 3.
A secondary evidence is admissible only upon compliance with Rule 130,
Section 5,which states that: when the original has been lost or destroyed,
or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or
existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part,
may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some
authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.
Proof of the due execution of the document and its subsequent loss would
constitute the basis for the introduction of secondary evidence.
In MCC Industrial Sales Corporation v. Sangyong Corporation, it was held
that where the missing document is the foundation of the action, more
strictness in proof is required than where the document is only collaterally
involved.
Guided by these norms, the court holds that Julio, Jr. failed to prove the due
execution of the original of affidavit as well as its subsequent loss. His
testimony was riddled with improbabilities and contradictions which tend to
erode his credibility and raise doubt on the veracity of his evidence. his
claim of Julio, Jr. that Emilio affixed his signature on the original affidavit in
1953 is highly improbable because record shows that 6milio died even
before that year, specifically, on November 13, 1952.
Assuming, in, that the receipt is admissible in evidence, there will still be no
valid and perfected oral contract for failure of Julio, Jr. to prove the
concurrence of the essential requisites of a contract of sale by adequate and
competent evidence. By the contract of sale, one of the contracting parties
obligates himself to transfer the ownership of, and to deliver, a determinate
thing, and the other to pay therefor a price certain in money or its
equivalent. A contract of sale is a consensual contract and, thus, is perfected
by mere consent which is manifested by the meeting of the offer and the
acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute the
19
contract. Until the contract of sale is perfected, it cannot, as an independent
source of obligation, serve as a binding juridical relation between the
parties. The essential elements of a contract of sale are; a) consent or
meeting of the minds, that is, consent to transfer ownership in exchange for
the price; b) determinate subject matter and c) price certain in money or its
equivalent.The absence of any of the essential elements shall negate the
existence of a perfected contract of sale.
A perusal of the above document would readily show that it does not
specify a determinate subject matter. Nowhere does it provide a description
of the property subject of the sale, including its metes and bounds, as well
as its total area. The Court notes that while Julio, Jr. testified that the land
subject of the sale consisted of 352 square meters, the receipt however,
states that it is more than 400 square meters. Moreover, it does not
categorically declare the price certain in money. Neither does it state the
mode of payment of the purchase price and the period for its payment.
Seemingly, Julio, Jr. wanted to prove the sale by a receipt when it should be
the receipt that should further corroborate the existence of the sale. At
best, his testimony only alleges but does not prove the existence of the
verbal agreement. Julio, Jr. miserably failed to establish by preponderance
of evidence.
On one hand, It is an age-old rule in civil cases that he who alleges a fact has
the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence. After
carefully sifting through the evidence on record, the Court finds that
Rogelio was able to establish a prima facie case in his favour tending to
show his exclusive ownership of the parcel of land under a title with an area
of 5,657 square meters, which included the 352 square meter subject lot
and is a derivative of a mother title, which covered a bigger area of land
measuring 30,000 square meters registered in the name of Emilio Dantis;
that Emilio died intestate on November 13, 1952; that Emilio’s five heirs,
including Rogelio, executed an extra judicial partition of estate on December
22, 1993 and divided among themselves specific portions of the property
In Swedich Match, AB v Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that the manner
of payment of the purchase price was an essential element before a valid
and binding contract of sale could exist. Albeit the Civil Code does not
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explicitly provide that the minds of the contracting parties must also meet
on the terms or manner of payment of the price, the same is needed,
otherwise, there is no sale. An agreement anent the manner of payment
goes into the price so much so that a disagreement on the manner of
payment is tantamount to a failure to agree on the price.