Rule 90

Sanchez vs. CA, at. al.

[G.R. No. 108947. September 29, 1997]

Facts

:�[Herein private respondent] Rosalia S. Lugod is the only child of spouses Juan C.
Sanchez and Maria Villafranca while [herein privaterespondents] Arturo S. Lugod,
Evelyn L. Ranises and Roberto S.Lugod are the legitimate children of [herein
private respondent]Rosalia.[Herein petitioners] Rolando, Florida Mierly, Alfredo
and Myrna, allsurnamed Sanchez, are the illegitimate children of Juan C. Sanchez.On
October 30, 1969, however, [herein private respondent] Rosaliaand [herein
petitioners] assisted by their respective counselsexecuted a compromise
agreement (Annex �D�, Petition) whereinthey agreed to divide the properties
enumerated therein of the lateJuan C. Sanchez.This compromise agreement was not
approved by the probate court.

Issue

:Is the Compromise Agreement partitioning the property of the estatewithout

approval of the probate court valid?

Held

:Yes.Petitioners contend that, because the compromise agreement wasexecuted during

the pendency of the probate proceedings, judicialapproval is necessary to shroud it
with validity. They stress that theprobate court had jurisdiction over the
properties covered by saidagreement. They add that Petitioners Florida Mierly,
Alfredo andMyrna were all minors represented only by their mother/naturalguardian,
Laureta Tampus.These contentions lack merit. Article 2028 of the Civil Code
definesa compromise agreement as �a contract whereby the parties, bymaking
reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to onealready commenced.�
Being a consensual contract, it is perfectedupon the meeting of the minds of the
parties. Judicial approval is notrequired for its perfection. Petitioners�
argument that the compromisewas not valid for lack of judicial approval is not
novel; the same wasraised in
Mayuga vs. Court of Appeals
,
]
where the Court, throughJustice Irene R. Cortes, ruled:�It is alleged that the lack
of judicial approval is fatal tothe compromise. A compromise is a consensual
contract.As such, it is perfected upon the meeting of the minds of the parties to
the contract. (Hernandez
v
. Barcelon, 23 Phil.599 [1912]; see also De los Reyes
v
. de Ugarte, 75 Phil.505 [1945].) And from that moment not only does itbecome
binding upon the parties (De los Reyes
v.
DeUgarte,
supra
), it also has upon them the effect andauthority of
res judicata
(Civil Code, Art. 2037),
even if not judicially approved
(Meneses
v
. De la Rosa, 77 Phil. 34[1946]; Vda. De Guilas
v
. David, 132 Phil. 241, L-24280, 23SCRA 762 [May 27, 1968]; Cochingyan
v.
Cloribel, L-27070-71 [April 22, 1977], 76 SCRA 361).� (Italics found inthe
original.)

In the case before us, it is ineludible that the parties knowingly andfreely
entered into a valid compromise agreement. Adequately assisted by their
respective counsels, they each negotiated its terms