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Jurgen Habermas: Theory of Communicative

Action, Discourse Ethics, Discursive Model


of Democracy
Jurgen Habermas is one of the most important political philosophers alive. He is relevant to the
other philosophers and political scientists discussed because of his focus on deliberative
democracy. In this essay, I will briefly sketch Habermas's theories of communicative action
(TCA) and discourse ethics (DE) in order to explain his discursive model of democracy (DMD).
As Habermas's philosophy draws extensively from both Kant and Rawls, I will briefly discuss
how he differs from them in important ways. Finally, I will attempt a critique of (DMD) by
discussing whether or not it is a viable, realistic mode of deliberative democracy.

The Theory of Communicative Action

(DE) is an extension of an earlier Habermasian theory called the theory of communicative action
(TCA). (TCA) is a critical theory Habermas supports to counter the single-mindedness of
Marxist historical materialism in social criticism. It recognizes, like Rawls' overlapping
consensus and theory of reasonable pluralism, the potential viability of a multitude of critical
theories. (TCA) necessitates "speakers to coordinate their action[s] and pursuit of individual (or
joint) goals on the basis of a shared understanding that the goals are inherently reasonable or
merit-worthy." (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2007) Inter-subjective communication,
then, becomes the shaping force behind a recognized plurality of critical modes. (TCA) has a
decidedly linguistic bent, as it defines "speech-acts" as relying on reasons and justification for
their truth-claims to be valid. By creating the need for the speaker to justify themselves,
Habermas creates a specific definition of acceptable speech that can be validly implemented
within (TCA). Speakers agree because they are motivated by rational justifications, and their
arguments are valid because they are so justified.

Communicative action, however, is not simply limited to discourse and reaching an agreement
on the substance of norms. Coordinating actions through discourse is also part of the theory, and
a part that is particularly important for (DMD).

Habermas distinguishes between communicative action in a social context and "strategic" action.
Strategic action seeks to fulfill an agenda and not necessarily come to the most rational
conclusion through discourse. The point of strategic action is to convince others to agree on an
action that will lead to success for those involved. Strategic actions are either "open" or
"concealed." If a strategic action is "open," then all of the participants in the discourse are aware
of the underlying strategic motive. If it is "concealed," then at least one participant incorrectly
believes the action to be communicative when it is known by the rest to actually be strategic.
(Baxter, 1987) Communicative action, by contrast, is not based on success, but "consists of
attempts by actors to cooperatively define the context of their interaction in such a way as to
enable them to pursue their individual plans. It is the paradigmatic form of social action oriented
toward reaching understanding." (Johnson, 1991)

Discourse Ethics

In order to govern the effective utilization of communicative action, Habermas developed


discourse ethics (DE). (DE) assumes that the moral norms that are subjectively held apply inter-
subjectively but may necessitate rational discourse (communicative action) in order to influence
the formation or reformation of moral norms. To this end, Habermas formulated three general
principles:

Universalization Principle (U): For a norm to be valid, the consequences and side effects that its
general observance can be expected to have for the satisfaction of the particular interests of each
person affected must be such that all affected can accept them freely.

Discourse Principle (D): Only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with
the approval of all affected in their capacity as participants in a practical discourse.

Consensus Principle (C): Free participation in a discourse is necessary to formulate a viable and
acceptable consensus on an issue. (Habermas, 1990)

These three principles represent freedom, equality, and consensus, respectively. (Sutton, 2000)
The only ethical way for a rational inter-subjective discourse to test the validity of a norm is for
(U) + (D) + (C) to be in action at all times.

Kant, Rawls and Discourse Ethics

As an ethical theory, (DE) has certain elements in common with the philosophies of both Kant
and Rawls. The three principles of (DE) are all formulated in a manner similar to that of Kant's
Categorical Imperative, but are given a decidedly dialogical twist in order to apply inter-
subjectively. Habermas is concerned with a number of rational individuals interacting in order to
come to valid conclusions about norms, not one subjective, moral individual, as Kant is.

Rawls philosophy seeks to provide the most just moral framework for a society. In that way, it is
similar to (DE). However, Rawls uses his thought experiments to actually produce moral content
and reach independent conclusions. Habermas does not. Habermas is concerned with the
procedure of finding valid moral norms, not necessarily the content of the norms themselves.
(DE) is a way of finding what is moral. (Hoenisch, 2005) While (U), (D), and (C) may be said to
contain inherent moral elements (equality, freedom, consensus), their structures are necessary in
order to guarantee the maximal inclusion and expression of inter-subjective argumentative
discourses drawn from the maximal amount of Rawlsian comprehensive doctrines. Thus, (U),
(D), and (C) exist in order to optimize the efficacy of (TCA), and are not moral norms in
themselves, although they may be said to presuppose them.

The Discursive Model of Democracy

Just as (TCA) is necessary for (DE), (DE) is necessary for (DMD). The word "discursive" in
discursive democracy is analogous to calling it "deliberative," but by calling it discursive it
retains the connotation of Habermas's discourse ethics.

(DMD) is an attempt by Habermas to apply (DE) to an institutional structure. Habermas


distinguishes liberal and republican models of democracy, and argues that each is problematic for
a variety of reasons. Liberal democracy focuses on individual rights and not an involved, active
citizenry. It places too much emphasis on the market and not enough on working institutions.
Republicanism, by contrast, asks too much of its citizens. It "is too idealistic in that it makes the
democratic process dependent on the virtues of citizens devoted to the public weal [. . .] The
mistake of the republican view consists in an ethical foreshortening of political discourse."
(Habermas, 1998)
The answer to the problems of liberal and republican democracy, says Habermas, is discursive
democracy. (DMD) "weaves together" both of the benefits of liberalism and republicanism -
liberalism's focus on individual rights and republicanism's insistence on an ethical citizenry.
"According to this proceduralist view [of (DMD)], practical reason withdraws from universal
human rights or from the concrete ethical life of a specific community into the rules of discourse
and forms of argumentation that derive their normative content from the validity-basis of action
oriented to reaching understanding, and ultimately from the structure of linguistic
communication." (Ibid.)

How does (DMD) achieve this? First, it inherently recognizes the subjective, equal worth of all
citizens, a recognition that is completely in line with liberal individual rights. Key to this
recognition is the three principles of (DE), which, as has already been noted, can roughly be
broken down into freedom, equality and consensus. From those three principles innumerable
individual rights can be tested and agreed upon through discourse, furthering still the scope of
individual rights.

Second, by placing all of the focus on dialogical communication between inter-subjective


individuals, the community-oriented view of a republican society is maintained. "Will-
formation," Habermas's term for creating the will to achieve ends through discourse, is an
outcome of discursive situations, on an equal playing field, between citizens. Citizens, having
reached consensus, are then acting as a political community to affect influential opinion.

The key difference between republicanism and liberalism is their respective views of the role the
citizenry should play in recognizing and interacting with the governmental apparatus. Liberals,
according to Habermas, consider democracy to legitimate the government, making it publicly
acceptable but nonetheless distinctly separate from the public sphere. Republicans, by contrast,
consider democracy to constitute the government. Citizens create a distinct political community,
inter-dependent on each other. (DMD) distinguishes itself from both views by insisting that
democracy should be based on rationalization. "[T]he procedures and communicative
presuppositions of democratic opinion- and will-formation function as the most important sluices
for the discursive rationalization of the decisions of a government and an administration bound
by law and statute." (Ibid.) This view requires more of the citizens than liberalism, but less than
republicanism. Whereas liberalism considers democracy a necessary tool for state-legitimation
and rights-protection, it fails to give the citizenry the necessary stake in democratic activity. The
republican view, which considers the political community of citizens to "constitute" the
government, is also unacceptable because it does not sufficiently distinguish the public from the
government quite enough, and depends only upon the politically devoted citizenry to act within a
given polity.
(DMD) creates solidarity in the public by engaging them with one another in rational discourse,
but it does not have them "constitute" the government in the strict sense of republican
democracy. It legitimates the government, separates the private sphere from the public, and
protects rights, but it does not simply stop there, as liberalism does. Instead:

The power available to the administration [under (DMD)] changes its general character once it
is bound to a process of democratic opinion- and will-formation that does not merely
retrospectively monitor the exercise of political power but also programs it in a certain way.
Notwithstanding this discursive rationalization, only the political system itself can "act." It is a
subsystem specialized for collectively binding decisions, whereas the communicative structures
of the public sphere comprise a far-flung network of sensors that respond to the pressure of
society-wide problems and stimulate influential opinions. (Ibid.)

Criticisms
While Habermas tries to give (TCA) and (DE) a real grounding of possible application to
existent democratic institutions with (DMD), it nonetheless is hard to consider (DMD) to
successfully apply beyond the thought experiment realm of Rawls' Theory of Justice. On a small
scale, a dozen educated scientists, doctors, and ethicists engaging in discourse to reach a moral
conclusion about a bioethical issue using (DE) and (TCA) does seem possible, as long as they
are open and rational participants who are not engaging in strategic action but communicative
action. (DMD), however, would have a much harder time coming to fruition in a heavily
populated society due to the need for an agreed upon set of rules that govern discursive modes
acceptable to Habermas for effective norm testing. Ensuring universal communicative action
would be nearly impossible, particularly in such an interest-centric realm as politics where
strategic considerations are so often devoted to individual, class, racial, and gender success.

Moreover, assembling a sufficiently sizable group of people, even at the city or town level, to
make any discursive outcome legitimately democratic would be extremely difficult to do. It is
more plausible that educated elites elected to represent the population would be small enough in
number and high enough in intellect to utilize (TCA) and (DE) towards a (DMD) outcome. But
the concentration of decision-making, even democratically, in representatives instead of the
people - the "public" sphere instead of the "private" - is exactly what Habermas doesn't want to
do. Indeed, as Habermas mentions in the quote at the end of Section V, the most important
element of (DMD) is the people shaping influential opinion.

While Habermas is correctly critical of Marxist social theory, his own leftist leanings may be his
undoing. (DMD) is an attempt at theorizing a genuine democratic society where decisions are
reached through rational, inter-subjective discourse between free, equal, and consensual
participants. This ideal, while attractive, is Utopian and a reflection of Habermas's dedication to
socialism. Nonetheless, (TCA) and particularly (DE) provide a sound discursive framework for
cooperative norm testing through rationalization. The application of such a framework has
innumerable possibilities.

Conclusion

While (DMD) may only make sense as a thought experiment, the proceduralist cast of (TCA)
and (DE) make them useful tools for ethicists and others. (DMD) itself, while idealistic to a fault,
nonetheless offers an interesting third way off the democratic path dominated by republicanism
and liberalism. The fundamental logic of engaging in communicative action in order to reach
valid conclusions through inter-subjective dialogue is sound, and it is hard to raise an ethical
argument against it. Habermas provides an interesting perspective with his theories that can help
expand perspectives of not only deliberative democracy and ethics but the very essence of
meaningful social interaction.

Sources

Baxter, Hugh. "System and Life-World in Habermas's 'Theory of Communicative Action'."


Theory and Society, Vol. 16, No. 1, (Jan., 1987), pp. 39-86.

Bohman, James and William Rehg. "Jurgen Habermas." The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy. Online Edition, 2007.

Habermas, Jürgen et.al. The Inclusion of the Other. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998.

Habermas, Jurgen. Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. Cambridge, MIT Press:
1990.
Hoenisch, Steve. "Habermas' Theory of Discourse Ethics." November 2, 2005. Criticism.com

Johnson, James. "Habermas on Strategic and Communicative Action." Political Theory, Vol. 19,
No. 2, (May, 1991), pp. 181-201.

Sutton, Michael. "Discourse Ethics - A Good Way to Develop Your Organization's Moral /
Ethical Understanding." Presented at IIPE 2000 in Ottawa, Canada on Sep. 24-28, 2000.

Published by Jacob Thomas

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