IJKUS 25-2 - SELECT China and North Korea's 4th Nuclear Test

Vol.25, No.
2, 2016 ISSN 1229-6902
Gong Keyu
North Korea’s Nuclear Test and Prospects for Peninsular Unification:
A Chinese Perspective
Frank Jannuzi
East Asia’s Fluid Dynamics: Whither Obama’s Pivot to Asia?
Vol.25, No.2, 2016

Hyoungsoo Zang
A Realistic Process towards Korean Unification
and the Harmonized Privatization of Properties in the Unified Korea:
Issues, Priorities, and Opinions of Key Stakeholders
Gus Swanda
The Deficiencies of a Westphalian Model for Cyberspace:
A Case Study of South Korean Cyber Security
Zafar Khan
North Korean Nuclear Issue:
Regime Collapsism or Negotiation?
International Journal of
Korean Unification Studies
2016 Vol. 25, No. 2
CONTENTS
Feature Theme:
North Korea’s Nuclear Test and Environment
for Unification Surrounding the Korean Peninsula
North Korea’s Nuclear Test and Prospects for Peninsular

Unification: A Chinese Perspective
Gong Keyu ........ 1
East Asia’s Fluid Dynamics:

Whither Obama’s Pivot to Asia?
Frank Jannuzi ...... 33
A Realistic Process towards Korean Unification and the

Harmonized Privatization of Properties in the Unified Korea:
Issues, Priorities, and Opinions of Key Stakeholders
Hyoungsoo Zang ...... 51
The Deficiencies of a Westphalian Model for Cyberspace:

Gus Swanda ...... 77

Zafar Khan .... 105
Contributors
Gong Keyu is a senior researcher and deputy director of the Center for Asian-
Pacific Studies, specializing in North Korea Nuclear Issues with the
Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS) in China. Dr. Gong’s
research fields include the North Korea Nuclear Issue, Sino-DPRK &
Sino-ROK Relations, Economic Cooperation of East Asia, among others.
Dr. Gong has been a deputy director of the Shanghai Luwan Develop-
ment and Reform Commission in 2008, and a visiting fellow in CSIS in
the US in 2010, and also a visiting fellow of International Scholar
Exchange Fellowship (ISEF) program of Korea Foundation for Advanced
Studies (KFAS) in 2015. Her books include “The Institutional building of
East Asia Economic Cooperation,” “Contemporary Korean Politics.” Dr.
Gong graduated from the Department of International Politics, Renmin
University of China in 1995, received an M.A. in International Relations
for Shanghai Institutes for International Studies in 2004, and a Ph.D. in
World Economics from the Shanghai Academy of Social Science in 2007.
She can be reached at gongkeyu1@hotmail.com.
Frank Jannuzi serves as President of the Maureen and Mike Mansfield Founda-
tion, advancing U.S. cooperation with partners in East Asia. He previ-
ously served as Deputy Executive Director of Amnesty International,
USA, promoting respect for human rights, protecting communities at
risk, and freeing prisoners of conscience. From 1997-2012 he was Policy
Director, East Asian and Pacific Affairs, for the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, under Chairmen Joseph Biden and John Kerry. Earlier in his
career, Mr. Jannuzi served as an analyst in the Department of State’s
Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Mr. Jannuzi holds a Bachelor of Arts
degree from Yale University and Master in Public Policy from the John F.
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. He has traveled
throughout Asia and written extensively on East Asia policy, including
U.S. relations with Japan, China, and North Korea. He lives in Baltimore
with his wife, Dr. Jennifer Martin, and their daughters, Zoe and Camille.
Hyoungsoo Zang is currently Professor of Economics and Finance at Hanyang
University, Seoul, Korea. Prior to joining the Hanyang University faculty
in 2000, he was affiliated with the Korea Institute for International Eco-
nomic Policy (1997-2000) and worked for developing countries in transi-
tion at the World Bank (Washington, D.C., 1993-1997). He had also
serviced as National Intelligence Officer for North Korean Affairs at the
National Intelligence Service (NIS) of the Republic of Korea for two years
(2005-2007) on leave of absence from Hanyang University. He has pub-
lished various academic papers and research reports on the North Korean
economy, agenda for international cooperation on the Korean peninsula,
and interim development assistance for North Korea in a multilateral
perspective. He holds a Ph.D. in Economics from Brown University in the
USA (1993). He can be reached at hzang@hanyang.ac.kr.
Gus Swanda is Associate Professor of International Relations and Diplomacy at

Busan University of Foreign Studies, where he has lectured for the past
ten years on international relations and technology, IR theory, interna-
tional security, political economies, and area studies. He holds an MA
in International Relations from the University of Chicago, a Ph.D. in
International and Area Studies from Pukyong National University, and
specializes in cybersecurity theory, crypto-currency, Northeast Asian
security, and inter-Korean relations. In addition to his research, teaching,
and publishing duties, Dr. Swanda also consulted for the Ministry of
Unification’s department of North and South Korean Dialog in 2008, and
hosted a public radio forum for current world events. He is currently
working on a book that examines the effect of South Korean cybersecurity
policy on the diversity of software in South Korea and the integrity of its
systems. He may be reached by e-mail at jgswanda@yahoo.com.
Zafar Khan (Ph.D. Nuclear and Strategic Studies, University of Hull, UK) is
author of the book Pakistan Nuclear Policy: A Minimum Credible Deterrence
(London and New York: Routledge, 2015). Currently, he serves as Assis-
tant Professor at the Department of Strategic Studies, National Defense
University, Islamabad. His papers have appeared in various national and
international peer-reviewed journals. The views expressed in this paper
are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the
National Defense University and/or any other institutes of Pakistan. He
can be reached at zafarwafa@yahoo.com.
International Journal of Korean Unification Studies
Vol. 25, No. 2, 2016, 1–31
North Korea’s Nuclear Test and Prospects

for Peninsular Unification:
A Chinese Perspective*
Gong Keyu
North Korea’s fourth and fifth nuclear tests and its subsequent actions
and reactions have changed the conditions for unification of the Korean
Peninsula. This article attempts to interpret these changed dynamics
and explore the prospects of unification after nuclear testing by focus-
ing on the nature of the Kim Jong-un regime, its unpredictability, and
instability. Now it is likely that escalatory sanctions, coup d’état, and
concerns stemming from Kim Jong Un’s health will lead to the collapse
of the North Korean regime and an accelerated process of reunification.
Multiple tests cannot help Pyongyang acquire the status of a nuclear
state, and forced unification under North Korea’s nuclear threatening
will be a suicidal act for Pyongyang. All major stakeholders must ade-
quately prepare themselves for an accelerated unification process given
nuclear tests and the subsequent developments.
Keywords: North Korea, China, Nuclear Test, Korean Peninsula, Unifi-

cation
2016 began with the shocking news that North Korea had conducted
its fourth nuclear test on January 6. Later, on February 7, North Korea
claimed to have “launched a satellite, Kwangmyongsong-4.”1 Only
* The authors would like to thank the International Scholar Exchange Fellowship
(ISEF) program of the Korea Foundation for Advanced Studies (KFAS) and
Program for Innovative Research Team of Shanghai University of Political
Science and Law Plateau Discipline.
1. “Reported that North Korea Launched a Satellite,” Rodong Sinmun, February 8,
2016.
2 Gong Keyu
nine months later, on September 9, North Korea announced that it

has “successfully carried out its fifth nuclear test.”2
The Korean Peninsula once again became a potential flashpoint
as regional powers scrambled to manage an increasingly unpre-
dictable, defiant, and provocative regime, making regional security
more complicated and sensitive. North Korea’s fourth and fifth nuclear
tests and the regime’s subsequent actions and reactions have also
changed the conditions for Peninsular unification. In this article, the
author attempts to interpret these changed dynamics and explore the
prospects of unification after nuclear testing by focusing on the nature
of the Kim Jong-un regime and in particular, its unpredictability and
instability.
Nuclear Tests: Their Nature and Consequences
Despite some initial skepticism, international experts conceded later

that the fourth nuclear test turned out to be the detonation of a hydrogen
bomb — just as Pyongyang had claimed it to be — although “the
explosion and the earthquakes it set off were less powerful than a
normal hydrogen bomb.”3 Others believed that the explosion is not so
powerful because North Korea had conducted a “mini-scale hydrogen
bomb to reduce the impact.”4
Each of the tests were followed by North Korea’s proclamations of
victories: “The first test is a safe and successful underground nuclear
test; the second one has elevated the explosive and operational capa-
bilities of the bomb to a higher stage; the third one detonated a minia-
turized and light bomb; and the fourth test of a hydrogen bomb is safe
2. Kirk Spitzer, “‘Fanatic Recklessness’: Nations Rip North Korea for Reported
Nuke Test,” USA TODAY, September 9, 2016, http://www.usatoday.com/
story/news/world/2016/09/09/north-korea-nuclear-test/90110856/ (accessed
November 30, 2016).
3. “North Korea Conducted Fourth Nuclear Test,” The International Nuclear News
1 (2016), pp. 12-13.
4. Li Mei, “North Korea’s H-bomb Ability,” Weapons Knowledge 3 (2016), p. 49.
North Korea’s Nuclear Test and Prospects for Peninsular Unification 3
and perfect.”5 In September of 2016, North Korea claimed that the fifth
test was “examined and confirmed,” and that they had “successfully
conducted a ‘higher level’ test of a nuclear weapon.”6
A country must meet four conditions to be formally deemed a
nuclear-weapon state (NWS): possession of an explosive device; long-
range ballistic missile capability; a light and miniaturized warhead
able to fit on a ballistic missile; and reentry technology that would
allow the warhead to survive its plunge through the atmosphere.
Pyongyang has tried to prove itself through its missile technology
and nuclear capability, though international experts have still not
deemed North Korea a fully “nuclear-armed state.”7 Some Chinese
experts believe that North Korea is now “capable of making thermonu-
clear weapons (A-bomb and H-bomb) mounted with miniaturized
warheads. And in terms of missile technology, it is fast moving toward
greater serialization, diversification, and stratification.”8 Multiple
tests and satellite launches have established North Korea as a nuclear-
capable state, if not a nuclear-armed one. As things stand now, the
5. Elizabeth Philipp, “North Korea Claims Hydrogen Bomb Test,” Arms Control
Today, January/February, 2016, pp. 36-37.
6. The Nuclear Weapons Institute of North Korea announced that the successful
nuclear test confirmed the “specific features of the nuclear warhead that has
been standardized to be able to be mounted on strategic ballistic rockets of
the Hwasong artillery units of the Strategic Forces.” It added that “there was
no radioactive materials leakage” from the detonation, and that the “stan-
dardization of the nuclear warhead will enable the DPRK to produce at will
and as many [warheads] as it wants [of] a variety of smaller, lighter and
diversified nuclear warheads of higher strike power with a firm hold on the
technology for producing and using various fissile materials.”
7. Scott A. Snyder, “A U.S.-ROK-China Dialogue on North Korea’s Nuclear Stale-
mate: Update, Review, and Assessment,” (paper presented at the Forum on
Asia-Pacific Security (FAPS) of the National Committee on American Foreign
Policy (NCAFP) hosted a Track 1.5 meeting in New York on March 22-23,
2016).
8. Zheng Jiyong, “Assessment of North Korea’s Nuclear Capability and China’s
Response,” (paper presented at “The Korean Peninsula Security Environment
the Fifth North Korean Nuclear test after and the Sino-ROK relations,” China
Policy Institute of Ajou University, South Korea, November 17, 2016).
4 Gong Keyu
nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula will become increasingly com-

plicated, politicized, and sensitive. The crisis not only concerns North
Korea’s nuclear ambitions, but, more importantly, the Kim regime’s
survival and longevity, and East Asian regional security. It has involved
an increasing number of regional and global players such as major
powers like China and the United States as well as international orga-
nizations like the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy
Agency. A political settlement that could serve the interests of all
stakeholders seems increasingly unlikely, if not impossible, especially
when multilateral mechanisms are virtually powerless. In the absence
of a robust regional security architecture based on mutual trust and
effective communication and dialogue, this protracted crisis is also
becoming increasingly delicate, threatening to trigger military conflict
as a result of strategic miscalculation.
The fourth and fifth nuclear tests and subsequent escalatory interna-
tional sanctions against Pyongyang have fundamentally changed the
dynamics on the Peninsula. North Korea has now crossed the point of
no return towards becoming a nuclear power, advancing in plutonium-
uranium enrichment technology and being capable of initiating a
preemptive nuclear strike. Initially a mediator, China has now become
a major stakeholder in peninsular affairs. With the Six-Party Talks
gridlocked, three-party, four-party, or even five-party talks9 may
become the new format, focusing on guarding against contingencies
rather than on maintaining stability.
Moreover, the nuclear crisis has also changed the structure and
nature of international relations of Northeast Asia. First, advances in
nuclear technology will help North Korea increase the quantity and
quality of their nuclear weapons over time, posing security challenges
in its neighborhood. Second, North Korea’s nuclear programs may
trigger a region-wide arms race in which regional powers scramble to
9. Foreign Minister Wang Yi Meets the Press, said that “Other parties have also
suggested some ideas, including flexible contacts in a three-party, four-party
or even five-party format,” March 9, 2016, Chinese Foreign Ministry, http://
www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/wjbz_663308/activities_663312/
t1346238.shtml (accessed November 30, 2016).
rearm, both conventionally and with nuclear arms, creating a classical

security dilemma on the Peninsula. Third, Pyongyang’s nuclear black-
mail and intimidation has legitimized potential military intervention
by the United States10 and “pushed South Korea and Japan closer
toward the United States.”11 Fourth, nuclear proliferation as a possible
result of illicit leaks and transfers of North Korea’s nuclear technology
and materials could have grave impacts on international security
overall.12 Finally, acquisition of nuclear capabilities solely by North
Korea would create an asymmetrical balance of power, undermining
the stability of the Peninsula.
China holds a clear position on the nuclear issue: “We are com-
mitted to realizing denuclearization of the Peninsula, upholding peace
and stability and properly resolving issues through dialogue and
consultation. The Peninsula has seen an escalation of tensions since
the DPRK conducted its fifth nuclear test. We call on all relevant
parties to exercise restraint and avoid taking actions that may add to
tension.”13 China also believes that sanctions are neither an end nor
the only approach. “We believe that it is necessary for the Security
Council to further respond to the nuclear test by the DPRK, and their
response should be focused on nuclear activities by the DPRK for the
purpose of resolving the Korean nuclear issue and safeguarding
peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula.”14
10. China said very clearly that “Oppose the deployment of the anti-missile system
of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) by the United States in
the Republic of Korea.”
11. Jia Xiudong, “North Korea Nuclear Test Cannot Change their own Security,”
People’s Daily Overseas Edition, January 7, 2016.
12. “North Korea as a de facto Nuclear State,” Nuclear Posture Review Report,
Department of Defense, April 2010, http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010
%20nuclear%20posture%20review%20report.pdf (accessed October 20, 2016).
13. Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lu Kang’s Regular Press Conference on Sep-
tember 21, 2016, Chinese Foreign Ministry, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_
eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1399373.shtml (accessed November 30,
2016).
14. Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Regular Press Conference
on September 14, 2016, Chinese Foreign Ministry, http://www.fmprc.gov.
6 Gong Keyu
Foreign Minister Wang Yi also said that China upholds the follow-
ing points: “Firstly, under no circumstances could the Korean Peninsula
be nuclearized, whether the DPRK or the ROK, self-produced or intro-
duced and deployed. Secondly, there is no military solution to the
issue. If there is war or turbulence on the Peninsula it is not acceptable
for China. Thirdly, China’s legitimate national security interests must
be effectively maintained and safeguarded.”15
Nuclear Ambitions and the Kim Jong-un Regime:

Stability and Contradictions
Kim Jong-un was officially declared the supreme leader after his
father’s sudden death on December 17, 2011. Contrary to outsiders’
predictions about possible domestic upheaval or even regime collapse
following a leadership transition, in the four years since his accession
to power, Kim Jong-un has consolidated his leadership of the party,
the government, and the military despite the inherent instability and
unpredictability of authoritarian regimes through political, economic,
military, and diplomatic means.
Politically, after five years, the Kim Jong-un regime, at the Seventh
Party Congress which convened on May 6, 2016, Kim Jong-un managed
to acquire a new title: Chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea, officially
“becoming the paramount leader of North Korea’s Juche revolution.”16
cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1397608.shtml
(accessed November 30, 2016).
15. On February 12, 2016, Foreign Minister Wang Yi gave an exclusive interview
to Reuters in Munich, Germany, Wang Yi Talks about Principles China Upholds
in Dealing with the Korean Peninsula Nuclear Issue on February 13, Chinese
Foreign Ministry, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/wjbz_
663308/activities_663312/t1340527.shtml (accessed November 30, 2016); On
February 25, 2016, Foreign Minister Wang Yi delivered a speech entitled
“The Developing China and China’s Diplomacy” at the Center for Strategic
and International Studies (CSIS) of the US, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_
eng/wjb_663304/wjbz_663308/activities_663312/t1344190.shtml (accessed
November 30, 2016).
Economically, in terms of industrial development, his regime has

given priority to metallurgy, electricity, coal, and rail transport along
with the mining, machinery, chemical engineering, and light indus-
try. The Seventh Party Congress declared that “We will work out the
phased strategy for the national economic development in a scientific
and realistic manner and carry it out without fail and carry through
the five-year strategy for the state economic development from 2016
to 2020 for the present.”17
Militarily, Kim Jong-un unveiled the Byungjin Line, which is the
simultaneous pursuit of nuclear and economic development, and
emphasized that North Korea must devote more resources and energies
to economic construction in tandem with strengthening and developing
their nuclear capabilities. Pyongyang has already declared that it will
pursue a de facto “nuclear power status”18 and it is estimated that,
according to current trends, North Korea will possess “at least 20 pieces
of nuclear weaponry or at most hundreds of pieces by 2020.”19 North
Korea continues to seek “asymmetric advantage through its ongoing
nuclear weapons and ballistic missile development.”20
Finally, Pyongyang has strengthened its diplomatic ties with
longstanding friendly nations.
16. “Kim Jong-un Thrills North Koreans with hours of Brilliance,” The Economist,
May 14-20, 2016, p. 19.
17. “Decision of Seventh Congress of WPK Adopted,” Korean Central News Agency,
May 10, 2016.
18. Wang Sheng and Ling Shengli, “Discussions on New Ideas of ‘Double Track’
to Solve DPRK Nuclear Issue,” Northeast Asia Forum (Jilin), No3, Total No. 125
(2016), pp. 17-20.
19. US experts claimed that North Korea had about 20 uranium-based warheads
with a major production capacity to produce another eight to ten uranium
warheads annually; for more details, see “The Danger Next Door,” Washington
Post, May 11, 2015. Moreover, some top Chinese nuclear experts estimate that
North Korea may already have 20 nuclear warheads, and may be able to double
its arsenal in 2016; see Jeremy Page and Jay Solomon, “China Warns North
Korean Nuclear Threat is Rising,” Wall Street Journal, April 22, 2015.
20. Van Jackson, “The Korean Peninsula’s Status Quo Crisis,” The Diplomat, May 6,
2015.
8 Gong Keyu
Characteristics of the Kim Regime
Inheritance
As the third leader of the Kim dynasty in North Korea, Kim Jong-un
has inherited and carried forward his ancestors’ legacies.
Kim Jong-un shares many outward similarities with his grandfa-
ther and founder of the regime, especially through his hairstyle and
demeanor. To build a cult of personality in contemporary North Korea,
Kim Jong-un has presented himself as a reincarnation of his grandfather
Kim Il-sung.
Kim Jong-il, Kim Jong-un’s father, attached great importance to
nuclear development and military modernization. As early as the
1990’s, he introduced Songun politics as the general principle guiding
North Korea’s socialist revolution and Workers Party leadership. Under
the Songun policy, Kim Jong-un has established the People’s Army as
the pillar and vanguard of the revolution and claimed to have turned
North Korea into a “great power that can produce man-made satellite
and nuclear weapon” through nuclear test.
Kim Jong-un has enshrined his father’s and grandfather’s poli-
cies into the so-called the Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism theory, which is
regarded as the perpetual guiding theory for the party and state. He
also emphasized that North Korea will “continue to march unswerv-
ingly on the path envisioned by Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-un toward
independence, Juche, socialism. This is the country’s one hundred-
year strategy and the ‘people first’ policy must be manifested in the
activities of the party and the state.”
Independence
Apart from inheriting his ancestors’ teachings, Kim Jong-un has also
left his own imprint on North Korea’s national strategy by calling for
the establishment of North Korea as a “highly-civilized power.”
In Kim Jong-un’s new year’s addresses for 2013 and 2014, the
term Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism appeared four times and two times,
respectively, but did not appear at all in the 2015 address. Kim delib-
erately skipped the phrase to focus public attention on his own merits
and achievements in order to strengthen his leadership role.
Over the past four years, Kim Jong-un’s role as the paramount
leader has been further enhanced by his frequent public appearances,
such as inspection tours, meetings with foreign dignities, public speeches,
decree issuance, and other appearances. He is quickly being idolized
among ordinary citizens.
Since taking over in 2011, Kim Jong-un has lost no time in consoli-
dating power through a sweeping reshuffle of the party, the adminis-
tration, and the military, replacing officials leftover from his father’s
regime with his own trusted confidants. Now that he has successfully
built his authority and power on his pedigree and merits, Kim has
begun to define his own distinct leadership style. Believing that long-
term regime survival and sustainability are essentially unopposed,
Kim seems to think that he is now “ushering a new era by launching
ambitious and aggressive reforms.”21
Peculiar characteristics
For seven decades, the survival of the Kim dynasty has been predi-
cated on certain characteristics:
(1) Deification and indoctrination. The sustainability of the regime
and universal loyalty has been achieved through mass indoctrination,
which underscores the Kim family’s Paektu pedigree. After assuming
leadership, Kim launched a sweeping propaganda campaign to deify
himself by imitating his grandfather in appearance and demeanor,
accentuating his political orthodoxy by invoking Kim Il-sung’s glorious
image in the hearts and minds of ordinary North Koreans.
(2) Hereditary elites and cronyism. Revolving around Kim Jong-
un are a number of interest groups consisting of the Kim clan and its
trusted cliques. These elite groups mainly include Kim’s family mem-
21. Fang Hanfan,“The 7th National Congress of Korean Workers’ Party and China’s
Countermeasure,” Journal of Yanbian University (Social Science) 49, no. 2 (March
2016), pp. 5-6.
10 Gong Keyu
bers (such as his younger sister Yeo-jong), offspring of revolutionary

heroes, and his most loyal cronies. Hereditary bureaucrats hold the
most important posts in the party, the government, the military, and
businesses. These elites have huge vested interests in the regime and
pledge the highest allegiance to the rule of the Kim family.
(3) Military loyalty and the state apparatus. In the Kim Il-sung
and Kim Jong-il eras, the military had played the central role in sus-
taining their absolute rule. Songun, Kim Il-sung’s signature doctrine,
placed the army at the main position in North Korean politics. Military
allegiance and the overall state apparatus ensured a smooth leader-
ship transition at the outset of the Kim Jong-un era.
(4) Double emphasis on nuclear development and the economy.
Chronic economic woes have weakened Pyongyang’s hands in the con-
ventional arms race. To compensate for this disadvantage, North Korea
pursues nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles to gain the upper hand
over South Korea. For North Korea, the virtue of the Byungjin Line lies
in the fact that it can decisively deter against attack while saving addi-
tional defense spending on conventional weaponry that can then be
devoted to economic construction and people’s livelihood.
Contradictions within the Kim Jong-un Regime
Interpretations, judgments, and reviews regarding the North Korean

regime and Kim Jong-un himself differ so significantly that there is
no consensus on whether the regime is rigid or flexible, whether Kim
Jong-un’s policies are strategic or tactical, rational decisions or impro-
vised responses, or short-lived remedies or long-term visions.
Contradictions within the regime are reflected in the following
aspects:
Proactive yet Superficial Reforms
Under the rules of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il, Pyongyang announced
a set of programs to improve North Koreans’ livelihood, such as
“[exchanging] meat for grass,” “turning all mountains into gold mines,”
“[the] provision of more meat and eggs for the people,” and “provi-
sion of more clothes for the people.” With Kim Jong-un at the helm,
Pyongyang unveiled the Byungjin Line to promote balanced progress
in military modernization, industrialization, and social solidarity
with a view towards building a socialist power.
In fact, in terms of at least economics, Kim Jong-un’s many signa-
ture construction projects, such as amusement parks, ski resorts, and
horse-riding clubs have been inspired by his overseas experiences in
Europe, rather than ordinary citizens’ essential needs.
Despite Ri Su-yong’s intensive foreign visits to Southeast Asia,
Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, Pyongyang hasn’t earned its
much-anticipated international clout, multilateral cooperation, or
economic assistance.
Pursuing Economic Development without Reform and Opening
Although Pyongyang withstood the economic contractions of the 1990s,

its general economic picture is not encouraging. In the eyes of the
political elite, North Korea has realized three dimensions of a strong
socialist power, namely, ideology, politics, and military, leaving only
the economic dimension unfulfilled.
North Korea watchers are wondering whether a young leader
like Kim Jong-un, who has returned after years of study abroad and
presented a distinct leadership style, will usher in a new age of Chi-
nese-style reform and opening for the North Korean people.
Indeed, since 2012, positive signs have been noted regarding
Pyongyang’s opening up to the outside world. North Korea has dis-
patched technocrats to China for inspection and study tours as well
as dispatching workers to earn foreign currency. However, large-scale
opening up is not without risks for North Korea, as increased exchange
with the outside world might threaten regime stability. The “execution
of Jang Song-thaek,”22 the overseer of Sino-North Korean Special
22. “Traitor Jang Song-thaek Executed,” Korean Central News Agency, December 12,
2013.
12 Gong Keyu
Economic Zones (such as Raseon), represented a major setback for

Sino-North Korean trade cooperation.
Therefore, the prospect of reform and the opening of North Korea
has always “had a negative outlook, resulting in failure rather than
success, given the crisis [in] the system and the regime.”23
Tranquil on the Surface but Unstable Deep Inside
For now, it seems that the leadership transition has been largely
uneventful. Compared with Kim Jong-il’s takeover of the leadership
role after three years of mourning following Kim Il-sung’s death,
Kim Jong-un’s ascendance and coronation was much faster in that he
has swiftly entrenched his supreme position through a sweeping and
well-calculated purge in which second-in-command figures “including
Ri Yong-ho, Jang Song-thaek, Choe Ryong-hae, and Hyon Yong-chol,
[have been] either demoted or executed.”24
North Korea watchers note that the young and aggressive Kim
Jong-un, without rich experience in politics, may antagonize some of
the hereditary elite by concentrating overwhelming power into his
own hands. In terms of foreign affairs, they are concerned that as a
youthful newcomer, Kim Jong-un has a strong inclination toward
adventurism and extremism, which may exacerbate the already tense
regional situation into an escalatory spiral.
Uncertainties about Regime Preservation
Some in South Korea have discerned some noticeable changes within

North Korean society, including an expanded role for the market,
entrenched social stratification, worsening social inequality, greater
23. Park Hee-jin, “The Status and Evaluation of Economic Reforms of the Four-
year-old Kim Jong-un Regime: Geopolitical Strategies and the Performance
of Opening Policies,” Journal of Peace and Unification 5, no. 1 (2015), pp. 20-31.
24. “How Kim Jong-un Gets Rid of Threats to His Power,” Chosun Ilbo, May 18,
2015, http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2015/05/18/20150518
01489.html (accessed October 20, 2016).
application of information technology, and inflows and circulation of

foreign concepts. Changes in public society include growing commer-
cialism and worship of money, distrust of the government and its
policies, diminishing loyalty toward leaders and the country, and ideo-
logical indifference to socialism and Juche.
The sudden deaths of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il from massive
heart attacks have raised concerns over Kim Jong-un’s health condi-
tions. Rumors began to circulate about Kim Jong-un’s whereabouts
and personal security when he disappeared from public view for
several weeks after watching a performance by the Moranbong Band
on September 3, 2014, and was absent from the second session of the
13th Supreme People’s Assembly on September 25. Missing for more
than 40 days from public view, Kim was reported to have inspected a
new residential block newly completed on October 14. During these
days, speculation, mostly international, “about Kim’s sudden death,
assassination, home arrest, and so on went rampant.”25
Contradictions within North Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions
North Korea’s nuclear programs “serve multiple purposes.”26 Domes-

tically, they help consolidate Kim Jong-un’s position by exaggerating
his leadership ability and strengthening his military capabilities by
achieving sufficient operational nuclear capabilities to serve a fait
accompli as a nuclear-capable state to strengthen its hand in negotia-
tions with the United States. Externally, Kim Jong-un is taking advan-
tage of the period leading up to the inauguration of a new US presi-
dent and exploiting tensions between China and the United States and
between China and Japan. It seems that Barack Obama has neither
interest nor time and energy to work on North Korean issues.
25. “Kim Jong-un Back on the Road,” Chosun Ilbo, October 23, 2014, http://english.
chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2014/10/23/2014102301220.html (accessed
November 30, 2016).
26. Jin Canrong, “China has a Fear of Sanctions Against North Korea,” Nihon
Keizai Shimbun, September 23, 2016, https://cn.nikkei.com/columnviewpoint/
viewpoint/21591-20160923.html (accessed October 20, 2016).
14 Gong Keyu
Meanwhile, the potential challenge of North Korea’s nuclear

capabilities is rising. It is not only because North Korea intends to
increase their nuclear stockpile for reasons of security but also because
a potential nuclear accident as a result of its poor technology is rising.
What’s more, North Korea also intends to expand its international
clout and independence through nuclear blackmail.
In China’s view, the focus of the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue
is on the US and the DPRK, who are in a game theoretic situation. At
the level of power politics, U.S.-North Korea game can be interpreted
as North Korea’s efforts to seek security with nuclear weapons since
their military power cannot compare to that of the U.S. North Korea
and South Korea cannot play leading roles regarding the Peninsular
issues though they themselves are closely related to the issues. Thus,
it is the U.S. that is playing the leading role and the North Korea
nuclear issue will trigger further nuclear competition on the Peninsular.
South Korea will likely either develop nuclear weapons itself or get
them from the U.S. as a counterweight to North Korea.
While the diplomatic mechanisms for achieving cease-fire on
the Peninsula have died, peace has not been established. Since 2003,
parties have tried but failed to transfer the mechanisms related to the
Six-Party Talks into an overall Northeastern Asian regional security
apparatus. The failures of the non-proliferation regime together with
security issues from American involvement have led to nuclear prolif-
eration on the Peninsular. Making matters worse, there is no mature
crisis management mechanism in Northeast Asia. Asymmetric con-
frontation between the U.S. and North Korea will last long into future.
As a result of the fourth and fifth nuclear tests, North Korea sig-
nificantly improved its nuclear capability, and it is unlikely that North
Korea will abandon its nuclear aspirations within the near future,
casting doubts on the value of a strategy of patience.
Prospects for Unification: Acceleration or Deceleration
China’s View of Peninsular Unification
By virtue of its location on China’s border, the Korean Peninsula’s

geopolitical position, its history, and current status have been closely
related to China’s political, military and economic security. Should
the nuclear crisis give rise to a large-scale riot or even a war, the interna-
tional environment that China faces would seriously deteriorate and
social stability and economic development in Northeast China would
be greatly impaired. Therefore, it is of vital importance to China’s
strategic interests to lower the possibility of the crisis escalating into a
war, to help pull the Peninsula out of the Cold War, and to prevent,
or at least postpone, the outbreak of acute conflict on the Peninsula.
To maintain peace and stability on the Peninsula, however, does not
mean to maintain the current separated state that exists between
North and South Korea. On the contrary, China is playing an active
role in breaking the impasse between the United States and North
Korea, helping with a soft landing of North Korea’s economy, and
promoting the peaceful reunification of the Peninsula, which is not
only in China’s interest, but will “satisfy the common interest of all
parties to the greatest extent.”27
As a close neighbor to the Peninsula, China not only expects to
maintain friendship with North Korea, but also looks forward to
developing a strategic cooperative partnership with South Korea both
on the political level and in other fields. “China does not seek a leading
position, scope of influence, or self-interest on the Peninsula.”28 In
fact, the Chinese government and its leadership have repeatedly
declared that “China supports the [advancement of the] two sides on
the Peninsula towards détente, and then peaceful reunification, on
27. Kim Donggil, “The ‘Tipping Point’ of China’s Patience with North Korea,”
The Harmony of Civilizations and Prosperity for All — Different Paths with
Common Responsibilities, Beijing Forum 2007, pp. 2-5.
28. Yu Shaohua, “Reunification of the Korean Peninsula: Foundation and Path,”
China International Studies 2 (2015), pp. 71-72.
16 Gong Keyu
the condition that no external forces get involved.”29

China’s view on the reunification of the Korean Peninsula is
“Détente, Peace, and Reunification,” which is also a hope shared by
the people of both the North and the South on the Korean Peninsula.
The leaders of both countries are adjusting their policy according to
the changing situation, trying to enhance peace and stability on the
Peninsula. However, due to the lasting mutual distrust and huge dif-
ferences between the two Koreas in their social systems, ideologies,
economic systems, and values, a breakthrough in their political rela-
tionship is barely visible in the short term.
The key interests are enshrined in Beijing’s “No War, No Instability,
No Nukes” (buzhan, buluan, wuhe) policy.30 Accordingly, neighboring
countries rife with divisions, conflicts, and strife would never be consid-
ered a blessing by China, let alone a convulsed Peninsula that “might
generate large swarms of refugees flowing into China’s northeast.”31
Thus, according to many experts, “China wants to maintain North
Korea and its regime as a buffer protecting China from all of these
alleged dangers.”32
China thinks that “it is impossible to push Pyongyang to renounce
its nuclear [ambitions] without at the same time taking into account
the regime’s security concerns.”33 Guided by a policy of “strategic
restraint,” the Obama administration has rejected Pyongyang’s pro-
posal of a peace agreement and call for ending South Korea-U.S. joint
29. Jamie F. Metzl, “The Korea Peninsular Unification and China’s Nation Interests,”
Sungkyun China Observer 3 (2015), pp. 53-54.
30. Bonnie Glaser and Brittany Billingsley, “Reordering Chinese Priorities on the
Korean Peninsula,” Center for Strategic and International Studies Report, November
2012, pp. 1-5.
31. “The collapse of North Korea would send millions of refugees over the 880
mile (1415 km)” border into China, bringing with them social and economic
anguish,” see Charlie Campbell, “A North Korean satellite launch angers
China,” TIME 187, no. 9 (2016).
32. Paul B. Stares and Joel S. Wit, “Preparing for the Sudden Change in North
Korea,” Council Special Report 42 (January 2009), pp. 19-21.
33. Leon V. Sigal, “Getting What We Need with North Korea,” Arms Control Today,
April, 2016, pp. 8-10.
military exercises, on the one hand, and “has strengthened its defense
ties with the Seoul by deploying additional troops on the Peninsula,
on the other.”34
Three Types of Unification
In China’s view, the approaches of unification of the Korean Peninsula

include the following:
Military-led (by Force)
The Korean War has proven that the use of force is no solution for the
problem of reunification, and turmoil will only produce disastrous
outcomes. Both the DPRK and the ROK have clearly expressed their
wishes for peaceful reunification, and major neighboring powers also
clearly object to a military solution. China similarly sees poor prospects
for military operations, and opposes unilateral military intervention
either by the ROK or the US, be it through a surgical strike on its mili-
tary and nuclear facilities or through highly intensive offenses on
potential targets such as in Libya.
Merger (by Annexation)
According to various research reports,35 many emergencies can occur

on the Peninsula. The ROK has a much higher probability of taking
advantage of such emergencies to realize reunification on its own
terms since it has substantially more resources.
34. Victor Cha, The Impossible State: North Korea, Past and Future (New York: Harper
Collins, 2012), pp. 336-342.
35. Bruce Bennett, “Preparing for the Possibility of a North Korean Collapse”
(RAND Corporation, 2013), pp. 88-93, http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_
reports/RR331.html (accessed June 10, 2016).
18 Gong Keyu
Step-by-step (by Peaceful Means)
The two sides on the Peninsula could gradually increase their levels of
equal and peaceful economic and cultural communication, increasing
confidence in and reduce hostilities against each other. On this basis,
the two sides should establish a framework for peaceful and stable
unification.
This approach best serves the interests of the two sides, and com-
plies with the aspirations for peace and development of the interna-
tional community and the Northeastern Asia region in particular. It is
also the most viable in theory, historic practice, and reality.
It is obvious that the different ways in which the reunification
could occur would bring about different risks and benefits for China.
The Nuclear Issue Variable
There are four issues relevant to unification, such as the nuclear issue,
foreign policy of the unified Korea, the military forces of the US in
ROK, and the prospects for China-US relations. “These four issues
will be major factors that China will consider during and even long
after the unification.”36 By far the most important is the nuclear issue.
China’s positions regarding the North Korean nuclear issue include
denuclearization of the Peninsula, peaceful resolution of disputes,
and maintenance of peace and stability of the region. China thinks
that its interests can be maintained if the issue is addressed in this
fashion. Therefore, China has frequently and consistently emphasized
these principles.
Some scholars used to argue that “the DPRK with nuclear weapons
but not chaotic will be more in China’s national interests rather than
one chaotic but without nuclear weapons.”37 Peace and stability will
36. Gong Keyu, “The Korea Peninsular Unification and China,” Sungkyun China
Observer 2 (2014), pp. 52-55.
37. “China, North Korea and America: Between Punxsutawney and Pyongyang,”
The Economist, February 13, 2016, p. 19.
be more relevant than the question of whether the DPRK has nuclear
weapons.
But they changed their perspectives after the DPRK conducted
nuclear tests for the fourth time, earlier this year. A growing number
of Chinese experts began to argue that “their only treaty ally is a
strategic liability rather than a strategic asset.”38
They argued that China was no longer a mediator but an immedi-
ate victim since DPRK’s capability of strategic deterrence had produced
negative effects on China’s strategic interests. Firstly, the DPRK has
already achieved a sufficient capability to threaten China’s national
interests, and some of China’s major cities and most-developed coastal
areas are all in range of the DPRK’s strategic weapons. Secondly, DPRK’s
growing deterrence capability will stimulate other regional actors to
advance their military facilities and even create their own nuclear
weapon systems, which will worsen China’s neighboring environment.
Thirdly, the DPRK’s nuclear tests and military threats provided the US
with excuses to input more strategic resources in Asia-Pacific region,
which increased strategic pressure on China. Therefore, China persis-
tently stands for denuclearization of the Peninsula.
China’s major concern has always been what kind of measures
relevant parties will take to ensure nuclear security, and how a unified
Korea will address the nuclear issue. China is particularly worried
about these issues if North Korea were to be annexed by South Korea.
For such an annexation to succeed, something dire must have
befallen North Korea’s nuclear weapons and relevant facilities. How
the leaders and high officials of DPRK would react and use these
nuclear facilities remains uncertain. The wanton use of nuclear weapons
or the proliferation of nuclear weapons to nonstate actors would
cause large casualties and cause serious pollution to neighboring
environment. That would be a grave burden for China to shoulder.
Another concern for China would be whether a unified Korea
would keep these nuclear weapons. A number of South Koreans
38. Bonnie Glaser and Yun Sun, “Chinese Attitude toward Korean Unification,”
International Journal of Korean Unification Studies 24 (2015), p. 72.
20 Gong Keyu
argue that the DPRK’s nuclear weapons belong to the Korean nation,
and South Koreans should be proud of them despite the current sepa-
ration. By that logic, a unified Korea would regard nuclear weapons
as valuable assets.
As such, how to deal with nuclear technologies and facilities and
whether to eliminate nuclear weapons will both be issues of major
concern to China for the foreseeable future. The North Korean nuclear
issue will have direct and indirect impacts on Chinese national interests,
with negative impacts more probable than positive ones. This is why
some Chinese scholars would like to argue for maintaining the status
quo rather than seeing the prospect of a reunified Korean Peninsula.
External Factors Accelerating Toward Unification
South Korean policy has shifted toward “an approach that emphasizes
sanctions, deterrence, and preparation for Korean unification.”39 South
Korean President Park Geun-hye’s Presidential Committee for Unifica-
tion Preparation, announced in February 2014, has sought to develop a
comprehensive approach to planning for unification.40 After North
Korea’s fourth nuclear test, President Park has changed South Korea’s
policy toward North Korea after Kim Jong-un’s repeated provocations
by broaching the possibility of “regime change.” After the fifth such
test, President Park even called the detonation an act of “fanatic reck-
lessness.”41 Although lawmakers in South Korea’s parliament raised
the idea of “decapitation” operation, “the South is unlikely to initiate a
39. Scott A. Snyder, “A U.S.-ROK-China Dialogue on North Korea’s Nuclear Stale-

mate: Update, Review, and Assessment,” (paper presented at the Forum on
Asia-Pacific Security (FAPS) of the National Committee on American Foreign
2016.)
40. Presidential Committee for Unification Preparation, http://www.pcup.gp.kr/
main.do (accessed September 30, 2015).
41. Kirk Spitzer, “Fanatic Recklessness: Nations Rip North Korea for Reported
Nuke Test,” USA TODAY, September 9, 2016, http://www.usatoday.com/
story/news/world/2016/09/09/north-korea-nuclear-test/90110856/ (accessed
November 30, 2016).
military attack to accelerate the unification process.”42

On the other hand, the decision based on “the review of the work
of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea” adopted at
the Seventh Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea stated that North
Korea will
stand for national reunification by federal formula and will make every
possible effort for peace and reunification. But if the south Korean
authorities opt for a war, persisting in the unreasonable ‘unification of
social systems,’ we will turn out in the just war to mercilessly wipe out
the anti-reunification forces and achieve the historic cause of national
reunification, [a] long-cherished desire of all the Koreans. We will make
positive efforts to ensure durable peace on the Korean Peninsula and
reunify the country by federal formula under the banners of national
independence and great national unity and thus build an independent
and prosperous reunified country, the common desire of all Koreans,
as soon as possible. Let us all vigorously fight for the completion of the
socialist cause, independent reunification of the country and victory of
the cause of global independence, firmly united around the Central
Committee of the WPK under the unfurled banner of Kimilsungism-
Kimjongilism.43
After North Korea’s fourth and fifth nuclear tests, one unification sce-
nario is that an increasingly provocative and assertive Kim Jong-un,
equipped with nuclear missiles, seeks greater international clout and
national independence, and uses nuclear weapons to blackmail the
South into unification on North Korea’s terms.
But as things stand now, especially given the internal and external
42. Dong Xiangrong: “The Adjustment and Change of South Korea’s Foreign
Policy after North Korea’s Fourth Nuclear Test,” Contemporary World, April
2016, pp. 30-31.
43. “In his report on the review of the work of the Central Committee of the
Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) at its 7th Congress, Kim Jong Un stressed
that to achieve the reunification of Korea is an important and urgent task
facing the WPK responsible for the destiny of the country and the nation.”
See Kim Jong-un, “WPK’s Tasks for National Reunification,” Korean Central
News Agency, May 7, 2016.
22 Gong Keyu
factors after the fourth and fifth tests, it is even more likely that an accel-
erated unification process will take place in one of the three following
scenarios:
Regime Collapse as the Result of Escalatory Sanctions
After the fourth nuclear test, the United Nations Security Council adopt-
ed Resolution 2270 with a 15-0 vote in favor of stepping up economic
sanctions against North Korea, imposing mandatory inspections of all
cargo going into and coming out of North Korea, ban on all financial
transactions, and restrictions on the export of North Korean strategic
assets and supply of aviation fuel to North Korea.44
Unilateral sanctions by some Western countries and China’s call
for full implementation45 of the UN resolution will certainly inflict
huge impact on the North Korea economy, potentially to the point
that Kim Jong-un’s regime collapses under extreme circumstances.46
The collective defection to South Korea by 13 North Koreans working in
a Chinese restaurant in April 2016 might be an early sign of a cracking
regime.47
Economic sanctions have blocked North Korea’s path toward
reform and opening. Even if Pyongyang emulates Beijing, the end
result may still be regime collapse instead of economic growth. As
44. “Sanctions on North Korea: Big Brother,” The Economist, March 5, 2016, p. 22.
45. The sanctions resolution still has three primary loopholes that could enable
circumvention of implementation. First, determination of whether items sub-
ject to inspection under sanctions are related to nuclear weapons is a discre-
tionary decision based on the judgement of the state conducting inspections.
Second, the exemption for trade in items related to people’s “livelihood” could
be exploited. Third, exemptions for humanitarian assistance could also be
exploited.
46. Shin Dong-ik, “The Adoption of UNSC Resolution 2270 on Sanctions against
North Korea: Lessons Learned and Future Response,” IFANS Focus, IF-2016-9E,
March 28, 2016, pp. 1-3.
47. Choi Song Min, “Latest Defection of Restaurant Workers Betrays Regime
Weaknesses,” Daily NK, June 9, 2016, http://www.dailynk.com/english/
read.php?num=13935&cataId=nk00300 (accessed October 20, 2016).
some put it, “Fearing that once opening itself to the outside word,
swarming in may not be only foreign products, investment, and tech-
nologies, but also an avalanche of information which may invalidate
what it has propagated, Pyongyang thinks it’s best to reject reform
and impose tight control over its people.”48
Coup D’état
In a little over four years of leadership from his father’s sudden death
to his coronation at the Seventh Party Congress, Kim Jong-un had
launched a sweeping reshuffle in which more than 70 senior officials
were executed, demoted, or sidelined — most notable among them
was his uncle-in-law Jang Song-thaek. His quick and reckless move
has left many outside observers concerned with the increasing possi-
bility of internal rebellion.
A Pyongyang watcher observes, “In such a highly-tense environ-
ment of power struggle, some elites within the regime, fearing for
their own security, might initiate a preemptive rebellion, coup d’état,
or assassination against Kim Jong-un, to preserve themselves, which
might subsequently lead to great upheaval and collapse.” Others think
it is possible that “the erratic nature of and a deep sense of insecurity
within the authoritarian regime usually create fear among its followers.
Cruel and bloody power struggles are pervasive, increasing the possi-
bility of coup d’état.”49
Concerns over Kim Jong-un’s Health
Kim’s health has always been a subject of much speculation. Over the
past four years, Kim Jong-un has put on much weight. “Standing at
171cm, he weighs more than 130kg.”50 At the Seventh Party Congress,
48. Deng Yuwen, “The Possibility of Collapse of North Korea and the Way,”
Lianhe Zaobao, April 30, 2016.
49. Ibid.
50. “Kim Jong-un ‘Put on 30 kg Over 5 Years’,” Chosun Ilbo, September 30, 2015,
http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2015/09/30/2015093000827.
24 Gong Keyu
after speaking for a little over one hour, Kim’s body began to sway,
his voice increasingly coarse. Some speculate that “the corpulent Kim
is prone to cardiac [arrest], diabetes, arthrolithiasis, apoplexy, and
other diseases.”51
With poor sanitation and health infrastructure, the outbreak of
communicable and infectious disease may prove to be deadly for North
Koreans. In the case of Ebola and MERS, Pyongyang panicked to the
point of closing its borders. In addition, Pyongyang is also vulnerable
to natural disasters, such as floods and insect infestation.
External Factors Decelerating Unification
Early unification is only remotely possible if Kim Jong-un decides to

preserve his rule with nuclear weapons, which may prolong the
rivalry between the two Koreas.
Another scenario is a decelerated process due to North Korean
dissatisfaction with South Korea.
Despite the role that the ROK might try to play, deceleration is
also highly likely. The confrontation between the DPRK and the ROK
is over which nation truly wields sovereignty on the Korean Peninsula.
Hence, their competition is by nature a zero sum game; neither nation
can tolerate the other side. What’s more, after separation of more
than half a century, the two have respectively established national
frameworks with totally different ideologies, political and economic
systems and social values. Not only the two political entities are con-
flicting against each other, but also the people of the two sides have
little hope of coexisting peacefully.
The two sides might be able to overcome some of the differences
in political, economic and social systems in the unification via assis-
tance by neighboring countries, but they would certainly encounter
html (accessed November 30, 2016).

51. “Kim Jong-un Wrinkle or Back of the Head as a Signal of Poor Health,” Yonhap
News Agency, August 12, 2015, http://chinese.yonhapnews.co.kr/newpgm/
9908000000.html?cid=ACK20150812002200881 (accessed November 30, 2016).
problems in engagements and integrations. After all, the two have

had different ways of thinking and ideologies for much too long,
which is always an obstacle in building confidence.
One More Variable
In China’s view, another uncertain external factor is the U.S. Election

and its aftermath.
North Korea has already said that, “Obama is trying hard to
deny the DPRK’s strategic position as a legitimate nuclear weapons
state but it is as foolish an act as trying to eclipse the sun with a palm.
It is foolhardy for the Obama group to get itself busy while crying
out for the senseless sanctions ballad even today when its ‘strategic
patience’ policy became totally bankrupt and it is nearing the end of its
tenure.”52 It seems North Korea is already trying to face the new
president of the United States.
On November 8, 2016, Donald Trump won the presidency with
306 electoral votes to the 232 received by Clinton and he “promised
to be a president to all Americans.”53
According to previous experience, it will take at least three to six
months for the new American administration to review and reeval-
uate the policy of the previous administration, and another three to six
months to draft new policy. That is to say that, in the coming months,
the U.S. will not have a serious policy toward Peninsular issues. On
the other hand, North Korea will expectedly take various forms of
provocations so as to increase their bargaining chips. North Korea
will also likely reach out with olive branches since Kim Jong-un has
already consolidated his power base.
On the U.S. side, three potential changes are worthy of attention.
The first should be the personal style of the new president including
52. “DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman Refutes Obama’s ‘Statement’ against

Nuclear Warheads Explosive Test,” Korean Central News Agency, September 11,
2016.
53. Darcy Oliver, “It is time for us to come together: Trump strikes conciliatory
tone in victory speech,” Business Insider, November 9, 2016.
26 Gong Keyu
Donald Trump’s willingness to resolve issues, the change of officials

on some of key positions, and a change towards overall South Korean
policy.
But it is very unlikely that the incoming American administra-
tion will give up the cause of de-nuclearization regardless of their
party affiliation. Moreover, the United States will likely adhere to a
set of goals consistent with the past. The U.S. will not recognize North
Korea’s status as a nuclear power; will not compensate North Korea’s
provocations; will not advance its relations with North Korea without
improvements in North-South relations; will not tolerate provocations
and threats by North Korea against its neighbors; and will strengthen
policy coordination and military cooperation with its allies including
South Korea and Japan.
Currently, some argue that “there appears to be growing debate
in Washington about the need for direct negotiations with the North,”54
while others opine that all relevant parties should jointly work for
North Korea’s regime change, or to initiate a unification led by South
Korea. If so, North Korea’s nuclear issues would be resolved for good.
Conclusion
It has been nearly 70 years since the division of the Korean Peninsula.
The two Koreas have worked persistently for reunification. They have
still made great strides towards reunification despite huge differences
between the two in the means and ends for achieving reunification
and the strategic competition of major powers behind the two parties.
China expects a Korean Peninsula free of war, turmoil, dramatic
upheavals and nuclear weapons, and supports gradual and peaceful
reunification instead of reunification through radical and/or military
means.
China has been a consistent supporter of the reunification of the
Peninsula. China does not think that reunification itself is a problem,
54. Asan Korea Perspective 1, no. 18 (2016).

but how it will occur, when, at what cost, and whether the Korean
people can live a better life after reunification. China does have a say
regarding the reunification, but will never dominate the process through
forcing either the timing or the means by which reunification is to
take place.
Unfortunately, the West has interpreted China’s response as too
simple and diplomatic since China has not provided clear and con-
crete answers of their own. Western policy-watchers have argued that
China’s real policy is to maintain the status quo on the Peninsula.
It is China’s growing concern that Washington and Seoul are try-
ing to press Pyongyang to the point of collapse with stepped-up sanc-
tions on the one hand while dominating the unification process on
Seoul’s terms.
Risks and uncertainties within Kim Jong-un’s regime are growing.
Multiple tests cannot help Pyongyang acquire the status of a nuclear
state, and unification via North Korean attempts for nuclear coercion
would be a suicidal act for Pyongyang. All major stakeholders, China
and South Korea in particular, must adequately prepare themselves for
an accelerating unification process given Pyongyang’s nuclear tests
and the subsequent developments.
As the biggest stakeholder in the process, the ROK should con-
sider China’s major concerns regarding the reunification. It should
also reflect on lessons from its history and jointly work with other
parties for a more peaceful and stable regional order.
Article Received: Reviewed: Revised: Accepted:
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30 Gong Keyu
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Vol. 25, No. 2, 2016, 33–50
East Asia’s Fluid Dynamics:

Whither Obama’s Pivot to Asia?
Frank Jannuzi
President Obama’s pivot to Asia accomplished some of its core objec-

tives, most notably strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance, stabilizing
U.S.-Japan-ROK security relations, and establishing diplomatic rela-
tions with Myanmar. However, it has left key tasks undone for the
incoming Trump administration, including reining in North Korea’s
nuclear ambitions and finding equilibrium with a rising China. More-
over, the apparent demise of the Trans-Pacific Partnership casts a dark
shadow over Obama’s legacy in East Asia, and calls into question
America’s continued leadership of the global economic order. Presi-
dent Trump will need to navigate East Asia’s fluid environment, a
region lacking strong multilateral institutions. Trump’s decisions, par-
ticularly his handling of a possible crisis on the Korean Peninsula and
China’s growing ambitions, will heavily influence how historians ulti-
mately assess the wisdom of Obama’s pivot.
Keywords: Pivot, Obama, TPP, DPRK, China
With Obama’s return from his last foreign trip as President, and as
his administration enters its last weeks in office, it is an appropriate
time to make an initial assessment of the Asia policy foundation he
has built for President-elect Donald Trump and the work that remains
unfinished. Obama’s much-touted rebalance of U.S. security, economic,
and diplomatic might toward the Asia-Pacific region has fulfilled some
of its key objectives — a “solid double” as one of pivot’s architects
recently concluded.1 Of note, President Obama has upgraded U.S.
1. Jeffrey Bader, former senior director for Asia, National Security Council,
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2016/08/29/obamas-
china-and-asia-policy-a-solid-double/ (accessed November 28, 2016).
34 Frank Jannuzi
military capabilities in the region, adopted revised defense guidelines

for the U.S.-Japan Alliance, stabilized U.S.-ROK-Japan security rela-
tions, including intelligence-sharing, by facilitating a diplomatic reso-
lution of the “comfort women” issue, enhanced maritime security
cooperation with Vietnam, the Philippines, Australia, Singapore, and
Indonesia, implemented the United States-Korea Free Trade Agree-
ment (KORUS), and normalized diplomatic relations with Myanmar.
It is an impressive list of accomplishments.
And yet, as supporters and critics of the pivot are quick to point
2
out, Washington has struggled to regularize its dealings with Beijing.
It has frankly failed to reach a strategic entente with East Asia’s largest
and most influential player. Washington and Beijing have cooperated
on issues such as climate change and Iran’s nuclear program, but ten-
sions between Beijing and Tokyo in the East China Sea and between
Beijing and Washington in the South China are rising, with open talk
of the possibility for armed conflict. Although a military clash between
the United States and its allies and China remains very unlikely, there
is a growing risk of a costly arms race in Asia. Moreover, strategic
mistrust between Washington and Beijing is hampering policy coordi-
nation on the region’s most vexing security challenge; North Korea’s
pursuit of nuclear weapons. In all fairness, the Obama administration
inherited a nasty situation from its predecessor. The best efforts of
four Presidents have failed to achieve the denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula. But there is no denying that the problem has grown
much more acute on Obama’s watch. The current trajectory of U.S.-
China relations runs through dangerous Pacific shoals and Korean
mountains. Frequent course corrections will be necessary, and should
be expected. If the United States proves unable to react to East Asia’s
changing security and economic landscape, the pivot will have failed
— the “base runner” left stranded at second base.
The defining characteristic of East Asia’s regional architecture
during the Obama administration has been its fluidity. The Obama
2. Victor Cha, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/09/06/the-unfinished-legacy-of-

obamas-pivot-to-asia/ (accessed November 28, 2016).
East Asia’s Fluid Dynamics 35
administration has proven nimble in responding to events in a region

in transition; one being shaped by economic, security, and political
forces of enormous magnitude. President Trump will need to be
equally agile — perhaps rebalancing the rebalance — if he hopes to
complete three core strategic objectives of the U.S. pivot to Asia:
opening markets for trade and investment, reining in North Korea’s
nuclear ambitions, and forging a more candid, constructive, and
cooperative relationship with China.
It is frankly too soon to say whether real estate mogul-turned-
politician Donald Trump will choose to build on Obama’s Asia policy
platform or bring in a wrecking ball and start from scratch. The 2016
campaign surfaced a new obstacle to U.S. leadership — a nativist,
“America-first” trend in politics vividly illustrated by popular oppo-
sition to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and Trump’s demand
that U.S. allies pay more for Washington’s security commitments.
With voters urging Washington to concentrate on the home front and
expressing growing skepticism over the value of alliances and free
trade agreements, there is a real risk that the Trump administration
will undo whatever progress Obama has made toward strengthening
the United States’ overall position in East Asia.
Taking Stock of Obama’s Pivot to Asia
Historians are wary of reaching any grand conclusions on recent

events when the ink is not dry. The most famous illustration of this
reluctance occurred when Richard Nixon in 1972 asked Zhou Enlai
what he thought of the French revolution two centuries before. Zhou’s
response? “It’s too early to say.” Although we now know that Nixon’s
question had been misunderstood by Zhou — who thought Nixon
was asking about the events of May 1968 in Paris — Zhou’s zinger
has come to symbolize both the danger of prematurely judging
historical events and the difference between China’s “long view” of
history and the shorter time horizon of Western powers.
We probably won’t be able to gain sufficient perspective on
36 Frank Jannuzi
Obama’s pivot to Asia to judge its full effect for a few decades, at
least. Long-term, the resolution of the Korean War may determine
whether historians judge the pivot a success or failure. At this junc-
ture, the best one can do is tally some positives and negatives. The
centerpiece of the pivot’s economic plan — TPP — is on life support.
President-elect Trump has vowed to withdraw from the agreement
on day one of his Presidency, perhaps to renegotiate it, perhaps to
replace it with a series of bilateral agreements. And despite the secu-
rity accomplishments chronicled by Bader, the Obama administration
has neither resolved the vexing problem of North Korea’s nuclear
ambitions nor established a comfortable equilibrium in U.S. relations
with China. These two challenges are linked, and President Trump’s
legacy may well be determined by how well he adapts a regional
architecture constructed in the aftermath of World War II to cope
with both.
Demise of TPP Blunts, but won’t Halt, Process

of Asian Economic Integration
A process of economic integration has been underway in East Asia

for decades. President Obama sought to secure a leadership role for
the United States through the negotiation of the Trans-Pacific Part-
nership, and appeared to be on the cusp of victory before the 2016
Presidential campaign heated up. During the campaign, most of the
candidates — even those seeking the nomination of the historically
pro-trade Republican Party — came out against TPP. To the dismay
of many in the Obama administration, even Hillary Clinton denounced
TPP, a pact she once championed as the “gold standard” in free trade
agreements. Donald Trump decried not only TPP but also previous
trade agreements, especially the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment. Trump won his long-shot bid to become President in part by
appealing to Americans in the industrial heartland of the country
who believe their economic prospects have been undermined by free
trade agreements that did not create a level playing field.
With the demise of TPP, at least for the foreseeable future, the
ability of the United States to “write the rules” of trade with East
Asia has taken a big hit. It is not clear whether Trump, as President,
will seek to renegotiate TPP or find other mechanisms to advance
U.S. trade and investment with Pacific partners. It is possible that the
other TPP nations may seek to amend the agreement and proceed
without the United States — an approach recently advocated by
Brookings economist Mireya Solis.3 In any event, the processes of
trade liberalization and increased foreign direct investment seem
unlikely to reverse course. The nations of Asia are today more eco-
nomically intertwined than at any time since the height of the Silk
Road. Over the past 20 years, China has emerged as the largest trad-
ing partner for almost all of its neighbors, in the process becoming
the factory floor for companies from the United States, South Korea,
Japan, Taiwan, and the European Union. Intra-Asia trade is growing
rapidly, encouraged by free trade agreements, investment treaties,
and infrastructure upgrades, and encouraged by a veritable alphabet
soup of multinational organizations with a strong economic focus,
including the Association for East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).
Economic interdependence contributes ballast to relationships
otherwise prone to listing, and the growing trade and investment
links can serve as a check on nationalistic or xenophobic behavior. One
can see this phenomenon at work in China’s relations with Taiwan.4
The interdependence among the region’s great powers also provides
a firm foundation for regional stability and an incentive for political
3. Mireya Solis, The TPP is Dead. Long Live the TPP, http://asia.nikkei.com/
Viewpoints/Viewpoints/Mireya-Solis-The-TPP-is-dead-long-live-the-TPP
4. For a nuanced view of this cross-Strait dynamic, see Maike Okano-Heijmans,
Sander Wit, and Frans-Paul van der Putten, Towards Greater EU-Taiwan Economic
Cooperation? Netherlands Institute of International Relations analysis, https://
www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/2015%20-%20Towards%20Greater
%20EU-Taiwan%20Economic%20C%20ooperation%20-%20Clingendael%20
Report%20(FINAL).pdf (accessed November 28, 2016).
38 Frank Jannuzi
reconciliation. This is true across the region, to include the Russian

Far East, which is looking to Asia (especially Japan) as a market for
natural resources and as a source of capital investment to bring oil
and gas reserves on line. President Putin’s interest in seeking some
accommodation with Japan over the Northern Territories issue is
motivated more by economics than by geopolitics.5
TPP was designed to reinforce these positive trends. The TPP
nations together represent more than 40 percent of global GDP, and
the agreement promised not only to promote trade and investment,
but also to help balance China’s growing economic clout, providing
fresh opportunities to countries like Vietnam and Indonesia to expand
links with the United States. Assurances from Washington that China
could eventually join TPP helped assuage concerns in Beijing that the
TPP is part of a U.S.-led containment strategy, and senior Chinese
Communist Party voices have cautiously welcomed the challenge of
readying the Chinese economy for the demands of the TPP regime.6
Trump’s victory has called all of this into question, and so has cast a
dark shadow over Obama’s pivot to Asia.
Security Challenges Loom on Near Horizon
North Korea is also casting a shadow over Obama’s legacy, and the
DPRK seems likely to confront President Trump with an early test of
his administration’s ability to manage U.S. affairs in East Asia. North’s
Korea has a track record of forcing itself onto the agenda of new Pres-
idents, and 2017 is not likely to be an exception to this rule. Add in
the uncertainty of President Park Geun-hye’s pending impeachment
proceedings, and you have a made-to-order “three AM wake-up call”
for an administration before it even has a chance to get its bearings or
5. Gil Rozman, editor, Japan-Russia Relations: Implications for the U.S.-Japan Alliance,
http://spfusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Sasakawa_Japan-Russia.
pdf (accessed November 28, 2016).
6. Paul Bowles, China Debates the TPP, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/
03/20/china-debates-the-tpp/ (accessed November 28, 2016).
secure Senate confirmation of its key cabinet secretaries.

Thanks in large measure to concerted diplomacy by Secretaries
of State Hillary Clinton and John Kerry and their Deputy Secretaries,
Jim Steinberg and Anthony Blinken, the region’s great powers today
generally share a common assessment of the dangers posed by North
Korea’s nuclear ambitions. Apart from the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea, the other five members of the defunct Six Party Talks share
the view that the DPRK must abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons
and demonstrate a genuine commitment to keep the peace and
respect international norms. At their 2015 summit meeting, Xi Jinping
and Park Geun-hye demonstrated remarkable solidarity on how best
to respond to North Korea’s continued intransigence.7 That unity was
also on display at the UN Security Council, which swiftly condemned
the DPRK’s missile launch on September 5, 2016, and its fifth nuclear
test on September 8, 2016. In each case, the UN body conferred for less
than 24 hours before condemning the North for flagrantly violating
repeated resolutions of the Security Council.
Unfortunately, the “Five” have not always maintained solidarity,
especially when it comes to enforcing sanctions, negotiating with the
DPRK, or using military moves to deter DPRK aggression. Chinese
sanctions enforcement has been lackluster, often falling short of U.S.
hopes and expectations.8 China and Russia repeatedly have urged the
United States and ROK to engage the DPRK in dialogue without precon-
ditions, while Washington and Seoul have insisted that the DPRK first
take “concrete steps” to prove its sincere interest in denuclearization.
The big story on the diplomatic front in 2016 was not the convergence of
views on the DPRK, but the divergence of Beijing and Seoul over the
Republic of Korea’s decision to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area
Defense (THAAD) system as a military response to the DPRK’s grow-
7. Foster Klug, China Snubs North Korean Leader in Visit to Seoul, http://bigstory.
ap.org/article/chinese-leaders-seoul-visit-snubs-north-korea (accessed November
28, 2016).
8. Stephen Haggard, Once Again, Sanctions Enforcement, https://piie.com/blogs/
north-korea-witness-transformation/once-again-sanctions-enforcement
40 Frank Jannuzi
ing ballistic missile capabilities. Despite assurances that THAAD would

in no way compromise China’s ballistic missile capabilities, Beijing
chose to vehemently condemn Seoul’s decision in July to deploy the
system. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi argued that Seoul’s decision
had “harmed the foundation of mutual trust between the two coun-
tries.” Beijing is likely worried that by integrating the ROK into its
missile defense architecture, the United States, long term, will improve
its ability to monitor Chinese ICBMs. My guess is that President Xi is
less concerned about THAAD, per se, than he is about Seoul moving
closer into Washington’s strategic orbit.
The bottom line is that China and the United States do not agree
on how best to steer the Korean Peninsula toward a future marked by
unification and peace. Disagreements among the ROK, China, and
the United States over how best to orchestrate/encourage/respond
to the prospects for Korean unification are likely to strain ties for
years, if not decades.
Competing visions for the future of the Korean Peninsula illus-
trate a core truth about contemporary East Asia. Despite progress
toward regional cohesion and evidence of complementary economic
and security interests, countervailing trends of growing nationalism,
and zero-sum thinking, exacerbated by many territorial disputes, have
accompanied the rise of China. The U.S. pivot to Asia hasn’t calmed
these waters.
Strategic Rivalries...
Nowhere are the tensions more pronounced than between Japan and
China. China’s rise and two decades of economic stagnation in Japan
have flipped the two nations’ relative positions. Officials in Tokyo
lament “Japan’s passing,” while officials in Beijing brag that the 21st
century belongs to the Middle Kingdom. The Sumo wrestling between
Japan and China for dominance in East Asia necessarily involves the
United States, Japan’s treaty ally and ultimate security guarantor. The
strategic rivalry between Beijing and Tokyo is compounded by com-
peting interpretations of history, particularly the roots of the Second

World War and Japan’s responsibility for crimes against humanity
during that conflict. Prime Minister Abe’s controversial 2014 visit to
the Yasukuni Shrine brought these issues back into play.9
To listen to some prominent voices on the current state of affairs
in Northeast Asia is to hear dire warnings of the potential for great
power conflict. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe caused a big
splash at the World Economic Forum in Davos on January 23, 2014,
when he compared contemporary Sino-Japanese relations to German-
UK relations prior to the start of World War I.10 Taking the analogy
further, he blamed China’s rapid increase in military spending —
double digit growth for more than a decade — for causing instability
in the region. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s rebuttal of Abe’s
remarks — calling them a “total disorder of space and time” — was
biting enough to underscore, in fact, Abe’s central point: tensions
among the great powers of Northeast Asia are high, and growing.
More recently, expanded Chinese air and naval patrols in the waters
surrounding Japan have prompted hundreds of sorties by Japan’s
Air Self Defense Forces. Something needs to be done to restore equi-
librium. As ROK Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se said, “Our choices
will dictate whether we will be able to overcome the confrontation
and conflict and usher in an era of trust and cooperation, or shall let
the specter of old history, i.e. ‘the curse of geopolitics’ return to haunt
us.”11 Or as Henry Kissinger warned in 2014: “Asia is more in a posi-
9. Martin Fackler, Japan’s Foreign Minister Says Apologies to Wartime Victims Will
Be Upheld, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/09/world/asia/japans-foreign-
minister-says-apologies-to-wartime-victims-will-be-upheld.html?_r=0 (accessed
November 28, 2016).
10. Kiyoshi Takanaka, Abe sees World War One echoes in Japan-China tensions, http://
www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/23/us-japan-china-idUSBREA0M08G2014
0123 (accessed November 28, 2016).
11. Yun Byung-se, Korea’s Vision for Unification and the Future of East Asia, http://
www.mofa.go.kr/webmodule/htsboard/template/read/engreadboard.jsp?
typeID=12&boardid=14137&seqno=313852&c=&t=&pagenum=1&tableName
=TYPE_ENGLISH&pc=&dc=&wc=&lu=&vu=&iu=&du= (accessed November
28, 2016).
42 Frank Jannuzi
tion of 19th-century Europe, where military conflict is not ruled

out.”12
Abe’s words at Davos resonated with his audience — even those
who disagreed with his historical analogy — because the world has
never been deft at accommodating the rise of a new great power.
China’s emergence on the global stage is unlikely to be an exception
to this rule. China’s rise is already reshaping East Asia’s geopolitics.
China has tried to reassure its neighbors that its rise will be “peaceful,”
but the very formulation — China’s peaceful rise — underscores the
fact that many in the region and beyond are nervous about the impli-
cations of China’s growing comprehensive national power. No one
talks of India’s peaceful rise or Brazil’s peaceful rise.
... in a Region Lacking Security Regimes
East Asia is marked by the relative absence of effective multilateral

security arrangements. As Former Japanese Defense Minister Yuriko
Koike observed in April, 2013, “Although Asia is the world’s most
dynamic region, it has a paucity of institutional mechanisms for resolv-
ing — or at least mitigating — international disputes of the type that
are ratcheting up tension across the region.”13 The East Asia Summit
provides a venue for high level policy deliberations, and the ASEAN
Regional Forum (ARF) affords an annual opportunity for defense offi-
cials to meet and compare notes on regional developments. But these
talk shops provide only a veneer of regionalism to an architecture
defined more by growing nationalism than by the subservience of
national ambitions to a shared vision of regional prosperity and security.
12. Jonathan Tirone and Patrick Donahue, Kissinger Says Asia is Like 19th Century
Europe on Use of Force, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-02-02/
kissinger-says-asia-is-like-19th-century-europe-on-use-of-force.html (accessed
November 28, 2016).
13. Yuriko Koike, Northeast Asia on the Brink, https://www.project-syndicate.
org/commentary/defusing-tensions-between-northeast-asia-s-big-three-by-
yuriko-koike (accessed November 28, 2016).
In fact, as at last year’s ARF meeting in Singapore, recent gatherings of

East Asian security officials seem as likely to inflame passions as to
calm the waters and foster collegiality.
East Asia has no NATO-like structures to provide strategic reas-
surance to smaller states worried about the potential consequences of
the rise of China across all dimensions — economic, military, and
political. Instead, the still dominant and most enduring security
structure of East Asia is the U.S. “hub and spoke” system defined by a
series of bilateral relationships woven into a defacto regional alliance
structure. U.S. treaty allies Japan, Republic of Korea, Australia, New
Zealand, Thailand, and the Philippines anchor this hub and spoke
system. Strong defense ties between the United States, Singapore,
Indonesia, and Taiwan, augmented by growing security partnerships
with Malaysia and Vietnam, provide additional capability to mitigate
regional strife, fight piracy, and respond to humanitarian disasters.
But much of this architecture is both politically and militarily anti-
quated, and badly in need of refresh. It was built, as Chinese critics
are quick to point out, with the Cold War in mind, and is only just
now beginning to adapt to the security challenges of the 21st Century.
Ironically, it is on the divided Korean Peninsula — where the shadows
of the Cold War still linger — that the United States, its Korean and
Japanese allies, and China and Russia may soon be forced to adapt
their thinking and their modes of interaction.
Korean Unification: Ultimate Test of the Pivot

and of U.S.-China Relations
Although it is impossible to predict precisely when and how the

Korean Peninsula will be united, it seems inevitable that one day the
Korean people, long divided, will join together as one nation. And
although the mode of unification — peaceful, violent, voluntary,
coerced — will have a huge impact on the unified state that emerges,
certain ground truths will likely prove decisive. The ROK is a vibrant,
politically stable, economically developed, democratic society, fully
44 Frank Jannuzi
integrated into the global community. It has twice the population of

the DPRK and its economy dwarfs that of its northern neighbor. It
enjoys a close military alliance with the United States, and its own
armed forces are much more capable than those of North Korea, with
the important exception of their lack of nuclear weapons. But that
deficiency is more than compensated by the credible extended deter-
rence offered by the massive U.S. nuclear arsenal. By contrast, the
DPRK is an impoverished, underdeveloped, politically anachronistic
state. It is isolated diplomatically and economically, and heavily sanc-
tioned for its pursuit of nuclear weapons. Its military is equipped
with antiquated weapons, and personnel are undertrained and
undernourished. The North most likely has a small stockpile of
nuclear weapons, but, as yet, no proven delivery systems.
Whenever unification does come, the people of South Korea and
their elected leaders will wield decisive influence over the final dispo-
sition of a unitary Korean state. That will be a good thing for the
Korean people, for the contrast between North and South does not
stop with “rich and poor,” or “strong and weak.” The government of
the DPRK — marked by feudal succession — is responsible for a
system characterized by massive human rights abuses. As Roseanne
Rife wrote in her capacity as Director of East Asia Research at Amnesty
International, “The gravity and nature of human rights violations are
off the scale.”
Amnesty’s conclusions were validated in 2013 by the UN Com-
mission of Inquiry (COI) into the human rights conditions in the
DPRK. The key findings of the commission about the DPRK include
the following:
• There is almost complete denial of the right to freedom of thought,

conscience, and religion;
• Entrenched patterns of discrimination, rooted in the state-assigned
class system, affect every part of life;
• Discrimination against women is pervasive in all aspects of society;
• The state has used food as a means of control over the population
and deliberately blocked aid for ideological reasons, causing the
deaths of hundreds of thousands of people;
• Hundreds of thousands of political prisoners have died in “unspeak-

able atrocities” in prison camps in the past 50 years; and
• Security forces systematically employ violence and punishments that
amount to gross human rights violations in order to create a climate
of fear.
The COI found that crimes against humanity have likely been com-
mitted by North Korea, and it wrote to North Korean leader Kim Jong
Un, warning him that senior officials may be held responsible.
Assuming that Korea will one day achieve unification, what kind
of state will emerge? I believe it is reasonable to expect several things:
• The new state will adopt political, economic, and social systems
closely resembling those of the ROK, bringing a higher quality of life
to the people of the former DPRK;
• The unified state will likely enjoy normal relations with all its neigh-
bors, including China — just as the ROK does today; and
• The unified state will be a member in good standing in the interna-
tional community.
Will a unified Korea remain a treaty ally of the United States? That
will be up to the Korean people to decide. It seems unlikely that the
Korean people would ignore all the benefits of the alliance — security
assurances in a region where Korea is surrounded by larger powers,
access to advanced military hardware and intelligence assets, interop-
erability with a global superpower, and a track record of six decades
of joint struggle against common adversaries — once the threat of
the DPRK was removed. But the nature of the alliance would almost
certainly change, and there would be a reassessment of the balance
and disposition of military forces. Some Koreans would probably
advocate for a complete withdrawal of U.S. forces. A significant
draw-down, particularly of Army troops, seems very likely in the
context of peaceful unification. But if Washington coordinates closely
with Seoul to manage the process of unification, the alliance will
endure post-unification.
Americans would surely welcome peaceful unification, as it
46 Frank Jannuzi
would remove a dire national security threat to both the USA and the
ROK, and bring about an improvement in the lives of more than 23
million Koreans living north of the DMZ. It would free up military
resources to be deployed elsewhere or to be demobilized. And despite
the enormous challenges associated with modernizing the DPRK,
unification will not only be a “burden,” but also an opportunity. It will
create new economic opportunities, including trade links to Europe,
raw materials, inexpensive skilled labor, and sparsely populated
land, that the people of a unified Korea will jointly exploit. There will
be plenty of tasks, and the investment and energy not only of the
Korean people, but also of Europeans, Americans, Japanese, and
Chinese, will be needed to bring about a transformation of the North.
Chinese Pragmatism will Trump History and Ideology
The impact of Korean unification on U.S.-China relations is harder to

foresee. Much will depend on the means of unification, and we simply
cannot predict that with any certainty. Some Chinese may lament the
loss of their traditional “buffer state” and ally. The People’s Liberation
Army dispatched upwards of 1 million “volunteers” to fight in the
Korean War, and Mao’s son was among the casualties. There will likely
be voices in China who ask on unification, “What were we fighting
for?” Others may be concerned that unification would undermine
China’s privileged economic position in the North. Sanctions on
North Korea have left China with a strangle hold on DPRK trade and
investment opportunities, such as they are. But overall, China-DPRK
economic relations are much less important than China-ROK trade,
which now exceeds $200 billion. The North is more an economic
liability for China than an asset, standing in the way of greater Chinese
prosperity in Dongbei.
Ultimately, China seems likely to respond pragmatically to unifi-
cation, concluding as U.S. scholar Minxin Pei did, that the smart bet
for Beijing is on Seoul.14 Officially, the Chinese government is on
record welcoming unification, but with the caveat that Beijing would
prefer to see an “independent” nation. Beijing’s support for the Six

Party Talks, which include a mechanism to negotiate an end to the
war and a process of North-South rapprochement, provides further
evidence of China’s embrace of unification as a desirable end state.
Future Regional Order
The ultimate test of the pivot will be whether the United States and
China avoid the established power-rising power security dilemma.
Projecting into the future, East Asia’s regional order will likely hinge
on whether China and the United States make room for each other.
The process of Korean denuclearization and unification may be the
first test of the ability of the great powers to cooperate — a test of
whether China will view the U.S. hub and spoke security architecture
as a strategy of containment or a bulwark of stability. That test may
come sooner than we think.
For the better part of 30 years, the United States and its allies
have been trying to convince the DPRK to abandon its pursuit of
nuclear weapons, with disappointing results. President Trump will
certainly rethink Obama’s approach. As an experienced business man
and deal maker, he may decide it’s time for the United States to
launch a multilateral initiative designed to attack the DPRK’s nuclear
ambitions enfilade rather than by frontal assault. The objective would
be to shift the focus of diplomacy from the North’s plutonium to its
people through a multifaceted engagement strategy based on the
Helsinki process launched by the United States and its allies during
the Cold War.
A Helsinki-style engagement strategy could be designed to aug-
ment, rather than replace the Six Party Talks, assuming they can be
resuscitated. The Helsinki-style approach would begin with a modest
agenda focused on confidence and security building measures to
14. Pei Minxin, Would China Block Korean Unification? http://thediplomat.com/

2013/01/would-china-block-korean-unification/ (accessed November 28, 2016).
48 Frank Jannuzi
reduce tensions and the risk of conflict emerging from miscommuni-

cation or miscalculation. Other dialogue topics would include energy
security, economic modernization, agriculture reform, international
trade and finance, social welfare, health policy, education, legal and
judicial systems, women’s rights, refugees, freedom of religion and
belief and the rights of the disabled.
Engagement of this sort would have to be given time to succeed.
It does not offer a quick fix to end the North’s nuclear ambitions or
eliminate its human rights violations, but neither do the alternatives
of coercive diplomacy or military strikes. And all military options
run the risk of exacerbating, rather than alleviating, great power ten-
sions. The goal would be to so fundamentally alter the situation that
a treaty ending the Korean War and denuclearizing the Korean
peninsula would be within reach rather than a bridge too far.
This approach has a number of advantages. First, it has the
potential to unify South Korean progressives, who first embraced the
notion under the presidency of Kim Dae-jung, and conservatives,
who see potential for it based on the German model of unification.
Second, Helsinki-style engagement has proven its value already,
helping to promote economic reform and greater respect for human
rights inside the nations of the Soviet bloc. Third, it offers a step-by-
step approach suited to a political environment devoid of trust. Initial
small-scale confidence building measures — reciprocal actions that
signal peaceful intentions — could create an environment more con-
ducive to taking larger risks for peace. Finally, an inclusive, regional
approach allays concerns that any one country would dominate the
structure. It would also allow middle powers to play a constructive
role — note the helpful advice on freedom of expression Mongolian
President Elbegdorj offered Kim Jong-Un in a speech to students at
Kim Il Sung University during his recent visit to Pyongyang.
So why hasn’t the Helsinki concept gained more traction in the
corridors of the Old Executive Office Building or the State Depart-
ment? Perhaps because the necessary preconditions for a Helsinki
process have not been met. The 1975 Helsinki Final Act did not begin
the process of détente; it followed it.
Jump-starting détente in Northeast Asia will require a bold diplo-

matic opening — think “Kissinger to China” bold. President Obama
would have had to channel the “Yes, We Can” spirit of 2008 rather
than the “Oh, No We Shouldn’t” spirit of 2016. Perhaps President
Trump, who craves being the center of attention, will take the plunge.
North Korea’s neighbors will likely embrace any U.S. move that
breathes fresh life into the diplomatic process.
It’s hard to say exactly how the DPRK might respond to such an
opening from Trump. DPRK officials managing energy policy, agri-
culture, light industry, science, and education have much to gain
from reducing North Korea’s political and economic isolation and
cultivating foreign investment, trade, and exchanges. But their clout
has been undercut by years of failed nuclear diplomacy and height-
ened military tension. Kim Jong Un, on the other hand, can probably
survive, if not thrive, even if the DPRK remains a pariah state. But he
might be flattered to deal directly with a world leader with whom he
shares certain character traits. If approached and offered a deal, Kim
Jong Un might defy expectations and try to navigate a path toward
peace and denuclearization. It would be supremely ironic if President
Trump negotiated an end to the Korean stand-off and charted a course
toward denuclearization and unification — ensuring a positive his-
torical legacy for Obama’s most identifiable foreign policy initiative,
his pivot to Asia, by securing a peace the Nobel laureate couldn’t
grasp.
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Vol. 25, No. 2, 2016, 51–75
A Realistic Process towards Korean Unification

and the Harmonized Privatization
of Properties in the Unified Korea:
Issues, Priorities, and Opinions
of Key Stakeholders*
Hyoungsoo Zang
This article presents three prerequisites to a potential Korean unifica-

tion, implying that South should make every effort to accommodate
the wishes of the North Korean to achieve permanent unification of the
Korean Peninsula. Removing the Demilitarized Zone that currently
separates the Koreas would be a key aspect of unification efforts in
order to satisfy the first prerequisite to long-lasting peace. Moreover, a
unified Korea will still need to treat North Koreans under a separate
system of social security at the onset of efforts, albeit including suffi-
cient economic incentives to North Koreans for this to remain feasible.
A contribution of this article to the existing literature is its proposed
guiding principles for resource allocation to make an economic pack-
age persuasive, including the nationalization of North Korean proper-
ties by the unified Korean government to commence the unification
process. Following this, the properties could be privatized in a harmo-
nized way, in conjunction with other unification policies.
Keywords: Korean unification, prerequisites of realistic Korean unifi-

cation, temporary separation of social security system, start-up assets,
harmonized privatization of national properties
* This research was supported by the research fund of Hanyang University (HY-
2014-G).
52 Hyoungsoo Zang
Introduction
The possibility of Korean unification became one of the primary con-

cerns of the South Korean government1 in the aftermath of the disso-
lution of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the North Korean econ-
omy in the early 1990’s. The unforeseen death of Kim Il-Sung in July
1994 and ensuing economic crisis and famine within North Korea,2
ignited numerous policy studies on the possibilities for Korean unifi-
cation and its aftermath. At the time, both South Korean and Ameri-
can intelligence authorities predicted a sudden collapse of the North
Korean regime within a few years. However, the regime of Kim Jong-
Il, which followed that of his father, would survive, and coupled with
the 1998 financial crisis in throughout East Asia, South Korean poli-
cymakers would turn their attention away from matters of unifica-
tion. Economic anxiety had shifted their concerns towards the likely
burdens that would follow reunification, and interest in Unification
Studies decreased dramatically.
The historic North-South Korean Summit in mid-June 2000 created
a completely different atmosphere in South Korean academia. A new
term, “Inter-Korean Economic Exchanges and Cooperation” emerged
to replace “Korean unification.” Human and physical exchange
between the two Koreas expanded very rapidly from that point until
July 8, 2008, when a South Korean tourist was shot to death by North
Korean soldiers just outside the Kumkang Mountain Tourist Area.
The South Korean government has banned travel to the Kumkang
Mountain tourism since then, and North-South Korean exchanges
and cooperation started to waver. This was exacerbated by the North
Korean sinking of the South Korean warship, the Cheonanham, and
the deaths of 46 South Korean marines on March 26, 2010. South
Korea reacted with strict bilateral sanctions on all exchange with
1. Although the “Republic of Korea” (ROK) is the official country name, we use
“South Korea” to emphasize that two Koreas will eventually be unified some
time from now.
2. Although the Democratic People’s Republic (DPRK) is the official country
name, we use North Korea.
A Realistic Process towards Korean Unification and the Harmonized Privatization of Properties in the Unified Korea 53
North Korea. The following year, the North Korean Leader, Kim
Jong-Il suddenly died on December 17, 2011 and his youngest son
Kim Jong-Un inherited the regime’s totalitarian power at the age of
28. The young North Korean leader has been regarded by many out-
side observers as unpredictable and immature, with some foreign
observers asserting that the execution of his uncle, Jang Song-Taek is
a signal towards the unstable nature of the Kim Jong-Un regime. Kim
Jong-Un’s decision to conduct a fourth nuclear test and launch a
ballistic missile in early 2016 resulted in much stronger bilateral and
multilateral sanctions on North Korea, leading some South Koreans
to again mention probable Korean unification in recent years.
There has been significant study on how to integrate the two Koreas
after unification. Privatization of national properties in the territory
of what is today North Korea is one of the most popular proposals.
Most scholars present the most “desirable” policy prescriptions on
the issues, though very few of them discuss the implications of a
“practical and realistic” process for Korean unification concerning the
policies for nationalized properties in the newly-unified Korea. More-
over, unification itself is clearly not able to be completed piecemeal
but instead demands an integrated synthesis of solutions. Policies for
managing the national properties in the unified Korea thus need to
be considered in harmony with other unification policies.
We start with examining the approximately year-and-a-half-long
German unification process, lasting from 1989 till late-1990. Many
critics at the time discussed failures in German policy at the time of
unification, such as the sudden monetary unification of East Germany,
which resulted in abrupt increases in East German wages and there-
after a sudden collapse of East German industry. Upon gleaning
some new and practical insights from the case of German unification,
we present realistic prerequisites for successful Korean unification,
which will lead us to formulate the implications of practical and real-
istic processes for Korean unification. In the meantime, we can also
rule out unification processes that are unrealistic and infeasible.
Using this historical discussion as a foundation, we will note the
importance of utilizing strategy in nationalizing certain properties in
54 Hyoungsoo Zang
a unified Korea. We will conclude with a proposal for a harmonized

process of privatization of property in the unified Korea to perma-
nently cement Korean unification.
Reexamining the Case of German Unification
German unification was criticized a case of insufficient preparation by

political critics, with their prevailing opinion being that monetary uni-
fication (July 1, 1990) in advance of political unification (October 3,
1990) was the most critical mistake in the process of German unifica-
tion. Exchanges of the East German currency into the West German
currency on too favorable terms for the East Germans were destined to
result in wage increases in East Germany. East German firms with low
productivity levels were unable to remain afloat in the pressures of the
resulting sudden wage increases. The West German government had
to allocate more resources than expected to help the newly-integrated
East German states catch up with their West German counterparts.
Nonetheless, political critics have overlooked some important aspects
of German monetary unification. We need to examine the German
unification process in greater detail to understand how.
Was the German Monetary Unification of July 1990 a Policy Failure?

A Reassessment
The historic fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989 signified the
everlasting will of East Germans who chose to migrate to West Ger-
many in response to uncertainly over their future. From the opening
of the border with East Germany in October 1989, almost 600,000
people migrated to West Germany in just a six-month period. East
German demonstrators shouted that “If the Deutschmark [West German
currency] does not come to us, we will go to it.” West Germans did
not want a mass migration of East Germans into the West. In this
context, monetary unification was regarded as a big step towards
preventing mass migration, thereby allowing East Germans to obtain
financial assets and salaries of sufficient quality and quantity without

migrating to the West.3 The West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl,
thus, proposed in early February 1990 an early monetary unification,
scheduled in July 1990, to lessen mass migration flows and perma-
nently cement unification.4
In spite of this, in early 1990, the prospects for the first East German
democratic multi-party election, scheduled to be held in mid-March
of 1990, were not very optimistic for Helmut Kohl. Votes for rapid
unification seemed not to decisively beat those for gradual unification.
The West German administration did its best to garner the enthusiastic
support of East Germans for a rapid and permanent unification. In
so doing, early monetary unification, with favorable terms for East
Germans, paved the way for successful German unification without
mass migration into the West. Politics dominates economics in almost
all cases. Thus, German monetary unification was regarded as a
consensus policy, supported by both the majority of East and West
Germans.
Was German Unification a Case of Absorption or of Negotiation

and Agreement?
German unification was commonly regarded as unification through

absorption. The fifteen East German regions (“Bezirk”) were re-
grouped to become five new federal states and merged with already
existing Federal Republic of Germany. Almost all political, economic,
and social institutions from the Western regions would exercise control
in the Eastern regions. East Germany became a part of West Germany;
the former was absorbed by the latter. Nonetheless, as discussed above,
West German and East German administrations negotiated over and
agreed with each other on most of major issues before unification, such
3. Further, East Germans could also get the same social security benefits as
West Germans after political unification.
4. Bernhard Seliger, “Ten Years after German Economic Unification: Are There
Any Lessons for Korean Unification?” International Journal of Korean Unification
Studies 10, no. 1 (2011), p. 129.
56 Hyoungsoo Zang
as monetary unification and the establishment of a public agency for

restructuring and privatizing state-owned properties in East Germany.
Even Helmut Kohl promised East Germans, in the period before unifi-
cation, to create a “flourishing landscape” in East Germany in order to
attract East German votes.5 German unification was definitely not a
forced unification but rather a negotiated and agreed upon one.
Indeed, every peaceful unification process requires some kind of
negotiation between the involved parties. Unification through absorp-
tion does not rule out unification through negotiation and agreements,
and vice versa. The two concepts of unification are not mutually exclu-
sive. Even the forceful and military unification case of Vietnam in 1975
included a kind of conciliation policy in favor of South Vietnam. The
Socialist Republic of Vietnam has three top leaders, the General Secre-
tary of the Communist Party, the President, and the Prime Minister of
Vietnam. To ensure a sustained and permanent unification, the posi-
tions have traditionally been allocated to someone from the Southern,
Central, and Northern regions of Vietnam. In the process of achieving
peaceful Korean unification, the importance of negotiation and agree-
ment between the South and the North cannot be underestimated.
Three Prerequisites for a Realistic Korean Unification

Process and their Implications
We present realistic prerequisites for Korean unification. The most

important prerequisite is that the North Korean people themselves
want unification with the South. Secondly, a North Korean Govern-
ment representing the will of the people would need to be in power.
Lastly the international community, including the US and China,
would need to be cooperative (or at least, not an active hindrance).6
5. Seliger, “Ten Years after German Economic Unification: Are There Any
Lessons for Korean Unification?” p. 118.
6. Hyoungsoo Zang, “A New Look on Korean Unification and Its Financing
Issues” (in Korean), Policy Studies [Jeongchaek Yeongu], Winter 2011 (2011), p.
135.
The German unification case clearly fulfilled these prerequisites.

Firstly, East Germans wanted to unify with the West and chose their
democratic government implementing their will through democratic
multi-party elections. The elected East German government negotiated
and agreed with the West to be absorbed into the Federal Republic of
Germany. The USA, the UK, the USSR, and France did not interfere.7 8
We discuss some novel implications of the above prerequisites of
Korean unification next.
Collapse of the North Korean Regime Would not be Enough

for Korean Unification
There have been a number of discussions on the scenarios of Korean

unification. Some of them include the possibility of North Korean
regime collapse.9 Quite a few South Koreans believe that a North
Korean collapse would be a sufficient precursor for Korean unification.
Thus, they believe that the South Korean forces, in concert with the
US, would have a genuine right to make an entry into the northern
part of the Korean Peninsula, which they hold to be the genuine terri-
tory of South Korea which has been occupied unlawfully by the North
Korean regime. Unfortunately, their belief would not be practically
materialized today. A future collapse of the current North Korean
regime, followed by South Korean and American intervention in
North Korea, would almost surely invite Chinese intervention into
North Korea as well.10 China would likely claim that the alliance
7. For the perceptions of the US, Japan, China and Russia (collectively called
the Big Four) on Korean unification, see Kyuryoon KIm, et al., The Attraction
of Korean Unification, Research on Unification Costs and Benefits 2013-2
(Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2013), pp. 159-308.
8. For the perceptions of other countries than the Big Four on Korean unifica-
tion, see Kyuryoon KIm, et al., Global Expectations for Korean Unification,
Research on Unification Costs and Benefits 2014-1 (Seoul: Korea Institute for
National Unification, 2014), pp. 7-360.
9. Bruce W. Bennett, Preparing for the Possibility of a North Korean Collapse,
National Security Research Division, Rand Corporation, 2013.
10. For detailed discussions, see Bennett, Preparing for the Possibility of a North
58 Hyoungsoo Zang
treaty (Article 2) signed in 1961 with North Korea would oblige one
party to intervene immediately on behalf of the other party once the
latter is invaded.
China’s possible military intervention in North Korea would
affect the prospect of Korean unification in a number of ways. It is
demonstrably not against Chinese national interests to support the
presence of the state of North Korea in the northern part of the Korean
Peninsula as a buffer state. Unification through military action with-
out satisfying its prerequisites would be impossible or at least highly
unlikely until Chinese national interests in the Korean Peninsula
changed substantially.11 Likewise, even without Chinese military
intervention, a North Korean collapse would not naturally lead to
Korean unification unless both the North Korean people and govern-
ment agree with unification with the South. A North Korean collapse
instead would most likely lead to establishment of a pro-China
regime in North Korea. As of now, unfortunately, North Korean peo-
ple do not know much about where they stand and how much they
suffer. After the passage of time, they would be able to know it even-
tually. Korean unification will need some time to be realized.
Korean Unification Requires Negotiated Agreements

between Participating Parties
The most significant implication of the realistic prerequisites of Korean

unification discussed above is that all kinds of state unification
require some kind of agreement between the two parties through a
certain negotiation process. The negotiation power between the two
states would vary in accordance with the situation at the time of an
Korean Collapse, pp. 87-91.

11. China has clearly opposed the American proposal to ban China’s petroleum
exports to North Korea as a new UN Security Council Sanction to the North
Korea’s 4th nuclear test and a ballistic missile launch in early 2016. China has
always maintained a “red line” that should not be crossed to maintain the
peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula. To them, it is the presence of
North Korea.
imminent unification. One of the states naturally would lead and the
other would follow in the negotiation process. However, the leading
state will not be able to wholly dominate the process; it should accom-
modate major concerns of the follower state as much as possible.
Otherwise, the unification process itself may falter and move back-
wards. Successful unification itself requires the explicit and implicit
consent of all (or most of) parties involved.
More specifically, in order to secure enough support for unifica-
tion among the North Korean people, sufficient prearranged economic
incentives would need to be offered to them during negotiations just
as West Germany did for the East German people between November
1989 and July 1990. The South would need to offer a much better
standard of living for the North Korean people after unification than
their status quo. Moreover, it is much more important during the
negotiation process to fulfill expectations of a majority of North Korean
people that they will be better off after unification. We will discuss
the principles and grand design of unification policies later. Here, we
present a general principle: Except for the ranks of North Korean
most powerful elites, most North Korean people including public
officials and soldiers of low-to-mid-grades would need to be pardoned
through a pre-announced general amnesty by a joint authoritative
entity before establishing the unified Korean government.
Is South Korea Financially Ready for Potential Korean Unification?
Another important concern for the sustainability of Korean unifica-

tion is the size of the compensation package for the North Korean
people, beyond what a simple calculation of unification costs would
show. The experiences of Yemen in accidentally reverting to their old
divided status and the ensuing civil war in the early 1990s should not
be replicated by Koreans. A complete, verifiable, irrevocable, and
sustainable Korean unification requires the credible alleviation of
uncertainties regarding unification process. People who will live in
the unified Korea need clear assurance for better life after unification.
Otherwise, they will not support it.
60 Hyoungsoo Zang
Thus, Korean unification will naturally accompany significant

costs. Most important would be the economic strength and fiscal
soundness of the South Korean government to pay for these so-called
unification costs. West Germany was the 3rd largest economy in the
world in 1990 and its currency, the Deutschmark, was the world’s
strongest. However, South Korea will not be able to match West
Germany’s might for decades. Fortunately, recent developments in
financial mechanisms make resource mobilization towards infrastruc-
ture much more feasible than in the 1990s. West Germany mainly
spent resources from its own fiscal coffers in the reconstruction of the
Eastern region after unification. In contrast, the rehabilitation of the
North Korean economy would be shared increasingly by the (interna-
tional) private sector. Higher utilization of public-private partnerships
(hereafter, PPP) would be possible as the political and commercial
risks of PPP projects will certainly decrease after a successful Korean
unification.
Nonetheless, the major portion of the unification costs would
still be income transfers from the South to the North. South Korea
will need to accommodate North Korean people’s wishes as much as
possible, and the most likely mechanism for doing so by the unified
Korean government would remain through fiscal measures. Substantial
issuance of government bonds and a greater amount of levied taxes
will be inevitable to accommodate these fiscal needs. After German
unification, West Germany has dedicated about 5 percent of its GDP
annually towards various kinds of economic and income subsidies to
East Germany. For the sake of comparison, the population of East
Germany was roughly one-quarter that of West Germany, but their
income level was roughly one-tenth its Western neighbor in 1990. On
the contrary, the population of North Korea is roughly one-half that
of South Korea, but the income required to maintain their popula-
tion’s standard of living is roughly one-thirtieth of their Southern
counterpart. The relative burden placed upon the average South
Korean will be six times greater than what was placed upon the average
West German. That is to say, South Korea will need to dedicate 30
percent of its GDP annually towards North Korean relief efforts,
which simply represents an infeasible unification scenario. Due to

these harsh economic realities, the so-called “unification costs argu-
ment” has prevailed widely in South Korea. More than a few South
Koreans believe that Korean unification will result in definite intoler-
able damage to the South Korean economy and thus a “Plan B” will
merit serious consideration.
Forceful and Physical Separation of the North from the South

after Political Unification will not be Practical
The idea of temporarily maintaining the Demilitarized Zone (here-

after, DMZ) under the ruling of the unified Korean government and
forceful separation of the southern and northern parts of the Korean
peninsula has recently been discussed as an alternative for reducing
the enormous financial burden of Korean unification. This idea however
could not satisfy the first prerequisite of Korean unification: North
Korean people should want unification and its outcomes with the
South. The North Korean people would likely voice fierce opposition
to physical separation of the North from the South after political unifi-
cation. We can rule out that kind of unification method simply
because it cannot achieve unification of two Koreas.
And yet, while we have noted that a forcefully maintained physical
separation of the North from the South after Korean unification would
not constitute a “Plan B,” we need to understand what exactly makes
it so infeasible. South Koreans have worried about a possibility of an
immediate mass-migration of North Korean residents into the South,
which would certainly result in many negative consequences, includ-
ing downward pressures on the wages of unskilled labor, enormous
demands for social welfare services, and inevitable but avoidable tur-
moil in the South.12 The temporary maintenance of the DMZ and
prohibition of unsolicited migration from the North to the South
12. Holger Wolf, “Korean Unification: Lesson from Germany,” in Economic Integra-
tion of the Korean Peninsula, Marcus Noland (ed.) (Washington, D.C.: Peterson
Institute for International Economics, 1998), pp. 174-175.
62 Hyoungsoo Zang
would keep the wages of unskilled labor stable in the South, make
fiscal transfers from the South to the North as small as possible, and
thus could hopefully result in a gradual and not-as-expensive inte-
gration of the two Korean economies. The idea is unfortunately based
on the impractical belief that South Koreans would be able to deter-
mine the will of North Koreans at a time that Korean unification
seems to be imminent. However, the idea would not be realized as
the North Korean people would never support unification of that
kind to begin with. South Koreans yearning for Korean unification
will encounter grave challenges in tending to the hearts of the North
Korean people while minding their own purse strings.
Let North Koreans decide to stay or migrate
Every feasible solution to South Korean reintegration challenges

would need to comprise the consent of both North and South Korean
residents. The North would not accept a forced physical separation
with their Southern neighbor, while the South remains unwilling to
bear too high a fiscal burden arising from Korean unification. A
newly-unified Korean government would certainly face enormous
challenges to tackle before completing Korean political unification.
Macroeconomic stabilization policies will be a necessity to cope with
these challenges. Providing North Koreans with essential consumer
goods for a sufficient period of time after unification to prevent
humanitarian crises will also be required.
As we gleaned from careful examination of the German unifica-
tion case, fiscal transfers from the South to the North to prevent a
sudden mass immigration would be a key issue again in the Korean
unification case as well. The South Korean economy, however, would
simply not be able to replicate the achievement of West Germany.13
13. Soogil Young, Chang-Jae Lee, and Hyoungsoo Zang, “Preparing for the
Economic Integration of Two Koreas: Policy Challenges to South Korea,” in
Economic Integration of the Korean Peninsula, Marcus Noland (ed.) (Washington,
D.C.: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 1998), p. 269.
To be precise, the major portion of fiscal needs after Korean political

unification will come from income transfers from the South to the
North. Further, most of fiscal resources will be dedicated towards a
new social security system for North Korean. The new North Korean
social security system in the post-unification period should in principle
be in accordance with the South Korean system. However, in order to
alleviate the financial burden this would entail and keep social discon-
tent to a manageable level, we suggest the provision of a temporary
social security system for North Koreans in the unified Korea.14 The
detailed design of the social security system for North Koreans resid-
ing in the North and those migrating to the South would need to be
studied more deeply in the near future, though we will deliver some
thoughts on the matter in a later section.
As emphasized before, the separation of social security systems
will not require the mandatory and physical separation of the Northern
region from the Southern. North Koreans will certainly get a genuine
right to migrate freely within the Korean peninsula after political uni-
fication. However, North Koreans who decide to migrate to the South
in a specified interim period after unification will not get the same
social security benefits as South Koreans are due to receive at the time.
Further, North Koreans who decide to stay in where they used to live
will get different social security benefits from those who migrate to
the South or from those given to South Koreans.15
To make the scheme more viable, we suggest that non-migrating
North Koreans get additional economic benefits over North Koreans
that choose to migrate. Non-migrating North Koreans will also be
equipped with start-up assets, which will be additional to the benefits
14. Zang, “A New Look on Korean Unification and It’s Financing Issues,” pp. 152-
153; Sukjin Kim and Kyuchang Lee, Designing a Separate Social Security System
for North Koreans after Unification (in Korean) (Seoul: Korea Institute for National
Unification, 2015), pp. 115-119.
15. The separation of social security system after Korean political unification
could be judicially lawful under the current Constitution of the Republic of
Korea. Kim and Lee, Designing a Separate Social Security System for North Kore-
ans after Unification, pp. 55-62.
64 Hyoungsoo Zang
from currency integration that will be bestowed to all North Korean

residents. North Koreans at the time of unification will be able to choose
one of two options, stay or migrate. Both options would certainly be
designed to allow for much improved standards of living for North
Koreans than they had before unification. In order to feasibly realize
Korean political unification, North Koreans will need to be convinced
from the outset that the upcoming political unification will absolutely
offer a better political and economic opportunity than they had
before.
Guiding Principles of the Harmonized Privatization

of the Properties in North Korea
Who will have the right to own the properties of North Korea after uni-
fication will be the key question for the unified Korean government,
and the answer for the question will have significant implications for
whether North Koreans will stay in the North or migrate to the South.16
A temporary separation of social security systems for North Koreans in
the unified Korea for “a specified interim period” would become viable
and feasible by providing “adequate” economic incentives to non-
migrating North Koreans. A contribution of this study would be that
we propose guiding principles for resource mobilization for making the
economic package feasible and sufficiently persuasive. We need a deep-
er discussion on how to privatize the properties of the Northern part of
the unified Korea in a harmonized fashion.
Current Situation of Property Rights in North Korea
The Socialist Constitution of North Korea17 does not allow private

property rights except for income from labor, agricultural production
16. Bennett, Preparing for the Possibility of a North Korean Collapse, p. 247.
17. It was first adopted in December 1972 and amended several times. The most
recent amendments were made in April 2016.
from a small family house garden, and inherited goods. Thus, the
State owns virtually all of houses, factories, businesses, mines, build-
ings, forests, lands, and all methods of production. In contrast, about
90 percent of farmlands are legally owned by socialist cooperatives,
with the remaining 10 percent owned by the State. The farmlands
owned by the State are basically set aside for seeds, breeding stock,
and specialty crops. Almost all of North Korea’s agricultural products
come from collective farms. The social cooperatives are comprised of
individual farmers that own these collective farms. This is an inter-
esting consequence of the North Koran land reform. Kim Il-Sung,
Kim Jong-Un’s grandfather, after assuming power, plundered land-
lords’ farmlands and distributed them to tenants for free. But, for
some years following redistribution, the tenants were forced to put
their farmlands “spontaneously” into socialist collective farms. That
is, farmers in North Korea are supposed to have de jure collective
shares in the collective farms, although they cannot exert their claims
individually.
North Korea’s property rights exist in quite a different situation
that those that existed in East Germany. About half of East Germany’s
houses, small-scale businesses and lands were already privately
owned in 1990. Thus, the concept of swift privatization could be a
natural cause for the unified German government. Another significant
difference between North Korea and East Germany lies in property
registration systems. North Korean authorities had already completely
abolished the property register system and nationalized virtually all
of North Korea’s properties. Certified copies of the land register were
destroyed because there was no longer a need for private ownership
registration.
North Korean authorities have provided the North Korean peo-
ple, through their comprehensive public distribution system, with
foodstuffs and almost all daily necessities, including consumer goods,
health services, education, employment, and even houses. However,
since the early-1990s when the former Soviet Union dissolved, the
North Korean economy began to rapidly deteriorate. The state could
not provide its people with enough food and necessities, and the peo-
66 Hyoungsoo Zang
ple responded desperately to the crisis by rushing out of the official

economy to participate in the unofficial economy. The planned economy
contracted and marketization began to spread. After the North Korean
authorities have officially approved most of the marketization activi-
ties already prevalent in July 2002, even the official economy came to
encompass both planned and market economies.18 Some new houses
and shops have been constructed, not by the State but by “donju”
(private money lenders) and sold to somebody else, which is consid-
ered illegal.19 “Donju” have been involved in other economic activities,
even in the official economy, such as with state-owned enterprises.20
North Korean authorities have noticed these illegal activities, but
most of them were more interested in receiving bribes from those that
partook in those activities.21 Home buyers would likely to regard
their houses as their own private properties. Although the emergence
of the private sector is still in its early stage, this trend will be more
likely to expand in the future.
North Korean Residents’ Intrinsic Property Rights Need to be

Safeguarded and even Bolstered to Establish Startup Assets
for North Koreans in the Early Stage of Korean Unification
After the political unification of Korea, most properties in the Northern

region of the unified Korea would be under the control of the unified
Korean government. The unified Korean government could nationalize
18. Mun-su Yang, North Korea’s Planned Economy and Marketization (Seoul: Min-
istry of Unification Institute for Unification Education, 2015), p. 83.
19. Seog-ki Lee, Mun-su Lee, and Eunlee Joung, Analysis of Markets of North Korea
(in Korean) (Sejong: Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade,
2014), pp. 215-218.
20. Ministry of Unification Institute for Unification Education, 2014 Understanding
North Korea (Seoul: Ministry of Unification Institute for Unification Educa-
tion, 2014), p. 261.
21. Yang, North Korea’s Planned Economy and Marketization, pp. 99-100; Lim, Kang-
Taeg, et al., Study of the Status of North Korea’s Official Economy for the Estima-
tion of Unification Costs/Benefits (in Korean) (Seoul: Korea Institute for National
Unification, 2011).
most of the properties in North Korea as the State owned them. At

the very early stage of Korean unification, how to privatize them
would certainly be one of the most important issues.
At the time of unification, privately occupied properties of North
Koreans should be recognized and protected. De facto private houses,
apartments, and small shops should be transferred to their current
tenants and privatized immediately. These will become a part of the
startup assets for North Koreans living in the non-farm areas. In
addition, North Korea’s state-owned enterprises in the official economy
would be privatized in due course and the net proceeds from privati-
zation would also be utilized for building up start-up assets for North
Koreans. Further, North Korean farmers have de jure collective shares
in collective farms, which should be respected. As to how to privatize
collective farms in North Korea, the majority opinion would be that
the unified Korean government should allow the members of collec-
tive farms to decide the way of privatization. In any case, all North
Korean farmers will own the houses they currently reside in and be
allowed to exercises their property rights in collective farms and thus
be equipped with some startup assets. Likewise, urban workers in
North Korea will own the houses they currently reside in and continue
to work in the businesses.
The recognition of “vested interests” of most North Korean peo-
ple22 would potentially cause some equity issues. For instance, houses
in Pyongyang will become much more expensive than those in remote
rural areas. Collective farms in the western sedimentary plains will
be appraised at much higher values than those in the eastern hilly
regions. A major portion of the equity issue could be resolved by pro-
viding initial capital to everybody remaining in North Korea. Consid-
ering that the size of the North Korean economy that is less than one
thirtieth of the South, the unified Korean government should do as
much as possible to expand startup assets for North Koreans who are
much poorer than South Koreans. Without supporting North Koreans
22. Exceptions will be applied to the so-called “core elite group” of North Korea,
which is estimated to be around 50,000 people.
68 Hyoungsoo Zang
financially in the early stage of Korean unification, North Koreans

will not be able to compete with others in the privatization of major
state-owned enterprises or investing in new businesses in North Korea.
Some of them would have to sell to entrepreneurs their houses, farm-
lands, shops and businesses for cash. With startup assets, North Koreans
could participate in taking over privatized businesses.
A likely way of injecting initial startup assets to North Koreans
would be currency integration with a favorable exchange rate applied
to the North Korean won.23 West Germany indeed utilized this method
in 1990. South Korea would need to do or promise to do similar injec-
tions during the presumed “unification negotiation period.” The injec-
tion would need to be distributed as equally as possible to average
North Koreans. For instance, instead of agonizing over how to find the
optimal exchange rate, the South Korean government could just give
(practically) the same amount of South Korean currency to every North
Korean adult. Other methods of injecting startup assets to only non-
migrating North Koreans will be discussed later.
The Separation of Social Security Systems between North and

South Korea for a Specified Interim Period needs to Coincide with
the Establishment of a “North Korea Privatization Trust Fund”
As mentioned above, South Korea cannot replicate the West German

case with regards to East Germany. Most importantly, South Korea
will need to offer a separate social security system for North Koreans
for an interim period, most likely ranging from five to ten years.
North Koreans migrating to the South after political unification
would not receive the same level of social security benefits as South
Koreans. North Koreans that remain would receive only local social
23. The injection of initial startup assets through setting a favorable exchange
rate for North Koreans would naturally raise a concern for inflation as a
monetary expansion would result. The financial resources needed to cover
the monetary expansion would need to be mobilized by issuing government
bonds, which would absorb the monetary overhang in the country and thus
reduce inflationary pressures.
security services, which in most cases would be inferior than those

bestowed upon South Koreans.24 To compensate for the lower levels of
social security services for North Koreans remaining in North Korea, a
certain scheme of economic incentives would be required. For this pur-
pose, this study proposes to establish a special-purpose Trust Fund
titled “The North Korea Privatization Trust Fund” (henceforth known
as the “Trust Fund”).
This Trust Fund will be filled with proceeds from selling priva-
tized national properties in the Northern region of the unified Korea.
Although most of North Korea’s state-owned enterprises may not
attract external investment, some major strategic industries such as
military equipment, metals, coals, and other mines producing mineral
resources would still be competitive. Operation and management of
the Trust Fund would be entrusted to the unified Korean government or
an independent party. Resources of the Trust Fund should be devoted to
providing economic incentives to only North Korean residents, the
provision of which would need to be legally guaranteed. The Trust
Fund will help North Koreans to stay where they were pre-unifica-
tion. Other incentives could include a public distribution of essential
consumer goods, health and education services, and unemployment
benefits for the specified interim period. The allotment of residence
rights in newly constructed apartments will be included as well.25
Conversely, North Koreans migrating to the South after unification
will not be able to receive those incentives,26 but they would probably
24. Zang, “A New Look on Korean Unification and It’s Financing Issues,” p. 153;
Kim and Lee, Designing a Separate Social Security System for North Koreans after
Unification, pp. 115-119.
25. Most houses in North Korea are dilapidated in the eyes of South Koreans.
There will be a wave of construction of new apartments in almost all of
major cities in North Korea after political unification.
26. This scheme is similar to the Hukou system of China. See Chun-Chung Au
and Vernon Henderson, “How Migration Restriction Limit Agglomeration
and Productivity in China,” (NBER Working Paper Series 8707, National
Bureau of Economic Research, January 2002), pp. 3-6; Zang, “A New Look on
Korean Unification and It’s Financing Issues,” p. 153; Kim and Lee, Designing
a Separate Social Security System for North Koreans after Unification, p. 106.
70 Hyoungsoo Zang
have access to opportunities for better education and health insur-

ance regardless. The Trust Fund will act as a deterrent to migration, if
managed properly and successfully. North and South Korean authori-
ties will negotiate and discuss the package of the Trust Fund as well as
the separation of social security systems. Negotiations will continue
until the general outline of the package would be acceptable to North
Koreans.
Potential problems with the management of the Trust Fund would
be the possibility of obtaining insufficient proceeds from privatization,
especially from dilapidated North Korean manufacturing facilities, as
well as the intrinsic mismatch between revenue and expenditure
flows. In the German case, the proceeds from selling East German
firms did not satisfy initial overly-optimistic expectations. In contrast,
we have reason to believe that the development of North Korean
mines would be able to contribute non-trivial proceeds to the Trust
Fund. Further, different from East Germany, where about half of
lands were already privately owned, the unified Korean government
will be able to nationalize most of lands (excluding farmlands) in North
Korea and anticipate proportionally bigger privatization proceeds.
Since privatizing the properties in North Korea would take some
time due to the scope of the process, the first installments brought
into the Trust Fund would need to come from the unified Korean
government’s budget through the issue of long-term government
bonds or raising taxes. The overt guarantee by the newly-unified
Korean government on maintaining the sustainability of the Trust
Fund will reinforce the feasibility of the Trust Fund. As proceeds
from privatization accumulate and the most urgent needs for sup-
porting North Korean residents subside, the Trust Fund may some-
time in the future buy back the previously-issued government bonds.
Swift determination of property rights is the key to swift privatiza-
tion, which is the key to building up the Trust Fund.
Restitution Claims, if Legally Proved, should be Properly

Compensated
To reconstruct and develop North Korea efficiently, public-private

partnership (PPP) investment projects would need to be widely applied
to infrastructure development of North Korea.27 For the success of
PPP projects, the unified Korean government and public sectors will
need to set up an incentive scheme for the private sector to actively
participate in infrastructure development projects that will need a
long time to come to fruition. The first step toward this would be to
finalize the property rights of land. Without ascertaining the proper
ownership of property, privatization cannot start. The unified Korean
government would be able to nationalize all the properties in North
Korea, except for legally-recognized private properties of North Korean
residents, de facto private properties, and farmlands de jure collectively
owned by farmers.
For the nationalization of properties in North Korea, a group of
people would be in the way who had claimed to own some lands in
North Korea. However, there are no certified copies of the land register
remained in North Korea. Furthermore, more than sixty years of deple-
tion, displacement, sedimentation, and erosion would make exact
matching of plots impossible, which is essential to ownership verifica-
tion. Furthermore, as both North and South Korean authorities have
executed farmland reforms, restitution claims on farmlands in North
Korea would be more or less rendered mull and void. Nonetheless, we
could not completely rule out the possibility that certain South Koreas
would present a legally non-disputable proof of ownership for lands
in North Korea. The majority of North Korea specialists in South Korea
support the use of compensation rather than allowing for restitution.
German experiences reinforce the specialists’ views. The unified German
27. For a detailed discussion of PPP, see Hyoungsoo Zang, Haesik Park and
Choonwon Park, External Financing in the Process of Korean Unification: Major
Issues and Policy Recommendations (in Korean) (Sejong: Korea Institute for
International Economic Policy, 2015), pp. 251-274.
72 Hyoungsoo Zang
government in fact first opted for restitution; however, due to extreme

complications and delays in the determination of property rights
within East Germany, a shift in policy emphasis from restitution to
compensation was necessary.28 German privatization authorities
could sell properties without waiting for the final determination of
their ownership, with compensation paid at a later time to owners if
needed, which contributed significantly to the speedy privatization
and attraction of investments into East Germany.29
Concluding Remarks
We started our discussion on the privatization of the properties in a

harmonized fashion in the unified Korea by presenting three prerequi-
sites for potential Korean unification. Firstly, the North Korean people
should whole-heartedly desire unification with the South. Secondly, a
North Korean government representing the will of the North Korean
people should be in power, and lastly, the international community,
including the US and China, would need to be cooperative. The impli-
cation of these prerequisites would be that the South Korean govern-
ment should accommodate North Korean people’s wishes as much as
possible during a “unification negotiation period” in order to achieve
permanent Korean unification.30 During the initial negotiation period,
among other matters, the swift introduction of a new land registra-
tion map for North Korea should be agreed upon by both North and
South Korea. New measurements of all lands in North Korea would
be required to establish this new land registration map, which would
take about two years and need to be done cooperatively. Without the
map, the process of finalizing property rights after unification would
be hindered and thus privatization would stall. Further, during the
28. Wolf, “Korean Unification: Lesson from Germany,” p. 183.

29. Wolf, “Korean Unification: Lesson from Germany,” p. 183.
30. The unification negotiation period was less than one year for Germans who
wanted a rapid economic integration.
negotiation period, major issues and priorities for after unification

should be discussed, negotiated, and agreed upon as Germans did
some 27 years ago.
The unified Korean government would be able to nationalize most
of the properties in North Korea. After that, their macroeconomic
policies, including currency integration, a temporary separation of
social security systems, privatizing the properties in North Korea
according to certain guiding principles, and the provision of economic
incentives towards remaining North Koreans would need to be done
in a harmonized way towards a successful and permanent Korean
unification. Here, the length of the specified interim period after uni-
fication would depend on when the migration pressures subside to a
manageable level, which will be determined by the electorate of the
unified Korea residing both in the South and the North. The North
Korea Privatization Trust Fund will be the key contributor to a suc-
cessful management of the interim period.
Probably the favorite opinion of the majority of South Koreans is
that the best way to prepare for Korean unification is to maintain the
fiscal soundness of the South Korean government. It is well-known
that a key reason for the South Korean government’s ability to over-
come both the financial crises in 1998 and 2008 successfully was in
fact South Korea’s fiscal soundness at the time.31 The South Korea’s
public debt-to-GDP ratio surpassed 40 percent, and is very likely to
rise towards 50 percent. However, the Korean peninsula remains
divided and any prospective future unification process will require
substantial fiscal resources. West Germany’s ratio of public debt-to-
GDP was well below 40 percent at the time of their unification.32
31. Zang, Park, and Park, External Financing in the Process of Korean Unification:
Major Issues and Policy Recommendations, pp. 182-183.
32. Zang, Park, and Park, External Financing in the Process of Korean Unification:
Major Issues and Policy Recommendations, p. 212.
74 Hyoungsoo Zang
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Vol. 25, No. 2, 2016, 77–103
The Deficiencies of a Westphalian

Model for Cyberspace:
Gus Swanda
Viewing contemporary attempts of technologically-advanced countries

to restrict outsider access to critical websites and infrastructure through
the lens of the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, there has been significantly
more credence given to the idea that nation-states are moving towards
creating an infrastructure for national cyber borders. If successful, such
a model would create new economic, social and technical problems
that may pose greater threats to national security. This paper explains
the drawbacks of the cyber-Westphalian model using South Korean
cyber policy as a case study, and highlights the potential dangers of
restricting the internet at the national level. Through data collected
from South Korean computer users and secondary sources, the author
finds that the implementation of national borders in cyberspace is not
feasible. In addition, such a model would bring with it severe detriments
to the online economy and personal freedoms, while still leaving vital
systems vulnerable.
Keywords: South Korean Cybersecurity, Cyber Borders, Cyber West-

phalia, Cyber Policy, Cyber Defense
Cyberspace has become the central nervous system of nations’ com-

munications, government and commercial operations, infrastructure
and security. As the internet grew in scale, so too did the dependence
on cyberspace and vulnerability to cyberattack. The fear that a person,
group or rival state could inflict catastrophic damage to a nation
through the internet has put national cybersecurity at the forefront of
* This work was supported by the research grant of the Busan University of For-
eign Studies in 2016.
78 Gus Swanda
debates on security policy. Malicious codes such as Stuxnet have shown

that all systems, both online and offline, are potentially vulnerable to
destruction. Some scholars posit the eventual outcome of the current
dynamic is the construction of national borders within cyberspace.1
As this national strategy becomes more prolific, cyberspace will begin
to resemble the current real-world, Westphalian border system.2
This paper examines the cyber-Westphalian model and poses
several central questions. First, are borders in cyberspace a fait accom-
pli? Second, are virtual borders technologically possible, psychologi-
cally comfortable, and systemically and politically manageable, as the
theory purports? Lastly, what are the potential detriments to nations
that pursue and/or achieve such sovereignty over their national
cyberspace? To answer these questions, the author analyzes the work
of Chris C. Demchak and Peter Dombrowski on cyber borders. Due
to South Korea’s status as a democratic and industrialized nation with
an advanced and ensconced high-speed cyber infrastructure, and its
efforts towards a relatively closed and nationalized internet, the
author uses South Korean cybersecurity policy and its management of
national cyberspace as a case study. Key aspects in the organization,
execution and monitoring of its national internet are essential for cre-
ating borders in cyberspace, and therefore the conclusions drawn from
the South Korean exemplar are applicable to other countries seeking
to create national borders in cyberspace. It is concluded that cyber
borders, such as those proposed by Demchak and Dombrowski, are
not inevitable. Although virtual borders may be technologically pos-
1. Holcomb Lee, and Shrewsbury June, “Securing Our Cyber Borders,” Innova-
tion 9, no. 1 (February/March 2011), http://www.innovation-america.org/
securing-our-cyber-borders (accessed January 14, 2016). Also see Katherine
Maher, “Cybersecurity: ‘The New Westphalian Web’,” Truman National Security
Project Doctrine Blog, February 25, 2013, http://trumanproject.org/doctrine-
blog/cybersecurity-the-new-westphalian-web/ (accessed August 14, 2016).
2. The Peace of Westphalia was a series of peace treaties signed between May
and October 1648 in the Westphalian cities of Osnabrück and Münster that
ended several European religious wars. These treaties were the first to recognize
the authority of diplomatic congress, and establish the modern concept of the
sovereign state in Europe.
The Deficiencies of a Westphalian Model for Cyberspace 79
sible, they are not necessarily feasible, nor are they always psychologi-
cally comfortable nor systemically and politically manageable. Fur-
thermore, the economic and social costs of pursuing such a model
make it unlikely that liberal democratic, developed nations will fully
adopt it.
National Borders in Cyberspace
Chris C. Demchak and Peter Dombrowski state in their paper, “Rise

of a Cybered Westphalia,” that the relatively ungoverned frontier of
cyberspace, like all frontiers, does not last forever where human soci-
eties are involved. Eventually, nation-states will extend their sover-
eignty to the internet and exert control over the electronic information
that comes in and out of their domains, and in essence create electronic
borders. Demchack and Dombrowski cite the recent developments in
the cybersecurity policies of developed nations as evidence that states
are already moving towards a bordered internet.3
According to Demchak and Dombrowski, “the transformation
from frontier to substrate across cyberspace” began with the discovery
of the Stuxnet virus in 2010. Stuxnet was a virus planted in the systems
of Iran’s nuclear centrifuge. It eventually destroyed those systems
and set the Iranian nuclear program back years. The malicious software
was believed to be uploaded to the secure, Iranian off-line system via
USB flash drives. Ingeniously crafted, the virus employed many new
sophisticated techniques and codes that were designed with specific
knowledge of its target. Such an endeavor required the resources of
an advanced country with an extensive intelligence network, and
have led some to believe that it was created by the United States,
Israel or both.4
3. Chris Demchak and Peter Dombrowski, “Rise of a Cybered Westphalian Age,”

Strategic Studies Quarterly 5, no. 6 (2011), pp. 32, 34-35.
4. Kim Zetter, “Stuxnet Attack on Iran Was Illegal ‘Act of Force’,” Wired, March
25, 2013, https://www.wired.com/2013/03/stuxnet-act-of-force/ (accessed
June 13, 2016).
80 Gus Swanda
Without remote directions, Stuxnet meticulously sought and

destroyed a predetermined section of the centrifuge and demonstrated
that heavily secured systems not connected to cyberspace are still
vulnerable to cyberattack. For Demchack and Dombrowski, this was
a turning point in cybersecurity policy. Developed nations now had a
concrete example of a cyber threat with real-world catastrophic poten-
tial. More importantly, nations now have a reason to draw lines and
establish sovereignty over the internet.
Demchack and Dombrowski maintain that the response will be
to move further towards a closed, bordered internet system that can
more thoroughly scrutinize foreign data and thereby prevent potential
threats to national security. 5 Examples of how states are already
administering such cybersecurity strategies are then given. According
to their theory, cyberspace is no longer only under the jurisdiction of
state-run communications and commercial agencies. Many industri-
alized nations are now treating cyberspace as another operational
domain of the military. South Korea is surely another example of this.
In addition, countries like China and the United States are developing
technology and defensive strategies that can create such borders in
cyberspace and allow nations to deal with cyber threats, even when
those threats come from their own citizens.6 These nations have already
demonstrated their willingness to go on the offensive, if need be, to
protect national interest. The militaries of technologically-advanced
countries have engaged in cyber warfare that goes beyond simple espi-
onage or vandalism, and seek to extend their regional and international
security paradigm to the realm of cyberspace. Such actions have forced
less technologically advanced countries to push their more developed
allies to secure their cyberspace through traditional security arrange-
ments and organizations such as NATO and the UN, as the cyber-
Westphalian map begins to take shape.7
5. Demchak and Dombrowski, “Rise of a Cybered Westphalian Age,” p. 33.

6. Swaine Michael D., “Chinese Views on Cybersecurity in Foreign Relations,”
China Leadership Monitor, September 20, 2013.
7. Demchak and Dombrowski, “Rise of a Cybered Westphalian Age,” pp. 36,
48-49.
The concept of a partitioned, defined, organized and controlled

cyberspace runs contrary to how most people perceive the internet. It
is not a distant, sparsely populated region of the country. The frontier
of cyberspace is a network of billions of systems in virtually every part
of the world, with an equal number of diverse actors. The exponential
acceleration of technological evolution and innovation therein has
formed an environment in which the aggressors manage to outpace
defensive strategies and systems. Software and hardware designed to
steal information, subvert systems, disrupt public policy, and mask the
user’s identity are freely shared among hackers underground. Also,
computer users in liberal democracies have become accustomed to the
freedom that a borderless cyberspace provides. Attempts by govern-
ments to close this Pandora’s box are often met with resistance that
spills over into the political arena, and has a significant effect on policy.
Unlike a physical frontier, reining in cyberspace would seem to be
impossible. However, Demchak and Dombrowski assert that reclaiming
sovereignty over the internet is technologically possible, psychologi-
cally comfortable, and systemically and politically manageable.8
It is further postulated that once technology is in place, states
will come to military, criminal and civil agreements defining respon-
sibility and jurisdiction in cyberspace. There have been several inter-
national civil and criminal cases involving cyberspace jurisdiction,
and going forward these territorial issues will be codified through
international institutions. “As civil society extends into cyberspace
with rules of accepted behavior reinforced by modern state institu-
tions, it becomes easier to invoke the routine activities of international
organizations to curb, if not cure, the disruptive activities of the failed-
state portions of the international virtual globe. As a result, institu-
tions will adapt and adjust while replicating the functional aspects of
the current physical concords and rules of behavior to contain the
harm by actors who deviate from the emerging virtual civil world.”9
It is Demchack and Dombrowski’s contention that the new map

9. Ibid., pp. 44-46.
82 Gus Swanda
of cyberspace complete with borders, boundaries, and frontiers that

are accepted by all states is inevitable. The beginnings of which can
already be seen in countries such as the U.S., China, South Korea and
the EU to varying degrees.10 However, examining not only the cyber
military policy of these states, but also their public and commercial
internet policies reveals that it will be difficult for many liberal demo-
cratic nations to execute and enforce even basic restrictive cyber poli-
cies. Furthermore, creating cyber borders depends on a partitioning
of cyberspace through technology and national public standards, and
although states can have shared agendas on cybersecurity, they rarely
have common standards when it comes to executing cybersecurity.
Such disconnects in cyber policies within a cyber-Westphalian system
would impede the flow of cyber traffic necessary for many forms of
international communication and commercial interaction. Forrest
Hare agrees with the basic concept of cyber borders, but cautions
policy makers not to disrupt the connectivity between nations.11 By
applying Kunrether and Heal’s game-theoretic approach to binary
choices (known as the interdependent security investment decision)
to international cybersecurity, they arrive at two conclusions. First,
the probability of a state investing adequately in cybersecurity is
directly related to the threat level at which it perceives cyber incur-
sions. Secondly, in order for cyber borders to be effective, all nations
must participate. Hare uses his own model for interdependent liberal
democracies to show that in order for cyber borders to be effective,
all relevant nations must participate.12 The fewer states that partici-
pate, the greater the probability of a successful attack. If only one
state or a few states participate, the system is compromised.13 There
10. Demchak and Dombrowski, “Rise of a Cybered Westphalian Age,” pp. 48-49,
57.
11. Forrest Hare, “Borders in Cyberspace: Can Sovereignty Adapt to the Challenges
of Cyber Security?” School of Public Policy, George Mason University Cryptology
and Information Security Series Volume 3: The Virtual Battlefield: Perspectives on
Cyber warfare (2011): 88-105, DOI: 10.3233/978-1-60750-060-5-88.
12. G. Heal and H. Kunruther, “Self-protection and Insurance with Interdepen-
dencies,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 36, no. 3 (2008):, pp. 103-123.
is little or no benefit for states to construct cyber borders if they main-

tain a connection with allies who do not pursue such borders.14 As the
utility of the internet expands, and reliance on internet-driven commu-
nications and commerce created in a borderless cyberspace increases,
states may be less inclined to participate. Thus more obstacles to cyber
borders are created, making a cyber-Westphalian system less probable.
South Korea can be seen as a litmus test for liberal democracies
following a closed internet strategy. It has already experienced the
difficulties of limiting cyberspace from its initial forays in cybersecu-
rity policy. In the late 1990’s, the South Korean government financed
the construction of the country’s advanced cyber infrastructure. To
protect its investment, policy makers took several steps intended to
ensure that public cybersecurity protocols would be sufficient to
combat most existing threats. Among these steps were the creation of
the national public-key infrastructure (NPKI), and the evolution of
agencies and departments responsible for monitoring cyber activities
and enforcing cyber policy. As South Korean internet proliferation
grew, policy began to increasingly limit anonymity, content, and access
to foreign sites, and restricted e-commerce activity in an attempt to
preserve the centralized security function and social integrity of its
cyberspace. However, these actions had the unintended consequences
of limiting the commercial potential of the internet in South Korea.
This strategy may have also facilitated the theft of personal informa-
tion of its citizens and ended up actually making South Korean systems
more vulnerable to incursions.15 During the past fifteen years, South
Korea has been the victim of many successful large-scale attacks, and
13. Hare uses the analogy of two airplanes from different airlines, boarding at
the same time. Both airlines must inspect all of their passengers’ luggage. If
one of the airlines fails to do so, a malicious actor may be able to plant a
bomb on the secured plane through the unsecured airport.
14. Hare, “Borders in Cyberspace,” 2010.
15. Keechang Kim, “Recent Changes in the Regulatory Landscape for E-Commerce
in South Korea,” The Asian Business Lawyer 16 (Fall 2015), p. 93, file:///C:/
Users/user/Downloads/04.Keechang Kim_article(3).pdf (accessed December
24, 2015).
84 Gus Swanda
has seen its carefully laid plans to partition and defend national
cyberspace begin to possibly unravel.
This paper highlights the deficiencies in the cyber-Westphalian
model. As was the case with South Korea, nations who pursue borders
in cyberspace will have to either drastically change the nature and
scope of their plans for a nationalized cyberspace, or abandon the
concept altogether. In the next section, the many obstacles to creating
virtual borders are examined in greater detail. The author illustrates
the potential economic consequences of partitioning the internet along
national lines. Ultimately, this is a critical analysis that challenges
Demchak and Dombrowski’s concept of the Stuxnet attack as a catalyst
for strengthening the monitoring of data flowing in from outside
national borders.
Obstacles to Virtual Borders
Demchack and Dombrowski’s model is predicated on the assertion

that virtual borders are technologically possible in addition to being
psychologically and politically manageable. However, there is evi-
dence that suggests, for liberal democracies, this may not be the case.
Technical Impediments
Technologically speaking, there have been a number of innovations

that may make borders in cyberspace possible. However, they are not
without their logistical limitations. Although cyber borders may well
be desired by developed nations, the implementations to such tech-
nology might make it unfeasible. Collectively, hackers have historical-
ly had an advantage over those defending national systems. Within
the parameters of the current architecture of the internet, it is still not
possible in some cases to detect new malicious code, locate and identify
attackers or fully secure vital, offline systems. However, even if future
technological advances were to allow nations to sequester their
national cyber infrastructures, there still seems to be no guarantee
that such actions would make systems more secure.

Technologies for securing borders in cyberspace must be able to
scan all information coming through their networks and detect mali-
cious or illegal codes, distinguish between national and international
content, and identify and locate their source. The conventional wisdom
has been that such security measures are simply impossible to enforce
completely, and that no defense is impenetrable. No matter what kind
of defensive strategy or technologies states may devise, given enough
time, every system can be hacked. Current technology cannot scan all
incoming data to determine national origin and threat potential, nor
can modern forensic techniques always track the source of the hack
and the identity of the hacker with complete confidence.16 Demchack
and Dombrowski argue against this by suggesting that governments
require data to be tagged at the source.17
In addition to tracking, such configurations also allow China to
control its internet through three main internet gateways. They further
cite China’s efforts to create its own internet known as China’s Next
Generation Internet (CNGI). Expansion of the number of internet
addresses (IPv6) allows for each machine in their cyberspace to be
tagged and tracked by its own unique web address. Such a design
requires a significant investment in infrastructure, but this “three-
dimensional” approach allows for greater control without sacrificing
the speed of the network. Such a description infers that the CNGI is
secure and cannot be subverted. However, this is not entirely accurate.
There are many ways around the security protocols of the CNGI.18
16. Cisco Systems, “Defending Cyber Borders: Beyond the Virtual Maginot
Line,” 1105 Media and Cisco GovEduTV Interactive video cast, October 25,
2012, http://www.cisco.com/c/dam/en_us/solutions/industries/docs/gov/
fedbiz121212maginot.pdf (accessed April 14, 2016).
18. Sending traffic over TCP/IP, requires both a MAC (Medium Access Control)
address (e.g., 3c:12:56:88:ab:00) and an IP address (e.g., 192.168.14.5). An IP
address is a logical address whereas a MAC address is a physical address.
There are special devices called routers (and bridges) that connect two or
more domains. Users accessing the internet through mobile computing
devices will touch many different MAC networks (home, work, public internet
86 Gus Swanda
With enough time and investment, any technology, cyber defense

strategy or internet architecture can be realized, but the question over
the feasibility of such actions would remain. Cryptography covers
four main areas of information security: authentication, integrity,
non-repudiation, and confidentiality. Encryption can only be used to
verify the sender’s identity and that the message is intact. So theoreti-
cally, the technology that would allow a nation to control its own
cyberspace does indeed exist. However, a bigger issue is that of pub-
lic and private shared keys.19
Cryptography can be broken down into two broad areas: shared-
key cryptography and public key cryptography. Shared key cryptog-
raphy allows preselected recipients with a cryptographic key to access
ciphered information. Identical private keys that are shared between
the users encrypts plain text information and decrypts ciphered infor-
mation. The problem with shared-key encryption is distributing the
key between communicants. If one of these keys is given to the com-
municants via the internet, then it may be intercepted, replicated, and
used to access the information by those outside the system. If one
key is distributed offline, then it is vulnerable to other methods of
espionage, and distribution of the key becomes more difficult as the
number of participants increase. If a nation were to use this method to
encrypt its national internet, distributing the key to all its citizens
securely would be next to impossible. Also, shared-key encryption is
vulnerable to known-plaintext attacks, chosen plaintext attacks, differ-
ential cryptanalysis, and linear cryptanalysis.20
access, etc). There are different IPv4 or IPv6 addresses at every location.
Although MAC addresses are supposed to be unique to every device in the
world (256^6 possible addresses), they can be hidden and replaced with a
false MAC or “spoofed” (Author’s interview with Jim Jackson, a Principal
Software engineer at BAE systems, September 30, 2014).
19. Larry D. Bennett, “Cryptographic Services — A Brief Overview,” SANS Insti-
tute InfoSec Reading Room, October 10, 2001, https://www.sans.org/reading-
room/whitepapers/vpns/cryptographic-services-overview-749 (accessed
February 13, 2016).
20. Hans Delfs and Helmut Knebl, “Symmetric-key Encryption,” Introduction
to Cryptography: Principles and Applications (Berlin, Heidelberg, New York:
Springer, 2007).
Public key distribution on the other hand, allows a large number

of public users access to text while at the same time verifying the
identity of the communicants and ensuring that only authorized
users have access to it. This system, known as a public key infrastruc-
ture (PKI), involves generating two separate keys. One key at the
source (website) is private, and the other key belongs to the public
user. A site that wants to be publicly accessed will request a digital
certificate from server administrators. Once it receives the digital cer-
tificate, the site can now verify the digital identity of a user, and vice
versa. The unique or identifying quality of each key is referred to as a
digital (or electronic) signature. If web browsers were the only entity
deciphering and verifying these keys, malicious users could steal the
private key and access the user’s information. Such hackers could
also steal the public key, make a false website and access the informa-
tion of multiple users. To prevent this, servers rely on a certification
authority or CA. These CAs are trusted third-parties that issue a digital
certificate to the site and to the users. These certificates are confirmed
by the web browser, so a CA must be trusted by all of the major web
browsers to allow access to all, regardless of which browser the user
uses. The digital certificates are often reissued automatically at random
intervals to ensure that they have not been compromised. Periodic
audits are also performed on the CA by auditing companies such as
WebTrust and Verisign.
In South Korea, the public key infrastructure is not administered
extra-governmentally. It relies on the Korean Internet Security Agency
(KISA) as a central certificate authority, and falls under the jurisdiction
of the Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning (MSIP). Acting as
the “root” CA, KISA dispenses control over the expedition of digital
certificates for public and private keys to officially accredited and pri-
vately run CAs. Currently, there are five Korean companies that are
accredited CAs.21 These encryption policies in South Korea are the
21. Korea Internet Security Agency (KISA), “Public Key Authentication Service,”
Public Key Authentication Service, http://rootca.kisa.or.kr/kor/popup/foreigner_
pop1_en.html (accessed February 15, 2016).
88 Gus Swanda
foundation for what is known as a “national public key infrastruc-

ture,” or NPKI.
Political Obstacles
Given the nature of civil societies in liberal democracies, it is not

entirely certain that cyber borders would be politically manageable.
In some societies, freedom of expression supersedes issues of cyber
security within the politic. For these countries, cyber borders would
not be politically manageable. Furthermore, the democratic process
in many countries often impedes the formation of the political con-
sensus that is required to expedite new cyber policy. The speed of
technological development relative to that of policy formation also
makes it extremely difficult for governments to legislate technology.
The nation’s earliest form of cybersecurity policy was to require
all users making internet transactions to verify their identity by
entering their national ID number via SEED encryption software. But
doing so requires the user to run a program called ‘ActiveX.’ The pro-
gram was designed to identify malicious code embedded in add-ons
and plugins that are required to use many websites. Every time
someone uses these sites, ActiveX prompts the user to verify that
they know the risks involved with the download, and if they would
like to proceed despite the potential danger. This policy led to the
unintended consequences of requiring users to use Windows (often
an older version that would run ActiveX) and Internet Explorer in
order to interact with many South Korean websites.22
As suggested by Demchak and Dombrowski, a national control
mechanism, such as South Korea’s NPKI, would seem to provide
greater cybersecurity. However, that has not necessarily been the case,
as problems with software compatibility created new vulnerabilities
with the NPKI, which can be traced to early internet policies. In 1999,
the Electronic Signature Act directed all domestic websites running
22. “For World’s Most Wired Country, Breaking Internet Monopoly is Hard,”
Korea Times, April 16, 2013.
embedded technologies (such as credit card or other financial trans-

action processing, exchange rate and measurement conversion calcu-
lators, geographical location devices, embedded database search
engines, etc.) to require their users to provide proof of identity, in the
form of the user’s national ID number, in addition to his or her private
key. It was this system that initially caused incompatibilities with
web browsers, as the great number of sites with these embedded
technologies could not be accessed due to the inability of most web
browsers to properly generate SEED encrypted ID number verifica-
tion. Fortunately for Microsoft, it had already developed ActiveX in
1996, a program that allowed browsers using its earlier binary interface
standards to access these embedded technologies. The ActiveX plug-
in also allowed users in South Korea to download the SEED ID verifi-
cation and all embedded technologies on a Korean site.23
This is especially problematic from a security standpoint. Users
must download the embedded programs through ActiveX, often
multiple times during a single visit, each time potentially exposing
their systems to malware implanted at the source or in systems with
copies of Internet Explorer or Windows that have been compromised.
Furthermore, these downloaded programs are deleted when the user’s
cache and/or temporary downloads are cleared, requiring the user to
repeat the process each time he or she revisits the site. This increases
the chances of the user downloading malware surreptitiously. This
mandated process is also a problem for frustrated users, whose inter-
action with these sites is constantly being interrupted by notifications
of required downloads. He or she must then agree to the download
while simultaneously acknowledging the risks of doing so. The idea
behind this process is that allowing a user to control downloads to
his or her system will provide greater scrutiny of what is being
downloaded, and thus help prevent the infiltration of malware. How-
23. Park Hun Myoung, “45th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences:
(HICSS 2012) Maui, Hawaii, January 4-7, 2012,” Proceedings of the Web Accessi-
bility Crisis of Korea’s Electronic Government, “Fatal Consequences of the Digital
Signature Law,” New York: IEEE, 2012, 2319-28.
90 Gus Swanda
ever, considering that the website cannot be accessed properly without

downloading the plug-in, a user’s only choices are to either download
the program or to not use the site. It is the contention of the author
that most users choose the former on a consistent basis. Furthermore,
their repeated acceptance of these downloads desensitizes them to
the dangers of such actions, and increases the number of system
incursions.
In a 2014 study on South Korean internet users’ on-line behavior,
the author of this paper conducted a survey on the response of South
Koreans to security plug-ins, specifically ActiveX.24 The results were
telling. 17.32% of participants responded that they automatically
downloaded all security plug-ins whenever instructed to do so, and
37.02% responded that they usually download the ActiveX -delivered
plug-in. Only 12.6% said that they seldom download plug-ins, with
only 1.57% responding that they never download such plugins (Table
1). When asked if their home computer had been rendered inoperable
due to malware, 32.2% responded that their system crashed one time
as a result of malware, 63.5% encountered this situation multiple
times, while only 4.3% reported that they had never been hacked in
that manner (Table 2).
Table 1. Reaction to Warning Prompt
Action %
Always “allow” to view the website? 17.32
Usually “allow” to view the website? 37.02
Sometimes “allow” to view the website? 29.92
Seldom “allow” to view the website? 12.6
Never “allow” to view the website? 1.57
Investigate further 1.57
24. J. Gustave Swanda, “The Dilemma of Software Uniformity and Cybersecurity

in South Korea” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Pukyong National University, 2016), pp.
105-107.
Table 2. Compromised CPU or Mobile Device (Home)
Has your personal mobile device or PC been rendered inoperable

%
by malware? If so, how many times?
Yes, only once. 32.2
Yes, more than once. 63.5
No, my home computing device has never stopped working due
4.3
to malware
In 2005, the Ministry of Public Administration and Security

(MOPAS) had jurisdiction over the NPKI, and amended the ID
requirement to apply only to the websites of government institutions
and websites that are involved in financial transactions or informa-
tion.25 Later, amendments also required that systems abandon ActiveX
by 2017.26 Despite these revisions, there are still many educational
institution, government, banking, and e-commerce websites that fall
under the original provision, and thus are required to employ ActiveX
or similar plugins which have the same problems and vulnerabilities.
Psychological Constraints
The way citizens perceive their government’s role in cyberspace varies

greatly from state to state. Culture, history, and demographics are all
determinant factors of a nation’s psychology on issues such as privacy,
25. Hun Myoung Park and Hanjun Park, “Diffusing the Information Technology
Education in the Korean Undergraduate Public Affairs and Administration
Programs: Driving Forces and Challenging Issues,” Journal of Public Affairs
Education 12, no. 4 (2006).
26. In March of 2015, the Federal Services Commission and the Ministry of Science,
ICT, and Future Planning repealed the ActiveX requirement for only transac-
tion verification. However, financial institutions are still required to have a
security plugin to verify the identity of online consumers. In addition, the
MSIP and FSC announced a new, updated version of ActiveX. Sung-won
Yoon, “ActiveX to be Phased Out in March,” The Korea Times, January 14, 2015,
http://m.koreatimes.co.kr/phone/news/view.jsp?req_newsidx=171687
(accessed July 5, 2015).
92 Gus Swanda
freedom of information, intellectual property, libel, and trust in the

government. Cyber borders may be psychologically acceptable in one
society, but not in another. These sui generis elements of the national
psyche may also impede the transition to a Westphalian internet.
In China for example, the government has met very little resistance
to its restrictive internet policies. Beginning in the mid 1990’s, succes-
sive regulations have increasingly limited what Chinese citizens can say
or access online. This led to the creation of Section Five of the Computer
Information Network and Internet Security, Protection, and Manage-
ment Regulations approved by the State Council on December 11, 1997
which states:
“No unit or individual may use the Internet to create, replicate, retrieve,
or transmit the following kinds of information:
1. Inciting to resist or breaking the Constitution or laws or the imple-

mentation of administrative regulations;
2. Inciting to overthrow the government or the socialist system;
3. Inciting division of the country, harming national unification;
4. Inciting hatred or discrimination among nationalities or harming the
unity of the nationalities;
5. Making falsehoods or distorting the truth, spreading rumors, destroy-
ing the order of society;
6. Promoting feudal superstitions, sexually suggestive material, gam-
bling, violence, murder;
7. Terrorism or inciting others to criminal activity; openly insulting other
people or distorting the truth to slander people;
8. Injuring the reputation of state organizations;
9. Other activities against the Constitution, laws or administrative
regulations.”27
In addition to censorship of government criticism online, many com-

mercial and social networking sites such as Google and Facebook have
been banned and replaced by their domestic counterparts. There are as
27. Jason P. Abbott, The Political Economy of the Internet in Asia and the Pacific Digital
Divides, Economic Competitiveness, and Security Challenges (New York: Praeger,
2004), p. 56.
many as 18,000 websites that are blocked by the Chinese government.28

Penalties for violating these rules or using virtual private networks to
circumvent policy can be harsh. But despite the threat of imprison-
ment, there is still a subdued counterreaction to government actions
often through satire and sarcasm. “Chinese websites made subtle
grievances against the state’s censorship by sarcastically calling the
date of June 4th (the anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen Square mas-
sacre) as “Chinese Internet Maintenance Day.”29 Perhaps this type of
subtle acknowledgement of censorship while still complying with
government policy would be psychologically manageable in China,
but would most likely be an atypical reaction to a government restrict-
ing the internet in other countries.
There are also those nations that have sought to control the flow
of certain sensitive foreign and domestic information only to find
their efforts undermined by a citizenry not willing to conform to state
standards. The best example of this is the Arab Spring. Despite the
ban on social networking and outside media sites, citizens of Tunisia,
Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria, and Bahrain were all able to utilize banned
sites to organize protest movements, disseminate censored information,
and eventually bring down many of those regimes.
The South Korean Government has also seen a surprising reaction
from its self-proclaimed “netizens” towards restrictive cyber policy.
Such reactions are often unexpected in a country renowned for con-
formity. In 2008, policymakers felt Korean bloggers were acting irre-
sponsibly by circulating rumors over the dangers of contracting mad
cow disease from American beef imports and posting malicious com-
ments about celebrities under pseudonyms. Public fervor ignited when
popular actress Choi Jin-sil committed suicide. There was widespread
speculation that negative comments posted about her on the internet
led to her suicide, and demands were made on legislators to prevent
28. Johnathan Zittrain and Benjamin Edelmin, “Empirical Analysis of Internet

Filtering in China,” December 30, 2006, https://cyber.harvard.edu/filtering/
china/ (accessed March 12, 2016).
29. Bobby Johnson, “Chinese Websites Mark Tiananmen Square Anniversary
with Veiled Protest,” The Guardian, June 4, 2009.
94 Gus Swanda
users from posting comments anonymously. In 2008, the so-called

“real-name internet” law was passed, which required people to use
their real name, verified by their national identification number when
posting comments on the internet.30 At first, internet users tolerated
the restrictions on their freedom of expression. But as cases of retribu-
tion by netizens against individuals who posted negative comments
on message boards grew, and after a system hack that led to a breach
of millions of South Korean identification numbers, public opinion
on the real-name law soured. The massive protests against the law
and public outcry from mostly younger Koreans sparked a movement
that eventually spilled over into the mainstream. Finally in 2012, the
constitutional court overturned the law finding that it “is unconstitu-
tional, and such provisions are in violation of the principle of less
restrictive alternative expression and freedom of speech of both users as
well as ISP’s in the cyberspace, and the self-dissemination of personal
information.”31 Part of controlling national cyber borders would be
to mitigate the negative public perception that accompany such mea-
sures. However, a survey done by the Federation of Korean Industries
(FKI) showed that 78.6% of users wanted to get rid of ActiveX, and
88% experienced some sort of difficulties because of ActiveX.32 As
was the case with South Korea, such unforeseen perceptions are often
uncontrollable and difficult to predict.
The crux of the problem was that Microsoft Windows is the only
platform that supports ActiveX. This forced all online businesses and
their users to exclusively use Microsoft Windows. Consumers were
also forced to use Internet Explorer as it alone supported ActiveX. This
resulted in website developers, along with banking and shopping
sites, optimizing all websites for Internet Explorer. It became the South
Korean industry standard in web development, which has given
30. Article 44-5 (Authentication of On-line Bulletin Board User) of the Act on
Promotion of Information and Communications Network Utilization and
Data Protection, etc. (정보통신망 이용촉진 및 정보보호 등에 관한 법률).
31. Constitutional Court Decision 2010Hun-Ma47 decided on August 23, 2012.
32. “South Koreans Overwhelmingly Approve of Scrapping ActiveX: Poll,” Yonhap
News Agency, March 23, 2014.
Microsoft a near monopoly on Korean operating systems and web

browsers for over a decade.33
This policy seemed prudent at the time, and initially limited the
traffic from foreign users and potential threats. The program became
obsolete around 2005, yet the policy remained long after that. Mali-
cious codes can easily be embedded to circumvent ActiveX making the
program virtually useless. It seems the Windows/ActiveX platform,
although cutting-edge in 1998, left systems near defenseless by 2013.
Turn of the twenty-first security assets like ActiveX, were liabilities
when it came to the hacking techniques of 2013. They proved to not
be a very effective shield against today’s viruses and malware, or
against the ingenuity of today’s hackers.
However, political discord, national security concerns, and the
technology market turned such levels of national control into political
liabilities, and forced the South Korean government to effect change in
this area. In 2011, after pressure from makers of alternative technologies
such as smart phones forced the government to rethink their 10 year-
old cybersecurity strategy, the government created a bylaw calling for
the support of at least three different web browsers on government
websites. Even if varying the browser support for government websites
could change the now embedded on-line behavior of developers and
users, implementing change is very difficult. In order for websites to
stop using ActiveX plug-ins, a government appraisal committee must
evaluate the new technology to ensure it has the same level of security.
However, the committee did not approve any alternative websites since
its inception for over four years.34 So by moving farther away from the
rest of world, the South Korea government actually put its country’s
cyber infrastructure closer to harm’s way.
33. Glen Moody, “South Korea Still Paying the Price for Embracing Internet
Explorer a Decade Ago,” Tech Dirt, May 9, 2012, https://www.techdirt.com/
articles/20120507/12295718818/south-korea-still-paying-price-embracing-
internet-explorer-decade-ago (accessed June 29, 2016).
34. Moody, “South Korea Still Paying the Price for Embracing Internet Explorer
a Decade Ago,” 2012.
96 Gus Swanda
Stuxnet
The Stuxnet virus is an exemplar of a cyber threat with catastrophic,

real-world consequences, which is a key element in Demchak and
Dombrowski’s model. It not only shifts policy focus towards a radically
new method of cyber defense, but it also serves as the fulcrum by
which public opinion is swayed towards cyber borders. However, is
that a fair representation of Stuxnet’s salience? It is not entirely certain
whether or not Stuxnet conforms to Demchak and Dombrowski’s char-
acterization as a catalyst for a new internet paradigm. To ascertain this,
the nature of the malicious code must be analyzed as well as its relation
to cyber-threat strategy.
Stuxnet was a large, densely coded computer virus designed
specifically to attack the synchronization mechanisms of the uranium
centrifuges at the Iranian nuclear facility. The virus replicated itself
and spread throughout the targeted system by utilizing a “zero-day”
exploit, a very rare and dangerous method of attack.35 A zero-day
exploit takes advantage of specific vulnerabilities in the software of
the host at the time of the incursion. With no defensive obstacles to
confront, nor any possibility of detection, the exploit spreads very
rapidly making containment extremely difficult if not impossible.
The first Stuxnet zero-day exploit spread itself to other sections of the
centrifuge’s systems by infecting the USB sticks of users. This exploit
was necessary, as the different sections of the centrifuge system, like
that of many highly-secured systems with catastrophic potential, were
not connected to each other nor to cyberspace. Throughout each sec-
tion, Stuxnet scanned the system in search of its target: the industrial
35. Due to the difficulty of engineering a new virus that operates in a completely
different manner than any other malware, and thereby avoiding both detec-
tion within the system and in the computer virus security zeitgeist, zero day
malware is very rare. Less than one in 1,000,000 malicious code uncovered
are zero days. They require the creator to meticulously test every part and
line of a software’s code; a process that can take years (Zetter, “How Digital
Detectives Deciphered Stuxnet, the Most Menacing Malware in History,”
2011).
control system used to program controllers that drive motors, valves,

and switches in industrial facilities. In order to execute new commands
to these industrial control systems on a Windows platform, the virus
must have an electronic certificate specific to that piece of hardware,
the contents of which are known only to a few at Microsoft, the manu-
facturer of the industrial equipment, and the end user. Forensic exami-
nation of the virus revealed that it used a valid, signed certificate
stolen from Realtek’s hardware manufacturing facilities in Taiwan.
This is no easy feat, leading experts to believe that the creators of the
virus had access to an extensive intelligence network.36
Further investigation showed that Stuxnet had not one but three
zero-day exploits in addition to 500 kilobytes of other malware coding,
a very large program compared to the average 10 to 15 kilobyte-sized
virus. Workers at the Iranian facility used Stuxnet-infected USB sticks
in both the centrifuge’s system and outside the system on work and
personal computers. This caused an enormous amount of collateral
damage, which is how Stuxnet was finally discovered.37 Each time
Stuxnet replicated itself it would contact one of two domains (web-
sites) in either Malaysia or Denmark. After securing the cooperation
of the domains’ DNS providers, investigators discovered that Stuxnet
had infected over 100,000 machines, a majority of which were in Iran.
Through trial and error, Stuxnet was attempting to upload itself to
the USB of someone who worked at the nuclear facility, where it
could download itself and eventually reach its intended target.38
The specificity of this virus’ functions is worth noting, as it makes
applying Stuxnet to another system with a different goal virtually
36. Kim Zetter, “How Digital Detectives Deciphered Stuxnet, the Most Menacing
Malware in History,” Wired, July 11, 2011, https://www.wired.com/2011/
07/how-digital-detectives-deciphered-stuxnet/ (accessed June 13, 2016).
37. Michael Joseph Gross, “A Declaration of Cyberwar,” Vanity Fair, March 2011,
http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2011/03/stuxnet-201104 (accessed October
20, 2015).
38. Ralph Langer, “To Kill a Centrifuge: A Technical Analysis of What Stuxnet’s
Creators Tried to Achieve,” The Langer Group, November, 2013, http://www.
langner.com/en/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/To-kill-a-centrifuge.pdf
(accessed July 6, 2016).
98 Gus Swanda
impossible. Today the usefulness of the Stuxnet virus is in essence

dead. It had one specific goal, and that goal was achieved. Although
unintended residual effects from Stuxnet were felt by systems in
cyberspace for some time afterwards, the coded commands would
only have its intended effect on the Iranian centrifuge. Once the virus
was discovered and deconstructed, cybersecurity firms were able to
tag its specific characteristics, allowing most security programs and
firewalls to detect and block the virus. The entirety of Stuxnet’s code
has since been open sourced, however the fear that an international
actor could employ the same or similar techniques found in Stuxnet
remains.
While Demchack and Dombrowski’s claim of Stuxnet causing a
panic among states and shifting emphasis towards borders appears
to be correct, it would be inaccurate to claim that such trepidation is
due entirely to Stuxnet. The fear of a cyber doomsday weapon existed
long before Stuxnet’s creation. In 1996, then CIA director John Deutch,
told a Daily News interviewer that hackers “could launch “electronic
Pearl Harbor” cyberattacks on vital U.S. information systems.” Shortly
thereafter at a U.S. Senate Governmental Affairs Permanent Subcom-
mittee on Investigations hearing, Deputy Attorney General Jaimie
Gorelick reiterated Deutch’s fears by telling subcommittee members,
“we will have a cyber-equivalent of Pearl Harbor at some point, and we
do not want to wait for that wake-up call.”39 These statements by high-
level government officials started the ball rolling towards domestic
cyberdefense policy, as anti-terrorist efforts in the U.S., China and
Europe slowly began shifting focus to include cyber threats, the idea
being that a large scale cyberattack against a nation’s critical infra-
structure could be as devastating as conventional terrorism or acts of
war. Even after the terrorist attacks on Washington and New York on
September 11, 2001, when national security policy was reevaluated,
many inside and outside the government believed the next big attack
would happen in cyberspace.
39. Zetter, “How Digital Detectives Deciphered Stuxnet, the Most Menacing
Malware in History,” 2011.
Furthermore, it can be inferred from the Stuxnet experience that

cyber borders would be ineffective against a zero-day threat like Stuxnet.
The virus showed that connectivity is not necessary to infiltrate secure,
closed systems. After all, the virus’ success was dependent upon the
intelligence gathered for its creation and implementation. It is not
unrealistic to assume that the distribution of such a cyber weapon
could just as easily be distributed in a national cyber domain, given
the intelligence and resources necessary for the attack.
Economic Effects
Another aspect that is overlooked in the Westphalian model is the

economic effect that national divisions in cyberspace may have. Such
effects were evident in the development of South Korean early e-
commerce policies related to the Digital Signature Act. The govern-
ment’s early cyber policy tried to stop cyber fraud by regulating the
architecture of doing business over the internet. This was a part of
the rationale behind the mandatory identification number verifica-
tion policy. Requiring patrons to download the identification plug-in
(ActiveX), enter a national ID number, and other such verifications
made it almost impossible for South Korean companies to serve cus-
tomers outside of Korea. Meanwhile, Korean online shoppers increas-
ingly frequented foreign e-commerce sites, due in part to the previ-
ously mentioned compatibility issues between the plug-in and non-
Microsoft operating and browsing software. This led to an erosion of
online business across the board in South Korea, a development
lamented by South Korean companies. In March of 2014, the FKI
lobbied President Park Geun Hye and the South Korean legislature to
repeal the ActiveX and ID entry policy. Data from the Korea Institute
for Industrial Economics and Trade showed that despite having
greater connectivity and superior internet infrastructure than most of
its foreign counterparts, South Korea’s on-line shopping sector was
only 2.69 billion USD or .24% of its GDP, compared to 1.24% in the
100 Gus Swanda
U.S. and 1.68% in China.40

Although the president promised to replace ActiveX with a less
restrictive and more interactive plan, ActiveX or similar plugins remain
in place for verifying financial transactions. In order for cyber borders
to be viable, they must allow the free flow of commerce over the inter-
net. A centrally controlled national cyberspace could very well expe-
rience the same problems as South Korea, or worse. This issue would
present a problem that policymakers would have to address first and
foremost when devising strategies to exert greater sovereignty over
the internet.
Conclusion
Demchack and Dombrowski have presented some sound arguments

for the “transformation from frontier to substrate across cyberspace,”
and many of their postulates, are in fact, indisputable. Governments
are indeed seeking to define national cyber boundaries, and to have
greater control over the electronic data within their borders. If tech-
nology, the politic and, most importantly, their constituencies would
allow it, an international cyber Westphalian system could become an
inevitability. However as South Korean forays into these boundaries
have shown, the limitations of technology, the inefficiency of the
political process, and the diversity of the national psyche mean that
such a system could not feasibly be realized in the form Demchack,
Dombrowski, and others have imagined. If and when liberal democ-
racies attempt to implement such policies, the negative effects to both
the economic and systemic base of national cyberspace may be enough
to force most nations to seek alternative strategies. The establishment
of shared international norms for cyberspace and international agree-
ments on cybersecurity are not necessarily accompanied by cyber
40. Sam Reynolds, “Korea’s ActiveX Problem,” VR-Zone, March 25, 2014, http://
vr-zone.com/articles/koreas-activex-problem/74622.html (accessed March 14,
2016).
borders.
In the case of South Korea, there has been a consistent push towards
centralizing control of national cyberspace. Despite a majority of
users regularly following the government-mandated protocols on a
regular basis (54.34%), an overwhelming amount (95.7%) have had
their systems compromised at least once.41 These numbers do not sup-
port the idea that a strong, centralized government-run cyberspace
is any more secure than a PKI that operates outside of government
control. Although the government has repealed its mandate of ActiveX,
it has simply replaced it with new protocols for downloading plug-ins.
This may bring similar problems, and possibly more impediments to
the free flow of information and commerce domestically and interna-
tionally. There is anecdotal argument to be made against centraliza-
tion of the internet as well. Throughout the government’s attempts to
secure its cyber infrastructure over the past decade, the country has
been plagued with many successful, high-profile cyberattacks on
industry and the government. This may be a sign that the govern-
ment needs a new tactic. In order to avoid the economic and logistic
pitfalls of a tightly sanctioned internet, policy makers should consider
following the examples of other countries, and leave the responsibility
for commercial and personal cybersecurity up to trusted browsers and
the individuals themselves.
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Vol. 25, No. 2, 2016, 105–129

Zafar Khan
The North Korean nuclear issue has become one of international

importance since North Korea’s withdrawal from the Non-Prolifera-
tion Treaty and acquisition of nuclear capabilities. It threatens both the
US and its Asian allies even as the DPRK regime reveals its intentions
for more sophisticated nuclear tests. The international community has
two rational options: 1) wait for collapse of the DPRK regime 2)
and/or restart diplomatic negotiations to settle the North Korean
nuclear issue. Currently, the Six Party Talks enacts tough economic
sanctions on the DPRK while the world “waits and sees” how and
when the DPRK’s regime will collapse. Given the failure of the interna-
tional community in preventing the North Koreans from acquiring
atomic weaponry, this article describes why diplomatic negotiation
and reengagement with the DPRK’s existing regime, not a collapsism
framework, is the most viable strategy to deal with the prevailing situ-
ation in the Korean Peninsula which, in turn, could ensure peace and
stability in the East Asian region.
Keywords: Nuclear North Korea, regime collapsism, the Six Party

Talks, Diplomatic negotiation, Peace and stability
Introduction
The Korean Peninsula became a victim in the Cold War between the
two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. It dealt
with a civil war from 1950 to 1953 between the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (the DPRK, North Korea) and the Republic of
Korea (South Korea), although the two adversarial superpowers each
played a major role in the struggle between the two Koreas in their
efforts to achieve their own strategic and military goals. Both Koreas
106 Zafar Khan
remain locked in struggle despite attempts for unification and the

acceptance of both nations to the United Nations in 1991. The Republic
of Korea, more advanced both economically and militarily, continues
to enjoy the security guarantee extended to it by the United States
and its extended deterrence policy, shared with its allies and partners
in Europe and Asia. Conversely, the DPRK is less developed econom-
ically and possesses weak conventional forces, though it continues its
efforts to test nuclear weapons and increase its stockpile of nuclear
warheads.
Due in part to their past hostilities and conflict with the United
States and its Asian allies, namely South Korea and Japan, North Korea
withdrew from the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2003 and conducted
several nuclear tests with security as their rationale. North Korea’s
continued tests of nuclear weapons has led to an increased reliance
upon them for their defense. Both the governance of the DPRK and
their acquisition of atomic weaponry have become an issue for the
international community, particularly for the states involved in the
Six-Party Talks (the United States, Russia, China, Japan, South Korea,
and North Korea). Given the current inactivity with the Talks, there is
no strategy towards progress in effect on the Peninsula, with both
Koreas at a stalemate. The international community has imposed strict
economic sanctions on the DPRK, but absent any diplomatic negotia-
tion or overall strategy on how to deal with its nuclear capabilities, they
have given into an attitude of collapsism, merely waiting and hoping
for peace to prevail through the collapse of the DPRK regime. This
unguided and vague strategy of “wait and see” has further deteriorated
the prospects for future diplomatic negotiation, be they bilateral, tri-
lateral, or multilateral. Conversely, this strategic vacuum has instead
benefited the DPRK regime, as it continues to survive and conduct
nuclear tests threatening the United States and its Asian allies. The
absence of a multi-pronged negotiation strategy, such as that of the
Six-Party Talks, has allowed the DPRK to continue their efforts in
maturing their nuclear weapons program, in turn further complicat-
ing the prospects of future talks.
The international community now needs to adopt a strategy that
North Korean Nuclear Issue 107
would reengage the North Korean government to both resolve the

nuclear issue and maintain strategic stability in the Korean Peninsula.
The reengagement could use a multi-pronged and sophisticated
negotiations strategy that involves not only the Six-Party Talks, but
also include bilateral negotiations (involving the DPRK and the US),
trilateral negotiations (involving the DPRK, the US, and the ROK),
and other multiparty negotiations that suit both the DPRK and ROK,
eventually crafting a road for a sustainable peace on the Korean
peninsula.
“Waiting and seeing” for the DPRK’s regime failure has not worked
even though the international community has waited for such a possi-
bility for more than 25 years. The DPRK’s leadership has learned which
measures to take to avoid domestic hostility and prevent the collapse of
its regime. Evidently, the international community’s failure to devise a
strategy to resolve the prevailing North Korean nuclear issue equals
its failure in stopping the DPRK from going nuclear in the first place.
Isolating the DPRK’s regime from contemporary world politics, enact-
ing strict sanctions, and cancelling the Six-Party Talks do not comprise a
viable strategy for the key players at the negotiating table. Similarly,
waging an outright war or conducting preemptive strikes against the
DPRK’s nuclear assets believed to be dispersed and concealed closer to
the Chinese and Russian borders are not rational options, given their
likelihood of making matters go from bad to worse.1
This article cites several key studies; namely, academic works and
policy papers which talk about the North Korea’s nuclear weapons
development program, the overall nuclear issue, and the process of
conducting the Six-Party Talks. Most of these works are based on the
history of the North Korean nuclear weapons program and the cul-
tural and domestic conditions of the people of the DPRK. Others dis-
cuss the evolution in North Korean nuclear strategy since its acquisi-
tion and first tests of atomic weaponry. There are a few works that
discuss the process of negotiation between other key state actors and
1. Shane Smith, “North Korea’s Evolving Nuclear Strategy” (US-Korea Institute

at SAIS, August 2015), pp. 1-22.
108 Zafar Khan
the DPRK in terms of resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. Never-
theless, there is little to no substantial work carried out that substan-
tially discusses the importance of multiple layers of negotiating
strategies which, in turn, could lead the DPRK to either stop further
testing of nuclear weapons and production of deterrent forces or to
become outright convinced to divert its nuclear weapons program
towards peaceful uses.
In using these readings from existing literature, this article unpacks
why and how various negotiating strategies will play a significant
role toward resolving the DPRK nuclear issue despite the international
community’s failure to prevent the North Korean withdrawal from
the NPT and testing its nuclear capability and the miserable failure of
“waiting and seeing” for the collapse of the DPRK regime. This article
attempts to discuss both why the international community has failed
in its “wait and see” strategy and why a multi-pronged negotiating
strategy, including the revival of the Six-Party Talks, has become
essential to resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. It also discusses
why sanctions have failed to persuade the DPRK’s regime away from
conducting more nuclear weapons tests and how military options
could worsen the situation on the Korean Peninsula. By synthesizing
all the ingredients essential to diplomatic progress, this article will
make a valuable contribution to the existing literature, with policy
implications for the two Koreas.
This article begins by elaborating how efforts by the international
community failed to prevent the DPRK from going nuclear and, later,
failed to de-nuclearize the Korean Peninsula. The following sections
analyze how the DPRK takes certain measures to prevent domestic
upheaval which could lead to regime collapse and what measures it
adopts to sustain the survivability of its regime. Moreover, it discusses
the central theme of how the key players of the international commu-
nity “wait and see” for the collapse of the DPRK regime and an ensu-
ing internal resolution to the nuclear issue. Finally, it advocates the
revival of a multi-pronged negotiation strategy, such as that of the
Six-Party Talks, to create an opportunity to reengage the North Korean
leadership in hopes of a mutual resolution to the nuclear issue.
The International Community’s Futile Efforts

in Convincing the DPRK
It is interesting to note that the international community, particularly

the US, failed to strike an Iranian-type of deal with the DPRK back in
the early 1990’s, when North Korea was still a member of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT), wherein other powers would provide
attractive incentives to the DPRK to prevent the North Korean with-
drawal and subsequent acquisition of nuclear weapons. There were
initial bilateral efforts between the DPRK and US to prevent North
Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons. This type of bilateral negotia-
tion failed because, despite the Clinton’s administration efforts in this
regard, the DPRK was not convinced of the value of the incentives
offered by the international community. Although the efforts of the
1990’s kept the DPRK away from acquiring nuclear weapons for
quite some time, they showed their failure when the North finally
decided to give notice of their intent to withdraw from the NPT. Even
though the DPRK had expressed its long-lasting intent to acquire
nuclear weapons and had placed national security at the forefront of
their strategy in the wake of the Korean Civil War (1950-1953), the
international community, under the so-called banner of non-prolifer-
ation, missed the chance to persuade North Korea not to acquire
nuclear weapons. This remained a quandary for the international
community and the task of non-proliferation.
The strategic environment thereby dramatically changed in the
Korean Peninsula when the DPRK, a formal member of the NPT
since 1985, finally withdrew from the NPT and made efforts towards
acquiring nuclear weapons for security purposes. This reflects the
failure of the international community, especially of the US, in switch-
ing from a normative posture as a member of the NPT, to a more
assertive posture in the prevention of nuclear proliferation. It was a
blow to the overall cause of global non-proliferation, as well, given
that North Korea was the first NPT signatory to later withdraw and
acquire nuclear capabilities.
Compared to the Clinton administration, which believed in an
110 Zafar Khan
“engagement policy” that offered economic aid, diplomatic normal-

ization, and regime assurance for the DPRK, the Bush administration
failed to pursue what Clinton and his team proposed to gradually
dissuade North Korea from acquiring atomic weaponry. The Clinton
administration would later become highly critical of the Bush admin-
istration’s hawkish strategy towards the DPRK. Although the Clinton
administration delayed North Korea in their efforts towards acquiring
nuclear weapons in accordance with their 1994 agreement, it was not
particularly effective in convincing the DPRK of the value of the pre-
scribed terms. His successor’s administration would later undermine
these political and diplomatic efforts when they pronounced North
Korea as a member of the “axis of evil” along with Iran and Iraq.
Bush’s team would also talk openly of overthrowing the North Korean
government through armed force, and was avowedly skeptical of
South Korean “sunshine” policies towards their northern neighbor.
In the wake of the American War on Terror, stemming from the
9/11 terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington DC, hawks
within the Bush administration prepared to wage war and bring
about regime change in many countries deemed counter to American
interests, including North Korea. The US Nuclear Posture Review of
2001/2002 also reflected the hawkish policies of the Bush administra-
tion through their consideration of North Korea as a rogue state.
After the invasion and overthrow of the government of Iraq — anoth-
er presumed rogue state — North Korea withdrew from the NPT.
They would later conduct tests of their nuclear capability in 2006,
2009, 2013, and most recently, 2016, spanning across both Democratic
and Republican-led administrations within the American govern-
ment. Arguably, this harsher stance towards “rogue states” like the
DPRK did nothing to advance American material interests, instead
encouraging the DPRK regime to speed up their research into atomic
weaponry to prevent something like the Iraqi debacle from happen-
ing within their own countries. Although the Bush Administration
genuinely sought regime change within North Korea, their ongoing
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq absorbed the strategic focus of the
international community, precluding them from seeking similar regime
change in Iran and North Korea. Even though it had the power to act
on it, the United States could not create a strategy of regime change
with a reasonable chance of success across so many nations at once.
Both American Democratic and Republican administrations failed,
as part of their bilateral initiatives, to convince North Korea of the
value of their terms, which in turn could have successfully averted
the North Korean acquisition of atomic weaponry. It can be argued
that the international community and the main actors in the cause of
non-proliferation were hoping for an internally-led collapse of the
DPRK regime, given the prevailing wisdom of the time concerning its
impending doom by its economic poverty, severe famine, the death
of Kim Il-Sung, and the harsh attitude of the North Korean regime
toward its people. Later, it was widely believed that the newest regime
under Kim Jong-un (young but inexperienced) following the demise
of his father, Kim Jon-il, in 2011 would not survive for long. All these
predictions were to be proved wrong. As the international community
“waited and saw” for the collapse of the North Korean regime, the
regime survived, continuing to develop more deterrent forces. How did
this happen, and how does the DPRK ensure its continued existence?
This will be discussed in the next section.
The DPRK’s Strategic Efforts to Ensure Regime Survival
As mentioned above, the international community, led by the efforts

of the United States, did their best to bring about and wait for the
failure of the North Korean regime, with many in both the Clinton
and Bush administrations awaiting the predicted sudden collapse of
the DPRK regime. Notably, in the wake of a severe North Korean
famine, the top US military command within the Korean Peninsula
predicted that the North Korean government would “disintegrate.”
George Tenet, then-Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, warned
that “sudden, radical, and possibly dangerous change remains a real
possibility in North Korea, and that change could come at any time.”2
A few years later, US Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz
112 Zafar Khan
remarked that North Korea was “teetering on the edge of economic

collapse.”3 These high-profile voices predicted regime failure, and in
so doing failed to conceive of a comprehensive justification for how
and why the North would instead survive.
Instead, the actions of the DPRK regime helped ensure its sur-
vival in both the pre- and post-nuclear periods. The international
community did not expect that their strict sanctions and strategic
plans against North Korea would not achieve their desired ends.
Indeed, the DPRK regime actually managed to strengthen their
efforts towards ensuring survival every time pressure from abroad
was placed upon the country; in spite of facing the threat of collapse
for more than two decades, it has readily adapted to the tough condi-
tions facing it. Daniel Byman and Jennifer Lind identified several key
tools in this effort such as restrictive social policies, manipulation of
ideas and information, use of force, cooption, manipulation of foreign
governments, and institutional coup-proofing, which enabled the North
Korean regime to be in consistent power.4 All of these factors are
backed up by the contemporary scholarship on the Korean security
and strategic studies.
First, the Kim family successfully coopted any effective opposi-
tion from emerging against the regime. To ensure their continued
governance of the country, the Kim regime engineered a successful
effort to prevent a revolt from emerging among the ranks of the clergy,
business leaders, students, and workers, with restrictions and social
engineering effectively disabling these groups’ capacity to criticize
the regime’s policies and minimizing the possibility of revolt.5 One
2. Quoted in Daniel Byman and Jennifer Lind, “Pyongyang’s Survival Strategy:

Tools of Authoritarian Control in North Korea,” International Security 35, no. 1
(Summer 2010), p. 44.
3. Ibid., p. 44.
4. For excellent study on this see, Daniel Byman and Jennifer Lind, “Pyongyang’s
Survival Strategy: Tools of Authoritarian Control in North Korea,” Interna-
tional Security 35, no. 1 (Summer 2010), pp. 44-74.
5. Ibid., pp. 48-49. For other important readings on this perspective see, Charles
K. Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 1945-1950 (Ittaca, N.Y: Cornell
University Press, 2003); Andrei Lankov, North of the DMZ: Essays on Daily Life
important aspect of such a strategy built upon “coordination goods”

that restricted social uprising against the regime. These “coordination
goods” included tactics such as “outlawing any organization indepen-
dent of regime, limiting the strict free speech and rights of assembly,
and preventing the scope of opposition from mobilizing in the first
place.”6 The goal ultimately is to prevent strong opposition against
the regime whose effective mobilization could threaten its survival.
This simply may not be in the best interest of the Kim regime.
Second, cults of personality, charismatic leadership, and ideological
guidance of the masses under the controlled and centralized informa-
tion regime helps a regime survival. Many states in Asia and Middle
East wielded these conceptual tools to help the regime maintain its
power.7 A combination of ideology, charisma, and religion, combined
with strict control of ideational tools, served to help the leader attract
the population and reduce the desire to rebel.8 In the DPRK, the Kim
leadership exercises all tools at its disposal for a regime survival. It
makes sure that in every possible medium — education, arts, enter-
tainment, monuments, and national myth — the regime is depicted to
the masses in such a way as to imbue it with a greater charismatic and
ideational influence.9 For example, it advocates Juche ideology (i.e., the
ideology based upon self-reliance) to lead North Koreans to believe
they need to rely on themselves rather than others in terms of resolv-
ing their issues.10 The Kim regime declares itself to be as part of the
in North Korea (Jefferson, N. C.: Macfarlane, 2007).

6. Byman and Lind, “Pyongyang’s Survival Strategy: Tools of Authoritarian
Control in North Korea,” p. 48.
7. See James Jankowski, Nasser’s Egypt, Arab Nationalism, and the United Arab
Republic (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2001); Said Amir Arjomand, The Turban
for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1988).
8. Joel S. Wit, “North Korea: The Leader of the Pack,” The Washington Quarterly
24, no. 1 (2001), pp. 77-92.
Control in North Korea,” pp. 51-52.
10. Bruce Cumings, North Korea: Another Country (New York: New Press, 2004),
p. 158.
114 Zafar Khan
suryong system which depicts the Kim leaders to be the “sun of the
nation” and the “eternal President of the Republic.”11 With all these
ideational ingredients such as centralizing information control, depict-
ing stories of bravery of the Kim family in textbooks, and associating
charismatic attitudes with the leadership and personality cult, the Kim
regime is well-settled to preclude stronger opposition from within the
Kim’s family and the North Korean masses.
Next, a regime that so stridently makes efforts towards its sur-
vival is willing to mobilize force to suppress any opposition that
could emerge to challenge its continued existence and capacity to
wield power. The DPRK regime’s most loyal forces have become the
crucial component in their efforts to repress opposition.12 Byman and
Lind remark that, “in the event that the information campaign fails,
nationalism wanes, and independent social classes emerge, authori-
tarian leaders retain their most important tool for staying in power:
the regular and often brutal use of force.”13 The regime will wield
their most loyal forces to ensure that opposition cannot mobilize
against it, discharging punishment to suppress any threat to their
existence. Anyone taking part in opposition against the regime place
themselves and their family members under the risk of punishment
via what Eva Bellin describes as a “robust coercive apparatus”14
including physical and mental torture, “disappearances,” exile, and
execution that in turn provides a signal to others to restrain from
participating in anti-regime activities.
The Kim regime also makes use of widespread surveillance to
11. Samuel S. Kim, “Introduction: A System Approach,” in The North Korean System
in the Post-Cold War Era, Kim (ed.) (New York: Palgrave, 2001), p. 14.
12. For interesting readings on this, see Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf Jr., Rebellion
and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts (Chicago: Markham,
1971); Ian Lustick, Arabs in the Jewish State: Israel’s Control of a National Minority
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1980).
Control in North Korea,” p. 55.
14. Eva Bellin, “The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Excep-
tionalism in Comparative Perspective,” Comparative Politics 36, no. 2 (2004),
p. 143.
ensure that no group, organization, or institution can mobilize against

it, using these tools to help police and party officials ascertain against
whom to discharge punishment. A refrain in existing literature on
modern North Korean society is that “everybody’s watching each
other in North Korea.”15 Given the strategy of effective surveillance,
“a basic principle in North Korea is that two people who trust each
other may discuss sensitive issues, but when a third joins them, noth-
ing can be said.”16 This strict surveillance and the threat of retaliatory
violence of force go hand in hand as essential ingredients for regime
survival. Oh and Hassig remarked that, “this form of punishment has
proved extremely effective in deterring all but the most brave, selfish,
or reckless individuals from going against the Kim regime.”17
Finally, the Kim regime relies upon selected elites in the form of
loyal army personnel, rising part officials, and bureaucrats, showing
them with perks and privileges to ensure their continued loyalty and
coopt the threat of coup or revolt. The Kim regime dedicates a large
portion of their national budget to its army, which it considers reliable,
organized, disciplined, and accountable for ensuring its continued
viability. Paradoxically, the armed forces have played a key role in
preventing regime change, though they themselves have the singular
ability to effect regime change through an armed coup. This has led
to the Kim regime taking special efforts to identify rogue elements
within the army and bestow punishment as it deems to fit to protect
its interests. This was seen most recently when Kim Jong-Un sought
punishment against a senior military officer on various presumed
charges.18 The regime executed its former Defense Minister with an
anti-aircraft gun in front of hundreds of spectators.19
15. Quoted in Martin, Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader.
16. Kongdan Oh and Ralph C. Hassig, North Korea through the Looking Glass
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 2000).
17. Ibid., p. 139.
18. Euan McKirdy and K. J. Kwon, “Ranking North Korean Army Officer Said to
be Executed by Regime,” The CNN, February 12, 2016, http://edition.cnn.
com/2016/02/10/asia/north-korea-army-chief-ri-yong-gil-executed/.
19. Emma Glanfield and John Hall, “Kim Jong-Un Executes Defense Minister
116 Zafar Khan
In sum, given the above factors, the survival of the Kim dynasty
and the overall DPRK regime are closely intertwined. The family has
done everything within its power to not only protect its own members,
but also to protect the regime, no matter the price. The introduction of
atomic weaponry has made the rationale for ensuring the continued
survival of the Kim regime even more basic. Presumably, the Kim
family can use the prospect of acquiring additional nuclear armaments
as a foundation for their continued rule due to the role nuclear deter-
rence will play in ensuring the continued survival of the DPRK regime.
The DPRK’s Nuclear Odyssey and the Banner of Collapsism
Is there any hope of the Kim regime in compromising their strategy

towards ensuring its continued survival, satisfying those that cling to
the concept of collapsism even after North Korea successfully deto-
nated numerous nuclear weapons in testing? Given the level of sup-
port that this notion still holds within academic and political circles,
it demands additional work to fill the gap in existing literature. As it
currently stands, it is likely that North Korea’s nuclearization has
instead weakened the banner of regime collapsism.
North Korea acquired its nuclear capability largely because it
perceives a threat from the United States and its forces stationed in
South Korea, even reduced as they are in the aftermath of the Cold
War. Security thus remains the predominant factor in its decision.
Although the DPRK regime had already issued notice to the interna-
tional community of its intent to withdraw from the NPT as early as
the 1990’s, it was the changed strategic environment it faced in 2003
that led to its ultimate withdrawal and subsequent efforts towards
going nuclear. In 2003, the US’s Nuclear Posture Review in 2003
Hyon Yong-Chol,” Daily Mail, May 12, 2016, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/

news/article-3079172/North-Korean-defence-minister-executed-anti-aircraft
-fire-disrespecting-leader-Kim-Jong-dozing-military-events-answering-back.
html.
declared North Korea to be a member of the “axis of evil.” Given the

American-led invasion of another non-nuclear country recently deemed
to be a member of this axis, Iraq, the DPRK regime feared it would be
next. Presumably, the regime believed the acquisition of nuclear
weapons would prevent a similar American-led invasion of their
own territory and serve to bolster their deterrent forces.
In the aftermath of the Six Party Talks, the DPRK successfully con-
ducted tests of their nuclear capability in 2006, 2009, 2013, and, in 2016,
a series of tests. These nuclear tests served a) to enhance the credibility
of its deterrent forces; b) to increase their lethality and range; c) to
miniaturize its deterrent forces and d) to signal to the US and allies not
to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) anti-
missile system in Asia which in turn could undermine the credibility of
the DPRK’s deterrent forces. It also raised strategic concern for China,
who remained an essential part of the Six-Party Talks. Since it is not
clear what nuclear strategy the DPRK would practice after it acquired
nuclear weapons, it is largely assumed that it could follow a doctrine
of minimum credible deterrence.20 However, it appears that North
Korea could expand the capacity of their deterrence force to retaliate
against forces well outside the Korean Peninsula given the develop-
ment of warheads and delivery systems, including Intercontinental
Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), that the North Koreans have been working
towards for much of the past two decades.21
The advent of nuclear weaponry bestowed the Kim dynasty with
enough confidence to consolidate both their family and the regime as
a whole. Atomic weaponry allows the DPRK regime to potentially
engage with their adversaries on much more equal terms, and the
role of the Kim dynasty in procuring these weapons and commanding
20. Zafar Khan, “North Korea Evolving Nuclear Strategy under the Pretext of
Minimum Deterrence: Implications for the Korean Peninsula,” International
Journal of Korean Unification Studies 24, no. 3 (2015), pp. 181-216.
21. See Anthony H. Cordesman, North Korean Nuclear Forces and the Threat of
Weapons of Mass Destruction in Northeast Asia, July 25, 2016, Center for Strategic
and International Studies, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/
publication/160725_Korea_WMD_Report_0.pdf.
118 Zafar Khan
their potential usage has strengthened its grip within the regime. The
Kim dynasty remains visibly at the forefront of efforts to upgrade,
sustain, and modify their deterrent forces according to the perceived
level of deterrence needed. Any blow to the command of the regime
could have deleterious effects on the survivability of the command
and control of the overall deterrent forces and thus their credibility
as a deterrent to attack. A non-nuclear North Korea would give cre-
dence to the concept of collapsism and the possible installation by the
international community of a political regime deemed more amicable
to international interests. Accordingly, the regime endeavors to refine
and develop their nuclear deterrent.
The chances of the “wait and see” school being correct grow ever
fainter. Given the previous preeminence of the collapsism theoretical
framework, the international community must consider the most
likely future contingencies for the DPRK regime. Should the interna-
tional community continue to entertain the notion of collapsism any
longer, given the continued development (and ensuing benefits
towards regime survival) of North Korean nuclear weapons? Would
these deterrent forces maintain their credibility in the face of a collapse
of the ruling regime? For that matter, what would come of these forces
and their weapons following the end of regime control? How would
a strategic rethink by the international community of the credibility
of North Korea’s deterrence forces impact the Korean Peninsula as a
whole?
The international community, and in particular the United States
and the Republic of Korea, confronts two fundamental issues, collap-
sism and the very real consequences of regime collapse given their
acquisition of nuclear weapons. The international community has
“waited and seen” for regime collapse for far too long. Nothing posi-
tive has happened, and the Korean Peninsula remains divided. The
longer the international community waits for the regime to collapse
on its own, the further it gets away from diplomatic and political nego-
tiations and the more the North Korean leadership is able to exploit
currently prevailing conditions for additional nuclear tests. Can the
international community afford such a scenario, given its potential
threats to peace and stability throughout the entire Peninsula?

Nuclear weaponry, in ruining the collapsism school, has also pro-
longed the conflict between North and South Korea. There is a genuine
need for an alternative strategy to resolve the nuclear issue in a way
that suits the needs of both nations. Rather than waiting for the
DPRK regime to collapse from internal factors, the US, China, and
other major players in the international community need to reengage
the DPRK regime alongside their counterparts in Seoul. Negotiation,
not collapsism, must be seen as the way forward. When it comes to
negotiation, this should be a multi-pronged, result-oriented, and suffi-
ciently complex effort to strike a deal that meets the needs of all con-
cerned parties, regardless of the specifics of how individual parties
negotiate together. Doing so will help ensure continued stability of the
Korean Peninsula in addition to meeting the individual security needs
of these nations. How it will do so is discussed in the next section.
The International Community Reengagement Policy:

A Road to Restart the Six Party Talks
Attractive as preemptive strikes against DPRK nuclear facilities may

appear, these efforts would only engender additional complications
on the Peninsula, likely escalating to a full-blown military conflict
that would not benefit any of the parties involved. Given the success
of diplomatic efforts in the case of Iran, military invasion should not
be seen as an ultimate viable solution, even in consideration of the
differences between the Iran and Korea situations. Namely, Iran was
in the process of acquiring a nuclear capability and had already tested
ballistic missiles but had neither acquired nor formally tested atomic
weaponry, and it remains unclear if they have acquired the capacity
to do so. Moreover, they are still a full member of the NPT and are
thus not allowed to pursue a nuclear weapons program for military
purposes. Therefore, it was easier, if still very complicated, for the
international community and particularly the US to strike a nuclear
deal that benefits all affected parties so long as there is no threat to
120 Zafar Khan
any party’s security. This is compared to the situation faced with North
Korea, a self-declared nuclear state that has formally withdrawn from
the NPT and demonstrated their nuclear capabilities. An Iranian-type
deal may not be likely; nonetheless, there is still a chance for the major
players within the Six-Party Talks framework to engage the North
Korean leadership on the nuclear issue. Regular talks and consistent
diplomatic efforts could eventually pave the way to revive the Six-
Party Talks involving key players in the politics of the Peninsula. Fur-
ther efforts can be made to enable these diplomatic endeavors to
become sufficiently complex and comprehensive enough to create the
results desired by all parties, involving anywhere from two to six (or
more) of the participating parties as the situation demands.
First, these talks or negotiations could be bilateral between the
US and the DPRK. For example, the US President-elect, Donald
Trump, stated during his presidential campaign that he would have
no issue meeting and talking with Kim Jong-un to help resolve the
current impasse.22 Both states could discuss issues of mutual concern
and come to a peaceful resolution. The US could offer, as the Clinton
Administration did in the 1990s, formal Confidence Building Measures
that could lead to the eventual lifting of sanctions and the provision
of economic assistance in return for guarantees that North Korea
would either stop further development of its nuclear weapons pro-
gram, including a ban on the production of nuclear warheads or
more sophisticated delivery mechanisms or an outright North Korean
transformation of its nuclear weapon program towards peaceful
nuclear technology. Given the number of tests already conducted by
the DPRK, the latter option remains unlikely, but the former could
remain viable if both parties are willing to settle for a halt to continued
development in lieu of outright disarmament at this juncture.
Second, there could be benefits to the Korean Peninsula through
22. Nick Allen, “Donald Trump Says he Would Meet North Korea’s Kim Jong-un
for Talks” The Telegraph, May 18, 2016, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
2016/05/18/donald-trump-says-he-would-meet-north-koreas-kim-jong-un-
for-fac/.
the use of trilateral talks between the two Koreas and the United
States. Given the South Korean proximity to its northern neighbor, its
interests could not be ignored during bilateral talks between American
and North Korean diplomats; however, this is not to say that the US
and the DPRK could not have their own negotiations. Assuming the
success of bilateral talks in halting further nuclear development, they
could then cooperate with the Republic of Korea to create an ensemble
of Confidence Building Measures between the two Koreas that would
benefit both nations.
Third, to add an additional layer of sophistication, there could be
four-sided talks between the two Koreas, the United States, and
China. China remains crucial to the overall process of diplomacy
with Korea and the US has realized that, absent a central role for
China, there is little chance of a quick resolution for the North Korean
nuclear issue. China’s role is a priority for a number of reasons: One,
China shares a border with the DPRK and holds a good historical
relationship with the North Koreans. Two, China is a recognized
nuclear weapons state with a recognized responsibility within the
global nonproliferation regime. Three, it is a permanent member of
the United Nations Security Council, where it plays a key role in
global politics overall. Four, it is a rising regional power with ambi-
tions towards strengthening their economic and military might.
Therefore, China’s role, as it continues its rise as a regional power,
can be positive in terms of developing a strategic environment in the
Korean Peninsula where all countries could have a win-win result
concurrent with strategic stability in the Korean region. It is expected
that the US would be able to put pressure on the Chinese to play a
central role in this context without needing to intimidate the DPRK.
Without a substantial role for China at the negotiation table, especially
in consideration of its regional rise, both the United States and the
Republic of Korea are unlikely to see any positive outcome materialize
from talks.
Last but not least, sustainable diplomatic negotiations could be a
key source for resolving the Korean nuclear issue. Resumption of all
types of diplomatic effort, including that of the Six-Party Talks,
122 Zafar Khan
would be possible given the following factors that would favor

engagement with the international community to reengage the DPRK
on the nuclear issue.
First, although North Korea formally withdrew from the NPT and
conducted tests of their nuclear capabilities, their nuclear weapons
program has not fully matured, even as it emerges from its current
embryonic stages. For example, the DPRK has not reached a suffi-
cient level of development to create a credible second strike deterrent
in the form of nuclear submarines, nor have they demonstrated the
development of tactical nuclear weapons. They have thus far failed to
fully develop ICBM technology, to say nothing of Multiple Indepen-
dent Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs) wielded by the preeminent nuclear
powers. To date, the North Korean nuclear forces are not considered
as being able to reliably strike targets within the continental United
States, at least not when compared to their potential for striking
American allies in East Asia.
Thus, the North Korea nuclear weapons program still offers an
attractive opportunity to the international community to reengage
with its leadership to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. If the
international community were to delay too long, there is a real chance
the DPRK would succeed in their intentions of upgrading and modern-
izing their nuclear capabilities, making it increasingly more difficult
to negotiate (and perhaps all but impossible, should they fully develop
the mature technology required). This would represent the ultimate
failure of talks and diplomacy. There is a very real chance of “missing
the boat” if the key players do not begin to adopt a sufficiently sophis-
ticated negotiation strategy today, with a consequent chance of greater
harm befalling upon them.
Second, it is important to note that North Korea does not con-
front a real nuclear rival within East Asia. China is a nuclear state,
but the DPRK does not face a major threat from their forces. Neither
South Korea nor Japan are nuclear states, instead enjoying the protec-
tion and deterrent offered by advanced and well-trained American
conventional forces.23 The only realistic potential threat perceived by
North Korean leaders is the continued presence of the US in East
Asian affairs, along with the security guarantee extended to its allies
— indeed, this was North Korea’s original rationale for going nuclear
in the first place. The fact that American allies have eschewed nuclear
weapons in favor of the nuclear security guarantee by the US creates
the possibility for engagement on the nuclear issue.
Third, given the above two scenarios that would constitute reen-
gagement with North Korea through a multi-pronged negotiation
stage, both the United States and China would play an extremely
important role. The US, a predominant player in the Asia-Pacific region,
could develop a strategy in which the DPRK no longer feels threatened
and is thus ready for diplomatic negotiations over its nuclear arma-
ment. The US could also further convince the Chinese to play a crucial
role in denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula while encouraging the
Japanese and South Koreans to maintain a sustainable relationship of
greater regional economic integration, reducing the likelihood of war.
This would become most likely when regional negotiation efforts reach
a sufficient level of sophistication to convince the DPRK regime that
diplomatic solutions are the best ultimate guarantor of regime survival.
After all, there are no American nukes stationed in East Asia, nor a for-
mal deployment of the THAAD missile defense system. Fears of tactical
nuclear weapons at their border are an artifact of the past.
To revive the Six Party Talks in conjunction with other negotiating
strategies, the US and its allies could lift the economic sanctions levied
on North Korea to provide the country with a chance to openly discuss
how they believe the nuclear issue could be resolved. The key powers
could convince the DPRK to allow their nuclear program to be inspected
by the International Atomic Energy Agency to ensure that they only
pursue a peaceful nuclear program. Furthermore, they could work to
ensure that the DPRK carries out the practice of “complete, verifiable
23. For a more recent articles on the US extended deterrence towards both Japan
and South Korea see, Fintan Hoey, “Japan and Extended Nuclear Deterrence:
Security and Non-Proliferation,” Journal of Strategic Studies 39, no. 4 (2016),
pp. 484-501. Also see, Se Young Jang, “The Evolution of US Extended Deter-
rence and South Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions,” Journal of Strategic Studies 39,
no. 4 (2016), pp. 502-520.
124 Zafar Khan
and irreversible denuclearization” (CVID) of the Korean peninsula.24

These diplomatic efforts, if genuine, could help the international com-
munity and the DPRK to revive the February 2012 nuclear deal in
which the North Korean leadership agreed to suspend their nuclear
and missile programs and to allow for the inspection of nuclear sites in
exchange for food aid.25 This is nowhere near the distant past; it begs
to be revived without additional monitoring of the DPRK’s taste for
additional nuclear tests. “Wait and see” will only become even more
unrealistic as the North Koreans continue their efforts. According to
Jong, “after 25 years of consuming the myth of North Korea’s immi-
nent collapse, it would be unbearably painful to face a future where
North Korea emerges as an operational nuclear state. If such a scenario
were to materialize, we would have only ourselves to blame.”26 In the
process of ongoing negotiation with the DPRK, it is indeed possible
that they may not agree to completely reverse their nuclear program;
however, they could at the very least elect to stop further production
and development of nuclear weapons and gradually move towards a
peaceful nuclear program under the surveillance of the IAEA. This
would be possible if and when the key states involved in talks with
North Korea undertake sufficiently complex diplomatic efforts to bring
the North Korean leadership back to the negotiation table.
Finally, unanimous agreement among the key players in East
Asian politics on how to best reengage the DPRK regime will likely
be difficult, but not outright impossible, even with complications
emerging from the own efforts of North Korean leadership. There
remains significant responsibility on the shoulders of the major powers
to find an avenue for diplomatic agreement rather than waiting for
the emergence of additional factors that would worsen affairs on the
24. Elizabeth Phillip, “Is North Korea’s Nuclear Program Irreversible?” The
National Interest, March 19, 2016, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/north-
koreas-nuclear-program-irreversible-15537.
25. Victor Cha and Nicolas D. Anderson, “A North Korean Spring?” The Washington
Quarterly 35, no. 1 (Winter 2012), pp. 7-24.
26. Jong Kun Choi, “The Perils of Strategic Patience with North Korea,” The
Washington Quarterly 38, no. 4 (Winter, 2016), p. 68.
Peninsula. The longer collapsism holds sway among the international

community, the more difficult it will be to resolve the nuclear issue
and the longer the Kim regime will have to entrench themselves
against military and political upheaval within the regime. Simply
put, there remains substantial room for misinterpretation on both
sides of the nuclear issue, despite the potential best efforts for all
involved parties. There is consequently a need to develop a strategy
to avoid mistrust between the parties involved with the Six-Party
Talks, with an emphasis placed on “opportunities,” not the “threats”
of the current situation and a genuine effort made towards finding
mutually beneficial solutions. As Chinese crisis management scholar-
ship states, the difference between “danger” and “opportunities”
depends upon the intensity of the impending crisis, with a real dan-
ger of armed conflict emerging but also a genuine opportunity to
control the situation to prevent the outbreak of war.27
Conclusion
The DPRK regime and the nuclear issue have fallen under the lime-
light of the international community, especially in light of the cancel-
lation of the Six-Party Talks, the imposition of economic sanctions,
and North Korean efforts to continue nuclear testing. If collapsism
continues to enjoy its predominance among international political
actors, the probability of conflict will only continue to grow, with
their “waiting and seeing” for a domestically-led collapse that will
likely never occur. The international community has adopted such a
strategy for much too long, and not only has it not happened, the
DPRK regime’s employment of disparate survival strategies has yet
to show any signs of failure. Nuclear weapons have only strengthened
27. For a conceptual understanding on crisis and crisis management, see Alastair
Iain Johnston, “The Evolution of Interstate Security Crisis-Management Theory
and Practice in China,” Naval War College Review 69, no. 1 (Winter, 2016), pp.
29-71.
126 Zafar Khan
government control, increasing the need for centralized command

and control to best wield their deterrent effect. Indeed, regime failure
in North Korea would affect the security of their nuclear weapons
and greatly increase the possibility of their misuse within the DPRK
or elsewhere on the Korean Peninsula, with ensuing major strategic
implications.
This article emphasizes the need for revival of the Six-Party Talks
while also for the international community to make efforts for a
sophisticated, multi-pronged negotiation strategy that would reen-
gage the DPRK regime and establish common interests to create
opportunities away from danger. The aim would be to encourage the
North Korean leadership to open up to a diplomatic solution of the
nuclear issue, especially given the failure of the regime to collapse on
its own. Collapsism is a disproven theoretical framework, made all
the more so by the regime’s efforts to ensure its continued survival,
especially through the acquisition of atomic weaponry. Were regime
collapse to actually occur, the possible loss of control over these
weapons could now have grave consequences for the security of other
nations in East Asia.
Therefore, the major actors in East Asia need to design a negotia-
tion strategy that would fully convince the North Korean leadership
to come back to the negotiation table, with the revival of the 2012
Talks serving as a potential avenue for the resumption of diplomacy.
This strategy could peacefully resolve the North Korean nuclear issue
to the mutual benefit of the DPRK regime and the global community
as a whole. Ultimately, it is in the best interests of everyone involved
to prevent a catastrophe from befalling the Korean Peninsula, given
the potential for losses by all the key players in Asian diplomacy.
Therefore, the most rational approach is to prevent this contingency
through diplomatic reengagement by the parties currently at odds
with each other. Belief in collapsism has not worked, will not work,
and will only serve to mar the prospects of future negotiation efforts.
It has created a strategic vacuum on the Peninsula, which the North
Korean leadership has exploited to bolster their own nuclear deterrent
and their odds of survival. The international community must strive
to resume the Six-Party Talks and make an all-out effort to revive

diplomatic negotiation before the DPRK achieves a truly mature
nuclear capability. Once that occurs, it may be all but impossible to
fully denuclearize the Korean Peninsula, a contingency that would
only serve to further destabilize the region and irrevocably damage
the interests of both the East and the West.
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Vol.25, No.

2, 2016 ISSN 1229-6902

Vol.25, No.2, 2016

North Korea’s Nuclear Test and Prospects for Peninsular

East Asia’s Fluid Dynamics:

A Realistic Process towards Korean Unification and the

The Deficiencies of a Westphalian Model for Cyberspace:

North Korean Nuclear Issue:

Gus Swanda is Associate Professor of International Relations and Diplomacy at

North Korea’s Nuclear Test and Prospects

Keywords: North Korea, China, Nuclear Test, Korean Peninsula, Unifi-

nine months later, on September 9, North Korea announced that it

Nuclear Tests: Their Nature and Consequences

Despite some initial skepticism, international experts conceded later

nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula will become increasingly com-

rearm, both conventionally and with nuclear arms, creating a classical

Nuclear Ambitions and the Kim Jong-un Regime:

Economically, in terms of industrial development, his regime has

Characteristics of the Kim Regime

bers (such as his younger sister Yeo-jong), offspring of revolutionary

Contradictions within the Kim Jong-un Regime

Interpretations, judgments, and reviews regarding the North Korean

Proactive yet Superficial Reforms

Pursuing Economic Development without Reform and Opening

Although Pyongyang withstood the economic contractions of the 1990s,

Economic Zones (such as Raseon), represented a major setback for

Tranquil on the Surface but Unstable Deep Inside

Uncertainties about Regime Preservation

Some in South Korea have discerned some noticeable changes within

application of information technology, and inflows and circulation of

Contradictions within North Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions

North Korea’s nuclear programs “serve multiple purposes.”26 Domes-

Meanwhile, the potential challenge of North Korea’s nuclear

Prospects for Unification: Acceleration or Deceleration

China’s View of Peninsular Unification

By virtue of its location on China’s border, the Korean Peninsula’s

the condition that no external forces get involved.”29

Three Types of Unification

In China’s view, the approaches of unification of the Korean Peninsula

Military-led (by Force)

Merger (by Annexation)

According to various research reports,35 many emergencies can occur

Step-by-step (by Peaceful Means)

The Nuclear Issue Variable

External Factors Accelerating Toward Unification

39. Scott A. Snyder, “A U.S.-ROK-China Dialogue on North Korea’s Nuclear Stale-

military attack to accelerate the unification process.”42

Regime Collapse as the Result of Escalatory Sanctions

Concerns over Kim Jong-un’s Health

External Factors Decelerating Unification

Early unification is only remotely possible if Kim Jong-un decides to

html (accessed November 30, 2016).

problems in engagements and integrations. After all, the two have

One More Variable

In China’s view, another uncertain external factor is the U.S. Election

52. “DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman Refutes Obama’s ‘Statement’ against

Donald Trump’s willingness to resolve issues, the change of officials

54. Asan Korea Perspective 1, no. 18 (2016).

Article Received: Reviewed: Revised: Accepted:

__________. “DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman Refutes Obama’s ‘Statement’

East Asia’s Fluid Dynamics:

President Obama’s pivot to Asia accomplished some of its core objec-

Keywords: Pivot, Obama, TPP, DPRK, China