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ROJAS, CHILZIA T.

Divine Word University of Tacloban v. Secretary of Labor and Employment


G.R. No. 91915 | September 11, 1992 | ROMERO, J.:
FACTS: Divine Word University Employees Union was certified as the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent of the Divine Word University. Two days before the scheduled preliminary
conference, the union’s resigned VP Mr. Brigido Urminita wrote a letter addressed to the
University unilaterally withdrawing the CBA proposals. Consequently, the preliminary conference
was cancelled. After almost three years, the union, which had by then affiliated with the Associated
Labor Union (ALU), requested a conference/agreement with the University for the purpose of
continuing the collective bargaining negotiations but to no avail due to the university’s continued
silence.
ISSUE: Are both parties guilty of negotiating in bad faith?
LAW:
ART. 250, LC. Procedure in collective bargaining. — The following procedures shall be observed
in collective bargaining: (a) When a party desires to negotiate an agreement, it shall serve a
written notice upon the other party with a statement of its proposals. The other party shall
make a reply thereto not later than ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such notice. xxx
ART. 252, LC. Meaning of duty to bargain collectively. The duty to bargain collectively means
the performance of a mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in
good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement....
Art. 263, LC. Strikes, picketing, and lockouts. – … (g) When, in his opinion, there exists a labor
dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the
national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the
dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. xxx
CASE HISTORY:
1. Before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB), the union filed a notice of
strike on the grounds of, among others, refusal to bargain. It led to the conclusion of an agreement
(May 10, 1988) between the parties. However, one hour before such agreement was concluded,
the university filed a petitioner for certification election.
2. Before Med-Arbiter Milado, acting on the University’s petition for certification election, he
issued an Order directing the conduct of a certification election as it was "well-supported in fact
and in law." Said Order prompted the union to file with the Secretary of Labor an urgent motion
seeking to enjoin Milado from further acting on the matter of the certification election and the
Secretary of Labor granted the motion pursuant to his extraordinary powers under Art. 263 (g),
LC.
3. Before the Secretary of Labor (Drilon), exercising his extraordinary powers under Art. 263(g)
once again, the Secretary consolidated the entire labor dispute and resolved three issues, among
others, (1) whether there was refusal to bargain and an impasse in bargaining. Resolving the issue
in the affirmative, the Secretary of Labor stated that undeniably, the union and the university have
not been able to conclude a CBA since its certification.
4. Acting Secretary of Labor Dionisio L. de la Serna dismissed for lack of merit the University’s
motion for reconsideration and affirmed the previous Order of the Secretary of Labor. He noted
the fact that the collective bargaining proposals of the union had not been validly withdrawn as the
union’s VP had resigned and the withdrawal was signed only by three of the eight members of the
Executive Board of said union. Granting that the withdrawal was valid, it did not "exculpate the
University from the duty to bargain with the Union" because the collective bargaining processes
had been "set in motion from the time the CBA proposals was received by the University until the
impasse took place on account of its failure to reply to the Union’s letters pursuing its CBA
Proposals.
Hence, the University had recourse the instant petition.
RULING: The Court ruled in the affirmative.
There was no "reasonable effort at good faith bargaining" especially on the part of the
University. Its indifferent attitude towards collective bargaining inevitably resulted in the failure
of the parties to arrive at an agreement. As unilateral moves were being undertaken only by the
union, there was no "counteraction" of forces or an impasse to speak of. While collective
ROJAS, CHILZIA T.

bargaining should be initiated by the union, there is a corresponding responsibility on the part of
the employer to respond in some manner to such acts under Art. 250(a), LC. Considering the
procedure outlined in the article, the Court cannot help but notice that the union was not entirely
blameless in the matter of the delay in the bargaining process. The withdrawal by the union’s Vice-
President being unauthorized and therefore ineffective, the same proposals could be considered as
subsisting but the union remained passive for three years. The records do not show that during this
three-year period, it exerted any effort to pursue collective bargaining as a means of attaining better
terms of employment. It was only after its affiliation with the Associated Labor Union (ALU) that
the same union, through the ALU Director for Operations, requested an "initial conference" for
the purpose of collective bargaining.
While the union was opening all possible avenues for the conclusion of an agreement, the
record is replete with evidence on the University’s reluctance and thinly disguised refusal to
bargain with the duly certified bargaining agent, such that the inescapable conclusion is that the
University evidently had no intention of bargaining with it. Bad faith on the part of the University
is further exemplified by the fact that an hour before the start of the May 10, 1988 agreement, it
surreptitiously filed the petition for certification election. And yet during said conference, it
committed itself to "sit down" with the Union. Obviously, the University tried to preempt the
conference which would have legally foreclosed its right to file the petition for certification
election. In so doing, the University failed to act in accordance with Art. 252, LC which defines
the meaning of the duty to bargain collectively as "the performance of a mutual obligation to meet
and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith."
The petition was dismissed.
OPINION:
I agree with the ruling of the Supreme Court. Bad faith on the part of the university can be
clearly seen on its intention to have no bargaining agreement of any kind with the union based on
its indifference attitude towards the union. The inaction on the part of the university does not
merely show its refusal to bargain or its disagreement and rejection as to the proposal of the union
but, rather, a total disregard to have a bargaining agreement. Under the law, while collective
bargaining should be initiated by the union, there is a corresponding responsibility on the part of
the university to act upon on such matter. Also, the university clearly violated Art. 252 of the Labor
Code which defines the meaning of the duty to bargain collectively as the performance of a mutual
obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith.
On the part of the union, bad faith attaches to them as well. As the withdrawal of the
collective bargaining proposal of the union was made by its former vice president, the union did
not take any corrective measures to prevent any miscommunication nor to clear to the university
the ineffectivity of withdrawal of the proposal. As ruled by the court, the proposal was still
subsisting and yet, no action on the part of the union was made in order to put into force their
proposal. It was only after three year and its affiliation to the ALU that it pursued once again its
yearning to have a bargaining agreement. The union slept on its right to have a better terms of
employment due to its inattention.

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