3kinds of threats

Action speaks louder

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A LAW EACH DAY (KEEPS TROUBLE AWAY) - Jose C. Sison () -

April 2, 2009 - 12:00am
Losing your temper may land you in jail. This is what Ron learned in his case which all started one
afternoon at about 4 p.m. Ron and his friend Sito were then drinking at a store owned by Sito’s son.
At that time another drinking party was going on in the nearby house of Nesty. Later on Nesty came
out drunk and inquired from several people what happened to two of his guests who were allegedly
mauled. Among those confronted by Nesty was Ron’s son Raymond. So Ron butted in and replied,
“Bakit kasama ka ba roon?” Then a scuffle ensued with Sito joining the fray. Nesty’s wife, Lily who
saw the entire incident tried to pacify the two from mauling her husband but was unsuccessful. So
Nesty was forced to run to his house followed by Lily. At around 6 p.m., Nesty told his wife to report
the boxing incident to the barangay authorities.

Lily then proceeded to the barangay hall at around 7:30 pm accompanied by her son. On their way,
at the alley near her house, she encountered Ron who blocked her way and confronted her with a
gun poked at her head saying “Saan ka pupunta, gusto mo ito?” Despite this fearful encounter, Lily
was still able to hurriedly proceed to the barangay hall where she reported only the gun poking
incident and forgot about the mauling of her husband in her excitement and confusion.

After proper investigations, criminal Information for slight physical injuries was filed against Ron and
Sito for the mauling of Nesty and another one for Grave Threats against Ron only for unlawfully and
feloniously threatening Lily with infliction on her person of a harm amounting to a crime. The
prosecution presented Nesty and Lily as witnesses who narrated the above events.

On the other hand Ron and Sito and a barbecue vendor testified for the defense not only to deny
and debunk the version of Nesty and Lily but also to positively show that it was the drunk and
troublesome Nesty who boxed Ron first and the latter only punched back until they were pacified,
with Nesty still pursuing and punching Ron anew and even shouting invectives.

The Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) however believed Nesty and Lily’s version and concluded that
Ron and Sito lost control of their temper due to Nesty’s unruly and drunken behavior. It also noted
that Lily wasted no time in reporting to the barangay authorities what happened to her regarding the
gun-poking incident and even forgot to report the mauling of her husband. The MeTC was convinced
that the negative assertions of the defense witnesses cannot prevail over such straightforward and
seemingly natural assertions of Nesty and Lily. Hence it convicted Ron and Sito of slight physical
injuries and sentenced them to fines of P200 and censure. Ron was also convicted of grave threats
and sentenced to 2 months imprisonment and fined P200.

Ron questioned the said decision. He insisted that their defense were not mere denials as he was
able to present the barbecue vendor an independent and impartial witness who positively testified on
what happened and supported their version. He also argued that his act of poking a gun was not
Grave Threats but only “Other Light Threats” under Article 285 par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC) which punishes “any person who shall threaten another with a weapon or draw such weapon
in a quarrel, unless it is in lawful self defense”. Was Ron correct?

No. As found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed the
MeTC decision, the positive testimonies of Nesty and Lily were straightforward and in accord with
the natural course of things. There could be no doubt that Ron and Sito lost their temper as Ron
himself admitted that he got annoyed by Nesty’s unruly behavior. Likewise, the gun-poking incident
also happened since Lily lost no time in reporting what happened to her instead of reporting about
the mauling of her husband, which she forgot in her hurry excitement and confusion. The barbecue
vendor’s testimony cannot be given more weight than their straightforward and credible statements.
They had no reason to concoct stories to pin down Ron on any criminal act.

Under the RPC there are three kinds of threats: grave, light and other light threats. Grave threats are
committed by any person who shall threaten another with infliction of a wrong amounting to a crime.
In light threats the wrong threatened does not amount to a crime but is accompanied by a condition.
In other light threat, the wrong threatened does not amount to a crime and without any condition.

In this case, considering what transpired earlier between Ron and Lily’s husband Nesty, Ron’s act of
pointing a gun at Lily’s head clearly indicates a threat to kill or to inflict serious physical injury on her
person. Actions speak louder than words. Taken in the context of surrounding circumstances, the
uttered words are consistent with the threat to kill or to inflict serious physical injury evinced by Ron’s
accompanying act of poking a gun (Caluag vs. People, G.R. 171511, March 4, 2009).

Read more at https://www.philstar.com/opinion/2009/04/02/454036/action-speaks-

louder#R4bl1X5DLy2RydQE.99

RONNIE CALUAG, G.R. No. 171511

Petitioner,
Present:

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

CARPIO MORALES,
- versus - CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.

Promulgated:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. March 4, 2009
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

For review on certiorari are the Decision[1] dated December 9, 2005 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 28707 and its Resolution[2] dated February
15, 2006, denying reconsideration. The appellate court had affirmed the
Decision[3] dated August 3, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Pias
City, Branch 198, in Criminal Case No. 04-0183-84, which affirmed the Joint
Decision[4] dated January 28, 2004 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Las
Pias City, Branch 79, in Criminal Cases Nos. 47358 and 47381 finding petitioner
Ronnie Caluag and Jesus Sentillas guilty of slight physical injuries and Ronnie
Caluag guilty of grave threats.

The factual antecedents of this case are as follows:

On May 18 and 23, 2000, two separate Informations [5] docketed as Criminal
Cases Nos. 47381 and 47358, respectively, were filed against Caluag and
Sentillas. The Information in Criminal Case No. 47381 charged Caluag and
Sentillas with slight physical injuries committed as follows:
That on or about the 19th day of March, 2000, in the City of Las Pias,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating together, and both of them mutually
helping and aiding one another did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, and employ personal violence upon the person
of NESTOR PURCEL DENIDO, by then and there mauling him, thereby
inflicting upon him physical injuries which required medical attendance for less
than nine (9) days and incapacitated him from performing his customary labor for
the same period of time.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]

The Information in Criminal Case No. 47358 charged Caluag with grave threats
committed as follows:
That on or about the 19th day of March 2000, in the City of Las Pias,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
 accused, moved by personal resentment which he entertained against one JULIA
LAVIAL DENIDO, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
threaten said JULIA LAVIAL DENIDO with the infliction on her person of a
harm amounting to a crime, by then and there poking his gun at her forehead and
uttering the following words in tagalog, to wit:

Saan ka pupunta gusto mo ito?

thereby causing said complainant to be threatened.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]

Upon arraignment, Caluag and Sentillas pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, joint
trial ensued.

The prosecution presented the two private complainants, the spouses Nestor
and Julia Denido, as witnesses. Their version of the facts are as follows:

In the afternoon of March 19, 2000, around 4 oclock[8] in the afternoon,

Nestor learned that two of his guests from an earlier drinking spree were
mauled. At that time, Caluag and Sentillas were drinking at the store owned by the
son of Sentillas.When Nestor inquired from several people including his own son
Raymond what happened, Caluag butted in and replied, Bakit kasama ka ba roon?,
and immediately boxed him without warning. Nestor retaliated but he was
overpowered by Caluag and Sentillas. Julia saw Caluag and Sentillas box her
husband. Although she tried to pacify them, they did not listen to her. To avoid his
assailants, Nestor ran to his house. Julia followed him. At around 6:00 p.m., Nestor
told his wife to report the boxing incident to the barangay authorities.[9]

Later, at around 7:30 in the evening, when Julia and her son Rotsen were on
their way to their barangay hall, she encountered Caluag, who blocked her way at
the alley near her house. Caluag confronted Julia with a gun, poked it at her
forehead, and said Saan ka pupunta, gusto mo ito?[10] Despite this fearful
encounter, she was still able to proceed to the barangay hall where she reported the
gun-poking incident to the barangay authorities.[11]

For its part, the defense presented the accused Caluag and Sentillas; and the
barbecue vendor Pablo Barrameda, Jr. as witnesses. According to them, in the
afternoon of March 19, 2000 at around 6 oclock in the evening, Caluag was on his
way home with his three-year old son when Nestor, drunk and unruly, blocked his
way and asked him, Pare, galit ka ba sa akin? He answered in the negative but
Nestor persisted in his questioning and would not allow him to pass
through. Annoyed, he told Nestor, Hindi nga! Ang kulit kulit mo! Nestor then
boxed him on his face which caused him to fall down. Caluag first assured himself
of the safety of his son and then punched Nestor back. As people around pacified
them, he was led to the store owned by the son of Sentillas. Nestor pursued him
and punched him again. As he retaliated, some bystanders separated them. Nestor
then shouted, Putang ina mo, Pare! Gago ka! Gago ka! Marami ka ng taong
niloko! Thereafter, an unidentified man from the crowd armed with a knife went
towards Nestor but Sentillas timely interceded and pacified the man. Sentillas
never boxed Nestor. Caluag also denied poking a gun at Julia.[12]

In a Joint Decision dated January 28, 2004, the MeTC found Caluag and
Sentillas guilty of slight physical injuries, and Caluag guilty of grave threats.

The MeTC relied on Nestors testimony. It noted that Nestor did not deny
that he was drunk at the time of the incident while Caluag admitted that he got
annoyed by Nestors attitude. The MeTC concluded that Caluag and Sentillas lost
control of their tempers due to Nestors unruly behavior. On the other hand, the
MeTC noted that Julia did not waste time reporting the gun-poking incident to the
barangay. While she had intended to report the mauling of her husband, as he
instructed her, what she reported instead was what happened to her. With such
straightforward and seemingly natural course of events, the MeTC was convinced
that the negative assertions of Caluag and Sentillas cannot prevail over the positive
testimonies of Nestor and Julia.

The decretal portion of the joint decision reads:

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises considered, the Court finds and
declares accused RONNIE CALUAG AND JESUS S[E]NTILLAS GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Slight Physical Injuries under Criminal
Case No. 47381, and sentences them to pay [a] fine of P200.00 each. The two (2)
accused are also censured to be more complaisant and well-bred in dealing with
people.

The Court also finds accused RONNIE CALUAG guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of the offense of Grave Threats under Article 282, par. 2 of the
Revised Penal Code, under Criminal Case No. 47358, and sentences him to suffer
two (2) months imprisonment [and to] pay [a] fine of P200.00.

Criminal Case No. 47382, as earlier explained, is ordered dismissed being

merely a duplication of Criminal Case No. 47358.

SO ORDERED.[13]
 Caluag and Sentillas appealed to the RTC which affirmed in toto the joint
decision of the MeTC.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC

on December 9, 2005. The appellate court noted that the MeTC gave credence to
the testimonies of Nestor and Julia because they were in accord with the natural
course of things.Likewise, petitioners negative assertions cannot prevail over the
positive testimonies of Nestor and Julia. The appellate court disregarded the
purported inconsistencies in the testimonies of Nestor and Julia since these refer to
collateral matters and not to the essential details of the incident.

Dissatisfied, petitioner appealed to this Court on the ground that the Court of
Appeals:
I.
MANIFESTLY OVERLOOKED CERTAIN RELEVANT FACTS NOT
DISPUTED BY THE PARTIES AND WHICH, IF PROPERLY CONSIDERED
WOULD JUSTIFY A DIFFERENT CONCLUSION;

II.
ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDINGS OF THE [MeTC] WHICH MADE
INFERENCES OR CONCLUSIONS IN ITS JOINT DECISION THAT ARE
MANIFESTLY MISTAKEN, ABSURD OR IMPOSSIBLE AND WHICH ARE
GROUNDED ENTIRELY ON SPECULATIONS, SURMISES OR
CONJECTURES OR ARE BASED ON A MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS;

III.
ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PETITIONER HEREIN IS GUILTY OF THE
OFFENSES CHARGED BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.[14]

Simply, the issue is: Was there sufficient evidence to sustain petitioners
conviction of slight physical injuries and of grave threats?

Petitioner contends that he was able to present Barrameda, an independent

and impartial witness, who supported his version of events and debunked those of
Nestor and Julia. Contrary to the findings of the lower courts that petitioner offered
mere denials, Barramedas testimony is actually a positive statement that should
have been given full credit. Petitioner also argues that although the lower courts
acknowledged that Nestor was drunk and troublesome at the time of the incident,
they chose to believe his testimony rather than petitioners. Petitioner adds that
there is no basis for the lower courts to conclude that he lost his temper because of
Nestors unruly behavior. Petitioner maintains that just because Julia immediately
reported the gun-poking incident to the barangay, this did not necessarily mean that
it actually happened. Petitioner also argues that assuming that he did poke a gun at
Julia, the crime committed was other light threats as defined under Article 285,
paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code.[15]

For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that
the MeTC did not err in giving credence to the testimonies of Nestor and Julia. The
MeTC found that the positive assertions of Nestor and Julia, their straightforward
manner of testifying, and the seemingly natural course of events, constituted the
more plausible and credible version. The MeTC also noted that Julia did not waste
time reporting the gun-poking incident to the barangay authorities immediately
after it happened. The OSG also agrees with the MeTC that petitioner lost his
temper, given the unruly behavior of Nestor.

We find the petition with insufficient merit and accordingly sustain

petitioners conviction.

At the outset, it must be stressed that petitioner raises questions of

fact. Certainly, such matters mainly require a calibration of the evidence or a
determination of the credibility of the witnesses presented by the parties and the
existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to
each other and to the whole, and the probabilities of the situation.[16]

The well-entrenched rule is that only errors of law and not of fact are
reviewable by this Court in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 under
which this petition is filed. It is not the Courts function under Rule 45 to review,
examine and evaluate or weigh once again the probative value of the evidence
presented.[17]

Moreover, findings of fact of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, are binding upon this Court. It is not the function of this Court to weigh
anew the evidence already passed upon by the Court of Appeals for these are
deemed final and conclusive and may no longer be reviewed on appeal.[18]

A departure from the general rule, however, may be warranted where the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to the findings and
conclusions of the trial court, or when the same is unsupported by the evidence on
record. Nevertheless, we find that there is no ground to apply the exception in the
instant case because the findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals are in
full accord with those of the MeTC and the RTC. This Court will not assess and
evaluate all over again the evidence, both testimonial and documentary, adduced
by the parties to the appeal particularly where, as in this case, the findings of the
MeTC, the RTC and the Court of Appeals completely coincide.[19]

Even if the Court relaxes the abovecited general rule and resolves the
petition on the merits, we still find no reversible error in the appellate courts ruling.

As the lower courts and the Court of Appeals correctly stated, the
testimonies of Nestor and Julia were more in accord with the natural course of
things. There could be no doubt that Caluag and Sentillas lost control of their
temper as Caluag himself admitted that he got annoyed by Nestors unruly
behavior. Likewise, the gun-poking incident also happened since Julia did not
waste time in reporting it to the barangay authorities. Instead of reporting the
mauling of her husband, she reported what happened to her in her hurry,
excitement and confusion. Indeed, the positive declarations of Nestor and Julia that
petitioner committed the acts complained of undermined his negative
assertions. The fact that Barrameda testified in petitioners behalf cannot be given
more weight than the straightforward and credible statements of Nestor and
Julia. Indeed, we find they had no reason to concoct stories to pin down petitioner
on any criminal act, hence their testimonies deserve full faith and credit.

The MeTC, the RTC and the Court of Appeals uniformly found petitioner
guilty of grave threats under Article 282, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code and
sentenced him to suffer two months of imprisonment and to pay a fine of P200. We
find no reason to reverse the findings and conclusions of the MeTC and RTC, as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Under the Revised Penal Code, there are three kinds of threats: grave threats
(Article 282), light threats (Article 283) and other light threats (Article 285). These
provisions state:
Art. 282. Grave threats. Any person who shall threaten another with the infliction
upon the person, honor or property of the latter or of his family of any wrong
amounting to a crime, shall suffer:

1. The penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the crime he
threatened to commit, if the offender shall have made the threat demanding
money or imposing any other condition, even though not unlawful, and said
 offender shall have attained his purpose. If the offender shall not have attained his
purpose, the penalty lower by two degrees shall be imposed.

If the threat be made in writing or through a middleman, the penalty shall be

imposed in its maximum period.

2. The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos, if the threat
shall not have been made subject to a condition.

Art. 283. Light threats. Any threat to commit a wrong not constituting a crime,
made in the manner expressed in subdivision 1 of the next preceding article, shall
be punished by arresto mayor.

Art. 285. Other light threats. The penalty of arresto menor in its minimum
period or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos shall be imposed upon:

1. Any person who, without being included in the provisions of the next preceding
article, shall threaten another with a weapon or draw such weapon in a quarrel,
unless it be in lawful self-defense.

2. Any person who, in the heat of anger, shall orally threaten another with some
harm not constituting a crime, and who by subsequent acts show that he did not
persist in the idea involved in his threat, provided that the circumstances of the
offense shall not bring it within the provisions of Article 282 of this Code.

3. Any person who shall orally threaten to do another any harm not constituting a
felony.

In grave threats, the wrong threatened amounts to a crime which may or

may not be accompanied by a condition. In light threats, the wrong threatened
does not amount to a crime but is always accompanied by a condition. In other
light threats, the wrong threatened does not amount to a crime and there is no
condition.

The records show that at around 7:30 in the evening, Julia Denido left her
house to go to the barangay hall to report the mauling of her husband which she
witnessed earlier at around 4:00 oclock in the afternoon. On her way there,
petitioner confronted her and pointed a gun to her forehead, while at the same time
saying Saan ka pupunta, gusto mo ito?[20] Considering what transpired earlier
between petitioner and Julias husband, petitioners act of pointing a gun at Julias
forehead clearly enounces a threat to kill or to inflict serious physical injury on her
person. Actions speak louder than words. Taken in the context of the surrounding
circumstances, the uttered words do not go against the threat to kill or to inflict
serious injury evinced by petitioners accompanying act.

Given the surrounding circumstances, the offense committed falls under

Article 282, par. 2 (grave threats) since: (1) killing or shooting someone amounts
to a crime, and (2) the threat to kill was not subject to a condition.

Article 285, par. 1 (other light threats) is inapplicable although it specifically

states, shall threaten another with a weapon or draw such weapon in a quarrel,
since it presupposes that the threat to commit a wrong will not constitute a crime.
That the threat to commit a wrong will constitute or not constitute a crime is the
distinguishing factor between grave threats on one hand, and light and other light
threats on the other.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for utter lack of merit. The

Decision dated December 9, 2005 and the Resolution dated February 15, 2006 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 28707 are AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

WE CONCUR:

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
 REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice


Designated member of Second Division pursuant to Special Order No. 580 in place of Associate Justice Antonio
Eduardo B. Nachura, who was earlier designated as an additional member per Special Order No. 571 but will
take no part being then the Solicitor General.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 46-57. Penned by Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta, with Associate Justices Eliezer R. Delos
Santos and Josefina Guevara-Salonga concurring.
[2]
Id. at 68.
[3]
Records, pp. 256-261. Penned by Judge Erlinda Nicolas-Alvaro.
[4]
Id. at 71-79. Penned by Judge Pio M. Pasia.
[5]
Id. at 1-2.
[6]
Id. at 2.
[7]
Id. at 1.
[8]
Time as stated during cross-examination. In the Sinumpaang Salaysay, the time of the incident is stated
as bandang 7:30 ng gabi.
[9]
Id. at 4 and 140.
[10]
TSN, November 19, 2001, p. 5; Sinumpaang Salaysay (Exhibit A), records, p. 25.
[11]
Id. at 3 and 86.
[12]
Id. at 8-10 and 184.
[13]
Id. at 79.
[14]
Rollo, p. 24.
[15]
Id. at 27.
[16]
Lamis v. Ong, G.R. No. 148923, August 11, 2005, 466 SCRA 510, 517.
[17]
Lorenzo v. People, G.R. No. 152335, December 19, 2005, 478 SCRA 462, 469.
[18]
Changco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128033, March 20, 2002, 379 SCRA 590, 593-594.
[19]
Id. at 594.
[20]
Exhibit A, Records, p. 25

SANTIAGO PAERA, G.R. No. 181626

Petitioner,
Presen
t:
CARP
IO, J., Chair
person,
NAC
HURA,
- versus - PERALTA,
ABA
D, and
MEN
DOZA, JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:

Respondent. May 30, 2011

x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This resolves the petition for review of the ruling of the Regional Trial Court
1 2

of Dumaguete City (RTC) finding petitioner Santiago Paera guilty of three counts of
3

Grave Threats, in violation of Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

The Facts

As punong barangay of Mampas, Bacong, Negros Oriental, petitioner

Santiago Paera (petitioner) allocated his constituents use of communal water coming
from a communal tank by limiting distribution to the residents of Mampas, Bacong.
The tank sits on a land located in the neighboring barangay of Mampas, Valencia and
owned by complainant Vicente Darong (Vicente), father of
complainant Indalecio Darong (Indalecio). Despite petitioners
scheme, Indalecio continued drawing water from the tank. On 7 April 1999, petitioner
reminded Indalecio of the water distribution scheme and cut Indalecios access.

The following day, petitioner inspected the tank after constituents complained
of water supply interruption. Petitioner discovered a tap from the main line which he
promptly disconnected. To stem the flow of water from the ensuing leak, petitioner,
using a borrowed bolo, fashioned a wooden plug. It was at this point
when Indalecio arrived. What happened next is contested by the parties.

According to the prosecution, petitioner, without any warning, picked-up his

bolo and charged towards Indalecio, shouting Patyon tikaw! (I will kill
you!). Indalecio ran for safety, passing along the way his
wife, Diosetea Darong (Diosetea) who had followed him to the water tank. Upon
seeing petitioner, Diosetea inquired what was the matter. Instead of replying,
petitioner shouted Wala koygipili, bisag babaye ka, patyon tikaw! (I dont spare
anyone, even if you are a woman, I will kill you!). Diosetea similarly scampered and
sought refuge in the nearby house of a relative. Unable to pursue Diosetea, petitioner
turned his attention back to Indalecio. As petitioner chased Indalecio, he passed
Vicente, and, recognizing the latter, repeatedly thrust his bolo towards him,
shouting Bisaggulang ka, buk-on nako imo ulo! (Even if you are old, I will crack open
your skull!).
According to petitioner, however, it was Indalecio who threatened him with a bolo,
angrily inquiring why petitioner had severed his water connection. This left petitioner
with no choice but to take a defensive stance using the borrowed bolo,
prompting Indalecio to scamper.

Except for Vicente, who was seriously ill, the Darongs testified during trial. Petitioner
was the defenses lone witness.

The Ruling of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court

The 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Valencia-Bacong, Negros Oriental (MCTC)
found petitioner guilty as charged, ordering petitioner to serve time and pay fine for
each of the three counts. The MCTC found the prosecution evidence sufficient to
4

prove the elements of Grave Threats under Article 282, noting that
the Darongs persistent water tapping contrary to petitioners directive must have
angered petitioner, triggering his criminal behavior. The MCTC rejected petitioners
5

defense of denial as self-serving and uncorroborated. 6

Petitioner appealed to the RTC, reiterating his defense of denial.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The RTC affirmed the MCTC, sustaining the latters finding on petitioners
motive. The RTC similarly found unconvincing petitioners denial in light of the clear,
direct, and consistent testimonies of the Darongs and other prosecution witnesses. 7
Hence, this appeal.

Abandoning his theory below, petitioner now concedes his liability but only for
a single count of the continued complex crime of Grave Threats. Further, petitioner
prays for the dismissal of the case filed by Vicente as the latters failure to testify
allegedly deprived him of his constitutional right to confront witnesses. Alternatively,
petitioner claims he is innocent of the charges for having acted in defense of the
property of strangers and in lawful performance of duty, justifying circumstances
under paragraphs 3 and 5, Article 11 of the RPC. 8

In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) finds merit in petitioners
concession of liability for the single count of the continued complex crime of Grave
Threats. The OSG, however, rejects petitioners prayer for the dismissal of Vicentes
complaint, arguing that petitioners guilt was amply proven by the prosecution
evidence, not to mention that petitioner failed to raise this issue during trial. Further,
the OSG finds the claim of defense of stranger unavailing for lack of unlawful
aggression on the part of the Darongs. Lastly, the OSG notes the absence of regularity
in petitioners performance of duty to justify his conduct. 9

The Issue

The question is whether petitioner is guilty of three counts of Grave Threats.

The Ruling of the Court

We rule in the affirmative, deny the petition and affirm the RTC.

Due Process Mischief in Raising

New Issues on Appeal

Although uncommented, petitioners adoption of new theories for the first time before
this Court has not escaped our attention. Elementary principles of due process forbid
this pernicious procedural strategy - it not only catches off-guard the opposing party, it
also denies judges the analytical benefit uniform theorizing affords. Thus, courts
generally refuse to pass upon freshly raised theories. We would have applied this rule
10

here were it not for the fact that petitioners liberty is at stake and the OSG partially
views his cause with favor.

Petitioner Liable for Three Counts of Grave Threats

To limit his liability to one count of Grave Threats, petitioner tries to fit the facts of
the case to the concept of continued crime (delitocontinuado) which envisages a single
crime committed through a series of acts arising from one criminal intent or
resolution. To fix the penalty for his supposed single continued crime, petitioner
11

invokes the rule for complex crime under Article 48 of the RPC imposing the penalty
for the most serious crime, applied in its maximum period.

The nature of the crime of Grave Threats and the proper application of the
concepts of continued and complex crimes preclude the adoption of petitioners theory.
Article 282 of the RPC holds liable for Grave Threats any person who shall threaten
another with the infliction upon the person x x xof the latter or his family of any
wrong amounting to a crime[.] This felony is consummated as soon as the threats
come to the knowledge of the person threatened. 12

Applying these parameters, it is clear that petitioners threat to

kill Indalecio and Diosetea and crack open Vicentes skull are wrongs on the person
amounting to (at the very least) homicide and serious physical injuries as penalized
under the RPC. These threats were consummated as soon as Indalecio, Diosetea, and
Vicente heard petitioner utter his threatening remarks. Having spoken the threats at
different points in time to these three individuals, albeit in rapid succession, petitioner
incurred three separate criminal liabilities.

Petitioners theory fusing his liability to one count of Grave Threats because he only
had a single mental resolution, a single impulse, and single intent to threaten
13

the Darongs assumes a vital fact: that he had foreknowledge of Indalecio, Diosetea,
and Vicentes presence near the water tank in the morning of 8 April 1999. The
records, however, belie this assumption. Thus, in the case of Indalecio, petitioner was
as much surprised to see Indalecio as the latter was in seeing petitioner when they
chanced upon each other near the water tank. Similarly, petitioner came
across Diosetea as he was chasing Indalecio who had scampered for safety. Lastly,
petitioner crossed paths with Vicente while running after Indalecio. Indeed, petitioner
went to the water tank not to execute his single intent to threaten Indalecio, Diosetea,
and Vicente but to investigate a suspected water tap. Not having known in advance of
the Darongs presence near the water tank at the time in question, petitioner could not
have formed any intent to threaten any of them until shortly before he inadvertently
came across each of them.

The importance of foreknowledge of a vital fact to sustain a claim of continued

crime undergirded our ruling in Gamboa v. Court of Appeals. There, the accused, as
14

here, conceded liability to a lesser crime one count of estafa, and not 124 as charged
theorizing that his conduct was animated by a single fraudulent intent to divert
deposits over a period of several months. We rejected the claim

[f]or the simple reason that [the accused] was not possessed of any fore-
knowledge of any deposit by any customer on any day or occasion and
which would pass on to his possession and control. At most, his intent to
misappropriate may arise only when he comes in possession of the
deposits on each business day but not in futuro, since petitioner company
operates only on a day-to-day transaction. As a result, there could be as
many acts of misappropriation as there are times the private respondent
 abstracted and/or diverted the deposits to his own personal use and
benefit. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
15

Similarly, petitioners intent to threaten Indalecio, Diosetea, and Vicente with bodily
harm arose only when he chanced upon each of his victims.

Indeed, petitioners theory holds water only if the facts are altered that is, he
threatened Indalecio, Diosetea, and Vicente at the same place and at the same time.
Had this been true, then petitioners liability for one count of Grave Threats would
have rested on the same basis grounding our rulings that the taking of six roosters or
16

13 cows found at the same place and taken at the same time results in the commission
17

of only one count of theft because

[t]here is no series of acts committed for the accomplishment of different
purposes, but only of one which was consummated, and which
determines the existence of only one crime. The act of taking the
roosters [and heads of cattle] in the same place and on the sameoccasion
cannot give rise to two crimes having an independent existence of their
own, because there are not two distinct appropriations nor two
intentions that characterize two separate crimes. (Emphasis in the
18

original)

Having disposed of petitioners theory on the nature of his offense, we see no reason to
extensively pass upon his use of the notion of complex crime to avail of its liberal
penalty scheme. It suffices to state that under Article 48 of the RPC, complex crimes
encompass either (1) an act which constitutes two or more grave or less grave
offenses; or (2) an offense which is a necessary means for committing another and
19

petitioner neither performed a single act resulting in less or less grave crimes nor
committed an offense as a means of consummating another.

The Prosecution Proved the Commission

of Grave Threats Against Vicente
We find no reversible error in the RTCs affirmance of the MCTCs ruling, holding
petitioner liable for Grave Threats against Vicente. The prosecutions evidence,
consisting of the testimonies of Indalecio, Diosetea and two other corroborating
witnesses, indisputably show petitioner threatening Vicente with death. Vicentes
20 21

inability to take the stand, for documented medical reason, does not detract from the
22

veracity and strength of the prosecution evidence. Petitioners claim of denial of his
constitutional right to confront witnesses is untenable as he had every opportunity to
cross-examine the four prosecution witnesses. No law requires the presentation of the
private complainant as condition for finding guilt for Grave Threats, especially if, as
here, there were other victims and witnesses who attested to its commission against
the non-testifying complainant. Significantly, petitioner did not raise Vicentes non-
appearance as an issue during the trial, indicating that he saw nothing significant in the
latters absence.

No Justifying Circumstances Attended Petitioners

Commission of Grave Threats

There is likewise no merit in petitioners claim of having acted to defend[] and

protect[] the water rights of his constituents in the lawful exercise of his office
as punong barangay. The defense of stranger rule under paragraph 3, Article 11 of
23

the RPC, which negates criminal liability of

[a]nyone who acts in the defense of the person or rights of a stranger,

provided that the first and second requisites mentioned in the first
circumstance of this article are present and that the person defending be
not induced by revenge, resentment or other evil motive.

requires proof of (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) absence of evil motives
such as revenge and resentment. None of these requisites obtain here. Not one of
24

the Darongscommitted acts of aggression against third parties rights when petitioner
successively threatened them with bodily harm. Indeed, all of them were performing
ordinary, peaceful acts Indalecio was standing near the water tank, Diosetea was
walking towards Indalecio and Vicente was standing in the vegetable garden a few
meters away. With the element of unlawful aggression absent, inquiry on the
reasonableness of the means petitioner used to prevent or repel it is rendered
irrelevant. As for the third requisite, the records more than support the conclusion that
petitioner acted with resentment, borne out of the Darongs repeated refusal to follow
his water distribution scheme, causing him to lose perspective and angrily threaten
the Darongs with bodily harm.

Lastly, the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or exercise of office under

the 5th paragraph of Article 11 of the RPC lies upon proof that the offense committed
was the necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise
of office. Arguably, petitioner acted in the performance of his duty to ensure delivery
25

of basic services when he barred the Darongs access to the communal water tank.
26

Nevertheless, petitioner exceeded the bounds of his office when he successively

chased the Darongs with a bladed weapon, threatening harm on their persons, for
violating his order. A number of options constituting lawful and due discharge of his
office lay before petitioner and his resort to any of them would have spared him from
27

criminal liability. His failure to do so places his actions outside of the ambit of
criminally immune official conduct. Petitioner ought to know that no amount of
concern for the delivery of services justifies use by local elective officials of violence
or threats of violence.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 28

November 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, Branch 39.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
 Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE C. MENDOZA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice
1 Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

2 Dated 28 November 2007, penned by Judge Arlene Catherine A. Dato.

3 Branch 39.

4 The dispositive portion of the MCTCs ruling provides (Rollo, p. 171):

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Santiago Paera GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Grave Threats under paragraph 2, Article 282 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, in all the above-entitled cases, and the Court hereby sentences him the
penalty of two (2) months and one (1) day to four (4) months of arresto mayor and FINE of Five
Hundred Pesos (P500.00) for each case.

5 Id. at 170.

6 Id. at 171.

7 Id. at 39.

8 Id. at 21-28.

9 Id. at 190-200.

10 Heirs of Lorenzo and Carmen Vidad v. Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 166461, 30 April 2010, 619
SCRA 609.

11 Santiago v. Garchitorena, G.R. No. 109266, 2 December 1993, 228 SCRA 214, 224, citing Padilla, Criminal
Law 53-54 (1988).

12 People v. Villanueva, Nos. 3133-3144-R, 27 February 1950, 48 O.G. 1376 (No. 4), 1381.

13 Rollo, p. 22.

14 160-A Phil. 962 (1975).

15 Id. at 971.

16 People v. Jaranilla, 154 Phil. 516 (1974). See also People v. De Leon, 49 Phil. 437 (1926) (involving conviction
for one count of theft for the taking of two roosters).
17 People v. Tumlos, 67 Phil. 320 (1939).

18 Gamboa v. Court of Appeals, supra note 14 at 970 (internal citations omitted).

19Article 48 provides: Penalty for complex crimes. When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious
crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.

20 Pedro Salvoro and Roberto Pontonilla.

21 Rollo, p. 169.

22The prosecution presented in evidence the certification of Dr. Fe V. Tagimacruz, municipal health officer of
Valencia, Negros Oriental, attesting that Vicente suffered from Alzheimers disease (id.).

23 Rollo, pp. 24-25.

24 The first two requisites correspond to the first two requirements under the first paragraph of the provision.

25 People v. Pajenado, 161 Phil. 234 (1976).

26 Republic Act No. 7160, Section 389(b)(12).

27 Among others, petitioner could have given the Darongs a final warning or, dispensing with such, immediately
sought injunctive relief from the courts.