Mambayya House Journal of Democratic Studies

Volume 6 Special Edition December 2015

i
Published 2018 by
Bayero University Press,
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Bayero University Kano,
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Kano.

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Research and Training (AKCDRT), Bayero University, Kano
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ii
Mambayya House Journal of Democratic Studies (MHJDS)

Mambayya House Journal of Democratic Studies (MHJDS) is

published by Mambayya House, Aminu Kano Centre for
Democratic Research and Training, Bayero University, Kano.
It provides a platform for researchers, social scientists and
other academics to disseminate knowledge about the
democratization process in Nigeria specifically and
democracy in general. The journal is published annually.

Articles to be considered for publication in MHJDS MUST

conform to the submission guidelines available at
http://www.mambayyahouse.org.ng. For further enquiries,
contact: The Managing Editor, MHJDS (+234-8032829234,
+234-8050561805), Mambayya House, Aminu Kano Centre
for Democratic Research and Training, Bayero University,
PMB 3011 Kano – Nigeria. Office Address: A69, Kofar
Ruwa Road, Gwammaja, Kano City. Email:
mambayyahouse@buk.edu.ng.

iii
 Editorial Board

Professor Attahiru M. Jega, OFR - Editor-in-Chief

Professor Mustapha A. Isa - Editor
Professor Muhammad D. Suleiman - Co-Editor
Professor Shehu Dalhatu - Co-Editor
Professor Habu Mohammed - Co-Editor
Professor Aminu Kabir - Co-Editor
Dr. Moses T. Aluaigba - Managing Editor

Editorial Advisers
Professor Adele Jinadu
Professor Kamilu S. Fage
Professor Haruna Wakili
Professor J. I. Elaigwu
Professor Stephen Howard
Professor M. C. Duze
Dr. Jibrin Ibrahim
Dr. Said Adejumobi
Department of Political Science,
University of Lagos
Department of Political Science,
Bayero University, Kano
Department of History, Bayero
University, Kano
Institute of Governance and Social
Research (IGSR), Jos
Centre for African Studies, Ohio
University, Athens, U.S.A.
Department of Sociology, University of
Mkar, Gboko
Centre for Democracy and
Development (CDD), Abuja
Economic Commission for Africa
(ECA), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

iv
 Contents

Assessing the Success of Nigeria’s 2015 General Elections

for Sustainable Democracy
Habu Mohammed…………………………………………………1

The Determinants of the Conduct of the Electorate in the

2015 Nigerian General Elections
James Apam………………………………………………………32

Political Party Finances and the Challenges of Monitoring

Compliance during the 2015 Elections
Dung P. Sha………………………………………………………68

Assessing the Level of Women Participation in the 2015

General Elections
Joy N. Ezeilo……………………………………………………...89

The Media and the 2015 General Elections in Nigeria

Umaru A. Pate………………………………………………….126

The Role of Foreign Actors in Enhancing the Smooth

Conduct of the 2015 Elections
Yunusa Z. Ya’u…………………………………………….……145

MHJDS – Call for Papers…………………………………166

v
vi
 Assessing the Success of Nigeria’s 2015 General
Elections for Sustainable Democracy

Habu Mohammed*

Abstract
What is particularly striking about Nigeria’s 2015 Elections
was the fact that beyond any hysteria of electoral violence,
hate campaigns and the background of insecurity in the
country, it was held and appraised as the best ever in the
nation’s history. This article provides an assessment of what
led to the success of the election and its challenges and
prospects of nurturing democratic sustenance in Nigeria.
Besides, the paper argues that central to the success of the
2015 Elections lies a combination of factors, but essentially
the long time preparations made by INEC and executed
through various reforms in the electoral practices that
addressed, even if partially, the electoral rigging and
infractions that characterized the Nigerian electoral
experiences in the last fifty years. It is also argued that the
2015 Elections represent the official verdict of the electorate
to their past electoral disappointments and their resolve to
accept democracy as the best form of government for the
country.

Introduction
Democracy and elections are two sides of the same coin. The
fo rmer dep ends on the latt er for its sus tenance and
development. However, the conduct of periodic elections
does not necessarily guarantee the institutionalization of
democracy. There may be elections without democracy, but
* Habu Mohammed, PhD. is a Professor in the Department of Political
Science, Bayero University, Kano, Nigeria.

1
there can be no democracy without elections. The history of
elections in Nigeria has been associated with a lot of
imperfections, uncertainties and unhealthy conducts. The
outcome of the successive electoral processes had, in most
cases, resulted in various contestations, ranging from
disagreement over the authenticity of the results declared;
accusations and counter-accusations of electoral rigging and
misconduct, to electoral violence of varying proportions. The
overall result of this form of political culture has been a
systematic development of a state of pessimism in the minds
of Nigerians across the country such that the system of
Nigeria’s electoral process is unlikely to engender a credible
election in the country.
This perspective was informed by the disposition of the
political class as politically intolerant and, principally, the
low level of the institutionalization of democratic values in
political parties. Thus, it was erroneously believed that
election in Nigeria could hardly be contested as free and fair,
not to talk of its outcome accepted as credible.
Even more serious about the electoral process in the
country is the track record of its deficit in the eyes of the
public, which makes the Election Management Body (EMB),
the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC),
suffer in serious public trust among other limitations.
However, despite all these odds, history was made in
Nigeria’s democratization and electoral process on May 28,
2015 when the country successfully held general elections
that eventually was adjudged free, fair and credible, at least in
comparison to the country's past experimentation with the
exercise. The election heralded the opposition political party,
the All Progressives Congress (APC) as the winner by more
than 2.5 million votes and ousted the ruling People’s
Democratic Party (PDP) from the corridors of power to
which it had been clinging since 1999 when the country

2
returned to democratic rule after a prolonged period of
military rule.
The 2015 General Elections, which have been described
by the former US Assistant Secretary of States, Johnnie
Carson, as being both “intensively watched and extremely
important” (cited in Wilson and Liang-Fenton, 2014), were
the first in the history of Nigeria, which saw an incumbent
government defeated at the polls and provided a successful
transition from one civilian rule to another and the change of
government from the ruling to the opposition party. It was a
political milestone that has been applauded locally and
internationally. Not only was it for the first time that Nigeria
passed through the troubled waters of elections scot-free, but
it also reclaimed, in the eyes of the international community,
her worthiness as a democratizing nation and ready to uphold
the democratic option as the effective and enduring approach
to addressing the country's nauseating electoral performance
and leadership quagmire.
By conceding defeat at the poll even before the last
count of the votes on March 31, via a telephone conversation
with the opposition candidate, the incumbent president had
controlled the nerves of political trouble-makers and their
instigators, and instantaneously discarded the negative
hypothetical conceptions of the outcome of the election held
in some quarters that it would eventually lead to the country's
disintegration.
However, beyond the successful outcome of Nigeria’s
2015 General Elections, there were reported infractions and
irregularities in a number of states, including high profile
cases of electoral misconduct, electoral violence and
logistical issues. Hence, it is important to assess the build up
to the exercise, its conduct and its patterns and dynamics in
order to lay bare its shortcomings for future adjustments and
appreciate its areas of strengths for democratic consolidation.

3
 Therefore, this article is divided into six sections.
Section one is the introduction. Section two discusses the
method adopted in the analysis of the 2015 Elections. In
section three, a general background to the 2015 General
Election is examined in order to set out the context of
assessing the election and the issues involved in it. In section
four, the paper provides an overview of the various variables
set out above for the assessment of the election and explains
how each contributed to the process of engendering peaceful
and credible elections in the country. Challenges and
prospects of election in Nigeria constitute the fifth section
and finally, the sixth section concludes the article.

Theoretical Perspective
According to Mackenzie (1967), there are four conditions of
free and fair elections: the existence of an independent
judiciary, an independent electoral body, a well-developed
system of political parties and the acceptance of the rules of
the political game by politicians and their party supporters (in
Ujo, 2004:2). The identification of the acceptance of the rule
of the political game and the resolution of national issues
through competitive elections have also been re-echoed by
political theorists. Out of the eight problems with African
polities identified by Celestian Monga (1997), the weakness
of political parties, the manipulation of the electoral process
and privatized violence and politicized armies occupy the
central concerns of most democratizing African states. This
argument also echoes Niall Ferguson’s identification of three
thresholds that democratizing nations must pass – “non-
violent resolution of political competition, the acceptance of
alternation in power, and the supremacy of the rule of law”
(cited in Joseph, 2007:105).
Therefore, following Mackenzie, Monga and
Ferguson’s postulations and the evidence available from
Nigeria’s electoral process in 2015, free, fair and credible

4
elections were the result of the non-violent end of the
electoral process, which was made possible as a result of the
acceptance of the electoral verdict, even if reluctantly, by the
ruling party; the independence of the electoral umpire
presiding the management of the election and the ability of
the electorate to influence political change without violence.
In essence, therefore, as a political process, not just a mere
political event, an election can be holistically assessed from
the context of the political actors and institutions that
constitute its drivers of change. Accordingly, this paper
identifies multiple agencies that can be regarded as actors in
Nigeria's electoral process and it captures only the critical
factors that would help to assess the 2015 General Election
rather than a case-by-case presentation of actors and their
contribution to the success of the electoral process.
Conceived from this method of analysis, it is also necessary
to raise questions about some pertinent issues about the 2015
General Election before assessing its general conduct for
sustainable democracy in Nigeria. These are: what are the
factors responsible for the success of the election? What
lessons do the elections portend for the sustenance of
democracy in Nigeria and other developing democracies?

Background to the 2015 General Elections

The background to Nigeria's 2015 General Elections can be
traced to the trailing political changes which started in the
aftermath of the 2007 General Elections, elsewhere described
as the most seriously flawed election ever (International
Crisis Group, 2014:1) and the subsequent electoral reform
initiated by President Umaru Musa Yar'adua. Similarly, the
conduct of the 2015 General Elections was profoundly
influenced by that of the 2011 because the political
insinuations - alliance and counter-alliances, decamping,
cross-carpeting and substantially the political brinksmanship
that characterized the four terms of President Goodluck Ebele

5
Jonathan of the ruling PDP midwifed the nauseating
experience of politics and governance that led to a renewed
conception of a new dawn in the Nigerian electoral process.
More importantly, the President's resolve to further empower
the electoral umpire and make it a relatively more
independent institution had received instantaneous applause
by a broad spectrum of the Nigerian society when he finally
appointed a scholar-activist in the person of Professor
Attahiru Muhammadu Jega as the New INEC chairman.
Jega replaced Professor Maurice Iwu who conducted the
2003 and 2007 elections respectively and was adjudged a
partisan player in the electoral successes of the ruling party.
On its part, INEC under Jega’s leadership was able to
introduce promising reforms for the successful conduct of the
2015 General Elections and the measures that would make
the exercise relatively free, fair and credible (Ibrahim and
Hassan, 2013:3).
The most prominent among the reform agenda of
INEC prior to the election included, but were not limited to,
the introduction of a biometric register of voters, a re-
modified Open Ballot System (REMOBS), improved security
features on sensitive electoral materials (i.e. serial numbering
and the colour coding of ballot papers and result sheets, as
well as the security coding of ballot boxes). Others were the
introduction of a more transparent framework for results
collation and returns, closer collaboration and partnerships
with a range of critical stakeholders, enhanced voter
education, the creation of the Inter-agency Consultative
Committee on Election Security (ICCES), continuous voter
registration, the use of National Youth Service Corps (NYSC),
university staff and other professional bodies as ad-hoc staff
and, of course, the use of card reader machines to accredit
voters before casting their votes (Jega, 2015a). One of the
areas that have assisted INEC to unfold its reforms in earnest
was the release of an N87.7 billion budget for the

6
procurement of the 2015 Elections materials, which
represents one of the largest budgets approved for an agency
in recent times (Jega, 2015c:61) and the support the
commission received from international agencies.
The Nigerian general elections of 2015 were the fifth in
the series of elections held since the end of military rule in
1999. The election was critical to the survival of democracy,
as it was for peace and security in the country. It came at a
crucial moment in the life of the country when violence,
kidnapping, political assassination and insecurity became a
recurring decimal in Nigerian politics. The election tested the
capacity and willingness of Nigerians to accommodate a
peaceful change of government and in consolidating
democracy.
Beside these concerns, the election was anticipated to be
more contentious than ever because its background was
characterized by security challenges unknown in the past
exercise. A large part of the electorate was facing insurgency
and the situation was apparently not very receptive for the
conduct of elections, especially in the north-east of the
country. With hundreds of thousands of inhabitants internally
displaced, some of them living as refugees in neighbouring
Chad, Niger and Cameroon, Nigerians became pessimistic
about the success of the election.
Although INEC had set up a committee to look into
how displaced persons could vote, still many of the Internally
Displaced Persons (IDPs) were traumatized to the extent of
becoming disillusioned about the peaceful conduct of
elections in their camps. Worse still, as the activities of the
insurgents continued unabated, the number of IDPs was on
the rise to defy any contingency measures that INEC intended
to provide (Mohammed, 2015a).
Second, the risks of violence were high, as barely less
than forty days to the election pre-election violence was on
the increase. This time around, unlike the 2011 Elections

7
where the north was speculated to be the theatre of political
violence, the geography of violence in 2015 had changed
fundamentally from the flashpoints of conflict in the north to
the South-south and the South-west. The violence in Ekiti
State between the supporters of the PDP and the APC before
and after the 2014 gubernatorial election in the state, the
shooting of APC supporters in Port Harcourt, Rivers State on
January 6, 2015, the bombing of the APC campaign office in
Okrika and the burning of Jonathan’s campaign vehicles in
Sololo, Jos Plateau State were indicative of how charged the
supporters of the two major political parties were and what
their responses would look like in the event of an
unfavourable outcome of election results in the 2015
Elections.
Third, the political dynamics and the change in the
power relations following the merger of opposition parties
created a new platform of political competition in which the
traditional appeal to ethnicity, religion or region by
politicians was significantly doused. Against the background
of the 2011 Elections, which was highly divisive as
primordial loyalties were used not only in the campaign
rallies of the then two dominant parties (the PDP and the CPC)
(Paden, 2015), it was envisaged that the same fate would
befall the 2015 Elections and even mar the corporate
existence of the country.

8
Figure 1: The Geography of the 2015 Elections

This situation had raised concerns for the next election

but, as the reach and appeal of the opposition party grew in
various parts of the country, a different scenario for the 2015
Elections was at sight. Indeed, the two dominant parties are
national in structure, membership and supporters, and their
presidential flag bearers had contested for the same office in
2011 and again in 2015 fresh hopes for victory at the poll
were not lost by each party. However, the emergence of
Muhammadu Buhari as the APC presidential candidate and
his party’s successful moves in attracting some notable PDP
members to decamp to the party had not only destabilized the
ruling party but also added another likely scenario of
changing the pattern of power relations in Nigeria.

9
Nigeria’s 2015 General Elections: A Critical Overview
The tenure of the president, vice president, governors and
deputy governors of all the states of the federation except
Anambra, Bayelsa, Kogi, Edo, Ondo, Ekiti and Osun and the
membership of the National and State Assemblies would
expire on the 28th day of May, 2015. Thus, the 2015 General
Elections were first scheduled to hold on February 14, 2015
but the electoral commission postponed it by six weeks to
March 28 amidst suspicion expressed in different quarters
that the exercise might not see the light of the day. However,
the electoral Commission, after its chairman had earlier
briefed the National Council of State meeting on February 5,
2015 about the Commission's level of preparedness to
conduct the election, but “after carefully weighing the
suggestions from briefing held with different stakeholders in
the electoral process”, made a U-turn and announced the
postponement.

Table 1: INEC Time Table and Schedule of Activities for

General Elections, 2015

S/No. Activity Date REMARK

1 Name of 1st October, 2014 Section 30(1) of the
election Electoral Act, 2010 (as
amended) provides no
later than 90 days before
the election.
2. Commencement Presidential and Section 99(1) of the
of campaign by National Assembly- Electoral Act 2010 (as
political parties. 16 November, 2014 amended) provides 90
days before polling day.
Governorship and
State House of
Assembly-30
November, 2014

10
S/No. Activity Date REMARK
3 Collection of 4-11 November, For political parties to
Forms for all 2014 issue to their candidates
elections by at INEC Headquarters.
Political Parties
4. Conduct of party Commencement To enable political
primaries, date parties democratically
including 2 October, 2014 nominate candidates for
resolution of Ends the election as required
disputes arising 11th December, by Section 87 of the
from the 2014 Electoral Act, 2010 (as
Primaries. amended)
5 Last day of Presidential and Section 31 (1) of the
submission of National Assembly- Electoral Act, 2010 (as
Forms CF001 18 December, 2014 amended) provides for
and CF002 at the not later than 60 days
INEC Governorship and before the election.
Headquarters State House of
(for all Assembly -25
elections). December, 2014
6 Publication of Presidential and Section 31(3) of the
Personal National Assembly- Electoral Act, 2010 (as
Particulars of 25 December, 2014 amended) provides for
Candidates publication within 7
(CF001) (for all Governorship and days of the receipt of the
elections) State House of Form CF001
Assembly- 1
January, 2015
7 Last day of Presidential and Section 35 of the
withdrawal by National Assembly Electoral Act, 2010 (as
candidate(s) -30 December, 2014 amended) provides for
replacement of not later than 45 days
withdrawn Governorship and before the election.
candidate(s) by State House of
political parties. Assembly-13th
January, 2015

11
S/No. Activity Date REMARK
8 Last day for the Presidential and Section 32,37,38,39 of
submission of National the Electoral Act, 2010
Nomination Assembly – 6th (as amended).
forms by January, 2015 Commission to appoint
political parties. time for submission.
Governorship and
State House of
Assembly – 20th
January, 2015
9 Publication of 13th January, 2015 Section 30 of the
official register Electoral Act, 2010 (as
of voters for the amended) provides not
election. later than 30 days before
the election.
10 Publication of Presidential and Section 34 of the
list of nominated National Assembly Election Act, 2010 (as
candidates. -13th January, 2015 amended) provides at
Governorship and least 30 days before the
State House of day of the election.
Assembly – 27th
January, 2015
11 Publication of Section 46 of the
Notice of Poll Electoral Act, 2010 (as
28th January, 2015 amended) provides not
(for all later than 14 days before
elections) the election.

12 Submission of Presidential and Section 45 of the

names of Party National Assembly- Electoral Act, 2010 (as
Agents for the 29th January, 2015 amended) Provides not
Election to the later than 7 days before
Electoral Officer Governorship and the election.
of the Local State House of
Government Assembly -12th
Areas or Area February, 2015
Councils.
13. Last day for Presidential and Section 99(1) of the

12
S/No. Activity Date REMARK
campaigns National Assembly- Electoral Act, 2010 (as
12th February, 2015 amended) prohibits
advertisements or
Governorship and broadcasts of campaigns
State House of 24 hours prior to the day
Assembly – 26th of the election.
February, 2015
14 Dates of Presidential and Section 25 of the
Elections National Assembly- Electoral Act, 2010 (as
National 14th February, 2015 amended) provides that
Assembly/Presid the Commission is to
ential Governorship and appoint a date not
Governorship/St State House of earlier than 150 days but
ate House of Assembly – 28th not later than 30 days
Assembly February, 2015 before the expiration of
the term of office of the
last holder of that office.
Source: INEC, 2014. *Note: (i) Run-off election to the office of the
President or Governor of a State (if any) will be held within 7 days after
the announcement of the result of the election in accordance with the
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended).

The postponement, Jega argued, was mainly informed

by the rising spate of insecurity in the north-eastern states of
the country and the apparent realization that the safety of the
exercise and the personnel involved would not be guaranteed
by the security agencies (Jega, 2015b). The postponement
generated mixed reactions among Nigerians and the
international community but in the end it could be regarded as
a blessing in disguise for at least three reasons. First, the
postponement gave INEC the advantage of overcoming the
problem of low PVC distribution and strengthened its
coverage of prospective voters in the country. As at the
period of postponement on February 4, the total number of
PVCs collected throughout the country was 45,829,808,
representing 66.58% of the total number of registered voters

13
(Jega, 2015b), but by February 17, this number increased to
52,233,396, representing 75. 88%. Indeed, within the spate of
the six weeks period of the election postponement, INEC
recorded an 80.61 % collection rate of voter cards. Second,
the postponement also gave another opportunity for the
competing political parties to further muster their energies for
campaign activities, especially in areas where they did not
reach out before the postponement. Third, it mellowed down
the tension, anxiety and hysteria that characterized the pre-
election period, which, in the case of Rivers State, were
occasioned by violent confrontation between the supporters
of the PDP and the APC.
The level of INEC preparedness for the 2015 Elections
was very high, so was the spirit of voters at the 155,000
polling units provided nationwide. For any successful election
to be held, the provision of adequate materials for its conduct
must be readily available, secured neatly and used with
expertise. Indeed, the hallmark of election revolves around
the deployment of election materials. It has been noted that
the past experience of elections in Nigeria had, in some cases
been associated with the non-arrival, insufficient supply or
even snatching of election materials by brigands and thugs or
some election officials deliberately delaying their
procurement. It should be noted that the latitude of Nigeria’s
electoral geography is very vast, covering 36 states, one
federal capital territory and 774 local governments with 990
constituencies and 69 million eligible voters. Therefore, it
requires a functional logistic arrangement to transport
election materials and ensure the effective management of
elections in such vast areas. Therefore, INEC had to deploy
700,000 temporary staff across the country in order to meet
up with the complexity of the exercise at hand.
On the day of the election, most of the polling units
were opened on time and accreditation started immediately at
8.00am or thereabouts. However, there were few cases of late

14
starting of the exercise in areas where election materials did
not arrive on time. These were exceptional cases which did
not affect the conduct of the exercise in most of the wards
affected. However, the most seriously affected polling areas
are the seven (7) Federal Constituencies where the election of
the House of Representatives was postponed due to the
shortage and non-delivery of ballot papers from the National
Headquarters of INEC. The seven constituencies that were
pending had their election on March 11, 2015, alongside the
Gubernatorial and House of Assembly elections.
Though a few problems associated with card readers
were reported, most of these cases arose either because poorly
trained INEC ad-hoc staff operated the machines or the ad-
hoc staff that was trained to operate the machines was simply
replaced some hours before the election. In some cases, some
of the operators, largely due to poor training, mistakenly
touched the ‘close bill’ button of the card reader, thereby
rendering the machines inoperable. Although most of the
problems identified with the use of the card reader were
attended to and resolved by the INEC technicians deployed
for that purposes, at the high point of the exercise in Bayelsa,
Enugu and Rivers States such machines were not fully
utilised in the accreditation of voters at the polling units.
Ideally, where the card readers failed to capture the
fingerprint of some voters, a form was supposed to be filled,
as was the case in most polling units throughout the
federation. Thereafter, such voters were cleared to cast their
votes.
Generally, the electorate participated actively in the
political process more than any other time in the past, except
in the north-east where insurgency continued up to the period
of the election. However, it should be stressed that the
Nigerian electoral environment has always been complex and
traditionally volatile. Despite the apparent euphoria by
Nigerians that at last the election was to be conducted, there

15
was also an underlying hysteria that, if it was not fairly
handled by politicians or the INEC, the exercise would breed
political uncertainty that could mar the dream of voters for
political change. Side-by-side with this uncertainty, there was
an element of optimism in the minds of voters over the
possibility of having a peaceful election.
This was further reinforced by two obvious underlying
realities: first, unlike in the previous elections where one
could see politicians and party supporters around the polling
units luring the electorate to vote in their favour or parties, the
March 28 election was devoid of such moves. Second, and
also most importantly, the atmosphere at different poling
units was calm. Hitherto, the alleged partisan role of the
military in the electoral process had not only raised a serious
question mark on the credibility of the institution but also
generated a lot of debate following the June 21, 2014 Ekiti
State gubernatorial election at which soldiers deployed for
election duties were alleged to have tempered with the
process. However, in deciding the Ekiti election petition, the
Court of Appeal made it illegal for the Nigerian state to
deploy soldiers to keep peace during elections. This singular
action also raised the confidence of voters that the 2015
Elections would not be a business-as-usual exercise. With one
or two policemen at each polling station, voters found the
atmosphere hospitable for the free conduct of the elections.
Though security personnel were insufficient or absent in
a number of places, the voters were very orderly and peaceful
in most of the polling units. The conduct of the police and
other security personnel in providing security for the
electorate, the INEC staff and the electoral materials was
unprecedented. In the past electoral experiences, the police
were found complicit in election law violations either by
serving the interests of the ruling party or deliberately
ignoring their mission of protecting the electorate, the INEC
staff, journalists and local election monitors. Though the

16
police proved incapable of containing the political violence in
Rivers State, there was a relative improvement in their
performance during the 2015 Elections.
Unlike the Gubernatorial and the State Assembly
elections, the Presidential election experienced a large turnout
of voters throughout the country except in areas where
elections were marred by conflict, as in the case of Rivers
State. In Jigawa State, for example, it was anticipated that out
of 1,831,276 registered voters in the state, at least 2/3 of this
number would turn out. As was expected, the actual turn out
of voters during the actual election was phenomenal. The
actual total vote cast in the state stood at 1,071889, while the
total valid votes cast represented 1,037564. The situation was
almost the same in other states where elections where
conducted peacefully. There seemed to have been a
consensus among voters that any disruption of the electoral
conduct would likely jeopardize their long awaited desire for
a free and fair election. Hence, the calmness with which they
conducted themselves was unprecedented.
It is ironic to note that the incessant cases of pre-
election violence and the minimal incidents of post-election
violence are indications that the electorate had confidence in
the outcome of the election in most of the states of the
federation. Before the election, the chairman of the National
Human Rights Commission, Prof. Obinkalu, observed that
there were 61 incidents of election violence in 22 states with
58 people killed, while the number of electoral crimes had
been on the high side in 3 states – Lagos (11 incidents and 22
persons killed); Kaduna (3 incidents and 9 persons killed) and
Rivers (1 incidents and at least 9 people killed) (reported in
Premium Times, February 12, 2015).
During the conduct of the election and its aftermath,
there were a few cases of election violence at the polling units
except in Abia, Akwa Ibom, Benue, Ekiti, Edo, Kogi,
Nassarawa and Rivers States where violence, intimidation,

17
voter harassment and disruptions of election were observed.
Though there were reports of killings in Ebonyi, Delta, Oyo
and Rivers States (YIAGA Report, 2015) and even the
opposition party claimed that in Rivers State alone, 55 of its
members were lost to political violence (International
Business Times, April 7, 2015), it can be said that such a high
number of death was not observed in many states of the
federation. In fact, in Gubernatorial and National Assembly
elections held on April 11, 2015, it was reported that 16
persons (5 in Benue; 4 in Kebbi; 2 each in Rivers and Lagos
and 1 each in Rivers and Lagos, and 1 each in Plateau, Bauchi
and Ebonyi States were killed (Vanguard, April 12, 2015).
The traditional forms of political party competition in
Nigeria, which have been characterized by ethno-religious,
regional and class dimensions as well as non-issue-based
party campaigns, have resonated in the build up to the
election (Mohammed, 2015b). However, these platforms for
party campaigns were less frightening because of the strong
foundation of the support base of the two powerfully
competing parties across the country. This has also led to
voting along party lines rather than essentially based on the
regional or religious affiliation of candidates, as was the
situation in 2011. Moreover, the opposition party was able to
roll out a systematic campaign strategy, which helped greatly
in dousing and counteracting allegations of primordial
sentiments in its activities and structural configuration of
membership in party hierarchy and candidates.
Earlier, the ruling party called the APC a party with
Janjaweed ideology that promoted terrorism, while the latter
alleged that the PDP was the cause of Boko Haram
insurgencies in north-east of Nigeria. Indeed, the
uncomplimentary utterances of the members of the two
parties reached a crescendo when the US, the EU and
ECOWAS condemned Katsina State Governor Ibrahim
Shema’s speech in which he likened opposition politicians to

18
“cockroaches” which should be “crushed”. Later, the APC
Presidential Campaign Council (APCPCO) reported First
Lady Mrs. Patience Jonathan to the International Criminal
Court (ICC) for mobilizing a hate campaign against General
Muhammadu Buhari. At the PDP campaign rally in Calabar,
the wife of the President had allegedly called her husband’s
party supporters to “stone” anyone who chanted the ‘APC
Change’ slogan (Vanguard, March 09, 2015).
Thus, barely a month to the election, it was evident that
the “do-or-die” character of party politics in the country was
heading towards a dangerous circumstance. It was in response
to this ugly scenario created in the campaign activities of the
political parties that the stakeholders on the country’s
democratization called for a peace accord. The Abuja ‘Peace
Accord’ was signed in January and re-affirmed in March 26,
by the main presidential candidates who committed their
political parties to peaceful electioneering campaigns,
peaceful polls and the effective management of the outcome
of the 2015 Elections to ensure that there was no outbreak of
violence.
Apparently, both political parties were very hopeful of
victory, as could be seen from their vigorous campaigns prior
to the election. On the one hand, the APC was determined to
win the election in all the offices contested. In most states in
the north-west, north-central, north-east and the south-west,
the party’s campaign slogan was all about ‘change’. Thus,
with the Buhari factor in northern politics in general and the
desire for change among Nigerians, Nigeria had passed
through the most competitive political campaign ever. The
ruling PDP, on the other hand, relied on the incumbency
factor at the national level and in states that the party was in
control as the main basis of their claim to victory.
The acceptance of the election results by the political
parties that competed for power is an indication that the
exercise was relatively free, fair and credible. Despite the

19
success of the election, imbibing democratic political culture
and understanding the electoral process by political parties
and citizens would take more time to mature. For example,
the immaturity of politicians was demonstrated by the form of
political intolerance demonstrated during the vote count by
the former Minster of the Niger Delta, Mr. Orubebe, who
publically denounced the process and castigated the INEC
leadership for alleged partisanship. This action would have
jeopardized the exercise and marred the dream of Nigerians
for a peaceful change of government.

20
Table 2: The 2015 General Election Results

S/No. STATE APC PDP WINNER

1 Ekiti 120,331 176,466 PDP
2 Ogun 308,290 207,950 APC
3 Enugu 14,157 553,003 PDP
4 Kogi 264,851 149,987 APC
5 Osun 383,603 249,929 APC
6 Ondo 299,889 251,368 APC
7 FCT 146,399 157,195 PDP
8 Oyo 528,620 303,376 APC
9 Nassarawa 236,838 273,460 PDP
10 Kano 1,903,999 215,779 APC
11 Jigawa 885,988 142,904 APC
12 Katsina 1,345,441 98,937 APC
13 Kwara 302,146 132,602 APC
14 Kaduna 1,127,760 484,085 APC
15 Anambra 17,926 660,762 PDP
16 Abia 13,394 368,303 PDP
17 Akwa Ibom 58,411 953,304 PDP
18 Benue 373,961 303,737 APC
19 Borno 473,543 25,640 APC
20 Cross River 28,368 414,863 PDP
21 Delta 48,910 1,211,405 PDP
22 Edo 208,469 286,869 PDP
23 Imo 133,253 559,185 PDP
24 Kebbi 567,883 100,972 APC
25 Lagos 792,460 632,327 APC
26 Niger 657,678 149,222 APC
27 Yobe 446,265 25,526 APC
28 Plateau 429,140 549,615 PDP
29 Bauchi 931,598 86,085 APC
30 Gombe 361,245 96,873 APC
31 Ebonyi 19,518 323,653 PDP
32 Sokoto 671,926 152,199 APC
33 Zamfara 612,202 144,833 APC

21
 S/No. STATE APC PDP WINNER
34 Rivers 69,238 1,487,075 PDP
35 Bayelsa 5,194 361,209 PDP
36 Adamawa 374,701 251,664 APC
37 Taraba 261,326 310,800 PDP
TOTAL 15,424,921 12,853,162
APC PDP
Source: INEC, 2015 Election Results

The mass media played both negative and positive roles

in the 2015 Elections. Through aiding and abetting politicians
in carrying out divisive and damaging campaigns through
jingles, documentaries and advertorials, both print and
electronic media substantially fanned the embers of Nigeria’s
melting pot of political innuendos, which dragged away the
attention of people from the real issue-based campaigns to
personality attacks. The use of NTA and some private
television stations like the Lagos-based African Independent
Television (AIT) in smearing the personality of the APC
presidential candidate is a case in point of the unprofessional
conduct of the media houses.
Worse still, the Media regulatory agencies appeared
incapable of challenging or sanctioning the perpetrators of
such undesirable political game. This was “either because the
journalists were lazy and did not interrogate the issues
adequately or indeed that the media house is influenced by
proprietorial or political interest to distort the news” (Jega,
2015c: 71). However, the posture of the media during the
2015 Elections does not mean that the institution did not
contribute to the democratization process and the success of
the election. Through public sensitization programmes,
commentaries and news reports and analyses, the media did a
great deal of work to sensitize the general public on the
electoral process.

22
 The election also saw a massive utilization of social
media in the tracking of election results and their
dissemination although in most cases, social media provided
unsubstantiated and overly fabricated news. Even at the time
when the results of the election were being collated, social
media spread the news of unofficial results in different wards
and polling centres across the country. The market-place of
information provided by the social media could be regarded
as a mechanism for tracking election results at the source.
The resort to social media by many Nigerians also served to
showcase how they were deeply concerned about the electoral
process and its outcome.
International agencies, such as the European Union (EU),
the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the International
Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), the African Union
(AU) the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP),
the United States Agency for International Development
(USAID) as international observers, contributed immensely
to the peaceful conduct of the election. These agencies and
institutions were able to place a special concern for peaceful
election in Nigeria and their modes of intervention were quite
numerous. Suffice it to say that the financial support and
technical assistance provided by the UNDP in the training of
INEC staff and organizing workshops, conferences and
roundtables went a long way in overcoming some logistic
challenges the Commission had faced during the 2011
Elections.
Similarly, it was the IFES that supported INEC to
establish a graphic design centre, which gave the Commission
the capacity to produce election materials internally. The AU
supported INEC with the Election Risk Management (ERM)
tool, which the Commission used to access the risk factors
associated with the election (Jega, 2015c:229).
In addition, the role of civil society organizations (CSOs)
was very crucial. Organized under the platform of the

23
Transition Monitoring Group (TMG) since the return to civil
rule in 1999, the CSOs played a frontline role in the
monitoring of the 2015 Elections. In particular, the “Quick
Count” Project implemented by the TMG proved to be a
major approach ever utilized by any organization in tracking
results, which contributed immensely in reducing election
malpractices.

Nigeria’s 2015 General Elections: Lessons for Sustainable

Democracy
The 2015 General Elections represent the best the country has
had so far in terms of organization and conduct. The elections
showed the readiness of Nigerians across the country to
uphold a democratic option as the effective and enduring
approach to addressing leadership change. The lapses
observed during the elections were exceptional cases that did
not affect the conduct of the exercise and the legitimacy of its
outcome. Indeed, most of the lapses that were noticed were
mainly as a result of the resistance of the political parties and
their supporters to change. The success of the elections
showed that election administration requires early
preparations. INEC’s experience from the 2011 General
Elections had informed the commission of the need for early
preparations and the introduction of systematic reforms,
which yielded much success.
Although the reforms initiated by the Prof. Jega-led
INEC are ongoing, with the proposed creation of additional
polling units generating fierce debate, it is pertinent to
implement these reforms by sensitizing Nigerians on the
wisdom behind the exercise. This is necessary because the
polling structure, which created 120,000 polling units and
8,809 wards or Registration Areas (RAs), was created in 1996
by the defunct National Electoral Commission of Nigeria
(NECON). Therefore, expansion in the size of the population
of these RAs requires that a demographic shift is needed to

24
meet the actual demand of the polling units. This will further
provide an enabling condition for free, fair and credible
elections in the country’s future democratic transition.
There are many factors to the success of the elections
prominent of which are the excellent stewardship and the
relative independence of the EMB and the strong synergy it
established with stakeholders. INEC’s collaboration and
partnerships with a range of critical stakeholders, including
the civil society organizations through the Inter-agency
Consultative Committee on Election Security (ICCES), as
well as the introduction of continuous voter registration,
among others, have greatly shaped the transition process. In
particular, with sixteen participating security and quasi-
security agencies, comprising the office of the National
Security Adviser, the Police Service Commission, the
Nigerian Air Force, the Nigerian Army, the National
Intelligence Agency, the Nigerian Immigration Service, the
Federal Road Safety Corps, the Nigerian Prisons Service, the
National Youth Service Corps and the Nigerian Police,
among others, the ICCES was able to provide information
about the security matters for INEC to prepare on election
security concerns.
The acceptance of the election results by the political
parties that competed for power is an indication that the
exercise was relatively free, fair and credible. One of the new
innovations that have helped greatly in the conduct of the
2015 General Election was the use of the Permanent Voter
Card (PVC) and the Card Reader (CR). It was in the quest for
meeting the requirement of the accreditation of voters that
INEC, pursuant to the powers granted to the commission by
the 1999 Constitution (as Amended), and introduced the card
reader. The innovation rendered most of the antics of
politicians null and void - the multiple registration of voters,
the manipulation of results and unmitigated connivance with
electoral officials to rig elections. The customization of result

25
sheets to polling units, which INEC started experimenting
during the Edo State governorship election in 2012, prevented
politicians from getting result sheets and moving them around
to perpetuate electoral misconduct. In all, it can be said that
the electoral reforms introduced by INEC in the 2015
Elections had substantially reduced electoral rigging and also
ensured that the mandate of the electorate determined the
outcome of the election. In short, voter trust in the Election
Management Body had been deeply enhanced in Nigeria.
This is one lesson that Nigeria’s democracy and indeed, other
developing democracies could learn from the experience of
the 2015 Elections.
The method of conducting elections in a staggered
period with Presidential and National Assembly elections
coming first is an innovation which has dual benefits. First,
the method neutralized the hangover effect of presidential
election in determining the outcome of gubernatorial
elections. Second, it also gauged the nature and dimension of
political violence, if not completely overcoming it, in the next
election. Thus, by determining who the president was and
who the elected National Assembly members were from the
March 28 election, the subsequent gubernatorial and House of
Assembly elections conducted in April were basically seen as
state matters and their dimension of political violence,
especially in Rivers and Imo States, could be regarded as
internally-induced by the nature of power relations in the
states rather than it arising from the larger national politics in
the country.
Thus, until Nigeria develops the basic requisites of
conducting elections in one day, as is the case in developed
democracies, one of the easiest approaches to the country’s
complex election geography is to maintain the method of
staggered elections with national elections conducted first
followed by the state elections.

26
 Therefore, African countries have a lot to learn from the
2015 Elections in Nigeria, not only because of its relatively
peaceful outcome but also in the way it was staggered and
allowed to address some logistical challenges. More so, the
fact that the election heralded for the first time, the opposition
party unseating the ruling party and the presidential candidate
of the latter accepting defeat, is a more important reason why
the country’s experience will for some time, serve as a model
for sit-tight African leaders, who cling to power and form a
political dynasty for themselves and their kinsmen. Indeed,
with the 2015 General Elections, Nigeria has crossed one of
the two daunting challenges before African citizens identified
by Richard Joseph that is, “securing the right to elect those
who will govern them in fair and honest elections…”
(2008:104). This process will surely ensure political
legitimacy in the new government that emerged after the
election.
For many years since 1999, successive governments had
suffered the crisis of legitimacy largely because of the
allegation of the flagrant electoral misconduct that trailed
their electoral victories. Contextually, one concurs with
Carbone’s (2009) conception, which suggests that democracy
in developing societies is likely to survive and consolidate
over time when the system undergoes a process of gradual
legitimization. This process, which involves normative and
performance legitimization, ensures the upholding of the
values and beliefs that assist democracy to thrive and “people
come to accept democracy because it helps to attain a valued
goal such as material well-being or social peace” (2009:135).
The case of citizens’ instrumental action that ensured the
peaceful conduct of the 2015 Elections suggests that
normatively, Nigerians accept democracy. Conversely, it was
based on the poor performance of those who steered the
leadership of the country since the return to civilian rule that
Nigerian voters decided to change the ruling party in

27
anticipation of changing their material wellbeing. It is in this
value preference that one can locate the reason behind voters’
collective solidarity, patience and support to making the
election a hitch-free exercise.
The results of the elections across the country showed
that Nigeria needs less than the number of the present
registered political parties. In 2011, there were 63 but in the
2015 Elections only 25 out of which only the PDP and the
APC performed well while the remaining parties did not
succeed in forming a government even in their respective
areas of origination. At another level, many of the political
parties that contested for the elections not only lacked
visibility in areas outside their original formation, but also the
capacity to even deploy agents to track down proceedings at
the polling units and collation centres.
Despite the success of the elections, imbibing
democratic political culture and understanding the electoral
process by political parties and citizens would take more time
to mature. This is not surprising because a peaceful change of
government does not always mean that Nigerian politicians
and the electorate have imbibed democratic values. If
anything, the experience of the 2015 Elections has amply
demonstrated that a successful election is neither the end of
the transition process nor the final stage of consolidating
democracy. Indeed, as Schmitter and O’Donnel argue, “a
transition is over when abnormality is no longer the central
feature of political life, that is when actors have settled on and
obey a more or less explicit means they can legitimately
employ in their conflicts with each other, the procedures they
should apply in taking decisions and the criteria they may use
to exclude others from the game” (quoted in Persching,
2004:3). What really happened in Rivers, Imo and Bayelsa
States, the hate campaign displayed by politicians in the
build-up to the 2015 Elections and later, Mr. Orubebe’s
embarrassing display of immaturity during the vote count at

28
the International Conference Centre, Abuja as well as the
harassment of opposition party supporters, were a few cases
of “abnormality” in Nigeria’s democratization process.

Conclusion
The 2015 General Election in Nigeria was an indication that a
‘sleeping giant’ will sooner or later re-awaken from its long
slumber in the area of meeting high expectations in her
democratic transition. The success of democracy is a triumph
against Africa’s civilian tyranny and a prospect of building a
foundation of sustainable democracy in the continent.
Although there are numerous challenges in the election, such
as multiple registration, under-age voting, non-issue-based
campaigns, the flagrant use of money by the major political
parties that contested in the election and lack of the expanded
participation of social groups like women, youth and the
physically challenged, the election is a benchmark of success
in the history of electoral democracy in the country. The new
innovations and reforms introduced by the electoral umpire,
the support received by the local and international
stakeholders, the unprecedented political tolerance displayed
by the electorate and, to some extent, the politicians accepting
the electoral verdicts in the federal and state elections are the
major contributory factors for the success of the exercise.
Despite some obvious odds identified with the election, it
is not an understatement to argue that Nigeria’s democracy is
on its path to consolidation. However, the development of
political culture thus far is yet to engender the final
destination of democratization in the country. The road to
democratic consolidation is still bumpy but it is in sight since
the election has engendered a new dawn in Nigerian politics
in which People’s votes count in laying the foundation of
political legitimacy. It can be hypothesized that the more such
legitimacy is cemented through policies that improve the

29
well-being of citizens, the greater the possibility of deepening
democratic sustainability.

References
Carbone, G. , (2009). The consequences of democratization.
Journal of Democracy, Vol. 20, No. 2. April 2009.
Ibrahim, J. & Hassan, I. , (2013) Nigerian political parties:
From failed opposition electoral alliance to merger - The
march towards the 2015 general elections. Abuja: Centre
for Democracy and Development (CDD), November
International Crisis Group, (2014). Nigeria’s dangerous 2015
Elections: Limiting the violence. International Crisis
Group, Africa Report, No. 220, 21, November.
International Business Times, (2015). Available Online,
Accessed: April 7, 2015.
Jega, A. M. (2015a). Full text of Professor Jega’s statement
on election postponement at a press conference. February
7, in Vanguard, Online February 8, 2015.
Jega, A. M. (2015b). INEC and the 2015 Elections:
expectations, prospects and challenges. Paper presented
by the Chairman, INEC during the Courtesy visit to INEC
Chairman by Bayero University, Kano Members of the
University Management at INEC Conference Room,
INEC Headquarters, Abuja, 19th Januarys, 2015.
Jega, A. M., (2015c). Election management in Nigeria: The
evolution of the Nigerian electoral process, 2010-2015.
Ibadan: Safari Books.
Joseph, R., (2008). Challenges of a “frontier region”. Journal
of Democracy, Volume 19, No.2, April 2008.
Monga, C., (1997). Eight problems with African politics.
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Mohammed, H., (2015a). Combating electoral violence in
Nigeria: Challenges and strategies for the 2015 general
elections. Paper presented at a one-day conference on the

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 theme: INEC and the 2015 general elections:
Expectations, prospects and challenges, organized by
Bayero University, Kano, January 19th – 20th 2015.
Mohammed, H., (2015b). Introduction: The dilemmas of
political parties in Nigeria. In Habu Mohammed (ed.).
The patterns and dynamics of party politics in Nigeria’s
fourth republic, Kano: Department of Political Science,
Federal University, Dutse (FUD).
Paden, J., (2015). Religion and conflict in Nigeria:
Countdown to the 2015 Elections. United States Institute
for Peace.
Pershing, T., (2004). Transition from authoritarian rule and
regime consolidation: Leaving democracy out. Brandeis
Graduate Journal, Vol. 2. Available at:
http://www.brandeis.edu/gradjournal Accessed: April 7,
2015.
Premium Times, (2015). 58 Nigerians killed in 2015 pre-
election violence so far. February 13. Available online.
Accessed: August 30, 2015.
Ujo, A. A., (2004). Understanding elections: A guide for
students and election managers. Kaduna: Anyaotu
Enterprises and Publishers (Nigeria) Ltd.
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Patience Jonathan to ICC. March 9. Available online.
Accessed, March 2, 2015.
Vanguard, (2015).Governorship polls: 16 killed as apathy
mars elections. April 12. Available online. Accessed,
August 30, 2015.
Wilson, J. H. & Liang-Ferton, D., (2014). Nigeria’s activists
find gaps in violence prevention efforts for 2015 Elections.
United States Institute of Peace.

31
 The Determinants of the Conduct of the
Electorate in the 2015 Nigerian General Elections
James Apam*

Abstract
The electoral circle in a democracy is only said to be
complete when the citizenry enlists into the membership of
political parties, engages in the electioneering campaigns,
registers to vote and actually votes at elections. These
co n d u c t s ar e de te r mi ne d by the nat u r e of pol it i c a l
contestation in the polity, the electoral process as designed by
the electoral commission and the issues of governance in the
period leading to the elections, etc. This paper examines
these issues in the 2015 Nigerian General Elections and
concludes that, while it may be difficult to actually determine
why the electorate voted for the parties as they did in the
absence of an exit poll or a more detailed study of the
outcome of the elections (except to speculate) a number of
factors like the preparations of the electoral body and the
nature of governance, the roles played by the media and the
organized civil society as well as foreign diplomatic support
actually determined the conduct of the electorate in the
elections. The paper recommends that, in future, the electoral
commission, civil society groups and the political parties
should be more actively engaged in the provision of political
education on a continuous basis, in-between elections. In
addition, the preparations for elections like the issuance of
voters’ cards, the delineation of constituencies and the
creation of additional polling units should be done well

* James Apam, PhD. is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Political

Science, Benue State University, Makurdi, Nigeria.

32
ahead of impending elections and not necessarily in the run-
up to the elections.

Introduction
The electoral process is the mechanism by which society
maintains harmony with the state. Changes in the
organization of the state and its relation to society and the
individual are first perceived through elections. States need
the consensus of those in society to remain in existence and
the chief function of elections is to maintain this consensus.
During an electoral process, voters fine-tune their beliefs,
values, norms, attitudes and opinions to those expressed by
candidates, the media and other shapers of opinion during
campaigns. Elections are also rituals marking the end of
periods-political and historical periods at both the societal and
the personal levels. Even when incumbents are re-elected,
there is the expectation that something new will occur after
the officials are sworn in again.
For the individual voter, elections also mark an end to
the discussions of the identification, definition and resolution
of issues; of the merits and drawbacks of candidates; of the
positive and negative effects of the media’s handling of the
campaigns and the role of government in society. By voting,
the citizens manifest concern for the well-being of society.
Thus, the essence of elections in a democracy is to
express popular will, engender political changes and
legitimize political regimes. As Schumpeter says, “democracy
means only that the people have the opportunity of accepting
or refusing the men who are to rule them” (cc Adejumobi,
2000:p34). In other words, democracy is all about conducting
elections and choosing political leaders since liberal
democracy is conceived as a political system characterized by
regular and free elections in which politicians organized into
parties compete to form the government by right of virtually

33
all the adult citizens to vote and by guarantee of a range of
familiar political and civil rights (Adejumobi, 2000).
The key properties or elements of liberal democracy are:
political participation of citizens, competition among political
agents especially parties, and the granting of a host of civil
and political liberties, which include freedom of expression,
association and of the press, sufficient to ensure the integrity
of political competition and participation. But as Adejumobi
(2000) asks, what criteria underscore meaningful elections
and under what conditions do elections make sense? In other
words, what are the constitutive and regulative mechanisms
and precepts necessary to promote healthy and free electoral
competition and under what environmental conditions do
elections thrive?
The constitutive and regulative mechanisms and
precepts of elections are about their structures and processes.
The former include the establishment of a competent,
relatively autonomous and non-partisan electoral body to
administer the conduct of the elections, the existence of an
impartial judiciary to interpret electoral laws and adjudicate
on electoral matters, a viable press and a non-partisan police
force, etc. The latter – that is, the processes of elections
involve the rules, procedure and activities relating to the
conduct of elections. These are the electoral laws, the
organization of political parties, voter registration,
nomination of candidates for elective public office, balloting,
counting ballots and the declaration of election results. Added
to these are the rules of the game; that is, there should be a
general acceptance throughout the political community of
certain vague rules of the game, which limit the struggle for
power and promote healthy electoral competition.
The environmental conditions conducive to and
supportive of meaningful elections are what could be
described as pre-election variables. These cover socio-
economic and political issues. The former involves creating

34
relative economic well-being and social welfare for the
people. The absence of this leads to a clientelist vote in which
the electorate is in a captive situation mainly trading off their
votes for token material incentives from patrons. This is what
Adejumobi (2000) refers to as the commodification of votes
This extensive definition of the ideal context for elections
presents a background upon which the conduct of the
electorate in the 2015 Nigerian General Elections can and
should be discussed.
This discussion of the conduct of the voters in the 2015
Elections looks at issues that informed the overall response of
the electorate to the performance of their civic responsibilities
and does not necessarily explain the voting pattern. These
responsibilities began with their willingness to register to vote
in elections, the collection of their voter cards at the
appointed dates, time and places and ended with their
decisions to cast their votes on election days and, in the
process, conducting themselves in an orderly manner.
In the typical discussion of voter behaviour, an analysis
of the result of the elections is done after an exit poll is done
to determine why voters voted for particular candidates or
political parties. This discussion cannot claim to have done
that since it does not rely on the result of an exit poll, except
to speculate about voter preferences or the strength of
political parties. The discussion is rather an attempt to explain
why the Nigerian electorate reacted to the electoral process in
the ways that they did in the 2015 Elections.
The reaction was determined by a number of factors,
which either facilitated or hindered their participation in the
process as well as the positive or negative contributions made
by individuals and groups in the performance of this civic
responsibility.
In the 2015 general election, the 5th to be held since the
end of military rule in 1999, voters elected the president,
members of the Senate, the House of Representatives and the

35
governors, as well as members of the state legislature. For the
first time since the transition from military rule in 1999, the
ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP) was challenged by a
new unified opposition party, the All Progressives Congress
(APC), which was formed in February 2013. The elections,
which were first scheduled to hold on 14th and 28th February,
2015 were later held on the 28th March and 11th April.
The Electoral Commission postponed it by six weeks
mainly due to the poor distribution of the Permanent Voter
Cards and insecurity due to the Boko Haram insurgency in
certain north-eastern states in the country. On each of the
election days, polling was extended to the following day due
to delays and technical problems with the Biometric Card
Readers (BCR) and voting disruptions in some places. The
opposition candidate, Muhammadu Buhari, won the
presidential election by more than 2.5 million votes, polling
15,424,921 votes and making 53.96% of the votes cast while
the incumbent President Goodluck Jonathan polled
12,853,162 votes, making 44.96% of the total votes cast. The
All Progressives Congress (APC) won most of the state
governorship elections just as it won most of the seats in the
two houses of the National Assembly. The election marked
the first time an incumbent president lost re-election in
Nigeria.
The success achieved in the general elections has been
attributed to a combination of factors, which included the
existence of an electoral umpire with a focused leadership, a
well-coordinated opposition force and a vigilant citizenry
driven by observant civil society organizations (CSOs).

Conceptualizing the Conduct of Voters

In normal political discourse, the conduct of the electorate is
understood to refer to, among other things, the act of showing
support and voting for candidates of one’s choice in elections.

36
That is what is also referred to as voter behaviour or
generally political behaviour.
Political behaviour is determined both by the objective
situations in which the people or individuals themselves and
by the predispositions that citizens and their leaders have
acquired through prior experience, their political goals,
expectations about the rules of political activities, conceptions
of the legitimacy of man and institutions, group loyalties,
assumptions about human nature and orientations towards
authority. In the same way, voting behaviour could be shaped
by factors of ethnicity, religion, material considerations, the
personality of contestants, party organization and manifesto,
campaign slogans and propaganda, social divisions which are
primarily economic, religious and regional as well as
insecurity and threats to life and social existence.
Such behaviour may not always be based on a deep
understanding of the issues in an election, as experience in
Nigeria has shown over time. Even in the advanced liberal
democracies, studies of voting behaviour have shown that
“voters have generally failed to meet a high standard of
citizenship and specifically that most of them lacked
substantial understanding of election-related issues”
(Patterson, 2006: p39).
In Nigeria, politicians have continually used ethnic and
religious divisions to attract sympathy and votes from the
electorate at elections while not raising issues of governance
in the course of the electioneering campaigns. Sometimes it is
difficult to measure the level of the acceptability of a
candidate or a political party given the irregularities that
occur during elections. The rulings of the election tribunals
(some of which are induced anyway) sometimes attest to this
claim.
In Western democratic societies, voter turnout at
elections tends to be high when controversial issues dominate
the campaigns, or if the programmes of the competing parties

37
are sufficiently differentiated and polarized by policies
affecting the people, thereby generating in them an intense
sense of having a stake in determining the outcome of the
election. From there, it becomes easier to measure or
determine the behaviour of voters.
Similarly, a number of factors bring about political
apathy. These range from the environmental setting to the
individual concerned. It is said that the higher the level of
political development (to which a political system has
attained) the greater participation in the political process. This
is because in this case, the system creates more structures for
participation as well as throws up new issues and demands,
which complicate the process of political interaction. For
other people, this increasing complexity of the interactive
process may be a source of discouragement to participate
either because they feel unable to comprehend the issues
involved or because they lack the qualifications to operate
effectively in the complex environment.
The Nigerian populace has a civic responsibility to vote
at elections, as it is the practice in democracies. Nigeria is
also a state party to the key universal and regional Human
Rights instruments relevant to democratic participation. Thus,
the right to vote and be elected in periodic elections through
universal suffrage are established in the Constitution and the
Electoral Act. The fundamental freedoms of assembly,
association, expression and movement are also provided for
as well as access to justice and legal remedy. This also
provides the background on which the conduct of the
electorate can be discussed.

The Conduct of the Electorate

For the over 50 years of Nigeria’s existence, almost all her
elections have never been free or fair. The factors responsible
for this, as has been discovered over time, include the late
enactment of laws, campaigns of calumny by the candidates

38
of political parties, which are also characterized by bribery
and thuggery, the manipulation of results by incumbent office
holders with the connivance of the electoral staff, inadequate
training of ad-hoc electoral staff, lack of a credible voter
register, the absence of the autonomy of the electoral body
and the misconduct of the staff, among other factors. These
issues invariably affect the overall conduct of voters at
elections.
In the 2015 Elections, the security situation, the large
population, infrastructure challenges and the fierce political
competition made for an extremely challenging electoral
environment. On 7 February, INEC postponed the elections
scheduled for 14 and 28 February by six weeks. This
followed the advice of the National Security Advisor and all
the Armed Services and Intelligence Chiefs that they could
not guarantee security for the proposed election days, as six
weeks was needed to conclude military operations against the
Boko Haram insurgency. Later, Boko Haram insurgents also
issued a statement in which they explicitly threatened the
elections.
After monetary inducements, campaigns of calumny,
insults and manipulations and the mobilization of people
along religious and ethnic lines and some pre-elections
violence, as occurred in some parts of the country, elections
were conducted peacefully in most parts of the country on the
two days set by the INEC. Nigerians lined up and waited
patiently to cast their votes; the elections witnessed a massive
turnout in most parts of the country. Most Nigerians were
determined to perform their civic responsibilities and ensure
that they voted a leader who would superintend the affairs of
the country in the next four years in spite of all odds. The
Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD), which had
election monitors in most parts of the country reported that
there were long queues of enthusiastic voters across the
country and that the general behaviour of voters was

39
adjudged satisfactory even in the midst of the challenges
encountered during the accreditation process in many parts of
the country. In some places, elections did not take place on
the first days due to INECs logistical problems, yet people
remained calm (CDD, 2015).
The CDD also reported that there were cases in Uyo,
Akwa Ibom State and Port Harcourt in Rivers State where
politicians and their supporters insisted on inspecting the
result sheets before accreditation started. This delayed the
take-off of accreditation in the affected polling units.
Remarkably, across the country, persons with disabilities
(PWD), the aged and women (the pregnant women and
mothers) were given special attention and voted with ease.
Generally, the overall conduct of the electorate was
determined to a large extent by the preparedness of the
electoral commission, the extent of civic education, the state
of the nation, the contribution of some civil society groups,
the media, the diplomatic support that the country received
and the low level of violence that occurred on election days.

State of the Nation and the Constellation of Political

Forces
A very important issue that greatly determined the enthusiasm
of Nigerians to vote in the last election was the nature of
governance in the country. In the run-up to the 2015 Elections,
the country desperately faced the problem of
insecurity/insurgency, economic decline/collapse, indiscipline,
massive corruption, leadership collapse on a national scale,
ethnic and sectarian divisions and a national crisis of
confidence. At 54, Nigeria was a country experiencing
diminishing identities of Nigerians, resulting in mass poverty
and deep social and political inequalities. The responsibility
to protect, which is a fundamental obligation of the Nigerian
state under international law, became increasingly worrisome
because of its inability to contain the activities of criminal

40
gangs and terrorists. The country witnessed the most heinous
and horrendous crimes against humanity emanating from the
Boko Haram insurgency, which threatened peace and the
general elections and also undermined the democratic gains
that had been made since the return to democratic rule in
1999. It was felt that the incumbent government had either
created these problems or promoted and worsened them and
could not be trusted with the task of providing the remedies
and leadership needed for national rebirth.
In February 2014, a group of opposition parties, which
had always failed against the ruling People’s Democratic
Party (PDP) in previous elections, decided to come together
to form what was called a mega-party in order to challenge
PDP. These parties were the Action Congress (AC), the
Congress for Progressive Change (CPC), the All Nigerian
People’s party (ANPP) and a faction of the All Progressives
Grand Alliance (APGA). It was initially thought that this was
a meeting of strange bed-fellows and that the alliance would
not last. The party was able to forge ahead after registration
and present a formidable challenge to the ruling party which
enabled it to capture power in the last election. The formation
of this party became a major issue in determining the conduct
of the Nigerian electorate in the 2015 Elections. The sense of
the organization of the new party within a very short time and
its relative ability to involve the major political actors across
the country and its ability to appeal to many Nigerians with
relatively new ideas offered hope to them that the PDP
behemoth could at last be ‘overthrown’. The party’s national
convention produced Muhammadu Buhari, who had lost three
previous elections as its presidential candidate to face the
incumbent President Goodluck Jonathan.
Those who supported Muhammadu Buhari of the All
Progressives Congress (APC) were of the opinion that,
though he may not have completely and believably
transformed into a true and modern democrat, he, at least, had

41
the discipline to rein in the rampant insurgency laying the
country waste, the common sense and altruism to subject
himself to the constitution and the ethical wherewithal to
tackle the corruption and economic collapse threatening to
trigger a revolution in Nigeria and destabilize the entire sub-
region. It was also felt he seemed able to restore the pride of
the nation and in many ways stand as a strong and disciplined
symbol around whom technocrats could have the space,
safety and comfort to design appropriate redemption policies
(Akinlotan, 2015). In this case, the choices of the electorate
were very clear; it was between those who wanted a change
in the direction the country was facing and those who
benefited from the existing arrangements and wanted a
continuation of the status quo. The stage was then set. The
nature of governance and the realignment of political forces
coupled with other issues then determined the outcome of the
elections.

Electoral Administration and the Credibility of the 2015

Elections
As usual, before the elections, there were very many
challenges faced by the electoral commission. Apart from
time constraints, there were other challenges, which included
the delineation of new constituencies, the creation or merger
of some polling units, the compilation of voters register and
training staff. The National Youth Corps members who had
initially been trained in the use of the card reader machines
passed out and left their places of primary assignment after
the postponement and had to be replaced by others who had
not been trained in the use of the machines. In other cases,
those who were trained and were still available were replaced
by electoral officers through some corrupt practices, thus
making the use of the card readers difficult in some places.
Other challenges were in dealing with electoral disputes,
providing voter education, improving the balloting process,

42
organizing election observation, preventing electoral fraud by
blocking all loopholes, etc. The electoral commission was
able to surmount some of these challenges but the outcomes
show that that there is still some room for improvement in the
future.
The Commission attempted to improve the integrity of
the voter register and voter registration which is extremely
challenging in Nigeria due to the lack of reliable
identification documents, very limited population registration
and the absence of a systematized birth and death register.
Foreign and independent observers have commented that the
electoral commission worked impartially, despite difficult
circumstances, strong tensions and criticisms. The European
Union Election Observer Mission (EU EOM, 2015) noted
positively INEC’s attempts to improve the integrity of voter
registration and identification by introducing biometric
measures. The Chief Observer said, “INEC’s efforts to take a
strong stand are commendable and particularly important
given the systemic challenges” (EU EOM, 2015). The
commission also made efforts to remove the names of those
who had done multiple registrations but the whopping
difference between the number that registered to vote and the
number that was actually accredited and voted shows that this
effort was not very successful. Understandably, those who
were displaced in the north- eastern part of the country could
not vote but that cannot account for that huge difference.
Clearly, there were still very many multiple registrations.
Figures obtained from the presidential election results from
the INEC website show that a total of 67,422,005 registered
to vote but only 31, 746,490 were accredited to vote in the
presidential elections, leaving a difference of 36,675,515. In
any case, the number of displaced voters in the north-eastern
part of the country was only put at 1.2m people though
unofficial estimates are slightly higher. The distribution of the

43
number of voters by state, as in the Appendix also shows that
more registered to vote than those that actually voted.
The mandatory use of Permanent Voters Cards (PVCs)
meant that their distribution and collection were critical. By
the originally scheduled 14 February election day, only
75.56% of PVCs had been obtained by registrants, with 16.8
million cards uncollected. However, the postponement
allowed for an extended opportunity for registrants to obtain
their PVCs, resulting in approximately 82% collected by 21
March. The late arrival of a large number of PVCs caused
frustration and increased tension in the run-up to the elections.
Regrettably, up to 100,000 PVCs remained unproduced a day
before the polling. This may have affected voter turnout to
some extent.
INEC has also engaged regularly with political parties
and civil society at central and state levels. There were still
complaints from politicians, especially on the proposed
creation of new poling units in some parts of the country but
this issue was resolved amicably and some confidence was
restored in the work of the commission except from a few
mischief-makers who were prepared to blame someone else
for their electoral failures, which were foreseen.
Various innovations and additional safeguards were
introduced into the electoral process, most notably with the
biometric card readers. An identification process was
introduced for the 2015 Elections with the use of biometric
measures to stop the multiple voting prevalent in earlier
elections. A card reader in each Polling Unit (PU) was
introduced to check the biometric data stored on each
person’s Permanent Voters Card (PVC) against a scan then
undertaken with their fingerprints with each PVC being only
valid in the PU where the voter was registered. However,
approximately two hours after the scheduled end of
accreditation on the first Election Day, INEC announced that
in case of card reader failure, their use would no longer be

44
required and registrants would be manually accredited. In so
doing, INEC expedited accreditation, but removed the
safeguard of electronically checking for authentic PVCs
allocated to that Polling unit (PU). In some places, voters
were accredited without the card reader being used. No
information is available on how many registrants were
accredited manually without the check of a card-reader. It is
suspected that some ad-hoc electoral officers colluded with
some unscrupulous politicians to subvert this process.
In the run-up to the elections, there was considerable
political interest in the issue of voting by internally displaced
persons (IDPs) but this was not translated into legislative
provisions. Nevertheless, based on a consultative process, the
INEC eventually invoked Section 46 (1) (c) of the Electoral
Act, which requires the publication of Polling Units not later
than 14 days before Election Day. Thus, it became impossible
for this category of Nigerians to vote in the elections. This
was a dent in the work of the commission but it cannot be
entirely blamed.

Civic Education and Issues-Based Politics as Major

Determinants of Voter Conduct
The twin issues of the level of the provision of civic
education and the extent to which politicians engage in
issues-based politics are the major determinants of the
conduct of voters in an election. Nigerian voters may have
shown their preferences for particular political parties, gone
out to vote and conducted themselves peacefully or otherwise
but how much of the issues at stake in the elections were they
aware of? Issues-based campaigning was overshadowed by
prevailing negative tactics, with personal insults and
escalating violence in some parts of the country.
Over time, politics in Nigeria has acquired a very bad
name. Political parties and contestants to political office do
not articulate clear ideas on how they intend to run the state

45
on election. “The contest for political power in the country is
driven by the contrasting imperatives of ethnicity and
regionalism, which by implication is devoid of any sustaining
unifying theme or ideology” (Apam, 2011:p125). Thus,
corruption and political opportunism have emerged as the
critical elements of Nigerian political behaviour. Those in
power determine the distribution of resources. Driven by the
desire to preserve the status quo, they have neglected the
responsibility to create a conducive environment for the
articulation of contending policies that would benefit the
entire country. This breed of politicians does not even have
faith in the ballot box. They believe that winning is the only
option in an election even if it is obvious that the voters do
not want them. They do not also believe that one could work
for and actually earn votes in an election based on one’s
vision and appeal or that democracy is anchored on a series of
elections (Apam, 2011
These issues are compounded by a lack of
understanding the issues involved in governance by the
electorate in the absence of a basic programme of civic
education. What happens in the process is what Ibeanu (2007)
refers to as a primitive accumulation of votes, which occurs
in the political sphere just as it occurs in the economic sphere.
By this, he means the winning of votes by use of both
objective and structural violence and disregard of the rule of
law. As he says, this is sustained by the belief that a
legitimate way of securing political power is to steal the
people’s mandate. Similarly, as Ibeanu (2007) also noted,
Nigerian voters do not attach great promissory content or
psychological value to their votes.
The vote is grossly devalued and the mandate claimed
by politicians is effectively dubious. This is because empty
promises are made at elections and voters know that the
‘deposits’ they are making in terms of their votes will be
worth little or nothing at the end of the election (Ibeanu,

46
2007). The void created by the failure of politicians to appeal
to voters on the strength of their vision and programmes and
the lack of understanding by the electorate are filled by ethnic,
religious and sectional sentiments which are whipped by
these same politicians. This was clearly reflected in the 2015
Elections where voting was based on these ethnic, religious
and sectional sentiments. The results below show that most of
the votes of the APC came from the North Eastern, North
Western, South Western and the North Central zones of the
country probably because the presidential candidate came
from the northern part of the country while the party did very
poorly in the South Eastern and South-South Zones of the
country where it could not garner up to 25% of the votes cast
in all those states.
Ethnic, sectional and religious sentiments played a key
role, as they were whipped up by politicians who had nothing
else to offer. Campaigns were taken to churches and mosques
just as all sorts of ethnic and regional organizations were
formed at that time to campaign for the Presidential
candidates. The APC had campaigned on the platform of
bringing about change in view of the deterioration that the
country had suffered in the hands of the PDP in its 16-year
rule while the PDP flaunted its transformation agenda. But it
was not so much of the projection of these issues that won
them votes. For the APC, it was obvious that the people
would be attracted to its offer of leadership in view of the fact
that most people held the PDP responsible for the country’s
deterioration and it did push that advantage while also
appealing to groups in the process.
The PDP did not help itself much as there was very little
to defend and was thus more involved in mudslinging and a
calumnious campaign. The party also played the ethnic and
religious card, which paid off in some parts of the country but
also became its waterloo in other parts, as evident in the
results (if they are truly a reflection of the people’s wish).

47
Statements and utterances of some of those who campaigned
for President Jonathan turned out to injure rather than further
his cause. The Tables below show the distribution of votes in
the various zones for the two leading political parties.

Table 1: Distribution of Voters Across the Six Geo-political

Zones of Nigeria

North Central Zone

S/ State No. of Accredited APC PDP
No Voters
1 Benue 754,634 373,961 303,737
2 Plateau 1,076,833 429,140 549,615
3 Nassara 562,959 236,838 273,460
wa
4 Kogi 476,839 264,851 149,987
5 Kwara 302,146 302,146 132,602
6 Niger 933,607 657,678 149,222
7 FCT 344,056 146,399 157,195

South- South Zone

S/ State No. of Accredited APC PDP
No Voters
1 Bayelsa 384,789 5,194 361,209
2 Rivers 1,643,409 69,238 1,487,075
3 Delta 1,350,914 48,910 1,211,405
4 Edo 599,166 208,469 286,869
5 Akwa- 1,074,070 58,411 953,304
Ibom
6 Cross- 500,577 28,368 414,863
River

48
South-East Zone
S/ State No. of Accredited APC PDP
No. Voters
1 Abia 442,538 13,394 368,303
2 Ebonyi 425,301 19,518 323,653
3 Anambra 774,430 17,926 660,762
4 Imo 801,712 133,253 559,185
5 Enugu 616,112 14,157 553,003

South-West Zone
S/ State No. of Accredited APC PDP
No. Voters
1. Lagos 1,678,754 792,460 632,327
2. Ondo 618,040 299,889 251,368
3. Oyo 1,073,849 528,620 303,376
4. Ekiti 323,739 120,331 176,466
5. Ogun 594,975 308,290 207,950
6. Osun 683,169 383,603 249,929

North-West Zone
S/No. State No. of Accredited APC PDP
Voters
1. Sokoto 988,899 671,926 152,199
2. Zamfara 875,049 612,202 144,833
3. Kebbi 792,817 567,883 100,872
4. Katsina 1,578,646 1,345,441 98,937
5. Kaduna 1,746,031 1,127,760 484,085
6. Kano 2,364,434 1,903,999 215,779
7. Jigawa 1,153,428 885,988 142,904

49
North-East Zone
S/No. State No. of Accredited APC PDP
Voter
1. Borno 544,759 473,543 25,640
2. Yobe 520,127 446,265 25,526
3. Bauchi 1,094,069 931,598 86,085
4. Taraba 638,578 261,326 310,800
5. Adamawa 709,993 374,701 251,664
6. Gombe 515,828 361,245 96,873

Summary of Votes by Zones

S/No. Zone APC PDP
1. North West 7,115,199 1,339,709
2. North East 2,848,678 796,588
3. North Central 2,411,013 1,715,818
4. South- South 418,590 4,714,725
5. South East 198,248 2,464,906
6. South West 2,433,193 1,821,416
Source: Compiled from the Presidential Elections Results as released by
INEC on its website

Civil Society and the 2015 Elections

As noted earlier, the change of leadership at the centre,
achieved at the 2015 Elections, resulted mostly from a
combination of factors, including a vigilant citizenry driven
by Civil Society Organizations (CSOs). A discussion on the
conduct of the electorate in the 2015 Elections will thus not
be complete without reference to the role of the organized
civil society in it, especially as some of these groups were
seen as performing negative roles in the run-up to the
elections.
Civil society in its specific meaning excludes those
groups that belong to the market-place and the state and those

50
groups interested in acquiring political power, which is why
political parties are not usually included among civil society
organizations. In other words, civil society acts as a buffer
against the power of the central government and in that role
encourages an atmosphere that allows various groups to
follow their own courses without fear of the central
government’s intrusion. Civil society can then be interpreted
to mean a kind of a social order that involves the widest
possible political participation and which ensures the political
accountability of the rulers to the ruled. It is a space that
exists between the national government and the individual
and this space consists of a variety of different groups and
associations each of which is dedicated to upholding certain
values to achieve particular ends.
The relevance of civil society cuts across all the facts of
nation and state life - from economic, political, health, social
and environmental development - as they play vital roles to
ensure sustainable development in all the aspects of state life.
As in other developing countries, Nigeria has several civil
society groups that tend to put both governments and their
policies in check and assist in achieving some of those
objections that would have seemed impossible for the
government to achieve on her own. Although these
organizations vary in composition, mission statement, vision
statement and core values - NGOs, CBOs, etc., they all have
in common an ideology of promoting equity and justice in the
polity and bringing about development that can be sustained
for many generations to come.
Despite this perceived role of civil society, it should not
be mistaken that it is a uniform positive force. Civil society
simply reflects the local situation and its actors may pursue
undemocratic and unprogressive goals. For example, in a
diverse society like ours where democratic values are still
weak, civil society actors can sometimes promote the
interests and views of only a certain group, which can impede

51
democracy and development. They may also promote values
that do not take into cognizance the interests of women, or
promote the interests of a particular ethnic group over others.
In the run-up to 2015, these negative roles were played by the
Odua People’s Congress (OPC) and the Movement for the
Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB),
which were used by the ruling PDP to attack its opponents.
Members of these groups destroyed the campaign billboards
and offices of the opposition APC, especially in the South
Western and the South Eastern regions, while security
agencies looked the other way. This was allegedly done after
huge sums of money had exchanged hands by way of
‘contracts to protect oil pipelines’.
A number of civil society groups however, made
positive contributions to the success of the last elections.
Salami (2015) reports that some civil society organizations in
a meeting with the Netherlands Ambassador to Nigeria
sought international support for the 2015 Elections .The event,
which took place at the offices of the Human Development
Initiatives (HDI), had members of various civil society
groups in attendance. They raised timely concerns for
possible violence in the elections if some trends were not
checked. The groups saw no reason for the initial
postponement of the polls since the Independent National
Electoral Commission (INEC) had achieved over 75%
distribution of Permanent Voter Cards (PVC). According to
them, the armed forces’ lack of readiness for the elections
was only a ruse by the federal government to buy time so as
to sack the then INEC Chairman, Prof. Jega and also to give
the government an opportunity to appoint a new Chairman
who would do the bidding of the ruling People’s Democratic
Party (PDP).
The groups believed that this kind of arrangement was a
recipe for violence, which would foster the alleged grand plan
of the federal government to institute a 2-year interim

52
government, with the excuse that elections could not be
conducted in a violent atmosphere. According to them, if the
government really wanted to hold free and fair elections, then
the processes to its build-up must be fair and transparent. The
organizations, therefore, urged the international community to
join and support the efforts of Nigerian civil society in
holding the government accountable to the electorate.
The Nigerian Civil Society Situation Room, a coalition
of about 60 CSOs, was another of those civil society groups
which kept an eye on the processes leading to the elections
and the actual elections. Led by the Executive Director of the
Policy and Legal Advocacy Centre (PLAC), Clement
Nwankwo, the group’s members monitored the electoral
process, keeping Nigerians informed about developments
through briefings at its situation room in Abuja. In the build-
up to the elections, it held discussions with major key players
in the electoral process, including the Chairman of the
Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), Prof.
Jega; international figures, such as the ex-Secretary-General,
United Nations, Kofi Annan, and notable religious leaders,
such as Cardinal John Onaiyekan. Some of these meetings
examined issues, including INEC’s preparations for the
elections, how to ensure a rancour-free process and what
should be done to ensure that the nation got the electoral
process right and averted chaos.
When the elections were suddenly postponed from the
earlier dates of February 14 and 28, the group alerted the
populace through a statement on February 12, titled:
“Situation Room: Nigeria’s Democracy Imperilled, to
Imminent Danger”. It urged major stakeholders, particularly
the courts, the security agencies and religious organizations,
to be wary and desist from yielding themselves as tools to
truncate the democratic process (Ikhilae, 2015). It noted that
the postponement of the elections following the stark refusal
of the military authorities to guarantee security, while

53
evoking dark memories of past military dictatorships, threw
up various constitutional and political challenges that would
undermine and subvert our fledgling democracy.
In a statement, the group said, “we believe the
postponement of this election, for whatever reason, will
undermine whatever modicum of legitimacy the electoral
process still has and may ultimately be the trigger for massive
unrest, violence and armed conflict, effectively setting the
stage for civil unrest” (Ikhilae,2015). At the conclusion of the
first round of voting on March 28, the group, after a thorough
assessment of the exercise, observed some lapses, including
the late arrival of electoral officers to polling centres, reported
cases of malfunctioning card reader machines and partisan
conduct by some security personnel, among others.
In a statement it issued on March 29, the group stated
that the failure of the card reader in some cases, which forced
INEC to revert to manual accreditation, undermined the full
benefit anticipated by the use of biometric technology and
imposed unnecessary hardship on Nigerians. It also warned
about the threat posed to the process’s credibility, where
security agencies failed to prevent interference in the electoral
process in some states. It urged the security agencies and
officials to conduct themselves according to established
standards of professional conduct and asked INEC to correct
its own deficiencies and inform the Nigerian public as to what
to expect during the next round of elections.
The group, whose member organizations had election
monitors throughout the country, said that, from reports
submitted by its members, it was concerned “about the
overall conduct of the elections” in some states because there
were grounds to question the credibility of the election results.
It urged INEC to take steps to authenticate the final collated
results from those states against the polling unit results and
make a reasoned judgment about them. It noted that in Rivers
State “historically deep-rooted political animosities played

54
out in a brazen, violent and naked manner to subvert the
electoral process in many local governments in the state”
(Ikhale, 2015).
It also expressed concern about what it termed the weak
oversight powers of INEC’s national headquarters over the
Resident Electoral Commissioners and state INEC offices in
the management and conduct of elections, which it partly
blamed for the situation in some states. ‘This makes it easy
for compromised RECs and other state-level INEC officers to
undermine the credibility of the election, sometimes with
reckless impunity,’ it said (Ikhale, 2015).
In addition to all these, several other civil society
organizations and International agencies like the Centre for
Democracy and Development (CDD) and the European
Union (EU) participated in monitoring the elections,
beginning from the registration of voters to the activities on
polling days. These efforts boosted voter confidence in the
entire process and enabled greater participation in the
elections as well as the overall credibility of the process.

The Media and the 2015 Elections

The Nigerian electronic and print media played a major role
in influencing the decisions of the electorate even to
participate in the elections and as well as influenced their
decisions to vote for particular candidates. These roles can be
described as both positive and negative.
The media is expected to be the unifying factor for all
interest groups but unfortunately some of it came out to be
brazenly partisan. It did not appreciate the fact that it had its
clientele across the political divides. Some of the
advertisements that were broadcast were, to say the least,
banal, puerile, uncultured and primitive and did not in any
way enhance our social and political development. Some of
the documentaries that were transmitted on some television
networks were in very bad taste. They sought to demonize

55
political opponents with a lot of inaccuracies and very
nauseating run-him-down lines and sometimes did not serve
the purpose of their production, as they instead attracted
sympathy for the intended targets at least, the results showed
in the newspapers also carried sensational news headlines
(some of which were false) in support of some candidates in
the elections, depending on their ownership. Some
newspapers conducted opinion polls and made predictions on
the outcome of the elections with a view to deceiving the
readership and helping those aspirants that they supported. A
few others were based on principled predictions and arrived
at fairly more scientific conclusions.
Social media also played a major role in influencing the
decisions of many voters to participate in the elections
sometimes with wide speculations and inflammatory
comments therein. Many Nigerians used this platform to open
up a whole new channel towards the bid for mandate
protection and making the People’s votes count. Examples
were Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, among others.
The European Union Election Observer Mission’s (EU
EOM) media monitoring reported that voters were able to
access a variety of views through the media. However,
government-controlled broadcast media failed to comply with
legal requirements on equitable coverage, clearly advantaging
the incumbents at federal or state levels, depending on the
political party in control of government. Such bias remained
essentially unchallenged by the regulatory body (EU, EOM,
2015). Positively, some private media offered relatively
balanced and diverse coverage of election campaigns.
Thus, it can be said that the coverage (from both the
conventional and social media) of the electioneering
campaigns, especially in the immediate period before the
elections, did shape the conduct of the electorate to some
extent.

56
Diplomatic Support and the Threat of Sanctions by the
International Criminal Court (ICC)
There is no doubt that the interest shown in the Nigerian 2015
Elections by the rest of the world contributed immensely to
the reactions of the Nigerian electorate to the process as well
as its outcomes.
Concern had earlier been expressed about the possibility
of Nigeria becoming a failed state by dint of the failure of
governance and the failure of the political elite to agree on the
basic rules of democratic conduct. Many observers, both
foreign and domestic then expressed the concern that the
2015 Elections might be a point at which the nation could
turn for the worst. The utterances, actions and inactions of
those in authority did not also help matters. The polity
became heated by the statements made by some highly placed
persons and some elements in society to the effect that if a
particular candidate did not win the elections the country
would cease to exist. The international community thus felt a
compelling need to show increased interest in the elections to
forestall the possibility of a systemic breakdown. This was
demonstrated in their material and diplomatic support through
the statements of world leaders who cautioned Nigerian
leaders and reassured the electorate that all would be well.
For example, when a group of civil society groups met
with the Netherlands Ambassador to Nigeria the same
concern was expressed. The Ambassador reiterated the
commitment of the Dutch government and the international
community in fostering good governance in Nigeria. He
regretted the initial postponement of the elections. According
to him, if INEC had fully performed its role by distributing
the PVCs on time, there would be no issues of low PVC
collection; the military would be solely held responsible for
the postponement of the elections. Also speaking on the
support Nigeria had from the international community, the
diplomat stated that the African Union (AU), the European

57
Union (EU) the United Nations Organization (UNO) and the
United States of America (USA) were all watching the
process and that the international community was ready to
take a diplomatic stand against any perceived electoral
manipulation. He also assured the Nigerian civil society
community that the International Criminal Court (ICC) was
already on ground to monitor the elections and check any
incidences of crimes against humanity. The International
Criminal Court (ICC) on its part issued a warning in a
statement through its Chief Prosecutor, Ms. Fatou Bensouda,
which said,

…any person who incites or engages in acts of

violence in the context of the upcoming
elections or otherwise-including by ordering,
inciting, encouraging or contributing to the
commission of crimes that fall within ICC’s
jurisdiction - is liable to prosecution either by
Nigerian courts or by the ICC (Daily
Independent, 2015) .

She also said that:

…violence is not a solution. The conduct and

outcome of election in Nigeria, free from
violence will not only prevent further
instability in the country, but will also send a
clear message that electoral competition does
not have to result in violence and crimes that
shock the conscience of humanity (Daily
Independent, 2015).

President Obama of the United States of America also

joined the fray when he issued a statement about Nigeria’s
preparation for the general elections, urging credible and

58
peaceful polls. In a message, he reminded the people of their
struggle for the country’s independence from colonial rule,
the struggle against military dictatorship and the need to turn
the country’s diversity into a source of strength (Daily
Independent, 2015). Addressing the Nigerian public
specifically, he said,

I call on all Nigerians to peacefully express

your views and to reject the voices of those
who call for violence. And when elections are
free and fair, it is the responsibility of all
citizens to help keep the peace, no matter who
wins (Daily Independent, 2015).

Earlier, the American Ambassador had warned that anyone

who promoted violence during the elections would be banned
from the United States of America. All these statements and
the overall diplomatic support were reassuring to Nigerians.
They could go out to perform their civic responsibility in a
peaceful manner despite the hanging threats of violence.

Violence and Insecurity in the 2015 Elections

The Nigerian political system is constructed in a manner that
produces regular patterns of failed elections. While Nigerians
are generally committed to exercising their civic
responsibilities, including voting for those they want to give
political power to, their political class has developed
systematic techniques for frustrating citizens in their civic
engagement through rigging and electoral fraud. As Alli
(2007) says, “Nigeria’s ruling elite has demonstrated lack of
respect for the most simple of democratic norms. They would
whip up ethnic and religious sentiments to oil the engines of
their political ambition and would care less about the
consequences of unleashing violence on their own
community.” Electoral violence, in its diverse forms, has

59
been one of the most troubling spots of the electoral process
over the years. In whatever form, it poses significant threats
to the quality of democratic participation, competition and
legitimacy and, by logical extension, the overall prospects of
democratic stability and consolidation.
The explanations given for the prevalence of conflicts
are: the existence of weak institutions; the prevalence of a
culture of impunity and the prebendal nature of our politics.
The regularity of this violence is also indicative of more
widespread systemic grievances, such as economic and ethnic
marginalization, etc. Thus, in spite of all warnings both from
within and without, some violence was experienced both in
the period leading up to the elections and on election days.
Before the elections, some Nigerian statesmen, notably
general Abdulsalami Abubakar and Chief Emeka Anyaoku,
succeeded in getting the two leading presidential aspirants,
President Goodluck Jonathan and his challenger,
Muhammadu Buhari, to sign a peace accord promising to
abide by the rules of democratic conduct and accept the
outcome of the elections before the elections. While these
personalities may have seen the need to conduct themselves
in an orderly manner, it was not the case with their supporters
and the political actors at the lower levels, who engaged in
violence and made inflammatory statements, which
precipitated violent acts in some parts of the country.
Nevertheless, the peace accord and other warnings both from
within and without encouraged people to turn out to vote and
protect their votes.
Indeed, as noted before, the violence that characterized
the 2015 Elections was predictable. Even before Election Day,
there had been violent expressions of political rivalry among
stakeholders and the agents of political parties, leading to the
use of thugs, arson, terrorism and other extreme criminal
measures. The use of the army and air force to help to keep
the peace during the elections helped to reduce the level of

60
violence compared to what was witnessed in the 2011
Elections. In spite of that, according to the National Human
Rights Commission, no fewer than 58 people were killed in
election-related violence from December 3, 2014 to February
2015 (Daudu, 2015). In Lagos, 11 incidents were recorded
with two people dead for each incident, an average of 22
people killed over a span of just 52 days. In Kaduna State,
there was, within that period, three incidents and nine killings
and Rivers had six incidents, including the detonation of
explosives and attacks on law courts (Dauda, 2015). Also, in
the Lagos there was the infamous protest by members of the
OPC which crippled business in addition to the harassment of
innocent persons and destruction of billboards belonging to
aspirants of the APC.
On Election Day, it was reported that three persons lost
their lives in Akwa-Ibom State during the governorship and
House of Assembly elections. In Rivers State, four persons
including a soldier were feared dead during the Presidential
and National Assembly elections. During the Presidential and
National Assembly elections in Benue State, five persons
were killed in Benue and the office of the INEC in Logo
Local Government was burnt down with a security man also
burnt inside it in addition to the harassment of several
electoral staff by men of the army in Katsina Ala and Ukum
and Logo Local Government areas. In Kebbi, four people
were killed and two others each in Rivers, and Lagos and one
each in Plateau, Bauchi and Ebonyi.
According to a report by the Centre for Democracy and
Development, over 100 people were killed during the just
concluded elections. These statistics do not include those
deaths that were unreported or those that were premeditated
or politically-motivated assassinations, arson and other
mayhem unleashed on the population by thugs sponsored by
politicians and killings by members of the Boko Haram.

61
 Both the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and the All
Progressives Congress (APC) were accused of deploying
thugs to intimidate opponents and attack party rallies,
convoys, members and offices. Armed attacks increased,
especially in Rivers, Lagos and Kaduna States. The National
Human Rights Commission’s report on pre-election violence
identified 60 incidents and 58 persons killed over a 50-day
period from December 2014. There have been reports of at
least 28 cases of shootings at rallies and convoys, 12 cases of
stoning/mob attacks on campaign convoys, 5 cases of bomb
explosions at party offices and 15 cases of the destruction of
vehicles, bill-boards and other properties of parties (EU
Report, 2015). The major form of organized violence was that
from Boko Haram, which ended up disenfranchising as many
as 1.2m Nigerians from the north-eastern part of the country.
All these forms of violence from the pre-election to election
days had their impact on the elections and their outcomes in
various measures.

Conclusion
A number of lessons have to be learnt and corrections made
in our electoral process going into the future. These lessons
have to be learnt from the identified flaws both on the part of
the electoral body, the political parties and the citizenry, as
we continue to make efforts to consolidate our democracy to
hold leaders accountable through more credible elections. The
voter is at the centre of any democratic attainment and greater
attention has to be paid to their concerns in any electoral
process.
Making sense of elections in Nigeria as a major
component of liberal democracy will require changes in five
areas. First, promoting constitutionalism and the rule of law.
This will guarantee some relative fairness and openness in
electoral matters. As Apter (1973:p111) has noted, “If a
political system is to work, equity must be structurally

62
integrated with order. When a political ceiling is reached and
the system breaks down, then order is not integrated with
equity.” Secondly, ensuring the neutrality and relative
autonomy of the institutional infrastructure of elections, viz-
the electoral body, the judiciary, the press and the police.
Thirdly, empowering civil society in order to act as a
purveyor of democratic values and practices in the country.
Fourthly, augmenting the material poverty of the people,
which often promotes electoral clientilism and servitude and,
finally, addressing the issue of the crisis of accumulation in
Nigeria which makes the capture of state power a priceless
political project for which all tactics, fair and foul are
permissible and in the process, deny voters the right to freely
choose their leaders.
Another area that demands attention is the provision of
civic education and political socialization, especially of
young people. The individual occupies such a central position
in state and society that his reform and education are
intrinsically linked to the emergence of a just and good state.
The various programmes of past regimes such as: The Ethical
Revolution, the War Against Indiscipline (WAI) and the
Mass Mobilization for Social and Economic Reform
(MAMSER), were at least honest recognitions of this all
important fact. (Nwankwo, 2012).
Regular, widespread and far-reaching political
education requires commitment from above and below. From
above are the state and its agencies. From below are the
families and the groups, i.e., NGOs, which broadly defines
and embraces all the organizations operating within the
political space between the state and the family. The religious
groups should also play a role in this regard. They can
conduct voter registration drives in places of worship, lobby
and campaign for legislation that impacts on their members,
educate members about impending legislation and such other
issues that are non-partisan. In such ways they will be

63
contributing in educating the people about governance and
elections.
Lastly, as stated by Olugbenga (in Ejukonemu and Edet,
2011:109), “The credibility of an election is a function of
three major components. These include openness, regularity
and the assurance of a level playing ground for all
candidates.” The Electoral Commission can further improve
on the electoral process to clear all doubts. The country’s
political leaders should move swiftly and institutionalize a
political culture devoid of ethnicity and individualism in
order for us to enjoy the beauty of democracy. There is also a
need for greater voter education to produce enlightened voters.
As Ibeanu (2007) has stated, Nigeria needs voters and not
people who cast ballots. Going further, he also stated, a voter
believes in the process of election, namely: that the process
he/she is engaged in does matter and that their votes count
and that elections can make a difference at all the levels of
society. “In so far as the existence of political parties and
elections are simply periodic events for filling offices, they
will remain as they have always been - hollow rituals,
simulated landslides and direct captures”( Ibeanu, 2007p34).
The INEC and its leadership should in future deploy all
the measures of strategic communications and enlist all the
possible assistance in ensuring effective civic education and
full public awareness about its plans for the safe delivery of
the right to vote, including a credible voter register, access to
permanent voter cards, the safety of election officials and
voters, the counting, collation and announcement of results
with adequate information on contingencies in case of
predictable or foreseeable election-day failures. The
commission may also do well in concluding electoral
arrangements like the delineation of new constituencies well
ahead of elections as well as putting in place a process for the
continuous registration of voters and not just in the period
leading to elections. These would help to improve voter

64
turnout in future elections and ensure that those who are
elected truly have the people’s mandate.
Political parties and civil society organizations should
also engage more in the promotion of civic education and the
promotion of issue-based politics instead of the reliance on
the discussion of persons, character assassination and the
promotion of violence to obtain political mandate. In this way,
the enthusiasm of voters will be raised. They will better
support those who obtain the mandate, abhor violence and
vote out bad leaders in future elections.

References
Adejumobi, S., (2000). Elections in Africa: A fading shadow
of democracy? In Okwudiba, N. (ed.) Government and
politics in Africa - A reader, Harare: AAPS Books.
Akinlotan, I., (2015). Palladium’s endorsement: Voting
Jonathan will doom democracy. The nation Newspaper,
Sunday, February 8.
Alli, W., (2007). Breaking the jinx: The challenges of the
2007 general elections in Nigeria. In Studies in politics
and society. A Journal of the Nigerian Political Science
Association, No. 8, December.
Apam, J., (2011). Political mobilizations in Nigeria: The 2011
Elections and the prospects for democratic consolidation.
In Review of Nigerian Political Economy, Vol. 1, Number
11, July – December 2011.Department of Political
Science and International Relations, University of Abuja,
Nigeria.
Apter, D,. (1973). Political change. London: Frank Cass.
Dauda, J., (2015). Survival of democracy in Nigeria: A
critical review of the 2015 general elections. Text of a
lecture delivered in Lagos and published in the The nation
newspaper, Tuesday, May 26.

65
 December, available at:
http://www.resjournals.com/ERJ Accessed: May 21,
2015.
EU Election Observation Mission Nigeria, (2015). General
elections preliminary statement. Press release issued by
the EU observer mission to the 2015 Elections. Available
at: www.euomnigeria.eu. Accessed: May 21, 2015.
Fadakinte, M., (2013). Civil society, democracy and good
governance in Nigeria: 1999-2012. International Journal
of Modern Social Sciences, Vol. 2, No. 2, Florida USA
ISSN 2169-9917, available at:
www.modernscientificPress.com Accessed: May 21, 2015.
Hassan, I CDD REPORT: Matters arising from voting phase
of Nigeria 2015 Presidential, National Assembly
Elections March 29, 2015 Press Release Accessed: May
21, 2015.
Ibeanu, O., (2007). Introduction: Elections and the
paroxysmal future of democracy in Nigeria. In Jega, A.
and Ibeanu, O. (eds.). Elections and the future of
democracy in Nigeria. NPSA Publication.
Ikhale, E., (2015). How civil society, citizens contribute to
change. Wednesday, May 13. Accessed online: May 21,
2015.
Nwankwo, O. B. C., (2012). The challenges of political
education in contemporary Nigeria: Re-thinking mission
and re-planning strategies. In Education Research Journal,
Vol. 2, No. 12, pp. 392-399,
Patterson, T., (2006). Voter competence. In Craig, S. (ed.).
The electoral challenge: Theory meets practice.
Washington: CQ Press.
Salami, D., (2015). 2015 poll: Nigerian civil society seek
international support for 2015 Elections. February 24,
2015. Accessed online: May 21, 2015.

66
Appendix

ABIA 1,396,162 PLATEAU 2,001,825

ADAMAWA 1,559,012 RIVERS 2,537,590
AKWA IBOM 1,680,759 SOKOTO 1,611,929
ANAMBRA 1,963,173 TARABA 1,340,652
BAUCHI 2,054,125 YOBE 1,099,970
BAYELSA 610,373 ZAMFARA 1,495,717
BENUE 2,015,452 EKITI 732,021
BORNO 1,934,079 ENUGU 1,429,221
CROSS RIVER 1,175,623 FCT 881,472
DELTA 2,275,264 GOMBE 1,120,023
EBONYI 1,074,273 IMO 1,803,030
EDO 1,779,738 JIGAWA 1,831,276
LAGOS 5,822,207 KADUNA 3,407,222
NASARAWA 1,242,667 KANO 4,975,701
NIGER 2,014,317 KATSINA 2,827,943
OGUN 1,829,534 KEBBI 1,470,648
ONDO 1,524,655 KOGI 1,350,883
OSUN 1,407,107 KWARA 1,142,267
TOTAL 68,833,476
OYO 2,415,566
Source: INEC Website

67
 Political Party Finances and the Challenges of
Monitoring Compliance During the 2015 Elections

Dung P. Sha*

Abstract
This article discusses the challenges faced in monitoring the
finances of political parties before, during and after the 2015
General Elections. It posits that there exist national laws on
political finance that stipulate campaign funds limits, the
disclosure of the sources of funds and the declaration of
accounts by political parties. However, these laws are not
implemented because there are institutional capacity
challenges that weaken attempts by the INEC and political
parties to implement the electoral laws on political financing.
This is due to vested interests of politicians and political
parties whose operations are consciously organized outside
the purview of the state regulatory institutions it obstructs the
implementation of the electoral laws. The article concludes
by suggesting that the provisions of the law on political
finance in Nigeria should be implemented by having the
appropriate institutional framework and the political will to
monitor and ensure compliance to the laws.

Introduction
The excessive use of money in politics in Nigeria has been
the subject of discussion amongst scholars and commentators,
who conclude that the role of money in financing politics
introduces unequal opportunities for political actors and
competitors in the field of play (Alexander, 1980; Adetula,
2006; Sha, 2006) The political class through this use of
money converts the political process to a game meant for only

* Dung Pam Sha, PhD. is a Professor in the Department of Political

Science, University of Jos, Nigeria.

68
politicians who have wealth or those who primitively
accumulate wealth and deploy it in competitive politics. In
such a situation, money becomes a significant factor in the
political process, where it is used to bribe officials and induce
voters to support particular candidates. In addition, political
“godfatherism” operates through the use of money and
violence. This is a situation where powerful politicians
control other politicians through funding their political
careers and extract loyalty and monetary benefits from them.
The “god-father is an investor and engages all methods to
protect his political investments” (Sha, 2005; Sha and
Kenneth, forthcoming).
These practices have weakened the democratic process
in the sense that mass participation in politics and in
governance is weakened. Indeed, this often influences
electoral outcomes that primarily suit sectional or private
interests. These practices have led us to also raise issues
regarding compliance to regulations that prevents the use of
money in political processes. There are laws on campaign
fund limits, the disclosure of the sources of political funds
and on remitting accounts to INEC, but there are, however,
few efforts at enforcing the provisions of the law.
This article discusses the challenges that are being
confronted in the monitoring of the finances of political
parties before, during and after the 2015 Elections and also to
make suggestions on how to ensure the effective monitoring
of finances. The paper argues that: (a) there are national laws
on political finance – campaign funds limits, the disclosure of
the sources of funds and the declaration of accounts by
political parties, but the laws are not implemented; (b) there
are institutional capacity challenges (with INEC and political
parties) that weaken attempts at implementing the electoral
law on political financing; (c) the vested interests of
politicians and political parties obstruct the implementation of
the electoral law in the sense that their operations are

69
consciously organized outside the purview of the state
regulatory institutions; (d) the provisions of the law on
political finance should be implemented through the
appropriate institutional framework and the political will to
monitor and ensure compliance of the law.
The article is structured into five sections. The next
section conceptualizes political finance and why it is
important to study it. Section three examines the Nigerian
legal framework on political finance. Section four discusses
the pre-2015 election political party campaign fund
mobilization by political parties and the challenges that
confronted the initial efforts made by INEC in tracking
political party finances. Section five concludes the paper by
examining the lessons derived from the study and policy-
based recommendations.

Political Party Finance

Political party finance is used in this paper to mean the
resources acquired and spent by political parties and electoral
candidates in election processes, including election
campaigns. There are two components of party finance:
income, which is the sum of the resources which candidates
and parties obtain for the political activity at a given point in
time, while expenditure is the sum of the resources which
candidates and parties spend in the conduct of political
activities during and after elections. Political party finance
laws are expected to monitor political party incomes and
expenditures in order to find out whether there are corrupt
links between donor contributions and political favours, as
well as show how corruption occurs through the spending
transactions of political parties and their candidates. In this
case, there is the monitoring of income and expenditure and
the misuse of administrative resources (Open Society Institute,
2005).

70
 The overall aim of monitoring is to contribute to an
environment in which corruption is less prevalent or less
likely to occur by promoting well-targeted reforms of law and
practice. The objectives of monitoring include: first, the
identification of shortcomings in the regulatory framework
governing campaign finance and monitoring the enforcement
of existing regulations. Monitoring helps in assessing how
well the existing legal and institutional framework for
campaign finance functions and to advocate relevant reforms
(Open Society Institute, 2005). Monitoring facilitates the
evaluation of the observation and enforcement of the existing
provisions of a legal framework. It may help in the
determination of whether the existing provisions are (i) too
vague to allow for effective enforcement; (ii) too complicated
to allow for effective enforcement; (iii) too restrictive to be
observed in practice; (iv) adequate but lacking an effective
enforcement framework; and (v) adequate but enforced in a
discriminatory fashion (Open Society Institute, 2005).
Second, monitoring political finance is done in order to
search for evidence of corruption in the political process,
which can be exposed by (a) examining the records of
donations for evidence of fictitious donors; (b) seeking
evidence of third-party spending, i.e., hidden contributions
made by unrecorded donors to a party or a candidate’s
campaign; (c) monitoring donations along with candidate and
party voting and policy records for evidence of political
decisions made in favour of specific donor interests; and (d)
monitoring the use of state resources for campaign purposes
(Open Society Institute, 2005).
Third, monitoring the finances of political parties and
politicians helps in promoting transparency in the campaign
finance system. It can unravel significant discrepancies
between monitored and declared income and expenditure,
which can then be used to generate support for greater
transparency, as well as for a more effective enforcement of

71
existing rules. Disclosure requirements are a prerequisite for
monitoring campaign income (Open Society Institute, 2005).
More specifically, the incomes of political parties are
monitored in order to check the veracity of income
declarations; disclose the identities of individual donors and
find out if elected parties’ or candidates’ political decisions
benefit donors (e.g., a database of awarded public contracts)
(Open Society Institute, 2005: 19). Monitoring expenditure
helps in assessing the accuracy of parties’ income
declarations vis-à-vis expenditure. If monitoring shows that
spending significantly exceeds declared income, this is a clear
indication that parties are covering up income or failing to
report it accurately (Open Society Institute, 2005: 19).
Second, monitoring expenditure reveals third party
spending on campaign services, which parties may use to
circumvent income or spending limits. Third, monitoring
expenditure may yield information to be employed by
regulators in establishing a legal framework and creating a
level political playing field. A lack of restrictions on spending
can result in spiralling campaign costs, which, in turn, can
encourage parties and candidates to engage in corrupt
financing to meet ever-increasing financial demands (Open
Society Institute, 2005: 20).
What is the nature of the political party regulatory
framework in Nigeria? This is what the next section will
focus on, as it examines the legal provisions in the 1999
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the Electoral
Act and other extant laws.

National Laws on Political Party Finance

The legal framework for political party finance in Nigeria is
derived from the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of
Nigeria (as amended). Section 225 provides that every
political party shall publish a statement of its assets and
liabilities. They shall also submit to INEC a detailed annual

72
statement and analysis of its sources of funds and other assets
together with a similar statement of its expenditure. In
addition, political parties are not expected to hold any funds
or other assets outside Nigeria or retain any funds or assets
remitted from outside Nigeria. Funds or assets remitted to
parties from outside Nigeria should be paid over or
transferred to INEC within twenty-one days of receipt with
relevant information regarding the transaction. INEC is also
empowered to direct political parties on the handling of their
records of financial transactions, including the examination of
such records.
Section 226 of the Constitution also provides that:
INEC, shall on a yearly basis, prepare the accounts and
balance sheet of every political party and submit same to the
National Assembly. In preparing this report, INEC has the
power to carry out investigations to enable it to know whether
proper books of accounts and other records have been kept by
the political parties. If INEC comes to a conclusion that
proper books of accounts have not been kept by a political
party, it shall so report.
Section 228 of the Constitutions also provides that the
National Assembly may provide for the punishment of any
person involved in the management or control of any political
party found to have violated any of the provisions of sections
225(3) of the Constitution. Such punishment may include the
disqualification of any person from holding public office on
the ground that such a person has aided a political party in
contravening section 225(3) of this Constitution.
The second regulatory framework is the Electoral Act.
The Act derives its powers from the 1999 Constitution and its
provisions regarding political party finance are also
elaborated and strengthened. Section 88 of the Act states that
no political party shall hold or possess any fund outside
Nigeria or retain any fund or other asset remitted to it from
outside in contravention of the provision that specifies the

73
maximum election expenses to be incurred by a candidate. A
violator of these provisions will be guilty of an offence and
shall forfeit the funds or assets to the Commission and on
conviction shall be liable to a fine of not less than N500,
000.00.
Section 89 requires each political party to submit to
INEC a detailed annual statement of Assets and Liabilities
and the analysis of its sources of funds and other assets in
addition to the statement of its expenditure yearly. In addition,
every political party shall grant access to any officer
authorized by INEC for the purpose of examining its records
and audited accounts.
Section 90 and 91 of the Act empowers INEC to place
limits on the amount of money or other assets, which an
individual or group of persons can contribute to a political
party for its activities. The maximum election expenses to be
incurred by a candidate at: (a) a presidential election shall be
one billion naira (N1, 000,000,000); (b) a governorship
election two hundred million naira (N200, 000,000); (c) a
National Assembly election forty million naira (N40,000,000);
(d) a House of Representatives election twenty million naira
(N20,000,000); (e) a State House of Assembly election ten
million naira (N10,000,000); (f) a chairmanship election to an
Area Council ten million naira (N10,000,000) and (g) a
councillorship election to an Area Council one million naira
(N1,000, 000).
Section 91(9 and 10) specifies that no individual or
other entity shall donate more than one million naira (N1,
000,000) to any candidate. A candidate who acts in
contravention of this section commits an offence and on
conviction shall be liable (a) in case of presidential election to
a maximum fine of N1,000,000.00 or imprisonment of 12
months or both; (b) in the case of a governorship election,
N800,000.00 or imprisonment for 9 months or both; (c) in
case of a senatorial seat election in the National Assembly

74
election, N600,000.00 or imprisonment for 6 months or both;
(d) in the case of a House of Representatives seat election in
the National Assembly election, N500, 000.00 or
imprisonment for 5 months or both; (e) in the case of a State
House of Assembly election, N300,000.00 or 3 months
imprisonment or both; (f) in the case of chairmanship election,
N300,000.00 or 3 months imprisonment or both; and (g) in
the case of councillorship election, N100,000.00 or 1 month
imprisonment or both.
Section 92 (6) provides that any political party that
incurs election expenses beyond the limit stipulated in the
Electoral Act shall be guilty of an offence and liable on
conviction to a maximum fine of N1,000,000.00 and the
forfeiture to the Commission of such an amount by which the
expenses exceed the limit set by the Commission.
Section 93 (1) of the 1999 Constitution provides that no
political party shall accept or keep in its possession any
anonymous monetary or other contributions, gifts and
properties from any source whatsoever. In addition, no party
shall accept any monetary or other contribution exceeding
N100, 000 unless it can identify the source of the money or
other contribution to the Commission. It also specifies that
every political party sponsoring the election of a candidate
shall, within three months after the announcement of the
results of the election, file a report of the contributions made
by individuals and entities to the Commission.
The third regulatory framework for political party
financing is the Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA).
The companies act has been designed to guide companies
doing business in Nigeria and with Nigerians. The law
equally prescribes sanction for the breaches of the regulations.
Section 38 (2) of the Companies and Allied Matters Act
(CAMA), for instance, outlaws corporate bodies from making
donations to political parties. The section specifically
provides that “a company shall not have or exercise power

75
either directly or indirectly to make a donation or gift of any
of its property or funds to a political party or political
association, or for any political purpose; and if any company,
in breach of this subsection makes any donation or gift of its
property to a political party, or political association, or for
any political purpose, the officers in default and any member
who voted for the breach shall be jointly and severally liable
to refund to the company the sum or value of the donation or
gift and in addition, the company and every such officer or
member shall be guilty of an offence and liable to a fine equal
to the amount or value of the donation or gift.” The next
section attempts to discuss some of the political events which
show clearly that the political party finance laws are far from
being observed by political parties and politicians.

The Pre-2015 Election Political Party Campaign Fund

Mobilization
Prior to the 2015 Elections, all the registered political parties
made frantic efforts at generating funds for their political
campaigns and these funds came from a variety of sources.
For the purpose of this study, we shall use the examples of
the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and the All
Progressives Congress (APC). The PDP held its fund-raising
for the electioneering campaign on 20 December, 2014 and
the donors are shown in Table 1.

76
Table 1: Donors at People’s Democratic Party Campaign
Launch
S/No. Donor by Sector Amount Donated (N)
1. Oil and gas 5 billion
2. Roads and Construction 560 million
3. Power 500 million
4. Transport and Aviation 1 billion
5. Food and Agriculture 500 million
6. Real Estate 4 billion
7. Automotive Association 450million
8. Tunde Ayeni and Co. 2 billion
9. Jerry Gana and Friends 5 billion
10. PDP Governors 1.05 billion
Source: Olalekan Adetayo, December 21, 2014,
http://www.punchng.com/news/govs-businessmen-others-donate-n21-
27bn-to-jonathan/

It should be noted that there were anonymous donors

who preferred to make contributions under these associations
and there were those who made contributions under a
committee of friends. The following report was made from
the fund-raising dinner:

77
 Box 1
Governors, Businessmen, others Donate N21.27bn to Jonathan
December 21, 2014
President Goodluck Jonathan’s re-election bid received a major boost on
Saturday, as businessmen, multinational organizations, interest groups and
individuals donated the sum of N21.27bn to support his campaign for the
2015 presidential election. The naira rain was at the People’s Democratic
Party Fund Raising Dinner held at the old Banquet Hall of the Presidential
Villa, Abuja.
The chairman of the occasion, Mr. Tunde Ayeni, set the ball rolling when
he announced a donation of N2bn. He said the sum consisted of N1bn
donated by him and his partner and another N1bn contributed by their
unnamed friends.
Players in the oil and gas sector announced a donation of N5bn; those in
real estate and building donated N4bn; transport and aviation, N1bn; food
and agriculture, N500m; Power, N500m; construction, N310m; road
construction, N250m; national automotive association, N450m and
Shelter Development Limited, N250m. The chairman of the fund raising
committee, Prof. Jerry Gana, said his friends and associates in the power
sector were donating N5bn. The PDP Governors Forum announced a total
donation of N1.05billion. The Bauchi State Governor, Isa Yuguda, who
spoke on behalf of the PDP governors, said each 21 of them would donate
N50m each.
The SIFAX Group announced a N100m donation, while PDP stakeholders
in Rivers State supported Jonathan’s bid with N50m. The 15 states on the
board of the Niger Delta Development Commission donated a total of
N15million, among other donations. Several private individuals also gave
donations.
Mr. Joseph Makanju, representative of the Chief Fund Raiser and
Chairman of the Dangote Group, Aliko Dangote, said his principal, who
was outside the country, did not leave a mandate. He, however, promised
that as soon as Dangote returned to the country, he would personally see
the National Chairman of the PDP, Adamu Mu’azu, to offer his support.
Makanju assured those at the event that his principal would justify his
position as the Chief Fund Raiser with his donation.
Source: http://www.punchng.com/news/govs-businessmen-others-donate-
n21-27bn-to-jonathan/

78
 The funds generated by the APC during its campaign
launch were N118million as at 8th January, 2014. This
amount must have increased tremendously after more
governors and members of the corporate sector joined the
party. The party adopted the use of scratch cards for the
donations. This method and approach made it difficult for
researchers and the press to know those who made those
contributions. The party gave the impression that the poor and
"ordinary" Nigerians were the major donors. But it is clear
that the poor Nigerians who cannot eat three good meals in a
day cannot be the donors of these millions. The donors would
have included politicians, contractors, state governors, oil
bloc owners and the importers of fuel who were in the
opposition or those who were in the ruling party, but were not
sure which way the electoral outcomes were to go, made
clandestine remittances to the APC (interview with a civil
society activist Abuja, 15th January, 2015) .
Both parties indeed violated the laws of the land
regarding political party financing in the following ways:
1. By Section 153 of the Electoral Act, INEC has powers to
make rules and regulations for the full implementation of
the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended). Pursuant to the
above powers, INEC enacted the Guidelines and
Regulations for Political Parties 2013. By Section 11 (b),
the guidelines require all the candidates to notify INEC of
all the events for the purpose of raising funds towards
their campaigns at least seven days to the event. It is
reported that no notice of the fund-raising was given to
INEC by the political parties and there was no INEC
representative at the events (Onyekpere, 2015).
2. It was also reported that state governors made
contributions at the fund-raising. Their donations infringe
section 100 (2) of the Electoral Act, which requires that
government and its agencies shall not be used to the
advantage or disadvantage of any political party or

79
 candidate in an election. What is worrisome is the fact
that these funds were state funds for the provision of
welfare and development, but were used for political
campaigns (Onyekpere, 2015).
3. The donations by the states on the board of the Niger
Delta Development Commission, in the case of the PDP,
is money coming from the coffers of a public agency,
which was used to campaign for a political party. These
are amounts misappropriated for the use of political
parties (Onyekpere, 2015).
4. The anonymous donations from the oil and gas sector,
real estate and building, transport and aviation, food and
agriculture, power, construction and road construction
violated section 93 (1) of the Electoral Act, which states
that no political party shall accept or keep in its
possession any anonymous monetary or other
contributions, gifts, properties, etc. from any source
whatsoever. Section 14 of the 2013 Guidelines also bars
candidates from accepting or keeping anonymous
donations, gifts or properties from any source whatsoever.
From both the PDP and the APC, there were anonymous
donations and this violated the electoral laws (Onyekpere,
2015).
5. Private foreign or national companies who made
contributions to the campaign funds of political parties
violated section 38 (2) of the Companies and Allied
Matters Act (CAMA), which prohibits corporate bodies
from making contributions to political parties (Onyekpere,
2015).

Initial Efforts at Tracking Political Party Finance and

Associated Challenges
The efforts made by INEC reported that “2015 was the first
time INEC was monitoring campaign finance.” The Interim
Report on Campaign and Party Finance Tracking for the 2015

80
General Elections, which gave the breakdown of the
candidates monitored in Table 2 below, shows that 8,173
candidates were monitored.

Table 2: Summary of the Candidates Monitored

Category of Candidates Number
Presidential 14
Senatorial 738
House of Representatives 1,759
Governorship 380
House of Assembly 5,282
Grand total 8,173
Source: The Interim Report on Campaign and Party Finance
Tracking for 2015 General Elections, INEC, 2015.

The monitoring was made possible through the

organization of methodology workshops that were designed
to provide skills to staff who were involved. The Election
Officers (Eos) monitored the exercise at the LGA level, while
the EPM staff monitored at other levels. The exercise covered
all the elections - House of Assembly, Senate, House of
Representatives, gubernatorial and presidential candidates
(Momoh, 2015).
The limitation of tracking political party finance as
pointed out by the Report includes the hostility exhibited by
the political parties to INEC, whose role is that of
ascertaining their compliance or contravention of the electoral
law. There is unwillingness on the part of political parties to
disclose their campaign itineraries to INEC. There are cases
where political party campaigns were often held outside the
7am - 8pm time frame. This made it extremely difficult for
the INEC to track these political events (Momoh, 2015).
The Report also noted gaps and differences between
candidates and political parties on fund-raising and campaign

81
expenditure. The candidates may generate funds and the
information may not be known to the party and the party can
do same. This makes accountability and tracking such funds
difficult. Furthermore, there are multi-layer campaigns by
political parties, candidates, the associates of candidates and
campaign teams at wards, local, states and national levels.
These sometimes take place simultaneously and some in
clandestine settings and locations. Some of these
environments are unfriendly as far as security is concerned.
This makes it difficult for INEC to follow and track (Momoh,
2015).
Similarly, there are multiple layers of inducement, in
cash and kind, by both givers and recipients. Tracking
inducement at political rallies, events and direct contact with
voters can be difficult. The methods and styles of
inducements are complex and often covert. This made it
demanding for INEC to track. The phenomenon of vote
buying is a growing characteristic of the Nigerian political
environment. This is now referred to as the “politics of the
belly” or “stomach infrastructure”. This phenomenon is
usually carried out by government officials in the name of
delivering services to citizens, but the ultimate goal is that of
buying votes from the electorate. INEC found it challenging
to track this type of political transaction (Momoh, 2015).
The six months regulation mandating political parties to
fill and submit the Political Party Transaction Form (PPTF) is
too long a period. This is because the parties may have lost
track of the details of transactions, given the fact that they had
not been used to these transactions. This length of period
means that INEC will have no data to work with. It is also
observed that the INEC Electoral Monitoring Unit (EPM)
does not have adequate personnel and enough funding to
conduct these complex monitoring exercises. Finally, the
prosecution for the violation of CAMA is the prerogative of
Corporate Affairs Commission and not INEC. This makes

82
tracking of compliance or contravention by INEC
meaningless if the powers of prosecution are located in a
different body (Momoh, 2015).
It is crucial at this point to try to answer the following
questions: Is the legal framework ideal for the
implementation of the party finance law? Are some of the
existing provisions of the laws vague to allow for effective
enforcement? Are the laws complicated to allow for effective
enforcement? Are the laws restrictive to be observed in
practice? Are the provisions lacking an effective enforcement
framework or are they enforced in a discriminatory fashion?
These questions can be answered only when there are
concerted efforts in the implementation of the law. At the
moment, INEC has not tested the law to determine its
efficacy and to know which actors will support or resist
implementation. However, the first effort made by INEC
shows the areas of possible challenge.
When follow-up steps are taken by INEC and other
related agencies towards the enforcement of these provisions,
it is clear that better experience can be derived by political
stakeholders. It is clear from this first experiment that there is
limited capacity on the part of INEC to carry out this
responsibility. The operational methods of political parties
and politicians which circumvent the provisions of the law
are also sophisticated.

Conclusions
From the above discussion, we argue that:
(a) there are national laws on political finance – campaign
funds limits, the disclosure of the sources of funds and the
declaration of accounts by political parties, but the laws
are not implemented. The monitoring attempt by INEC
tended to focus more on the expenditure component of
party financing rather than both income and expenditure.

83
(b) There are institutional capacity challenges with INEC and
political parties that weaken attempts in the
implementation of the electoral law on political financing.
INEC has little capacity to handle this finance tracking
responsibility. This explains why the Justice Uwais
Electoral Reform Report recommended the unbundling of
INEC to make it function well in political finance
monitoring, amongst others. The call for the unbundling
of INEC is a call for a separate commission to be charged
with the monitoring of political party finances.
(c) The vested interests of politicians and political parties
obstruct the implementation of the electoral law in the
sense that their operations are consciously organized
outside the purview of the state regulatory institutions.
There is, therefore, resistance on the part of politicians
and political parties in complying with the provisions of
the law on party finance, particularly those on the
disclosure of sources, the declaration of expenditure and
the observance of campaign limits.
(d) There are problems with the election legislations. Some of
the existing provisions of the laws are too vague to allow
for effective enforcement; while others are too
complicated to allow for effective enforcement. Some are
restrictive to be observed in practice. Most of the
provisions are adequate but are either lacking an effective
enforcement framework or it is enforced in a
discriminatory fashion.

(e) The provisions of the law on political finance must be

implemented by having the appropriate institutional
framework and the political will to monitor and ensure
compliance.

84
Public Policy Recommendations
The report offered some suggestions for remedying the
situation and these include:
(i) The need for both pre-election financing and campaigns
to be captured by monitors, as attention is paid to the
monitoring of Election Day transactions
(ii) The need for a pre-briefing submission of PPTF series to
ensure that political parties understand the contents and
requirements in order to ensure substantial compliance of
the regulations and
(iii) The need for focal persons of political parties, especially
treasurers at state and LGAs levels, to be trained in the
techniques of responding to INEC tracking requirements.
In addition, it is expected that (iv) INEC should be
empowered to prosecute the violators of campaign
finance regulations. In the same vein, strict penalty, such
as vacating a seat if one is discovered to have made false
claims, declaration or disclosure;
(v) INEC needs to develop a framework of cooperation with
Inter-party Advisory Committee (IPAC) to carry out
advocacy for transparent campaign finances;
(vi) INEC needs to cooperate with the financial sector,
especially banks, in disclosing cash flows and
withdrawals by political parties and members and
(vii) There is the need for more whistle-blowers to engage in
activities around the issue of political party financing
(Momoh, 2015).
The author is also in fundamental agreement with the
recommendations contained in the Interim Report quoted
extensively above. The following recommendations are also
offered for the strengthening of the electoral process and the
entire system to ensure a level-playing ground for political
competitors. This is because non-compliance with election
regulations in respect of political party finances has led to the
high-jacking of the electoral process by big business-men,

85
politicians and political parties. This capture has given them
extraordinary influence in the formulation of laws,
regulations and government policies, which are often
designed to their advantage. The quality of democracy is
adversely affected in the process.
The author therefore suggests that the National
Assembly and the other organs of government should do the
following:

1. Creation of a specialized regulatory body with the capacity

to monitor political party finance.
2. If the above is not possible at the moment, there should be
the strengthening of the capacity of INEC to monitor
through (a) the recruitment of specialized staff and (b) the
specialized training and retraining of these staff.
3. If 1 and 2 will not deliver the needed results, there is the
need to out-source the monitoring function of political
finance to private organizations, who are known to have
proven integrity and capacity to perform this function.
4. CSOs should be encouraged and empowered to engage in
monitoring political finance.
5. More innovative approaches to political party finance
tracking should be developed to confront the complex
operations of the competitive Nigerian political
environment.
6. There must be monitoring of both income and expenditure
components of political party finance.
7. There is the need for the education of political party
personnel on political party finance laws and the need to
ensure compliance.
8. There is the need to use the findings of the monitoring
reports to ensure compliance of the law and to strengthen
democracy.

86
References
Adetula, V. O. et.al. (eds.)., (2006). Money, politics and
corruption in Nigeria, Abuja: International Fund for
Electoral Support (IFES), pp. 124 – 132.
Federal Republic of Nigeria, (1999). 1999 Constitution of the
Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended 2010), Abuja:
National Assembly.
Federal Republic of Nigeria, (2010). Electoral act, Abuja:
National Assembly.
Federal Republic of Nigeria, (1990). Companies and allied
matters act (CAMA), Chapter 59. Laws of the Federal
Republic of Nigeria, available at:
http://www.nigerialaw.org/CompaniesAndAlliedMattersA
ct.htm Accessed: December 11, 2015.
Independent National Electoral Commission, (2015). The
interim report on campaign and party finance tracking for
2015 general elections. mimeo, Abuja: INEC 2015: 6).
Olalekan, A. (2014). Governors, businessmen and others
donate N27bn to Jonathan. (December 21),
http://www.punchng.com/news/govs-businessmen-others-
donate-n21-27bn-to-jonathan/ Accessed: December 26,
2015.
Onyekpere, E., (2015). How Jonathan’s campaign donors
violated the law.
http://dailyindependentnig.com/2015/01/09/jonathans-
campaign-donors-violated-law/ Accessed: December 11,
2015.
Sha, D. P. (2005). Too much politics, too little democracy:
Assessing the quality of Nigerian democratic transition
project. Nigerian Journal of Policy and Strategy, Vol. 15,
Nos. 1 and 2, December, pp. 123-141.
Sha, D. P., (2006). Vote buying and the quality of democracy.
In Adetula, V. O. et al (eds.). Money, politics and
corruption in Nigeria, Abuja: International Fund for
Electoral Support (IFES), Chapter 11, pp. 124 – 132.

87
Sha, D. P. and Okoineme, K. A., (forthcoming). Neo-liberal
politics, the state and the question of people’s power in
Nigeria in Samir, A. (ed.)., Democracy and social
progress: lessons from the south. Hanoi: South-South
Solidarity Network.
The Open Society Institute, (2005). Monitoring election
campaign finance - A handbook for NGOs. New York:
Open Society Justice Initiative.

88
 Assessing the Level of Women Participation in the 2015
General Elections

Joy N. Ezeilo*

Abstract
This article assesses the extent of women’s participation in
the 2015 Elections and, in doing so, considers previous
women performances since the transition to civilian rule to
remind us of the gains and setbacks as well as help us to
determine what the critical issues were, and whether these
have changed, particularly in the context of what one may
consider as barriers to women participation in politics in
Nigeria. The article concludes that the great expectation of a
significant increase in the number of elected women in the
2015 Elections has been dashed and that urgent action is,
therefore needed to mainstream gender and enhance
women’s representation, especially by adopting and
implementing affirmative action measures, as articulated in
the national gender policy and other international and
regional normative frameworks.

Introduction
Women’s equal participation in decision
making is not only a demand for justice or
democracy, but can also be seen as a necessary
condition for women’s interests to be taken
into account. Without the perspective of
women at all the levels of decision-making,
the goals of equality, development and peace

* Joy N. Ezeilo is a professor in the Department of Public and Private

Law, Faculty of Law, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, Nigeria.

89
 cannot be achieved (The Beijing Platform for
Action, 1995 Paragraph 181).

States Parties shall take specific positive action

to promote participative governance and the
equal participation of women in the political
life of their countries through affirmative
action, enabling national legislation and other
measures to ensure that: (a)women participate
without any discrimination in all elections; and
(b) women are represented equally at all levels
with men in all electoral processes…. (Article
9 of the Protocol to the African Charter on
Human and People’s Rights on the Rights of
Women in Africa).

Political participation for women can be at different

levels, whether formal or informal. At the formal level, it
envisages women’s active participation in politics, being part
of political leadership, setting political agenda and also vying
for political representation. At another and mostly informal
level, it signifies women’s participation as part of the
electorate and taking part in a range of democratic activities,
including but not limited to registering as voters, going out on
Election Day to vote, participating in discussion and political
debate, lobbying and activism around elections and
demanding accountability from political leaders. Although
women’s participation at both the formal and informal levels
is imperative for the survival of any democracy project, this
paper will be more concerned with women’s participation at
formal level since that is where we have visible democratic
deficits.
Unarguably, women have participated actively as voters
in all elections, following the general franchise to vote
throughout Nigeria now constitutionally guaranteed. In the

90
just concluded elections, we listened to and viewed stories in
the media of pregnant and nursing mothers queuing for hours
to vote. There was also the fascinating case in Sokoto during
the presidential election on April 12, 2015 where a pregnant
woman went into labour while waiting to vote and still went
back to vote immediately after she safely delivered her baby.
These are heroic feats signifying the political awareness and
increasing participation of women in political activities.
Despite the lack of sex disaggregated data on voting
patterns that would have revealed whether more women or
men voted in elections, there is a strong perception that
women out-vote men in elections. Notwithstanding, there is
unanimity when it comes to women’s political representation
and leadership which is that they have been marginalized in
both elective and appointive positions, hence, the need to
focus on women’s qualitative participation for substantive
representation and political leadership within political parties
in elective office and beyond.
Women in Nigeria had the right to vote at the time as
men did in 1956, though women resident in the north were
disenfranchised in 1957 by the opposition of northern
politicians on religious grounds, but the franchise was
returned in 1976. Despite the constitutionally-guaranteed
right to vote, women’s role in politics is still limited. Women
have never been legally excluded from any high position in
the governments since after independence, but they have held
few significant political offices.
Under Nigerian law, women have the constitutional
right to participate in politics (The Constitution of the Federal
Republic of Nigeria, 1999, Section 40). Further, the principles
of state policy (The Constitution of the Federal Republic of
Nigeria, 1999, Chapter II, Section 40) stated as one of its
political objectives the promotion of national integration and
the prohibition of discrimination based on sex and status. By
Section 77(2) of the Constitution, “Every citizen of Nigeria

91
who has attained the age of 18 years residing in Nigeria at the
time of the registration of voters for purposes of election to a
legislative house, shall be entitled to be registered as a voter
for that election.” In other words, women have the right to
vote and be voted for (see sections 106, 131 and 177 for
registration as a voter for election to the House of Assembly
of a state, the Presidency and state governorship,
respectively). Furthermore, section 42 of the 1999
Constitution enunciates the principle of non-discrimination
and the equality of the sexes. From these provisions, one
tends to conclude that women in Nigeria have their political
rights guaranteed. However, political rights are much more
encompassing than the mere right to vote and be voted for. It
entails participation in politics, governance and decision
making in general.
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW, 1979) in articles 7
and 8 enjoins State parties to take all the appropriate actions
to eliminate discrimination against women in the political and
public life of the country and, in particular, shall ensure to
women, on equal terms with men, the right to vote in all
elections and public referenda and to be eligible for election
to all publicly elected bodies (see Article 7(a) – (c) of
CEDAW).
The right of women to represent their governments at
the international level and to participate in the work of
international organizations is equally guaranteed (see
Nigerian NGO CEDAW Coalition and WACOL, CEDAW
and Accountability to Gender Equality in Nigeria (Shadow
Report to the CEDAW Committee 41st Session, 2008: 35-40).
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)
stipulates that everyone has the right to take part in the
government of their country directly or through freely chosen
representatives. The African Charter on Human and Peoples
Rights (1981) not only reinforced these rights, especially the

92
right to freedom from discrimination, but also expanded
gender-specific rights in its Protocol (2003) on the Rights of
Women in Africa. Thus, the right to participation in the
political and decision-making process is guaranteed and state
parties are urged to take specific positive action to promote
participative governance and the equal participation of
women in the political life of their countries through
affirmative action, enabling national legislation and other
measures (Article 9 of the Protocol to the African Charter on
the Rights of Women in Africa).
Articles 4 and 3 of CEDAW encourage state parties to
adopt temporary special measures aimed at accelerating de
facto equality between men and women in the political, social,
economic and cultural fields. This is the effect of a combined
reading of Articles 3 and 4 of CEDAW. Since Nigeria is a
State Party to both CEDAW, which it ratified on June 13,
1985 and has been relatively regular in its report to the
CEDAW Committee and the Protocol to the African Charter
on the Rights of Women, which Nigeria ratified on December
16, 2004, it is under an obligation to take all the appropriate
measures to eliminate discrimination against women in
political and public life.
On May 29, 1999, Nigeria completed its transition
programme that enthroned democracy after several years of
military dictatorships and political and economic crises. The
successful conduct of the 1999 election marked the beginning
of moving from transition to transformation. However,
Nigeria is still battling to cultivate a democratic culture that
will transform the political terrain and the participation of all
the stakeholders, especially women and the youth. Military
rule and the militarization of the state did not create an
enabling environment for women’s political participation.
Unfortunately, women have not fared better even in the
present democratic dispensation, even though they were

93
responsible for an estimated 27 million votes in the 1998/99
elections.
There is evidence that even educated women continue
to have little interest in political matters and where the
interest is shown, they pursue different political goals mainly.
Women have lower political awareness and lesser ability and
inclination to participate actively in the political system. Thus,
they cannot influence policy formation on a regular basis. For
the grassroots women, it is even worse. Most women’s
voluntary associations are religious, economic or social
welfare-oriented, rather than political in nature. Women’s
associations, until recently, have not had raising the
consciousness of women or organizing them into large
numbers as their objectives but to support changes in
women’s roles that will lead to a more active participation in
national life, excluding politics. For those in the rural areas,
even the active participation in other spheres is found wanting.
The purdah tradition of Muslim communities and the
lower level of employment for women in such places limit
their political participation and attendance at meetings outside
the home. Khalid attributed the practice of purdah with
ingrained male-held definitions of gender in traditional Hausa
culture as part of the barriers to women’s participation in
public life (Jega et al, 2002:125). Many women do not vote
and in the instances where they do, they tend to cast their
votes in line with what their husbands say. In Nigeria, the
1979 election was the first time that most Muslim women
from the north had the opportunity to vote. There was a large
turnout but they voted where the men wanted them to. This
trend of affairs is the same even in southern Nigeria where
prevailing cultural attitudes treat women as minors or mini-
persons that should not be trusted with leadership positions.
Women have been wooed at election time, but mainly as
voters, and not encouraged further to seek elective office.
Suffrage for most women and for the most part, has not gone

94
beyond casting a ballot in an election. The process of
governance and the making of an efficient, responsive and
accountable government by the elected have not been issues
to reckon with by the governed, particularly grassroots
women. The question then, and which will be discussed later
is, what then can we do to overcome these obstacles and
ensure the effective participation of women in governance
and the decision-making process in Nigeria?
Lately, however, more women are getting involved in
politics, but the percentage, as compared to men, is still
unimpressive after 50 years of independence and at least two
decades of democratic governance. The First-Past-the-Post
electoral system practised in Nigeria does not allow
proportional representation at any level of the political
arrangement. Candidates must be nominated by their parties
through primary elections and must come under the party
platform as independent candidacy is not legally recognizable
(note that the Electoral Act 2010, No. 6 as Amended in 2011
has anticipated that this may become recognized in future and
has, therefore, mentioned independent candidates in some of
the provision. For example, see Section 90 on the INEC
power to limit contribution to a political party or to an
independent candidate. The primary election is a major
roadblock to women’s quest for elective post, as most of their
political ambitions are terminated at that level, especially in
the big parties with electoral prospects.

Women’s Performance in Previous Elections: 1999- 2011

An appraisal of women in politics and decision-making
positions in Nigeria and the nature and degree of their
involvement and participation show that women in Nigeria
are politically marginalized and, as such, under-represented in
power. In 1999, at the first transitional election from military
to civilian rule, the number of women elected into National
and State Parliaments was as follows: National Assembly: 12

95
out of 360 in the House of Representatives, representing 3.33
% and 3 out of 109 in the Senate, representing (2.75 %). State
Houses of Assembly had only 12 women in the 36 states of
the federation, amounting to a mere 1.21%. The year 2003
recorded some increase, as more women were elected into the
National Assembly: House of Representatives had 21 elected
women out of 360, representing 5.83 %; 4 out of 109 into the
Senate, representing 3.7 % and States Houses of Assembly
jumped from 12 in 1999 to 38, representing 3.84 % in terms
of gender ratio to elected males (WACOL, 2003, 2005).
In 2007, there were some marginal gains by women into
elective positions. The gender audit of those elected into the
parliament nationwide shows that the Senate had 9 females
out of 109 seats (7.33 %); House of Representatives, 23 out
of 360, representing 6.38 % while State Houses of Assembly
elected 52, representing 5.25 % as against 38 in 2003
(WACOL, 2008: 35-38). Furthermore, 6 women were elected
as deputy governors as opposed to two in 2003.
However, the position of governor still appears to be off
limits for women, so also that of vice president and president.
The result of the 2011 Elections is dismal and reveals that at
the Senate, women won only 8 seats out of 109 and 25 out of
360 seats at the House of Representatives; representing a
mere 7 percent respectively in both Houses of National
Assembly. Across the 36 states of Nigeria, women won a
total of 69 seats at Houses of Assembly out of the available
990 seats contested for in the election, representing
approximately 7 %. Overall, women’s representation after the
2011 Elections stood poorly at seven percent.
Statistical information on the 2011 Elections reveals
that only 909 female candidates, out of 10,037, representing a
mere 9.1%, were successful at their respective party primaries
elections and won nominations to stand for the election
proper. At the conclusion of the elections, only 101 out of this
909 female candidates won their seats at the National and

96
State Parliaments, representing a mere 6.4% at the Senate and
7% at both the House of Representatives and State Houses of
Assembly. In effect, women’s representation in Nigeria is less
than 10 percent. This is a far cry from the 35 percent
recognized in the National Gender Policy. The problem of
lack of credible elections has further worsened women’s
chances of running for office and winning elections. Nigerian
women have no confidence in the country’s electoral process
and are of the view that, without significant reforms in this
sector, they will continue to be under-represented in power
and decision-making positions.

Table 1: Number of Seats Won by Women in National and

State Parliaments and their Party Affiliations

S/No. Political Senate HOR SHOA Total

Parties Seats
1. ACCORD - 1 - 1
2. CAN 1 6 15 22
3. ANPP - 1 - 1
4. APGA 1 1 6 8
5. CPC - - - -
6. DPP - - - -
7. LP - - 2 2
8. PDP 5 16 46 67
Source: Compiled by the Author, 2011.

97
Note that these figures and party affiliations have changed
following the merger of some parties and also the cross-
carpeting of parliamentarians.

98
 99

99
Table 3: Party Candidates Fielded for the 2011 Elections and
the Gender Ratio of Women to Men

S/ Political Total No. Female % Male %

No Parties Fielded Cand. Ratio Cand. Ratio
. (PP) by Party

1. ACCOR 168 11 6.5% 157 93.5%

D

2. ACN 1347 67 5% 1280 95%

3. ANPP 1293 77 6% 1216 94%

4. APGA 640 78 12.2 562 87.8%

%
5. CPC 1167 64 5.5% 1103 94.5%

6. DPP 187 4 2.1% 183 97.9%

7. LP 775 91 11.7 684 88.3%

%
8. PDP 1510 84 5.6% 1426 94.4%

Source: Compiled by the author

At the end of the 2011 Elections, the number of elected

women in the national parliament decreased in comparison to
their performance in 2007, while that of State Houses of
Assembly increased from 54 to 69, an increase of about 30
percent. Women’s performance in the 2011 Elections was
dismal. Coming on the heels of the increased visibility of
women and agitations for affirmative action of 35%, as provided
for in the National Gender Policy (NGP), it is indicative that the
problem of their under-representation in power is far deeper and
requires structural and systemic reforms if they are to have

100
access to power and decision-making positions. The PDP, as the
ruling party in 2011, produced the then greatest number of
elected women across the country. The gender ratio of the
party’s candidates prior to the election, which stood at 5.5%
female as opposed to 94.5% of men, is extremely low when
compared with other parties with a lesser presence in
government.
These statistics affirm the fact that the political
arrangement, in particular access to power and decision- making
in Nigeria, has significantly excluded female legitimacy, thereby
resulting in democratic deficits. From the 1999 election to date,
we have seen only a marginal increase in the number of women
representatives in elective and appointive positions. The
outcome of the 2011 Nigeria general elections shows, in fact, a
regression. Unfortunately, this downward trend has continued,
as we shall see from the result of the 2015 General Elections.
The increasing rate of the abandonment of political quests
by women aspirants and the high outright-failure rate of the
political campaign projects of women have reinforced the fact
that they are doubly disadvantaged in the political scheme of
affairs. This state of affairs has prompted concerned
persons/actors, including national and international
organizations, to engage with political party leaderships,
politicians, executives and parliamentarians to find a solution.
The UN Women, Abuja Nigeria, for example, recently
championed the development and validation of a strategic
framework for political parties to ensure the implementation of
the 35 percent affirmative action, as contained in the National
Gender Policy of 2007. The substance of this document
advocates, amongst others, for the adoption of voluntary party
quotas that would change the current status quo and increase
significantly women’s representation in both the elective and
appointive positions in Nigeria.
INEC is not unmindful of this development and has
advocated in its new Gender Policy of 2014 (IGP: 2014) support
to create an enabling legislative environment to achieve gender
101
equality and bridge the gaps in political representation in
elective posts at all the electoral levels. Further, the IGP seeks to
encourage gender equity and balance within political parties,
especially in the identification of candidates in line with the
provisions of their statutes.
It is pertinent to observe that the Beijing Platform of
Action adopted at the 4th World Conference on Women 1995
recommended that every position, appointive or elective, should
have at least 30 percent reserved for women. The UN
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women enjoins state parties to take positive steps,
including using affirmative action, to ensure equality in political
and public life at the national and international levels. The
National Gender Policy (2006) advocates also for a 35 percent
reservation for women in both elective and appointive positions
(National Gender Policy, 2006). Yet, that benchmark has not
been reached and the forecast does not portend that it may be
achieved in the 2019 elections, unless affirmative action is
legislated.

Women and the 2015 Elections: Facts and Figures

The 2015 Elections has come and gone with a major upset for
the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), the political party that had
been in power since 1999. Notwithstanding this significant
change of government from the party in power – the PDP to the
opposition party of the All Progressives Congress (APC) that
won the election on the mantra of Change, not much has
changed for the Nigerian woman, as the following statistics
reveals.
The election results show that women won, at the National
level, 8 out of 109 (7.3 %) senatorial seats and 20 out of 360 (5.6
%) of the House of Representatives seats. The story at state
parliaments is even worse, as women won only 39 out of 991
available seats. These figures represent a paltry percentage of
3.9. The overall percentage of seats won by women at the
National Assembly is just about 6.5, a decrease from the 2011
102
Elections that stood at seven percent. The 2015 Elections result
is a political assault on Nigerian women despite the increased
number of female political entrants into political parties who
contested political posts as their party candidates.
The retrogression is significant and calls for action to
further study what went wrong and why women politicians and
contestants were unable to consolidate and build on the previous
gains made at certain levels in the past elections. For example, in
2011, State Houses of Assembly seats women won 69, which
represented a 30 percent increase from the 2007 election. In
2015, they lost 30 of those seats, which compute to about a 40
percent loss. The story is the same for the House of
Representatives, which declined from 27 elected women to 20.
Only in the Senate did women manage to maintain the status
quo without gaining or losing any seat. This statistical
information is gloomy and portends danger to our democracy
and development.
Further analysis of the 2015 General Election is a pointer
to the dismal participation of women in that election. For
example, out of the 991 available seats in the state houses of
assembly in the 36 states of the federation, we had only 756
female candidates who contested the general election as their
party’s flag-bearers. Meanwhile, the total number of candidates
was 4945 out of which male candidates were 4179. The
female/male gender ratio, when compared, stood at a mere 15.5
percent. In fact, some states, especially in the north-east and
north-west zones, have very low participation of women as
contestants in the election. The number of candidates for the
election into the states parliaments in the aforementioned zones
was: Katsina (1), Yobe (1), Borno (2), Jigawa (3), Sokoto (3),
Zamfara (5), Gombe (7), Bauchi (7), Kaduna (8), Adamawa (10),
Taraba (15), Kebbi (18) and Kano (19). In fact, the north central
zone did not perform any better except for Kwara, Plateau and
Kogi States who had 32, 27, and 22 female contestants
respectively. Other states from the zone have as follows:

103
Nassarawa only 2 candidates and Benue 11 while Niger fielded
13 women as candidates.
The political party that fielded the greatest number of
female candidates for election at the State House of Assembly
level was the MPPP, which had a total of 85 female contestants
across the country for elective positions. This was followed by
NCP (56), PDP (54) and APC and LP 44 candidates each.
Others are: PPA (39), ID (36), CPP (35), APGA and UDP each
had 31 candidates. This analysis revealed that the party that won
the 2015 General Election was in a distant fourth position in
terms of the number of women it fielded for that election. Most
interestingly is the fact that the PDP, despite losing the general
election, had overall elected more women into elective posts
than the APC. In the Senate, for example, the PDP elected 5
women as opposed to APC’s 3. In the same vein, PDP won 15
out of the 20 seats occupied by women presently in the House of
Representatives, with the APC accounting for a mere 5.

Table 4: Summary of Elected Female Candidates for 2015

General Elections
Positions No. of No. of Female No. of Female
Available Candidates Candidates that
Seats Won
Presidential 1 1 -
Vice Presidential 1 4 -
Senatorial 109 124 8
Governorship 29 24 -
Deputy Governors 29 62 4
House of 360 266 20
Representatives
State Houses of 991 749 39
Assembly
Source: Compiled by the author

104
Table 5: Female Deputy Governors
S/No. Name Party State
1 Hon. Cecilia Ezeilo O. PDP Enugu
2 Yetunde Abosede Onanuga APC Ogun
3 Dr. (Mrs.) Ipalibo Banigo PDP Rivers
4 Adebule Idiat Oluranti APC Lagos
Source: Compiled by the author

Table 6: List of the Female Candidates Who Won the 2015 and
their Political Parties Affiliations Senators

S/ Name Party Senate State Constituency

No.
1 Dr. (Mrs.) PDP Elected Cross Cross Rivers
Rose Oko Rivers North Senatorial
District
2 Mrs. Binta APC Elected Adamawa Adamawa North
Masi Garba Senatorial
District
3 Mrs. Uche PDP Elected Anambra Anambra
Ekwunife Central
Senatorial
District
4 Princess PDP Elected Anambra Anambra North
Stella Oduah Senatorial
District
5 Mrs. Oluremi APC Elected Lagos Lagos Central
Shade Tinubu Senatorial
District
6 Chief (Mrs.) PDP Elected Ekiti Ekiti Central
Raji Rasaki
Fatima
7 Sen. Olujimi PDP Elected Ekiti Ekiti South
Biodun
8 Mrs. APC Elected Oyo Oyo Central
Monsura
Sumonu
Source: Compiled by the author

105
Table 7: House of Representatives

S/ Name Party House State Constituency

No of Reps
.
1 Asabe Vilita APC Elected Borno Gwoza/Dambo/C
Bashir hibok
2 Hajiya PDP Elected Gombe Kattungo/Shongo
Fatima Binta m
3 Bello APC Elected Gombe
DukkuNafada
Hajiya Federal
Aishatu Constituency
Jibril Dukku
4 Princess APC Elected Kwara Ekiti/Irepodun/Isi
Olufunke n/Oke-Ero
Adedoyin Federal
Constituency
5 Princess PDP Elected Enugu Uzouwani/Igboet
Stella Ngwu iti Federal
Constituency
6 Mrs. Elendu PDP Elected Abia Bende Federal
Ukeje Constituency
Nnenna
Ijeoma
7 Hon. PDP Elected Abia Isikwuato/Isukwu
Onyejeocha atoUmuneoche
Nkeruka Federal
Chidubem Constituency
8 Barr. PDP Elected Edo Ovia North East
Omosede Federal
Igbinedion Constituency
Gabriella
9 Betty Apiafi PDP Elected Rivers Abua/Odual/Aho
ada East
10 Blessing PDP Elected Rivers Port-Harcourt II
Nsiegbe
11 Mrs. Ayo APC Elected Osun Ayedaade/Irewol
Hullayat e/Isokan Federal
Omidiran Constituency

106
 12 Mrs. PDP Elected Delta OshimiliAniocha
Onyeamaech Federal
i Mrakpor Constituency
Joan
13 Hon. PDP Elected Bayelsa Ogbia Federal
Sodaguno Constituency
Omoni
14 Barr. (Mrs.) PDP Elected Lagos AjeromiIfelodun
Rita Orji Federal
Constituency
15 Mrs. PDP Elected Anambra Aguta Federal
Eucharia Constituency
Anazodo
16 Evelyn PDP Elected Delta Uvwie/Okpe/Sap
Omavowan ele
Oboro
17 Khadija APC Elected Yobe Gulani/Gujbadam
Bukar aturu/
Ibrahim Tarmuwa

18 Hon. PDP Elected Akwa Eket/Onna/Esit/E

Owoidighe Ibom ket/Ibeno
Ime Ekpoatai
19 Hon. Beni PDP Elected Plateau Langtang
Lar North/Langtang
South
20 Hon. Linda PDP Elected Anambra Onitsha
Ikpeazu North/South/Ogb
aru
Source: Compiled by the author

Table 8: 2015 House of Assembly Candidates

State Total Female % Male % Ratio

Cand. Ratio Cand.
Abia 152 27 17.76 125 82.24
Adamawa 162 10 6.17 152 93.83
AkwaIbom 121 9 7.44 112 92.56
Bauchi 113 7 6.19 106 93.81
Bayelsa 145 9 6.21 136 93.79

107
Benue 91 11 12.09 80 87.91
Borno 124 2 1.61 122 98.39
Cross River 82 10 12.19 72 87.82
Delta 206 37 17.96 169 82.04
Ebonyi 105 14 13.33 91 86.67
Edo 108 12 11.11 96 88.89
Ekiti 132 36 27.27 96 72.73
Enugu 166 68 40.96 98 59.04
Gombe 98 7 7.14 91 92.86
Imo 148 30 20.27 118 79.73
Jigawa 86 3 3.48 83 96.51
Kaduna 116 8 6.90 108 93.10
Kano 239 19 7.95 220 92.05
Katsina 163 1 0.61 162 99.39
Kebbi 108 18 16.67 90 83.33
Kogi 112 22 19.64 90 80.36
Kwara 131 32 24.43 99 75.57
Lagos 118 41 34.75 77 65.25
Nasarawa 124 2 1.61 122 98.39
Niger 117 13 11.11 104 88.89
Ogun 189 42 22.22 147 77.78
Ondo 167 30 17.96 137 82.04
Osun 184 73 39.67 111 60.33
Oyo 239 29 12.13 210 87.87
Plateau 88 27 30.68 61 69.32
Rivers 163 18 11.04 145 88.96
Sokoto 176 3 1.70 173 98.30
Taraba 110 15 13.64 95 86.36
Yobe 70 1 1.43 69 98.57
Zamfara 148 5 3.38 143 96.62
Total 4945 756 15.49 4189 84.51
Source: Compiled by the author

108
Table 9: Total Number of Female State House of Assembly
Candidates for Each Party Across the Nation
S/No. Political Number of
Party Female Candidates
1. APC 44
2. MPPP 85
3. PDP 54
4. APGA 31
5. PPA 39
6. APA 8
7. ACCORD 29
8. NCP 56
9. CPP 35
10. PPN 22
11. AD 13
12. ACPN 16
13. ACD 19
14. UPP 27
15. LP 44
16. SDP 21
17. ADC 29
18. UDP 31
19. ID 36
20. PDC 4
21. KOWA 25
22. AA 6
23. DPP 4
24. NNPP 30
25. PDM 8
26. SDC 1
27. UPN 4
28. HDP 1
Source: Compiled by the author (2015)

109
Barriers to Women Participation in Elections
Since Nigeria’ transition to civil rule, the re-occurring question
has been how to consolidate our nascent democracy. The often
unasked but pertinent question is whether there could be a
consolidation, when more than half of the population has been
excluded from political participation. In Nigeria, women
continue to face numerous barriers hindering their participation
in public life in general. In fact, it has been a democratic Nigeria
without women.
Gender constraints have prevented them from participating
in politics on an equal footing as men. Men have been practising
politics since community life began, both in rural areas and in
cities. On the contrary, women have had less exposure to the
public arena than men. Therefore, community organizations,
cooperatives, trade unions, political parties, private or public
managerial positions, the church and the military are entities that
have been, to large extent, alien spheres of action for women
often relegated to the domestic sphere. The pejorative name
calling and labelling of women politicians as bad women have
not ceased. As recently shared by Senator Aisha Jummai
Alhassan (2015), an APC gubernatorial candidate in the 2015
Taraba governorship election:

As a woman, I was initially called all kinds of

names mostly bad ones, I was heavily criticized
under the guise of religion by my opponents or
their agents, I was blackmailed, etc. All the above
were done to me simply because I am a woman,
not because I did not have the capacity to perform
since everyone in Taraba knew that I was doing
better than all male colleagues (Senators) at that
time and in the past.

110
 Nigerian women have no confidence in the country’s
electoral process and are of the view that, without significant
reform in this sector, women will continue to be
underrepresented in power and decision-making positions.
Notwithstanding the improvement and electoral credibility
brought by Professor Jega’s administration as the INEC
Chairman, there is hardly any election conducted in the country
that has been completely free of irregularities, electoral
malpractices, violence and various degrees of disruption.
Inability to conduct credible elections in Nigeria has been
attributed to the long period of military rule, coupled with weak
democratic institutions and processes and a host of other
historical factors, which have led to the emergence of a political
culture characterized by electoral violence, monetized politics,
low political accountability, the abuse and personalization of
power, a zero sum approach to politics, general apathy towards
elections and low participation of critical segments of the society,
such as women (Electoral Reform Report, 2009). The problem
of a lack of credible election has further worsened women’s
chances of running and winning, since most of them are ill-
equipped to beat men at their own game, so to say.
The zoning/rotation of elective office (that includes party
and public offices) in Nigeria, which is usually based on the
principle of federal character, as provided for in Section 14 (3)
of 1999 Constitution of Nigeria, works against women, since
gender consideration is not one of the indices recognized under
the federal character principle. The main concern is the equitable
allocation of offices/power sharing amongst the 36 states, the six
geo-political zones and ensuring ethnic balance. This zoning and
power sharing formula, alongside the indigene policy that
discriminates against women married out of their states of origin,
remains one of the greatest challenges to women’s quest for
political power in Nigeria.
A major barrier, out of many roadblocks to power that
women are confronted with, is the electoral system of “the First-
Past-the-Post” (FPTP). Women will fare better if this is
111
modified to allow for some level of Proportional
Representations for Legislative Elections. This is because, in the
FPTP, a candidate with the majority of votes is declared the
winner of an election. However, in the Proportional
Representation (PR) System, seats in the legislature are allocated
to the political parties based on the percentage of total votes
scored in an election. In other words, the seats are shared by
different political parties subject to the proportional number of
constituent seats won by each party. The party with the highest
constituent seats enjoys more reserved seats compared to other
political parties. The PR system undoubtedly will favour women,
the youth and minority groups, as well as enhance better
representation overall in the polity.
Thus, it was a welcome development for those interested in
advancing women’s access to power when the Electoral Reform
Committee (ERC) in its report recommended a combination of
First-Past-The-Post and Modified Proportional Representations
for Legislative Elections at the Federal, State and Local
Government levels, with 30% of the seats reserved for women.
It is interesting to note that INEC, in its official report of the
2007 General Election, supported the Proportional
Representation (PR) system of election (INEC, 2007). Although
PR was adopted by the government white paper on electoral
reform and favoured by Nigerian women as a concrete strategy
for ensuring greater inclusiveness and power-sharing between
political parties and interest groups with the potential to
minimize post-election tensions, it was nevertheless rejected by
the Parliament in the revision of both the Electoral Act and
Constitutional Amendment relating thereto. Again, there is no
legal basis for independent candidates, which further reinforces
the centrality of the role played by political parties in Nigeria’s
elections.
Furthermore, varying forms of threats militate against
women’s political participation and these include: political
godfatherism, hijacking political party structure (garrison
politics), mercantile politics that admits only money-bags,
112
political gangsterism aka do-or-die politics, thuggery,
kidnapping and general insecurity in the polity; political party
biases against female candidates, indigeneship contestations, the
zoning and power sharing formula, gender-based political
violence against women, cultural and religious fundamentalism,
family and societal biases against female politicians, use of
pejorative name calling for female politicians and unleashed
propaganda against their person (Ezeilo, 2010).

The Role of Political Parties in Promoting Women’s

Participation
Unarguably, political parties and their modus operandi in
Nigeria constitute a major threat to women’s participation. Yet,
ironically, women can only succeed through it since there is no
room yet for independent candidature. If one may ask: Have
Nigerian political parties played the pivotal role expected of
them in facilitating the political advancement of women? My
answer will be an emphatic No. Again, how do we hold political
parties to account over its female members?
A cursory examination of political parties’ manifestos and
constitutions in Nigeria shows, glaringly, the lack of the political
will to change the status quo and ensure a better gender balance
of power in the political system (Ezeilo, 2009:16). It is common
knowledge that the only position given to women in political
parties’ executive is the so-called “Woman/Women Leader”
position, which smacks of tokenism and shows a reticence in
promoting women to key party positions. Since women’s
political wings have been banned, it appears that women
politicians have no other space for democratic engagement other
than through an individual office of the “Woman Leader”
(Ezeilo, 2011:199).
Nigeria’s political parties have not demonstrated any
serious inclination to implement mechanisms for equal gender
representation within the party structure. Starting from their
manifestos, these parties display a blatant disregard for women
participation and representation in the political process through
113
to the election. They are also very gender insensitive. Today,
there are only a few women in the national executives of all the
political parties. Apart from the nebulous position of “Woman
Leader”, other women who hold any position in the national
executives of the parties hold such posts as director of welfare,
social organizer or ex-officio members. These positions are in
truth politically redundant portfolios or, at best, seasonally
functional offices.
The experiences of women in elections in Nigeria,
especially in 2015, indicate that Nigerian political parties do not
empower or support female aspirants. Yet, the party is the most
central and important arena for political participation and if
women are excluded in its power structure and affirmative
action is not pursued by parties beyond articulating them in their
manifestos and constitutions, then there is a problem for women.
The analysis by the researcher of the gender parity and
participation of women in political parties in Nigeria through a
systematic study of their party constitutions and manifestos
reveals that, although most political parties recognize the role of
women in national development, they still exclude them from
active participation in party politics. Even where women are
involved in decision-making, their membership and participation
in the national and state caucuses of their various parties are
severely limited. Reading through the constitutions and
manifestos of about 50 political parties that have come on board
since the 1999 transition to civilian rule, one cannot but
conclude that our political parties are grossly gender-insensitive.
Right from the use of language, one will at once notice the
gender bias (Ezeilo, 2011a: 45-52). The ‘he’ gender instead of
‘he or she’ reference is the language of gender bias. Some of the
manifestos only have cosmetic plans for women development.
Reading through the welter of manifestos, one is left with the
impression that Nigerian political parties do not understand what
is meant by gender balance; neither are they willing to protect or
promote it to stimulate greater women participation in the
political process.
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 Women’s Aid Collective (WACOL) had, in the run-up to
the 2007 party primaries, conducted Focus Group Discussions
(FGD) with female politicians and aspirants from the south-east
and south-south geo-political zones. Their findings reinforce
what a lot of political observers and analysts have argued, to wit,
that formal institutions are generally male-dominated and
intrinsically male-biased. This is basically true of Nigerian
political parties. Right from the beginning of party politics in
Nigeria, the emergent local political parties have always been an
entirely male affair with women as mere spectators (WACOL,
2009). This ugly disenfranchising situation has largely remained
the same to date.
The recent policy and practice of all the political parties in
Nigeria to exempt women standing for electoral office from
paying any fees has undoubtedly thrown open the door for
increased women participation in politics. In fact, the 2011
Elections recorded the highest number of women aspirants in the
history of elections in Nigeria. Although many did not scale
through the hurdles of party primaries’ First-Past-The-Post
electoral system, nevertheless the number of female candidates
that emerged is still the highest and can be attributed to the
waiver of nomination fees that usually range from $2,000 (N300,
000) for the lowest office of State House of Assembly to about
$100,000 (N10, 000,000) if one aspired for the office of the
President of the country. Obviously women who are less
economically endowed and could not have dared the male
moneybags politicians, took maximum advantage of this policy,
hence the huge number that made incursions into politics and
also took part in party primary elections. The parties themselves
are quick to show this as a good example of their support for
female politicians to access political power. It must be observed
that women were not exempted from the Expression of Interest
form, which is usually cheaper and costs about a tenth of what
nomination fees actually cost.
Of course, unequal access to campaign financing and other
political resources have been implicated in the high failure rate
115
of campaign projects of contemporary women political aspirants.
However, instead of the waiver of nomination fees, serious
consideration should be given to the setting up of funds for
assisting women political aspirants. Again, the political parties
should adopt other practical measures, such as party quotas for
women, the inclusion of at least, 35% affirmative action in its
manifestoes and constitutions and, most importantly, an
accountability mechanism that will ensure its implementation.
From the above discourse, it is logically deducible that
political parties have a duty to enhance women’s participation in
politics, especially at the highest decision and policy-making
bodies of the parties, such as party caucuses, national working
committee, national executive councils, board of trustees, etc.
This will ensure that both men and women tackle issues
affecting women and the nation effectively. It is, therefore,
recommended that parties should be encouraged to respect the
affirmative action included in the national gender policy and
promote gender equity and women participation in politics both
in their objectives, manifestoes and constitutions. Also, there
should be a gender policy desk in all the parties to ensure that all
matters affecting the participation of women are effectively
handled. Parties that excluded women in committees and
national offices should be encouraged to include them in such
offices. Above all, women should form a caucus in their
respective parties to fight for their rights and those of their
constituencies.

Beyond the 2015 Elections and the Way Forward

There have been persistent calls for affirmative action to remedy
the gender gaps in politics, especially in the aftermath of the
Beijing World Women’s Conference of 1995, which popularized
the recommendation of at least 30% representation of women in
power and decision making. The National Gender Policy 2007
has further raised the gender stake by providing for 35%
affirmative action. Previously, CEDAW had called for
affirmative action in all the spheres of life and in favour of
116
women. This was re-echoed by the Protocol to the African
Charter on the Rights of Women in Africa and the Millennium
Development Goals (MDG3: 2000) that set also the agenda of
increasing the proportion of seats women occupy in the
Parliament. Nevertheless, women are far from the actualization
of gender equity or parity in governance.
Despite the several hurdles women in Nigeria have had to
confront in the political arena, some achievements have been
recorded and an increasing number of them are now aspiring and
vying for elective posts. Of course, much more could be
achieved if deliberate action or conscious efforts were put in by
stakeholders, in particular, the political parties.
Consequently, it is imperative that the government must
take a step forward to increase women’s participation in politics.
With the changing global trends, Nigerian women are beginning
to realize that the time has come for them to seek their rightful
place and a fair share in government, commerce, etc. Coupled
with this also is the realization that Nigerian men, themselves
disenfranchised by the military for 29 out of Nigeria’s 55 years
of independence, are not about to hand power over to women on
a platter.
Women are gradually realizing their own capacity to
mobilize and empower themselves, as well as use their
numerical strength to change their situation. This is central to
their political emancipation because for women to win, they
must first seek nomination and, secondly, be able to get other
women to vote for them. These have so far not happened
extensively, but going by the growing number of female
political party card carrying members, the sensitization by
women groups and non-governmental organizational activities
that have women empowerment as their primary focus and target,
a change will not be far in coming. The quantum of this training
and mobilization/ empowerment meetings, forums and
conferences is on the increase and has continued to be so,
following the return of democratic government in Nigeria.

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 Political party quotas and other forms of affirmative action
to mainstream women in the party structure and leadership are
needed. Unarguably, legislative action legalizing affirmative
action will facilitate quick gains in women’s representation. As
Egwu (2003:4) has argued:

Regardless of nomenclature, Affirmative Action

or the use of quota has a salutary effect on the
level of women’s participation in governance,
although its critics point to the danger of
preventing increase in women’s participation
above the quota. The effectiveness of the strategy
is attested to by the number of countries that have
had to adopt it as a means of expanding the
democratic space to women.

The adoption of affirmative action by legislation will

entrench proportional representation and ensure gender
sensitivity in the party nomination process. Furthermore,
eliminating political violence and engaging with traditional and
religious institutions, including cultures opposed to women
leadership is imperative in order to encourage women to take
active role in politics.

Assessing the Level of Women Participation

In assessing the level of women’s participation in politics and
elections in Nigeria, one is persuaded to submit that, as far as
politics and political reform in Nigeria are concerned, gender
and power balance have never been on the front burner of
national discourse. Rather, it has been how to balance power
between multi-ethnic groups - “larger and smaller”, “majority
and the minority” and the six geo-political zones within the
nation state, Nigeria (Ezeilo, 2011). It is time we stopped and
asked what about those that do not wish to be represented by
ethnicity, but on other forms of identification, such as gender.
The federal character principle enshrined in the Constitution
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encourages the scramble for power based on ethnic identity
alone and the constitutional provision that appointment should
be made on the basis of “indigeneship” reiterates that. How can
we go beyond this narrow construction of the Nigerian citizen
based on ethnicity and which ethnic entrepreneurs have
promoted to the detriment of other forms of identification -
gender, class, identity, profession, residence and so on?
A gloss over the examination of political parties’
constitutions and manifestoes in Nigeria glaringly portrays the
lack of political will to change the status quo and ensure a better
gender balance of power in the political system. It is within this
context that the recommendation of the Electoral Reform
Committee becomes significant that political parties should have
20% of women in their governance body. The Electoral Reform
Committee was set up by President Yar’adua on 28th August,
2007 and chaired by the former Chief Judge of Nigeria, Justice
Uwais. Its terms of reference include examining the relevant
provisions of the 1999 Constitution, the Electoral Act and other
legislation that have a bearing on the electoral process and
assessing their impact on the quality and credibility of general
elections. The Committee submitted its report on 12 December,
2008, and up till now the Legislature and the Executive are still
grappling with how to transform some of the report’s
recommendations into laws and policies.
In order to enhance internal democracy in the political
parties, the Justice Uwais Electoral Reform Committee (ERC)
recommended that political parties should give more attention to
the nomination of women and youth as candidates and,
furthermore, that political parties should ensure that women
have equal access to leadership opportunities within party
organizations. To this end, political parties are encouraged to
examine party structures and procedures and remove barriers
that directly or indirectly discriminate against the participation
of women in politics (Electoral Reform Report, 2007). It should
be noted that this recommendation was accepted by the
Presidential Committee that produced the white paper report of
119
February 2009. Of course, without any concrete mechanism for
the operationalization of this recommendation, it will amount to
nothing. It will be at best merely persuasive. Unfortunately, the
National Assembly has failed to take into account the
recommendations of this Committee in the current amendment
of the Electoral Act, 2010.
A few examples from Africa will show that Nigeria is a
laggard in terms of political development of her womenfolk. The
National Parliament in Rwanda today has gained over 50 percent
representation of women. This was made possible through
constitutional reform entrenched in the Constitution of Rwanda
that recognized affirmative action to enhance women’s political
participation. Today, this African country ranks amongst the
world’s best examples of a gendered Parliament alongside some
Nordic countries of Europe. Today, Rwanda, by virtue of an
affirmative action clause in its 2004 Constitution, is the most
gender balanced Parliament in the world given the number of
seats women occupy (IPU, 2008). The South African National
Assembly, which ranked 13th out of 183 countries in a 2005
study by the Inter-Parliamentary Union, has then, and till ten
years ago, 129 of its 400 member as women (OSISA, 2007).
Even Ghana has done better than Nigeria in terms of the
promotion of gender equality agenda. As has been noted, the
1992 Constitution demonstrates that country's commitment to
the rights of women by recognizing gender equality, as per
(Article 17(1) and (2)). Article 17(4) allows for affirmative
action measures. In Article 35(5) and (6), the state has a duty to
remove, through law reform and affirmative action, all forms of
discrimination. The 1992 Constitution in its Directive Principles
of State Policy also enjoined the state to take “appropriate
measures” to “achieve reasonable regional and gender balance in
recruitment and appointment to public offices” (Ezeilo,
2011:521; OSIWA, 2007:31-37).
If a similar action is taken in Nigeria, it will improve
women’s political participation both nationally and
internationally, thereby achieving the goals of CEDAW, as
120
provided in articles 4, 7 and 8, and article 9 of the Protocol to
the African Charter on the Rights of Women in Africa, which
enfranchised women, giving them the right to hold public office
and take part in the formulation of policy.
In the end, it behoves the government through executive,
legislative and judiciary action to be accountable and ensure
gender equality. In fact, the burden of State responsibility
requires that governments take positive measures, including
affirmative action, to redress systemic discrimination that
impedes women’s active participation in power and decision-
making positions.
Unless this is done, Nigerian women’s political
participation will continue to be low, making the implementation
of articles 8 and 9 of CEDAW impossible to realize. Without
strong and powerful women’s institutions at all levels,
mainstreaming women’s concerns in public policies and
programmes will be ineffective.
The peculiarity of Nigeria as a developing nation with hard
grips to traditional, religious and cultural values that relegate the
female gender to a subordinate status calls for a concerted effort
towards women’s empowerment. Since democracy is about
“people’s rule”, with a broad sense of social justice, Nigeria may
yet be far from true democracy with its present gross gender
imbalance in governance. Dividends of democracy are not
achievable with about half of the population of the country
relegated and inactively engaged. This is so because human
resources is the power of development and for any meaningful
development to take place and be sustained, there is the need to
incorporate women who constitute about 50% of the population
of the country into mainstream political and governance roles.
Movements that are promoting greater democracy in political
life must take account of women’s needs and concerns in order
to grow in strength and vitality. To endorse civil and political
rights, without explicitly addressing women’s rights in the
domestic/private sphere and the public/social domain, broadly

121
creates a truncated and ultimately unsustainable democratic
setup.

Conclusion
In concluding this article, I would like to reiterate some few
points that will result in real advancement for women in
democratic governance. The government should implement
affirmative action forthwith within a minimum of 35% of
opportunities in all elective and political appointments, as
contained in the national gender policy and reinforced by the
Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, CEDAW, the
Protocol to the African Charter on Women’s Rights and the
MDG-3, in order to redress the gender imbalances in the polity.
The political parties should adopt “Voluntary Party Quotas” that
are in tandem with existing legal and policy frameworks
abovementioned and, even importantly, strengthen political
commitment for the enforcement of party quotas to increase
women’s access to power. The Independent National Electoral
Commission (INEC), in its monitoring of political parties,
should use gender indices to measure political party compliance
to their manifestos and constitutions. Political parties must be
held accountable to their constitutions and manifestoes. I urge
all the stakeholders to support an enabling legislative
environment to achieve gender equality and bridge the gaps in
political representation in elective posts at all electoral levels.

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 The Media and the 2015 General Elections
in Nigeria
Umaru A. Pate*

Abstract
This article focuses on the media and its role in the 2015
General Elections in Nigeria. It recognizes the media as an
important stakeholder in Nigeria’s electoral process because of
its responsibility to inform educate and mobilize the public
about elections for sustainable democracy. The article reviews
the performance of the media in elections since 1999, with
specific attention on the conduct of the media, especially the
electronic and social media in the March 2015 General
Elections. It highlights the challenges the media encountered in
carrying out its functions arising from the unethical behaviour
of politicians and conclude by recommending increased focus of
the media on changing the existing mind-sets in Nigeria, a
review of the enabling laws of the public broadcast stations to
make them professionally independent and strengthening
regulators, such as the NBC, to enforce the broadcasting code.

Introduction
Regular elections have been holding in Nigeria since the
co u n t ry ’ s re t u rn to de m oc r a cy in 1999 . Th e na t i o n a l
Constitution has provided that general elections must hold into
elective positions at the state and federal levels at the interval of
four years. Accordingly, general elections are held every four
years across the country. Such elections are often accompanied
by a series of activities and high excitement that involved the
media, particularly in widely reporting and advertising of the
candidates, parties and their programmes. Normally, elections
are important news events that are of significant interest to the

* Umaru A. Pate is a Professor in the Department of Mass Communication,

Bayero University, Kano, Nigeria.
126
media because they are events that entail conflicts,
disagreements and tensions. They are important social and
political events that engage the attention of the media as part of
their traditional responsibility of informing, educating and
mobilizing the society for sustainable democracy and
development. In the same vein, the reporting of elections is part
of the surveillance function of the media in which citizens are
educated on the quality of the individual candidates presenting
themselves for elective office and warn the society on any
impending danger in the process. Indeed, the media have
remained a critical element in the organization and holding of
elections in the country.
Enormous literature exists on the conduct of the media in
Nigeria’s elections at various times. While many scholars have
criticized the performance of the media as being often partisan,
non-critical, personality-focused, unethical, elite and urban
centred and highly commercialized, many others have, however,
acknowledged the role of the media in educating and moulding
the opinions of the people during elections and for investigating
and challenging wrong-doing in the process (Omu, 1978;
Ogbondah, 1994; Yusuf, 2001; Nwosu, 2003; Oso, 2010 and
Pogoson, 2015).Thus, in this paper, we shall review the
performance of the media in elections in Nigeria since 1999,
with specific attention on the conduct of the media in the March
2015 General Elections.

The Electoral Process

Holding elections in Nigeria usually involves elaborate
preparations, rancorous exchanges and post-election court cases
that sometimes lasts for a year or longer to conclude. Each
general or national election went through a series of stages that
impinged on the legitimacy and credibility of the outcome. The
steps are:
a. Registration of voters
b. Registration of political parties/political party campaigns

127
 c. Preparations by the electoral body (like the procurement of
electoral materials, recruitment of temporary staff, etc.)
d. Holding elections
e. Post elections (complaints and litigations).
The above steps and arrangements characterized the build
up to the 2015 Elections. Perhaps, one major issue that
distinguished the preparations in 2015 from the earlier periods
was the shifting of the dates for holding the elections at the
instance of the government, “so that it can complete the fight
against the insurgency in the North-east part of the country”.
Understandably, the action was reluctantly and suspiciously
received by many citizens, as indicated in the content of the
press during the period (Arogundade, 2015). Thus, shifting the
dates, the insurgency war and the merger of opposition political
parties and the adoption of the card reader by the Independent
National Electoral Commission (INEC) had, in several ways,
affected the direction, credibility and legitimacy of the elections.
They were characterized by suspicions, complaints, accusations
and counter-accusations and even litigations by various
stakeholders. All of that were generously covered by the media.

The Perception of Elections in Nigeria

Elections and electioneering periods mean different things to
different people in Nigeria. Over time, we have observed,
correctly or not, that Nigerians perceive elections in the country
in the following forms. Equally, too, these perceptions appear
definitive in the conduct of the stakeholders as well as the media:
a. For every election, the end justifies the means.
b. Elections are equal to ‘wars’ that must be won at all costs.
c. In politics, there is no morality. Securing the victory by
whatever means and tricks should be uppermost.
d. Politics is business. Elections provide the opportunity for
interest groups, agencies and individuals to make big
monies.

128
 e. Irrespective of a candidate’s moral, ethical and
performance records, his money and connections are what
can qualify him into a political office
f. All the levels of government and agencies are liable to
illegal behaviours, depending on their levels of interest.
g. The media serve the interests of those in power - their
owners or those who can pay their ways by whatever
means.
h. In elections, politicians insist on “make sure you are not
defeated and you now go to court; but win and be taken to
court”.
i. Political offices are routes for the corrupt acquisition of
wealth. Therefore, it must be paid for heavily by the
seekers, who, in any way, will recoup their electoral
investments in office.
j. Staying in opposition is the least of options. The typical
politician should be in office or relate “well” with
successful ones.

The Media and Elections

The mass media have been very important pillar in the Nigerian
democratic system. With a very wide media landscape covering
conventional, online and social media channels, the country has
over 100 newspapers, magazines and 250 broadcast stations in
addition to numerous online sites. The media sector is vibrant,
diverse and boisterous; and, as in the case of the public
broadcast media, non-critical to the government. Over time,
these channels have played critical roles in the electoral process
by providing costless and reliable details for education and
opinion formation among the voting public, which had
differently adjudged the performance of the media in elections.

129
 For instance, an audience survey by the National
Broadcasting Commission on the Broadcast Media Coverage of
the 2011 General Elections showed that 64% of Nigerians
adjudged the coverage as unfair among the various parties and
candidates as against 34% that rated the performance fair. The
coverage was characterized by partisanship in the public stations,
the high cost of coverage and weak investigative and non-critical
posture in reporting (NBC, 2011).
Similarly, the United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP), in a study of the media coverage of electoral issues in
the 2011 Elections in Nigeria, concluded that: women were
marginalized in media coverage; rural areas were insignificantly
covered and the big three political parties (the People’s
Democratic Party, Action Congress of Nigeria and the All
Nigeria People’s Party) dominated the media space (IMS, 2011).
Similarly, a study by the European Union (EU) on the coverage
of the 2011 Elections revealed the absence of balance towards
the candidates and their parties, since 21 out of the 63 parties
contesting in the elections were insignificantly or merely
mentioned during national television (NTA) prime time
broadcast, as 80% of its coverage of political actors was devoted
to the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and a lowly 5%
to the leading opposition parties, the Action Congress of Nigeria
(ACN) and the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) .
In a similar fashion, the second largest television network
in the country, the AIT, followed a scheme similar to that of the
NTA, while Channels TV offered the most equitable coverage to
political parties and presidential aspirants (NESP, 2011). The
above findings did not differ significantly in the 2015 General
Elections. Stories on the elections received high attention in the
local and international mass media, even though much of the
attention accorded the political parties went to the “two leading
political parties, People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and All
Progressives Congress (APC) which secured more than 91
percent of political parties’ media coverage”.

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 In a study on the coverage of the elections titled:
“Reportage of 2015 Elections: A Monitoring Scorecard of Print
and Online Media” by the Nigerian Press Council (NPC) and the
International Press Centre (IPC) with the support of the United
Nations Development Programme and‎ the Democratic
Governance for Development II (UNDP/DGD II), it was
discovered that, whereas 24 registered parties barely had a little
over eight percent mentioning in the media, both the PDP and
the APC had an overwhelming 91.6 percent mentioning. “For
the six months covered by this report, political parties were used
as sources 8,318 times out of a total of 42,595 sources. The APC
had the highest mention with 3,911 or (47.01 percent) closely
followed by PDP with 3,716 or (44.67 percent). All other 24
political parties shared the remaining (8.4 percent) of mention
with a significant number without mention at all.” The report
also revealed media imbalance in the coverage of gender-related
issues, as male politicians had 95 percent mentioning as sources
of news reportage than their female counterparts, who barely
had five percent.
Evidently, in 2015, all of the parties had received some
coverage, even though like in the previous elections, much of
the focus was on the APC and the PDP. For instance, after the
elections, the American Consulate in Nigeria commended the
performance of the media in offering a platform for the
expression and amplification of ideas by contestants during the
campaign season. The Consul-General, Jeff Hawkins (2015),
said: “The news media, like their peers in other parts of the
world, shoulder a heavy responsibility to inform and educate the
electorate, in some cases placing them in harm’s way. We are
aware that some courageous journalists were injured during the
elections.” Hawkins said that, by providing to the Nigerian
electorate timely, factual, analytical and objective information to
help them to understand the issues and where the candidates
stood, the news media lived up to a universal professional
standard and contributed immensely to a healthy and functioning
democracy in Nigeria.
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 In the build-up to the 2015 General Elections, numerous
national and international organizations like the United Nations
and its organs, the embassies of friendly nations, international
donor agencies, international and local civil society
organizations (CSOs) as well as the National Electoral
Commission and regulatory agencies, such as the National
Broadcasting Commission (NBC) and the Nigerian Press
Council (NPC), had supported or directly organized capacity
building exercises for different categories of media personnel in
the reporting and managing of information during national
elections. The media and its personnel, in addition to the
existing professional code of ethics, received a number of
advisory guidelines and codes that are in line with best practices
on reporting elections and electioneering issues. Widely
circulated in the industry, the guidelines sought to enforce the
professional handling of information in line with the code of
ethics that emphasize truth, balance, fairness and equity to all
the parties and candidates. In a very few cases, in-house brain-
storming sessions were internally held in the media houses.
The National Broadcasting Commission provided an
elaborate guideline on Political Reportage. The media also got
some advisory guides from the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP), the National Orientation Agency, the
Broadcasting Organization of Nigeria, the Independent National
Electoral Commission, the Nigerian Press Council and many
others. However, the availability of these guides did not
significantly prevent professional breaches in the media,
particularly in government-owned and a few of the private
stations. For instance, in the 2011 and 2015 Elections,
independent observers had delivered mixed assessments on the
conduct of the media in the electoral exercise. One of such
observer groups, the Transition Monitoring Group (TMG), an
amalgam of civil society organizations, reported that the media
significantly and widely covered the three elections in 2007,
2011 and 2015(TMG Election Monitoring Report, 2015).

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 The TMG (2015) observed that while some sections of the
media tried to report ethically, professionally and in line with the
Electoral Act, many others were clearly biased, one-sided and
culpable of professional misbehaviour. Specifically, the National
Broadcasting Commission (NBC) had sanctioned thirty-three
radio and television stations during the 2011 Elections for
various professional breaches. Each of the stations was fined
₦500,000 (NAN, April 4, 2011). In the 2015 Elections, the
campaigns got messier with the dissemination of hate campaigns
and the use of foul language on leading broadcast stations like
the Nigerian Television Authority (NTA), the African
Independent Television (AIT) and some national newspapers.
Damaging jingles, documentaries and write-ups against the
leading opposition presidential candidate appeared repeatedly as
advertisements in violation of the basic professional etiquette
and provisions of the Advertising Code.
For instance, the study of the 2015 Elections revealed that
“a total of 117 sensational headlines, incitement and hate
speeches as well as stereotypes were recorded in the six-month
period(of the study) with an average of about 20 per month
across the 12 selected national print media” (Arogundade, 2015).
And, while the campaigns lasted, regulatory agencies like the
National Broadcasting Commission (NBC), the Nigerian Press
Council (NPC) and the Advertising Practitioners Council
(APCON) appeared publicly unable to sanction the individual
media houses involved probably because the ruling party and the
central government were largely responsible for the offensive
advertisements.
The offensive advertisements were not only exchanged
among the two leading presidential candidates, but some were
also directed at the Chairman of the Independent National
Electoral Commission (INEC). For instance, a full page
newspaper advertisement was placed in several newspapers, for
a number of days, sponsored by “Fresh Focus” (Jonathan’s
support group) castigating the Chairman of INEC and
questioning his commitment to free and fair elections because of
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his insistence on using the permanent voters card (PVC) and the
card reader in the 2015 Elections. The advertorial by the “fresh
focus” group questioned the Chairman on the Commission’s
preparedness to hold the election as scheduled.
The political attack by the ruling party and its supporters
took a more negative dimension when the wife of the President,
Mrs. Patience Jonathan, called for the “stoning” of the
opposition when they went to campaign in Calabar (Daily Trust
March, 19, 2015). On another occasion, she belittled the
collective honour and integrity of a section of the country in a
campaign speech in Lokoja, when she uttered some damaging
remarks on the people of the North (Sunday Trust, March 8,
2015). The remarks by Mrs Jonathan instantly turned into a
vicarious liability on the candidate she was campaigning for.
The opposition APC saw it as political capital and placed the
speech in many national newspapers as advertisements.
Correctly or not, the APC interpreted the comments by Mrs
Jonathan as a recipe for war, comparing it to what happened in
Ivory Coast after its election, where the incumbent President
Laurent Gbagbo lost but refused to leave. His wife, Mrs Simone
Gbagbo, was reported to have uttered similar statements in the
pre-election period, which eventually triggered a civil war in the
country after the 2010 Election. Using the Ivorien analogy, the
APC wrote a complaint letter to the International Criminal Court
(ICC) against Mrs Jonathan, for “preaching violence” in her
campaign speech and made loud noises in the local media on the
subject (Sunday Trust, March 8, 2015).
Perhaps, observing the negative trend in the build-up to the
elections, the House of Representatives, through the House
Committee on Information, invited the managers of two
television networks in the country (NTA and AIT) for a hearing
on the drift. The two managers defended their actions in separate
submissions to the House. Specifically, the NTA Director
General, Sola Omole, said, “there was nothing wrong with the
documentaries titled: The Lion of Bourdillon and The Real
Buhari aired by the NTA; that it was not done in bad taste (Daily
134
Trust, March 11, 2015). The Director General averred that,
“there was nothing politically biased about the documentaries…
it was a matter of perception, what you may describe as hate
message, I might not consider it as such. NTA is 100% in
compliance with NBC regulations”.
It was after the declaration of the results of the elections
and the ruling party had lost that the regulatory body, the NBC,
announced that it had sanctioned eighteen broadcast stations for
various acts of violations against the political broadcasting code.
The NBC indicted the Nigerian Television Authority (NTA),
African Independent Television (AIT) and Nigerian Info, among
others, for breaching the sensibilities rules as well as the 24-
hours advertisement prohibition rules. NBC said it was
particularly displeased with the breaches of the rules on the
broadcast of sponsored electoral campaign materials, which
failed to conform to the standards of truth, decency and good
taste and clearly identifying the sponsors of advertisements. The
Nigerian Press Council (2015) had also documented cases of
professional breaches against some publications that bordered on
unfair political behaviours that were disguised as news reports
and delivered a mixed verdict on the conduct and ethical
standing of the press during the electioneering period. The
Council specifically scored many of the leading newspapers low
in carrying offensive advertorials and hate speeches.

Social Media and 2015 Election

The coming of social media has changed the political landscape
in Nigeria, especially the political campaign and processes in the
2015 General Election. Various social media platforms were
used by politicians to reach the electorate. Platforms like:
Twitter, Facebook, BBM, Whatsapp, MySpace, YouTube, blog
and Istagram facilitated electioneering campaigns and the
policing of the election results in real-time. The major
presidential contenders in the 2015 Elections maintained Twitter
and Facebook accounts in which they interacted with their
supporters and propagated their manifestos. Perhaps, very
135
importantly, the platforms served as effective avenues for
policing election results. On the Presidential Election Day,
accredited election observers, civil society Situation Rooms, the
INEC, the PDP and the APC Situation Rooms deployed
observers to the field that relied on various social media
platforms for live reports. A few hours after voting commenced
in Nigeria, observers and citizens disseminated election results
as announced at various voting centres using Twitter, Facebook,
BBM, Whatsapp, etc. As the election results went viral on social
media, political parties, citizens, local and international
observers monitored and tracked mostly before the official
central announcement by INEC; in many cases, the officially-
collated results tallied with those posted on social media. From
what happened, it was clear that social media had significantly
facilitated the checking of election rigging through the close
monitoring of the process as well as in the tracking of the results,
making it difficult to manipulate or change the results already
circulated in the public domain.
Generally, one can summarize the nature of the coverage
and performance of the media in the 2015 Elections in Nigeria
as follows:
a. Coverage was high and wide at all levels
b. Excessive coverage focused on fears, speculations and
rumours about the elections.
c. Pre-election coverage was not issue-based. Personality
issues overwhelmed the attention of the media.
d. The media “was not sufficiently critical” in analysing the
various campaign promises made by parties or their
candidates.
e. There was little reporting on the tract records of candidates
in relation to the promises they were making and how they
had performed in the past, either in public office or any
other sector.

136
 f. There were no attempts to tract the promises made by
incumbents and the extent to which such promises were
implemented.
g. The media demonstrated weaknesses in upholding the
spirit of investigative journalism as part of their
responsibility of keeping those in governance accountable
to the people.
h. There was the absence of rigorous analysis of the
manifestos of the various political parties to highlight their
areas of focus and strategies.
i. Most times, the media had failed to distinguish between
the official and political party campaign activities of
incumbents, especially in the government-owned broadcast
outlets.
j. Many government-owned broadcast media violated the
provisions of the Electoral Act and the Nigeria
Broadcasting Code, particularly in respecting the
principles of pluralism, commercialization, decent
language and equal airtime to all political parties during
electioneering periods.
k. Because of the commercialization regime in the broadcast
media, investigative or even rigorous journalistic analyses
on issues and candidates were given little regard
l. Hate speech and outright lies appeared as advertisements.

Challenges
The greatest challenge to the organization and conduct of
elections in 2015, and for the media, in particular, was the
erratic attitude of many of the stakeholders. This attitude had
permeated into the general society as evidenced in the
perceptions of the people. The intolerant behaviours of

137
politicians, the absence of internal political party democracies
and the weaknesses and gaps in institutions like INEC, security
agencies, etc. had in several ways betrayed desperation,
illegality and dishonesty aptly captured, re-inforced and
represented by the media. The media had repeatedly encountered
mind-sets, attitudes and habits that had affected their
performance in the electoral process.
As argued by Iyayi (2007), “election mind-sets are
particularly consequential for democracy. They shape political
behaviour before, during and after elections. Election mind-sets
derive from other mind-sets that we have about several other
conditions and factors that shape elections. These include mind-
sets about power and politics, the role of the state on society,
ethnicity, religion and political succession.”
These were compounded by the ownership pattern and
competing interests in the media industry. Personal interests and
the political sympathies of owners were often mainstreamed into
the professional content of publications and broadcasting to
demonize, advocate or manipulate public opinion. Even media
organizations that claimed non-partisanship were easily betrayed
by the contents of their pages or airwaves. Under the guise of
performing their constitutional, structural and psychological
responsibilities, many media professionals deliberately confused
facts with feelings, masqueraded objective critical analyses with
subjective political biases and, in many cases, engaged in
defamatory contents that appeared as news, though were actually
planted stories (Pate, 2014). Commenting on the direction of
some of the campaigns during the election period, the Director
of the International Press Centre, Lanre Arogundade (2015b),
identified moral loss as the major consequence of the ethical
infractions displayed by the media in the coverage of the
election, as “many readers, listeners and viewers permanently
turned off the media outlets because of their excessive
partisanship while swimming in the ocean of hatred”.
In fact, the situation in the government-dominated
broadcast media before and during post-election was glaringly
138
partisan to the point that many of them were sanctioned by the
regulatory authority for violating the electoral broadcasting code.
State-owned broadcast media outfits jettisoned the provisions of
their establishment acts, national laws and the broadcasting code
or the professional code of ethics. In many of the government-
owned media, there were excessive interferences by officials,
the overbearing influence of non-professionals from outside the
media, often from the political parties, and the tight control
sometimes bordering on censorship in the newsrooms. The
loopholes further exacerbated such scenarios in their
establishing laws, which severally gave the political leadership
in the states the license to directly interfere in the content and
appointments of officials in the organizations (Pate, 2014).
In the private media, personnel referred to the political and
economic interests of owners in the content of their media. The
staff is expected, in situations where it is not directly instructed,
to understand, respect and avoid “friendly fires”. As
acknowledged by the President, Nigerian Guild of Editors
(NGE), Mr. Femi Adesina (2015), ownership structure was a
factor dictating the disposition of media operatives during
campaigns. He remarked that: “Clearly, particularly in the
electronic media, you will see that they were partisan due to
their ownership, whether public or private. Once the ownership
was beholding to one side, the media followed to that side, the
Nigerian Television Authority NTA, understandably owned by
the government, and African Independent Television (AIT)
private, but the owner was beholding to the government in
power, so the station itself took that same line. But we also saw
Channels Television that was quite neutral, very professional,
very ethical, so we saw all sorts”.
Perhaps quite fundamental is the precarious economic
conditions in the media houses, which in a way, led to
compromising independence for survival, and personal safety
and job protection by personnel. As a result, some of them
became subservient to government officials and, for the private
media, the interests of advertisers and owners. The vulnerability
139
of the system promoted a subtle trend among top editorial staff
in media houses to secretly take up appointments as professional
consultants or public relations experts or advisers to aspirants,
candidates and political parties. This is not to suggest that the
so-called objectivity precludes journalists from holding political
opinions, belonging to political parties and supporting particular
candidates, but they were not expected to masquerade their
opinions or biases to appear as objective analysis of issues with
the hope of misleading the audience.
Another issue that had affected the performance of the
media in the electoral process was the commercialization regime
in media houses. Even though the Broadcasting Code insists on
free coverage for political parties and their activities, the rule
was, however, minimally respected by the broadcast media.
Because of the monetary charges, some candidates, parties and
members of the public were denied quality access in the media.
Equally, in the name of advertisements, salient provisions of the
Code of Election Coverage were violated. Below are few
examples of the violated sections:
a. Article 3.5.2 states that: “A media organization shall not
publish or air political adverts; advertorials and sponsored
political news that seek to create hatred or incite violence”.
b. Article 4.3 declares that, “A media organization shall reject
any material intended for publication or airing by parties,
candidates and other interests that contains hateful or
inciting words and messages”.
c. Article 4.4 requires that: “A media organization shall
refrain from publishing or airing abusive editorial
comments or opinions that denigrate individuals or groups
on account of disability, race, ethnicity, tribe, gender or
belief”.

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Other Challenges
Poor Logistical Support: In most media houses, basic support
facilities like vehicles, cameras, laptops and online connection
gadgets were hardly available in sufficient quantity. There were
instances when reporters relied on commercial vehicles to cover
large areas during the elections. Because of that, some of them
were exposed to danger of and abuse by thugs. In some cases,
they found it more convenient moving around collectively in
unmarked vehicles to avoid being attacked because of what may
be perceived as the “sins” of their individual media houses or
employers.

Journalists and Personal Safety: Not many journalists were

covered by any kind of insurance in the event of injury or death.
Journalists were left to their own means and devices as their
employers did not provide them with such cover. Some of them
suffered abuse while covering the elections. The managements
of media outfits confirmed the claim, saying that they lacked the
resources for such safety cover for their staff. For example,
because of the violence that characterized the elections in Rivers
State, Charles Eruka of Channels Television was injured during
a violent explosion in Okrika, Rivers State. Many others
suffered minor attacks and intimidation in several locations.

Misunderstanding the Roles of Journalists and the Media by

Politicians: Many journalists found it difficult to operate
professionally and independently because of the misperception
of the place and role of the journalists in democratic settings by
politicians. Many politicians wanted journalists to be non-
critical and report everything about them in manners they
desired and not necessarily based on professional judgements.
Many politicians failed to appreciate the professional and ethical
requirements for news reporting during the elections.

141
Lessons
Based on the above observations, the following conclusions can
be drawn from the coverage of the 2015 Elections in Nigeria.
a. The media is an important partner in the electoral process.
b. Political misbehaviour and negative attitudes in the wider
society affect the conduct of the media.
c. Widespread violation of the Electoral Act, the Professional
and NBC codes (plurality, access, fairness, sycophancy,
hate speech, commercialization of news, bribery, etc.)
affects the perception and credibility of the media as an
objective fourth estate of the realm.
d. Internal and external pressures are mounted on operational
staff (threats, attacks, sanctions, promises of appointments,
etc.).
e. The media did little of investigative journalism to dig into
the backgrounds and antecedents of candidates and
behaviours and the manifestoes of parties.

Recommendations
a. Increase the focus of the media on existing mind-sets to
address specific negative attitudes in the society.
b. Strengthen the professional engagement of the media with
the politicians, civil society organizations, institutions and
agencies involved with elections to improve media
performance.
c. There is the need for a review of the enabling laws of the
public broadcast stations to make them professionally
independent to check proprietary and commercial controls.
d. The media should be encouraged to be more confident in
investigating the conduct of politicians, the fulfilment of
promises by incumbents, the behaviour of institutions like

142
 the police, INEC, and the specific allegations of
malpractice and other such negative acts.
e. Civil society groups should focus increased attention on
the performance of the media at various levels.
f. Strengthen regulators like the NBC to enforce the
Broadcasting Code more forcefully, especially on the big
stations.
g. Increase the funding to media houses by proprietors to
enhance the capacity of the media.
h. Caution is required in the use of language in the media.

References
Adesina, F., (2015). The Guardian, May 4, Lagos.
APCON, (2015). Code of ethics.
Arogundade, L., (2015). Reportage of 2015 election in Nigeria:
A monitoring scorecard of print and online media. Lagos:
NPC/IPC/ UNDP.
Arogundade, Lanre. (2015b), The Guardian, July 4.
IMS, (2011). Media coverage of electoral issues in 2011
elections in Nigeria. Lagos: IMS/UNDP.
Pate, U. A, (2007). The broadcast media and sustainable
democracy in Nigeria: Issues and challenges. Journal of
Development Communication, Vol. 18, No. 1, AIDCOMM.
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Jeff, H., (2015), The Guardian, May 9.
National Broadcasting Commission, (2015), The Independent,
March 31,
News Agency of Nigeria, (2011). News Bulletin, April 2011
Nigerian Electoral Support Group, (2011). Election
monitoring
report.
Nigerian Press Council, (2015). The Nigerian Observer, April
30.
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Ogbondah, C. (1994). Military regimes and the press in Nigeria,
1966-1993: Human Rights and National Development.
Lanham: University Press America.
Omu, F., (1978). Press and Politics in Nigeria. Ibadan:
Longman Nig. Limited.
Oso, L. and Pate, U., (2010). Mass media and society in Nigeria,
Lagos: Malthouse Press.
Pate, U., (2003). Media ethics in political reporting on the
broadcast media in Nigeria. In Nwosu, I. (ed.). POLIMEDIA:
Media and politics in Nigeria. Enugu: ACCE.
Pate, U. A., (2014). Media performance in Nigerian elections,
lessons learned since 1999. Keynote paper delivered at the
strategy meeting on media and the 2015 elections organized
by UNDP/INEC/Guild of Editors held on February 20 – 21,
2014 at the Sheraton Hotel, Ikeja, Lagos.
Pogoson, I., (2015). Political parties and participation of youth,
women and persons living disabilities in the 2015 Elections.
Paper presented at the NIPSS conference on the review of
2015 elections held in Abuja.
Transition Monitoring Group, (2011). 2011 presidential election
in Nigeria: Final report. Abuja: TMG.
Transition Monitoring Group, (2015). The conduct of 2015
presidential election in Nigeria. In Punch, Lagos: July 1.
Yusuf, B., (2001). Mass media in a constitutional democracy:
The Nigerian experience. In Alemika, E. O., et al (eds.).
Constitutional federalism and democracy in Nigeria. Kaduna:
HRM.

144
 The Role of Foreign Actors in Enhancing the
Smooth Conduct of the 2015 Elections
Yunusa Z. Ya’u*

Abstract
This article examines the role of foreign actors in enhancing the
smooth conduct of the 2015 Elections. These actors collectively
are referred to as the international community, who were
interested in the conduct of credible elections in Nigeria through
different modes of intervention such as the diplomatic action;
financial support; holding Nigeria to acceptable conduct and
technical assistance. They further supported the INEC and
CSOs in conducting credible and acceptable elections.
Therefore, the paper concludes that the intervention of ICC and
the conveyance of both domestic and foreign observers made the
losers accept the outcome of the elections without any violence.

Introduction
This article looks at the contributions of foreign actors to the
success of the Nigerian elections, in particular, the Presidential
Election, which was held on April 1, 2015. Pundits had made
predictions about the ominous collapse of the country, but the
Presidential Election ended up peacefully with an incumbent
conceding defeat after losing power for the first time in the
electoral history of the country. Before then, the country was on
edge, what with the inability of the government to contain the
raging insurgency that had taken control of a large chunk of the
north-east What with the various inflammatory and hate-filled
campaigns that ran during the campaign period. In the end,
Nigeria held its most credible elections so far and the results
across different parts of the country indeed reflected the wishes
of the people.
* Yunusa Z. Ya’u is the Executive Director, Centre for Information
Technology and Development (CITAD), Kano, Nigeria.

145
 While the success was, without doubt, due to all Nigerians,
it is important that we do not lose sight of the role played by
major international partners engaged in democratic promotion.
These partners referred to as “Foreign Actors” made different
and important contributions to the conduct of the election.

Conceptualizing Foreign Actors

It is important to start with clarifying what constitutes foreign
actors as used in this paper. This is because foreign actors could
in general involve all those who are not Nigerians. For example,
the supporters of Boko Haram from outside Nigeria are foreign
actors. They have worked by either design or accident to
undermine the good conduct of the elections. There also those
foreign actors who stood to gain from the consequences of
flawed elections in the country.
The foreign actors, as used here, refer to the collection of
the international community (diplomatic, government,
development partners and non-governmental organizations) that
were interested in the conduct of credible elections in Nigeria
and actually took active steps to play some specific roles in
enhancing the quality of the election. In this sense, we can think
of the United Nations and its agencies (such as the UNDP and
the International Criminal Court), foreign embassies (both of
African and other countries), development partners (such as
USAID and DFID), foreign observer missions (both of AU and
EU as well as others), international NGOs (such as the National
Democratic Institute (NDI), the International Foundation for
Electoral Systems (IFES), the International Republican Institute
(IRI), etc., as well as foreign private foundations, such as the
Ford Foundation and MacArthur Foundation, among many
others.
Excluded from these are foreign commercial interests,
even if they served as vendors for election related procurement.
In this sense, although the card reader played a key role in the
conduct of the elections, we do not include the foreign
companies that supplied the technology or the product. Also
146
excluded are foreign media organizations whose role in the
election is best captured by looking at the role of the media in
general in the conduct of the elections.
These actors do not necessarily act as one single
constituency or played the same role. On the contrary, their roles
were as diverse as they were. However, they were all committed
to the credible conduct of the election and played
complementary roles to each other as each sought to play where
it was more appropriate to its mandate.

Modes of Intervention
Foreign actors are by law and definition excluded from direct
participation in the election. They cannot campaign for or
against, nor can they actively engage the electorate. But they can
provide support and assistance to various stakeholders to support
the processes to ensure the success of the elections. Four modes
of intervention by foreign actors could be identified as
evidenced in the 2015 Elections. These were:

1. Diplomatic Action: These were embedded in behind-the-

scene actions by diplomats who expressed the positions of
their governments on critical issues relating to the elections.
In addition to embassy level engagement, a number of
countries sent diplomatic delegations to the country to
engage government and other stakeholders in ensuring that
the elections were conducted peacefully and transparently.
Among the key delegations were the US Secretary of State,
John Kerry; the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary, Philip
Hammond; and the former Secretary-General of the UN, Mr.
Kofi Annan. There were also direct statements by such
leaders as President Obama of the US and the Prime
Minister of UK. Indeed, the UK pledged £5million pounds to
the multinational African force to tackle the Boko Haram
insurgency in the northeast” (Onuah and Payne, 2015), so
that the insurgency did not threaten the good conduct of the
election.
147
2. Financial support: This is the direct transfer of funds in the
form of grants for election-related activities and programmes
that were either channelled through state actors, such as
INEC or non-state actors, such as civil society organizations.
The United Nations (UN), for instance had provided 60
million dollars to ensure the success of Nigeria’s 2015
General Elections (see http://nigerianreviews.com/united-
nations-provides 60m-for-nigerias-general-election
chambas/#sthash.gis7Upyv.dpuf). Many other foreign actors
did make direct fund transfer in the form of grants to both
INEC and other relevant government agencies, such as the
National Orientation Agency (NOA) and the National
Broadcasting Commission (NBC) as well as a number of
CSOs. Activities that were supported included voter
education campaigns, peaceful election sensitization
programmes, training observers, the production of
observation kits and setting up specialized observation
platforms, among others.
3. Holding Nigeria to Acceptable Conduct: Nigeria is a
member of many international organizations. These
organizations have set up minimum standards for the
conduct of elections as well as the general governance
process in member countries. Foreign observers were
precisely here for this purpose. Their speaking up for
upholding global standards and commitment ensured, for
instance, that INEC had the leverage to navigate its
autonomy and independence in spite of agitation and calls
from some camps that the INEC Chairman be dismissed
following the debacle over the shift in the election days. The
voices of foreign actors were also strong in calling for no
further shift in the election days, as well as in calling for
moderation during the campaigns.
4. Technical Assistance: This is non-direct financial assistance
that was extended to either INEC or other relevant
stakeholders to support the election processes. It manifested
in several forms, including seconding technical experts, the
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 development of policy documents or other services rendered
for election purposes by a third party that was paid for by
foreign actors. INEC was a major beneficiary of this but by
far not the only one. Many CSOs have benefited from this
type of support. This support enabled CSOs to roll out new
programming activities that hitherto were not done.

Specific Illustrations
The support to the conduct of the 2015 General Elections by
foreign actors can be discussed under six major sub-themes.
These are:

1. Support to INEC
One of the key ingredients for the success of the election was
that INEC was able to prepare for the election. INEC benefited
from different support and assistance by foreign actors in the run
up to the elections. This support can further be categorized into
four:
a. Direct funding: A number of organizations provided funds
to carry out some of the critical activities INEC needed to
do in order for it to be well prepared for the elections. One
example of this was a grant of $900,000 from the Ford
Foundation “to support a number of activities of the
Commission including the establishment of a Virtual
Library at the electoral Institute” (INEC. 2014:31).
Another key support that INEC received which impacted
on the conduct of the election was the support for an
independent Registration and Election Review Committee
following the 2011 Elections. The Committee, headed by
Prof. Adele Jinadu, himself a former National Electoral
Commission (NEC) member, was charged with reflecting
on the 2011 Elections. In its report (INEC, 2012), the
committee made far reaching recommendations, which
were subsequently implemented by INEC. Among these
was that ”Information and Communication Technology
(ICT) should be prioritized and integrated into INEC
149
 procedures internally, with the use of social media
optimized both in INEC internal procedures and in the
electoral process”. The recommendation helped to push
INEC towards a more robust deployment of ICT in the
election process, leading to the decisive use of the card
reader technology, which turned out to be the magic tool
for the elections. The Election Management System
Project, a key component in the improvement of the
conduct of the election, was supported by International
Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) (INEC, 2015: 5).
b. Training: In line with its strategic plan, INEC needed to
train its staff on various aspects of elections. For example
in January, 2015 the Commission conducted training on
BRIDGE and Gender and Election for Gender Desk
Officers from both the states and the headquarters
supported by UNDP-DGD. IFES “supported the
Commission in its efforts towards capacity building of
staff through the Training Needs Assessment (TNA).
International IDEA provided financial support for the
BRIDGE training and election risk management workshop.
c. Technical Support: While INEC had benefited from much
technical support, the one provided by UNDP-DGD was
outstanding for its variety of activities and long-term
duration. The DGD supported the development of the
INEC Gender Policy, the deployment of experts to work
with INEC and convening a series of interfacing meetings
for INEC, among others. IFES provided technical support
for the voter registration exercise and others. International
IDEA provided technical expertise for the development of
the Commission’s Election Project Plan.
d. Working Visits: A number of organizations facilitated
working visits and exchange programmes as well as
participation in various international fora on elections.
These visits, exchanges and conferences exposed INEC
staff and officials to new trends, mechanisms and tools for
enhancing the credibility of elections. For example in
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 October 2013, INEC participated at an international
workshop for its top managers organized by the
International Centre for Electoral Training, Mexico whose
aim was “to contribute to the institutional strengthening of
INEC through the exchange of knowledge and experiences
and to present useful international experiences and
practices for the legal, political and financial behaviour of
electoral management bodies” (INEC, 2014: 38). The
Commission was supported in undertaking study tours of
some EMBs as part of learning best practices (INEC:
2014:41). Other organizations that provided avenues for
knowledge sharing included Friedric Ebert Stiftung (FES),
the German Embassy, IFES, etc.

2. Support to Civil Society Organizations

The work of civil society organization also helped in
enhancing the conduct of the election. Many civil society
organizations carried out activities that supported the good
conduct of the elections. These included sustained advocacy
for the reform of the electoral system, observation of the
preparatory stages of the elections, constant oversight on
INEC, voter education, sensitization campaign for peaceful
election, efforts aimed at protection and enhancing the
autonomy and independence of the election management
body and the actual observation of the election. Given the
number and spread of the CSOs and a variety of their
activities, there was no part of the country that was not
reached, nor were there important stakeholders that were not
touched by the CSO engagement. However, the most visible
of these engagements was election observation.
While many CSOs were able to observe the elections,
three election observation projects or platforms were very
significant not only in their reach but also in providing a
confidence mechanism for the citizens and an independent
mechanism for assessing the quality of elections as well as in
their ability to work with both INEC and other stakeholders
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in constantly seeking out areas of improvement from the
preparatory stages through to the election days. They also
allowed the public to have a fair idea of the results even
before INEC could make announcements, thus pre-empting
an attempt at post-election manipulation of the results as it
used to happen in the past.
The three major civil society election observation
projects that were significant in their contribution to the
conduct of the elections were: Quick Count, the Content
Aggregation System for Election (CASE), Platform and the
Situation Room. Quick Count was implemented by the
Transition Monitoring Group (TMG), a coalition of over 260
CSOs that has since the return to civil rule in 1999 been
observing all state and national elections in the country.
The CASE was a platform designed and deployed by the
Yar’Adua Centre in partnership with over 18 other
organizations. The Yar’Adua Centre itself did not deploy
observers but merely provided the platform which the
partner organizations used to send and aggregate their
reports. The CASE platform enabled partner CSO observers
to directly send their reports, which were then collated and
sorted separately but also capable of the generation of
generalized observation results across organizations.
The Situation Room had neither a platform nor observers
of its own. Instead, it leveraged both the observers of its
member organizations and the platforms they built (CASE
and Quick Count). In addition to the General Situation Room,
there was also the Women Situation Room as well as other
Election Situation Rooms set up by other organizations, such
as the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD).
Altogether, the organizations that uploaded using the
CASE platform (including the TMG) deployed about 9,919
field observers (Yar’Adua Foundation, 2015) across the
country, covering all the states of the federation. There were
of course several other domestic observer groups that were
not part of this platform. What this meant was that there
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were sufficient number of observers across most of the states.
Their presence helped in enhancing the credibility of the
elections by reducing the chance for flagrant electoral
malpractice, knowing that the elections were under the
watchful eyes of these observers.
Foreign actors assisted the CSOs in the deployment of
the observers in three ways. First, all the platforms were set
up by funds provided by the foreign actors. CASE was, for
instance, funded by MacArthur Foundation, Open Society
Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA), the UK Department for
International Development (DFID) and the Canadian Fund
for Local Initiative (CFLI). Similarly, Quick Count was
made possible by a grant from USAID through the National
Democratic Institute (NDI). The Situation Room itself was
supported by the DFID and OSIWA (Situation Room, 2015:
6).
Secondly, foreign actors provided the funds for much of
the training of domestic observers as well as for the actual
deployment of the observers in the field. For example, TMG
observation was supported by the National Democratic
Institute (NDI), the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID) and the United Kingdom Department
for International Development (DFID) (Zikirullah, 2015).
Thirdly, foreign actors facilitated a most productive
bridge building and engagement between INEC and several
critical stakeholders, such as the media, political parties and
civil society. The DGD initiated an interface between
political parties and civil society whose aim was to facilitate
greater understanding, such that the two will not only speak
along the same lines in advising INEC but also allowed
CSOs to monitor internal democratic processes within the
parties. A similar interface was done with the media and
security agencies as well as between the media and CSOs, on
one hand and INEC, on the other. One of the most sustained
interfaces was that between civil society and INEC brokered
by the Situation Room. Since the mid-2014, the Situation
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Room had held a monthly interface in which INEC officials
were usually invited to brief civil society of its preparation
and in turn civil society offered suggestions on improvement
as well brought out areas of lapses that needed to be
addressed. The Situation Room also has since 2011 issued
statements on major election instances in the country which
have helped in providing INEC with areas of remediation
(see for instance, Situation Room, 2014).These bridge
building efforts bought the two into constructive dialogue for
which INEC benefited greatly.
No less important was also the support of foreign actors
for voter education activities. DFID, for instance, funded
Action Aid Nigeria for a national voter education
programme that combined a multiplicity of strategies, which
were implemented in partnership with several other local
groups in 10 states. Named Strengthening Citizen’s
Engagement in Electoral Process (SCEEP), its purpose was
to strengthen citizens’ engagement with the electoral process
and deepen democratic governance in Nigeria. Similarly,
Search for Common Ground, with support from USAID,
mounted a nationwide peaceful election campaign targeting
youths, women and people with disability. MacArthur
Foundation and the DFID, through the Nigeria Stability and
Reconciliation Programme (NSRP) supported the Centre for
Information Technology and Development (CITAD) to set
up a hate speech online observatory for the campaign whose
purpose was not only to curb dangerous speech but also to
provide information that was needed as part of the election
conflict early warning system.

3. The Pull Behind the Peace Accord

It was clear that everybody wanted to find a way to get the
political actors to agree to some peaceful contest. The major
political parties were either too suspicious of local actors
who wanted to do this or felt that they lacked the status to
bring them to the table. Thus, the initial response to the
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initiative was lukewarm. For instance, an earlier suggestion
by former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Prof. Bolaji
Akinyemi, on the need “to unequivocally express their
commitment to peaceful campaigns and elections, as well as
proper management of reactions to the results of the polls to
achieve peaceful outcome” was dismissed by the Presidency
(Samson Ezea, 2014). This, however, did not discourage the
promoters of the peace initiative. They enlisted the support
of prominent figures both within and outside the country to
support the initiative. One of them was the former UN
Secretary-General, Kofi Annan. Mr. Annan came to Nigeria
in furtherance of the peace initiative and, on 13th of January,
addressed the Nigeria civil society Situation Room meeting.
In that address, he urged politicians and their supporters to
be careful with their language, for “words can inflame, incite
and provoke; but they can also soothe and reconcile” (Annan,
2015). Two days later, he presided over a conference at
which the presidential candidates of the parties signed the
first peace accord. The Accord, among other things,
extracted a commitment from the candidates:

o To run issue-based campaigns at national,

state and local government levels. In this,
we pledge to refrain from campaigns that
will involve religious incitement, ethnic
or tribal profiling, both by ourselves and
by all agents acting in our names.

o To refrain from making or causing to

make in our names or that of our party
any public statements, pronouncements,
declarations or speeches that have the
capacity to incite any form of violence,
before, during and after the elections.

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 o To forcefully and publicly speak out
against provocative utterances and oppose
all acts of electoral violence, whether
perpetrated by our supporters and/or
opponents.

o To commit ourselves and political parties

to the monitoring of the adherence to this
Accord, if necessary by a national peace
committee made up of respected
statesmen and women, traditional and
religious leaders (National Peace
Committee, 2015).

Clearly, Kofi Annan’s stature and influence were

brought to bear in getting the candidates to sign the accord.
However, this did little to stop the supporters of the parties
from trading hate speech and violence. This especially
became elevated when kites began flying that the elections
were going to be postponed. It was in this context that the
U.S. Secretary of State, John Kerry, came and met with
President Goodluck Jonathan and Muhammadu Buhari, the
presidential candidates of the People’s Democratic Party
(PDP) and the All Progressives Congress (APC),
respectively. He emphasized that the U.S. government
“strongly believes in Nigeria having credible, free and fair
elections next month” and added that it would not hesitate to
deny American visa to any political office seeker involved in
political violence in Nigeria. “We want to say that any
Nigerian who promotes any form of violence during the
elections remains ineligible for U.S. visa.” (Premium Times,
January 15, 2015). The intervention of John Kerry thus
reinforced international support for the Peace Accord,
especially through the threat of visa denials.
Finally, the peace initiative promoters used their being
networked within the UN system where some of them had
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worked to get UN identification and support for the Peace
Initiative. The support of the UN for the Peace Accord was
not limited to diplomatic engagement and pronouncements:
it also got the UNDP to financially support it. It was through
this financial backing that a second accord was signed on
22nd March, just a week to the election. This second accord
provides that: “Now that the campaigns have come to an end,
we meet today to renew our pledge for peaceful elections.
We therefore call on all fellow citizens of our dear country,
and our party supporters, to refrain from violence” (National
Peace Committee, 2015a).
The statement of congratulation and the acceptance of
defeat by the then President Jonathan was in fulfilment of
the commitment to the accord. The statement itself set up a
tone of expectation from the public that, when the
governorship elections were held later, the public not only
peacefully accepted the results but also eagerly awaited the
statement of acceptance of defeat by losing candidates. This
was a novelty for Nigerian elections, as, hitherto, losing
candidates simply condemned the results.
The international support for the Peace Initiative not only
made it possible for the politicians at the national level to be
committed to it but also generated a groundswell for its
replication at the state level. A number of the development
partners that were supporting election programme, such as
the DFID, NSRP, etc. worked to get the governorship
candidates in several states to sign similar accords.

4. The Intervention of the ICC

The International Criminal Court (ICC) was not usually
active on election matters. However, its efforts, following
the violence in Kenya and Cote D’Ivoire, provided a
reference point on how its work could help to reduce
election-related violence. Ahead of the 2011 Elections, the
ICC issued a statement urging peaceful conduct and restating
its mandate to investigate crimes against humanity. Although
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violence did occur following the election, the ICC did not
find it as reasonable grounds to activate an investigation. On
24 February, 2014, the Prosecutor of the International
Criminal Court, Mrs. Fatou Bensouda, delivered an address
at a seminar hosted by the Attorney-General of the
Federation and Minister of Justice of Nigeria during which
she stated that her office was investigating crimes by the
Boko Haram insurgents and made an allusion to the fact that
election violence could also be investigated. This was
followed on 08/05/2014 with a statement on the abduction of
the Chibok girls. Part of the statement reads:

Having concluded that some of the alleged crimes

committed in the Nigeria situation fall within
subject-matter jurisdiction of the ICC, the Office
of the Prosecutor is currently assessing relevant
national proceedings in conformity with the
principle of complementarity. Under the Rome
Statute, the Nigerian authorities have primary
responsibility to investigate and prosecute the
alleged crimes. Such cases may become
admissible before the ICC if there are no relevant
investigations or prosecutions in Nigeria, or if the
national authorities are unwilling or unable to
carry out genuine investigations or prosecutions
(Bensouda, Fatou, 2014).

There was no direct reference to the election, but

analysts seem to now put the matter of dealing with the
violence in the hands of the government. If the government
could not rescue the girls and stop the violence, then it might
well be culpable of the violence. This found resonance in the
political opposition circles.
Following the escalation of violence, especially with the
suicide bomb attacks on markets in Maiduguri and Potiskum
on 11 and 12 January, the ICC Prosecutor issued another
158
statement on 20/01/2015. Although much of the context of
the speech related to the activities of the insurgents in the
country, she indicated that her office would continue to
gather information on possible crimes in Nigeria within the
jurisdiction of the court. In February 2, she issued a warning
against “the risk of election violence in Nigeria and restated
her resolve “to prosecute individuals responsible for ICC
crimes” (Bensouda, Fatou, 2015). Her most direct statement
was on March 16 in which she, warned that “Any person
who incites or engages in acts of violence in the context of
the upcoming elections or otherwise – including by ordering,
inciting, encouraging or contributing to the commission of
crimes that fall within ICC’s jurisdiction – is liable to
prosecution.” (Bensouda, Fatou, 2015a). Several CSOs
reproduced this warning both in print and in electronic form
and circulated it on social media, radio and television as well
as in print media.
The intervention by the ICC not only generated debate
within different political camps with a number saying they
were compiling documentation to report specific politicians
to the ICC for inciting violence but also even talked about
reporting the military as well. The metaphor of Gbagbo of
Côte d’Ivoire which surfaced in the media, was prominent as
a warning against inciting violence and to a large extent, this
intervention made politicians become careful about what
they said during the campaigns. They all became advocates
of the peace accord. That the elections came and passed with
little violence was an indication that the messages by the
ICC reinforced other similar messages in demanding and
getting peaceful elections in the country.

5. Long Term Observer Missions

Long Term Observer Missions (LTOMs) are teams sent well
in advance of the election to be on the ground to observe the
preparatory stages of the election. This they do through
159
interaction with various stakeholders as well as by directly
observing some of the election-related processes. Their
reports are fed back regularly to their principals. For the
2015 Elections, both the European Union and African Union
sent LTOMs. They consulted and their reports were
instrumental in shaping the opinions of European
Governments in the need to ensure that elections were not
further delayed after they were postponed in February. This
also helped to provide a cover against the possible
subversion and undermining of the autonomy and
independence of the election management body.
One important contribution of the LTOMs was the
response of the international community to the peace
initiative, which was widely supported. The pre-election
observation of the LTOMs had detailed the rising tension in
the country as well as the increasing trade in hate speech by
the politicians as they campaigned (CITAD, 2015). Their
report raised awareness that made a number of organizations
not only support various activities against electoral violence
but also spawned a number of peace initiatives, culminating
in the peace accord. One of these efforts established is the
Peace and Security Working Group (PSWG). The PSWG
brought together the diplomatic community, development
partners, international and local NGOs working on peace
building and conflict mitigation with the aim of enhancing
“the effectiveness and coordination of interventions that are
designed to reduce or to prevent the start or resumption of
violent conflict in Nigeria. These activities were to address
the underlying drivers, neutralize potential triggers of
violence, create a societal expectation for peaceful conflict
resolution or stabilize society politically and socio-
economically in the midst of crisis situations” (PSWG: 2014:
4). The PSWG went on to produce pre-election situation
reports, a set of scenario for both federal and state elections
(PSWG, 2015), in which it identified the key conflict drivers
and the triggers of violence and proposed methods and
160
mechanisms for neutralizing them as well as pre-empt
violent conflict to ensure that, whatever the outcome, violent
conflict was avoided.

6. Actual Election Day Observations: The Convergence

of Operation between Domestic and International
Observers
INEC accredited more than 100 observer groups, including
14 international and regional organizations for the election.
The foreign observers comprised embassies of 11 countries -
the United States of America, Switzerland, Britain, Germany,
France, Japan, Canada, Ireland, Australia, Ghana and the
Republic of Korea.
These observers were deployed across all the geo-
political zones of the country. Their presence on Election
Day served to give confidence to the voters that their votes
would count. It also helped in ensuring that in many places,
brazen electoral malpractices were not perpetrated. These
served two purposes both of which enhanced the conduct of
the elections. One, the presence of the observers helped to
make sure those voters and election officials as well as
others conducted themselves in accordance with the law and
regulations for the elections. Second, the fact that it largely
drove away brazen malpractices meant that the possibility of
a counter- response to such malpractices through violence
was reduced. This contributed in the relative peaceful
conduct of the elections.
Two days to the election, the Situation Room held
meetings with both the EU and AU Observers Teams. In
both meetings, it was agreed that both foreign and domestic
observers would collaborate and share information during
and after the election. They would also continue to consult as
events unfolded. These consultations were maintained
throughout the elections. As counting got underway, it
became clear that the ruling party was losing the presidency
but there were efforts to arrest the situation to either upturn
161
 the swing or lead to an inclusive election. Both domestic and
foreign observers not only had direct field reports but also
had access to reports by the various observation platforms,
such as Quick Count and CASE as well as the CDD election
platform and, therefore, were able to quickly assess the
election. A joint meeting of the domestic and foreign
observers was convened on Monday, two days after the
presidential election at which the conduct of the election was
reviewed. The meeting observed that, although there were
some incidents (some of them very critical, such as in Rivers
and Akwa Ibom State), the overwhelming conclusion was
that the election was free and fair and that vote counting and
tallying were a true and faithful reflection of the voting
preferences of the voters. It was, therefore, agreed that
statements should be issued to first commend the conduct of
the election and call on all the parties to ensure a peaceful
conclusion of the election. This was done.
The meeting also agreed to reach out to both the
Abdulsalami Peace Committee (which brokered the Peace
Accord) and the Diplomatic Committee to urge them to
reach out to government and political parties to ensure that
they respected the spirit of the accord they signed by
allowing the election to be concluded and to accept the
results in good faith. This was important; given that there
were unconfirmed reports that some people were bent on
either tempering with the result or rendering the process
inconclusive. Again, these were acted upon with speed. In
the end, this last minute actions of the foreign actors through
the diplomatic community contributed in making Jonathan
accept defeat and congratulating Buhari even before the last
tally was done.

Conclusion
A number of things are clear. First, foreign actors’ support
helped INEC to be technically prepared for the election, and this
was very crucial to the success of the elections. Secondly,
162
foreign actors’ principled position of holding Nigeria against a
benchmark of global standards enabled INEC to assert and
maintain its independence. Third, foreign actors assisted in
building bridges between INEC and critical stakeholders, such
as media and civil society. These bridges helped in making these
segments of the society offer constructive criticisms that helped
INEC in particular to address a number of lapses. In turn, it was
this disposition that made civil society and media rally round
INEC and mounted pressure that was critical in ensuring that the
autonomy and independence of the election management body
were not trampled upon by an incumbency that was bent on
winning the election. Direct pressure by the foreign actors,
especially through their embassies and the UN system,
complemented local pressure that demotivated government
taking punitive measures against the leadership of INEC. Fourth,
foreign actors’ financial support to INEC and CSOs helped in
setting up systems that allowed the elections to be transparent
and won the confidence of the people. Fifth, the intervention of
the ICC along with various peace initiatives generated a context
in which there was real commitment to avoiding electoral
violence. Lastly, the convergence of both domestic and foreign
observers on the conduct of the election made losers accept the
election without mobilizing for a violent rejection of the results.

163
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 Mambayya House Journal of Democratic Studies
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