CASE:

PEOPLE v. ROLANDO CENTENO

FACTS:

It all started, innocuously enough, with a drinking spree. On that afternoon of December 1,
1968, Rolando Santos was enjoying himself with some friends and plenty of beer that he
eventually could not carry. Within the hour, he would be dead of a massive brain
hemorrhage.

According to Violago, he and Santos, together with their other companions, were in the store
of one Aling Goreng when Patrolman Valeriano Reyes approached Santos and told the
young man to come with him. Santos demurred, protesting that he had done nothing wrong,
whereupon Reyes boxed him in the chest and forcibly brought him to the police station.
There Santos loudly objected to his detention, prompting Police Chief Centeno to say,
"Matigas ka yatang talaga," although he relented later and allowed him to go home. But as
Santos was leaving, Centeno had a change of mind and asked Reyes to bring Santos back.
Reyes was holding Santos's arm when Centeno administered the first karate blow on the
nape of Santos's neck that made the victim fall forward on the backrest of a bench. This
was followed by two more karate blows that crumpled him to the cement floor where he lay
prostrate and motionless. On Centeno's order, two policemen then picked up Santos and
took him inside the locker room adjacent to the municipal jail.

The trial court believed the prosecution and convicted the police chief while absolving his co-
accused.[1] Rolando Centeno is now before us on appeal of his conviction.

ISSUE:

How Santos died is the question we have to settle. The prosecution says he was killed with
karate blows dealt by the accused-appellant. The defense denies this. It says Santos
drunkenly staggered and fell and hit his head and bled to death.

HELD:

The defense itself submitted that Santos shouted drunkenly within hearing distance of
Centeno and Reyes, "Putang inang mga pulis iyan! Walang kuwenta sa akin iyan!"[9] They
claimed to be tolerant and simply admonished him to go home, but subsequent events
showed they were really annoyed by his remarks. This was the motive that prompted Reyes
to drag Santos to the municipal building and led Centeno later to kill him.

We are satisfied that Violago and Villanueva were telling the truth about the killing of their
friend although there were indeed inconsistencies in their statements. These were minor
lapses only and did not impair the essential truthfulness of their narrations. As for the
defense, its explanation of the death of Santos while he was in the custody of the police is
hardly plausible and mainly speculative. Murder cannot be excused on such improbable
conjectures.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED except as to the civil indemnity,
which is increased to P30,000.00. Costs against the accused-appellant. It is so ordered.

DOCTRINE:

Murder it was indeed with the qualifying circumstance of treachery. There was alevosia
because Santos was suddenly attacked from behind when in his weakened and intoxicated
condition, coupled with the fact that his arm was then being held by Reyes, he could not
defend himself. The accused-appellant had employed means aimed at achieving his
purpose without risk to himself from any defense the victim could have made.

CASE:

Arturo Romera vs People of the Philippines

FACTS:

One evening in October 1998, Roy Mangaya-ay was drunk and was banging on the door of
Arturo Romera. Mangaya-ay was thrusting his bolo at the door and walls of the house of
Romera. Romera’s wife woke him up. Stirred by the commotion, Romera went outside
through another door and approached Mangaya-ay. The two had a scuffle and during which
Romera stabbed the stomach of Mangaya-ay. Mangaya-ay was later brought to the hospital
where he was treated and he survived. Meanwhile, Romera voluntary surrendered to the
authorities.

Romera was later found guilty of frustrated homicide but the trial court considered his
voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance.

Romera appealed as he averred that the mitigating circumstances of provocation (Par. 4,

Art. 13, RPC) and passion and obfuscation (Par. 6, Art. 13, RPC) should have been
considered by the court, that ultimately, the penalty imposed should have been lowered by
one degree due to the presence of two or more mitigating circumstances.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Romera is correct.

HELD:

Yes, he is partly correct. Provocation and passion and obfuscation should have been
considered by the trial court however, it is a rule that if the mitigating circumstances of
provocation and passion and obfuscation or those found in paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 of Article
13 of the Revised Penal Code all arise from the same facts, they shall only be considered as
one. In this case, provocation and passion and obfuscation all arise from the act of
Mangaya-ay of thrusting his bolo at the house of Romera while the latter was resting. As
such, there are two mitigating circumstances present, to wit:
1. Voluntary surrender;

2. Provocation and passion and obfuscation (taken as one).

DOCTRINE:

Romera appealed as he averred that the mitigating circumstances of provocation (Par.

4, Art. 13, RPC) and passion and obfuscation (Par. 6, Art. 13, RPC) should have been
considered by the court, that ultimately, the penalty imposed should have been lowered by
one degree due to the presence of two or more mitigating circumstances.

That being, since there are two mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstances,
the penalty to be imposed shall be lowered by one degree.

CASE:

PETER ANDRADA, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

FACTS:

That on or about the 24th day of September 1986, in the City of Baguio, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with intent to kill,
with evident premeditation and with treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously attack, assault and hack one ARSENIO UGERIO on the head twice with a bolo
thereby inflicting upon latter: hacking wound, head, resulting in 1) skull and scalp avulsion
vertex; 2) depressed comminuted skull fracture.

Thus performing all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of Murder as a
consequence thereof, but nevertheless, the felony was not consummated by reason of
causes independent of the will of the accused, that is, by the timely medical attendance
extended to Arsenio Ugerio which prevented his death.

Petitioner interposed self-defense and invoked the mitigating circumstance of voluntary

surrender. His version is that he and one Romy Ramos were drinking beer with a hospitality
girl named Liza inside Morlows Restaurant, when three military men occupied the table next
to them. They had pistols tucked in their waists. Without any warning or provocation, two of
the men, whom he identified as Cpl. Ugerio and Sgt. Sumabong, approached him, slapped
his face several times and pointed their guns to his head. They cursed him and threatened to
summarily execute him because he was so boastful.

Cpl. Ugerio then collared him and dragged him outside the restaurant, while Sgt. Sumabing
followed. Fearful that he might be killed, petitioner pulled out his bolo, wrapped in a
newspaper, from his waist and swung it at the two military men. He did not see if he hit any
of them. Then he ran to his house in Camdas Subdivision. He checked to see if his mother
or grandmother was at home so either of them could assist him in surrendering to the police.
But neither was present. On his way to surrender to the police, he met his mother
accompanied by a policeman. They then proceeded to the police sub-station at Magsaysay
Avenue where he surrendered.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused PETER ANDRADA guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated murder.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the trial courts Decision, thus:

WHEREFORE, THE DECISION APPEALED FROM IS HEREBY AFFIRMED WITH THE

MODIFICATION THAT THE APPELLANT IS SENTENCED TO AN INDETERMINATE
PENALTY OF FOUR (4) YEARS AND TWO (2) MONTHS OF PRISION CORRECIONAL,
AS MINIMUM, TO EIGHT (8) YEARS AND TWENTY (20) DAYS OF PRISION MAYOR, AS
MAXIMUM.

The Court of Appeals, in modifying the imposable penalty, found that petitioner is entitled to
the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority as he was only 17 years, 9 months and 20
days old at the time of the incident.

Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was denied by the Appellate Court
in its Resolution dated August 13, 1998.

ISSUE:

(1) whether petitioners right to due process was violated;

(2) whether his plea of self-defense is in order;
(3) whether the crime committed is frustrated murder or frustrated homicide; and
(4) whether he is entitled to any mitigating circumstance, assuming he is guilty.

HELD:
On the first issue, petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in not holding that the
trial court violated his constitutional right to due process.

In the following cases, we held that there has been gross negligence or incompetence
on the part of counsel for the accused,

In criminal cases, the negligence or incompetence of counsel to be deemed gross must have
prejudiced the constitutional right of an accused to be heard.

The long-standing rule in this jurisdiction is that a client is bound by the mistakes of his
lawyer. Mistakes of attorneys as to the competency of a witness, the sufficiency, relevancy
or irrelevancy of certain evidence, the proper defense or the burden of proof, failure to
introduce evidence, to summon witnesses, and to argue the case, unless they prejudice the
client and prevent him from properly presenting his case, do not constitute gross
incompetence or negligence.

On the second issue, petitioner invokes self-defense. Hence, it is incumbent upon him to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that he indeed acted in defense of himself. For in
invoking self-defense, the accused admits killing or seriously wounding the victim and thus,
has the burden to justify his act.[15] The requisites of self-defense are: (1) unlawful
aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel or prevent it; and (3)
lack of sufficient provocation of the part of the person defending himself.[16]

We find that the petitioner has not adequately discharged his burden of proving the
elements of self-defense.

On the third issue, petitioner contends that assuming he is guilty, he should only be
convicted of frustrated homicide, not frustrated murder. He insists that treachery was not
present. His hacking the victim was a spur-of-the-moment act prompted by self-preservation.

We are not persuaded. There is alevosia when the offender commits any of the crimes
against persons employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly and especially to ensure the execution of the crime without risk to himself from any
defense which the offended party might make.[17] We agree with the lower courts that the
petitioner planned to kill the victim with treachery in mind. At that time, the victim was seated,
having just finished a meal at a late hour. His back was towards petitioner when the latter,
without warning, hacked him twice on his head with a bolo. The attack was so sudden and
unexpected that the victim had no opportunity either to avert the attack or to defend himself.

On the fourth issue, petitioner insists that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender should have been appreciated in his favor.

Evidence for the prosecution shows that petitioner, after attacking the victim, ran away.
He was apprehended by responding police officers in the waiting shed at the corner of
Cambas Road and Magsaysay Avenue. For voluntary surrender to be appreciated, the
surrender must be spontaneous, made in such a manner that it shows the interest of the
accused to surrender unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his
guilt or wishes to save them the trouble and expenses that would be necessarily incurred in
his search and capture. Here, the surrender was not spontaneous.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
September 18, 1997 and its Resolution dated August 13, 1998 in CA-G.R. CR No. 15851
are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

CASE:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. SPO1 VIRGILIO G. BRECINIO, appellant

FACTS:

That on the 30th day of June 1996, more or less 6:00 o'clock in the evening, inside the
Municipal Jail, Municipality of Pagsanjan, Province of Laguna, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, with treachery and
evident premeditation, while conveniently armed with a service firearm Colt Caliber .45 with
SN 531333, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot ALBERTO
PAGTANANAN, a jail inmate, who was then caught unaware and was hit on the upper
quadrant medical clavicular line, resulting in his instantaneous death, to the damage and
prejudice of his surviving heirs.

That the crime was committed with the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident
premeditation.

Robinson Arbilo testified that, at around 5:00 p.m., on June 30, 1996, he was with inmates
Sammy Bolanos, Rafael Morales, Edwin Maceda, Filomeno Mapalad, Jr. and victim Alberto
Pagtananan inside the Pagsanjan municipal jail, cell no. 1, when appellant SPO1 Virgilio
Brecinio, who was drunk, arrived. Appellant entered their cell and asked for their names, and
the reasons for their detention. After answering, each of them received a blow in the
stomach from the appellant for no apparent reason. Thereafter, appellant ordered them to
bring out all their belongings from their cell. While doing so, they were hit with whatever
object the former could get hold of.

Appellant proceeded to the comfort room and, as he emerged therefrom, he saw the victim
Alberto Pagtananan also coming out. Appellant confronted the victim and asked him where
he came from. The victim answered that he had just urinated. Apparently not believing him,
appellant accused the victim of hiding and making a fool of him. The victim innocently replied
hindi naman po. Irritated by the answer, appellant berated the victim and when the latter
looked at him, he asked, Bat ang sama mong tumingin? The victim did not reply. Appellant
punched the victim in the stomach but still the latter said nothing.

Appellant pulled out his .45 caliber pistol tucked on his right waist and fired it twice in
succession. The first shot was directed upward; the second downward. The inmates inside
the cell were all cowering in fear and were huddled together in one corner of the bed,
covering their ears. Witness Arbilo who was merely one-and-a-half meters in front of the
appellant then saw the latter aim his gun at the victim and fire the third shot, hitting the victim
in the stomach. Seeing the victim lying prostrate on the ground, the inmates lifted and laid
him on the bed. At that juncture, appellant, who was standing in front of the inmates,
reholstered his gun on his waist and ordered them to get water for the victim. SPO1 Bayani
Montessur then arrived and ordered the victim to be brought to a nearby hospital but the
latter was declared dead on arrival.

ISSUE:

Appellant alleges that the trial court erred in convicting him of murder and that, if an offense
was indeed committed, it was only reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.

HELD:

A careful evaluation of the records shows that the court a quo was correct in finding
appellant guilty of killing the victim.

The trial court correctly appreciated the presence of treachery which qualified the offense
to murder. For treachery to be considered, the accused must have deliberately and
consciously adopted a means of execution that rendered the person attacked with no
opportunity to defend himself or to retaliated.

We hold that the trial court did not err in convicting the appellant of murder. The penalty
therefor under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659 (The
Heinous Crimes Law) is reclusion perpetua to death. There being neither mitigating nor
aggravating circumstances, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed in
accordance with Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision dated October 15, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court of
Santa Cruz, Laguna, Branch 28, in Criminal Case No. SC-6476, finding SPO1 Virgilio G.
Brecinio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua, is hereby AFFIRMED. Appellant is ordered to pay the
amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity and P25,000 as temperate damages to the heirs of
Alberto Pagtananan.

CASE:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. BERNARDO CORTEZANO and JOEL

CORTEZANO, appellants.

FACTS:

That on or about the 6th day of May, 1990, in the afternoon at Bgy. (sic) Azucena,
Municipality of Sipocot, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design, conspiring,
confederating together and mutually helping one another, taking advantage of their superior
strength with force, intimidation and with grave abuse of confidence, did then and there
wilfully (sic), feloniously and unlawfully have carnal knowledge one after the other with Leah
C. Cortizano (sic), 7 years old, minor, against her will and the offended party suffered
damages.

Momentarily, Boyet Orcine arrived and inquired what Joel and Bernardo were doing to Leah.
Joel and Bernardo ordered Boyet to rape Leah and threatened to box him if he refused. Joel
and Bernardo laughed as Boyet was having his turn with Leah. Joel and Bernardo then
called Leah Lou and Lionel into the room, letting them see their sister naked.

Joel and Bernardo threatened to kill her and the members of the family if she told anyone
about what happened to her. Joel, Bernardo and Boyet left the room together. Leah went out
of the room and washed her vagina.

Petrified, Leah did not reveal to her grandparents what happened to her. After that first
harrowing incident, Joel and Bernardo subjected her to sexual abuse daily. After every
sexual intercourse they had with Leah, Joel and Bernardo would threaten to kill her and her
family if she told anyone what they had been doing to her.

After trial, the court rendered a decision convicting the appellants of four counts of rape,
Hence, this appeal.

The appellants also claim that although their defense of alibi is inherently weak, it is
incumbent upon the prosecution to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt before a
judgment of conviction could be rendered against them. Considering the prosecution's
evidence, tattered as it is, their defense assumes importance and is even decisive of the
outcome of the case.

HELD:

The Court finds the appeal without merit.

In this case, the trial court gave credence and full probative weight to the testimony of the
victim, in tandem with those of the other witnesses of the prosecution:

The provincial prosecutor may have opted to file only four counts of rape instead of thirty-six
counts of rape for reasons other than the implausibility of Leahs testimony. Neither is Leahs
testimony enfeebled by her siblings failure to report to their parents or grandparents that they
saw her naked on May 6, 1990. At the time, Leah Lou was barely three, while Lionel was
only a year old. The children were too young to realize the importance of reporting such an
incident to their parents or grandparents.

In the present recourse, the appellants defense of alibi deserves scant consideration. As
consistently held by this Court:

[A]libi is the weakest of all defenses. It is a settled rule that for an alibi to prevail, the
defense must establish by positive, clear and satisfactory proof that it was physically
impossible for the accused to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission, and not merely the accused was somewhere else.[27]

For alibi to prosper, the following must be established with clear and convincing evidence:
(a) the presence of the appellant in another place at the time of the commission of the
offense; and, (b) physical impossibility for him to be at the scene of the crime.[28] Alibi
cannot prevail over the positive, straightforward and spontaneous testimony of the victim
identifying the appellants as the malefactors and how they consummated the crimes
charged.

The Court notes that the appellants were still minors when they committed the offense. At
the time, Joel was 13 years and 6 months old, while Bernardo was 12 years and 4 months
old. Nevertheless, they are not exempt from criminal liability.

Article 12, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Article 12. Circumstances, which exempt from liability.The following are exempt from criminal
liability:
3. A person over nine years of age and under fifteen, unless he acted with discernment, in
which case, such minor shall be proceeded against in accordance with the provisions of
Article 80 of this Code.

A minor who is over nine years old and under fifteen years old at the time of the commission
of the crimes is exempt from criminal liability only when the said minor acted without
discernment. It is the burden of the prosecution to prove that a minor acted with discernment
when he committed the crime charged. In determining if such a minor acted with
discernment, the Courts pronouncement in Valentin v. Duquea[34] is instructive:

The discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a
minor under fifteen years of age but over nine, who commits an act prohibited by law, is his
mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong, and such capacity
may be known and should be determined by taking into consideration all the facts and
circumstances afforded by the records in each case, the very appearance, the very attitude,
the very comportment and behavior of said minor, not only before and during the
commission of the act, but also after and even during the trial.

The imposable penalty for rape committed by two or more persons under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code was reclusion perpetua to death.[35] Since the appellants were both
minors at the time they committed the offenses, they are entitled to the benefits of the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority under Article 68(1) of the Revised Penal Code
which reads:

Art. 68. Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years of age.When the
offender is a minor under eighteen years and his case is one coming under the provisions of
the paragraph next to the last of Article 80 of this Code, the following rules shall be
observed:

1. Upon a person under fifteen but over nine years of age, who is not exempted from liability
by reason of the court having declared that he acted with discernment, a discretionary
penalty shall be imposed, but always lower by two degrees at least than that prescribed by
law for the crime which he committed.

In these cases, the crimes were not aggravated by abuse of superior strength because the
said circumstance is already considered in the penalty imposed by the law for the crimes.
However, the crimes were aggravated by relationship, pursuant to the second paragraph
of Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.[36] The appellants are the uncles of
the victim. The crime charged in Criminal Case No. L-1679 was aggravated by the
appellants, adding ignominy to the natural effects of the crime.[37] In People v. Fuertes,[38]
this Court ruled:

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Libmanan,
Camarines Sur, Branch 56, in Criminal Cases Nos. L-1679 and L-1680, finding the
appellants Bernardo Cortezano and Joel Cortezano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four
counts of rape is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS.
DOCTRINE:

Ignominy is a circumstance pertaining to the moral order which adds disgrace and obloquy
to the material injury caused by the crime. The clause Which add ignominy to the natural
effects of the act contemplates a situation where the means employed or the circumstances
tend to make the effects of the crime more humiliating or to put the offended party to shame.

Ignominy was attendant when the appellants forced Boyet Orcine to rape the victim, and
laughed as the latter was being raped by Boyet, and when they ordered Leah Lou and Lionel
to look at their naked sister after the appellants had raped her. However, the aforementioned
modifying circumstances cannot aggravate the crimes and the penalties therefor because
the same were not alleged in the Information as mandated by Section 9, Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Although the crimes were committed before the
effectivity of the said Rule, it shall be applied retroactively because it is favorable to the
appellants.

CASE:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee vs. ROMEO AMBRAY y LUTERI

FACTS:

On or about March 13, 1996, in the City of Pasig and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the accused, with lewd design and by means of force and intimidation did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with Melanie Hernandez, a
minor, eleven (11) years old, against her will and consent.

Melanie testified that on March 13, 1996 at around 2:00 oclock a.m., she was awakened
when she was carried by the accused Ambray to the bed; thereafter the accused removed
her short pants and T-Shirt. She tried to shout but the accused quickly covered her mouth
with a handkerchief. The accused subsequently inserted his penis into her vagina and
sexually abused her for about three minutes. She fell asleep, still feeling the pain, and woke
up at about 7:00 oclock a.m. She left the house to pick up the laundry from her
grandmothers place as instructed by the accused. She was about to reveal her ordeal to her
mother and went straight to the market place. Unable to locate her mother, she went instead
to her aunt, Vilma Perez. She broke down and confided her tragic experience in the hands of
her mothers common-law spouse, the accused Ambray. Vilma Perez accompanied Melanie
to the Block 4, Police Substation in Rosario, Pasig City, where she gave her statement[2] to
the police authorities.[3]

Melanie also stated that the accused had been raping her since she was barely six years
old, and that the accused sexually abused her sometimes twice a week. She felt severe pain
every time but she did not have the courage to divulge the same because she was afraid
that the accused would carry out his threats to kill them all.
Romeo Ambray denied having raped Melanie. He claimed that on March 13, 1996 he was
then sleeping beside his three children, Ronel, Rowena, and Raymart, on their bed. Melanie
and her half-brother Robin, were sleeping on the floor about two meters away from the bed.
The accused claims that he could not have raped Melanie because even just a slight
movement would awaken his child sleeping beside him. He further testified that Vilma Perez,
the victims aunt goaded Melanie to go to the police and press false charges against him to
convince Melanies mother, Vinia, to end her common-law relations with the appellant
because he is a gambler and could not support his family. He claimed that prior to the
alleged incident, Melanie was complaining to her mother and her brother that her half-
brother Robin was raping her.[8]

The trial court found Ambray guilty beyond reasonable doubt and rendered judgment.

ISSUE:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO
THE INCREDIBLE TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT AND IN NOT
CONSIDERING THE DEFENSE INTERPOSED BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF

STATUTORY RAPE DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

HELD:

We affirm the judgment of conviction. After a careful examination of the evidence, the court
is satisfied that the guilt of the accused has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.

The trial court held that Melanies testimony which was straightforward and categorical was a
truthful account of what transpired during the incident in question.

We find no compelling reason to disturb the findings of the court a quo, which observed the
manner by which Melanie testified and her demeanor, and took into account her apparent
immaturity, youthfulness and lack of malice. The long standing rule is that when an alleged
victim of rape says she was violated, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that
rape has been inflicted on her, and so long as her testimony meets the test of credibility, the
accused may be convicted on the basis thereof.[13] Indeed, it defies comprehension why an
eleven year old girl would concoct a story of defloration, allow any examination on her
private parts and publicly disclose that she had been sexually abused by her mother's
common-law spouse if her if her motive were other than to protect her honor and bring to
justice that person who defiled her.

However, the penalty imposed by the trial court should be reduced.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the Court a quo is AFFIRMED.

DOCTRINE:

This is a case of statutory rape, considering that the victim was under twelve years of age.

The penalty imposable is reclusion perpetua. Although it was shown that the accused is the
common-law spouse of the victims mother, the first special qualifying circumstance
described in paragraph 1, above quoted, was not alleged in the indictment on which he was
arraigned. The failure to allege the fact of relationship between the accused and the victim in
the information for rape is fatal and consequently bars conviction of its qualified form which
is punishable with death. Qualifying circumstances must be properly pleaded in the
indictment in order not to violate the constitutional right of the accused to be properly
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.