Personality and Social Psychology Review Copyright © 2000 by

2000, Vol. 4, No. 3, 255–277 Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

A Rose by Any Name? The Values Construct

Meg J. Rohan
School of Psychology
University of New South Wales

Definitional inconsistency has been epidemic in values theory and research. An ab-
breviated review of values-related theory and research is provided, and 5 aspects of
the values construct that may have contributed to this inconsistency and the resulting
lack of synthesis are discussed. A proposal for the process by which value priorities in-
fluence attitudinal and behavioral decisions also is outlined. Attitudinal and behav-
ioral decisions are shown to be traceable to personal value priorities, although the
link is indirect. The importance of 4 constructs in this process is highlighted. In the
past, personal value systems, social value systems, worldviews, and ideologies each
may have been given the generic label values.

“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a
scornful tone, “it means just what I choose it to
mean—neither more nor less.”
“The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can
make words mean different things.”
“The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is
to be master—that’s all.” (Carroll, 1865/1966, p. 185)
Important theorists in a variety of fields have em-
phasized the importance of people’s value priorities in
understanding and predicting attitudinal and behav-
ioral decisions. For example, Gordon Allport (1961)
suggested that value priorities were the “dominating
force in life” (p. 543) because they directed all of a per-
son’s activity toward their realization. Elsewhere,
Allport (1955) berated psychologists for failing to con-
sider that people’s value priorities influence their per-
ception of reality (p. 89). Allport’s reprimand remains
relevant even now because value theory and research
are at the fringe of the field. For example, no discus-
sion of value theory appears in a sample of introduc-
tory social psychology and personality textbooks
published in this decade (Aronson, Wilson, & Akert,
1997; Baron & Byrne, 1997; Burger, 1997; Carducci,
1998; Cloninger, 1996; Hewstone, Stroebe, &
Stephenson, 1996; Liebert & Liebert, 1998; Myers,
1996; Pervin, 1996; E. R. Smith & Mackie, 1995). Al-
though Allport’s enthusiasm for the construct lost its
influence with the rise of behaviorism (behaviorists
would have looked with disfavor at this unobservable
Preparation of this article was supported in part by an Australian
Research Council Small Grant to Meg Rohan. Thanks to Mark
Zanna, David A. Kenny, Felicia Pratto, and Shalom Schwartz for
their insightful comments and suggestions.
Requests for reprints should be sent to Meg J. Rohan, School of
Psychology, The University of New South Wales, Sydney 2052,
Australia. E-mail: m.rohan@unsw.edu.au.
construct), it does not explain why enthusiastic atten-
tion to the values construct has not been revived now
that there is a willingness to discuss and investigate
other latent constructs such as schemas (e.g., Reich &
Weary, 1998) and working models (e.g., Mikulincer,
1998). Or, does the values construct exist in contempo-
rary research under other names?
The status of values theory and research suffers be-
cause the word values is open to abuse and overuse by
nonpsychologists and psychologists alike. For exam-
ple, consider politicians’ (and others’) moaning about
the erosion of family values. What do they mean by fam-
ily values? People—including psychologists, anthro-
pologists, political scientists, and sociologists—seem
to use the word values in Humpty Dumpty fashion: They
make it mean just what they choose it to mean.
However, the problem is not new. Adler (1956), for
example, suggested that as a result of definitional con-
fusion, the “emphasis on values has slowed down the
advancement of the social sciences rather than fur-
thered it” (p. 279). One popular strategy for settling
confusion is to invent new names for the construct.
Clyde Kluckhohn (1951), whom Levitin (1968) de-
scribed as having offered one of the most comprehen-
sive analyses of the values construct, described the
result of this strategy:
Reading the voluminous, and often vague and diffuse,
literature on the subject in the various fields of learn-
ing, one finds values considered as attitudes, motiva-
tions, objects, measurable quantities, substantive areas
of behavior, affect-laden customs or traditions, and re-
lationships such as those between individuals, groups,
objects, events. (C. K. M. Kluckhohn, 1951, p. 390)
M. B. Smith (1969) also bemoaned the “proliferation of
concepts akin to values” that were labeled, for example,

255
 ROHAN
as core attitudes or sentiments, preferences, cathexes,
and valences (p. 98). D. T. Campbell (1963) provided a
list of 76 concepts that included value, attitude, and mo-
tive to illustrate that “superficially quite dissimilar ter-
minologies may be describing essentially the same
facts and processes” (pp. 100–101). D. T. Campbell
(1963) suggested that the common characteristic of
these concepts was that each could be viewed as coordi-
nators of behavior. However, conceptualizing the ab-
stract, trans-situational, implicit nature of these funda-
mental coordinators of behavior is difficult.
The purpose of this article is to review briefly work
in the area of values, to propose a definition of the val-
ues construct that distinguishes it from other related
constructs, and to propose a process by which value
priorities coordinate people’s attitudinal and behav-
ioral decisions. In tracing the link between value prior-
ities and decisions, I highlight the importance of two
constructs—worldviews and ideologies—that are of-
ten labeled as values. Before presenting this proposal, I
discuss aspects of the values construct that are at the
heart of definitional diversity and confusion.
At the Heart of the Confusion? Five
Aspects of the Values Construct
Aspect 1: Nouns and Verbs
Use of the word value as a noun is recorded in the
Compact Oxford English Dictionary (1991) as early as
1303, to refer to the fairness and equivalence of the
amount of a commodity in an exchange, and in 1398 to
mean a standard of estimation. Use of value as a verb is
registered at a similar time, to describe the act of ap-
praising the worth—in terms of its appropriateness for
exchange—of a commodity. However, its meaning
was later expanded to incorporate more abstract ex-
changes and standards. Thomas and Znanieki
(1918/1958) focused on this latter meaning in their fa-
mous The Polish Peasant work.
Value as a verb. The use of value as a verb im-
plies that some higher level evaluation has taken place.
When people say that they value (verb) a thing, person,
action, or activity, they are expressing a deeper meaning
associated with that entity. So, they do not simply like
the entity; they feel that it is good (the meaning of good is
discussed later) and relates to or somehow expresses
their underlying values (noun). The link between peo-
ple’s liking for an entity and their value priorities has
been demonstrated empirically (see Feather, 1995; see
also Feather, 1982s).
Little specific attention has been paid to the valuing
process, but it has been suggested, for example, that peo-
ple chronically and effortlessly engage in ascertaining
256
the goodness or badness of the stimuli in their environ-
ments (a “drive to evaluate,” Festinger, 1954; see also
Pratto, 1994). Norman Feather’s (1996) comment sheds
light on what may be taking place in the valuing process:
“We relate possible actions and outcomes within partic-
ular situations to our value systems, testing them against
our general conceptions about what we believe is desir-
able or undesirable in terms of our own value priorities”
(p. 224). Perhaps as a result of the lack of theoretical
(and empirical) attention to the valuing process itself,
programs designed to change people’s value priorities
(e.g., the value self-confrontation method; Rokeach,
1973) have met with limited success, and long-term
changes are disappointingly rare (e.g., see Kristiansen
& Hotte, 1996). Investigation of the valuing process
may benefit from work such as Tetlock’s (1986) exami-
nations of ideological reasoning and work on the pro-
cessing of information (e.g., the heuristic–systematic
model and the elaboration likelihood model; see Eagly
& Chaiken, 1993).
Value as a noun. A dilemma that early values
theorists and researchers faced was whether values
(noun) should be investigated from the perspective of
the entity being evaluated (e.g., “How much value does
the entity have?”) or from the perspective of the person
doing the valuing (e.g., “What does this person value?”;
see Feather, 1975, p. 3, for a discussion of this point).
However, this issue essentially has been settled: Con-
temporary values theorists investigate the values con-
struct from the perspective of the person who evaluates
the entities in his or her environment, and they seek to
measure people’s priorities on various values in an ef-
fort to understand the underlying motivations of peo-
ple’s responses to their environments (see Rohan &
Zanna, in press).
An aid to people’s constant evaluation of the stimuli
in their environments (value as a verb) would be a cogni-
tive structure in which information about past evalua-
tions could be collected (see Bargh, Chaiken, Govender,
& Pratto, 1992). This information, if organized, then
could serve as a kind of analogical principle to use in
evaluating and imbuing meaning to newly encountered
objects and events. Humans’ ability to use analogy to
imbue meaning and coherence to their experiences is
highly developed. Indeed, some cognitive scientists
(e.g., Holyoak & Thagard, 1995, 1997; Thagard & Shel-
ley, in press) have considered it so much a part of human
experience that they have used computer simulations to
demonstrate the ease with which analogies are used. Be-
cause these analogical principles are relevant across sit-
uations and time, they may be what are generally
referred to as values (noun). The values construct de-
scribed this way, then, seems not unlike schemata that
were defined by Bartlett (1932) as being “active organi-
zations of past experience” (p. 201).
 THE VALUES CONSTRUCT

Schwartz and Bilsky (1987, 1990) found that five
features of the values construct are recurrently men-
tioned in the values literature: that the values con-
struct concerns (a) beliefs, (b) desirable end states or
behaviors, (c) trans-situational guides, (d) selection
and evaluation of behavior and events, and (e) the
relative ordering of beliefs, desirable end states or be-
havior, or guides. These features are all consistent
with the suggestion that the value system is a stable
meaning-producing superordinate cognitive structure.
Considering its analogical nature, the value system
may provide the basic architecture of what has been
referred to as the “narrative mode” of human under-
standing that deals in “human or human-like intention
and action and the vicissitudes and consequences that
mark their course” (Bruner, 1986, p. 13; see also
McAdams, 1999). The value system also may pro-
vide organization for what Hazel Markus (1977) and
her colleagues (e.g., Fong &Markus, 1982) have in-
vestigated as self-schemata.
It is a well-supported suggestion that value systems
are cognitive structures, and often it is implied in value
definitions (see Table 1 for a selection of definitions)
and in explanations about the function of value sys-
tems. For example, this suggestion is implied in
Allport’s (1961) contention that value systems were
“schemata of comprehensibility” (p. 544) and in C. K.
M. Kluckhohn’s (1951) answer to the question “Why
are there values?”: Because without value systems “in-
dividuals could not get what they want and need from
other individuals in personal and emotional terms, nor
could they feel within themselves the requisite mea-
sure of order and unified purpose” (p. 400). Others
have stated it more clearly. For example, Rokeach
(1968) suggested that value priorities occupy central
positions in cognitive networks of attitudes and beliefs.
Feather (1971, 1980, 1999) also clearly described the
cognitive structure status of value systems and de-
scribed them as abstract structures or associative net-
works. However, he highlighted an important
feature—that the networks are linked to the affective
system. As a result, these abstract structures—“orga-
nized summaries of experience”—provide “continuity
and meaning under changing environmental circum-
stances” (Feather, 1980, p. 249). Silvan Tomkins’s
(e.g., 1979) script theory seems relevant. Tomkins sug-
gested that from the earliest weeks of life, humans store
“scenes” containing at least one affect and one object of
that affect (see Carlson, 1981). These scenes are col-
lected into “scripts” so that sense can be made of the re-
lations among various scenes.
An assumption implicit in discussions of affective
links to value systems is that people will be motivated to
engage in situations that are similar to other situations
that resulted in positive affect (or an absence of negative
affect), to be with people who enable positive affect (or
minimize negative affect), and to behave in ways that
will produce positive affect (or reduce negative affect).
These motivations may then produce what Schwartz
and Bilsky (1987, 1990) described as the motivational
goals that underlie value priorities—people may have
preferences for particular types of emotion (and there is
some indirect evidence for this; see work on self-regula-
tory focus by Higgins, e.g., 1997). For example, accord-
ing to Schwartz and Bilsky (e.g., 1987) the defining goal
of self-direction values is independent thought and ac-
tion; thinking and behaving in independent ways may
provide feelings that can be described as positively

Table 1. A Selection of Values Definitions

Theorist Definition

Lewin (1952, p. 41)
C. K. M. Kluckhohn (1951, p. 395)
Heider (1958, p. 223)
Rokeach (1973, p. 5)
Feather (1996, p. 222)
Schwartz (1994, p. 21)
Schwartz (1999, p. 24)
Values influence behavior but have not the character of a goal (i.e., of a force field). For
example, the individual does not try to “reach” the value of fairness, but fairness is “guiding ”
his behavior. It is probably correct to say that values determine which types of activity have a
positive and which have a negative valence for an individual in a given situation. In other
words, values are not force fields but they “induce ” force fields. That means values are
constructs that have the same psychological dimension as power fields.
A value is a conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a
group, of the desirable that influences the selection from available modes, means, and ends of
actions.
We shall use the term value as meaning the property of an entity (x has values) or as meaning a
class of entities (x is a value) with the connotation of being objectively positive in some way.
A value is an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is
personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state of
existence.
I regard values as beliefs about desirable or undesirable ways of behaving or about the
desirability or otherwise of general goals.
I define values as desirable transsituational goals, varying in importance, that serve as guiding
principles in the life of a person or other social entity.
I define values as conceptions of the desirable that guide the way social actors (e.g., organizational
leaders, policy-makers, individual persons) select actions, evaluate people and events, and
explain their actions and evaluations.

257
 ROHAN
valenced, high arousal (e.g., excited, elated). The defin-
ing goal of security values is stated as safety, harmony,
and stability of society, of relationships, and of self; be-
having in ways that enable such safety, harmony, and se-
curity may provide a feeling that can be described as
positively valenced, low arousal (e.g., calm, relaxed;
see Feldman Barrett & Russell, 1998, for an affect struc-
ture model in which the distinction between high and
low arousal is described).
Feather’s (e.g., 1999) suggestion that some value
types may be relatively undifferentiated with a limited
network of associations, whereas others have a high de-
gree of differentiation with a complex network of asso-
ciations, may provide direction for further research into
the development of values and value change. The im-
portance of particular value types may be driven by re-
peated confirmation of particular entity–outcome
sequences. Repeated disconfirmation of such se-
quences may stimulate modification, and the provision
of experiences (either direct or vicarious) may build up
the entity–outcome sequences in less elaborated value
types.
Values versus attitudes. When the values con-
struct is viewed in terms of an abstract meaning-produc-
ing cognitive structure, the divide between value priori-
ties and evaluations of specific entities seems wide
indeed. However, people not only use the words “I
value” in talking about their evaluations of specific or
tangible entities, they also use them in describing their
evaluations of abstract trans-situational guides. For ex-
ample, people not only may say “I value that ring” but
also may say “I value security.” The problem is that se-
curity can be labeled as a value, but it seems inappropri-
ate to label a person’s attachment to a ring as a value. The
term attitude may provide a temporary solution to the
problem of the abstractness or specificity of people’s
judgments. Allport (e.g., 1935), as well as others (e.g.,
see Eagly & Chaiken, 1993), used the word attitude to
describe specific judgments as well as abstract judg-
ments that could be labeled as values. However, atti-
tudes that have some kind of value-related implication
are often discussed in terms of having an “ego defen-
sive” function (e.g., Katz, 1960; Ostrom & Brock, 1968,
1969; Sherif & Cantril, 1947; M.B. Smith, Bruner, &
White, 1956; see also Johnson & Eagly, 1990). Work by
David Sears and his colleagues on symbolic racism
(e.g., Sears & Kinder, 1985) and work by Mark Zanna
and his colleagues (e.g., Esses, Haddock, & Zanna,
1993; Zanna, Haddock, & Esses, 1990; see also Biernat,
Vescio, Theno, & Crandall, 1996) in which the violation
of symbolic beliefs was found to be an important factor
in prejudiced attitudes can be viewed as another per-
spective on the value-related implications of attitudes.
Although the term attitude has remained popular
(e.g., see the much-quoted passage in Allport, 1935, p.
258
798), empirical focus on the values construct has
become somewhat obscured. To allow the values con-
struct a chance to come back into the limelight, I pro-
pose that the term attitude is used only for evaluations
of specific entities. The term values then can be re-
served for discussions of abstract trans-situational
guides. Already, this seems to be the convention in dis-
cussions of what are labeled value-expressive attitudes
(e.g., see Maio & Olson, 2000a, 2000b).
Summary. Used as a verb, value refers to the pro-
cess of ascertaining the merit of an entity with reference
to an abstract value system structure. Used as a noun,
value refers to the result of this process. These value
judgments may be formed or amended when people en-
counter new entities or existing judgments are chal-
lenged. Rather than use attitude to refer to evaluations of
either specific or more abstract entities, I propose that
attitude is reserved for describing evaluations of spe-
cific entities. In view of the conceptualization of the
value system as an affectively charged cognitive struc-
ture, more attention to affect value system links seems
warranted.
Aspect 2: Values, Value Types, Value
Priorities, and Value Systems
Not only is the word values used in reference to
people’s value priorities and the organization of those
value priorities, their value systems, it is also used to
describe judgments and categories of judgments. For
example, broad-mindedness is a judgment that con-
cerns acceptance of diversity, and self-direction refers
to a category of judgments that concern independence
and free thinking.
The ensuing confusion not only leads to misunder-
standings and misinterpretations but also obscures an
important assumption that has been characteristic of all
value theories and for which there is now empirical sup-
port: Although people differ in terms of their value pri-
orities, the structure of the human value system is
universal (e.g., Schwartz, 1992, 1994, 1996). That is,
people differ only in terms of the relative importance
they place on a set of universally important value types.
The assumption that value system structure is uni-
versal may be lost in phrases such as “people attach
great importance to their values” (Maio & Olson,
1998, p. 294) that are meant to describe people’s ten-
dency to defend their value priorities. It also may be
lost in discussions of how children acquire values (i.e.,
how children’s value priorities undergo change; see
Grusec & Kuczynski, 1997).
A review of value theories is presented next to pro-
vide an overview of past and contemporary focus on
the value system, value types, and value priorities.
 THE VALUES CONSTRUCT
Early value theories. In general, early theorists
focused on individual differences in the organization of
some universally relevant set of human features. For
example, Alexander Shand (1896, 1914) proposed a
theory of character in which different configurations in
the organization of sentiments (a concept somewhat
consistent with the values construct) resulted in differ-
ences in people’s attitudinal and behavioral responses
to the world. Eduard Spranger (1928), a philosopher
who also focused on organization, suggested that six at-
titudes (i.e., value types) were present in everyone in
different proportions with one dominating. So, for ex-
ample, Spranger suggested that for the self-affirming
rhetorician, political value priorities dominated,
whereas economic value priorities dominated the prac-
tical type.
Spranger’s (1928) work inspired the first (1931)
version of the Study of Values instrument (Allport,
Vernon, & Lindzey, 1960). This instrument provided
an indication of the relative priorities people placed on
the six value types by measuring the effect of people’s
value priorities on their answers to questions. The
Study of Values instrument was one of the most popu-
lar measures of human value priorities for many years.
Also guided by the assumption that a value system
contains a finite number of universally relevant value
types on which people place relative importance, Mor-
ris (1956) presented people with 13 ways to live and
asked them to rate each of the descriptive paragraphs to
show how much they liked or disliked each of them
(see Dempsey & Dukes, 1966, for a shortened, revised
version). Morris (1956) found that five general value
types were contained in the “ways to live” descriptions
(see pp. 32–34): social restraint and self-control, en-
joyment and progress in action, withdrawal and
self-sufficiency, receptivity and sympathetic concern,
and self-indulgence (or sensuous enjoyment). Each
way seems to describe the implications of a high prior-
ity on one value for priorities on other values. For ex-
ample, the following way can be viewed as a
description of the effects that a high priority on hedo-
nistic values has for other value priorities:
Life is something to be enjoyed—sensuously enjoyed,
enjoyed with relish and abandonment. The aim in life
should not be to control the course of the world or soci-
ety or the lives of others, but to be open and receptive to
things and personas, and to delight in them. Life is more
a festival than a workshop or a school for moral disci-
pline. To let oneself go, to let things and persons affect
oneself, is more important than to do—or to do good.
Such enjoyment, however, requires that one be
self-centered enough to be keenly aware of what is hap-
pening and free for new happenings. So one should
avoid entanglements, should not be too dependent on
particular people or things, should not be self-sacrific-
ing; one should be alone a lot, should have time for med-
itation and awareness of oneself. Solitude and sociality
together are both necessary in the good life. (Morris,
1956, p. 16)
In measurement terms, Morris can be viewed as being
ahead of his time—his approach has been labeled the
prototype approach and it has been used, for example,
in assessing attachment style (e.g., see Griffin &
Bartholomew, 1994), parenting style (Rohan & Zanna,
1996), and self-esteem (Rohan, 2000). The logic of this
approach is that people in general (both novices and ex-
perts) primarily understand the world by assessing di-
verse configurations of characteristics and comparing
this assessment with a prototype (see Broughton,
Boyes, & Mitchell, 1993; Cantor, Smith, French, &
Mezzich, 1980; Mayer & Bower, 1986; Setterlund &
Niedenthal, 1993).
Rokeach’s (1973) value theory. Milton Rokeach
(1973)—who has been accorded the major credit for
providing an impetus for values research after behav-
iorism’s heyday (see Mayton, Ball-Rokeach, & Loges,
1994)—used a somewhat different approach to mea-
surement. He named values, briefly explained their
meaning, and asked people to arrange the value words
“in order of importance to YOU, as guiding principles
in YOUR life” (e.g., Rokeach, 1973, p. 27). There were
two types of value words in the list: goals (terminal val-
ues) and modes of conduct (instrumental values). The
list of goals included such things as a “comfortable life
(a prosperous life)” and “self-respect (self-esteem),”
and the mode of conduct list included such things as
“broad-minded (open-minded),” “forgiving (willing to
pardon others),” and “helpful (working for the welfare
of others)” (see Rokeach, 1973, pp. 359–361). Respon-
dents then arranged the list of value words in terms of
the relative importance they placed on them. The set of
values named was created on the basis of intuition (see
Rokeach, 1973, p. 30) and was meant to be a reasonably
comprehensive sample of possible human values.
However, Braithwaite and Law (1985) identified four
omissions in this list: values relating to “physical devel-
opment and well-being (e.g., physical fitness, good
health),” “individual rights (e.g., privacy, dignity),”
“thriftiness (e.g., care with money, taking advantage of
opportunities),” and “carefreeness (acting on impulse,
spontaneity).” Nevertheless, Rokeach’s (1973) list of
value words was produced with the assumption that “all
men everywhere possess the same values to different
degrees” (p. 3). Incidentally, Schwartz (e.g., 1992) was
unable to find support for the usefulness of the termi-
nal–instrumental distinction.
Since its development, the Rokeach Value Survey
(Rokeach, 1973) has been perhaps the most popular
method of measuring value priorities. Unfortunately,
259
 ROHAN
no theory about the underlying value system structure
was proposed, and therefore the Rokeach Value Sur-
vey is essentially a list of unconnected value words.
Without a theory about underlying value system struc-
ture, it is impossible to understand the consequences of
high priorities on one value type for priorities on other
value types (see Schwartz, 1996, for further discussion
of the problems that result when an integrated system
of value priorities is not considered). Attention to the
consequences of one value priority for other value pri-
orities surely is critical to understanding patterns of re-
sponses that seem, at first glance, to be unrelated. Such
attention may be important for understanding consis-
tency in response patterns. Response consistency al-
ready has received a huge amount of theoretical and
empirical attention (e.g., see Aronson, 1969, 1992;
Festinger, 1957).
Schwartz’s (e.g., 1992) value theory. Schwartz
and Bilsky (e.g., 1987, 1990) developed a theory about
value system structure by focusing on the motivational
concern embodied in each value. They revived the as-
sumption that people differ only in the relative impor-
tance they place on a universally important set of value
types, and because they focused on the motivational
goal each value type embodies, the implications of pri-
orities on one value type for priorities on others within
an integrated system could be proposed.
In a revision of the original theory, Schwartz (1992)
suggested that two motivational dimensions structure
the value system. These are cast in terms of conflicts,
and the two dimensions can be understood in terms of
two fundamental human problems that need to be
solved (Rohan, 1998; see also F. R. Kluckhohn &
Strodtbeck, 1961, who suggested there were five fun-
damental human problems). One dimension, labeled
openness to change–conservation, relates to the con-
flict between being motivated “to follow their own in-
tellectual and emotional interests in unpredictable and
uncertain directions” or “to preserve the status quo and
the certainty it provides in relationships with close oth-
ers, institutions, and traditions” (Schwartz, 1992, p.
43). The second dimension, labeled self-enhance-
ment–self-transcendence, relates to the conflict be-
tween concern for the consequences of own and
others’ actions for the self and concern for the conse-
quences of own and others’ actions in the social con-
text. Ten value types are arranged along these two
dimensions (see Table 2 for definitions and representa-
tive values for each type): power, achievement,
hedonism, stimulation, self-direction, universalism,
benevolence, conformity, tradition, and security.
In Figure 1, the location of these value types along
the two dimensions is shown. New labels for these two
dimensions are provided. Use of these labels not only
may avoid evaluative misinterpretation (e.g., it may
260
seem that openness to change is somehow better than
conservation) but also may direct attention to the myr-
iad of ways in which these motivations can be ex-
pressed. For example, the funky-looking new wave
aromatherapist who adheres religiously to his or her re-
gime of essential oil applications may well be moti-
vated by a focus on organization rather than on
opportunity (the conservation end of the openness to
change–conservation dimension); the osteopath who
relishes in his or her status as a miracle worker may be
strongly motivated by his or her focus on individual
outcomes rather than on social context outcomes (the
self-enhancement end of the self-enhancement–self-
transcendence dimension).
The focus on the individual–social context outcomes
dimension (i.e., the self-enhancement–self-transcen-
dence dimension) may reflect people’s beliefs about hu-
man nature (see Wrightsman, 1991): People who have a
greater focus on social context outcomes than on indi-
vidual outcomes may believe that humans are essen-
tially good, whereas people who have a greater focus on
individual outcomes than on social context outcomes
may be less positive about others’ essential goodness
(Schwartz has made similar suggestions, e.g., personal
communication, April 3, 1999). Indirect support for this
suggestion was provided by de St. Aubin (1996), who
found that people who were highly humanistic were
more likely to report high priorities on values that
Schwartz (e.g., 1992) classified as relevant to the social
context outcomes end of the individual–social context
outcomes dimension (e.g., broad-mindedness, world of
beauty; see Table 2).
The focus on the opportunity–organization dimen-
sion (i.e., the openness to change–conservation dimen-
sion) seems conceptually similar (or even identical) to
the Big Five personality factor Openness to Experi-
ence as described and discussed by McCrae (1996).
According to McCrae, this factor is best understood
“as a fundamental way of approaching the world that
affects not only internal experience but also interper-
sonal interactions and social behavior” (p. 323). The
focus on the opportunity–organization dimension also
may relate to temperament (Rohan, 1998; see also
Kochanska & Thompson, 1997, who discuss its role in
children’s internalization of parental values). For ex-
ample, on the basis of their response to novelty, Kagan
and his colleagues (e.g, Kagan, Reznick, & Gibbons,
1989) identified what seems to be a stable tempera-
ment style; it may be expected that those who focus on
opportunity will be less anxious in response to novelty
than will those who focus on organization. Links be-
tween the focus on the opportunity–organization di-
mension and what Carol Dweck and her colleagues
(e.g., Dweck & Leggett, 1988) described in terms of
incremental self-theories (personal attributes are rela-
tively malleable) and entity self-theories (personal at-
 THE VALUES CONSTRUCT
Table 2. Value Types, Definitions, and Representative Values (See, e.g., Schwartz, 1992, 1996)
Value Types and Definitions
Power: Social Status and Prestige, Control or Dominance
Over People and Resources.
Achievement: Personal Success Through Demonstrating
Competence According to Social Standards.
Hedonism: Pleasure and Sensuous Gratification for Oneself.
Stimulation: Excitement, Novelty, and Challenge in Life.
Self-Direction: Independent Thought and Action-Choosing,
Creating, Exploring.
Universalism: Understanding, Appreciation, Tolerance, and
Protection for the Welfare of all People and for Nature.
Benevolence: Preservation and Enhancement of the Welfare
of People With Whom One is in Frequent Personal Contact.
Tradition: Respect, Commitment, and Acceptance of the
Customs and Ideas That Traditional Culture or Religion
Provide the Self.
Conformity: Restraint of Actions, Inclinations, and Impulses
Likely to Upset or Harm Others and Violate Social
Expectations or Norms.
Security: Safety, Harmony, and Stability of Society, of
Relationships, and of Self.
tributes are relatively fixed) also could be explored.
Further, the promotion versus prevention self-regula-
tory focus proposed by Tory Higgins (1997) also
seems somewhat consistent with the focus on the op-
portunity–organization dimension (see Rohan &
Zanna, 1998, for a discussion of the links between
value priorities and self-regulatory focus).
Representative Values
Social power: Control over others, dominance.
Authority: The right to lead or command.
Wealth: Material possessions, money.
Success: Achieving goals.
Capability: Competence, effectiveness, efficiency.
Ambition: Hard work, aspirations.
Influence: Have an impact on people and events.
Pleasure: Gratification of desires.
Enjoyment in life: Enjoyment of food, sex, leisure, and so on.
Daringness: Adventure-seeking, risktaking.
A varied life: Filled with challenge, novelty, change.
An exciting life: Stimulating experiences.
Creativity: Uniqueness, imagination.
Freedom: Freedom of action and thought.
Independence: Self-reliance, self-sufficiency.
Curiosity: Interest in everything, exploration.
Choose own goals: Select own purposes.
Broadminded: Tolerant of different ideas and beliefs.
Wisdom: A mature understanding of life.
Social justice: Correcting injustice, care for the weak.
Equality: Equal opportunity for all.
A world at peace: Free of war and conflict.
A world of beauty: Beauty of nature and the arts.
Unity with nature: Fitting into nature.
Protecting the environment: Preserving nature.
Helpful: Working for the welfare of others.
Honesty: Genuineness, sincerity.
Forgivingness: Willingness to pardon others.
Loyalty: Faithful to my friends, group.
Responsibility: Dependable, reliable.
Humility: Modesty, self-effacement.
Acceptance of my portion in life: Submission to life’s circumstances.
Devotion: Hold to religious faith and belief.
Respect for tradition: Preservation of time-honored customs.
Moderate: Avoiding extremes of feeling or action.
Politeness: Courtesy, good manners.
Obedience: Dutiful, meet obligations.
Self-discipline: Self-restraint, resistance to temptation.
Honor parents and elders: Showing respect.
Family security: Safety for loved ones.
National security: Protection of my nation from enemies.
Social order: Stability of society.
Cleanliness: Neatness, tidiness.
Reciprocation of favors: Avoidance of indebtedness.
Identification of the underlying value system struc-
ture allowed Schwartz (1992) to specify the relations
among the value types in the value system: People’s pri-
orities on adjacent value types will be similar, whereas
maximum differences in priorities will occur when
value types are opposite each other. For example, be-
cause human rights activists are likely to have high pri-
261
 ROHAN
Figure 1. Location of 10 value types in a two-dimensional space.
orities on equality values—these are representative of
the universalism value type—they are likely also to
have high priorities on self-direction because universal-
ism and self-direction are adjacent in the system. Fur-
ther, because the power value type is in direct opposition
to universalism, activists’ lowest value priorities are
likely to be on power. Thus, activists’ very negative re-
action to a show of police strength and power at a street
rally could be predicted.
According to Schwartz (1996), value priorities are
responses to “three universal requirements of human
existence: biological needs, requisites for coordinated
social interaction, and demands of group survival and
functioning” (p. 2). As mentioned earlier, this com-
ment highlights the assumption that has been charac-
teristic of value theories: All of the value types in the
human value system are important in some way to hu-
man functioning—otherwise, why would they be part
of the universally shared value system structure? The
relative importance people place on each value type re-
flects their choices about what they are prepared to lose
a little of to gain a little more of something else. For ex-
ample, although all people are likely to see the positive
aspects of adhering to traditional standards, the struc-
ture of the value system (see Figure 1) is such that to
have higher priorities on a tradition value type means
lower priorities on stimulation and hedonism value
types: less excitement in exchange for predictability.
Measurement of value priorities is in the style of the
Rokeach Value Survey (Rokeach, 1973). In the
Schwartz Value Inventory (Schwartz, 1996), respon-
dents are asked to rate the importance (after choosing
262
the two most important and two least important value
words to provide an anchor for ratings) of 44 value
words (see Table 2) that relate to the 10 value types in the
value system.
Summary. To avoid confusion, use of the terms
value priority, value type, and value system is encour-
aged to clarify the assumption (which has theoretical
support) that all humans have a value system that con-
tains a finite number of universally important value
types, but differ in terms of the relative importance they
place on each of these value types—people’s value pri-
orities—can be kept clearly in mind.
The Schwartz value theory (1992) is a contribution to
understanding not only the components of the human
value system but also how people differ in terms of the
dynamic organization of value priorities on the 10 value
types contained in the value system. Value-neutral la-
bels for the two motivational dimensions described in
the Schwartz theory as structuring the value sys-
tem—focus on individual outcomes–focus on social
context outcomes, and focus on opportunity–focus on
organization—were proposed, and links between these
dimensions and other constructs were highlighted.
Aspect 3: Value Priorities Are a Function of
What Type of Judgments?
Braithwaite and Scott (1991) cast this problem in
terms of the controversy about whether value priorities
are conceptions of the desirable (what people ought to
do) and the desired (what people want to do). They
 THE VALUES CONSTRUCT
suggested that this question had been settled, and there
was some consensus that value priorities concerned the
desired rather than the desirable. However, Schwartz
and Bilsky’s (1987) value definition can be viewed in
terms of both the desired and the desirable: They de-
scribed the values construct in terms of the “cognitive
representations of three types of universal human re-
quirements: biologically based needs of the organism,
social interactional demands for interpersonal coordi-
nation, and social institutional demands for group wel-
fare and survival” (p. 551). Thus, people’s value
priorities can be viewed in terms of people doing what
they ought because they want to survive in their social
environments. But, do people want to do more than
simply survive? The question of what value priorities
are judgments of seems to require further attention.
Values as guides for survival. If people’s value
priorities are viewed in terms of survival in the social
environment (i.e., in terms of satisfying requirements
of existence), it is difficult to explain why people will
ignore their personal safety to behave in ways they feel
are consistent with their value priorities. For example,
consider the person with high priorities on benevolence
or universalism (see Table 2) who, as discussed earlier,
can be understood in terms of a greater focus on social
context outcomes than on individual outcomes. She or
he may do as the unidentified passenger did in 1982
when he altruistically passed the helicopter winch to
others so that they could escape the freezing Washing-
ton River after their plane crashed (Kelly, 1982): pro-
vide others with a means of survival to his or her own
detriment. Or, consider people who embrace a religion
and likely have high priorities on tradition (see
Schwartz, 1992), who would rather die than give up
their religion. Patrick Henry’s proclamation, “Give me
liberty or give me death,” provides another example.
When people give up their lives to uphold their value
priorities, they make exceptionally strong statements
that without this entity, life is not worth living. Value
priorities surely are more than survival guides.
Values as guides for goodness. Returning to the
notion that value priorities concern the “ought” rather
than “want,” value priorities may provide guides for
goodness. The ability to live by such guides rather than
simple drives has been discussed at length as the feature
that separates animals from humans (e.g., see Tomkins,
1962), and some believe that humans essentially strive
to be moral or ethical (e.g., Aronson, 1992; Kagan,
1999). Therefore, value priorities provide the princi-
ples for moral and ethical living (e.g., Hart, 1962).
However, judgments of goodness are idiosyncratic
(e.g., see Ichheiser, 1949; Kendler, 1993). In 1644,
Spinoza (1644/1985) explained the idiosyncratic na-
ture of the judgment of goodness: “From all this, then,
it is clear that we neither strive for, nor will, neither
want, nor desire anything because we judge it to be
good; on the contrary, we judge something to be good
because we strive for it, will it, want it, and desire it”
(Postulate IX, p. 160).
Spinoza’s wisdom leads to a suggestion for the inte-
gration of the ought and want aspects of value priori-
ties in a way that reference to disputable notions of
good can be avoided. Often in early research, what was
good and moral was assumed to be consensual (e.g.,
see Peck & Havinghurst, 1960, who focused on char-
acter development). Roger Brown (1965) provided an
example in which people generally might not agree
about the goodness and badness of particular types of
people: He reported that in 1938, a psychologist (E. R.
Jaensch), who was also a Nazi supporter, discovered
an ideal type (the J-Type) who would make a good
Nazi party member because he (and presumably she)
would “recognize that human behavior is fixed by
blood, soil and national tradition” (Brown, 1965, p.
478) and an “anti-type” who would be an irritant to the
Nazi cause as a result of liberal views that the environ-
ment and education were the determinants of behavior.
Value priorities as guides to “best possible
living.” The ought and want aspects can be integrated
if value priorities are viewed as evidencing the dynamic
organization of judgments about the capacity of entities
(i.e., things, people, actions, activities) to enable best
possible living. This means (consistent with arguments
made by many theorists and researchers) that people are
not simply driven to satisfy their basic survival needs
(e.g., see Lee, 1948) or to avoid pain (e.g., see Higgins,
1997, 1998) but are driven to live as pleasantly and pro-
ductively as possible. This proposal is grounded in the
Aristotelian (Aristotle, circa 350 BCE/1980) wisdom
that eudaimonia is the ultimate human goal. The Greek
word eudaimonia has been misleadingly translated as
“happiness.” However, by eudaimonia, Aristotle meant
human flourishing (i.e., actualizing potential) rather
than mere positive affect. This point was taken up by
Waterman (1993), who translated eudaimonia as “per-
sonal expressiveness,” linked it to optimal psychologi-
cal functioning, and successfully distinguished between
two conceptions of happiness: Aristotle’s eudaimonia
and hedonic enjoyment. According to Aristotle, flour-
ishing is the ultimate goal towards which all human ac-
tion is directed (see Nicomachean Ethics, Book 1, Sec-
tion VII, Aristotle, circa 350 BCE/1980). Value
priorities can provide guides for living the best way pos-
sible. The value system, therefore, can be understood as
concerning the aspects of the environment to which hu-
mans must pay attention. This is consistent with the
idea, discussed earlier, that the two motivational dimen-
sions structuring the value system concern the two fun-
damental human problems humans must solve.
263
 ROHAN
People’s failure to distinguish between wants and
survival needs may reflect their value priorities. So, by
saying “I need” rather than “I want,” a person may be
expressing that an object is somehow related to his or
her high priorities on a particular value type. Consider,
for example, “I need a new car.” People with high pri-
orities on the power value type (defined in terms of a
motivation toward social status and prestige; see Table
2) may see a new car as absolutely necessary to main-
tain their social superiority. To these people, losing
their social superiority would mean feeling unable to
live the best way possible.
Although people may be motivated to live the best
way possible, a multitude of personal and environmen-
tal constraints mean that people do not always behave
in ways consistent with their value priorities. Further-
more, because people generally use what has been de-
scribed as the “fast and frugal” satisficing strategy—
labeled the “take the best strategy” (Gigerenzer &
Goldstein, 1996)—they may not always make deci-
sions that lead to best possible living. People’s evalua-
tions of their progress in negotiating their social
environment in a way that enables them to adhere to
their value priorities, that is, their progress in living the
best way possible, can be understood as the evaluation
that underlies self-esteem (see Rohan, 2000, in which
self-esteem is described as resulting from an estimate
of personal progress in living the best way possible).
Ordering the importance of requirements and
desires. From this perspective, the value system can
be viewed as providing a way to order which require-
ments or desires are more or less important to best pos-
sible living. So, for example, people who have high pri-
orities on tradition and conformity value types can be
viewed as having judged that best possible living
means that personal desires are less important than the
requirements of being a cooperative group member. In
contrast, people who have high priorities on the hedo-
nism value type can be viewed as having judged that
best possible living means that personal desires are
more important than are the requirements of group
membership.
Psychologists have described humans’ psychologi-
cal requirements at length. For example, Aronson
(1992) suggested that people strive to view themselves
in three ways: as competent, predictable and consis-
tent, and moral. Other basic human needs have been
discussed. For example, the need for relatedness al-
ways has been a popular topic (e.g., Baumeister &
Leary, 1995; Bowlby, 1969). What these things mean
to people, and the primacy of each, are likely to be dic-
tated by people’s value priorities. For example, moral-
ity to a person who has high priorities on tradition may
mean following traditional practice, whereas it may
mean being true to oneself to someone who has high
264
priorities on self-direction. Though this may be a uni-
versal human requirement, people’s value priorities
may dictate the primacy of relatedness over other hu-
man requirements. So, for example, the need for relat-
edness may be primary for those who have high
priorities on value types motivated by a focus on social
context outcomes but less important for those who
have high priorities on value types motivated by a fo-
cus on individual outcomes. For the latter people, the
need for power may be primary (see Baumeister, 1998,
who discussed the needs for “belongingness” and
power as fundamental interpersonal motives).
If value priorities are understood as guides to best
possible living that provide a way to order require-
ments and desires, it is easy to explain why people in
the same environment differ in terms of their value
priorities if value systems concern “universal human
requirements” (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987) or if value
systems concern conceptions of what is desirable that
have been learned in the social environment. Though
they share an environment, particular configurations
of experiences and personal attributes will result in
variations in people’s views of what best possible liv-
ing means to them; this will be reflected in their
value priorities that evidence the dynamic organiza-
tion of people’s judgments about the capacity of enti-
ties to enable best possible living. Furthermore, value
priorities are likely to change as people’s judgments
are amended in response to changes in circumstances
and personal attributes (e.g., skill level). For exam-
ple, consider the finding that people tend to become
more conservative when they become parents (e.g.,
see Altemeyer, 1988). For a parent, best possible liv-
ing now may include having a happy and successful
child, and planning for this happiness and success
may mean that the importance of value types moti-
vated by a focus on organization (tradition, confor-
mity, security) will be increased.
Summary. In response to the confusion about
the nature of the judgments that give rise to value pri-
orities, it was proposed that judgments concern the
capacity of entities to enable best possible living.
Best possible living is viewed in Aristotelian terms
and was explained to mean flourishing or personal
expressiveness—not just surviving (Aristotle, circa
350 BCE/1980). This view builds on the suggestion
that people’s value priorities will change in response
to changes in their environments: As people’s cir-
cumstances change, so too will their judgments about
what best possible living means to them. This view is
consistent with the consensus described by
Braithwaite and Scott (1991) that personal value pri-
orities have to do with the desired, or what people
want, rather than with the desirable, or what people
ought to do.
 THE VALUES CONSTRUCT
Aspect 4: Personal, Social, or
Cultural Value Systems?
People have not only their own value system but per-
ceptions of others’ value systems, and groups (e.g.,
clubs, religious congregations, corporations, societies,
cultures) can be described in terms of the values they en-
dorse or promote. Whereas people’s own value system
and their perceptions of others’ value systems are
intrapsychic cognitive structures, descriptions of
groups’ value systems are not. Although a distinction is
often made between personal value systems and de-
scriptions of groups’ value systems (cultural value sys-
tems), there has been little or no attention to the
distinction between two intrapsychic value systems,
what will be referred to here as personal and social value
systems. Descriptions of the values that groups endorse
can be understood as being ideological value systems.
The difficulty in conceptualizing these value systems is
beyond the scope of this article, but suffice it to say that
there is no consensus about whether to understand these
in terms of the average of the group members’ personal
value priorities or, for example, group leaders’ or other
significant members’ beliefs about what the groups’
value priorities should be (see Rokeach, 1979, for a dis-
cussion). In focus here are intrapsychic value systems.
Making a distinction between two intrapsychic value
systems, the personal and the social, introduces new
complications. Attention to at least four of these is re-
quired. First, a layer of complication is added to the
problem of definition. Whereas personal value systems
can be defined as judgments of the capacity of entities to
enable best possible living, what are social value sys-
tems? It is proposed that social value systems contain
people’s perceptions of others’ judgments about best
possible living or functioning, that is, others’ (e.g., other
people, groups, institutions, cultures) value priorities.
Social value systems, therefore, organize people’s per-
ceptions of others. Second is the issue of whether per-
sonal and social value systems are similarly or
differently structured. Rules of parsimony—and re-
search (e.g., Schwartz, 1999; Schwartz & Sagiv,
1995)—support the proposal that personal and social
value systems will be structured similarly. Furthermore,
if personal value system structure is universal (although
value priorities differ, the underlying structure is the
same for all people; see earlier), then others’ value prior-
ities surely also would be organized according to this
universal structure. Third, what does the personal ver-
sus social value system distinction mean for the number
of intrapsychic value systems? It seems reasonable to
propose that people have only one personal value sys-
tem. Logically, it would be impossible for people to
have more than one personal value system if they are to
feel that their thoughts “do not fly about loose, but seem
each to belong to some one thinker and not to another”
(James, 1890/1950, p. 330). However, people may have
more than one social value system—they may have per-
ceptions of the value systems of all people and groups
with whom they interact. However, in view of people’s
ability to categorize (e.g., Cantor & Mischel, 1979), it is
likely that people will have a limited number of
prototypical social value systems that will allow catego-
rization of their perceptions of others’ value priorities.
Fourth, if both personal and social value systems exist,
then attitudinal and behavioral decisions may be traced
to either system. This is discussed further later.
Some of the confusion about the difference between
people’s personal value systems and their perceptions
of others’ value priorities—people’s social value sys-
tems—stems from the tendency to discuss people’s
stable tendencies to deal with others in their social en-
vironments in particular ways as social values (e.g.,
Beggan & Allison, 1994; Liebrand & Dehue, 1996;
McClintock, 1978; Rokeach, 1973; Van Lange, Otten,
De Bruin, & Joireman, 1997). Schwartz (1992) pro-
vided evidence that such tendencies can be understood
in terms of what has been labeled the focus on individ-
ual–social context outcomes dimension of the personal
value system.
The strength and replicability of the finding that
personal value priorities influence perceptions and be-
havior (see Postman, Bruner, & McGinnies, 1948, for
an early study) has been discussed at length (e.g.,
Allport, 1955). Distinguishing between personal and
social value priorities is grounded in the assumption
that not only will personal value priorities influence
perceptions and behavior, but so too will social value
priorities influence perceptions and behavior. Indirect
evidence for this assumption comes from studies that
show people who identify with groups often behave
similarly in response to a stimulus. For example, per-
haps the Dartmouth and Princeton football fans’ foot-
ball club social value priorities were highly salient and
therefore influenced their perceptions of the football
game made famous by Hastorf and Cantril (1954). Per-
haps salient ethnic group social value priorities also
produced the finding (Vallone, Ross, & Lepper, 1985)
that pro-Arab and pro-Israeli television viewers saw
different things in the same programs.
People’s social value systems may have idiosyn-
cratic aspects when they do not involve actual individ-
uals. For example, the way people perform role-related
behavior may relate to idiosyncratic aspects of their so-
cial value systems. For example, one person’s percep-
tions of a prison guard’s value priorities may differ
from another’s, and these differences are likely to be
reflected in different role-playing behavior. Not all the
guards in Zimbardo’s prison study (Zimbardo, Haney,
Banks, & Jaffe, 1982) behaved similarly. Work in the
area of intercultural stereotyping also is relevant to the
idiosyncratic nature of social value systems. For exam-
265
 ROHAN
ple, Sidanius, Pratto, and Bobo (1996) showed that
there were identifiable individual differences in peo-
ple’s beliefs about Black people; social value priorities
are likely to have inspired these beliefs.
When social value systems involve actual individu-
als, accuracy and clarity become an issue. Relevant to
this issue is Grusec and Goodnow’s (1994) work in
which children’s accurate or inaccurate perceptions of
parental value priorities and other messages influenced
subsequent behavior (see also Grusec, 1997). Inaccu-
racy or confusion about social value systems may be im-
portant to understanding social anxiety (e.g., see Leary
& Kowalski, 1995, who suggest that lack of knowledge
about social rules will lead to social anxiety). Social in-
telligence (e.g., Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1987) also may re-
late to social value system accuracy and clarity.
If personal and social value systems exist, then peo-
ple must decide whether to behave in line with others’
expectations—consistent with social value priori-
ties—or in line with their own value priorities. There is
no shortage of research showing that people use infor-
mation about others’ needs, desires, and expectations in
regulating their behavior (e.g., Moretti & Higgins,
1999), and the notion that people need to reconcile satis-
faction of their own value priorities with conformity to
others’ value priorities is not a new issue. For example,
Allport (1955) acknowledged the problem. He dis-
cussed the difference between the “tribal” and the “per-
sonal” and suggested that although “opportunistic
modes of adjusting” (p. 39) are dictated by the social
(tribal) environment, individuals develop other stan-
dards of conduct for themselves. Allport (1955) sug-
gested that attempting to reconcile these two modes of
becoming, the tribal and the personal, was a lifelong
process. Permanent reconciliation between the tribal
and the personal may take the form of what has been de-
scribed as internalization—people then have similar
value priorities to those of an important social group,
such as the family or a religious organization (e.g., see
Deci & Ryan, 1995; Emler, Ohana, & Dickinson, 1990;
Goodnow, 1990; Rohan, 1998; Rohan & Zanna, 1998).
Theory and research in which it is suggested that per-
sonal autonomy is important for psychological health
(e.g., Deci & Ryan, 1995) implies an optimal reconcilia-
tion for daily conflicts between personal and social
value priorities: Behave according to personal value pri-
orities. However, for some (e.g., those with high priori-
ties on the conformity value type), behaving in ways that
are in line with others’ value priorities is in line with
their own value priorities. Highest priorities on a partic-
ular value type may be associated with a particular opti-
mal reconciliation. For example, for the person with
highest priorities on hedonism, optimal reconciliation
may be something like “whatever gives me the most
pleasure” (or, perhaps, the least pain). However, for
people who have highest priorities on power, optimal
266
reconciliation may be total adherence to personal value
priority standards. Diary study methods (see Wheeler &
Reis, 1991) may be most useful for examining this prob-
lem, as suggested by a pilot study (Rohan & Harris,
1999) using this methodology. It was found, for exam-
ple, that people’s personal value priorities were related
to the relative number of occasions in which their own,
others’, or both own and others’ value priorities were
viewed as being an issue: Although all participants re-
ported more instances in which both own and others’
value priorities were involved, participants motivated
both by a focus on organization and social context out-
comes (high priorities on benevolence, tradition, and
conformity) reported the greatest number.
Research in the area of self-presentation may be
useful to investigations of the daily reconciliation be-
tween personal and social value priorities. Two main
kinds of motivations for seeking to present particular
information or images about self to others have been
proposed (see Baumeister, 1982): as a means to gain
practical and material rewards or to claim an identity.
Whereas the first can be understood as a delayed-grati-
fication reconciliation solution (behaving according to
social value priorities for later personal value priority
satisfaction), the second (often observed in studies on
reactance) can be understood in terms of a personal
value priority reconciliation solution.
Past research into “value fit” has acknowledged the
benefits associated with compatibility between per-
sonal and social value priorities (e.g., see Bills, 1952;
Feather, 1975; Furnham & Bochner, 1986; Triandis,
1990). The difficulty of conceptualizing and measuring
what were labeled earlier as ideological value systems is
an important factor in interpreting such research. In re-
cent research (Rohan & Maiden, 2000), a modified
Schwartz Value Inventory was used to measure teach-
ers’ perceptions of their school’s ideological value sys-
tem (i.e., their school-related social value priorities),
and it was shown that the fit between teachers’ personal
value priorities and their social value priorities (using
within-subject correlations) strongly predicted, for ex-
ample, reported stress, job commitment, and satisfac-
tion. Neither an index of fit constructed on the basis of
personal value priorities and the school’s value priori-
ties according to the school principal nor an index con-
structed on the basis of fit between personal value
priorities and the average of all teachers’ social value
priorities could match this prediction.
There is an unmistakable similarity between the no-
tion that people need to reconcile personal and social
value priorities and the concept of agendas (individual,
interpersonal, relationship, group) discussed by Snyder
and Cantor (1998) in their proposal that a functionalist
strategy could be used productively to understand per-
sonality and social behavior. Use of a values approach
will provide a way to understand the structure of the
 THE VALUES CONSTRUCT
agendas and will provide a way to understand how
well-being is influenced by the satisfaction of each type
of agenda or only one type of agenda to the detriment of
others. In short, the values approach may serve as a uni-
fying foundation for carrying out Snyder and Cantor’s
suggestions for investigation.
Summary. To settle the confusion generated by
the existence of different types of value systems, in dis-
cussions of people’s own value priorities it should be
specified that personal value priorities are at issue; in
discussions of people’s perceptions of others’ (e.g.,
other individuals, groups, institutions, societies) value
priorities, it should be specified that social value priori-
ties are at issue; and when descriptions of the value pri-
orities endorsed or promoted by groups are discussed,
they should be identified as ideological value systems.
Personal and social value systems are located within
the person (i.e., are both intrapsychic value systems).
Although people will have only one personal value sys-
tem, they are likely to have more than one social value
system. Social value systems will have the same struc-
ture as the personal value system.
A major issue that the personal–social distinction
highlights is how people reconcile what they want with
what others want, and whether optimal reconciliation
is related to people’s personal value priorities requires
consideration. Investigations of this issue could use di-
ary study methods and strategies suggested by psy-
chologists who promote a functionalist approach to
understanding personality and social behavior.
Aspect 5: Value Systems, Worldviews,
and Ideologies
Not only is the word values often used to refer to
cognitive structures that now have been labeled as
value systems, but it also has been applied to people’s
conscious beliefs about the way the world is or should
be, as well as to the value-laden constructions people
use when deliberating about, justifying, or promoting
their attitudinal or behavioral decisions. To settle the
resulting confusion, I propose the following guidelines
so that the values construct can be distinguished from
two other related constructs: identify focus on the cog-
nitive structure in terms of value systems (or value
types, or value priorities), use the term worldviews to
describe people’s conscious beliefs about the world
that are a function of their value priorities, and use the
term ideologies to describe value-laden constructions
people use in or after their decision making.
A separate issue: Use of value language. A sep-
arate issue from naming and separately investigating the
three very different constructs is the ease with which
people use the language of values. People’s facility with
value language reflects human capacity for
metacognition (e.g., see Mischel, 1998). This meta-
cognition not only means that people are capable of talk-
ing about their value priorities but also means that peo-
ple are able to use value language to argue for one
attitudinal or behavioral decision over another. Indeed,
Perelman (1982) suggested, based on Aristotle’s wis-
dom, that convincing arguments require reference to the
value system. As discussed later, arguments that contain
value priority associations are referred to as ideologies.
Humans’ capacity for metacognition concerning
their value priorities is critical for measuring value pri-
orities. Because the way people cognitively represent
their value priorities is shared (although value priorities
differ, the structure of the value system is universal), it
seems unsurprising that the language of values is shared
(see Schwartz, 1996, p. 2). However, individual differ-
ences are likely to exist in the ease with which people
can (or want to) think and talk about their personal and
social value priorities; that is, their metacognition con-
cerning their value priorities may differ. People who
suffer from a lack of what has been called self-concept
clarity (J. D. Campbell, 1990) and self-certainty
(Baumgardner, 1990) may suffer from difficulty in
thinking and talking about their personal value priori-
ties. (See also Fazio & Powell, 1997, who showed that
“attitude accessibility” was related to students’ adjust-
ment to college—attitude accessibility is likely to be
linked to the ease with which people can think and talk
about value priorities.) Rokeach (1973) alerted re-
searchers to this problem when he suggested that com-
pletion of his value survey was “highly projective in
nature, somewhat like the Rorschach or the Thematic
Apperception Test” (p. 27). Whether difficulty in re-
porting their personal value priorities is related to a ha-
bitual tendency to settle daily personal–social value
system conflicts (discussed earlier) in favor of social
value priorities should be considered.
Perhaps the developers of the early value priority
measures were very aware that not all people would find
it easy to think or talk about their value priorities. In the
early measures, personal value priorities were indirectly
measured by asking people about their attitudes or prob-
able behavior (e.g., the study of values; Allport et al.,
1960) or by asking them about their preferred ways of
living (e.g., Morris, 1956). Because direct questions are
asked about value priorities, Rokeach’s (1973) and
Schwartz’s (1992) value inventories, as well as a new
measurement tool designed to measure priorities ac-
cording to the Schwartz (1992) value theory (Oishi,
Schimmack, Diener, & Suh, 1998), seem to take less ac-
count of this problem.
Schwartz and his colleagues have almost completed
testing a new questionnaire for measuring personal
value priorities that requires less abstract thought (Sha-
lom Schwartz, personal communication, March 24,
267
 ROHAN
2000). Respondents are asked to compare themselves
with individuals who are described in terms of what is
important to them. The descriptions are theoretically
linked to values that differ in terms of the two value sys-
tem dimensions. For example, to measure priorities re-
lated to the conformity value type, male respondents are
asked to rate their similarity to a person who is described
in the following way: “It is important to him to be polite
to other people all the time. He believes he should al-
ways show respect to his parents and to older people.”
To reduce demands even further, another strategy may
be to ask respondents questions that relate directly to the
underlying motivational dimensions. For example, to
find out whether people are more focused on individual
or social context outcomes, they could be asked,
“Which do you think is better: to be respected or appre-
ciated? Which do you think is worse: to be a selfish per-
son or a dependent person?” To find out whether people
are more focused on opportunity or organization, they
could be asked, “Which would be better in the long run:
to be consistent or be open to new experiences? Which
would be worse: to have limited options or have no
plans?” This would enable identification of people in
terms of the quadrant location of their highest value pri-
orities with minimum decision making.
Wolfgang Bilsky (1998a, 1998b), with whom
Schwartz (e.g., Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987) developed
the original version of his value theory, also has dis-
cussed people’s abilities to think about their value prior-
ities. Bilsky (1998a, 1998b) suggested that the
motivational concerns that underlie value priorities can
be characterized according to an implicit–explicit con-
tinuum. So, for example, to the extent that value priori-
ties are easily accessible to consciousness, they are
explicit motives. He also suggested that the implicit–ex-
plicit distinction may allow integration of the values and
motivation literatures.
Value systems and ideologies. Demonstrations
that people’s value priorities influence their perceptions
(e.g., Postman et al., 1948) support the widely held as-
sumption that the operation of people’s value systems in
guiding their behavior often occurs effortlessly, without
conscious awareness. However, more conscious
thought is likely when making a decision that involves
an entity that is not easily categorized in a way that en-
ables swift analogical reasoning from value priorities,
when a choice is between whether to behave in accord
with one’s own value priorities or another’s value prior-
ities, or when the reconciliation process involves one’s
own and more than one other’s dissimilar value priori-
ties (see Wegner & Bargh, 1998, for a review of auto-
matic and controlled behavior theory and research). In
such situations, people are likely to argue for one course
of action over another. Because, as mentioned earlier,
good arguments need reference to value priorities, argu-
268
ments will contain either implicit or explicit reference to
value priorities. Thus, value priorities still guide attitu-
dinal and behavioral decisions because they enable the
decision to be framed in a particular way (see Pratto, in
press; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; see also Conover &
Feldman’s 1984 discussion of the use of schemas in
thinking through political issues).
However, people use value priority-based argu-
ments not only in deliberating about their decisions but
also for self-justification purposes (see Aronson et al.,
1997, who linked self-justification with the mainte-
nance of self-esteem; recall that earlier, self-esteem
was described as resulting from an estimate of progress
in living the best way possible, i.e., according to per-
sonal value priorities). Both pre- and postdecisional
value priority-relevant arguments can be labeled as
ideologies (see Pratto, in press). The label ideology
seems appropriate for these constructions that are
learned—and maintained—in the social environment
even though, as a terminology, it has about as much
definitional diversity as the term values (e.g., see
McLellan, 1986, p. 1: “Ideology is the most elusive
concept in the whole of social science”).
Rokeach (1973) described people’s postdecision
use of ideologies (though not using that term) and sug-
gested that this enabled a person to “end up smelling
himself, and being smelled by others, like a rose” (p.
20). Rokeach (1973) expanded:
The language of values is an ingenious language admi-
rably suited to the enlightenment of all kinds of self-in-
terest, whether enlightened or unenlightened, selfish
or altruistic. It permits rational justification of self-in-
terest, and, insofar as it is necessary, the language of
values can also be employed as an Aesopian language
to permit rationalized justification of self-interest. (p.
168)
Because ideologies contain value priority associations,
people will be able to feel they are making the best deci-
sion and will be able to convince themselves and others
that they are good, moral, or ethical, that is, behaving
according to a set of principles. (Morality from this
point of view has been referred to as enlightened
self-interest, see Ramm, 1998; see Kristiansen & Hotte,
1996 for a discussion of the value language use in
self-evaluations of morality; see Kristiansen & Zanna,
1988, 1994, for discussion of value language use in jus-
tifying social and intergroup attitudes; and see Pratto,
in press, for a discussion of “legitimizing ideologies.”)
Whether the same ideology will be used in deliberating
about and in explaining, justifying, or promoting the
decision may depend on whether the context of deci-
sion making changes. The appropriate ideology in one
context may not be appropriate in another.
Because the rhetoric in ideologies can be manipu-
lated to connect almost any thing, person, action, or ac-
 THE VALUES CONSTRUCT
tivity to value priorities (i.e., to what constitutes best
possible living), an ideology can be made relevant to a
wide variety of situations by virtue of the value priority
associations contained within it, and the attitudinal and
behavioral decisions that result will depend on features
of the situation in which it is applied (e.g., see Pratto,
Tatar, & Conway-Lanz, 1999, who suggested that ide-
ologies may have different implications for different
social groups). However, the manipulation of the rhet-
oric in ideologies means that values are often viewed
as “remarkably slippery social constructions that take
on different meanings over time and across political
cultures” (Tetlock, Peterson, & Lerner, 1996, p. 34).
But, it is ideologies, not value priorities, that are re-
markably slippery.
Ideologies may contain a large number of value as-
sociations or a few. For example, a noblesse oblige ide-
ology—those with more should help those with
less—contains implications for universalism value pri-
orities but no obvious implication for stimulation value
priorities (see Pratto, Stallworth, & Conway-Lanz,
1999, who examined use of this ideology in legitimiz-
ing “guns” rather than “butter” social policies). In con-
trast, political ideologies may contain a greater number
of links (e.g., see Braithwaite, 1994, 1997; Rokeach,
1973). Whether the structure of ideologies can be
mapped onto the value system will depend on the num-
ber of value system associations: Whereas broader ide-
ologies may map onto value system structure,
narrower ideologies will not.
Tetlock (1986; see also Billig, 1991; Billig et al.,
1988) focused on ideologies people use in decision
making. His value pluralism model of ideological rea-
soning (as well as the revised model; Tetlock, Peterson,
& Lerner, 1996) can be used in systematic investiga-
tions of the value priority-related reasoning connected
to attitudinal and behavioral decisions. Tetlock et al.
(1994) used the model to demonstrate, for example, that
political ideologies differ in the degree to which they ac-
knowledge conflicts among important value priorities,
and thus the extent to which ideologies contain complex
trade-off reasoning. Whether this model is relevant to
understanding how people reconcile personal and social
value priorities can be considered.
In other research, Tetlock and his colleagues are in-
vestigating “taboo trade-offs” (e.g., Fiske & Tetlock,
1997; Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000)—
trade-offs that people do not like to think about or dis-
cuss openly (e.g., trade-offs between friends and its
monetary cost). In addition, these researchers are inves-
tigating the success of ideologies that do or do not ac-
knowledge conflicts between value priorities. For
example, Tetlock (in press) found that to the extent that a
politician acknowledges value conflict (i.e., has en-
gaged in more complex trade-off reasoning), she or he is
trusted and respected less (the “traitor effect”).
Value systems and worldviews. Solomon Asch
(1952) discussed the importance of knowing about the
“conscious mode” in which things appeared to people
(pp. 64–65). Feather (1971) recognized that this con-
scious mode was distinct from value systems, and he de-
scribed it as a perceived structure that represented the in-
formation immediately present in the environment. The
term worldview can be used to distinguish between this
conscious mode and the cognitive structure that has
been described as the value system. Although the term
worldview also is not without definitional diversity (see
Mannheim, 1936/1972), it seems the most appropriate
because it is defined as “contemplation of the world,
view of life” (Compact Oxford English Dictionary,
1991, p. 2340).
How do value systems relate to people’s world-
views? Parsons (1951) suggested an inescapable link
between people’s personal value priorities and the way
they viewed the world. Early research in which peo-
ple’s (personal) value priorities influenced their per-
ceptions (e.g., Postman et al., 1948) supported the
suggestion that people’s worldviews directly evidence
their personal value systems. Because of this strong
link, the value system structure could be used to guide
investigations of people’s worldviews. Beliefs relating
to each value type should be found.
There has been some research into the relation be-
tween personal value priorities and worldviews. For ex-
ample, Altemeyer (1998) examined the relation
between people’s worldviews and their personal value
systems. He found, consistent with expectations and
earlier research (e.g., Rohan & Zanna, 1996), that the
strongest relations between the right-wing authoritarian
worldview and the personal value system concerned
priorities on tradition and conformity value types. He
also found that the strongest relation between the social
dominance orientation (SDO) worldview (see Pratto, in
press; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994) and
the personal value system concerned priorities on the
power value type. Altemeyer (1998) observed that
Right-wing authoritarians fear that authority and con-
ventions are crumbling so quickly that civilization will
collapse and they will be eaten in the resulting jungle.
In contrast, high SDOs already see life as “dog eat
dog” and—compared with most people—are deter-
mined to do the eating. (p. 75)
How very different, then, is the conscious mode in
which things appear to right-wing authoritarians and to
people who have a strong SDO as a result of their per-
sonal value priorities. For each, it is clear that best pos-
sible living has a very different meaning (i.e., they have
very different value priorities), and this controls the
way each views the world.
269
 ROHAN
I mentioned earlier that if personal value priorities
evidence judgments about the capacity of entities to
enable best possible living, then personal value priori-
ties will change when circumstances (or personal at-
tributes) change. Changes in circumstances could be
understood not only in terms of physical circumstances
but also in terms of the people contained in one’s social
environments. Constant interaction with people who
have different personal value priorities may change
people’s beliefs about the world; changes in people’s
beliefs about the world will be reflected in changes to
their personal value priorities.
Summary. I propose the following guidelines so
that the values construct can be distinguished from two
other related constructs: Use the term value system if
the cognitive structures are in focus, use the term
worldviews if investigating people’s beliefs about the
way the world is or should be that are a function of their
value priorities, and use the term ideologies to describe
value-laden linguistic constructions that are used in or
after decision making.
In investigations of worldviews, beliefs that evi-
dence each value type should be found because the
way people view their worlds is a function of their per-
sonal value priorities. In contrast, ideologies will differ
in terms of the number of value associations that can be
identified. An ideology only will have links to value
priorities—either personal or social—by virtue of the
references (implicit or explicit) to values contained in
that ideology.
What Does It All Mean for the
Values–Attitudinal and Behavioral
Decision Link?
To bring together the points made regarding the po-
tentially confusing aspects of the values construct that
relate to understanding how value priorities cause atti-
tudinal and behavioral decisions, I now describe a pro-
posal for this process. First, definitions for constructs
relevant to the process are given.
A value is an implicit analogical principle con-
structed from judgments about the capacity of things,
people, actions, and activities to enable best possible
living. Value priorities evidence the dynamic organi-
zation of these principles. Value systems are integrated
structures within which there are stable and predictable
relations among priorities on each value type.
Personal value systems concern people’s own judg-
ments about the capacity of entities to enable best pos-
sible living for themselves. Social value systems
concern people’s perceptions about others’ judgments
concerning the capacity of entities to enable best possi-
ble living, that is, others’ value priorities. A worldview
is a collection of conscious beliefs about how things
270
are or should be. Thus, people’s worldviews constitute
their version of actual or potential realities. An ideol-
ogy is a rhetorical association or set of associations be-
tween things, people, actions, or activities and best
possible living. Because value systems structure judg-
ments about the capacity of entities to enable best pos-
sible living, ideologies will contain either implicit or
explicit reference to value priorities.
The Process
If personal value priorities are “intimately bound up
with a person’s sense of self” (Feather, 1992, p. 112)
and are “a type of personality disposition” (Bilsky &
Schwartz, 1994, p. 178), then it seems logical to sug-
gest that all attitudinal and behavioral decisions ulti-
mately should be traceable to personal value priorities
(see Figure 2). That is, personal value priorities cause
decisions. People intuitively may operate under the as-
sumption that personal values cause decisions, and this
assumption may explain the (possibly) universal pro-
hibition against hypocrisy (see Aronson, Fried, &
Stone, 1991, who use this prohibition to change behav-
ior). Thus, in Figure 2, the personal value system
stands as the superordinate structure.
People’s personal value systems cause people to
view the world in a particular way. However, as men-
tioned, constant interaction with people who have dif-
ferent personal value priorities may change people’s
beliefs about the world; changes in people’s beliefs
about the world will be reflected in changes to value
priorities. In Figure 2, there are double arrows between
personal value systems, worldviews, and social value
systems to reflect this potential. This arrangement
takes account of Rokeach’s (1973) comments that “a
major advantage gained in thinking about a person as a
system of values rather than a cluster of traits is that it
becomes possible to conceive of his undergoing
change as a result of changes in social conditions” (p.
21; see also Tomkins, 1966; Young, 1946).
The most direct path from personal value priorities
(through worldviews) to attitudinal and behavioral de-
cisions (see Figure 2) reflects the widely held and empir-
ically supported assumption that people’s personal
value priorities often guide their behavior effortlessly,
with little or no conscious awareness. Relevant to this is
the hypothesis put forward by Schwartz (1996): Associ-
ations with “any outside variables” will “decrease
monotonically as one moves around the circular struc-
ture of value types in both directions from the most posi-
tively associated value type to the least positively
associated value type” (p. 6). Sagiv and Schwartz
(1995) found, for example, that interpersonal coopera-
tion is related in the predicted way: Benevolence priori-
ties were most strongly associated with interpersonal
cooperation, and power priorities were least strongly as-
 THE VALUES CONSTRUCT
Figure 2. Proposed relations among personal and social value priorties, worldviews, ideologies, and
attitudinal and behavioral decisions.
sociated. Interpersonal cooperation behavior was cho-
sen for study because the games that could be used to test
hypotheses “are constructed to tap behaviors that ex-
press relatively pure motivations straightforwardly”
(Schwartz, 1996, p. 6). Research in which these types of
relatively pure motivations (i.e., those that are relatively
unaffected by situational influences and therefore social
value priorities) are investigated may be most relevant
to the most direct path from personal value systems to at-
titudinal or behavioral decisions.
If people are thoroughly immersed in their interac-
tions with others, they may behave according to their
social value priorities effortlessly. The path from so-
cial value systems to attitudinal decisions reflects this
possibility. Perhaps relevant to this path is research
(Ybarra & Trafimow, 1998) in which priming of what
was described as the collective self (perhaps, social
value priorities) produced different behavior than did
priming of what was described as the private self (per-
haps, personal value priorities). That such priming pro-
duced different behavior may be important to consider
in discussions and investigation of “interattitudinal
consistency” (e.g., Lavine, Thomsen, & Gonzales,
1997)—attitudes may be consistent with either per-
sonal or social value systems.
When people use ideologies to help them make more
complex decisions—those that require conscious
thought—the ideologies may be in line with either per-
sonal or social value priorities. A path from the personal
value system (through worldview) to a personal value
system linked ideology element, as well as a path from a
social value system to a social value system linked ide-
ology element, therefore, is included. Billig’s (1991)
discussion of discourse analysts who demonstrate peo-
ple’s ability to take on different “patterns of talk” is rele-
vant to the idea that people may use different ideologies
in their decision making depending on whether personal
or social value systems are salient. Somewhat similar is
Luker’s (1984) proposal that people differ in terms of
the beliefs on which they base their attitudes. For exam-
ple, Luker found that prolife activists based their abor-
tion attitudes on statements such as the purpose of sex is
procreation, whereas prochoice activists based their
abortion attitudes on statements such as the purpose of
271
 ROHAN
sex is to foster intimacy and experience pleasure. Al-
though Seligman and Katz (1996) suggested that people
may “construct value systems in the context of specific
issues” (p. 55), they made a point related to Luker’s,
namely that people associate particular value priorities
with particular issues (see also Tourangeau, Rasinski, &
D’Andrade, 1991, who found that students who had dif-
ferent opinions also framed the relevant issue in differ-
ent ways by linking the issue to different value priorities
and premises). It is likely that when personal value pri-
orities are salient, the ideology that “feels right” will be
one that contains links to important personal value pri-
orities; when social value priorities are salient, the ideol-
ogy that feels right will be one that contains links to
important social value priorities.
People may change their beliefs about the world (i.e.,
their worldview) if they behave in particular ways often
enough. This may be why “stateways can change folk-
ways” (see Aronson, 1995). Consider as a simple exam-
ple the change in attitudes and behavior regarding the
wearing of seat belts (for a weightier example, see
Deutsch & Collins, 1951). There is now general consen-
sus that it is good to wear seat belts, although the ideolo-
gies people may use to justify their positive attitudes and
seat belt wearing behavior may differ depending on
value priorities (e.g., high priorities on conformity: “be-
cause it’s the law”; high priorities on security: “because
it keeps me safe”). The arrow from attitudinal or behav-
ioral decisions back to the worldview element was in-
cluded to reflect this type of worldview change
possibility (Figure 2). The arrow from decision explana-
tion, justification, promotion back to the worldview ele-
ment was included for the same reason.
Whether or not they made a decision with full
awareness, people are likely to use ideologies in ex-
plaining to themselves or others why they made a
particular decision, in justifying their decision, or in
promoting their decision. As mentioned, whether the
ideology used in deliberating about decisions is the
same one used in decision explanation, justification,
or promotion may depend on whether the deci-
sion-relevant context (in terms of both physical cir-
cumstances and people involved) remains constant.
Therefore, in Figure 2 there is an element from attitu-
dinal and behavioral decision labeled “situationally
appropriate ideology.” The only time decision mak-
ing should not require use of an ideology is when
people deny they had any choice: Involuntarily ex-
pressed attitudes or behaviors need not be explained
or justified (this has been demonstrated extensively in
dissonance research; e.g., Zanna & Cooper, 1974).
If people use a different ideology in the course of
explanation, justification, or promotion, they may
change the decision (the arrow from situationally ap-
propriate ideology back to attitudinal or behavioral de-
cision). The potential for explanation, justification, or
272
promotion to alter decisions may underlie Maio and
Olson ’s (1998) findings: They found change in attitu-
dinal decisions (in this case, reports of value priorities)
when people provided reasons for their previously re-
ported attitudinal decisions.
The major implication of the proposed process by
which value priorities—both personal and social—
cause attitudinal and behavioral decisions is that the
often-recorded failure to find strong value–attitude–
behavior relations (e.g., LaPiere, 1934; Wicker, 1969)
can be explained. In Figure 2, four possible paths from
personal value systems to decisions are proposed. Each
of these paths may be associated with a different deci-
sion, even though the underlying value systems are sta-
ble. Specification of which path is being investigated
may enhance understanding and prediction of the
value–attitude–behavior relation.
General Summary
In discussing five confusion-producing aspects of
the values construct, I presented a selection of theory
and research in which the term values was not used but in
which the construct under investigation seemed consis-
tent with it. I also described work of earlier values theo-
rists, and a contemporary value theory, the Schwartz
(1992) value theory. Because it explains how people’s
solutions to two of the most basic human problems in-
fluence their motivational focus, the Schwartz (1992)
theory can provide the structure for investigating the
fundamental coordinators of behavior.
Confusion can be reduced greatly if social theorists
and social scientists specify when they are talking about
people’s value priorities and value systems rather than
the category of judgment or set of judgments that can be
described as values or value types. The term attitude,
which sometimes has been used to describe a value pri-
ority, should be reserved for describing a specific evalu-
ation of an entity. To distinguish it from the values
construct, a worldview was described in terms of a per-
son’s conscious beliefs—which are a function of that
person’s value priorities—about the way the world is or
should be. Value priority-based arguments people use to
help them make decisions as well as explain, justify, or
promote their decisions were labeled as ideologies, and
an ideology was described as a rhetoric association or
set of associations between entities and living the best
way possible. Because judgments about how to live the
best way possible are assumed to be what value systems
organize so analogical reasoning can be used to provide
meaning to experience and guide action, ideologies will
contain either implicit or explicit reference to value
priorities.
I proposed a distinction between personal and social
value systems. Both are intrapsychic structures, and
social value systems contain organizations of people’s
 THE VALUES CONSTRUCT
perceptions of others’ value priorities. Both can influ-
ence people’s attitudinal and behavioral decisions, and
as Gordon Allport (1955) suggested, reconciliation be-
tween action to satisfy personal value priorities or con-
formity to social value priorities is likely to be a
lifelong process.
Personal and social value systems, worldviews, and
ideology constructs were included in a proposal for the
process by which personal value priorities cause attitu-
dinal and behavioral decisions. I offer the framework as
a starting point for researchers who, like Allport, believe
that value systems are the fundamentally important con-
struct for understanding and predicting people’s atti-
tudes and behavior, but who have found that the
confusion associated with the values area reduces the
potential for focused, systematic investigations.
For centuries, psychologists and others have sought
to understand the fundamental coordinators of human
behavior. The message embedded in this article is that
by conceptualizing these fundamental coordinators as
value systems, we may be able to synthesize and build
on the knowledge produced by generations of theorists
and researchers who have focused on this important
construct, whether or not they have used the problem-
atic term values.
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