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ISSUE: W/N the publication in Official Gazette is required before any law or statute
takes effect
HELD: Yes. The publication of all presidential issuances of public nature or of general
applicability is mandated by law. Presidential issuances which apply only to particular
persons or class of persons such as administrative or executive orders need not be
published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concern. On the
other hand, presidential issuances of general applicability which have not been
published shall have no force & effect.
These pacts made by the parties independently were calculated to alter the mortgage a contract
clearly entered into, converting the latter into a contract of antichresis. The contract of
antichresis, being a real encumbrance burdening the land, is illegal and void because it is legal
and valid.
ISSUE: W/N the petitioner should be deemed the possessor of the land in good faith because
he was unaware of any flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition by which it is
invalidated
RULING: Yes. From the facts found established by the Court of Appeals we can neither
deduce nor presume that the petitioner was aware of a flaw in his title or in the manner of its
acquisition, aside from the prohibition contained in section 116. This being the case, the
question is whether good faith may be premised upon ignorance of the laws.
Gross and inexcusable ignorance of law may not be the basis of good faith, but possible,
excusable ignorance may be such basis. It is a fact that the petitioner is not conversant with
the laws because he is not a lawyer. In accepting the mortgage of the improvements he
proceeded on the well-grounded belief that he was not violating the prohibition regarding the
alienation of the land. In taking possession thereof and in consenting to receive its fruits, he
did not know, as clearly as a jurist does, that the possession and enjoyment of the fruits are
attributes of the contract of antichresis and that the latter, as a lien, was prohibited by section
116. These considerations again bring us to the conclusion that, as to the petitioner, his
ignorance of the provisions of section 116 is excusable and may, therefore, be the basis of his
good faith.
ISSUE: W/N the widow is already barred from availing death benefits under the Civil
Code because she already availed damages under the Labor Code
Facts: Petitioner Doña Adela Export International, Inc., filed a Petition for
Voluntary Insolvency. The case was docketed and raffled off to the RTC of
Mandaluyong City, Branch 211. The RTC, after finding the petition sufficient
in form and substance, issued an order declaring petitioner as insolvent and
staying all civil proceedings against petitioner.
Thereafter, Atty. Gonzales was appointed as receiver. After taking her oath,
Atty. Gonzales proceeded to make the necessary report, engaged appraisers
and required the creditors to submit proof of their respective claims. Atty.
Gonzales filed a Motion for Parties to Enter Into Compromise Agreement
incorporating therein her proposed terms of compromise.
The creditors TIDCORP and BPI also filed a Joint Motion to Approve
Agreement which contained some terms and conditions for their benefit. The
RTC rendered the assailed Decision approving the Dacion En Pago by
Compromise Agreement and the Joint Motion to Approve Agreement.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is bound by the provision in the BPI-
TIDCORP Joint Motion to Approve Agreement that petitioner shall waive its
rights to confidentiality of its bank deposits under R.A. No. 1405, as
amended, otherwise known as the Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits and R.A.
No. 8791, otherwise known as The General Banking Law of 2000?
In this case, the Joint Motion to Approve Agreement was executed by BPI
and TIDCORP only. There was no written consent given by petitioner or its
representative, Epifanio Ramos, Jr., that petitioner was waiving the
confidentiality of its bank deposits. The provision on the waiver of the
confidentiality of petitioner’s bank deposits was merely inserted in the
agreement. It is clear therefore that petitioner is not bound by the said
provision since it was without the express consent of petitioner who was not
a party and signatory to the said agreement.
ISSUE: W/N CA has jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases involving
custody of minors in light of the provision in RA 8369 giving family courts exclusive
jurisdiction over such petitions.
HELD: Petition granted. CA should take cognizance of the case because nothing in
RA 8369 revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving custody of
minors. The reasoning of CA cant be affirmed because it will result to iniquitous,
leaving petitioners without legal course in obtaining custody. The minor could be
transferred from one place to another and habeas corpus case will be left without
legal remedy since family courts take cognizance only cases within their jurisdiction.
Literal interpretation would render it meaningless, lead to absurdity, injustice, and
contradiction. The literal interpretation of “exclusive” will result in grave injustice and
negate the policy to protect the rights and promote welfare of children.
Pesca vs Pesca
UCPB VS UY
THE FACTS: Prime Town Property Group, Inc. (PPGI) and E. Ganzon Inc.
were the joint developers of the Kiener Hills Mactan Condominium
Project (Kiener Hills). In 1997, spouses Walter and Lily
Uy (respondents) entered into a Contract to Sell with PPGI for a unit in Kiener
Hills. The total contract price amounted to ₱1, 151,718. 7 5 payable according
to the following terms: (a) ₱l00,000.00 as down payment; and (b) the balance
paid in 40 monthly installments at ₱26,297.97 from 16 January 1997 to 16 April
2000.4
On 17 April 2006, the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board Regional
Office (HLURB Regional Office) received respondents' complaint for sum of
money and damages against PPGI and UCPB. They claimed that in spite of
their full payment of the purchase price, PPGI failed to complete the
construction of their units in Kiener Hills.8
In its assailed 23 May 2012 decision, the CA affirmed with modification the OP
decision. While the appellate court agreed that respondents are entitled to a full
refund of the payments they may have made, it ruled that UCPB is not solidarily
liable with PPGI, and as such cannot be held liable for the full satisfaction of
respondents' payments. It limited UCPB's liability to the amount respondents
have paid upon the former's assumption as the party entitled to receive
payments or on 23 April 1998 when the MOA and AIR Agreement were made
between UCPB and PPGI.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant Petition for Review is
PARTIALLY GRANTED. The promulgated Decision dated 24 March 2010 and
Resolution dated 16 February 2011 are hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION, as follows:
UCPB moved for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA in its assailed 18
October 2012 resolution.
On the other hand, UCPB countered that the only issue to be resolved in the
present petition is the actual amount of its liability. It explained that the assailed
CA decision had become final and executory after respondents failed to appeal
the same. UCPB pointed out that the issues respondents raised were already
ventilated before the appellate court. It believed that respondents should have
filed their own appeal to assail the issues they found questionable.
It must be remembered that when a case is appealed, the appellate court has
the power to review the case in its entirety.17 In Heirs of Alcaraz v. Republic of
the Phils., 18 the Court explained that an appellate court is empowered to make
its own judgment as it deems to be a just determination of the case, to wit:
Thus, when UCPB appealed the present controversy before the Court, it was
not merely limited to determine whether the CA accurately set UCPB's liability
against respondents. It is also empowered to determine whether the appellate
court's determination of liability was correct in the first place. This is especially
true considering that the issue of the nature of UCPB's liability is closely
intertwined and inseparable from the determination of the amount of its actual
liability.
Stare Decisis applies only to cases decided by the Supreme Court: As above-
mentioned, respondents bewail the reliance of the CA on 0 'Halloran arguing
that it was not a binding precedent since it was not issued by this Court. In De
Mesa v. Pepsi-Cola Products Phils. Inc.,20 the Court explained that the doctrine
of stare decisis deems decisions of this Court binding on the lower courts. The
principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere is entrenched in Article 8 of the
Civil Code, to wit: It enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires our
courts to follow a rule already established in a final decision of the Supreme
Court. That decision becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent
cases by all courts in the land. The doctrine of stare decisis is based on the
principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should
be deemed settled and closed to further argument. In other words, the doctrine
of stare decisis becomes operative only when judicial precedents are set by
pronouncements of this Court to the exclusion of lower courts. It is true
regardless whether the decisions of the lower courts are logically or legally
sound as only decisions issued by this Court become part of the legal system.
At the most, decisions of lower courts only have a persuasive effect. Thus,
respondents are correct in contesting the application of the doctrine of stare
decisis when the CA relied on decisions it had issued.
Issue: Whether or not the employer, who has furnished a gentle and
tractable team (of horses) and a trusty and capable driver, is liable for the
negligence of such driver.
Ruling: NO. The cochero of the defendant was not negligent in leaving
the horses in the manner described by the evidence in this case. It is
believed that acts or performances which, in a long time, have not been
destructive and which are approved by the society are considered as
custom. Hence, they cannot be considered as unreasonable or
imprudent. The reason why they have been permitted by the society is
that they are beneficial rather that prejudicial. One could not easily
hold someone negligent because of some act that led to an injury or
accident. It would be unfair therefore to render the cochero negligent
because of such circumstances. The court further held that it is a
universal practice of merchants during that time to deliver products
through horse-drawn vehicles; and it is also considered universal
practice to leave the horses in the manner in which they were left during
the accident. It has been practiced for a long time and generally has not
been the cause of accidents or injuries the judgment is therefore
reversed.
Facts:
Petitioner filed a claim of refund/credit of input vat in relation to its zero-rated sales from July
1, 2002 to September 30, 2002. The CTA 2nd Division partially granted respondent’s claim for
refund/credit. Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, insisting that the
administrative and the judicial claims were filed beyond the two-year period to claim a tax
refund/credit provided for under Sections 112(A) and 229 of the NIRC. He reasoned that since
the year 2004 was a leap year, the filing of the claim for tax refund/credit on September 30,
2004 was beyond the two-year period, which expired on September 29, 2004. He cited as
basis Article 13 of the Civil Code, which provides that when the law speaks of a year, it is
equivalent to 365 days. In addition, petitioner argued that the simultaneous filing of the
administrative and the judicial claims contravenes Sections 112 and 229 of the NIRC.
According to the petitioner, a prior filing of an administrative claim is a “condition precedent”
before a judicial claim can be filed. The CTA denied the MPR thus the case was elevated to
the CTA En Banc for review. The decision was affirmed. Thus the case was elevated to the
Supreme Court. Respondent contends that the non-observance of the 120-day period given
to the CIR to act on the claim for tax refund/credit in Section 112(D) is not fatal because what
is important is that both claims are filed within the two-year prescriptive period. In support
thereof, respondent cited Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Victorias Milling Co., Inc. [130
Phil 12 (1968)] where it was ruled that “if the CIR takes time in deciding the claim, and the
period of two years is about to end, the suit or proceeding must be started in the CTA before
the end of the two-year period without awaiting the decision of the CIR.”
Issue: Whether or not the claim for refund was filed within the prescribed period
Held: Yes. As ruled in the case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Mirant Pagbilao
Corporation (G.R. No. 172129, September 12, 2008), the two-year period should be
reckoned from the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made. In Commissioner
of Internal Revenue v. Primetown Property Group, Inc (G.R. No. 162155, August 28, 2007,
531 SCRA 436), we said that as between the Civil Code, which provides that a year is
equivalent to 365 days, and the Administrative Code of 1987, which states that a year is
composed of 12 calendar months, it is the latter that must prevail being the more recent law,
following the legal maxim, Lex posteriori derogat priori. Thus, applying this to the present
case, the two-year period to file a claim for tax refund/credit for the period July 1, 2002 to
September 30, 2002 expired on September 30, 2004. Hence, respondent’s administrative
claim was timely filed.
Tenchavez v. Escano
Facts:
February 24, 1948, Vicente Escano, 2nd yr student of commerce, from a well-
to-do and prominent family in Cebu, married petitioner Pastor Tenchavez, an
engineer, without the knowledge of her parents.
o Their marriage was the culmination of a love affair, and was duly
registered with the local civil register.
Their plan to elope was disrupted by her mother who took her home, where
she admitted the marriage. Her parents were surprised and disgusted.
A letter was handed to Mamerto Escano which discloses an amorous
relationship between Tenchavez and Pacita Noel, their friend. Thereafter, the
couple became estranged.
June 24, 1950, without informing her husband, Escano applied for a passport
for which she indicated that she was single, and after approval, she left for
the US.
In the District Court of Nevada, she filed for divorce, which was eventually
granted, on the ground of extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character.
Sep.13, 1954, Escano married an American, Russel Leo Moran, in Nevada,
with whom she had children. She acquired US citizenship.
July 30 1955, Tenchavez initiated the proceedings at bar by a complaint on
the annulment of the marriage, and asked for legal separation and damages.
But Escano claimed that her divorce was valid, and so is her marriage to her
present husband.
Ratio:
Tenchavez and Escano were validly married to each other, under the civil law.
o age of majority, valid consent, Catholic priest
The valid marriage between Tenchavez and Escano remained subsisting and
undissolved under Philippine law, notwithstanding the divorce obtained from
the Court of Nevada.
At the time the divorce was issued, Escano, like her husband, was still a
Filipino citizen.
o Thus, she was then subject to Philippine law.
Art. 15 of the Civil Code (Nationality rule):
Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition
and legal capacity of persons are binding upon the citizens of the
Philppines, even though living abroad.
The Civil code of the Philippines does not allow absolute divorce. It only
allows legal separation.
The Philippine courts cannot recognize a foreign decree of absolute divorce.
Art. 17 of Civil Code:
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those
which have for their object public order, policy and good customs, shall not
be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
The policy of our law cannot be nullified by acts of private parties, hence
Escano’s divorce and second marriage are not entitled to recognition as valid.
Her marriage and cohabitation with Russell Leo Moran is technically
“intercourse with a person not her husband” from the standpoint of
Philippine law, and entitles plaintiff Tenchavez to a decree of legal separation
under our law, on the basis of adultery.”
HELD: The Supreme Court held that in the absence of the evidence to the contrary
foreign laws on a particular subject are presumed to be the same as those of the
Philippines. This is known as Processual Presumption. In this case, there being no
proof of Chinese law relating to marriage, there arises a presumption that it is the
same of that of Philippine law the said marriage then is declared valid. Therefore,
William Gatchalian following the citizenship of his father is a Filipino citizen.
Where it held that, considering that in case of doubt, all presumptions favor the
solidarity of the family and every intendment of the law or facts leans toward the
validity of marriage, “he who asserts that the marriage is not valid under our law bears
the burden of proof to present the foreign law.” This case, therefore, shifted the
burden of proof from the one who asserts the validity of a marriage to the one
assailing the validity of the marriage. Pertinently, the Supreme Court stated, to wit: In
Miciano v. Brimo (50 Phil. 867 [1924]; Lim and Lim v. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil.
472; Yam Ka Lim v. Collector of Customs, 30 Phil. 46 [1915]), this Court held that in
the absence of evidence to the contrary, foreign laws on a particular subject are
presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. In the case at bar, there being
no proof of Chinese law relating to marriage, there arises a presumption that it is the
same as Philippine law.
The lack of proof of Chinese law on the matter cannot be blamed on Santiago
Gatchalian, much more on respondent William Gatchalian who was then a twelve
year-old minor. That fact is, as records indicate, Santiago was not pressed by the
Citizenship Investigation Board to prove the laws of China relating to marriage,
having been content with the testimony of Santiago that the Marriage Certificate was
lost or destroyed during the Japanese occupation of China. Neither was Francisco
Gatchalian’s testimony subjected to the same scrutiny by the Board of Special
Inquiry. Nevertheless, the testimonies of Santiago Gatchalian and Francisco
Gatchalian before the Philippine consular and immigration authorities regarding their
marriages, birth and relationship to each other are not self-serving but are admissible
in evidence as statements or declarations regarding family relation, reputation or
tradition in matters of pedigree (Sec. 34, Rule 130). Furthermore, this salutary rule of
evidence finds support in substantive law. Thus, Art. 267 of the Civil Code provides:
“Art. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final judgment or
possession of status, legitimate filiation may be proved by any other means allowed
by the Rules of Court and special laws” (See also Art. 172 of the Family Code).
Interestingly and with reasons, Justice Florentino Feliciano strongly registered his
dissent in the aforequoted ruling by stating that “the rule that a foreign marriage valid
in accordance with the law of the place where it was performed shall be valid also in
the Philippines, cannot begin to operate until after the marriage performed abroad
and its compliance with the requirements for validity under the marriage law of the
place where performed, are first shown as factual matters” (Ibid., pages 913-914).
ISSUE: Was the fact of marriage of Sy Kiat and Yao Kee in China proven as a custom?
Construing this provision of law the Court has held that to establish a valid foreign marriage
two things must be proven, namely 1) the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact;
and 2) the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence.
In the case at bar petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative to the law and
custom of China on marriage. The testimonies of Yao and Gan Ching (brother) cannot be
considered as proof of China’s law or custom on marriage not only because they are self
serving evidence, but more importantly, there is no showing that they are competent to testify
on the subject matter. For failure to prove the foreign law or custom, and consequently, the
validity of the marriage in accordance with said law or custom, the marriage between Yao
Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction.
However, as petitioners failed to establish the marriage of Yao Kee with Sy Kiat according to
the laws of China, they cannot be accorded the status of legitimate children but only that of
acknowledged natural children. petitioners are natural children, it appearing that at the time
of their conception Yao Kee and Sy Kiat were not disqualified by any impediment to marry
one another. [See Art. 269, Civil Code] And they are acknowledged children of the deceased
because of Sy Kiat’s recognition of Sze Sook Wah and its extension to Sze Lai Cho and Sy
Chun Yen who are her sisters of the full blood.
Private respondents on the other hand are also the deceased’s acknowledged natural
children with Asuncion Gillego , a Filipina with whom he lived for 25 years without the benefit
of marriage. They have in their favor their father’s acknowledgment, evidence by a
compromise agreement entered into by and between their parents and approved by the CFI
wherein Sy Kiat not only acknowledged them as his children by Asuncion Gillego but likewise
made provisions for their support and future inheritance.
Aznar vs Garcia
Facts: Helen Christensen Garcia filed a petition for review to the Supreme Court the
decision of the lower court in Davao declaring that Maria Lucy Christensen is the
sole heir of testator Edward Christensen. Facts of the case are as follows:
ISSUE: Whether or not the national law of the deceased should be applied in
determining the successional rights of his heirs.
HELD: Yes. Article 16 of the Civil Code states that succesional rights are determined
by the national law of the country where the deceased is a citizen hence the internal
law of California since it was ruled that Edward Christensen is a citizen of California.
Said internal law distinguishes the rule to be applied to Californians domiciled in
California and for Californians domiciled outside of California. For Californians
residing in other jurisdiction, the law of said country must apply. Edward Christensen
being domiciled in the Philippines, the law of his domicile must be followed. The case
was remanded to the lower court for further proceedings – the determination of the
successional rights under Philippine law only.
Article 16 of the Civil Code provides that the intrinsic validity of testamentary
dispositions are governed by the national law of the decedent, in this case, California
law. The provision in the laws of California giving a testator absolute freedom in
disposing of his estate is the internal law which applies only to persons domiciled
within the said estate. On the other hand, the provision in the laws of California stating
that personal property is governed by the laws of the domicile of its owner is the
conflict of laws rule that applies to persons not domicile in the said state. Accordingly,
the laws of the Philippines, in which the testator is domiciled governs the succession
and the regime of legitimes must be respected.
Amos vs Bellis
FACTS:
Amos G. Bellis, a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States.
By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had 5 legitimate
children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in
infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman
By his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had 3
legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis;
and finally, he had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria
Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis
August 5, 1952: Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines
dividing his estate as follows:
1. $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen
2. P40,000.00 each to his 3 illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina
Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis
3. remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives
July 8, 1958: Amos G. Bellis died a resident of Texas, U.S.A
September 15, 1958: his will was admitted to probate in the CFI of
Manila on
People's Bank and Trust Company as executor of the will did as the will
directed
Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective
oppositions on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as
illegitimate children
Probate Court: Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the
national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did
not provide for legitimes.
ISSUE: W/N Texas laws or national law of Amos should govern the intrinsic
validity of the will
HELD: YES. Order of the probate court is hereby affirmed
Doctrine of Processual Presumption:
The foreign law, whenever applicable, should be proved by the
proponent thereof, otherwise, such law shall be presumed to be exactly
the same as the law of the forum.
In the absence of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should
not be presumed different from ours. Apply Philippine laws.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the
national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions,
with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of
successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will;
and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that —
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the
law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the
order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic
validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the
person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may he the nature
of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be
found.
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of
the decedent.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of
the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are
no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of
the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be
determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be
applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
ISSUE: Does a foreign national have an obligation to support his minor child
under Philippine law?
Issue: Whether the case is dismissible on the ground of principles of lex loci
celebrationis and lex contractus, forum non conveniens and state of the most
significant relationship rule.
Facts: Brand Marine Services, Inc. (BMSI), a corporation duly organized and existing
under the laws of the State of Connecticut, United States of America, and respondent
Stockton W. Rouzie, Jr., an American citizen, entered into a contract whereby BMSI
hired Rouzie as its representative to negotiate the sale of services in several
government projects in the Philippines for an agreed remuneration of 10% of the
gross receipts. Rouzie filed before the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) a suit against BMSI and Rust International, Inc.
(RUST), for alleged nonpayment of commissions, illegal termination and breach of
employment contract. Labor Arbiter rendered judgment ordering BMSI and RUST to
pay respondent’s money claims. Upon appeal by BMSI, the NLRC reversed the
decision of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed respondent’s complaint on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction. Rouzie, then a resident of La Union, instituted an action for
damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bauang, La Union against
Raytheon. Rouzie essentially reiterated the allegations in the labor case, and Rouzie
also averred that BMSI and RUST as well as petitioner itself had combined and
functioned as one company. In its Answer, Raytheon alleged that contrary to
respondent’s claim, it was a foreign corporation duly licensed to do business in the
Philippines and denied entering into any arrangement with respondent or paying the
latter any sum of money. Petitioner also referred to the NLRC decision which
disclosed that per the written agreement between respondent and BMSI and RUST,
denominated as "Special Sales Representative Agreement," the rights and
obligations of the parties shall be governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut.
Raytheon’s contention:
(a.)The written contract between Rouzie & BMSI included a valid choice of law
clause, that is, that the contract shall be governed by the laws of the State of
Connecticut.
(b) It also mentions the presence of foreign elements in the dispute, namely that
the parties & witnesses involved are American corporations & citizens & the evidence
to be presented is located outside the Philippines, that renders our local courts
inconvenient forums. The foreign elements of the dispute necessitate the immediate
application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
Issue:
Ruling:
As regards jurisdiction over the parties, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over
herein respondent (as party plaintiff) upon the filing of the complaint. On the other
hand, jurisdiction over the person of petitioner (as party defendant) was acquired by
its voluntary appearance in court.A
Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case based on the principle of forum non
conveniens requires a factual determination; hence, it is more properly considered
as a matter of defense. While it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain
from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after vital facts are
established, to determine whether special circumstances require the court’s
desistance.