HOLY TRINITY REALTY v. VICTORIO DELA CRUZ, GR No.

200454, 2014-10-22
Facts:
Subject of the controversy is a parcel of land located in Brgy. Dakila, Malolos, Bulacan (Dakila
property) registered in the name of Freddie Santiago
The Dakila property used to be tenanted... but in August 1991, these tenants freely and voluntarily
relinquished their tenancy rights in favor of Santiago through their respective sinumpaang pahayag... in
exchange for some financial assistance and individual... homelots titled and distributed in their names...
the petitioner purchased the remaining 208,050 square meters of the Dakila property from Santiago,[7]
and later caused the transfer of the title to its name as well as subdivided the Dakila property into six
lots
The petitioner then developed the property by dumping filling materials on the topsoil, and by erecting
a perimeter fence and steel gate. It established its field office on the property.
the Sanggunian Bayan ng Malolos passed Municipal Resolution No. 16-98 reclassifying four of the six
subdivided lots
Consequently, the Municipal Planning and Development Office (MPDO) of Malolos, Bulacan issued a
Certificate of Eligibility for Conversion (Certificate of Zoning Conformance),[11] as well as a
Preliminary Approval and Locational Clearance in favor of the... petitioner for its residential
subdivision project on the Dakila property.
n Augus
On August 23, 1999, the petitioner purchased from Santiago another parcel of land with an area of
25,611 located in Barangay Sumapang Matanda, Malolos, Bulacan (Sumapang Matanda property)
April 2006, a certain Silvino Manalad and the alleged heirs of Felix Surio wrote to the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) of Bulacan to request an investigation of the sale of the Dakila
property.[14] This was followed by the letter request of
Sumapang Matanda Barangay Agrarian Reform Council (BARC) Chairman Numeriano L. Enriquez to
place the Dakila property within the coverage of Operation Land Transfer (OLT) pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 27,... The OIC-Regional Director opined that the sale of the Dakila property
was a prohibited transaction under Presidential Decree No. 27, Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6657[18]
and DAR Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1989; and that the petitioner was... disqualified from
acquiring land under Republic Act No. 6657 because it was a corporation.
Pending resolution of the Motion to Withdraw/Quash/Set Aside,... the Register of Deeds issued
emancipation patents (EPs) pursuant to the order of the OIC-Regional Director. The petitioner's titles
were canceled and EPs were issued to the respondents... on the petitioner's motion for reconsideration,
the DAR Secretary said that the Dakila property was not exempt from the coverage of Presidential
Decree No. 27 and Republic Act No. 6657 because Municipal Resolution No. 16-98 did not change or
reclassify but merely re-zoned... the Dakila property.
(OP) reversed the ruling of DAR Secretary Pangandaman upon its finding that the Dakila property had
ceased to be suitable for agriculture, and had been reclassified as residential land pursuant to Municipal
Resolution No. 16-98... the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the OP. It declared that prior to
the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 on June 15, 1988 and even after the passage of Municipal
Resolution No.
16-98 on March 4, 1998, the Dakila property was an agricultural land; that there was no valid
reclassification
Issues:
Did the CA gravely err in limiting its decision to the issue of whether or not the Dakila property was
subject to the coverage of Republic Act No. 6657?
Was the Dakila property agricultural land within the coverage of Republic Act No. 6657 or Presidential
Decree No. 27?
Was the issuance of the EPs pursuant to the August 16, 2006 order of the DAR Regional Office proper?
Ruling:
We reverse the CA, and reinstate the decision of the OP
The CA declared that the Dakila property as an agricultural land; and that there was no valid
reclassification under Municipal Resolution No. 16-98 because the law required an ordinance, not a
resolution.
We agree in part with the CA.
Nonetheless,... the Dakila property was not an agricultural land subject to the coverage of Republic Act
No. 6657 or Presidential Decree No. 27.
Verily, the basic condition for land to be placed under the coverage of Republic Act No. 6657 is that it
must either be primarily devoted to or be suitable for agriculture.
Consequently, before land may be placed under the coverage of Republic Act No. 6657, two requisites
must be met, namely: (1) that the land must be devoted to agricultural activity; and (2) that the land
must not be classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or... industrial land.
Considering that the Dakila property has not been classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial
or industrial, the second requisite is satisfied. For the first requisite to be met, however, there must be a
showing that agricultural activity is... undertaken on the property.
Here, no evidence was submitted to show that any agricultural activity like cultivation of the land,
planting of crops, growing of fruit trees,... and other farm activities and practices were... being
performed on the Dakila property in order to subject it to the coverage of Republic Act No. 6657.
Even if we supplemented the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 27, the outcome is still the same,
because the Dakila property was still not within the scope of the law. For land to be covered under
Presidential Decree No. 27, it must be devoted to rice or corn crops, and... there must be a system of
share-crop or lease-tenancy obtaining therein. If either requisite is absent, the land must be excluded.
ection 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands. - For purposes of acquisition of private lands,
the following procedures shall be follow
Section 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands. - For purposes of acquisition of private lands,
the following procedures shall be followed:
The unquestioned non-compliance with the procedures set by Republic Act No. 6657 and its relevant
rules and regulations further denied to the petitioner the exercise of its right of retention.[81] In doing
so, the OIC-Regional Director disregarded this... constitutionally guaranteed right. We cannot
understate the value of the right of retention as the means to mitigate the effects of compulsory land
acquisition by balancing the rights of the landowner and the tenant and by implementing the doctrine
that social justice is not... meant to perpetrate an injustice against the landowner.
In fine, the order of the OIC-Regional Director was patently null and void. The denial of due process to
the petitioner sufficed to cast the impress of nullity on the official act thereby taken. A decision
rendered without due process is void ab initio and may be attacked... directly or collaterally.[83] All the
resulting acts were also null and void. Consequently, the EPs awarded to the respondents should be
nullified.
Principles:
Land on which no agricultural activity is being conducted is not subject to the coverage of either
Presidential Decree No. 27 or Republic Act No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law).

CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY REPRESENTED ITS PRESIDENT

DR. LEONARDO A. CHUA, petitioner,
vs.
THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD,
THE COURT OF APPEALS and ALVIN OBRIQUE, REPRESENTING
BUKIDNON FREE FARMERS

FACTS:

The petitioner, the CMU, is an agricultural education institution

owned and run by the estate located in the town of Musuan,
Bukidnon province. It started as a farm school at Marilag,
Bukidnon, in early 1910, in response to the public demand for an
agricultural school in Mindanao. In the early 1960's, it was
converted into a college until it became what is now known as the
CMU, but still primarily an agricultural university. On January 16,
1958 the late Carlos P. Garcia, issued Proclamation No. 467,
withdrawing from sale or settlement and reserving for the
Mindanao Agricultural College, a site which would be the future
campus of what is now the CMU. A total land area comprising
3,080 hectares was surveyed and registered and titled in the
name of the petitioner.Several tribes belonging to cultural
communities, opposed the petition claiming ownership of certain
ancestral lands forming part of the tribal reservations. Some of
the claims were granted so that what was titled to the present
petitioner school was reduced from 3,401 hectares to 3,080
hectares. In 1984, the CMU approved Resolution No. 160,
adopting a livelihood program called "Kilusang Sariling Sikap
Program" under which the land resources of the University were
leased to its faculty and employees. This arrangement was
covered by a written contract. The faculty and staff combine
themselves to groups of five members each, and the CMU
provided technical know-how, practical training and all kinds of
assistance, to enable each group to cultivate 4 to 5 hectares of
land for the lowland rice projects. Each group pays the CMU a
service fee and also a land use participant's fee. It was expressly
stipulated that no landlord-tenant relationship existed between
the CMU and the faculty and/or employees. This particular
program was conceived as a multi-disciplinary applied research
extension and productivity program to utilize available land, train
people in modern agricultural technology and at the same time
give the faculty and staff opportunity within the confines of the
CMU reservation to earn additional income to augment their
salaries. Among the participants in this program were
Alvin Obrique, Felix Guinanao, Joven Caballero, Nestor Pulao,
Danilo Vasquez, Aronio Pelayo and other complainants
(respondents).
Obrique was a Physics Instructor at the CMU while the others
were employees in the lowland rice project. In 1986, the agri-
business project for the production of rice, corn and sugar cane
known as Agri-Business Management and Training Project was
discontinued due to losses incurred while carrying on the said
project. Some CMU personnel, among whom were the
complainants, were laid-off when this project was discontinued.
The CMU later launched a self-help project called CMU-Income
Enhancement Program (CMU-IEP) to develop unutilized land
resources, mobilize and promote the spirit of self-reliance,
provide socio-economic and technical training in actual field
project implementation and augment the income of the faculty
and the staff. The one-year contracts expired on June 30, 1988.
Some contracts were renewed. Those whose contracts were not
renewed were served with notices to vacate. The non-renewal of
the contracts, the discontinuance of the rice, corn and sugar can
project, the loss of jobs due to termination or separation from the
service and the alleged harassment by school authorities, all
contributed to, and precipitated the filing of, the complaint.

ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not the DARAB has jurisdiction to hear and decide
Case No. 005 for Declaration of Status of Tenants and coverage of
land under the CARP.
2.) Whether or not respondent Court of Appeals committed
serious errors and grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in dismissing the Petition for Review on Certiorari and
affirming the decision of DARAB.

RULING:
 DARAB JURISDICTION LIMITED ONLY TO MATTERS INVOLVING
IMPLEMENTATION OF CARP.
Under Section 4 and Section 10 of R.A. 6657, it is crystal clear
that the jurisdiction of the DARAB is limited only to matters
involving the implementation of the CARP. More specifically, it is
restricted to agrarian cases and controversies involving lands
falling within the coverage of the aforementioned program. It
does not include those which are actually, directly and exclusively
used and found to be necessary for, among such purposes,
school sites and campuses for setting up experimental farm
stations, research and pilot production centers, etc.Consequently,
the DARAB has no power to try, hear and adjudicate the case
pending before it involving a portion of the CMU's titled school
site, as the portion of the CMU land reservation ordered
segregated is actually, directly and exclusively used and found by
the school to be necessary for its purposes. SEGREGATING SOME
HECTARES OF LAND WITHOUT FINDING THAT COMPLAINANTS ARE
TENANTS: GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
Where the quasi-judicial body finds that the
complainants/petitioners are not entitled to the rights they are
demanding, it is an erroneous interpretation of authority for that
quasi-judicial body to order private property to be awarded to
future beneficiaries. The order segregating 400 hectares of the
CMU land was issued on a finding that the complainants are not
entitled as beneficiaries, and on an erroneous assumption that
the CMU land which is excluded or exempted under the law is
subject to the coverage of the CARP. Going beyond what was
asked by the complainants who were not entitled to the relief
prayed for, constitutes a grave abuse of discretion because it
implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. NEITHER DARAB OR COURT OF
APPEALS HAS RIGHT TO PASS UPON NEEDS OF SCHOOL.
 As to the determination of when and what lands are found to be
necessary for use by the CMU, the school is in the best position to
resolve and answer the question and pass upon the problem of its
needs in relation to its avowed objectives for which the land was
given to it by the State. Neither the DARAB nor the Court of
Appeals has the right to substitute its judgment or discretion on
this matter, unless the evidentiary facts are so manifest as to
show that the CMU has no real need for the land. The evidence is
sufficient to sustain a finding of grave abuse of discretion by
respondents Court of Appeals and DAR Adjudication Board. The
Court declared the decision of the DARAB and the Court of
Appeals as null and void and hereby order that they be set aside,
with costs against the private respondents.ARMERS
AGRICULTURAL LABORERS ORGANIZATION (BUFFALO),
respondents.

ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS VS

SEC. OF AGRARIAN REFORM (1989)
30 Nov 2017
[175 SCRA 343; G.R. NO. L-78742; 14 JUL 1989] Constitutional Law| Police Power|
Power of Eminent Domain
FACTS:
The following are consolidated cases:
1. A petition alleging the constitutionality of PD No. 27, EO 228 and 229 and RA
6657. Subjects of the petition are a 9-hectare and 5 hectare Riceland worked by
four tenants. Tenants were declared full owners by EO 228 as qualified farmers
under PD 27. The petitioners now contend that President Aquino usurped the
legislature‘s power.
2. A petition by landowners and sugar planters in Victoria‘s Mill Negros Occidental
against Proclamation 131 and EO 229. Proclamation 131 is the creation of
Agrarian Reform Fund with initial fund of P50Billion.
3. A petition by owners of land which was placed by the DAR under the coverage of
Operation Land Transfer.
4. A petition invoking the right of retention under PD 27 to owners of rice and corn
lands not exceeding seven hectares.
ISSUE:
Whether the aforementioned EO‘s, PD, and RA were constitutional.
HELD:
The promulgation of PD 27 by President Marcos was valid in exercise of Police
power and eminent domain.
The power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. 131 and EO 228 and 229 was
authorized under Sec. 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution.
Therefore it is a valid exercise of Police Power and Eminent Domain
RA 6657 is likewise valid. The carrying out of the regulation under CARP becomes
necessary to deprive owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the
maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent
domain for which payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking
contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is
the surrender of the title and the physical possession of said excess and all
beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favour of the farmer-beneficiary.
The Court declares that the content and manner of the just compensation
provided for in Section 18 of the CARP Law is not violative of the Constitution.

W E D O N O T M I N D A D M I T T I N G T H AT A C E R TA I N D E G R E E O F
P R A G M AT I S M H A S I N F L U E N C E D O U R D E C I S I O N O N T H I S I S S U E , B U T
A FTER AL L TH I S CO U R T IS NO T A CLO I S TER ED IN S TI TU TI O N
REMOVED FROM THE REALITIES AND DEMANDS OF SOCIETY OR
O B L I V I O U S T O T H E N E E D F O R I T S E N H A N C E M E N T. T H E C O U R T I S
A S A C U T E LY A N X I O U S A S T H E R E S T O F O U R P E O P L E T O S E E T H E
G O A L O F A G R A R I A N R E F O R M A C H I E V E D AT L A S T A F T E R T H E
F R U S T R AT I O N S A N D D E P R I VAT I O N S O F O U R P E A S A N T M A SS E S
D U R I N G A L L T H E S E D I S A P P O I N T I N G D E C A D E S . W E A R E A WA R E
T H AT I N VA L I D AT I O N O F T H E S A I D S E C T I O N W I L L R E S U LT I N T H E
N U L L I F I C AT I O N O F T H E E N T I R E P R O G R A M , K I L L I N G T H E FA R M E R ’ S
H O P E S E V E N A S T H E Y A P P R O A C H R E A L I Z AT I O N A N D
R E S U R R E C T I N G T H E S P E C T R E O F D I S C O N T E N T A N D D I SS E N T I N
T H E R E S T L E S S C O U N T R Y S I D E . T H AT I S N O T I N O U R V I E W T H E
I N T E N T I O N O F T H E C O N S T I T U T I O N , A N D T H AT I S N O T W H AT W E
S H A L L D E C R E E T O D A Y. A SS O C I AT I O N O F S M A L L L A N D O W N E R S I N
T H E P H I L I P P I N E S , I N C . V S . S E C R E TA R Y O F A G R A R I A N R E F O R M , 1 7 5
S C R A 3 4 3 , G . R . N O. 7 8 7 4 2 , G . R . N O. 7 9 3 1 0 , G . R . N O. 7 9 7 4 4 , G . R .
N O. 7 9 7 7 7 J U LY 1 4 , 1 9 8 9 — J U S T I C E I S A G A N I C R U Z , P O N E N T E

175 SCRA 343 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Bill of Rights – Equal Protection –
Valid Classification
Eminent Domain – Just Compensation
These are four consolidated cases questioning the constitutionality of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Act (R.A. No. 6657 and related laws i.e., Agrarian Land
Reform Code or R.A. No. 3844).
Brief background: Article XIII of the Constitution on Social Justice and Human Rights
includes a call for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program. The State
shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers
and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they
till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. RA
3844 was enacted in 1963. P.D. No. 27 was promulgated in 1972 to provide for the
compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to
specify maximum retention limits for landowners. In 1987, President Corazon
Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of
PD 27 and providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as
well as the manner of their payment. In 1987, P.P. No. 131, instituting a comprehensive
agrarian reform program (CARP) was enacted; later, E.O. No. 229, providing the
mechanics for its (PP131’s) implementation, was also enacted. Afterwhich is the
enactment of R.A. No. 6657, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law in 1988. This law,
while considerably changing the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives
them suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions.
[Two of the consolidated cases are discussed below]
G.R. No. 78742: (Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary)
The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. sought exception from the
land distribution scheme provided for in R.A. 6657. The Association is comprised of
landowners of ricelands and cornlands whose landholdings do not exceed 7 hectares.
They invoke that since their landholdings are less than 7 hectares, they should not be
forced to distribute their land to their tenants under R.A. 6657 for they themselves have
shown willingness to till their own land. In short, they want to be exempted from
agrarian reform program because they claim to belong to a different class.
G.R. No. 79777: (Manaay vs Juico)
Nicolas Manaay questioned the validity of the agrarian reform laws (PD 27, EO 228, and
229) on the ground that these laws already valuated their lands for the agrarian reform
program and that the specific amount must be determined by the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR). Manaay averred that this violated the principle in eminent
domain which provides that only courts can determine just compensation. This, for
Manaay, also violated due process for under the constitution, no property shall be taken
for public use without just compensation.
Manaay also questioned the provision which states that landowners may be paid for
their land in bonds and not necessarily in cash. Manaay averred that just compensation
has always been in the form of money and not in bonds.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause.
2. Whether or not there is a violation of due process.
3. Whether or not just compensation, under the agrarian reform program, must be in
terms of cash.
HELD:
1. No. The Association had not shown any proof that they belong to a different class
exempt from the agrarian reform program. Under the law, classification has been
defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars
and different from each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to
the following requirements:
(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;
(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.
Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be
treated alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The
Association have not shown that they belong to a different class and entitled to a
different treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also owners of other
properties must be made to share the burden of implementing land reform must be
rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two classes of owners that is
clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this
matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid
classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice
except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill of Rights. In the
contrary, it appears that Congress is right in classifying small landowners as part of the
agrarian reform program.
2. No. It is true that the determination of just compensation is a power lodged in the
courts. However, there is no law which prohibits administrative bodies like the DAR from
determining just compensation. In fact, just compensation can be that amount agreed
upon by the landowner and the government – even without judicial intervention so long
as both parties agree. The DAR can determine just compensation through appraisers
and if the landowner agrees, then judicial intervention is not needed. What is
contemplated by law however is that, the just compensation determined by an
administrative body is merely preliminary. If the landowner does not agree with the
finding of just compensation by an administrative body, then it can go to court and the
determination of the latter shall be the final determination. This is even so provided by
RA 6657:
 Section 16 (f): Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the
matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for final determination of just
compensation.
3. No. Money as [sole] payment for just compensation is merely a concept in traditional
exercise of eminent domain. The agrarian reform program is a revolutionary exercise of
eminent domain. The program will require billions of pesos in funds if all compensation
have to be made in cash – if everything is in cash, then the government will not have
sufficient money hence, bonds, and other securities, i.e., shares of stocks, may be used
for just compensation.