Cadalin vs. POEA, G.R. No. L-104776, Dec.

5, 1994

Facts:

Cadalin et al. are OCWs deployed to various Middle Eastern countries, including Bahrain. Under the contracts, the choice of
applicable law is Bahrain law in case of contractual disputes. The contracts were later pre-terminated, claiming that they were not
paid what was due to them, the laborers, upon their repatration to the Philippines, filed complaints for damages against the
employer. The claims having been filed after one year from the termination of their employment contract, under Bahrain law,
specifically of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 the action has already prescribed.

The claimants contented that the prescriptive period is as provided under Article 11144 of the NCC which provides for a 10 year
prescriptive period because their claims arose from the violation by the employer of the employment contract. The NLRC, on the
other hand, believes that the applicable period is Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines which provides for a 3 year
prescriptive period because their claims arise from employer- employee relationship.

Issue:

1. Should the Bahrain law on prescription apply?

2. Whether the prescriptive period governing the filing of the claims is 3 years, as provided by the Labor Code or 10 years,
as provided by the Civil Code?

Held:

1. No. Statute of limitations is sui generis -- it may be procedural or substantive, depending on the characterization given
such a law. This distinction, however, becomes irrelevant when there is a borrowing statute, as in the case of our Rules of
Court, which provides that any action barred under the law of the country where the cause of action arose is also barred in
the Philippines. A “borrowing statute” directs the state of the forum to apply the foreign statute of limitations to the pending
claims based on a foreign law. But, in this case, SC did not apply our Rules of Court on the ground that doing so would
contravene the constitutional provision on protecting the rights of labor. The courts of the forum will not enforce a foreign
claim obnoxious to the forum’s public policy.
2. The 3 year prescriptive period as provided by the Labor Code should apply. Since the violation arise from employer-
employee relationship.

Aznar vs. Garcia, G.R. No. L-16749, Jan. 3, 1963

Facts:

Edward Christensen, who at his death was a US citizen but domiciled in the Philippines, left a will, devising unto Maria Helen, his
acknowledged natural child, a certain amount of money and giving the rest of his estate to Maria Lucy. Helen opposed the partition
on the ground that she is deprived of her legitime. Her contention is that the law of California (Article 946 of the Civil Code of
California) directs that the law of the domicile (Philippines) should govern the will and in accordance therewith and following the
doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary provision in question should be referred back to the law of the
decedent's domicile, which is the Philippines.

The probate court ruled that as Edward Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the State of California at the time of
his death, the successional rights and intrinsic validity of the provisions in his will are to be governed by the law of California, in
accordance with which a testator has the right to dispose of his property in the way he desires.

Issue:

Whether or not the national law or the domiciliary law should apply?

Held:

Domiciliary law. The Doctrine of Renvoi is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of
another. Here, the intrinsic validity of wills is governed by the national law of the decedent. In the present case, the national law of
Edward is the laws of California. However, there were two conflicting California laws regarding succession. One is enunciated in In
Re Kaufman (which does not provide for legitimes) and another is Art. 946 of the California Civil Code (which provides that the law
of the domicile applies). SC held that the national law is Art. 946, which is the conflict of laws rule of California. The reason is that In
Re Kaufman applies only to residents while Art. 946 is specific to non-residents. Thus, since Art. 946 contains a refer-back to
Philippine laws (the law of the domicile), then Maria Helen is entitled to her legitime.
The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in
California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile cannot and should not refer the
case back to California; such action would leave the issue incapable of determination because the case will then be like a football,
tossed back and forth between the two states, between the country of which the decedent was a citizen and the country of his
domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the
question has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of California provides no legitime for children while the
Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the
parent recognizing them.

Bellis vs. Bellis, G.R. No. L-23678, June 6, 1967

Facts:

Amos Bellis, who was a national and domicile of Texas, United States at the time of his death, executed two wills, one to govern his
Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate, which provided that his properties should be distributed in accordance with
Philippine law and not with his national law, one devising a certain amount of money to his first wife and three illegitimate children
and another, leaving the rest of his estate to his seven legitimate children. Before partition, the illegitimate children who are Filipinos
opposed on the ground that they are deprived of their legitimes.

Issue:

1. Whether or not Doctrine of Renvoi should apply?

2. Whether or not the applicable law is Texas law or Philippine Law?

Held:

1. No. In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discussed the doctrine of renvoi. Said doctrine is
usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of another. In the present case, it is not
disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death. Renvoi doctrine is
not applicable because there is no conflict as to the nationality and domicile of Bellis. He is both a citizen and a resident of
Texas. So even if assuming the law of Texas applies the domiciliary rule, it is still Texas law that governs because his
domicile is Texas. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the
application of the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved
are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be
presumed different from ours.
2. Texas law. Applying the nationality rule, the law of Texas should govern the intrinsic validity of the will and therefore
answer the question on entitlement to legitimes. The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the
State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the
intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law,
the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis. A provision in a foreigner's will to the
effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and
void, for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters under Article 16 of the Civil Code states said
national law should govern.