Krzysztof Jerzy Gruszczyńsk WMU in Warsaw, Poland

NATO’s and its member’s military doctrines

Si vis pacem, para bellum (draft as of june 2016))

1
Table of contents
Acronyms

Introduction
I. The new military threats to international peace, stability and security
II. The XXI century military warfare: cyber war and hybrid war
III. Contemporary military strategy of The Federation of Russia
IV. Contemporary military strategy of People’s Republic of China
V. Present USA military doctrine
VI. NATO response to Russian military threat
VII. Contemporary military strategy of NATO’s allies
VIII. Contemporary military strategy of Republic of Poland
IX. EU common defense and security policy
X. Conclusion

Bibliography

2
Introduction

The November 13 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris have not only crystallized the
threat of the self-declared Islamic State ISIS to the world, but also created an unlikely
opportunity to open a dialogue with The Federation of Russia. However, these
tragedies do not change the long-term threat The Federation of Russia poses to
peace, stability and security in European Union. The Federation of Russia’s
encroachment in Ukraine is a threat to the security and stability of the European
Union and tests the resolve of NATO in an unprecedented way, similar though to the
period of Cold War, which inexorably is coming back.
Unfortunately once again the European Union faces the question how to deter
the The Federation of Russia aggression and whether ensuring peace by deterring
warlike power through armaments means that merely being prepared for war is not
enough and that it is necessary to wage war in order to deter war? The Federation of
Russia President Vladimir Putin’s 2015 military intervention in Syria is further
evidence of his ambition to broaden his country influence and capitalize on regional
instability. Recent violations of Turkish airspace on January 29 2016 by aircraft of
the Russian air group in the Syrian Arab Republic ads to this problem1
Although the circumstances around the conflict between The Federation of
Russia and the European Union today differ considerably from those of the Cold War,
it nonetheless poses a serious threat to European Union security and stability, and
demands a careful and comprehensive European Union response. This requires the
review of modern military doctrine not only of NATO and its allies but also the main
adversaries China, North Korea and Russia. A given military doctrine2 is a description
of the work strategy, contribution and a generalized mission statement of the
integrated military forces in battles, operations and engagements. This Doctrine
facilitates common work functionality standards across the military. This in-turn
contributes to the standardization of the operations, coordination of the forces in
carrying out a mission and enhancing the success rate of accomplishing military
tasks. A brief review of developments in Chinese military policy since the fall of 1976.

1
Two Turkish F-16s shot down a Russian Su-24 on Nov. 24 after it briefly violated Turkish airspace along
Turkey’s border with Syria. Turkish-Russian relations are badly strained after the incident. Russia announced a
slew of commercial sanctions on Turkey, which Ankara calculated could cost the country up to $9 billion
2
Doctrine is a guide to anyone who wants to learn about war from books: it will light their way, ease their
progress, train their judgment and help them to avoid pitfalls. Doctrine is meant to educate the minds of future
commanders.....not to accompany them to the battlefields. C Von Clausewitz On War

3
Topics considered include the changes in People’s Republic of China's security
environment, key issues on People’s Republic of China's military modernization
agenda, an assessment of various factors tending to limit the prospects for rapid or
far-reaching policy changes, and observations on the emergent framework of
Chinese defense doctrine. The paper offers some tentative conclusions on the
implications of these policy changes for the PRC's relations with both the United
States of America and states throughout East Asia.
NATO and its allies might once again return to the concept of containment,
which was a mode of European Union relations that many presumed would be
relegated to the dustbin of history at the end of the Cold War. However, the current
period might accurately be dubbed the era of “new containment”, with many urging
the United States of America, NATO and European Union to once again contain,
constrain and counter what they view as The Federation of Russia’s expansionist
policies. However Russia believes that NATO expansion to the East enables the
alliance to deploy forces next to Russia’s borders and then accuse Russia of
„carrying out dangerous maneuvers near the alliance’s bases.
The first chapter The new military threats to international peace, stability and
security places its main emphasis on modern military threats to international
community, perceives selected conflicts from the perspective of hybrid warfare and
its component of information operations and analyzes consequent impacts on
international security. The international community now face multiple, simultaneous
security challenges from traditional state actors and trans regional networks of sub-
state groups – all taking advantage of rapid technological change. Future conflicts
will come more rapidly, last longer, and take place on a much more technically
challenging battlefield. People’s Republic of China’s actions is adding tension to the
Asia-Pacific region. For example, its claims to nearly the entire South The People’s
Republic of China Sea are inconsistent with international public law. The international
community continues to call on The People’s Republic of China to settle such issues
cooperatively and without coercion. The People’s Republic of China has responded
with aggressive land reclamation efforts that will allow it to position military forces
astride vital international sea lanes. People’s Republic of China’s military budget has
grown even faster than its GDP, averaging over 12 % for over a decade. The 2.3-
million-strong People’s Liberation Army is fast developing high-tech weaponry, from
stealth fighters to precision missiles and nuclear submarines. Its first aircraft carrier is

4
due to enter service in August. The goal is clearly to project power at a time when
Beijing continues to cast a covetous eye over Taiwan and is locked in territorial
disputes with neighbors in the South The People’s Republic of China Sea and
beyond. The People’s Republic of China is a direct threat to European and US hopes
of spreading democratic values. Beyond its repression of domestic dissidence, The
People’s Republic of China has been a consistent barrier to UN efforts to curtail
despotism from Burma to Sudan and Syria. Republic of China Africa policy runs
counter to EU attempts to link development to human rights and People’s Republic of
China’s very economic success undermines the European Union’s aspirations to be a
model for others to follow. The Federation of Russia’s Vladimir Putin disregards arms
control agreements, places sophisticated weapons close to NATO’s borders, and
deliberately sows uncertainty over his intentions. He is creating no-go areas in parts
of Eastern European Union, making NATO allies nervous and challenging European
Union’s security order. The Federation of Russia has “repeatedly demonstrated that it
does not respect the sovereignty of its neighbors and it is willing to use force to
achieve its goals. The Federation of Russia’s military actions is undermining regional
security directly and through proxy forces.” NATO’s strategists (and those at the
Pentagon) worry about something more opaque. The Federation of Russia feels
surrounded by NATO, and a paranoid The Federation of Russia is cause for concern.
The Federation of Russia’s 2014 military doctrine pointed to the perceived danger of
NATO enlargement, the alliance’s missile defense system and “the establishment in
states bordering The Federation of Russia of regimes whose policies threaten The
Federation of Russian interests” ‒ a veiled reference to changes of government in
Ukraine and Georgia. In response, Putin is trying to push the European Union out of
a region he considers The Federation of Russia’s near abroad. On 2 March, 2015
Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen convened the North Atlantic Council due
to what it called The Federation of Russia’s military action and President Vladimir
Putin’s alleged threats against Ukraine. The North Atlantic Council condemned what
it called The Federation of Russia's military escalation in Crimea and called it a
breach of international public law. However it seems that transferring authority of
Crimea to Ukraine in 1954 was a violation of Soviet law and returning it to Russia
corrects that mistake, because when soviet leader Nikita Krushchev signed Crimea
over to Ukrainian control, no one expected that the USSR would break up and that
when it did, Crimea was handed over It also called conthe Federation of Russia to

5
respect its obligations under the UN Charter, the Budapest Memorandum of 1994,
the Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation between The Federation of Russia and
Ukraine of 1997 and the legal framework regulating the presence of the The
Federation Of Russian Black Sea Fleet Director of National Intelligence James
Clapper in early February 2016 submitted a statement of record to the US Congress
that indicated The Federation of Russia will vigorously pursue efforts aimed at
reestablishing the Great Power status that it lost in 1991, when the USSR imploded
USA Defense Secretary Ash Carter, meanwhile, in February 2016 accused The
Federation of Russia of intimidating its immediate neighbors, and said he doubted
whether The Federation of Russia was still committed to strategic stability on nuclear
weapons. The Federation of Russia has repeatedly dismissed assertions by USA and
European officials that it presents a threat to the European Union, portraying the
accusations as dangerous saber-rattling. The Federation of Russia seemed intent "to
erode the principled international order that has served us, our friends and allies, the
international community, and also The Federation of Russia itself so well for so long."
The Federation Of Russia's military doctrine updated in recent years laid out new
guidelines for the use of nuclear weapons, and The Federation Of Russia's ongoing
deployment to Syria has been widely seen as a showcase for new weaponry and a
training ground for new military tactics The United States of America and NATO has
moved slowly to adjust to The Federation Of Russian actions, which have included
increased bomber and fighter-jet flights near NATO members' borders, as well as the
military deployment to Syria, The Federation Of Russia's largest in decades. “The
Federation of Russia is assuming a more assertive cyber posture based on its
willingness to target critical infrastructure systems and conduct espionage operations
even when detected and under increased public scrutiny. The Pentagon's budget
request for the coming fiscal year includes a $3.4 billion quadrupling of spending to
bolster European defense. And NATO recently announced plans to begin rotating up
to a brigade-sized, multinational force into some Eastern European and Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania, in an effort to reassure alliance members.
The next chapter II the XXI century military warfare: hybrid war and cyber war
discusses the nature of explains why new methods of modern conflicts were utilized,
and introduces the essential characteristics of the cyber warfare. The 2015 The
Federation of Russia intervention in Ukraine has generated much debate about the
use and effectiveness of hybrid warfare, a type of warfare widely understood to blend

6
conventional/unconventional, regular/irregular, and information and cyber warfare.
The term ‘hybrid warfare’ appeared at least as early as 2005 and was subsequently
used to describe the strategy used by the Hezbollah in the 2006 Lebanon War. Since
then, the term “hybrid” has dominated much of the discussion about modern and
future warfare, to the point where it has been adopted by senior military leaders and
promoted as a basis for modern military strategies. The Federation of Russia has
been using an advanced form of hybrid warfare in Ukraine since early 2014 that
relies heavily on an element of information warfare that the The Federation of
Russians calls “reflexive control.” The primary objective of the reflexive control
techniques The Federation of The Federation of Russia has employed in the Ukraine
situation has been to persuade the to do something its leaders mostly wanted to do
in the first place, namely, remain on the sidelines as The Federation of The
Federation of Russia dismantled Ukraine. These techniques would not have
succeeded in the face of European Union leaders determined to stop The Federation
of Russia aggression and punish or reverse The Federation of Russia violations of
international public law. The Federation of Russia has been unable so far to
translate the strategic and grand strategic advantages of its hybrid warfare strategy
into major and sustainable successes on the ground in Ukraine. It appears;
moreover that The Federation of Russia may be reaching a point of diminishing
returns in continuing a strategy that relies in part on its unexpectedness in Ukraine.
Yet the same doctrine of reflexive control has succeeded in surprising the European
Union in Syria. The European Union must thus awaken itself to this strategy and to
adaptations of it. The future hybrid campaigns might be easily conducted by
circumventing international public law through attribution problem in cyberspace 3
through current modern communication technologies. Cyber attacks are a direct
threat to the Republic of Poland’s war fighting ability given its reliance on information
networks. Hostile states, including The Federation of Russia, now have ready access
to highly capable and technologically advanced tools to target others through
internet-connected systems and we are seeing greater use of offensive cyber
operations. Therefore the biggest threat to national security these days comes from

3
The interdependent network of information technology infrastructures that includes the Internet,
telecommunications networks, computers, information or communications systems, networks, and embedded
processors and controllers. [in]: USA Cyber Operations Policy (U); National Security Presidential Directive
(NSPD) 54/Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 23, SUBJECT: Cyber security Policy (U); 8
January 2008)

7
not from aircraft carriers or infantry divisions, but a computer with a simple Internet
connection. Cyber warfare involves the actions by a nation-state or international
organization to attack and attempt to damage another nation's computers or
information networks through, for example, computer viruses or denial-of-service
attack. That much became clear after the catastrophic hack in June 2015 —most
likely by a foreign power—of sensitive federal employee data stored online. The
federal government suffered a staggering 61,000 cyber-security breaches last year
alone. This most recent wave of hacks exposed the records of up to 14 million
current and former US government employees, some dating back to 1985.
Compromised information includes Social Security numbers, job assignments and
performance evaluations. Cyber threats4 don’t only come in the form of traditional
hacking. The Federation of Russia has set up a sophisticated “troll army” under the
umbrella of its Internet Research Agency to wage a massive disinformation campaign
in support for its invasion of Ukraine, and of the Kremlin in general. These trolls work
hard, each one pumping out 135 comments per 12-hour shift. Furthermore, each troll
is reportedly required to post 50 news articles a day while maintaining at least six
Face book and ten Twitter accounts. That’s a whole lot of misinformation. Despite
economic hardship caused by sanctions, The Federation of Russia believes in this
mission enough to employ a full-time staff of 400 with a monthly budget of $400,000.
A full 70 % of America’s corporate intellectual property theft is believed to originate
from People’s Republic of China. That doesn’t just mean random hackers who
operate within People’s Republic of China’s borders; we’re talking about elite cyber
groups housed by the government in Beijing. The People’s Republic of China
decided long ago that it couldn’t compete with the USA in direct military strength. The
US already outspends The People’s Republic of China more than 4-to-1 in that
regard, making catch-up near impossible. Beijing has instead decided to focus
instead on commercial and government espionage. While exact figures are hard to
come by, in May 2013 two former Pentagon officials admitted that “Chinese computer
spies raided the databanks of almost every major USA defense contractor and made
off with some of the country’s most closely guarded technological secrets The United

4
A circumstance or event that has or indicates the potential to exploit vulnerabilities and to adversely impact
organizational operations, organizational assets (including information and information systems), individuals,
other organizations, or society. More extensively Department of Homeland Security, National Initiative for
Cyber security Careers and Studies

8
States of America needs a smooth, well-functioning mutual aide system for cyber
security that provides all of the hard-won benefits of the nation's system for
hurricanes and other emergencies.

The chapter III Contemporary military strategy of The Federation of Russia

seeks to provide a fresh outlook how the Russian perceive the American threat to
their peaceful existence. The next chapter Contemporary military strategy of The
Federation of Russia President Vladimir Putin signed the new The Federation of
Russian Military Doctrine into effect on 25 December 2014, replacing the version of
February 2010. It was drafted by a Security Council working group, and had been
commissioned before the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis in July 2013. So as well as
representing a response to the current conflict escalation, the document also
addresses broader changes in The Federation Of Russia’s domestic and foreign
policy environment The list of “military threats” has not changed since 2010. But in a
context of tension, more of the outlined scenarios now apply to the United States of
America and NATO: “an abrupt exacerbation of the military-political situation
(interstate relations”, “a show of military force” through exercises in The Federation
Of Russia’s neighborhood or “obstructing” state and military command and control,
for example through a “global strike”. The Military Doctrine reflects the tense state of
relations between The Federation of Russia and the European Union. The potential
for direct and indirect conflict results less from any flexing of military muscles such as
The Federation Of Russian aircraft flying close to NATO borders or announcements
of arms purchases; ultimately, in view of the economic crisis, it is dubious whether
the latter will be implemented in full. The real challenge consists in the “non-linear
warfare” that Fe Russia may in future apply in other post-Soviet states. NATO and
the European Union too, must find adequate responses. In the military sphere it is not
helpful that conventional arms control has been deadlocked for years. In fact this is
precisely the aspect that needs to be adapted to take account of “non-linear warfare”,
for example by including other armed organs or permitting foreign observers to
observe smaller exercises at least close to the borders. The question for the
European Union will be above all to strengthen the resilience of its eastern members
and especially its post-Soviet partners, for example through a joint energy strategy or
better integration of their The Federation of Russian minorities. The Federation of
Russia’s new Doctrine still asserts interest in cooperating with the European Union

9
on fighting terrorism and Islamist extremism, on reviving arms control and on
strategic missile defense. NATO and the European Union should pragmatically grasp
the opportunities for cooperation that exist there. But they should abandon the
illusion that there could be positive spill-over effects for the general state of relations.
To observe the old rule Audi alteram partem (or audiatur et altera pars) meaning
"listen to the other side", or "let the other side be heard as well, in accordacne with
the principle that no person should be judged without a fair hearing in which each
party is given the opportunity to respond to the evidence against them, the Russian
grounds for annexation of Ukraine will be presented. Russia’s deployment of military
forces within the sovereign territory of the Ukraine, it’s ordering of Ukrainian forces to
withdraw from the Crimean Peninsula and its occupation and annexation of Crimea
has been decried by the international community as violations of international law.
Yet Russia has put before the Security Council and the international media a series
of defenses arguing that it has not acted contrary to international law. First, Russia
argued that it acted in defense of Russian speakers residing in Crimea. Then, Russia
stated that its use of force was in response to a request for military assistance by the
democratically-elected head of the Ukrainian State. Later, Russia argued that it never
used military force in the Ukraine; rather, it was local Ukrainian militias that stormed
and occupied Ukrainian military bases. Finally, Russia argued that the annexation of
the Crimea was achieved by a democratic referendum in which over 97% of
Crimean’s voted to voluntarily separate from Ukraine and join Russia as a federal
subject Putin perceives the European Union as a genuine strategic threat. The threat
comes from the EU’s potential to reform associated countries in ways that pull them
away from Russia. The EU’s Association Agreements and DCFTAs are incompatible
with Putin’s plan to expand Russia’s Customs Union with Belarus and Kazakhstan
and create a “Eurasian Union.” Putin’s goal is to secure markets for Russian products
and guarantee Russian jobs. He also sees the Eurasian Union as a buffer against
alien “civilization” ideas and values from European Union and the West. Western
European Union and The United States, or rather the politicians in that part of the
world, think it is okay, all it takes is to „introduce democracy and the state of law“. Till
this day they have not learned anything from the fact the repeated attempts to „export
democracy“ have failed and that even two decades of massive western support to
Bosnia and Herzegovina, artificially created after the disintegration of Yugoslavia
bore no fruit. Not to mention the Arab Spring. The European political mainstream,

10
represented by the elites in Brussels makes a calculation that the Ukrainian crisis can
be used to strengthen European centralization and unification, especially the
direction of a joint foreign policy (designed to silence the still differing foreign policies
of individual EU states) and the creation of a joint European army, an idea resisted by
most member states so far. A large part of the European political mainstream
(although much less in Germany and even less in the south of the EU) tries, together
with the United States, to turn Russia into a “bogey man” in the East, something that
is in the American strategic interest. Ukraine is only a tool in that respect

Simply stated Ukraine as to a great extent is an artificial entity that did not turn
into an independent state until the breakup of the USSR two decades ago. The state
of Ukraine today is a sad outcome of Stalin's attempts to mix up nations and
boundaries, disrupt natural historical ties and create a new Soviet man by turning
original nations into mere ethnic residua and historical leftovers Ukraine as we know
it today, has no historical tradition of statehood, and in over twenty years of its
existence the country failed to create a state that would be accepted by the bulk of its
population. The state was not born out of its people's efforts to gain self-
determination and sovereignty, it came into being through the dissolution of the
USSR by its political leadership, and emancipation of the artificial Soviet republics,
created by The Federation of Russia in their then valid borders The new state
emerged from an essentially artificial administrative portion of the Soviet totalitarian
Union that wanted to show the world how the national issue can be resolved once
and for all by replacing individual nations with the „Soviet people“. The Russian and
crucified areas of the east and south of Ukraine (with three hundred years of Russian
history behind them) were artificially linked to the originally Polish Galicia and
Subcarpathian Ruthenia acquired by Stalin after World War II, lands that had never
belonged to any of the old Slav states in the East. The independent Ukrainian state
did not exist before 1991, unless we consider as such the brief period of civil war
after the 1917 October revolution, when unsuccessful attempts at Ukrainian
independence featured such controversial figures as general Skoropadsky, atamans
Machno and Petljura, or Stepan Bandera in World War II. Their legacy (anti-
semitism, affinity to German Nazis), is considered very controversial outside the
nationalistic western Ukraine. More than twenty years of Ukrainian independence that
followed, were not enough to create a common Ukrainian identity and convince the

11
people of this very heterogeneous land that independent Ukraine is the right social
formation, fulfilling their national aspirations. Such ambition is seen in especially
among ethnic Ukrainians living in the west (Galicia, Volhynia) who accentuate the
tragic experience of the Soviet era (deportations, gulags, famine), harbor anti-
Russian feelings and wish to build Ukraine as a Ukrainian nation state. The position
of a „second“Russian state as sought by Presidents Kravchuk and Kuchma is
unacceptable to them. It is no coincidence that this backward and weak western part
of Ukraine was the moving force behind the 2004 Orange Revolution as well as the
Maidan protests in 2014. By overthrowing Janukovych, the nationalist western part of
the land assumed exclusive power attempting to disrupt the long, traditional
Ukrainian ties to Russia, and replace it with exclusive orientation on the West, the EU
and the United States. However, experience shows that western Ukraine is not
strong enough to fulfill these plans – the economic weight of its eastern part so far
prevailed every time After twenty years of independence, Ukraine is a divided country
on the threshold of economic bankruptcy. It is home to two nations with different and
probably antagonistic visions of the future, two nations growing apart every day. Both
these nations look up to the world outside with unrealistic expectations – one to the
West, the other to Russia.

Ukraine includes territories in the west that had never belonged to the Russian
empire (Transcarpathian region, Galicia, and others) and became part of Russia only
after [World War II], and on the other hand territories that were from the 18th century
purely Russian (Crimea, Odessa, the Eastern part of the country), for which the
independence of the Ukraine meant the extraction from their original nation. Russian
and russified areas of the east and south of Ukraine (with three hundred years of
Russian history behind them) were artificially linked to the originally Polish Galicia
and Subcarpathian Ruthenia acquired by Stalin after World War II, lands that had
never belonged to any of the old Slav states in the East. The best to this poor country
is to remain—a country economically deeply rooted in the post-Soviet bloc, a country
linked to Russia and in many respects dependent on it. For Russia, the Ukraine is
more than just its closest foreign country, more than e.g. Estonia, Tajikistan, or
Azerbaijan. It is the historic cradle of its statehood and culture, home to tens of
millions of Russians.

12
 Russia argues that the separation of Crimea from Ukraine resulted from
genuine efforts of its people to attain independence. But he offers very little evidence
for that claim. Crimea long enjoyed considerable autonomy within Ukraine, including
its own constitution. The only openly separatist movement in Crimea, Russian Unity,
led by the self-proclaimed prime minister of Crimea, Sergey Aksyonov(also known as
“Goblin” in Crimea’s underworld) secured only three seats out 100 in the last election
to the Crimean Parliament. And between 2011 and 2014, the publicly declared
support for joining Russia among Crimean inhabitants was between 23 and 41
percent. Further claim is that the Maidan demonstrations turned radical, although “the
government [of Viktor Yanukovych] [made] all kinds of concessions and [took] no
repressive action against them.” 5 In addition the demonstrations were organized by
“the comrades in Western European Union and in the United States,” with the
purpose of “fuelling tensions in Ukraine, organizing all those Maidens [sic]; that was a
way of destroying Ukraine. The current situation is a result of complicated historical,
political, and cultural legacies of Ukraine, and not of Russia’s involvement, which has
been only reactive. Granted, Ukraine’s political and economic transition hardly
qualifies as a success. After the Kiev putsch was carried out (unconstitutionally for
legalistic purists), after all those who dared have a different opinion faced brutal
violence, after the de facto expulsion of the democratically elected president who did
not dare act against violent demonstrators, and after the concerns of the Russian part
of Ukrainian population started increasing steadily, the most specific and
geographically limited, formally autonomous part of Ukraine – the Crimea – became
subject to a referendum (clearly with consent and silent joy on the Russian part), in
which an overwhelming part of the population took part, and resolutely expressed the
wish of the population of Crimea to cease their association with Ukraine (where they
never belonged before Khrushchev's intervention in 1954). It is obvious that these
people did not feel like remaining in a vacuum and wished to return to Russia. It is
equally obvious Russia can be happy about it (despite substantial short-term
problems), but the sequence of events was different from what we find in mainstream
media purporting that Russia annexed Crimea on its own will. In Georgia's
breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Russia managed to mass-

5
In reality, Maidan demonstrations emerged as a direct response to the crackdown on the demonstrators on
November 30th. This was followed, way before the violent events of this February, by a series of repressive acts
by regime against peaceful protesters, such as the one on December 11th 20114

13
distribute Russian passports to local residents to provide a pretext for its military
intervention in 2008. In Crimea, however, Russia did not have this luxury because it
had to act quickly once Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych fled. Indeed,
"Operation Annex Crimea" — from Russia's initial incursion to the Russian-Crimea
treaty signing — was completed in only 18 days.

Chapter IV Contemporary military strategy of The People’s Republic of China

describes the role and implications for US of military armaments of China. People’s
Republic of China’s current military strategy was adopted in 1993. Following the end
of the Cold War and the demonstration of advanced precision-strike capabilities in
the Gulf War, People’s Republic of China’s leaders instructed their armed forces to
prepare to fight “local wars under modern high technology conditions” (ago josh
tiaojian xia jubu zhangzheng). In the most general terms, adoption of this strategy
stemmed from the conclusion that small and medium-sized local conflicts, not
general or total wars, were the most likely threats that The People’s Republic of
China would encounter in the post-Cold War period. Chinese writings characterized
these conflicts as sudden, intense and destructive, features which in turn required
The People’s Republic of China to develop new capabilities stressing joint
operations, rapid response and offensive strikes to deter such wars from arising or to
win them if they did occur. The military goal pursued by The People’s Republic of
China that attracts most attention today is the potential use of force over Taiwan,
which Chinese writings identify as a mission distinct from the maintenance of
territorial integrity. At the moment, People’s Republic of China’s leaders emphasize
preventing the island’s de jure independence and, with growing economic
interdependence, creating conditions for “peaceful unification” (heping tongyi).
Another goal that has also attracted increasing attention in the USA and around the
Asia Pacific is People’s Republic of China’s emphasis on defending “maritime rights
and interests.” For People’s Republic of China’s leaders, maritime security involves
several different but related challenges. First, The People’s Republic of China
disputes the sovereignty of three groups of offshore islands. Although it controls all of
the Paracels disputed with Vietnam, it holds only a minority of the features in the
Spratlys and none of the Senkakus. Second, The People’s Republic of China has yet
to reach delimitation agreements with its maritime neighbors (except for Vietnam)
and thus agree upon the control of undersea resources, especially petroleum. Third,

14
as its economy has developed, Chinese sources reflect an increased sensitivity to
military threats from the sea to People’s Republic of China’s wealthy coastal
provinces, the need to exploit maritime resources for economic development and,
more generally, the vulnerability of People’s Republic of China’s economy to its
dependence of sea lines of communication that can be disrupted or blockaded in a
conflict.

The following chapter V Present USA military doctrine outlines US doctrine

2015 which is the way to directly shape what the doctrine process of the future will
look like. This is the first comprehensive review of US doctrine structure that is based
on the impact that an evolving operational environment and technological advances
have in how we collect, display and disseminate information Doctrine's enduring
value is truly realized only to the extent it is inculcated across the Army. The
implementation plan guides the incorporation of Doctrine 2015 through education and
training lanes, including conferences, curriculum, CTCs and war fighter exercises.
Doctrine 2015 creates a top-to-bottom hierarchy of publications, beginning with the
top-level, easy-to-read doctrinal principles called Army Doctrine Publications, or
ADPs. They are 10-15 pages long and easily accessible to Soldiers through
technology. The lower level publications, called Army Techniques Publications, or
ATPs, will likely change the fastest. The Army can update these more rapidly without
having to change the whole body of information on a specific subject. However, it’s
worth remembering that NATO and it means the US was the main adversary during
the Cold War, and its expansion eastward is considered a threat even today, despite
its changed mission after the 1989 fall of Communism in Eastern Europe and the
breakup of the Republic of Poland Pact. China, despite military cooperation and a
number of common interests with The Federation of Russia, is by far the top long-
term threat. Thus, the ruling Russian elites promote the narrative of their country
being besieged by potential enemies and threats of various levels of seriousness,
which serves as a powerful motivation for the Russian leadership to conduct military
reforms—and for the Russian population to support them. Building up the new armed
services for the XXI century has become a top priority for the third Putin
administration Russian leaders are concerned about U.S. military superiority and the
progress of China’s military over the long term. They are worried about non-state
strategic threats, such as radical Islamists, both domestic and in Central Asia. To

15
counter these threats, the Russian government has appropriated 22 trillion rubles
over the next decade for modernization of the military. Of that amount, roughly $650
billion will be spent on new equipment. Such big procurement and restructuring
program includes 100 new naval vessels, 600 new warplanes, and 1,000 new
helicopters, to be delivered by the year 2020 The modernization of the Russian
military has important implications for U.S. military readiness, force structure, and
military posture in the Central Command, European Command, and Pacific
Command. The growing Russian interests in the Syria and Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania affect US forces and allies. However, U.S. intelligence
capabilities have been committed for the past 12 years to the Middle East and
Afghanistan. However, with the Russian military strengthening overall, combined with
U.S. defense budget cuts, the U.S. military superiority vis-à-vis The Federation of
Russia and China is declining. However unlikely a future full-scale war between the
U.S. and Russia might be, the U.S. should prepare to win handily—and that takes
information, personnel, platforms, funds, and allies. With military budget cuts and
U.S. global disengagement, all these factors are becoming uncertain. Russia’s
military buildup and modernization has serious implications for U.S. foreign policy
and security objectives. First, a more powerful The Federation Russia may become a
threat to NATO allies. Therefore this increase in military power will affect countries of
the former USSR, which are seeking more freedom from Russia and are trying to
shake off their past as imperial subjects, including Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, and
the countries of the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Finally, Russian military
power will be a factor to take into account in conflicts in the Middle East, including the
recent friction with the U.S. over Syria. The U.S. government should be mindful of
Russia’s return as an important factor in international relations. Russia will
increasingly affect its neighbors in Eastern and Central Europe, in the South
Caucasus, and in Central Asia, and will do its best to project power into the
Mediterranean and the Middle East. Furthermore it is vital that the Obama
Administration and his successor 2016 increase intelligence gathering on Russian
military modernization and strategic and tactical goals, programs, and plans. It is also
crucial that U.S. military modernization continue—and that defense spending remain
at 4 percent of gross domestic product. The most important step that the new
Administration can take in light of Russia’s growing military power is to increase
intelligence gathering on Russian military modernization and strategic and tactical

16
goals, programs, and plans. The next step for administration is to pay closer attention
to the dynamics of Russian technical–military cooperation with other countries (arms
and military-technology sales); maintain the U.S. military budget at 4 percent of gross
domestic product (GDP); continue U.S. military modernization, including the nuclear
arsenal and missile defense; and expand military cooperation with NATO allies and
partners, especially those in the former USSR. The top priority is expanding military
cooperation with Central European NATO allies and NATO partners, especially in the
former USSR. As demonstrated by the occupation of Crimea and the conflict with
Ukraine, as Russia is becoming more powerful militarily, it is also becoming more
assertive politically. The Federation of Russia is increasingly intervening in the
domestic and foreign policies of most countries of the former USSR, dragging them
into its sphere of influence. To counter this tendency, the U.S. should temporarily
deploy military assets necessary for protection of its allies in Central Europe; boost
the number of U.S. military training facilities, including in Romania, Bulgaria, Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania; increase senior leader engagement with the former Soviet
republics; commit to a speedy and robust ballistic missile defense in Europe; and
enhance cyber security cooperation. In addition the U.S. should avoid repeating the
embarrassing precedent with Steadfast Jazz 2013, a large NATO military exercise in
Poland and Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania , where it sent only 200 troops—as much
as Estonia, viewed by U.S. allies in Europe as weakening of the U.S. commitment to
European security.

The next chapter VI NATO military doctrine and strategy provides a discussion
to NATO responses to renewed Russian threat. NATO and the European Union face
similar challenges in protecting their networks against the growing threat of cyber
attacks. To help both organizations better meet this challenge, on February 10 2016
a Technical Arrangement on Cyber Defense was concluded between the NATO
Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) and the Computer Emergency
Response Team of the European Union (CERT-EU). The Technical Arrangement
provides a framework for exchanging information and sharing best practices between
emergency response teams. The Technical Arrangement is a concrete example of
NATO and the EU working together to enhance shared security. It is also the latest
example of long-standing cooperation on cyber defense between the two
organizations. In addition, cyber defense staff from the European Union has

17
participated for several years in NATO’s flagship annual cyber defense exercise
Cyber Coalition. The EU-NATO cooperation in cyber security issues started in 2010,
with high level staff-to-staff cyber defense consultations and informal meetings that
now take place annually. NCIRC and CERT-EU have been cooperating since the
creation of CERT-EU in 2011. The EU has been also observing the NATO annual
cyber defense exercise, "Cyber Coalition". Several informal cooperation initiatives
have taken place between NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence
and EU agencies NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg meet with EU Defense
Ministers on 5 February 2016 to discuss shared security challenges and stronger
cooperation between the European Union and NATO. He stressed the importance of
working more closely to address hybrid threats and violent instability in the South. Mr.
Stoltenberg welcomed the United States of America’ plans for an increased military
presence in European Union, calling it “an important sign, and part of the adaptation
of the Alliance to a more demanding security environment.” He also welcomed the
commitment of European Allies to step up defense spending, noting that “last year
the cuts in defense spending in European Union practically stopped.” He added, the
picture is still mixed, but we are moving now in the right direction.” More than 10
years have passed since French Republic and the U. K. launched the European
Security and Defense Policy through the St Malo Declaration. The European
Commission attempted to prelaunch cooperation in 2007 with a communication which
aimed at fostering a more competitive European defense industry. The EU executive
set up a task force on defense industries and markets, outlining that more than 1,350
SMEs are present on the European defense sector. It re-launched its attempt in July
2013, with a follow up Communication on defense and industrial policy. NATO
Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen has called on European countries to
step up cooperation on defense 2 September 2013, arguing in favor of moves
towards a borderless EU defense market and intensified integration on military
matters this could prove a daunting task. Previous attempts at launching joint
European industrial defense ventures have yielded few results, apart from
the AirbusA400M military transport aircraft and the Eurofighter jet developed by
British Aerospace, which were both plagued by political interference and rivalry
between participating countries. But the Commission believes that deep cuts in
national defense budgets following the financial and economic crisis makes a case
for pooling resources. From 2010 to 2015, EU defense spending declined from €254

18
billion to €199 billion while defense budgets increased significantly in emerging
markets, according to the Commission.

Very important chapter VIII Contemporary military strategy of NATO’s allies

analyzes military potential of France, Germany and Great Britain and is followed by
next chapter VIII Contemporary military strategy of Republic of Poland. It will be
presented very important National Security Strategy is on the security and defense of
the Republic of Poland. It was adopted by the government and approved by the
president. The strategy is the basis for the development of more detailed documents
such as the political and strategic defense directive. This strategy is implemented in a
state ensuring its security, containing e. g. identification of national interests and
strategic objectives, assessment of the future shaping of the strategic security
environment, and rules and ways of achieving the strategic objectives in the
predicted conditions (realization of operational tasks), as well as preparations
(maintenance and transformation) of the national security system (realization of
preparative tasks) since Poland joined NATO in 1999, there was also a specific logic
presented by subsequent governments while they were formulating tasks and
missions for the Polish Armed Forces (PAF Poland and other countries from the CEE
region faced many difficulties convincing other Allies about the need to invest in the
development of substantial NATO infrastructure in the region. Ultimately, the so-
called contingency plans for Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were finally
adopted by NATO and the new Lisbon strategy brought an extremely important
“reassurance package, Poland placed emphasis on professionalization of armed
forces (Poland finally abandoned conscription in 2008 and initiated a startup of
building a fully-professional army of 100,000 soldiers with National Reserve Force of
additional 20,000 troops) and training them mostly for expeditionary operations (with
special emphasis on Special Forces). As stated in the National Security Strategy of
the Republic of Poland, “the size, organization and assets of the armed forces will be
continually adapted to defense requirements, allied and international commitments
and the social economic potential of the State. As the nature of security threats
evolves, static armed forces designed for territorial defense will be gradually phased
out in favor of advanced, mobile, highly specialized units. The nature of new risks
necessitates cooperation between the armed forces and civilian structures within the
scope of response to non-military threats, as well as in rescue and antiterrorist

19
operations in the homeland and outside its borders.” Over the last two years Polish
government boosted its efforts to modernize and professionalize the armed forces to
meet the requirements of the modern battlefield. In spite of the general decrease of
the size of PAF to just 100,000 soldiers (with additional 20,000 soldiers in National
Reserve Forces), the level of their combat capabilities is increasing mostly due to the
participation of the substantial military contingents in the operations in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and to some extent also, in the Balkans where they were tasked with
many different duties including direct combat missions. In 2012 two crucial
documents in this sphere were approved to support this line of thinking: “Program of
Development of Polish Armed Forces for years 2013-2022″ and the “Technical
Modernization Plan” (signed on December 11) in the period 2013-2016 Poland
allocated about 135.5 billion PLN (approximately $40 billion) on defense procurement
and technical modernization. In addition, from 2017 until 2022 the military spending
will amount to about 273.2 billion PLN (102.1 billion for technical modernization).

The final chapter IX EU common defense and security policy uses the insights
of perspective and criticism of CFSP. When the Republic of Yugoslav started to
disintegrate in 1991 and the prospect of widespread regional conflict loomed, the EU
claimed leadership of the crisis, epitomized by Jacques Poos's infamous proclama-
tion that the hour of Europe had arrived. Treaty of Maastricht 1992 which proposed
centralizing initiatives, such as the Single Currency, the EU immediately sought a
unified line on Yugoslavia as a vehicle for proving its foreign policy credentials. Since
the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, the European Union has sought to forge a Common
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) precisely to take the lead in times of global
crises. As stated in Maastricht, the goal of a common defense policy is to reinforce,
"the European identity and its independence in order to promote peace, security and
progress in Europe and in the world." The treaty called on member states to
coordinate positions at international institutions and to "uphold the common positions
in such fora."[Maastricht Treaty specifically called on the permanent members of the
United Nations Security Council (France and Britain) to defend EU positions at the
U.N. The Lisbon Treaty created a permanent EU president, and extends the roles of
the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and of
the EU's powerful diplomatic corps. With a single legal personality, European Union
would sign international agreements on behalf of all member states. According to

20
Article 43 TEU CSDP, ‘common defense policy’ covers a wide array of policy areas
ranging from humanitarian and rescue operations to peace-making and post-conflict
stabilization. Lisbon has also played a significant part in augmenting the institutional
presence of CSDP by introducing new institutions such as the new post of the High
Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and her CSDP
coordinating role under Article 43 (2) TEU). It has also provided for the
institutionalization of the European Defense Agency (EDA) in order to promote
greater cooperation in the field of armaments procurement (Articles 42 (3) and 45
TEU). Inter alia, Lisbon also contains in Article 42 (7) TEU a mutual assistance
clause which, rather symbolically, provides that Member States shall assist each
other in the event one of their counterparts is attacked. Member States have made it
explicit in Lisbon that ‘in particular, national security remains the sole responsibility of
each Member State.’ (Article 4 (2) TEU). As such, any move towards ‘common
defense’ will have to be made by the twenty-seven Member States acting according
to ‘their constitutional requirements’ as per Article 42 (2) TEU. Despite the progress
made since Maastricht, the Heads of State in Lisbon remained adamant that state
actors still dominate policy agenda-setting and implementation. Hence, the
rebranding of the ESDP to CSDP and the change from ‘European’ to ‘Common’
Security and Defense Policy does not imply any alteration on the predominance of
the state as the central actor in defense policy formulation and implementation.
Neither does Lisbon cast any doubts as to NATO’s supreme role in European
security. The nature of CSDP remains an intergovernmental affair where Member
States take decisions by unanimity and the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) has no
jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the limited mandate of CSDP operations. The EU’s
Lisbon Treaty introduced a number of innovations—beefing up the post of foreign
policy high representative, creating the EEAS, and emphasizing a comprehensive
approach to external conflicts and crises—that represented a clear attempt at
rectifying the union’s shortcomings. These reforms were based on an understanding
that Europe can only benefit from bringing together the two components of its foreign
policy, the member states and the institutions. The 2009 Treaty of Lisbon and pooling
and sharing initiatives such as CSDP’s Ghent Framework offer new opportunities for
cooperation. Indeed, CSDP should take on greater prominence as an institutional
venue for defense cooperation as the potential of NATO’s Smart Defense appears
limited following US attempts to use the initiative as a mean to prompt its Alliance

21
partners to purchase US armaments Critically, unanimous voting has been removed
in several key areas and majority voting introduced for 12 different areas of foreign
policy, including the election of the EU foreign minister and proposals emanating from
the foreign minister. However, opportunities to pool and share capabilities under
CSDP have not been taken and serious shortfalls in the military capabilities
necessary for European military autonomy persist. European nations are dependent
on the US for key strategic enablers.[3] EU and NATO members also continue to
duplicate military forces and capabilities and have failed to coordinate national
defense cuts resulting from austerity measures.

While crises multiply and become more complex in Ukraine, Europe’s Eastern
neighborhood and around the Mediterranean immigration crisis, the European Union
seems to find it difficult to respond to challenges in these regions. The EU’s Common
Foreign and Security Policy are criticized for giving the impression that it cannot get a
grip on events as they unfold. Such criticisms are unfair: Europe’s partners look just
as helpless in finding solutions to the present turmoil, and it has only been six years
since the EU’s Lisbon Treaty reviewed the union’s whole set of institutional
arrangements for foreign policy. Yet, questions arise about European Union ability to
become a significant factor in the international field. The creation of new institutional
mechanisms and the centralization of foreign-policy making in EU have not created a
stronger Europe capable of handling global, or even European, security. Instead, the
CFSP has resulted in inaction, or been subject to domination by France and
Germany. It has also frequently been used as a platform from which to confront
America and frustrate U.S. policy, particularly the war on terrorism. In fact, three
characteristics can be drawn from looking at the performance of the CFSP to date.
The transatlantic relationship is vital to European and international security.
European countries and the United States must nurture their relationships in order to
achieve and maintain peace and security. But the United States should be wary of
relinquishing its transatlantic leadership role to the European Union. Rather than
realizing America's need for European Union to take on more of its own security
burden, a common EU foreign policy is more likely to drain the already limited military
capabilities of the member countries and potentially serve as a tool for those in
European Union who believe that American global power must be "counterbalanced."
It should be emphasized that, the U.S. government should pursue a policy under

22
which its bilateral engagements with European nations are prioritized, and
engagement with the EU is based purely on where Brussels can add value to a
specific policy area. The United States and European Union should engage on
critical foreign policy issues, such as military planning and counterterrorism, both
bilaterally and through NATO.

Chapter I New military threats to international peace, stability and security

Contemporary international security threat has two basic aspects, namely

traditional security threat and non-traditional security threat, like a coin’s two sides.
The former can be characterized as the threat to a nation emanating from other
nations and involving a military component. It bears on the survival of a nation, a
state, or a regime, and thus often been regarded as the core of security threat. The
latter refers to the threat to the development of a sovereign state, and even the
survival of mankind, in the form of economic crisis, transnational crimes, infectious
diseases, environmental pollution, climate change, and most threatening peace and
stability terrorist attacks. These threats were often beyond the concerns of
conventional security threats in the past.

The threat of terrorism and terrorist groups to European’s security and

interests of Republic of Poland in a stable international order is growing. There are
now more extremists fighting for terrorist causes in more countries than ever before.
Terrorist attacks around the world increased by 35 per cent from 2013 to 2016. The
United States of America State Department has estimated that more than 32,000
people were killed in terrorist attacks in 2014.6 The major threat we are currently
facing is from violent extremism perpetrated or motivated by terrorist groups such as
Daesh, al-Qa’ida and others that claim to act in the name of Islam as do Islamic State
of Iraq and al-Sham (hereinafter referred to as ISIS).7 The anti-European Union
narrative of terrorists means that not only citizens of French Republic, Belgium but
also the Republic of Poland might continue to be targeted at home and abroad. The
rise of ISIS military forces in Iraq and Syria and the group’s rapid spread across the

6
US Department of State, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism: Country reports on
terrorism, Washington 2015
7
The world’s most committed and fanatical radical organization has only recently gone by its current name, after
the unrecognized Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) was proclaimed in April in 2013 Al-Sham has been
most commonly translated from Arabic as the Levant, hence ISIL. It was previously known as Jama'at al-Tawhid
wal-Jihad, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic State of Iraq.

23
Middle East, North Africa and South and South East Asia has resulted from ISIS’s
ability to exploit weak central government authority and local ethnic, social and
economic grievances to undermine stability and expand the group’s extremist
ideology. The violent extremist ideology promoted by ISIS is rejected by the vast
majority of Muslims, and it is Muslims, Christians in Syria who have suffered the most
at the hands of ISIS. Daesh’s control of territory challenges the territorial integrity of
Syria undermines the international system of rules and cooperation. ISIS uses its
control of territory to train fighters, spread its propaganda message, foster
international terrorism and ferment conflict. These conflicts, particularly in Iraq and
Syria, will continue to attract foreign terrorist fighters, including from European Union
and countries in our region. As these foreign terrorist fighters return from conflicts
with new skills and networks, the risk of instability and attacks in their home countries
will rise and continue.8 There also does exits the real threat that nuclear terrorism still
continues to be the single largest threat to peace and security in the United States of
America and the world. The nuclear- weapons states are aware of that risk and have
put considerable effort into securing nuclear facilities and fissile materials.
Unfortunately, fissile materials are not the only radioactive materials in circulation.
Radioactive isotopes are widely used in industry and in medicine. Some radioactive
isotopes would be suitable for radiological terrorism, and the risk of them falling into
terrorist hands remains high. Terrorists or criminals can only build an improvised
nuclear explosive device (IND)9 or a radiological dispersion device (RDD)10 if they
can acquire the necessary materials. An IND requires the acquisition of large

8
The ability of terrorist organizations to organize, train, spread their propaganda and mount operations is
supported by state fragility, US borders and an increasing number of ungoverned spaces through parts of North
Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and Asia including in Libya, Iraq, Syria and elsewhere. State
fragility in North Africa and the Sahel is also leading to the widespread distribution of weapons which are used
in conflicts in other parts of Africa.
9
Pursuant to 22 USCS § 6305 (4) [Title 22. Foreign Relations and Intercourse; Chapter 72. Nuclear Proliferation
Prevention; Sanctions for Nuclear Proliferation], the term nuclear explosive device means “any device, whether
assembled or disassembled, that is designed to produce an instantaneous release of an amount of nuclear energy
from special nuclear material that is greater than the amount of energy that would be released from the
detonation of one pound of trinitrotoluene (TNT).”
10
An RDD combines a conventional explosive device — such as a bomb — with radioactive material. It is
designed to scatter dangerous and sub-lethal amounts of radioactive material over a general area. Such RDDs
appeal to terrorists because they require limited technical knowledge to build and deploy compared to a nuclear
device. Also, the radioactive materials in RDDs are widely used in medicine, agriculture, industry and research,
and are easier to obtain than Weapons grade uranium or plutonium. The primary purpose of terrorist use of an
RDD is to cause psychological fear and economic disruption. Some devices could cause fatalities from exposure
to radioactive materials. Depending on the speed at which the area of the RDD detonation was evacuated or how
successful people Are at sheltering-in-place, the number of deaths and injuries from an RDD might not be
substantially greater than from a conventional bomb explosion

24
(kilogram) quantities of fissile material, such as highly enriched uranium or separated
plutonium. Whereas nuclear weapons are typically only made from uranium or
plutonium, radiological weapons could employ a wide range of nuclear or non-
nuclear radioactive materials and do not require fissile material. Although many types
of radioactive materials exist, only about a dozen exhibit characteristics that qualifies
them as serious security threats, such as half-life, radioactivity, portability,
dispensability, and availability. According to the President Obama, nuclear terrorism
is the “single biggest threat” to USA security.11 A nuclear detonation, whether on USA
territory or anywhere else in the world, could devastate the world economy and cause
global panic as states scrambled to protect themselves from similar attacks.
Fortunately, the international community is aware of the danger and has expended
considerable time, effort, and resources, notably through the Nuclear Security
Summit process, working to secure nuclear materials globally.12

Proliferation of bioweapons is another major concern, more severe than what

people have expected before. Today's cutting-edge life-sciences techniques,
knowledge, materials and equipment can also be deliberately or inadvertently
misapplied, which has potentially catastrophic effects. In 2005, a group of American
researchers sequenced the 1918 influenza virus, which may have killed as many as
50 million people, while a second research team recreated the virus and confirmed its
high virulence in mice13. Nations with flourishing biotechnology industries or in the
process of becoming biological powerhouses include both big powers and small
countries. Biosafety laboratories that have been built or panned to be built spread
over the world. With the increasing number of countries involving in the research of
pathogens, the risk of using bioweapons is on the rise in future conflicts

The end of the Cold War has undermined much of the global power structure.
The international system is no longer bipolar with the military standoff of two
superpowers. Instead, one superpower is predominant, with a number of regional
powers becoming increasingly important. The shadow of world war has faded out.

11
Remarks by President Obama and President Zuma of South Africa before Bilateral Meeting. The White
House. April 11, 2010. Accessed March 11, 2016. www.whitehouse.gov
12
The most effective way to prevent the use of nuclear and other radioactive materials in terrorist attacks is to
reduce the quantities in circulation. Solutions to replace many of the most dangerous (Category 1 and 2) sources
with safer alternatives exist today and can be implemented with a straightforward investment of capital and
regulatory effort.
13
http://forum.prisonplanet.com/index.php?topic=142366.0

25
Democratization and multipolarization have become the major trends in the
development of international relations. More than at any time in this century, none of
the major centers of power perceives other major powers as currently posing a
serious military threat or as fundamentally antagonistic to its interests. The global
geopolitical contest between ideologies is over; market-oriented economy, open-door
policy, freer trade, the rule of law, good governance and peaceful development are
widely accepted as norms, if not fully implemented. In the global context, threats of
traditional security problems to world peace have been considerably moderated, and
states tend to resolve deputes in the framework of the United Nation. A number of
long-standing conflicts have diminished—the Middle East, Afghanistan, —even if they
are not settled.

Figure the phases of non-linear warfare

26
Source: http://warontherocks.com/2016/03/The Federation Of Russian-hybrid-warfare-and-other-dark-
arts/

In this otherwise stable security environment, threats related to nuclear

weapons and their impact on deterrence have multiplied. These have emerged from
the trend towards nuclear proliferation and growth of international terrorism.

Iran is pursuing a uranium-enrichment program and other projects that could provide
it with the capability to produce bomb-grade fissile material and develop nuclear
weapons within the next several years.

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

27
 In contrast, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has the material to
produce a small number of nuclear weapons, announced its withdrawal from the The
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty14, and tested nuclear devices. Uncertainty persists
about how many additional nuclear devices Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
has assembled beyond those it has tested. It is estimated to have 6-8 plutonium
based warheads as of 2015.15 In terms of nuclear arsenal, is still by far a small and
only potential threat but because of the extremely reckless and unpredictable nature
of its behavior, it presents a special kind of threat. To deal with such a threat the US
and South Korea need to maintain credible nuclear and non-nuclear deterrence to
deter any major attempt by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and
conventional preparedness to counter any low-intensity provocation. “Defense and
deterrence” is the key phrase. Missile defense, for example, is not only good as
defense as such but also as a proof of deniability of any Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea n provocation or intimidation. Faced with the series of Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea n military provocations there have been talks of asking
the US to reintroduce its tactical nuclear weapons to the Peninsula or even to get
missiles for South Korea rather than discussing nuclear reduction. Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea is not a member of the global Chemical Weapons
Convention and has never revealed the extent of its chemical capabilities. It is
believed to possess a significant chemical weapons capability, but there are few
trusted sources on this aspect of their military capability. The DPRK engaged in low-
level nuclear weapons development following the 1957 US announcement of the
abrogation of part of the 1953 Armistice in order to allow the positioning of US
nuclear weapons in South Korea. These nuclear forces were removed in 1991,
opening up a discussion that led to the 1992 Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of
the Korean Peninsula. 16 It is estimated that Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
has between 24-42kg of weapons grade plutonium and the regime recently

14
The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) which entered into force in March 1970 seeks to inhibit the spread
of nuclear Weapons. Its 190 (191 with North Korea*) states-parties are classified in two categories: nuclear-
weapon states (NWS)—consisting of the United States, Russia, China, France, and the United Kingdom—and
non-nuclear-Weapon states (NNWS). Under the treaty, the five NWS commit to pursue general and complete
disarmament, while the NNWS agree to forgo developing or acquiring nuclear US weapons.
15
Mr. Kim appears increasingly volatile during his fifth year in pours. In his statement on May 6th 2015 to the
first congress of his Workers’ Party in 36 years, he boasted that his nuclear weaapons and missile programs
brought his country “dignity and national pours.” American and South Korean officials said they believed that
North Korea could make a nuclear warhead small enough to mount on its midrange Nodong missile, which
usually carries a 1,500-pound payload but can carry as much as 2,200 pounds over shorter distances
16
See more at: https://www.chathamhouse.org/media/comment/view/190677#sthash.3JkVbqnp.dpuf

28
announced that it has 38.5kg. Depending on design, this could be enough for
somewhere between three and eight plutonium bombs. It is also believed that
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has developed a highly enriched uranium
feed but there is no certainty about how much HEU it may have manufactured or
whether it has a working HEU warhead design. The announcement recently that
Pyongyang intends to restart the mothballed reactor at Yongbyong is not of
immediate, but longer-term concern. Within some three-four years, approximately
6kg per year of plutonium Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has invested
considerable energy into its missile program, in part for self-defense and in part to
generate income through sales to other countries and non-state armed groups. It
necessary to deter Democratic People’s Republic of Korea n provocation and
aggression, ensure US forces on the Korean Peninsula remain ready and capable to
‘fight tonight’ if necessary, and defend against threats emanating from Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea against the United States of America and its allies. 17 The
new US budget 2016 supports investments necessary to deter Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea n provocation and aggression ensure our forces on the Korean
Peninsula remain ready and capable to fight if necessary, and defend against threats
emanating from Democratic People’s Republic of Korea against the United States of
America and our allies. This includes threats posed by Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, against which the US is fully capable of
defending its homeland. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s nuclear test on
January 6th and its ballistic missile launch on February 7th 2006 were highly
provocative acts that undermine peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in
the region.18The US position has been, and remains, that Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea must abide by its international obligation to abandon its nuclear
and missile programs and stop its provocative behavior.
In August 2013, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea restarted the 5-
megawatt heavy-water graphite-moderated reactor it used to extract plutonium in the
past for its nuclear warheads, although operation of the reactor since then has not
been constant. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea unveiled a centrifuge facility

17
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea must abide by its international obligation to abandon its nuclear and
missile programs and stop its provocative behavior.
18
After the ballistic missile launch, the United States of America and the Republic of Korea jointly announced
the start of formal consultations to discuss the feasibility of deploying a Terminal High- Altitude Area Defense
(THAAD) system to the Korean Peninsula at the earliest date.

29
in 2010, but it is unclear if Pyongyang is using the facility to produce highly-enriched
uranium for weapons. Experts estimate that Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
could have the material for an additional 4-8 uranium based warheads as of 2016. 19
In September 2015, North Korea committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons and
existing nuclear programs. In March 2016 Russia has warned Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea that threats to deliver “preventive nuclear strikes” could create a
legal basis for the use of military force against the country, suggesting that even
DPRK few remaining friends are growing concerned about its increasingly
confrontational stance. The Russian foreign ministry statement, which follows
a Democratic People’s Republic of Korean threat to “annihilate” the US and South
Korea, also criticizes Washington and Seoul for launching the largest joint military
drills yet to be held on the peninsula.20 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s
nuclear test on January 6th 2016 and its ballistic missile launch on February 7th were
highly provocative acts that undermine peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula
and in the region
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea should be aware of the fact that in this
way the DPRK will become fully opposed to the international community and will
create international legal grounds for using military force against itself in accordance
with the right of a state to self-defense enshrined in the United Nations Charter,
Iran: No known weapons or sufficient fissile material stockpiles to build
weapons. However, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the institution charged
with verifying that states are not illicitly building nuclear weapons, concluded in 2003
that Iran had undertaken covert nuclear activities to establish the capacity to
indigenously produce fissile material. In July 2015, Iran and six world powers
negotiated a long-term agreement to verifiably and signifant Iran's capacity to
produce material for nuclear weapons and the IAEA is continuing its investigation
and monitoring of Tehran’s nuclear program.21

19
North Korea announced January 10, 2003 that it was withdrawing from the treaty, effective the next day.
Although Article X of the NPT requires that a country give three months notice in advance of withdrawing,
North Korea argued that it satisfied this requirement because it originally announced its decision to withdraw
March 12, 1993, and suspended the decision one day before it was to become legally binding. There is not yet a
definitive legal opinion as to whether North Korea is still a party to the NPT.
20
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/08/russia-warns-north-korea-nuclear-strike
21
According to The International Atomic Energy Agency Iran kept to its pledge to have on hand no more than
300 kilograms of uranium enriched to 3.67% and no more than 5,060 centrifuges producing that uranium at a
facility at Natanz. Iran has 1044 rudimentary centrifuges at an underground site called Fordow but they are not

30
Nuclear capabilities of People’s Republic of China, USA and Russia

Under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START22, 1991) and its
successor (New START23, 2011), Russia and the US are committed to reducing
stocks to under 1 550. In addition, they have 2 720 non-deployed strategic/non-
strategic warheads, in storage or under maintenance — not limited by New START
(non-strategic warheads are slightly smaller than strategic warheads and designed
for use on the battlefield rather than against civilian targets, but are still considerably
more powerful than the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki). Nuclear
arsenal, has maintained parity with the United States of America. Russia's 7 500
nuclear weapons have at present 1 780 deployed strategic warheads, the most
dangerous category, available for immediate use.24 Under New START, the United
States of America and Russia report the size of their deployed strategic nuclear
arsenals every 6 months.

Figure

enriching uranium, under the agreement, the IAEA monitors all declared Iranian nuclear sites 24/7 through
onsite cameras and/or inspectors.
22
The U.S.-Soviet Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, known as START I, was signed on July 31, 1991 START I
remained in force until December 5, 2009. It contained the option of extending the treaty for five-year periods,
but Washington and Russia decided against extension — negotiations are already underway on a new,
replacement treaty, and START I was allow to expire. The treaty provided for reductions to equal aggregate
levels in strategic offensive arms, carried out in three phases over seven years from the date the treaty enters into
force. Specific, equal interim levels for agreed categories of strategic offensive arms by the end of each phase.
Central limits include: 1,600 Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles (SNDVs); 6,000 accountable warheads; 4,900
ballistic missile warheads; 1,540 warheads on 154 heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) for the
Soviet side

23
The Treaty bettweeen the United States of America and the Russian The Federation on Measures for the
FurtherReduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, also known as the New START Treaty, entered
into force on February 5, 2011. Under the Treaty, the United States and Russia must meet the Treaty’s central
limits on strategic arms by February 5, 2018; seven years from the date the Treaty entered into force. Each Party
has the flexibility to determine for itself the structure of its strategic forces within the aggregate limits of the
Treaty. These limits are based on the rigorous analysis conducted by Department of Defense planners in support
of the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Aggregate limits: 1,550 warheads. Warheads on deployed ICBMs and
deployed SLBMs count toward this limit and each deployed heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments
counts as one warhead toward this limit. This limit is 74% loUSr than the limit of the 1991 START Treaty and
30% loUSr than the deployed strategic warhead limit of the 2002 Russia Treaty. A combined limit of 800
deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear
armaments. A separate limit of 700 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers equipped
for nuclear armaments. This limit is less than half the corresponding strategic nuclear delivery vehicle limit of
the START Treaty.

24
The exact number of nuclear Weaapons in each country’s possession is a closely held national secret. Despite
this limitation, however, publicly available information, careful analysis of historical records, and occasional
leaks make it possible to make best estimates about the size and composition of the national nuclear US weapon
stockpiles:

31
Source:

As of 1 September 2015, the United States of America reported that its

nuclear arsenal contained 1,538 strategic warheads attributed to 762 deployed
missiles and bombers – a decrease of 105 warheads and 30 launchers compared
with 2014.25 The United States of America has begun an extensive modernization of
its entire nuclear weapons enterprise. Over the next decade, the US government
plans to spend nearly $350 billion on modernizing and maintaining its nuclear forces
and the facilities that support them This includes a new class of nuclear powered
ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs26), a new long-range bomber with nuclear
capability, a new air launched cruise missile (ALCM27), a next-generation land-based

25
By 1 September 2015, the Air Force had reduced the number of deployed ICBMs by eight since March 2015,
indicating the beginning of the planned reduction of deployed ICBMs from 450 to 400 under the New START
Treaty. See e. g. State Department. 2016. “New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms.”
Fact sheet, January 1. (effective date: September 1, 2015)
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/251152.pdf. Defense Department. 2014a. Report on plan to
implement the nuclear force reductions, limitations, and verification and transparency measures contained in the
New START treaty specified in Section 1042 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012,
April. p. 3. http://www.defense.gov/documents/New-START-Implementation-Report.pdf.
26
For example SSBN-726 class FBM submarines can carry 24 ballistic missiles with MIRV warheads that can
be accurately delivered to selected targets from almost anywhere in the world's oceans. Earlier FBM ships carry
16 missiles. A cylindrical pressure hull structure of HY-80 steel is supported by circular frames and enclosed by
hemispherical heads at both ends. The pressure hull provides an enclosure large enough for Weaapons, crew, and
equipment with enough strength to enable the ship to operate deep enough to avoid easy detection
27
The AGM-86B air-launched cruise missiles and AGM-86C/D conventional air-launched cruise missiles are
developed to increase the effectiveness of U.S. Air Force B-52H Stratofortress bombers. The CALCM has been
used since the 1990s for long-range precision strike on the opening hours of conflict. AGM-86B/C/D missiles
increase flexibility in target selection. AGM-86B missiles can be air-launched in large numbers by the bomber
force. B-52H bombers carry six AGM-86B/C/D missiles on each of two externally mounted pylons and eight
internally on a rotary launcher, giving the B-52H a maximum capacity of 20 missiles per aircraft. The AGM-86C

32
ICBM28, a new nuclear-capable tactical fighter aircraft29, complete full-scale
production of one nuclear warhead (W76-1) and initial production of two others (B61-
12 and W80-4). Currently, the U.S. nuclear force is organized around a massive
nuclear response, which limits flexibility to certain lower-level scenarios where tactical
nuclear weapons or even exotic versions of tactical nukes built for hitting deep buried
bunkers or to cause maximum electromagnetic pole destruction could be used
instead of high-yield strategic nuclear weapons as a way to limit escalation.

Figure

CALCM differs from the AGM-86B air launched cruise missile in that it carries a conventional
blast/fragmentation payload rather than a nuclear payload and employs a GPS aided INS.
28
“ICBMs can only support nuclear wartime operations against Russia because current-generation ICBMs fired
from the existing three bases on their minimum energy trajectories have to overfly Russia and China to reach
targets in potentially adversarial third countries. The new missiles are needed to replace the arsenal of 450
Minuteman IIIs and would put the United States in the same league with China and Russia. Both countries are
deploying new and more advanced road-mobile missiles with multiple warheads. The US Government is
preparing to acquire a replacement for the MM III [Minuteman III] intercontinental ballistic missile system that
replaces the entire flight system The Government is preparing to acquire a replacement for the MM III
[Minuteman III] intercontinental ballistic missile system that replaces the entire flight system, The new weapon
system will use the existing Mk12A and Mk21 Reentry Vehicles (RV) in the single and multiple RV
configurations. The remainder of the missile stack will be replaced.

29
US officials has proposed installing nuclear Weaapons on the Lockheed Martin F-35C Joint Strike Fighter for
deployment aboard aircraft carriers as a hedge against Russia and China The US government has committed to
outfitting only the land-based F-35A with nuclear Weaapons as a “dual-capable aircraft,” namely the Boeing
B61-12 thermonuclear guided bomb the first full-up B61-12 nuke will be assembled by 2020 and early aircraft
integration activities with the F-35A are due to begin2016. The current time line would see the F-35A achieve
dual-capable status by 2024 as part of the Block 4 configuration

33
 Source: http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/report-urges-pentagon-to-arm-f-35cs-
with-tactical-nucle-1713569994

The US nuclear arsenal remained roughly unchanged in the last year, with the
Defense Department maintaining an estimated stockpile of some 4,670 warheads to
be delivered via ballistic missiles and aircraft. Most of these warheads are not
deployed but stored, and many are destined to be retired. Of the approximately 1,930
warheads that are deployed, roughly 1,750 are on ballistic missiles or at bomber
bases in the United States of America, with another 180 tactical bombs deployed at
European bases.30 Approximately 180 B61 bombs are deployed in the European
Union at six bases in five countries (Belgium, The The Federal Republic of Germany,
Italy, Netherlands and Turkey). The USA government declared in April 2015 that its
stockpile included 4,717 warheads as of September 2014. Since then, a small
number of warheads are thought to have been retired. In addition to the roughly
4,670 warheads in the military stockpile, the USA government in April
2015 announced that approximately 2,500 retired warheads at that
time were awaiting dismantlement. In addition, close to 20,000 plutonium cores (pits)
and some 5,000 Canned Assemblies (secondary’s) from dismantled warheads are in
storage at the Pantex Plant in Texas and Y-12 plant in Tennessee.31

30
Hans M. Kristensen & Robert S. Norris (2016) United States of America nuclear forces, 2016, Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists, 72:2, 63-73, DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2016.1145901; For a comparative perspective see,
Energy Department. 2015a. National Nuclear Security Administration, “Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship
Management Plan,” March. p. 2.25

https: //nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/FY16SSMP_FINAL%203_16_2015_reducedsize.pdf CBO. 2015b.

“US Congressional Budget Office.” Projected Costs of USA Nuclear Forces, 2015 to 2024, January 22. p. 4.
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/114th-congress-2015-2016/reports/49870-NuclearForces.pdf
31
http://fas.org/issues/nuclear-USapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/ See e. g. Young, S. 2016. “Just How New is
the New, Nuclear-armed Cruise Missile?” Union of Concerned Scientists, January 13.

34
 The US Air Force operates a force of 440 silo-based Minuteman III ICBMs,
split across three wings: the 90th Missile Wing at F.E. Warren Air Force Base in
Wyoming; the 91st Missile Wing at Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota; and the
341st Missile Wing at Malmstrom Air Force Base in Montana.32 Each wing has three
squadrons, each with 50 silos for Minuteman III ICBMs controlled by five launch-
control centers. During 2015, missiles were removed from 10 silos as part of the US
implementation of New START and another 40 silos will be emptied before the
treaty’s limit on deployed launchers has to be met by February 2018. This will leave
the United States of America with a force of 400 deployed Minuteman ICBMs, down
from 450 in 2010 when the treaty was signed. The excess 50 missiles will be
removed from silos across the three bases rather than from one base. The US Air
Force currently operates a fleet of 20 B-2 and 93 B-52H bombers. Of those, 18 B-2s
and 76 B-52Hs are nuclear-capable. New START counts 89 B-52Hs, because of
installed equipment that makes some B-52Hs accountable under the treaty, even
though they no longer serve a nuclear role (State Department 2016). Of the 89
accountable bombers, approximately 60 (16 B-2s and 44 B-52Hs) are thought to be
assigned nuclear missions under US nuclear war plans. 33

http://allthingsnuclear.org/syoung/the-new-cruise-missile STRATCOM. 2015b. US Strategic Command Public

Affairs, “US Strategic Command to Conduct Command, Control Exercise,” October 30.
https://www.stratcom.mil/news/2015/584/US_Strategic_Command_to_Conduct_Command_and_Control_Exerci
se/
32
The LGM-30 Minuteman III, built by Boeing, is an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) being used by the
US Air Force Combat Command. The Minuteman III is a vital component of the US strategic deterrent forces
and the inventory is controlled by the Air Force Global Strike Command. Minuteman III is a long-range, solid-
fuel, three-stage ICBM with the capability to carry single or multiple nuclear warheads. The missile is powered
by three solid-fuel rocket engines and USighs 36,030kg (79,432lb). It has a range of more than 6,000mi (5,218
nautical miles) and speed of approximately 24,000km/h (15,000mph) at burnout. See further Wilson, S. W.
2015. Commander, Air Force Global Strike Command, prepared testimony before the Senate Armed Services
Committee Strategic Forces Subcommittee, April 22, p. 13. http://www.armed
services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Wilson_04-22-15.pdf Mesnard, C. 2015. Air Force Global Strike Command
Public Affairs, “Global Strike Command Tests ICBM, Bomber Capabilities.” Air Force Print News Today,
March 27 http://www.afgsc.af.mil/news/story_print.asp?id=123443525 Reif, K. 2015a. “Air Force Wants 1,000
New Cruise Missiles.” Arms Control Today, May 7. https://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/2015_05/News/Air-
Force-Wants-Thousand-New-Cruise-Missiles
33
The bombers are organized into nine bomb squadrons in five bomb wings at three bases: Minot Air Force Base
in North Dakota, Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana, and Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri. Since 2012,
two new wings and three new squadrons have been added to the heavy bomber organization using Air Reserve
and Air National Guard personnel. This includes the 307th Bomb Wing and its 93rd and 343rd squadrons of B-
52Hs (integrated with the 2nd Bomb Wing at Barksdale Air Force Base). The other new wing, the 313th, operates
the 110th Bomb Squadron with B-2 bombers (integrated with the 509th Bomb Wing at Whiteman Air Force
Base).

35
 The US Navy operates a fleet of 14 Ohio-class SSBNs, of which eight operate
in the Pacific from their base near Bangor, Washington, and six operate in the
Atlantic from their base at Kings Bay, Georgia. Each submarine is equipped to carry
up to 24 Trident II (D5)34 submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

Figure

Source: http://fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/slbm/d-5.htm

Normally, 12 of the 14 submarines are considered operational, with the 13th

and 14th boat in a refueling overhaul at any given time. The unclassified New START
aggregate data, however, shows that not all the remaining 12 submarines are fully
loaded or operational. As of 1 September 2015, for example, only 236 missiles were

34
The Trident II D5 is the latest generation of the U.S. Navy's submarine-launched fleet ballistic missiles,
following the highly successful Polaris, Poseidon, and Trident I C4 programs. First deployed in 1990, the Trident
II D5 missile is currently aboard OHIO-class and British VANGUARD-class submarines. the new C4 missile
could be used in then-existing submarines (e.g., approximately 74 in. in diameter and close to 34 ft in length). In
addition, the accuracy of the new C4 missile system was to be equivalent at 4000 nm to that of the POSEIDON
C3 at 2000 nm The ten Trident submarines in the Atlantic fleet USre initially equipped with the D-5 Trident II
missile. The eight submarines in the Pacific USre initially equipped with the C-4 Trident I missile. In 1996 the
Navy started to backfit the eight submarines in the Pacific to carry the D-5 missile.

36
counted as deployed (loaded in launch tubes), 52 fever than the full capacity of 12
boats.35
Figure

Source: Reuters
The Federation of Russia heat has greatly diminished with the end of the Cold
War but gradually changed after 2015 annexation of Crimea. 36 A specific concern
especially in relation to the current debate in European Union is the possible
relocation of TNW removed from European theatre to the Far East. The situation is
not exactly the same but a few years ago the INF Treaty was negotiated. The 1987
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty between the USA and the USSR
37was one of the most significant arms-reduction accomplishments of the Cold War.
The INF Treaty led to the elimination of ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles
with ranges from 300 miles to 3,400 miles, their launchers, and associated support
structures and support equipment. In 2014, the USA State Department officially
accused Russia of violating the treaty. The allegation sparked renewed interest in the

35
http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/us-may-disable-some-submarine-based-nuclear-arms-capacity/
36
US observe further strengthening of the Black Sea Fleet with a number of new submarine and surface ships,
including six improved Kilo-class submarines, six Admiral Grigorovich-class frigates, six Bykov-class patrol
ships and at least nine Project 21631 small guided missile corvettes106 - Temporary deployment of Tu-22M3
long-range dual-capable bombers duringexercises in 2015, with Russian reports indicating that the bombers
would be stationed permanently in Crimea in “nearest future”.
37
The USSR did not like the U.S. GLCMs and Pershing II ballistic missiles deployed in European Union in the
1980s, a key factor in getting Russia to change its negotiating stance and ultimately accept a treaty banning all
INF missiles. The thought that the Pentagon might dream up a Pershing III makes the Russian Ministry of
Defense nervous—and hopefully reminds the Kremlin of why it saw value in the INF Treaty in the first place.

37
utility of the agreement for the United States of America, and in the implications of
Russia’s violations for USA allies in European Union.38 Russia’s aggressive and
illegal behavior and the inability of the United States of America to bring Russia back
into compliance with the INF Treaty indicate that the treaty has outlived its utility and
is no longer in the USA interest. Russia has been threatening NATO with nuclear
attacks, thus severely undermining the 1970 Nonproliferation Treaty regime, and has
been intent on changing the post–Cold War security order in European Union by
annexing Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014.

Figure

Source:http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2008/08/russian-forces-in-the-
georgianwarpreliminary-assessment-and-recommendations

Even before the USA government determined that the cruise missile test
constituted a violation of the INF Treaty, Philip Breedlove, Supreme Allied
Commander in European Union, said that a “weapon capability that violates the
I.N.F., that is introduced into the greater European land mass is absolutely a tool that

38
The State Department’s 2014 Annual Compliance Reportfound that the Russian The Federation “is in
violation of its obligations under the INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise
missile (GLCM) with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, or to possess or produce launchers of such
missiles.” USA Department of State, “Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and
Disarmament Agreements and Commitments,” July 2014, p. 8,
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/230108.pdf

38
will have to be dealt with39. Allies were informed about Russia’s violations in January
2014.[33] In May 2015, Jens Stoltenberg, the NATO Secretary General, called
Russia’s nuclear threats “unjustified, destabilizing and dangerous.”40 He deemed
Russia’s nuclear rhetoric “deeply troubling” and noted NATO’s “concerns regarding
its [Russia’s] compliance with the INF Treaty.”

Figure

Source: Heritage Org.

Initially, the idea was to remove SS20s to the east of Ural Mountains that
caused concern in Japan and finally an agreement was reached to eliminate the
specific category of nuclear forces globally.
Figure Military expenditure o the Federation of Russia and major European Union
countries 1995-2014

39
Michael R. Gordon, “NATO Commander Says He Sees Potent Threat from Russia,” The New York Times,
April 2, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/03/world/European Union/nato-general-says-russian-force-
poised-to-invade-U. K. raine.html (accessed June 4, 2015).
40
Jens Stoltenberg, “Adapting to a Changed Security Environment,” speech at Center for Strategic and
International Studies, Washington, DC, May 28, 2014,
http://nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_120166.htm (accessed June 4, 2015).

39
Source: SIPRI
A The Federation of Russia’s decision to place advanced S400 air defense
missiles in Kaliningrad has extended the reach of The Federation of Russian
launchers into NATO airspace, challenging NATO’s control of the skies and its ability
to help its Baltic members in the event of The Federation of Russian hostility. These
missiles could help the The Federation of Russia to invade Latvia, Estonia or
Lithuania, forcing the alliance to recover the Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia in a
military campaign of a size unseen in European Union since World War II. In 2015,
The Federation of Russia suspended its participation in the Conventional Forces in
European Union (CFE) Treaty meetings, which promoted military transparency and
confidence between NATO and The Federation of Russia following the end of the
Cold War41

41
T he United States can continue the current level of confrontation with Russia more or less indefinitely and
avoid the kind of danger that the original Cold War posed. Even to attempt a negotiation with Russia over the
issues that led to the Ukraine crisis and the general deterioration in U.S.-Russia relations would constitute a sell-
out of Ukraine and, worse, might USll produce a hot war. On recent evidence—the continuing Russian
aggression in Ukraine and USstern sanctions in response, the frightening proxy confrontation over Syria in

40
Figure

Source: http://2001-2009.state.gov/t/vci/rls/prsrl/2008/99743.htm

The Federation of Russia no longer provides information on its conventional

forces allows inspections or tells NATO about its military buildup. The CFE Treaty
specified limits on The Federation of Russian weapons, which The Federation of
Russia now disregards.42 In spite of The Federation of Russia’s economic difficulties,

which U.S. USapons could USll be killing Russian soldiers, and the steadily increasing stream of provocations
and invective from both sides—the trends are not good at all

42
Beginning in 2010, the Obama administration sought to resolve the CFE dispute through the development of a
draft “framework” for new negotiations to strengthen the CFE Treaty regime. But by mid-2011, the talks stalled
as Russia could not agree to the principle of host-country consent or to a resumption of compliance with the
original CFE Treaty.In response, the U.S. Department of State announced in a Nov. 22, 2011 press release that

41
Putin has made investing in more modern and combat-ready forces a priority. On
October 2015, General Frank Gorenc, commander of US Air Forces in European
Union, said that The Federation Of Russia’s new aircraft and air-defense systems
had “closed the air force gap” with NATO. That same month, Admiral Mark Ferguson,
commander of US Naval Forces European Union, warned of the increasing capability
of the The Federation of Russian Navy. The Federation of Russia has invested in
new nuclear-powered attack and ballistic missile defense submarines, partly
equipped with long-range cruise missiles, which could be used to close sea-lanes or
disturb lines of communication. Similarly, since annexing Crimea, The Federation of
Russia has modernized its Black Sea Fleet – stationed in Sevastopol – shifting the
Black Sea’s military balance in The Federation of Russia’s favor.43 The Federation of
Russia has undertaken large, unannounced exercises in the Baltic and Black Sea
regions. Some exercises train for large-scale war and include up to 100,000
personnel. Other so-called snap exercises are designed to demonstrate The
Federation of Russia’s heightened military readiness. The Vienna Document obliges
all signatories (which includes NATO and former Soviet states) to submit advance
notification about any exercises. The Federation of Russia’s disregard for the
agreement feeds speculation over its intentions. Most of these exercises include
nuclear weapons systems. During a series of war games in March 2015, The
Federation of Russia temporarily deployed its nuclear-capable SS-26 Iskander
missiles44 to Kaliningrad and sent nuclear strategic bombers to Crimea.

Washington “would cease carrying out certain obligations” under the CFE Treaty with regard to Russia, putting
the future of the 1990 pact in serious doubt.

43
http://www.cer.org.U. K. /insights/no-denial-how-nato-can-deter-creeping-The Federation Of Russian-threat
44
Missiles can be launched 16 minutes from traveling or 4 minutes from highest readiness. The second missile
can be launched in less than a minute once the first missile is launched.
The transport-erector-launcher (TEL) vehicle uses MZKT-7930 Astrolog 8×8 high mobility chassis. It is
poUSred by the YaMZ-846 diesel engine, developing 500 hp. Vehicle can be airlifted by the An-124 transport
aircraft.

42
Figure The deployment of Iskander-M missile complexes in Kaliningrad will
fundamentally change the balance of security in European Union

Source:https://socioecohistory.wordpress.com/2015/05/30/russia-stations-iskander-missiles-in-
kaliningrad-nato-cries-wolf/

The 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty requires the United
States of America and the USSR to eliminate and permanently renounce their
intermediate-range ground-launched nuclear cruise missiles (GLCM).45 The US
government in 2014 and 2015 accused The Federation of Russia of violating its
obligations not to “possess, produce, or flight-test” a GLCM or its launchers.46 In
March 2015, Putin said he was ready to put his nuclear forces on alert after the
annexation of Crimea. In The Federation Of Russian military circles, discussions
have re-emerged over the use of a ‘limited nuclear strike’ to stop a conflict from
45
With a series of highly advertised sea- and air-launched cruise missile attacks against targets in Syria, the
Russian government has demonstrated that it doesn’t have a military need for the controversial ground-launched
cruise missile that the United States has accused Russia of developing and test-launching in violation of the 1987
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty.
46
the ballistic missile (SS-26; Iskander-M) has a range of 500 km (310 miles), possibly more. Such a range
would be a violation of the INF. In contrast, the U.S. National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) has
consistently listed the range as 300 km (186 miles). Likewise, the cruise missile known as Iskander-K
(apparently the R-500) has also been widely rumored to have a range that violates the INF, some saying 2,000
km (1,243 miles) and some even up to 5,000 kilometers (3,107 miles)

43
escalating During the Cold War, NATO’s defense strategy relied on the so-called ‘trip
wire model’ – large numbers of US combat forces were based in European Union,
deterring attacks from the East. Today, the US and NATO rotate small numbers of
forces through Republic of Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania but the measures
fall short of permanent stationing. In part, this is because European Union European
Union does not want to antagonize The Federation of Russia, and strives to uphold
the NATO-The Federation of Russia Founding Act. That political agreement prohibits
the permanent stationing of “substantial combat forces” close to The Federation of
Russia. But it also commits The Federation of Russia to respect the sovereignty of
other states; a principle it clearly violated in Ukraine.

Figure military balance between Russia and Ukraine

Source: IISS
No wonder that in august 2015 the Ukrainian National Security and Defense
Council revised the country’s military doctrine Wednesday, defining Russia as the
country’s adversary and laying out a long-term path toward NATO membership. The

44
new military doctrine of Ukraine determines the Russian The Federation as the
country's military adversary and defines conditions for the liberation of temporary
occupied territories of Ukraine.47 In 2014 military expenditures in Ukraine have
constituted 3.1% of GDP while the budget plan for 2015 is 3.35% of GDP. This is
lower than the average level of spending for participants in any of the four types of
conflicts specified above. Thus, based on international experience in the second half
of 20-th and the beginning of 21-st century, Ukraine needs to rise its military
spending by 1-2% of GDP, not lower it. Ukraine increased its military spending in
2015 up to 3 % of the country's gross domestic product, whereas approximately UAH
14 billion was allocated from the Ukrainian Defense Ministry's budget of UAH 44.6
billion for the development of weapons for the army in 2015, and nearly UAH 2 billion
was spent on the training of Armed Forces personnel, In 2015, the Defense Ministry
got UAH 44.6 billion from the state budget, including UAH 4.4 billion worth of state
guarantees. The increase in spending compared with 2014 when the defense budget
was UAH 27.3 billion was UAH 17.3 billion, or 1.6 times48 for the 2016 the Ministry of
Defense has asked for its budget to be raised to 3.8% of GDP. If this request is
accommodated and the real levels of spending are preserved for the National Guard
and the border guards service (which, together with the armed forces, roughly
constitute the military force of the country), the overall level of military spending in
Ukraine would rise from 3.35% of GDP to 4.5% of GDP. This would bring them close
to average levels of military spending by countries engaged in similar conflicts in the
second half of 20-th – beginning of 21-st centuries.49

47
At the Security Council meeting, U. K. rainian President Petro Poroshenko said the doctrine "not only
officially establishes the Russian The Federation as U. K. raine's military opponent, but states the task of
relocating military units and creating the necessary military infrastructure in the eastern and southern regions
http://www.ibtimes.com/U. K. raine-military-doctrine-declares-russia-enemy-nato-membership-top-goal2080133

48
U. K. raine's president announced plans to boost his country's defense spending by an estimated 50 %,
pledging to spend an extra 40 billion hryvnia ($3 billion) by 2017
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/U. K. raine/budget.htm
49
SIPRI data Current level of military spending is still low if compared to other countries that throughout their
recent history have found themselves in similar circumstances. International experience suggests that additional
1-2% of GDP should be allocated to military spending.

45
Figure

Source: Reuters
The reform program Strategy 2020 provides that Ukraine should become a
military state, increasing its military expenditures from 1 % of the GDP to 5 %. 50 The
reform program envisions an increase of military funding from 1 % of the GDP in
2014 to 5 % in 2020. The reforms also envision an increase in the number of
servicemen in Ukraine from 2.8 people to 7 people per 1,000 people, where the
defense and national security reform is a key reform envisioned by the program
Strategy 2020. The last budget saw the military spending rise to 90 billion hryvnias
(US$4 billion). In 2016 the government aims to spend 113 billion hryvnias (US$5
billion) as directed by a decree signed by President Poroshenko on 2 December
2015.51

50
The 2015 UK National Reform Programme sets out the actions that the government is taking to address the
structural reform challenges facing the UK, in line with a set of country specific recommendations agreed by
Heads of State or government at the Council of the European Unionan Union in July 2014. Member states of the
European Unionan Union submit a National Reform Programme, before the end of April each year, as part of the
European Unionan Semester. The new EU surveillance structure under European Union 2020, known as the
European Unionan Semester, brings together reporting on fiscal and structural policies.
51
As such these figures pale into insignificance compared with defense budgets of the world poUSrs, but in
%age terms Ukraineaims to spend 5% of its GDP on defense, which is 2.5 times higher than NATO countries
have agreed to.

46
 NATO has a term for Putin’s tactics: Anti-Access Area Denial (A2/AD)52, which
refers to an adversary’s attempts to make it impossible, or very costly, for NATO to
gain access to a region to help its members or other countries
Figure

Source: https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/importance-area-denial-war
It challenges NATO’s freedom of movement. A2/AD capabilities can include
missile defense systems, anti-ship cruise missiles, submarines, high-readiness
brigades and Special Forces. A2/AD used to be jargon known only to People’s
Republic of China-watchers. By building artificial islands in contested areas of the
South The People’s Republic of China Sea, and developing advanced ballistic
missiles (so-called “carrier killers”) and anti-ship cruise missiles, The People’s
Republic of China aims to keep the US Navy at bay and extend its influence in the

52

47
European Union Pacific. The Federation of Russia is now doing something similar in
Eastern European Union. NATO needs about seven brigades, of which three must be
heavy armored brigades, supported by airpower and other assets, to deter The
Federation of Russia in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. Currently, NATO is three or
four brigades short and the Pentagon only plans to add one heavy armored brigade
in the region. Due to semantic sensitivities, it is unlikely that European Union troops
will be stationed there ‘permanently’. 53
Second, NATO should invest in the territorial defense of its eastern members.
After years of training and equipping their militaries for missions outside European
Union, states like Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Republic of Poland must now re-
learn tactics for slowing a possible The Federation of Russian advance and they
need the alliance’s support to do this. NATO must also develop a clear message on
deterrence and leave no doubt that NATO is a nuclear alliance. Three of its members
possess nuclear capabilities, and NATO should be clear that nuclear blackmail from
The Federation of Russia, or anyone else, will never be tolerated. Moreover, NATO
should stage more military exercises in regions that are vulnerable to a The
Federation of Russian A2/AD challenge, like the Baltic and Black Seas, and possibly
the Arctic.

53
But the US intends to increase the number of its troops rotating through Eastern European Union
‘persistently’, and the rest of NATO should follow suit. NATO should also invest in equipment that offsets
Putin’s A2/AD tactics: next-generation aircraft and anti-submarine defenses that are less vulnerable to The
Federation Of Russian firepoUSr are needed.

48
 Figure

Source: http://www.businessinsider.com/russia-equipped-six-military-bases-in-the-arctic-2015-12
Russian prepared plans for construction of at least 13 airfields and 10 radar
stations, as well as the reactivation of a number of Soviet-era bases, incl. airfields
and ports on the Novosibirsk Islands in the Laptev Sea and the Franz Josef
archipelago, and a major airbase at Tiksi in Yakutia. In addition they want Re-
activation and / or strengthening of units in the areas including the 61 st Independent
Naval Infantry Brigade and the 200th Independent Infantry Brigade, to be stationed at
Sputnik Base, Pechenga, inside the Arctic Circle (16 km from the Norwegian border
and 65 km from the Finnish border).
Exercises should focus on increasing the readiness of all of NATO’s forces to
move across European Union – not just its rapid response forces, as is the case now.
Recent exercises, like ‘Allied Shield’ and ‘Trident Juncture’, which involved 15,000
and 36,000 personnel respectively, have been promising. But NATO should be able
to train with larger numbers, particularly if The Federation of Russia is doing so. This
also requires taking a fresh look at equipment storage and transport across allied
territory – not just along the borders. NATO should also agree on the conditions
required for its strategic commander to deploy and exercise the rapid response force

49
as he sees fit. At the moment he cannot respond quickly to developments and must
wait for the result of a slow decision-making process. NATO should also help allies to
respond to scenarios involving irregular forces, like the ‘little green men ‘The
Federation of Russia used in Crimea, without giving The Federation of Russia pretext
for military escalation

In its new Military Doctrine, The Federation of Russia reserves the right to
utilize nuclear weapons in the event of aggression against the Russian The
Federation involving the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the
state is under threat'. However Vladimir Putin stated in 2015 that a nuclear alert had
been considered during the Crimean crisis, and suggested that the threshold for a
Russian nuclear response could be lower.54 Russia deploys an estimated 307
ICBMs that can carry approximately 1040 warheads, nearly 40% of the country’s total
strategic warheads. The ICBMs are organized under the Strategic Rocket Forces 55 in
three missile armies, with a total of 12 divisions with approximately 40 regiments. As
of January 2016, the Strategic Rocket Forces were estimated to have 299
operational missile systems of five different types. Intercontinental ballistic missiles of
these systems carry 902 warheads. The replacement of Soviet-era ICBMs with
modern types is more than halfway done and scheduled for completion in 2022.

54
Ukraineconflict: Putin 'was ready for nuclear alert', BBC News, 15 March 2015. While it is uncertain that
Russia would ever follow through on such threats, they are a useful psychological USapon and part of its hybrid
approach to Ukraineand potential NATO allies.
55
Strategic Rocket Forces is a separate branch of the Russia's Armed Forces, subordinated directly to the
General Staff. The current commander of the Strategic Rocket Forces -- Lt.-General Sergei Karakayev -- was
appointed to this post by a presidential decree of 22 June 2010.

50
Figure

Source: Reuters
Deployment of the first-generation SS-27 Mod. 1 (Topol-M) is complete; deployment
of the second-generation SS-27 Mod. 2 is continuing at an accelerated pace; and
development of a compact version of the SS-27 (RS-26)56 is in progress. The
remaining Soviet-era ICBMs include: SS-18 (RS-20 V). The SS-18 is a silo-based,
10-warhead heavy ICBM first deployed in 1988. The missile is being gradually retired
with approximately 46 SS-18s with 460 warheads remaining in the 13th Missile
Division at Dombarovsky and the 62nd Missile Division at Uzur. The SS-18 is
scheduled to remain in service until the early 2020s, when it will be replaced by the
RS-28 (Sarmat) ICBM. SS-19 (RS-18 or UR-100NUTTH). The silo-based, six-
warhead SS-19 entered service in 1980 and is gradually being retired and replaced
by the silo-based SS- 27 Mod. 2 (RS-24). We estimate that a total of 20 missiles
remain in service with 120 warheads, possibly split between the 60th Missile Division
at Tatishchevo and the 28th Guards Missile Division at Kozelsk. The SS-19 is

56
The RS-26 Rubezh [Frontier], also known as the Avangard, was created on the basis of RS-24 Yars. This
nomenclature is a bit confusing, since the Rubezh coastal missile system was put out of service in 2006 and
replaced by a new Bal-E-type mobile coast-based missile system. The RS-26 missile was created on the RS-24
Yars ICBM basis. The new upgraded missile will have multiple warheads and is expected to be lighter than
Yars. The RS-26 ICMBs will be only mobile launched, as no silo basing is envisaged for them. The new RS-
26 Rubezh is an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), meaning that it follows a ballistic trajectory to reach
the target.

51
scheduled to be retired in 2019. SS-25 (RS-12 M or Topol). Russia is retiring SS-25\
missiles at a rate of one to three regiments (nine to 27 missiles) each year and
replacing them with the SS-27 Mod. 2 (RS-24) and the new RS-26. There are about
90 SS-25s left, although the number could be as low as 72 if divisions converting to
the SS-27 Mod 2 retire all SS-25s in one step instead of gradually, regiment by
regiment. The last SS-25s will be withdrawn from service in 2021.
The new ICBMs include SS-27 Mods. 1 and 2 (Topol-M and RS-24). The SS-
27 Mod. 1 is a single warhead missile, known in Russia as Topol-M, that comes in
either mobile (RS-12M1) or silo-based (RS- 12M2) variants. Deployment of the SS-
27 Mod. 1 was completed in 2012 with a total of 78 missiles: 60 silo based missiles
with the 60th Missile Division in Tatishchevo, and 18 road-mobile missiles with the
54th Guards the SS-27 Mod. 2, known in Russia as the RS-24 or Yars, is a modified
SS-27 Mod 1 (Topol-M) that carries a multiple independently targetable reentry
vehicle (MIRV). Following initial deployment of the first two regiments of SS-27 Mod.
2 in 2010–2012, with a total of 18 mobile missiles at the 54th Guards Missile Division
at Teykovo, deployment is now well underway at the Novosibirsk and Nizhniy Tagil
divisions, where the first regiments went on combat duty in late 2013. Altogether, the
Russian military says that six new SS- 27 Mod. 2 (RS-24) regiments were put on
combat duty in 2015,57 but some of those were only partially armed The Russian
Navy operates a fleet of 12 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) of
three classes: Six Delta IVs (Project 667BRDM), three Delta IIIs (Project 667BRD),
and three Boreis (Project 955). Each submarine can carry 16 submarine-launched
ballistic missiles (SLBMs) for a combined total of nearly 800 warheads.58

57
Russian The Federation Defense Ministry. 2016. “Defense Minister General of the Army Sergei Shoigu Held a
Teleconference With the Command Personnel of the Armed Forces.” See e. g. Interfax. 2015a. “New Russian
ICBM should be in Production Before 2020, Deputy Minister Says.” April 20.
http://eng.mil.ru/en/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12073634@egNes
Kristensen, H. M., and R. S. Norris. 2015. “Nuclear Notebook: Russian Nuclear Forces, 2015.” Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists 71: 3 http://thebulletin.org/2015/may/russian-nuclear-forces-20158299
58
The first three new Borei (Project 955/A) SSBNs are in service, with another five in various stages of
construction. The first boat, Yuri DolgorU. K. i (K-535), is based at Yagelnaya in the Northern Fleet, from
where it conducted its first two-month patrol under the Arctic ice from August to October of 2015 (Interfax
2015b). The second boat, Alexander Nevsky (K-550), arrived at its home base at Rybachiy near Petropavlovsk in
September 2015, where it will be joined by the third Borei, Vladimir Monomakh (K-551), in 2016 or 2017.
Interfax. 2015b. “Russian Ballistic Missile Submarine Returns to Port After Ice-cap Cruise.” December 15.
Translation from Russian by BBC Monitoring. See e. g. Gertz, B. 2015. “Russia Nearing Deployment of New
Intermediate-Range Naval Missile.” Washington Free Beacon, August 21.
http://freebeacon.com/national-security/russia-nearing-deployment-of-new-intermediaterange-naval-missile
Interfax. 2015b. “Russian Ballistic Missile Submarine Returns to Port After Ice-cap Cruise.” December 15.

52
Russia operates two types of nuclear-capable heavy bombers: the Tu-160 Blackjack
and the Tu-95MS Bear H59. We estimate that there are 70–80 bombers in the
inventory, of which about 60 are counted as deployed under New START.
Figure

Source: http://www.agoodtreaty.com/2010/07/06/mitt-romney-on-new-start/
Both bomber types can carry the nuclear AS-15 Kent (Kh-55) air-launched
cruise missile (ALCM) 6 and possibly gravity bombs, 7 and the Tu-160 can also carry
the nuclear AS-16 Kickback (Kh-15) short-range attack missile. A new long-range
nuclear cruise missile, designated the Kh-102, is being fielded and will probably
replace the older nuclear missiles.60 Tactical air forces are Russia’s second largest
user of nonstrategic nuclear weapons, with an estimated 570 assigned for delivery by
Tu-22M3 (Backfire) intermediate- range bombers, Su-24M (Fencer-D) fighter-
bombers, and the new Su-34 (Fullback) fighter bomber.

59
Tupolev Tu-95MS (Nato code name: Bear-H) is a four-engine, long-range, turboprop, strategic bomber /
missile carrier developed by Russian aerospace and defense company JSC Tupolev Design Bureau. The carrier is
currently in service with the Russian Air Force. Based on the airframe of Tu-142 (Bear F) maritime patrol
aircraft, the Tu-95MS aircraft is a modernised version of the Tu-95 Bear strategic bomber. It is equipped with
stand-off cruise missiles and can be deployed in combat missions to defeat cruise missiles and strategic enemy
targets.

60
Podvig, P. 2005. “Test of a Kh-555 Cruise Missile.” Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, May 26.
http://russianforces.org/blog/2005/05/test_of_a_kh555_cruise_missile.shtml See e. g. Sutyagin, I. 2012. Atomic
Accounting: A New Estimate of Russia’s Non-Strategic Nuclear Forces. London: Royal United Services
Institute, November.
https://rusi.org/publication/occasional-papers/atomic-accounting-neEuroepan nionimate-russia%E2%80%99s-
non-strategic-nuclearforce

53
 Figure

Source:RIANOVOSTI
All types can deliver nuclear gravity bombs and the Tu-22M3 can also deliver
AS-4 (Kitchen) ALCMs. NATO reported in early 2016 that Tu-22M3s carried out a
simulated nuclear strike exercise against Sweden in March 2013.61 The Tu-22M3 and
Su- 24M are being upgraded. The Su-34, which will gradually replace the Su-24M,
has already been deployed to the Voronezh and Morozovsk bases in European
Union Russia. A total of 120 Su-34s are planned through 2020. Russia’s air- and
missile-defense forces are also upgrading nuclear-capable systems. The S-300 air-
defense system with nuclear-capable SA-10/20 interceptors is deployed across
Russia and is slowly being upgraded to the S-400 system with SA-21 interceptors,

61
NATO. 2016. The General Secretary’s Annual Report 2015, January, p. 19.
http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_01/20160128_SG_AnnualReport_2015_en.pdf

54
and an upgrade of the nuclear-tipped A-135 antiballistic missile defense system
around Russia is reported to be underway.62

People’s Republic of China

The People’s Republic of China is thought to have “several hundred
warheads,” far less than the 1,600-3,000 that have been suggested by some.63 None
of the warheads are thought to be fully deployed but kept in storage under central
control. The existence of a Chinese non-strategic nuclear arsenal is uncertain. The
Chinese arsenal is increasing with production of new warheads for DF-31/31A and
JL-2 missiles.64 The People’s Republic of China has approximately 260 nuclear
warheads in its stockpile for delivery by approximately 160 land based ballistic
missiles as well as aircraft165 The current force has approximately 160 nuclear-
capable land-based missiles of seven types, half of which are short-range and
medium-range; the number of long-range missiles is increasing slowly.66

62
Hans M. Kristensen & Robert S. Norris (2016) United States of America nuclear forces, 2016, Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists, 72:2, 63-73, DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2016.1145901
63
https://www.smallwars.com/forum/analysis-of-regions-nations/1120-eurasian-nuclear-threats
64
The new DF–41, which could be deployed as early as 2015, may carry up to 10 MIRVs and have a maximum
range as far as 7,456 miles, allowing it to target the entire continental United States of America. In addition,
some sources claim People’s Republic of China has modified the DF–5 and the DF–31A to be able to carry
MIRVs. Moreover, People’s Republic of China in late September reportedly conducted the first flight test of a
new DF-31 variant, the DF-31B, which may be able to carry MIRVs. People’s Republic of China could use
MIRVs to deliver nuclear warheads on major USA cities and military facilities as a means of overwhelming
USA ballistic missile defenses.
65
See more Clapper JR (2015) Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of theUS
IntelligenceCommunity, Senate Armed Services Committee, February 26, p. 7.
http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Clapper_ 02-26-15.pdf. CIA (2001) Foreign missile
defense developments and the ballistic missile threat through 2015, unclassified summary. National Intelligence
Council, December. https://www.fas.org/ Defense Department (2011) Annual Report to Congress:
Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of People’s Republic of China 2011.
Office of the Kristensen and Norris spp/starwars/CIA-NIE.htm.SecretaryofDefense,August
25.http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2011_cmpr_final.pdf.
66
The oldestmissile inPeople’s Republic of ChinaŐs inventory, the DF-3A (CSS-2), is a liquid-fueled, single-
stage, maneuverable, intermediaterange ballisticmissile that candeliver a 3.3- megaton warhead up to 3,000
kilometers (km), sufficient to target southeastern Russia and Japan. See more Haney DC (2015) Prepared
Testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, March
http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Haney_03-19-15.pdf.
KristensenHM(2015) Pentagon report: People’s Republic of China deploys MIRV missile. FAS Strategic
Security Blog, May 11. http://fas.org/blogs/security/2015/05/People’s Republic of China-mirv.

55
 Figure:

Source: Reuters
The People’s Republic of China’s DF-5A (CSS-4 Mod 2) Na liquid-fueled, two-
stage, silo-based ICBMŃ has a range that exceeds 13,000 kilometers and has
apparently been targeted at the United States of America and Russia since the early
1980s. The DF-5A is a longer-range modified version of the DF-5 (CSS-4 Mod 1).
The Pentagon reported in May 2015 that The People’s Republic of China had
equipped some of the DF-5As with multiple independently-targetable re-entry
vehicles (MIRV) (Defense Department, 2015: 8)67. People’s Republic of China’s

67
Defense Department (2015) Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the
Peopl’s Republic of People’s Republic of China 2015. Office of the Secretary of Defense, April
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2015_People’s Republic of China_Military_PoUSr_Report.pdf. See more Office
of Naval Intelligence (2015) The PLA Navy:New Capabilities and Missions for the 21st Century.
http://www.oni.navy.mil/
Intelligence_Community/People’s Republic of China.html Sanger DE and Broad WJ (2015) People’s Republic
of China making some missiles more poUSrful. New York Times, May 16.
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/ Kristensen HM (2014a)

56
primary regional nuclear missile is the two-stage, solid-fuel, road mobile DF-21 (CSS-
5) medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM). The DF-21 exists in two nuclear versions:
the DF-21 (CSS-5 Mod 1) and the newer DF-21A (CSS-5 Mod 2).

The Mod 1 version has a range of 1,750-plus km but the new version probably
has a longer range of about 2,150 km. The People’s Republic of China has built two
types of submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), the JL-1 and JL-2, which
were developed for two types of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines. The
1,700-km-range, two-stage JL-1 (CSS-NX-3) SLBM developed for a single old Xia-
class (Type 092) submarine first entered service in 1986 and is not considered
operational. The Xia is based at the North Sea Fleet base near Qingdao in the
Shandong province. The submarine underwent a lengthy shipyard overhaul in 2005
and 2006 but appears to have stayed in port since then. The Xia/JL-1 weapon
system is expected to be retired soon. Development of the new JL-2 (CSSNX- 14)
SLBM for the second-generation Jin-class (Type 094)68 submarine is nearing

People’s Republic of China SSBN fleet getting ready ” But for what? FAS Strategic Security Blog, April 25.
https://fas.org/blogs/security/2014/04/People’s Republic of Chinassbnfleet.
68
The JIN SSBN’s intended USapon, the JL–2 submarine launched ballistic missile, appears to have reached
initial operational capability after approximately ten years of R and D, giving People’s Republic of China its first
credible sea-based nuclear deterrent.* The JL–2’s range of approximately 4,598 miles gives People’s Republic

57
completion The JL-2 is a modified version of the DF-31. Equipped with a single
warhead and possibly penetration aids, the JL-2 has never been flight tested to its full
range but is estimated to have a range of 7,000-plus km. The 2015 Pentagon report
estimates the range as 7,400km (Defense Department, 2015: 9). Such a range is
sufficient to target Alaska, Guam, Russia, and India from waters near People’s
Republic of ChinaŃ but, unless the submarine carrying the weapon sails significantly
eastward, not the continental United States of America.
Figure 1. Potential Julang-2 SLBM launches areas for targeting continental United
States of America

Source: Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris Chinese nuclear forces, 2015 Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists 0(0) 1–8! The Author(s) 2015
The People’s Republic of China produces and fields a number of cruise
missiles, including land-attack cruise missiles that may have a nuclear capability.
One potentially nuclear-capable Chinese cruise missile is the DH-10 (CJ- 10) land-
attack cruise missile (LACM).
The Cold War experience of nuclear restraint and responsibility has been
effectively replaced by grave dangers of nuclear and other WMD terrorism. This has
led to heightened risks of conflict escalation. A catastrophic terrorist attack leading to
conventional war and its escalating towards a nuclear exchange is no longer an
improbability. This risks creating hitherto unknown interpretations of deterrence and
dangers to its stability. The combination of nuclear weapons and terrorism has thus

of China the ability to conduct nuclear strikes against Alaska if launched from waters near People’s Republic of
China; against Alaska and Hawaii if launched from waters south of Japan; against Alaska, Hawaii, and the
Euroepan nionern portion of the continental United States of America if launched from waters Euroepan nion of
Hawaii; and against all 50 USA states if launched from waters east of Hawaii.

58
extended the conflict spectrum, to include terrorist action at one end to a nuclear
exchange at the other. While international collective action and mature
statesmanship can reduce and contain this danger, the risk of having to manage
nuclear deterrence under unstable conditions is real. Deterrence will have to be
based from now on multiple instruments which can be applied in an integrated
manner. Deterrence, like any other strategy, is not the end goal of nation states. It is
nothing more but a means to achieve more security, to protect you from threats and
challenges coming from abroad.
Traditionally the concept of deterrence69 has been associated with nuclear
weapons although in fact the concept is also applicable to other weapons of mass
destruction as well as even conventional weapons.

Figure

Source: Reuters

69
Deterrence, military strategy under which one poUSr uses the threat of reprisal effectively to preclude an
attack from an adversary poUSr. With the advent of nuclear USapons, the term deterrence largely has been
applied to the basic strategy of the nuclear poUSrs and of the major alliance systems. The premise of the strategy
is that each nuclear poUSr maintains a high level of instant and overwhelming destructive capability against any
aggression—i.e., the ability, visible and credible to a would-be attacker, to inflict unacceptable damage upon the
attacker with forces that survive a surprise attack. An essential element in successful deterrence is a degree of
uncertainty on the part of a would-be aggressor as to whether the target poUSr, although attacked and badly
damaged, will nonetheless retaliate—even at the risk of suffering further, crippling damage in a second attack.
Thus, nuclear-deterrence strategy relies on two basic conditions: the ability to retaliate after a surprise attack
must be perceived as credible; and the will to retaliate must be perceived as a possibility, though not necessarily
as a certainty. http://www.britannica.com/topic/deterrence-political-and-military-strategy It was entirely credible
to threaten the USSR with the use of nuclear USapons in response to a Soviet attack on the United States. But
how could the United States make credible the threat to use nuclear USapons against the Soviet homeland in
response to a Soviet attack on U.S. allies in European Union?

59
 Needless to say the concept fits more neatly with weapons or weapons’
systems that have devastating effects, because the rationale behind being deterred
from acting as a result of the presence of a particular weapon or weapons’ system is
that the consequences would be so costly that the state decides not to take such
actions. If the consequences of action were not consequential, the deterrent effect
would be minimal and the probability that states would risk challenging the deterrent
would increase the concept of deterrence is more effective in global strategic security
paradigms. In such circumstances, the states are high and issues more clearly
defined. In regional circumstances, deterrence concepts still apply but they are more
circumspect, essentially because strategic weapons cannot easily be utilized without
having ramifications also on the deterrent holder. A case in point in the Middle East
was the 1973 Arab/Israeli war. Its relations with its military supplier, the USSR,
tenuous at times. Egypt initiated the war, with limited military and ambitious political
objectives. The goal immediately was to shatter the aura of invincibility that the Israeli
army had acquired, not really to liberate the Sinai. Politically, the plan was to create a
new paradigm with a level of uncertainty with risks and opportunities for regional and
global stakeholders that would generate a political and diplomatic process as a
catalyst for a negotiated Arab/Israeli comprehensive peace. It is noteworthy that
Egypt initiated the 1973 war for the fore-mentioned purposes in spite of its prior
knowledge that Israel had significant nuclear potential, in other worlds was not
deterred by this potential. Another interesting Middle East example that reflects on
the whole concept of deterrence is the Egyptian position refusing to join the Chemical
and Biological Weapons conventions until Israel ratifies the Treaty on the Non
proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This position implies a balance of deterrence
between difference weapons systems factoring in a complex calculation of the
respective capacities of states to bear or envisage losses. 70

Therefore I consider that it’s very appropriate to concentrate the discussion on

threats and threat perceptions: this is indeed an indispensable entry point to the
analysis of the future of deterrence. Deterrence as a concept is highly influential too,
in non-nuclear security settings. The notion is not inconsistent, for example, with the

70
The states parties to the BTWC met twice in 2014. The meetings mainly consisted of an exchange of views
and experience, with a focus on cooperation and assistance in the life sciences for peaceful purposes, a review of
science and technology developments, and strengthening capacity to assist those potentially threatened with
biological USapons.

60
idea of bringing together a wide range of instruments for purposes of applying
diplomatic pressure to prevent or bring an end to conflict (e.g. Libya). Non-nuclear
deterrence also has relevance in the context of terrorism, via the concept of denial of
benefit to terrorists who may be thinking of carrying out an attack. The search for
ways of building more resilient societies, by reducing the vulnerability of vital
infrastructure sites for example, is partly designed to deter attacks on those sites.
One could go on with other examples. Deterrence, both nuclear and non-nuclear
remains relevant and evident in the approaches being taken to the security
challenges faced by the U.K. Nonetheless, there are limits to the value of deterrence
as a core organizing concept for thinking about 21st century security challenges and
these limits are not just about the nature of the security threats being faced (e.g.
terrorists may have no return address) but also about the contemporary distribution of
power. A combination of conventional military and nuclear capabilities, of economic
sanctions and of coordinated international responses, all supported by multilateral
organizations like the UN, will form the basis of deterrence. Nuclear deterrence by
itself, and applied by a single state, is more likely to be counterproductive The targets
of deterrence and the activities being deterred can range from proliferation related
activities, to use of international terrorism as instrument of state policy, to military
provocation and adventurism. India views nuclear deterrence as a means of limited
value against the new range of threats facing it and the international community. A
combination of instruments will therefore need to be utilized to obtain a cumulatively
constructive impact, to prevent the new range of threats from impacting on the
security of a state, or a region or on a global scale. Nuclear deterrence is therefore in
need of being reinterpreted as one amongst a range of options, and even more as an
option of last resort.71

71
Looking at the international system from The Federation of Russia, I should confess that the threat perceptions
in my country have shifted in a very profound way. Of course, you can still find The Federation of Russia
politicians and academics who continue to believe in the antagonistic conflict betUSen The Federation of Russia
and the Euroepan Union. HoUSver, the political mainstream in The Federation ofThe Federation of Russiadoes
not subscribe to this view; the dominant perception is that the United States of America and the Euroepan nion,
in general, does not present a direct strategic threat to The Federation of Russia. It does not mean that The
Federation OfThe Federation of Russiaand Washington do not compete with each other or agree on every
question in global politics, but the totality of the conflict is gone. And without this totality one can rightfully
question the credibility of traditional deterrence

61
 Figure

Source: Reuters

Collective Self-Defense.

It should be emphasized that the right of all states to defend themselves was
well-established in CIL prior to adoption of the UN Charter. Article 51 of the Charter
provides: “Nothing in the present Chapter shall impair the inherent right of individual
or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the UN until
the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace
and security.” The Article 5172 states that the inherent right of collective self-defense
allows victim States to receive assistance from other States in responding to and
repelling an armed attack. To constitute a legitimate act of collective self-defense, all
conditions for the exercise of an individual State’s right of self-defense must be met,
along with the additional requirement that assistance must be requested by the
Victim State. There is no recognized right of a third-party State to unilaterally
intervene in internal conflicts where the issue in question is one of a group’s right to
self-determination and there is no request by the de jure government for assistance.
a. Collective defense treaties, such as that of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (the Rio
Treaty), the Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States
72
Article 51 of the Charter provides: “Nothing in the present Chapter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the UN until the Security
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.”

62
of America (ANZUS), and other similar agreements, do not provide an international
legal basis for the use of USA force abroad, per se. Such agreements simply
establish a commitment among the parties to engage in “collective self-defense” as
required by specified situations, and provide the framework through which such
measures are to be taken. From an international public law perspective, a legal
basis for engaging in measures involving the use of military force abroad must still
be established from other sources of international public law extrinsic to these
collective defense treaties (i.e., there still must be a justifiable need for collective
self-defense or a UN Security Council authorization to use force). The United States
of America has entered into bilateral military assistance agreements with numerous
countries around the world. These are not defense agreements, and thus impose no
commitment on the part of the United States of America to come to the defense of
the other signatory State in any given situation. Moreover, such agreements, like
collective defense treaties, also provide no intrinsic legal basis for the use of military
force. Already in the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS), the USA Government
took a step toward what some view as a significant expansion of use of force
doctrine from anticipatory self-defense to preemption.73 Such position was
reinforced in the 2006 NSS, which reaffirmed the doctrine of preemptive self-
defense against “rogue states and terrorists” who pose a threat to the United States
of America based on their expressed desire to acquire and use weapons of mass
destruction.74 The “Bush Doctrine” of preemption re-casted the right of anticipatory
self-defense based on a different understanding of imminence. Thus, the NSS
stated, “We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and
objectives of today’s adversaries.” It concluded: “The greater the threat, the greater
is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking action to defend
ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s
attack.” The 2010 NSS, however, suggests a possible movement away from the
Bush Doctrine, as the Obama Administration declares in the NSS that, “while the
use of force is sometimes necessary, [the United States of America] will exhaust
73
The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America of America, (2002). issued
20 September 2002, is that of “preemption,”[1] defined as “preemptive and preventive action.” The NSS notes
that terrorism and USapons of mass destruction in the hands of rogue states have made preemption more
attractive as a policy option, but it does not lay out specific criteria or guidelines for determining when the U.S.
should carry out preemptive attacks. In addition, the NSS seeks to build more integrated intelligence capabilities,
to coordinate with allies to form a common assessment of the most dangerous threats, and to transform our
military forces to ensure our ability to conduct rapid and precise operations to achieve decisive results.
74
The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America of America, (2006).

63
other options before war whenever [it] can, and [will] carefully weigh the costs and
risks of action versus the costs and risks of inaction.”75 Moreover, according to the
2010 NSS, “when force is necessary . . . [the United States of America] will seek
broad international support, working with such institutions as NATO and the U.N.
16
Security Council.” Nevertheless, the Obama Administration maintains that “the
United States of America must reserve the right to act unilaterally if necessary to
defend our nation, yet we will also seek to adhere to standards that govern the use
17
of force.”

A modern-day legal test for imminence, consistent with the above, was
perhaps best articulated by Professor Michael Schmitt in 2003. He stated that
States may legally employ force in advance of an attack, at the point when (1)
evidence shows that an aggressor has committed itself to an armed attack, and (2)
delaying a response would hinder the defender’s ability to mount a properly
defense.76 The anticipatory self-defense, whether labeled anticipatory or
preemptive, must be distinguished from preventive self-defense, whereas
preventive self-defense—employed to counter non-imminent threats—is illegal
under international public law.

Anticipatory Self-Defense

Some states embrace an interpretation of the UN Charter that extends beyond

the black letter language of Article 51, under the CIL principle of anticipatory self-
defense. Anticipatory self-defense justifies using force in anticipation of an imminent
armed attack. The International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation
has put in place voluntary restrictions on the export of ballistic missile technology but
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has not signed the Code. It has successfully
tested short and medium range missiles such as the Hwasong 5 and 6 (Scud variety)
missiles that have ranges of 200-500km and could easily reach Seoul. These are
notoriously inaccurate, which is true for most ballistic missile systems due to the

75
The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America of America 22 (2010).
76
http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2014/05/us-legal-argument-current-wars-lawful-USve-never-found-one.html
Michael Schmitt, Preemptive Strategies in International public law, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 513, 534 (2003). See
e. g. YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENSE 244-46 (4th ed. 2005); Ashley
Deeks, ‘Unwilling or Unable’: Toward an Normative Framework for Extra-Territorial Self-Defense, 52 VA. J.
INT’L L. 483 (2012).

64
dependability and variance in launch conditions, weather conditions and old or non-
existent guidance systems. 77

Chinese threat comes from the nuclear and conventional forces

modernization and build-up. The People’s Republic of China may soon acquire anti-
access and area-denial capability... For numerous states, the sustained military,
political and economic ascension of The People’s Republic of China is increasingly
viewed as a likely threat to international security Threats to international security
generated by People’s Republic of China’s challenge to USA hegemony must be
viewed more soberly, particularly given the uncertainty of People’s Republic of
China’s ‘rise’.78 People’s Republic of China’s potential nuclear threat, while growing,
is still comparatively small and vulnerable when viewed alongside that of the USA
People’s Republic of China’s nuclear stockpile is currently between a tenth and a
hundredth the size of the USA arsenal despite People’s Republic of China’s military
modernization attempts, any military exchange between the two states would be
hugely asymmetrical. The continued pre-eminence of the USA military will be a
significant factor in the potential of a growing The People’s Republic of China to
disrupt international security. People’s Republic of China, fully aware that an increase
in bellicosity can be challenged by the USA, with overwhelming force, will attempt a
peaceful transition to great power status
Now if The People’s Republic of China and The Federation of Russia decided
to challenge the US in the Pacific, they would have to face off against the Pacific
Fleet (made up of the 3rd and 7th fleets), which we would assume has already been
pulled back from any operations in the Middle-East and is guarding Japan, Hawaii,
and the European Union Coast. The Third fleet alone consists of five Nimitz class
carriers, while the Seventh has one more. That's six carriers, each individually
possessing enough air power to go toe to toe with the Chinese and The Federation of
Russia navies combined. These are supported by battle groups, surface craft,

77
The lack of accuracy is one of the technical and tactical factors that prompt ballistic missile possessors into
developing nuclear warheads as the large devastation caused by a nuclear explosion compensates for missing the
target by miles. HoUSver, there is no finesses in nuclear targeting and likely blow-back of radiation - the fear of
which is generating anxiety in People’s Republic of China - and other effects, such as unleashing an attack in
kind, are factors that temper nuclear ambitions in other countries, but obviously not in Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea .
78
See e. g. Kaplan, Robert. 2010. ‘The Geography of Chinese PoUSr: How far will People’s Republic of China
reach on Land and at Sea?’. Foreign Affairs 89(3) Glaser, Charles. 2011. ‘Will People’s Republic of China’s
Rise Lead to War?’. Foreign Affairs. 90(2); CRAIG COHEN | MELISSA G. DALTON 2016 Global2016
forecast CSIS Center for Strategic and International Studies Washington D.C. 2016

65
amphibious warfare craft, and submarine squadrons. any engagement on the open
seas is overwhelmingly slanted in the favor of the United States of America because
it would be out of range of land based fixed wing planes (i.e. fighter planes) and The
People’s Republic of China and The Federation n of Russia would need to rely on
carrier launched planes. People’s Republic of China's best bet against US Carrier
battle groups are ASBM (anti-ship ballistic missiles, which haven't been perfected
yet, and are thus far shot from land only, making them only effective if the fighting
occurs near the Asian Mainland. Mentioned above factors deeply contribute to fast
increase in worldwide military spending, whereas global military expenditures topped
$1.6 trillion in 2015, an increase of about 1 % from the previous year, according to a
new report by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).79 That
represents the first increase in global military spending since 2011, with growth
coming from Asia and Oceania, Central and Eastern European Union, and a few key
Gulf powers, as well a slower defense drawdown in the US than in previous years. 80
Military expenditures is defined as current and capital spending from each nation’s
armed forces, including peacekeeping forces; defense ministries and other
government agencies that deal with defense projects; paramilitary forces, when
judged to be trained and equipped for military operations, and military space
activities81 The data is based on open sources, including a questionnaire that is sent
out annually to governments; as a result, some totals, most notably People’s
Republic of China’s, are estimates rather than concrete figures. Unsurprisingly, the
US remains the top military spender at $596 billion, nearly tripling People’s Republic
of China’s estimated total of $215 billion. However, the US did drop by 2.4 % from
2014 figures. Saudi Arabia ($87.2 billion) moved past Russia ($66.4 billion) for the
third spot, a move the researches attribute to the falling cost of the Rubble. Similarly,
the drop in value of the euro let the United Kingdom ($55.5 billion) flip spots with
French Republic ($50.9 billion) at fifth overall and seventh overall, respectively. 82
The report highlights the impact of falling oil prices on defense spending,
noting that it led to “an abrupt reduction in military spending” in countries such as

79
http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/policy-budget/budget/2016/04/04/global-military-spending-grows-
sipri-global-arms-trade-report/82530864/
80
SIPRI’s military expenditure report is released annually to track overall defense spending on a global scale.
81
http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/policy-budget/budget/2016/04/04/global-military-spending-grows-
sipri-global-arms-trade-report/82530864/
82
http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/policy-budget/budget/2016/04/04/global-military-spending-grows-
sipri-global-arms-trade-report/82530864/

66
Angola, Chad, Ecuador, Kazakhstan, Oman, South Sudan and Venezuela. Oil
revenue-dependent giants like Russia and Saudi Arabia bucked that trend in 2016,
but the SIPRI authors expect both nations spending to drop in 2016Regionally,
spending in Asia and Oceania rose 5.4 %, at an estimated $438 billion — 49 % of
which comes from People’s Republic of China. People’s Republic of China’s
spending more than quadrupled that of India, the region’s second-largest military
investor, and it continues a trend of major growth in military spending in the region,
which has increased by 64 % since 2006.
European military spending increased 1.7 % in 2015 to $328 billion, driven
largely by Eastern European Union, which includes Russia and those nations
perturbed by Russia’s invasion of Ukrainian territory in 2014. In fact, Eastern
European spending increased by 90 % from 2006.83 Military spending from Latin
America and the Caribbean actually dropped by 2.9 % in 2015, to $67.0 billion, while
African expenditures fell by 5.3 % in 2015, with an estimated $37.0 billion. The
researchers decided not to publish a regional estimate for the Middle East, as “data
for 2015 is unavailable for several countries.

83
ibidem

67
Chapter II The XXI century military warfare: cyber war and hybrid war

The September 11 2001 event has pushed the international society to rethink
the concept of security threat. International terrorists and ‘home grown’ radicals
become the main threat to national security and people. Terrorism, WMD terrorism in
particular, constitutes a common challenge for all over the world. Transnational and
technologically facilitated threats such as terrorism, possible WMD terrorism,
transnational organized crime, and cyber-attack enjoy a high profile, as do potential
problems accompanying fast and large scale people movement.

Hybrid war

The recent The Federation of Russia intervention in Ukraine has generated

much debate about the use and effectiveness of hybrid warfare, a type of warfare
widely understood to blend conventional/unconventional, regular/irregular, and
information and cyber warfare. In the last decade, some of the most important military
forces and coalitions in the world, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), have attempted to address and counter so-called hybrid threats. Recent
Russian military operations not only in Ukraine but also in Suria are only part of an
increasingly sophisticated hybrid campaign, described in the Military Doctrine as 'a
complex mixture of military force with political, economic, information and other non-
military means'. The importance of this hybrid approach has been also acknowledged
by Russian Chief of Staff General Valery Gerasimov: 'in many cases, [non-military
tools] have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness'84
The new hybrid approach has the advantage for Russia of remaining below the
threshold likely to trigger a military response by NATO, which despite not having a
Treaty obligation to defend Ukraine, has committed itself to providing support.85 Of
course such actions can be denied by the Russian government: military operations
can be attributed to volunteers and cyber-attacks to 'patriotic hackers'

84
Top Russian General Lays Bare Putin's Plan for U. K. raine, World Post, 11 February 2014.
85
NATO leaders pledge support to Ukraineat Wales Summit, NATO, 4 September 2014.

68
Figure

Source: https://geopolicraticus.wordpress.com/2014/10/07/hybrid-warfare/
Rather than develop strategies based on ‘hybrid’ challenges (an elusive and
catch-all term), I believe decision-makers should stay away from it and consider
warfare for what it has always been: a complex set of interconnected threats and
forceful means waged to further political motives. The term ‘hybrid warfare’ appeared
at least as early as 2005 and was subsequently used to describe the strategy used
by the Hezbollah in the 2006 Lebanon War. Since then, the term “hybrid” has
dominated much of the discussion about modern and future warfare, to the point
where it has been adopted by senior military leaders and promoted as a basis for
modern military strategies

In its 2011 Field Manual 3-0 Operations86, the USA Army defined the term as:
“The diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, and/or
criminal elements all unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects.” In recent years,
The Federation of Russia policy makers have skillfully mixed military and non-military
tactics to achieve geopolitical gains at the expense of the United States of America
and its partners and allies. Recent The Federation of Russia aggression against the
country’s neighbors has involved cyber attacks, information operations, psychological
pressure, media manipulation, economic threats, proxy actions, sophisticated
86
Field Manual (FM) 3-0 is one of the Army's two capstone doctrinal publications; the other is FM 1, The Army.
FM 3-0 presents overarching doctrinal guidance and direction for conducting operations. Change 1 to FM 3-0
reinforces the primary role of commanders in military operations by emphasizing mission command, the means
by which Army commanders command and control their forces. It reflects how the human dimension has taken
precedence over technology, with emphasis on initiative and responsibility at all levels of command.

69
propaganda, exploitation of ethnic strife, and courting deliberate and accidental
agents of influence in foreign countries through influence-buying and framing issues
in attractive ways to sympathetic audiences. While these tactics do not cause
significant harm individually, when combined they can weaken a country and prime it
for invasion or insurrection. The aggregate effect of employing these tools has also
presented a potent hybrid mix that NATO and the United States of America have
found difficult to counter. For example, The Federation of Russia actions in Ukraine
and elsewhere have deliberately fallen below the threshold normally deemed
necessary for invoking NATO’s Article 5 collective defense guarantee. The
Federation of Russia tactics have also exploited ambiguities to make it more difficult
for European Union leaders to reach a consensus that all these activities are
orchestrated by The Federation of Russia or any other single aggressor

There is no explicit The Federation of Russia government doctrine for hybrid

warfare, but even before The Federation of Russia’s recent military interventions, The
Federation of Russia strategists embraced information warfare, studied intensely how
social forces can affect security developments, and developed a “reflexive control”
concept that applied measures to lead an adversary to “reflexively” pursue actions
sought by The Federation of Russia. In 2008, for instance, The Federation of Russia
may have induced Georgian forces to launch an offensive against The Federation of
Russia proxies in South Ossetia, providing the The Federation of Russia government
with its desired justification to invade Georgia. The Federation of Russia leaders have
in practice though not explicitly joined the Obama administration in emphasizing a
“whole-of-government” approach to generating “smart power” tools for foreign policy.
The Federation of Russia’s Chief of the General Staff, Valery Gerasimov, explicitly
stated in 2013 that The Federation of Russia would apply “the broad use of political,
economic, informational, humanitarian, and other nonmilitary measures …
supplemented by military means of a covert nature character,” to achieve The
Federation of Russia interests. In May 2014, The Federation of Russia Defense
Minister Sergei Shoygu told Arab military officials that The Federation of Russia
believed that the United States of America had engineered the Arab Spring and
Euromaiden protests in Ukraine to gain control of natural resources and subvert
foreign governments. Shoygu stated that The Federation of Russia would also
engage in “information operations” to counter USA and European Union

70
“expansionism.” The Federation of Russia’s hybrid tactics on display in Ukraine and
elsewhere have included:87 Information operations entailing a mix of propaganda,
disinformation, diplomatic duplicity, media manipulation, and outright falsehoods
designed to confuse and divide opinion in the targeted state and elsewhere (i.e.,
failing to keep pledges to deescalate a crisis). The subsequent ambiguous operating
environment makes it increasingly difficult for The Federation of Russia’s opponents
to craft an effective counterstrategy or mobilize support against The Federation of
Russia. The Federation of Russia information operations also exploit political,
economic, regional, ethnic, sectarian, social, and other divisions in the targeted state.
For instance, information campaigns vilify the non-The Federation of Russia
populations by claiming that they are disenfranchising the target state’s ethnic The
Federation of Russians, highlighting real or fabricated injustices, and offering The
Federation of Russia support for protection of their minority rights. A common tactic is
to denounce local opposition groups as “fascists” and NAZI sympathizers, while
accusing these groups’ European Union backers as seeking natural resources or
“social revolutions” designed to replace pro- Russia governments with European
Union puppet regimes. In foreign countries, The Federation of Russia information
operations try to win support among international peace groups, The Federation of
Russia-friendly media, supportive businesses, and right- and left-wing extremists
opposed to NATO and European Union values. The The Federation of Russia
government also provides funding for pro-The Federation of Russia NGOs, political
parties, and transnational criminal organizations in foreign countries to support proxy
operations. The The Federation of Russia government has recently sought to gain
sympathizers among European Union social conservatives through attacks on
homosexual activists and other controversial social behavior in defense of
conservative Christian values. Within The Federation of Russia, the government
promotes nationalism in order to mobilize patriotic fervor on behalf of the state’s
actions. The media also exaggerates foreign threats to The Federation of Russia to
rally support behind the government. Psychological operations employing The
Federation of Russian-controlled media and agents of influence in order to create a
narrative favorable to the Kremlin, incite subversive activity by the targeted state’s
population through “controlled chaos,” intimidate civilian support networks (such as

87
http://www.diplomaatia.ee/en/article/countering-The Federation of The Federation Of Russias-hybrid-threats/

71
military contractors), spur flows of refugees, and create other distractions that
weaken the targeted government’s ability to resist The Federation of Russia actions.
For example, the resurrection of the concept of “Novorossiya” gave pro-The
Federation of Russia Ukrainians a new sense of legitimacy and identity that fortified
their separatist ambitions. The Federation of Russia’s actions targets a part of a
country in a way that threatens escalation to the entire country if the government
resists The Federation of Russia gains.

Covert deliveries of weapons to pro-The Federation of Russia fighters under

the guise of rendering help to distressed populations. This tactic involves rendering
relief aid to territories in which Russia has created the conditions for a humanitarian
crisis in the first place, thereby allowing The Federation of Russia to provide both
“bullets and bandages.” Moreover, when the targeted government objects to the The
Federation of Russia deliveries on its territory without its permission, The Federation
of Russia shows that it can ignore the foreign government’s wishes. The Federation
of Russia also relies on direct arms sales and purchases to influence foreign actors.
Economic destabilization involving formal sanctions, The Federation of Russian-
induced labor stoppages, and transnational criminal organizations, threats to cut
energy sales and other vital commercial ties, and additional implicit or explicit
economic coercion designed to weaken the targeted population and deter external
intervention on its behalf. The Federation of Russia officials have also consistently
warned about the high mutual costs of economic sanctions and publicly denigrated
the effectiveness of foreign sanctions. Furthermore, The Federation of Russia can
supplement these coercive measures by offering others positive incentives to
cooperate with The Federation of Russia, such as purchasing the Mistral amphibious
ships from French Republic, offering lucrative investment opportunities to foreign
businesses, or subsidizing energy sales to foreign countries.
The employment of “paramilitary proxies” such as “little green men”
(undeclared The Federation of Russia military personnel operating without insignia or
official affiliation), retired The Federation of Russia military personnel, active duty The
Federation of Russia soldiers “on vacation” and other The Federation of Russia
„volunteers” who join local irregular units, self-declared “Cossack” fighters, and other
regional militants including criminal gangs. They engage in rapid localized actions
that present others with fait accompli and, through staged incidents of supposed

72
attacks against The Federation of Russia interests or humanitarian crises, justify
more direct The Federation of Russia military intervention in addition to diplomatic,
logistical, and other non-military support. The Federation of Russia’s elite
commandos (Spetsnaz) can organize and lead these irregular groups as well as
hinder the movement of enemy forces, seize control of key infrastructure, and
conduct provocateur operations such as dressing as local ethnic The Federation of
Russians and provoking non-ethnic The Federation of Russians. The Federation of
Russians can also infiltrate the civil society institutions and local security forces of a
targeted state. Seeking “partial deniability” by employing The Federation of Russia
soldiers irregularly, patriotic The Federation of Russia hackers not belonging to
government agencies, and other groups not formally part of the The Federation of
Russia government or armed forces.88
Employing force feints that use exercises, troop deployments, and other
military activities to intimidate countries, disrupt the targeted state’s military response
(i.e., forcing the Ukrainians to disperse their forces and bring air defenses that have
no use in fighting the pro-The Federation of Russia separatists), and deter
intervention by third parties through threats of escalation. If another state bordering
The Federation of Russia confronts a The Federation of Russia-backed separatist
movement, then that state cannot apply its full military potential against the rebels but
would have to hold some troops back either to avoid provoking The Federation of
Russia or to prevent The Federation of Russia troops from attacking them where and
when they are most vulnerable (near The Federation of Russia and engaged with
The Federation of Russia proxies, as with The Federation of Russia’s last-minute
counter offensive in Ukraine in late August 2015 which shattered Ukrainian forces
and saved the separatists from imminent defeat). The mobilization of The Federation
of Russia military power near a target country also positions The Federation of
Russia to intervene more effectively if necessary, as the exercises enable The
Federation of Russia forces to launch conventional operations with less warning time.
The shadow of escalation also makes The Federation of Russia’s non-military
subversion efforts more effective. Without the risk of potential The Federation of
Russia military intervention, a targeted government could more easily suppress pro-

88
The intent is to allow The Federation of Russiaofficials to deny direct responsibility for the disorders in the
targeted country while making evident to select audiences that there is some official The Federation of
Russiainvolvement in the disorders that could escalate if provoked, thereby deterring countermeasures by the
targeted government or by third parties.

73
The Federation of Russia proxies and The Federation of Russia’s “little green men”
by applying its full police powers and conventional force against them. But in Ukraine,
the government’s response was limited to avoid giving The Federation of The
Federation of Russia pretext for escalation to direct intervention, which nevertheless
did occur when the pro-The Federation of Russia insurgency performed poorly. The
Federation of Russia leaders mistakenly expected more The Federation of Russia
Ukrainians to join the uprising or the insurgents to fight better. Instead, the The
Federation of Russia government had to expand its direct intervention over time by
providing more equipment and training to the insurgents and increasing the number
of The Federation of Russia „volunteers” who eventually reinforced them. The
Federation of Russia also used its air defense systems to establish a de facto no-fly-
zone over eastern Ukraine and engaged in military (including nuclear) exercises
during the Ukraine conflict. Nonetheless, The Federation of Russia would generally
like to avoid, or at least conceal and minimize under the cover of conducting military
exercises or humanitarian interventions, any conventional military campaigns in
foreign countries.
Tactically shifting between offensive and defensive postures designed to keep
the targeted state and its foreign supporters off guard and force them to remain
reactive rather than engage in proactive moves. To maintain the initiative in Ukraine,
The Federation of Russia officials have accused their opponents of taking
destabilizing and aggressive actions in what former NATO Secretary General Anders
Fogh Rasmussen termed “a smokescreen designed to cover up The Federation of
Russia's own broken promises, interference and escalation.” The Federation of
Russia media outlets also promote conspiracy theories to discredit European Union
motives and actions, claiming for instance that the European Union (not The
Federation of Russia) violates international public law89, threatens The Federation of
Russia by expanding NATO, promoted social revolutions to subvert pro-The
Federation of Russia regimes, and builds missile defenses to counter The Federation

89
See e.g. Department of the Air Force, The Judge Advocate General’s School, Air Force Operations and the
Law (3rd ed., 2014); USA Naval War College, International public law Studies, Vol. 88, Non-International
Armed Conflict in the TUSnty-first Century (2012). 12 See, e.g., The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and
School, USA Army, International and Operational Law Department, Law of Armed Conflict Deskbook (2014);
The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, USA Army, International and Operational Law
Department, Law of Armed Conflict Documentary Supplement (2014); The Judge Advocate General’s Legal
Center and School, USA Army, International and Operational Law Department, Operational Law Handbook
(2014). United Kingdom Ministry of Defense, Joint Service Publication 383, The Joint Service Manual of the
Law of Armed Conflict (2004).

74
 of Russia under the pretext of protecting against Iran. The Federation of Russia
information organs also promote the notion that The Federation of Russians are
paranoid about their security needs so it would be best for foreign governments to
avoid taking strong actions that could result in irrational The Federation of Russia
escalation. Moreover, The Federation of The Federation of Russia has sometimes
paused its aggression by, as in Ukraine, offering a compromise after the successful
initial campaign reached its culminating point, thus allowing The Federation of The
Federation of Russia to keep the Crimea under its control while temporarily “freezing”
the conflict in eastern Ukraine. The Federation of The Federation of Russia gains
additional leverage by positioning itself to unfreeze the conflict at any time. For
example, The Federation of Russia officials might reignite the separatist conflicts in
Georgia, Moldova, or Ukraine should any of these countries try to join NATO.
Cyber attacks against critical public and private infrastructure networks that
delay and disrupt the target’s response to The Federation of Russia actions, along
with cyber disruptions or other anti-access attacks against NATO communications,
information, and other critical networks. The uncertain consequences of launching
major cyber attacks has thus far limited The Federation of Russia’s use of cyber
weapons, but, as with The Federation of Russia’s unused nuclear arsenal, The
Federation of The Federation of Russia hopes to exploit its possession of these
weapons (with their potential to inflict catastrophic damage on a target) to deter
European Union actions against The Federation of The Federation of Russia and its
proxies. Another constraint of The Federation of Russia’s inclination to disrupt foreign
information networks is that The Federation of Russia employs cyber tools to
supplement other data collection methods, ranging from reading public sources to
espionage activities by The Federation of Russia agents. The The Federation of
Russia strategy of “reflexive control,” which was seen most clearly in Georgia in 2008,
when the South Ossetia government was staffed by many The Federation of
Russians, one of whom was the minister of defense. Presumably with The Federation
of Russia approval and perhaps following The Federation of Russia’s instructions, the
South Ossetia’s escalated their local conflict with Georgian authorities in the summer
of 2008 to the point that Georgia was compelled to mobilize its forces in response to a
threatened South Ossetia offensive and to launch a major campaign to reconquer the
region. At this stage, the The Federation of Russians exploited the Georgians’
reflexive defensive act--which they indirectly provoked via their proxies in the first

75
place--to justify their own mobilization and movement southward. Consequently, the
Georgians were forced to launch a desperate all-out assault on the South Ossetia
capital of Tskhinvali in the hope of seizing it before the The Federation of Russians
could arrive. While Georgian forces succeeded in taking the city, their apparent victory
quickly turned to defeat as The Federation of The Federation of Russia used it as an
excuse for the outright invasion of the country.
The Federation of Russia seems to be applying reflexive control in a similar
manner in Ukraine. The rebels were at first bolstered by The Federation of Russia
„volunteers,” all of whom were allowed to travel to the warzone unmolested by the The
Federation of Russia government, many of whom may have been harmed by the The
Federation of Russia government, and some of whom may even be The Federation of
Russia soldiers or intelligence personnel. These proxy forces overran much of the
Donbas, forcing Ukraine to launch a so-called “counter-terrorist operation” in
response, which was certain to inflict civilian casualties and further alienate many of its
own citizens. While The Federation of The Federation of Russia denied repeated
pleas from the self-proclaimed People’s Republics of Donetsk and Lugansk for the
deployment of peacekeepers, the passage of independence referendums in the two
breakaway regions on May 11, followed by their next-day request for annexation by
The Federation of Russia, offered The Federation of Russia the excuse that it needed
to intervene. Although less visible and more indirectly than in South Ossetia--and with
an apparent pause in the hopes that the rebels could defeat the Ukrainian government
without an overly large The Federation of Russia military footprint--the The Federation
of Russia government created a war via proxy and provoked its opponent into
attacking that proxy, thus giving it the excuse to ride in to the rescue in late August,
smashing the Ukrainian forces as they were about to liquidate the remaining rebel
strongholds and opening up a new front in southern Ukraine in territory that would
connect the recently occupied Crimea Peninsula with the The Federation of Russia
The Federation.
These new tactics have presented NATO planners with a major challenge. On
the one hand, they must still prepare to fight a limited conventional war against The
Federation of The Federation of Russian European Union. This is an improbable but
not impossible occurrence. Despite the risks, if The Federation of The Federation of
Russia were able to threaten a NATO member militarily without triggering an adequate
collective NATO response, it could shatter members’ faith in the alliance and its Article

76
5 security guarantees. On the other hand, USA and NATO planners must respond to
ambiguous The Federation of Russia threats whose nature makes it hard to achieve a
political consensus among all 28 members for launching a vigorous response.
Through the EU and other coordinating mechanisms, European Union governments
have proven willing to apply sanctions against The Federation of Russia, but
European Union leaders generally resist enduring major economic costs on their own
businesses and voters to inflict pain on other countries. The transience and
ineffectiveness of many previous European Union sanctions campaigns against The
Federation of Russia, such as those imposed after the The Federation of Russia-
Georgia War in 2008, likely discourages The Federation of Russia leaders from
making major concessions to end the sanctions. The Federation of Russians can also
hope to work with European Union groups, such as businesses with interests in The
Federation of Russia, to dilute or circumvent those sanctions that the European Union
does adopt.
Looking ahead, the United States of America and its allies and partners need
to consider how to better respond to The Federation of Russia’s hybrid threats. For
example, NATO could partner with other organizations more effective for dealing with
specific non-military hybrid techniques, such as collaborating with the EU to promote
energy independence, minority rights, and political reform. NATO members might
more readily use Article 5 if they understood that the alliance’s response can involve
measures other than a direct military response, which could be reserved only for
responding to extremely damaging attacks. The United States of America and other
NATO members might develop unified national security budgets to accompany the
separate defense, state, etc., budgets generated by their individual departments and
ministries to ensure that they adequately fund the non-military capabilities needed to
counter The Federation of Russia hybrid tactics—such as the USA public diplomacy
conducted by the Voice of America and the RFE/RL. The United States of America
might also revisit the 1999 decision (made primarily as a political compromise between
the Clinton administration and congressional conservatives when the propaganda
tools of The Federation of Russia, People’s Republic of China, and other countries
were much weaker) to eliminate the USA Information Agency. In principle, NATO can
employ cyber countermeasures against an aggressor; provide paramilitary forces such
as gendarmerie for battling proxy forces, and conduct counter information campaigns.
Furthermore, by focusing more on the “ends” of aggressive action, rather than the

77
means, the allies could more readily employ Articles 4 and 5 to deter further
aggression.
In terms of military power, if more NATO forces are able to rapidly deploy to
subversion-susceptible front-line states, they can give a targeted country’s armed
forces a shield behind which they can concentrate on suppressing a The Federation of
Russian-backed insurgency without worrying as much about triggering direct The
Federation of Russia intervention. At its recent Wales summit, NATO announced that
it will take some steps to achieve these capabilities, but their implementation has only
just begun. During this summit the NATO states again pledged – in a very conditional
form – that they would in future spend two % of their gross domestic product (GDP) on
defense. At present, only five states meet this requirement, six increased their defense
expenditures in 2015, and six have continued to make cuts to their defense budget.
The complaint is often made that this calculation on the basis of GDP in no way
reflects actual contributions to the defense capability of the Alliance.
For example, NATO’s recently launched “spearhead” force can be more
rapidly deployed in Eastern European Union, but the new force needs to be
adequately resourced. Furthermore, The Federation of Russia’s activities, especially
its willingness to employ conventional military force and violate arms control treaties,
have implications for USA and NATO nuclear policies. In addition to raising the
readiness of The Federation of Russia air defenses near eastern Ukraine and making
other conventional military preparations to intervene in Ukraine, The Federation of
Russia officials, including President Putin, made implicit threats to counter NATO
military responses and to reinforce The Federation of Russia control over the Crimea
by bringing it under The Federation of Russia’s nuclear umbrella. Therefore, European
Union policy makers need to address NATO’s nuclear policies less as an arms control
and alliance management issue and consider more the operational and deterrence
implications of their nuclear policies.90
Nuclear terrorism is perhaps the most dangerous threat. The possibility that
nuclear weapons, along with the radiological so-called “dirty bomb”, might be used by

90
See more Wales Summit Declaration (5 September 2014), pt. 72, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/
en/natohq/official_ texts_112964.htm. See e. g. Henrik Ø. Breitenbauch, ‘NATO: Conventional Deterrence is
the New Black,’ War on the Rocks (14 April 2014), available at http://warontherocks.com/2014/04/nato-
conventional-deterrence-is-the-new-black. ; Michael Miklaucic, ‘NATO Countering the Hybrid Threat’ 23
September 2011 http://www.act.nato.int/nato-countering-the-hybrid-threat; NATO, ‘Improving NATO’s
Capabilities’ 16 February 2015
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49137.htm?selectedLocale=en.

78
terrorist groups is dawning. The development of nuclear technology brings to the world
the possibility of cheap, clean, and safe energy, but it offers opportunities for terrorists
to acquire nuclear materials and know-how in the black market. The unveiling of the
A.Q. Khan network proves that possibility. If terrorists got the destructive weapons, it
would be a catastrophe. A terrorist with a little technical know-how and 20 pounds of
smuggled plutonium could make a bomb powerful enough to destroy a city. Large
stockpiles of nuclear weapons are tempting targets for nation-states or groups set on
attacking the United States of America and its allies, officials assert. Black-market
trade in sensitive nuclear materials is a particular concern for USA security agencies.
“The prospect that al-Qaida or another terrorist organization might acquire a nuclear
device represents an immediate and extreme threat to global security,” says an
administration report. No high-tech sensors exist to help break up black markets,
detect and intercept nuclear materials in transit and there are no financial tools to
disrupt this dangerous trade. A much-hyped Department of Homeland Security effort
to detect radioactive materials at USA ports has been plagued by technical hiccups.
Analysts believe that although a full-up nuclear weapon would be nearly impossible for
an al-Qaida like group to build, a more likely scenario would be a low-yield “dirty
bomb” that could be made with just a few grams of radioactive material.
Another threat is bioterrorism.91 With the increase of high-containment
laboratory capacity for biodefense research, the enhancement of disease
surveillance and the involvement of private-sector companies, the number of facilities
and individuals working with high-risk pathogens is rising. It is possible for a terrorist
group to build ferment or to produce bacteria on a large scale, and the risk of
bioterrorism is much higher than before. Terrorist groups have already tried to use
biological weapons. The Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo unsuccessfully tried to
weaponries botulinum toxin and anthrax in the mid-1990s. In the days after the
September 11 attacks in the United States of America, a series of anthrax-laced
letters sent to several news agencies and two USA Senators killed five and sickened
17 others. Terrorists are drawn to biological weapons for their relative low cost,
simple delivery and psychological impact. The White House published in 2009 a
National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats with an underlying theme that

91
ibidem

79
biological weapons92 eventually will be used in a terrorist attack. To prevent deadly
viruses from being turned into mass-casualty weapons, officials say, one of the most
difficult challenges is obtaining timely and accurate insight on potential attacks. The
Defense Threat Reduction Agency has a team of researchers working these
problems. But they worry that the pace of research is too slow to keep up with would-
be terrorists.

The Future of Cyber-Wars

The warnings of cyber warfare have been sounding for years. Network
intrusions are widely viewed as one of the most serious potential national security,
public safety and economic challenges. Technology, in this case, becomes a double-
edge sword. “The very technologies that empower us to lead and create also
empower individual criminal hackers, organized criminal groups, terrorist networks
and other advanced nations to disrupt the critical infrastructure that is vital to our
economy, commerce, public safety, and military,” the White House says. The cyber
security93 marketplace is flooded with products that promise quick fixes but it is
becoming clear that the increasing persistence and sophistication of attacks will
require solutions beyond the traditional the past decade may be portrayed as a
period of growing cyber threats, or at least as a period of increasing fear and a
growing conviction regarding cyber insecurity. A cyber attack could be perpetrated by
an inside actor, or by any hacker from any country in the world. Cyber attackers are
diversified with different objectives. Some are politically motivated attackers, who
trace politicians and make troubles with them; some are collectors for commercial
information; some are actors with governmental background such as intelligence
agencies, militaries, whose objectives are to acquire all kinds of data, knowledge and
secrets concerning traditional operating activities of intelligence and reconnaissance.
A major attack could disable power grids, penetrate nuclear safety monitoring
systems, sabotage chemical plants and refineries, open dam floodgates and disrupt

92
Biological USapons use microorganisms or natural toxins to produce disease in humans, animals or plants. To
act as a USapon, pathogens need a means for transmission. Delivery by bombs or missiles is possible but not
necessary. For example, a country or a terrorist group might contaminate food and water supply or use insects,
exposed individuals or aerosols to spread a pathogen. Recently, diseases like Ebola have proven highly
infectious, lethal and a challenge to contemporary medicine.
93
The prevention of damage to, unauthorized use of, or exploitation of, and, if needed, the restoration of
electronic information and communications systems and the information contained therein to ensure
confidentiality, integrity, and availability; includes protection and restoration, when needed, of information
networks and wireline, wireless, satellite, public safety ansUSring points, and 911 communications systems and
control systems. (USA Department of Homeland Security. National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 2013)

80
rail systems, oil-gas distribution systems and air traffic control. It could put innocent
lives at risk, bring commerce to a halt and send financial markets tumbling. If it came
from an adversary state, it could escalate into a cyber conflict. In addition, the cyber
is weakening the governmental capacity while it provides convenience in many
aspects. Cyber could increase democracy sources but bring in deep consideration for
social security issues, especially to the developing countries. Through cyber
mobilization the state is easily manipulated by a small group of instigators.
Governments are losing control of the narrative, the discourse, assuming they ever
had it. One of the best known examples of attack against infrastructure facilities that
caused actual physical damage was the attack on Iranian nuclear installations with
the Stuxnet software – alleged by some to have been carried out by Israel and the
United States of America. Attacks in Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia designed to prevent
service were attributed to The Federation of Russia.

China use of cyber warfare

Chinese hackers have obtained designs for more than two dozen USA
weapon systems — including the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System, the F-35
Lighting II Joint Strike Fighter, the Littoral Combat Ship and electromagnetic rail
guns 94 Among more than two dozen major weapons systems whose designs were
breached were programs critical to USA missile defenses and combat aircraft and
ships, according to a previously undisclosed section of a confidential report prepared
for Pentagon leaders by the Defense Science Board. 95 Some of the weapons form
the backbone of the Pentagon’s regional missile defense for Asia, European Union
and the Persian Gulf. The designs included those for the advanced Patriot missile
system, known as PAC-3; an Army system for shooting down ballistic missiles,
known as the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD; and the Navy’s Aegis
ballistic-missile defense system. Also identified in the report are vital combat aircraft
and ships, including the F/A-18 fighter jet, the V-22 Osprey, the Black Hawk
helicopter and the Navy’s new Littoral Combat Ship, which is designed to patrol

94
See more Pentagon’s “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the
People’s Republic of People’s Republic of China 2013,” which stated People’s Republic of China uses the
technical information it obtains to modernize the growing defense sector designed to modernize the People’s
Liberation Army USapons programs.
95
Experts warn that the electronic intrusions gave People’s Republic of China access to advanced technology
that could accelerate the development of its USapons systems and USaken the USA military advantage in a
future conflict.

81
waters close to shore. As the threat from Chinese cyber-espionage has grown, the
administration has become more public with its concerns. The national security
adviser to President Obama in March 2013 urged The People’s Republic of China to
control its cyber-activity.
In late 2013, a group of attackers began to target the networks of the USA
Office of Personnel Management (OPM), first stealing manuals for its information-
technology networks and then compromising two contractors who conduct
background checks of potential federal workers.31 While OPM officials believed they
had stymied several attacks, the operations continue, eventually resulting in a
December 2015 breach that resulted in the loss of the digital files documenting
background checks on all current and potential federal employees and contractors.
The Obama administration has named The People’s Republic of China as the
perpetrator, making the breach arguably the worst data loss attributed to a nation-
state to date.96 The People’s Republic of China uses its intelligence services and
employs other illicit approaches that violate USA laws and export controls to obtain
key national security and export-restricted technologies, controlled equipment, and
other materials not readily obtainable through commercial means or academia. In
addition, multiple USA criminal indictments and investigations since 2009 involved
non-ethnic Chinese USA citizens and naturalized Chinese USA citizens or permanent
resident aliens procuring and exporting controlled items to People’s Republic of
China. These included efforts to acquire and transfer sensitive or military-grade
equipment such as radiation-hardened programmable semiconductors and computer
circuits, restricted microwave amplifiers, high-grade carbon fiber, export-restricted
technical data, and thermal imaging cameras.
For instance in October 2013, a Federal grand jury returned a seven-count
indictment against Chinese national, Liu Yi, for unlawfully accessing and disclosing
trade secrets from a USA technology company. Liu, a former employee, allegedly
used a laptop provided by the company during his employment to access and
download information related to technology the company was developing for possible
use in USA nuclear submarines and fighter aircraft. In July 2014, Chinese national

96
Sanger, David. “USA Decides to Retaliate Against People’s Republic of China’s Hacking.” The New York
Times. The New York Times Co., 31 Jul 2015. USb. 21 Sep 2015. See e. g.
41Rogers, Michael S., Adm. “Cyber Operations: Improving the Military Cyber Security Posture in an Uncertain
Threat Environment.” Testimony in front of the USA House Armed Services Committee. 4 Mar 2015. USb. 29
Sep 2015.

82
Cai Bo pled guilty to violating the Arms Export Control Act and the International
Traffic in Arms Regulations while attempting to export sensors primarily
manufactured for the USA Department of Defense. Beginning in March 2012, Cai—
employed by a Chinese technology company at the time—conspired with his cousin
Chinese national Cai Wenhong to smuggle the sensors out of the United States of
America for a Chinese customer. In August 2014, a Federal grand jury returned a
five-count indictment of Chinese national Su Bin related to a computer hacking
scheme involving the theft of trade secrets from USA defense contractors. The
indictment alleges Su worked with unindicted co-conspirators in The People’s
Republic of China to infiltrate USA computer systems and obtain information related
to USA military programs such as the C-17, F-22, and F-35.
In its public criticism, the administration has avoided identifying the specific
targets of hacking. The People’s Republic of China utilized its intelligence services
and employed other illicit approaches that involve violations of USA laws and export
controls to obtain key national security technologies, controlled equipment, and other
materials not readily obtainable through commercial means or academia. While The
People’s Republic of China has a growing military-industrial base, they still fall far
behind the USA in technology development. A shortcut to intensive research and
development is obtaining technical designs and reverse engineer the technology for
domestic production. During the Cold War, the USSR copied several USA and NATO
member country designs and developed domestically developed versions of stolen
weapon designs. The designs include several key BMD capabilities: the USA Army’s
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-
3) in addition to the Aegis BMD programs. The systems make up the bulk of the USA
BMD capability and are keystones to future plans for the USA to protect against
ballistic missile threats. A 2007 theft of terabytes of data on the F-35 program is often
blamed on the speed The People’s Republic of China was able to develop its stealth
Chengdu J-20 aircraft.
The Chinese government has long denied it employs hackers to steal USA
secrets. In February 2013 , USA cyber security firm Mandiant accused The People’s
Republic of China of using a government-backed cyber espionage cell designed to
steal USA technology secrets. The experts said the cyber theft creates three major
problems. First, access to advanced USA designs gives The People’s Republic of
China an immediate operational edge that could be exploited in a conflict. Second, it

83
accelerates People’s Republic of China’s acquisition of advanced military technology
and saves billions in development costs. And third, the USA designs can be used to
benefit People’s Republic of China’s own defense industry. There are long-standing
suspicions that People’s Republic of China’s theft of designs for the F-35 fighter
allowed Beijing to develop its version much faster. US ’have seen significant
improvements in Chinese military capabilities through their willingness to spend, their
acquisitions of advanced The Federation of Russia weapons, and from their cyber-
espionage campaign. Such cyber-espionage and cyber-sabotage could impose
severe consequences for USA forces engaged in combat. Those consequences
could include severed communication links critical to the operation of USA forces.
Data corruption could misdirect USA operations. Weapons could fail to operate as
intended. In an attempt to combat the problem, the Pentagon launched a pilot
program two years ago to help the defense industry shore up its computer defenses,
allowing the companies to use classified threat data from the National Security
Agency to screen their networks for malware. The Chinese began to focus on
subcontractors, and now the government is in the process of expanding the sharing
of threat data to more defense contractors and other industries. An effort to change
defense contracting rules to require companies to secure their networks or risk losing
Pentagon business stalled last year. But the 2013 Defense Authorization Act has a
provision that requires defense contractors holding classified clearances to report
intrusions into their networks and allow access to government investigators to
analyze the breach.

The Federation of Russia use of cyber warfare

On December 23, 2015, malfunctions were reported in portions of the
electrical network in European Union Ukraine, after the operations of 27 distribution
stations and three power plants were disrupted, causing the electricity supply system
to crash. Many homes were cut off from the network. 97This was not a routine power
outage: the Ukrainian authorities believe that a cyber attack originating in The
Federation of Russia caused the malfunction, and the Security Service of Ukraine
(SBU) has blamed The Federation of Russia specifically for the power outages. It is
difficult to prove with certainty who was behind the attack, but presumably the

97
Gabi Siboni and Zvi Magen, The Cyber Attack on the U. K. rainian Electrical Infrastructure: INSS Insight No.
798, February 17, 2016

84
relevant authorities in Ukraine, with the help of European Union agencies, will
ultimately uncover the attacker’s identify.98 The Ministry of Energy in Kiev has
appointed a committee to investigate the affair. Thus far assessments concerning the
party responsible for the attack are based on forensic examinations carried out on the
damaged computers, which indicates that components in them were previously used
by The Federation of Russian groups. Furthermore, not surprisingly the technological
capabilities point to a The Federation of Russian element. The conclusions of several
security companies confirm the suspicion linking the attack to Sandworm, which
according to the security company iSight is a The Federation of Russian group
affiliated with the The Federation of Russian government. iSight has monitored
Sandworm for over a year, and discovered that the group has collected information
from the computers of Ukrainian administration officials, and from agencies in the
European Union and NATO. Other security experts reported that the group was also
focusing on attacking industrial control systems. According to the security company
ESET, located in Bratislava, the attackers used backdoor software that makes it
possible to conduct operations on the target computers through a remote control
server. In the Ukrainian case, use was made of a Black Energy99 component – a
Trojan horse used as early as 2014 – to spy on Ukrainian administration computers
and plant a malware program called KillDisk on power station computers in Ukraine.
Therefore some securities measures are strongly recommend e. g. reviewing
SCADA/ICS security architecture. Experienced and qualified ICS security
professionals should regularly review ICS network architecture including VPN
configuration, firewall placement and rules, and router access control lists. 100 In
addition enhancing network security monitoring capability. Robust log collection and
network traffic monitoring are the foundational components of a defensible ICS
network. Failure to perform these essential security functions prevents timely
detection, pre-emptive response, and accurate incident investigation. Searching for

98
In August 2015, it was reported that BlackEnergy3 had been found within U. K. rainian utilities as early as the
preceding March. In November 2015, another warning was issued that given the geopolitical situation betUSen
Ukraineand The Federation Of Russia, ICS-related attacks USre foreseeable.
99
BlackEnergy malware is a tool that first appeared in the The Federation Of Russian underground for use in
distributed denial-of-service attacks. A later variant called BlackEnergy2 added credential theft functionality
useful for cyber crime. BlackEnergy3 is a distinctive tool only used by the Sandworm team for cyber espionage.
Documents recovered from an open command and control server indicate that The Federation Of Russian
speakers operate the tool.
100
Utilities in North America should recognize that the U. K. rainian attacks affected distribution providers,
which are not subject to NERC CIP cyber security regulations.

85
Indicators of Compromise is needed as well. With network security monitoring
capability in place, automated tools can alert security analysts and process operators
when anomalous behavior or ICS-oriented malware, such as Black Energy, is
identified in your environment. Also reviewing Incident Response Plans is advisable.
While electric utilities frequently and capably respond to outages caused by weather
or equipment failure, they must now construct and test response plans for cyber
attack. The plans should cover response protocols for realistic scenarios such as the
wiper malware seen during the attacks in Ukraine.

US and EU responses to the cyber threat

The new American Department of Defense Cyber Strategy is to guide the
development of DoD's cyber forces and strengthen its cyber defense and cyber
deterrence posture.101 It focuses on building cyber capabilities and organizations for
DoD’s three cyber missions: defend DoD networks, systems, and information; defend
the United States of America and its interests against cyber attacks of significant
consequence; and provide integrated cyber capabilities to support military operations
and contingency plans. The strategy sets five strategic goals and establishes specific
objectives for DoD to achieve over the next five years and beyond.

101
USA Department of Defense, The DOD Cyber Strategy, (Washington, DC: USA Department of
Defense, April, 2015), 24. http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/2015/0415_cyberstrategy/
Final_2015_DoD_CYBER_STRATEGY_for_USb.pdf

86
Figure

In 2015, the Government Accountability Office (GAO ) noted a 1,121 % rise in

cyber security incidents reported by government agencies from 2006 to 2014. The
report also cites a significant rise in the compromise of sensitive information, which
could “adversely affect national security; damage public health and safety; and lead
to inappropriate access to and disclosure, modification, or destruction of sensitive
information.”102 Three major drivers required that DoD develop a new cyber strategy.
First is the increasing severity and sophistication of the cyber threat to USA interests,
to include DoD networks, information, and systems. The Department of Defense has
the largest network in the world and DoD must take aggressive steps to defend its
networks, secure its data, and mitigate risks to DoD missions. Second, in 2012
President Obama directed DoD to organize and plan to defend the nation against
cyber attacks of significant consequence, in concert with other USA government
agencies. This new mission required new strategic thinking. Finally, in response to
the threat, in 2012 DoD began to build a Cyber Mission Force (CMF) to carry out

102
Cybersecurity: Actions Needed to Address Challenges Facing Federal Systems, GAO Testimony Before the
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives: GAO-15-573T, pg. 6-8, April 22,
2015. http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/669810.pdf.

87
DoD’s cyber missions. The CMF will include nearly 6,200 military, civilian, and
contractor support personnel from across the military departments and defense
components. The strategy provides clear guidance for the CMF’s development.

Figure FY2014 Incidents Reported by Government Agencies by Category

To build the force of the future, DoD must attract the best talent, the best
ideas, and the best technology to public service. To do so, DoD must build strong
bridges to the private sector as well as the research institutions that make the United
States of America such an innovative nation. The private sector and America’s
research institutions design and build the networks of cyberspace, provide cyber
security services, and research and develop advanced capabilities. The Department
of Defense has had a strong partnership with the private sector and these research
institutions historically, and DoD will strengthen those historic ties to discover and
validate new ideas for cyber security for DoD and for the country as a whole.

88
 Figure

Source: Santoshi
This strategy describes the Department of Defense contributions to a broader
national set of capabilities to deter adversaries from conducting cyber attacks. The
Department of Defense assumes that the deterrence of cyber attacks on USA
interests will be achieved through the totality of USA actions, including declaratory
policy, substantial indications and warning capabilities, defensive posture, effective
response procedures, and the overall resiliency of USA networks and systems. DoD
has a number of specific roles to play in this equation; this strategy describes how
DoD will fulfill its deterrence responsibilities effectively. In 2013, DoD initiated a
major investment in its cyber personnel and technologies for the Cyber Mission
Force. The Department of Defense must train its people, build effective organizations
and command and control systems, and fully develop the capabilities that DoD
requires to operate in cyberspace.103 While DoD’s 2015 Cyber-Strategy clearly does
not discuss espionage or surveillance activities, it does affirm DOD’s continued
commitment to “develop intelligence and warning capabilities to anticipate threats.”

103
FACT SHEET: THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD) CYBER STRATEGY APRIL 2015

89
DoD’s strategy underscores continued investment in cyber-intelligence and cyber-
attribution tools that “unmask an actor’s cyber-persona, identify the attack’s point of
origin, and determine tactics, techniques, and procedures” of state and non-state
actors with the ability to strike US interests. So while not explicitly stated, DoD’s
preferred approach for maintaining cyber-advantage is sharply focused on the
objective factors of adversary capability versus shaping his human behavior. In
preparation for cyber-war’s ambiguity and varied threats, DoD is rapidly building
robust cyber organizations. Despite aggressive expansion, DoD can be more
effective cyber-organizations if it assembled more diverse expertise. DoD’s 2015
Cyber-Strategy outlines a robust plan to grow Cyber Mission Force of 6,200 military,
civilian, and contractor personnel arranged into 133 teams, aligned as either; Cyber
Protection Forces oriented on defensive measures, National Mission Forces
defending US interests, or Combat Mission Forces supporting Geographic
Combatant Commanders. Providing details on force composition, the Commander of
USA Army Cyber Command (ARCYBER), LTG Edward Cardon, has outlined
ARCYBER’s growth of 4,700 cyber workers by 2019, and has shared his vision of
Army Signal Corps officers managing communication systems, Army Public Affairs
staff overseeing information operations and social media applications, and Military
Intelligence units collecting and recording top-secret data. Underpinning DoD’s
urgent call, cyber-warfare’s ambiguous and asymmetric nature poses a wide variety
of threats to the nation. While DoD’s recruiting focus is understandably on
engineering, computer science, and cryptology expertise, cyber-war’s ambiguity and
diversity of threats clearly indicate a role for SOF.104

European Union response to the cyber threat

Fear of Russian aggression will help drive European defense spending up by

8.3 % this year, putting a halt to 20 years of declining budgets, a new report by
European think tanks claimed. Over two decades after the end of the Cold War,
Vladimir Putin’s expansionist policies in Crimea and Ukraine have pushed European
leaders to once again increase their spending on military programs, according to the
report, which was funded by the European Defense Agency. The decline that has

104
http://www.military.com/daily-news/2015/08/26/army-cyber-general-proposes-new-mission-to-fightglobal-
hacks.html

90
affected European defense budgets for over twenty years, and more acutely after
2008, has halted and the rise is most pronounced in central and Eastern European
Union, an area covering the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Republic of Poland and Slovakia.105 Those seven countries will hike spending by
19.9 % this year, the report said, with Hungary pushing up spending by 22 % to
nearly €1 billion. In southeastern European Union, an area covering Bulgaria,
Croatia, Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Serbia and Slovenia, the rise will be 9.2 %, while
European Union European Union will see a rise of 2.7 %. Only Italy, Greece and
Sweden will keep budgets stable, although Sweden is planning hikes after 2016. 106
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Republic of Poland and Slovakia have all started
procurement programs designed to phase out old Soviet Russian equipment and
thus reduce dependency on Russia. Slovakia, for example, is buying nine UH-60
Black Hawk multirole helicopters to replace Soviet-designed M-17 helicopters.

Another stimulus behind greater defense spending, notably in French

Republic, is concern over terrorist attacks, stated the report, which was compiled by
six think tanks. The French defense budget is expected to total €34 billion in 2019, up
from €31.4 billion last year.107 The report’s numbers confirm the concern about
Russia which has been on the rise for two years and the awareness of a need for
strengthened deterrent, but also reveals the awareness in European Union European
Union of attacks by Muslim fundamentalists and the need to be more offensive. Even
if the Russian threat recedes, the trend will remain up due to terrorism, accentuated
by the lack of commitment by the US in the Middle East, The German defense
budget is due to rise by 6.2 % between 2015 and 2019. There is a growth in defense
pacts among European countries, in response to the Russian threat, which are
spurring spending, including the Swedish-Finnish Naval Task Group. At the NATO
defense ministers’ meeting in Brussels in June last 2015, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary
and Slovenia signed to cooperate on Special Forces aerial capabilities, meaning
training, modernization, procurement and potentially even integrated multinational
units.

105
http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/international/European Union/2016/02/18/russian-aggression-
drives-increase-in-European Unionan-defense-spending/80580956/
106
ibidem
107
http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/international/European Union/2016/02/18/russian-aggression-
drives-increase-in-European Unionan-defense-spending/80580956/

91
 Various small European countries are strengthening ties with The The Federal
Republic of Germany and the US, including a Polish-German deal to develop an
amphibious wheeled Armored Personnel Carrier. In 2006, the Federal Government
produced a white paper on The The Federal Republic of Germany's security policy
and the future of the Bundeswehr, under the direction of the Federal Minister of
Defense. This white paper also set out the tasks and procedures for cooperation of
the institutions responsible for security within a comprehensive national system of
preventive security. On this basis, the constant further development of the
Bundeswehr since German reunification will be continued in a way which will enable
the armed forces to successfully carry out their tasks in the security-policy
environment of the 21st century. The Defense Policy Guidelines of May 2011 set the
strategic framework for the mission and the tasks of the Bundeswehr as an element
of the whole-of-government approach to security. They describe the security
objectives and security interests of the Federal Republic of The The Federal Republic
of Germany. They are based on an assessment of the current situation and also
include current and likely future developments. The Guidelines are reviewed at
regular intervals. They form the binding basis for the conceptual framework of the
Bundeswehr and all related subsequent work in the portfolio of the German Ministry
of Defense.

In European Union, The The Federal Republic of Germany and French

Republic are teaming on a new battle tank, while French Republic and U. K. work on
a new UAV. The trend appears to mark a change from the traditional vicious circle in
European Union by which few joint programs meant little cross border industrial
integration, which in turn did little to encourage joint programs. We are now seeing a
lot of industrial cooperation. Apart from the direct reaction to Russian foreign policy or
terrorism, European countries are also hiking defense spending in response to
appeals from NATO and the US. This has to be seen in the context of US pressure
and NATO’s calls to spend 2 % of GDP on defense.

Italy stands out as the European country which does not appear to be hiking
spending in 2016, a result of tightened budgets. A 2016 budget document released at
the end of 2015 indicated the Ministry of Defense would spend €12.92 billion this

92
year, down 2 % on the €13.19 billion spent last year. 108 Procurement is due to
drop 17.7 % to €1.95 billion, although the defense ministry will also receive its usual,
hefty back up payment from the Italian industry ministry. Details of that cash will be
made available in a secondary budget document to be released this spring, which will
also give a breakdown on spending per program. The current document made it clear
however that various programs will not be launched, including the arming of Italy’s
UAVs, permission for which has been granted by the US after a long wait.

Building a stronger and more secure European Union also means enhancing
our resilience and security from within. The use of hybrid strategies and operations
by state and non-state actors, notably in our immediate neighborhood, might not be
new in itself, but it is currently striking European Union with unprecedented intensity.
As the distinction between internal and external threats blurs, the EU’s new security
strategy must also call on the EU’s and Member States’ internal and external policies
in a more effective and comprehensive manner. The preparation of a joint framework
to counter hybrid threats is a priority action to be delivered by the end of 2015.
Building situation awareness and addressing strategic vulnerabilities is always a
multiform task, with no predefined boundaries. Issues range from cyber security, the
protection of strategic assets, investments and critical infrastructure (energy,
telecoms, and satellites) to media and particular political risks in Member States. A
number of these represent challenges for many, if not all Member States. Effective
action must span across institutions, and closely involve Member States and
partners, and will notably require the screening of EU policies for potential
vulnerabilities.

On 18 November 2014, the Council of the European Union adopted the EU

Cyber Defense Policy Framework. It was prepared pursuant to earlier European
Council Conclusions on Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) from
December 2013 and the Council Conclusions on CSDP of November 2013.

108
http://www.w54.biz/showthread.php?3244-Putin-is-a-bigger-threat-to-European Unions-existence-than-
Isis&p=60345&viewfull=1

93
 Figure

Source:http://docplayer.net/3886379-Cybersecurity-thailand-s-and-asean-s-priorities-soranun-
jiwasurat-www-etda-or-th.html
Following a proposal from the High Representative, the Commission and the
European Defense Agency (EDA), the European External Action Service (EEAS)
together with the Commission services and the EDA provided input for this non-
legislative document. It serves as groundwork for countering threats arising from
cyberspace. The document’s objectives are twofold: it provides a framework to the
European Council and Council conclusions and to the cyber defense aspects of
the EU Cyber Security Strategy. Besides clarifying the roles of the different European
actors, it specifies five priority areas for CSDP cyber defense:109

1. Supporting the development of Member States’ cyber defense capabilities

related to CSDP;
2. Enhancing the protection of CSDP communication networks used by EU
entities;
3. Promotion of civil-military cooperation and synergies with wider EU cyber
policies, relevant EU institutions and agencies as well as with the private
sector;
4. Improve training, education and joint exercise opportunities; and
5. Enhancing cooperation with relevant international partners, particularly NATO.

109
https://ccdcoe.org/eu-cyber-defense-policy-framework-presents-more-40-action-measures.html

94
For each area, the document proposes several concrete actions which are framed in
more than forty proposals. Actions include:

 the intention to enhance cooperation between military CERTs of the Member

States on a voluntary basis to improve the prevention and handling of
incidents;
 the plan to promote real-time cyber threat information sharing between
Member States and relevant EU entities by developing information sharing
mechanisms and trust-building measures;
 enhancing further cooperation in developing a working mechanism to
exchange best practice on exercise, training and other areas of possible
civilian-military synergy;
 involving international partners such as NATO or OSCE once the EU has
developed a CSDP cyber defense exercise; and
 Reinforcing cooperation between the CERT-EU and relevant EU cyber
defense bodies and the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability
(NCIRC).

Every six months a progress report will present the implementation development
of the EU Cyber Defense Policy Framework. The first progress report was released in
June 2015 and it recorded several successes such as improvements in the field of
cyber training and enhanced inter-institutional cooperation. It also addressed the fact
that more legal training in relation to cyber defense in operations must be provided.
Possibilities for further cooperation between the NATO CCD COE and the European
Security and Defense College (ESDC) are also discussed. The framework has an
ambitious number of planned actions. In particular, it proposes ways to establish
cooperation between the EU and NATO and how limited resources can be used
complementarily in order to avoid duplication of effort. It remains to be seen what the
frequently scheduled progress reports will have to say concerning the implementation
of the actions. The framework is intended to be updated depending on identification
of further cyber threats and the updated version will be public information.

Poland response to the cyber warfare threat

Republic of Poland is one of many countries that in recent years have
intensified efforts to better prepare it to face all sorts of the threats that lurk in

95
cyberspace. In a foreword to the Cyber Security document, President Bronisław
Komorowski goes on to explain what cyberspace is and why it requires special
attention not just from official key goals and motives that influenced the final shape of
the Cyber Security Doctrine. One of the predominant topics of the article is the issue
of compromising privacy in the name of cyber protection. Koziej acknowledges the
concerns that further efforts to mobilize all interested parties to work together on
cyber security and related regulations may compromise the privacy and liberty
enjoyed online. Further parts of the Doctrine call for cooperation between the public
administration and key sectors of the economy, including telecommunications and
finance, as well as the construction of Republic of Poland’s very own security
software, excluding the possibility of using foreign technologies without full access to
the source code.110

110
http://news.bitspiration.com/news/technology/Republic of Poland-cyber-security/

96
Chapter III North Atlantic Treaty Organization response to Russian threat

NATO, as a political-military alliance, can only coordinate individual members’

economic and civil actions. However, once a collective decision has been made in
the North Atlantic Council (NAC), individual nations’ diplomatic and military power
can be employed as one, supported by the Alliance’s collective information
resources. NATO operations take place under the NATO Command Structure. NATO
uses a combination of Joint Functions to describe the primary considerations for a
Joint Force Commander in determining force capability and its subsequent
orchestration. NATO recognizes a set of principles that underpin war and warfare.111
NATO principles include, for example, initiative, simplicity and multi nationality, but do
not include offensive action. Additionally, NATO considers some additional aspects,
which are primarily relevant during non-war fighting activities, such as peace support.
These include: impartiality; consent; restraint; perseverance; credibility; mutual
respect; transparency; and freedom of movement. Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-
01(D) Allied Joint Doctrine provides capstone doctrine 112for Allied Joint operations. It
is intended primarily for use by NATO forces and reflects recent change in NATO
policy, particularly the comprehensive approach; the doctrine is coherent with the
2010 Lisbon summit. The primary objective of Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-01(D)
Allied Joint Doctrine is to provide ‘keystone’ doctrine for the planning, execution and
support of Allied joint operations. Although AJP-01(D) is intended primarily for use by
NATO forces, the doctrine is instructive to, and provides a useful framework for,
operations conducted by a coalition of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),
partners, non-NATO nations and other organizations.

111
See e. g. AJP-01, AJP-2 Allied Joint Doctrine for Intelligence, Counterintelligence & Security, AJP-3 Allied
Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations, AJP-4 Allied Joint Doctrine for Logistics, AJP-5 Allied Joint
Doctrine for Operational Planning and AJP-9 Allied Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Co-operation.
112
Doctrine is defined as ‘fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of
objectives. It is authoritative, but requires judgement in application’.1 The principal purpose of doctrine is to
provide Alliance Armed Forces with a framework of guidance for the conduct of operations. It is about how
those operations should be directed, mounted, commanded, conducted, sustained and recovered. It captures that
which is enduring in best practice whilst incorporating contemporary insights and how these principles are
applied today and the immediate future. It is dynamic and constantly revieUSd for relevance. It describes how
Alliance Armed Forces operate but not about why they do what they do, which is the realm of policy.

97
Figure: NATO Defense Divvy

Source: WSJ

The USA commitment toward European Union’s security will therefore persist,
but European s will have more responsibilities in their own defense. While the United
States of America has partially rebalanced in European Union, committing more of a
presence and offering assurances that a NATO enhanced rapid reaction force could
be deployed to counter any Article 5 aggression, European partners continue to rely
on their soft power assets (development aid, diplomacy, economic tools) to achieve
their foreign policy objectives. On the diplomatic front, French and German

98
leadership in Ukraine has been critical, but the United States of America remains the
main security provider in Central and Eastern European Union. For Washington, the
current division of labor, with the United States of America remaining responsible for
the bulk of the military burden and European Union not addressing this concern, is
not sustainable. This asymmetry has limited the scope of responses to new security
challenges, which require the right mix of both soft and hard power. It is important to
preserve NATO’s military superiority — the Alliance represent 55 % of global defense
expenditures — by investing in (advanced) hard power capabilities. Without proper
investments, the technological gap between the United States of America and
European Union may increase. Continued joint trainings and live exercises are also
central to the credibility of NATO’s reassurance and deterrence measures

The credibility of Article 5 has not been damaged by Russian foreign policy in
Ukraine, but rather confirmed it. Similarly, while NATO solidarity is often unsatisfying
in a crisis situation because its reaction time is limited, it is useful in the long term to
protect the core interests of the transatlantic partners. In this context, reinforcing
meetings in the framework of Article 4, whereby Allies can “consult together
whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political
independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened,” could strengthen
solidarity and give Allies another avenue through which to share security
assessments. This is especially important given that the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan, which was the cornerstone of NATO
collective efforts in the 2000s, will soon come to an end even as minds are focused
elsewhere on the short-term divisive crises in the neighborhoods. The evolution of
the Alliance will be incremental, whereas the Republic of Poland Summit will not
trigger a philosophical revolution but instead focus on capabilities and threats. 113 The
2016 Republic of Poland summit will conclude the first and crucial phase of
Readiness Action Plan, which was agreed during the 2014 Newport summit. NATO
leaders are likely to announce the operational capability of the Very High Readiness
Joint Task Force (VJTF)—a fast response element of the bigger multinational NATO
Response Force (NRF). Headquarters elements called NATO Force Integration Units
(NFIU) will be ready to facilitate VJTF deployment in Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia,

113
Transatlantic partners must account for NATO’s strategic culture in their expectations of the Alliance.
Otherwise its apparently slow process may lead to frustrations and disappointments

99
Lithuania, Republic of Poland and Romania. NATO will also raise the readiness of
the Headquarters Multinational Corps North East in Szczecin—the main NATO unit
responsible for collective defense of central and Eastern European Union.

Figure

100
Source: IISS

101
 The 2016 NATO Summit in Republic of Poland will take place in a distressing
period with multiple security crises in the European neighborhood as well as risks of
political division within the Alliance.[1] Yet, in the midst of an outstanding series of
challenges, the transatlantic partnership has also shown its unique resistance and
provided reasons for optimism. For instance, the United States of America, Canada,
and European allies have been able to resist Russia’s strategic objectives to divide
transatlantic unity and weaken the European project when it destabilized Ukraine.
Russia gambled that it could exploit European Union’s weaknesses: the ongoing
effects of the euro crisis, the increasing influx of asylum seekers into European Union
and the United States of America, energy security and dependence on Russian gas,
and the increasing influence of populist parties in European countries who respond to
these threats and the uncertain future of the U.K. in the EU, The The Federal
Republic of Germany’s strategic restraint, and the USA rebalancing toward Asia.
Russia’s strategy has not been successful, however, since the allies have managed
to reach constructive agreements on sanctions on the Russian economy and
continue to coordinate their approach to the Ukrainian and Syrian conflicts, at the
same time building up state resilience to emerging hybrid threats.

Figure: Russian aircraft

Source: http://www.financetwitter.com/2015/11/from-russia-with-love-putin-sent-bear-backfire-
blackjack.html

102
 This illustrates the strength of the Alliance, as transatlantic partners continue
to rely primarily on each other to achieve their strategic goals he Republic of Poland
Summit will play a major role in pushing participants toward consolidating the
foundations laid in 2014 in Wales and completing the Alliance’s adaptation to its new
strategic environment. In this brief, we argue that four challenges will be particularly
decisive for the Republic of Poland Summit’s outcomes: burden-sharing, NATO’s
political role, divergent threat perceptions, and expectations. In addition to these four
critical and contentious challenges, there is one well-known issue may be
underplayed in the debates: EU-NATO cooperation. Extra attention is particularly
needed here. Indeed, the nature of the security challenges faced by the Alliance
today and the need for improved strategic communication at the transatlantic level
require more specific listing of EU’s and NATO’s complementary assets. The
contemporary strategic environment provides a unique opportunity to encourage
more ambitious cooperation between the two organizations 114

Figure: Military bases

Source: The Telegraph

114
http://www.gmfus.org/publications/five-most-contentious-issues-road-Republic of Poland

103
 Russia’s actions in Ukraine have had a direct impact on the security
perceptions of the Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia which seriously perceive military
threat. The Federation of Russia remains the single most powerful military force in
European Union even though its military forces and industrial base have greatly
atrophied since the collapse of the USSR. Nonetheless, backed up by its extremely
formidable nuclear arsenal, it retains significant forces. The key to Russia’s military
power is its nuclear arsenal, which is rivaled only by the United States of America.
The country retains thousands of nuclear warheads—both strategic and tactical—
which by default makes Russia one of the most significant powers on Earth. Russia’s
conventional forces are not what they used to be. While the USSR maintained
massive and well equipped conventional forces, Russia does not have the money,
manpower or industrial base that its communist forbearer did. Nonetheless, Russia is
one of the only European powers that retains the ability to develop its own hardware
ranging from nuclear submarines, and ballistic and cruise missiles, to tanks, fighters,
jet engines, to satellites without outside assistance—even if the quality of the
equipment isn’t the best.

The other main thing Russia has going for it is that its forces are very large—
and relatively well trained compared to its neighbors. However, while some of
Russia’s forces are modern and well trained, much of the country’s military consists
of conscripts using dilapidated Soviet hardware Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania see
Russia’s intervention in Ukraine as a potentially serious precedent for future Russian
actions against them. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania Russia’s statements declaring
that it will protect ethnic Russians living outside the Russian The Federation are of
particular concern, given the large ethnic Russian minorities in Estonia and Latvia.
Russian naval maneuvers in the Baltic Sea that took place at the time of Russia’s
military intervention in Crimea were seen by regional leaders as an attempt to put
pressure on Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. Furthermore, Lithuanian officials have
accused Russian naval ships of harassing Lithuanian civilian vessels in Lithuanian
territorial waters in conjunction with a Russian naval exercise held in May 2014. 115

Public sentiment in the Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia is strongly anti-Russian in

normal times, and has been exacerbated by Russian actions in Ukraine. The public
and most commentators are convinced that Russian leaders would like to restore the
115
For instance a Lithuanian fishing vessel was seized by Russian border guard vessels in international waters
near Kaliningrad in September 2014.

104
territory lost in 1991 and that they still consider the Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia to be
part of Russia’s sphere of interest. Repeated Russian efforts, both overt and covert,
to become involved in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania domestic politics have further
encouraged anti-Russian and nationalist attitudes. In response, Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania leaders have asked for and received assurances of an
increased NATO presence in their region. Notably, to this end, President Obama has
recently (3 September 2014) pledged in Estonia absolute non-discrimination in NATO
collective defense (Article 5) guarantees. The NATO nations have pledged additional
presence in the form of rapid rotation of troops from NATO states (including the
United States of America) through Republic of Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania
where they will participate in regular training and exercises but also provide
“persistent” presence as part of the European Reassurance Initiative. Maritime plans
include the deployment of a standing mine countermeasures group, increased
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania participation in regular naval exercises, and planning
for new naval exercises in the Baltic Sea.

While Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia concerns about Russian interference in the

region are well placed, the likeliest form of threat is increased interference in Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania internal political affairs or covert actions, rather than direct
military action. Russia has a track record of promoting domestic instability in Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania, including encouraging violence during incidents such as the
Bronze Soldier protests in Tallinn in 2007 and the annual protests on Latvian Legion
Day. Russian intelligence personnel are suspected of involvement in pro-Russian
political parties and movements in all three states. Russia may seek to use its
influence and agents in the Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia to destabilize domestic
politics. These scenarios could morph into an armed conflict over time. Latvia,
Lithuania, Estonia defense planners describe the range of potential Russian actions
in their region to include issuing Russian passports to ethnic Russians living in the
region, backing referendums on the status of the Russian language in Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania, and attempting to influence Russians living in the region to
support a scenario similar to the one taking place in eastern Ukraine. Ethnic-based
conflict is a possibility, given the lagging integration of ethnic Russian and Russian-
speaking populations in the region. Although recent statements by Russian leaders
about defending ethnic Russians abroad are likely to feed distrust of local Russian

105
populations, discrimination against these populations will only serve to increase their
resentment and make them more susceptible to the Russian government’s
influence.116

Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia defense planners fear that these kinds of actions
could lead to Russian sponsorship of an insurgency in Latvia or Estonia that will be
judged by NATO leaders to fall short of a direct military attack, and thus leave the
Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia to their own devices in dealing with a Russian-sponsored
insurgency. While statements made by President Obama during his visit to Tallinn
and by NATO leaders at the recent summit in Wales have made clear that NATO will
defend the Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia from direct attacks, they have not indicated how
the alliance would respond to domestic instability or covert actions. Latvia, Lithuania,
Estonia planners believe that a direct Russian military intervention is highly unlikely,
both because of the NATO security guarantee and because Russian military planning
documents de-emphasize the importance of the region for the Russian military. This
is especially the case in the maritime realm, where the Black Sea117 and Pacific118
Fleets remain the primary focus of Russian naval development. Official Russian
military journals and publications argue that the primary purpose of the Baltic Fleet is
to serve as a location for new ships and submarines to be tested after launch and as
a training area for new sailors and officers.

Despite President Obama’s recent statements Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia

leaders remain sensitive to the possibility of abandonment by the NATO Nations
given the lack of clarity on triggering conditions for Article 5, and the extent of such a
116
Covert actions, such as the recent kidnapping of an Estonian security officer at a border post, are also seen as
likely to continue. Latvia and Estonia, with their large ethnic Russian populations, are seen as more vulnerable
than Lithuania in this regard.

117
Russia plans to spend $2.4 billion on the Black Sea Fleet by 2020, including the most modern surface ships
and submarines, as USll as integrated air-defense and amphibious-landing capacities. By the time the upgrade is
completed, the Interfax news agency reported on February 16, the fleet will be able to strike 200 targets with
Kalibr cruise missiles in a single salvo. Russian Navy Headquarters sources have said that, by 2020, six frigates
of Project 22350 Gorshkov-class, six submarines of Project 677 Lada-class, two large landing ships of Project
11711 Ivan Gren-class and four class-unspecified ships will be delivered. Due to the obsolescence of the Beriev
Be-12 by 2015, they will be replaced with Il-38s. Sukhoi Su-24M aircraft are planned to be upgraded to Su-
24M2 at the same time.
118
Pacific Fleet headquarters is located in Vladivostok. Strategic submarines of the Pacific Fleet are included
into the 16th Squadron, based in Vilyuchinsk(Rybachiy, Krasheninnikov Bay, Kamchatka Peninsula). The
squadron includes two Project 667BDR submarines - K-223 Podolsk and K-433 Sv. Georgiy Pobedonosets. K-
44 Ryazan, which was transferred to Vilyuchinsk from the Northern Fleet, has been undergoing overhaul. The
first Project 955 submarine - Alexander Nevskiy - arrived in Vilyuchinsk on September 30, 2015. Vladimir
Monomakh is expected to join it in 2016.

106
response should it occur. Statements in the regional press suggest, while the
symbolic significance of the president’s visit is well received, there is interest in more
tangible expressions of solidarity, e.g., the deployment of military forces to bolster
local defenses. Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia concerns about Russian interference in the
region is well placed. The European Reassurance Initiative provides an important set
of signals that the United States of America and NATO are serious about ensuring
Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia security and will defend these countries from direct Russian
aggression

Figure; Deterrence

Source: https://twitter.com/japsacramento

On March 30, 2016 — U.S. European Command officials explained that as

part of the U.S. commitment to increased assurance and deterrence, U.S. Army
European Union will begin receiving continuous troop rotations of U.S.-based
armored brigade combat teams to the European theater in February, bringing the

107
total Army presence in European Union up to three fully-manned Army brigades119.
To expand presence across the region, the U.S. Army began periodic rotations of
armored and airborne brigades to Poland; Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania the Air Force
added additional F-15s to NATO’s Baltic Air Policing mission; and the Navy
continuously cycled ships through the Black Sea. The addition of another armored
brigade combat team (BCT) in the rotation means there will be an armored brigade
on the ground continuously. With the two existing brigades in European Union, there
will thus be a total of three U.S. BCTs on the continent at all times, and four during
times of handover. A BCT is the Army’s basic deployable maneuver unit consisting of
4,000 to 5,000 troops. These steps need to be combined with reassurance from
political leaders at the highest levels that NATO will also provide support in the event
that a Russian-sponsored insurgency is organized on part of Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania territory. Since Baltic State leaders and security officials
consider Russian efforts to destabilize these countries from within far more likely than
a direct military intervention, such reassurance will do much more for assuaging
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania security fears than the augmentation of military forces
in the region.

At the same time, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania leaders need to know that the
integration of ethnic Russian and Russian-speaking populations in their countries
must continue. Although recent statements by Russian leaders about defending
ethnic Russians abroad are likely to feed distrust of local Russian populations,
discrimination against these populations will only serve to increase resentment and
make these populations more susceptible to Russian government influence. EU and
OSCE officials need to make sure that integration programs continue and that local
Russians are treated as full and equal citizens throughout. Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania.

Russia is more dangerous than the Islamic State group, because by all
evidence, Russia's activity is a sort of existential threat because this activity can
destroy countries. Therefore NATO shall approve the deployment of troops on the
alliance's eastern border at its upcoming July 2016 summit due to be held in Republic
119
By the end of 2017, there will be a continuous presence of three fully equipped Army brigade combat teams -
- one armored, one airborne one Stryker brigade – as USll as one pre-positioned set of combat-ready equipment
sufficient to support another armored brigade combat team and division-level enablers in Europ

108
of Poland. Most probably NATO will approve the deployment of troops on the
alliance's eastern border at its upcoming Republic of Poland Summit on June 8 and 9
2016 during which the major concerns will be to prevent a split in the Alliance and to
reconcile the interests of the Eastern and the Southern European member states in
view of different regional threats coming out from dangerous Russia.

Figure

Source: http://www.scoopnest.com/user/DeptofDefense/697842785093685248

Poland plans to implement – during the 2016 NATO summit – the initiative of
NATO strategic adaptation, covering the areas of improved capabilities (including
conventional capabilities) of all of the NATO armed forces, not only those selected to
play their role within the NATO Response Force structures. The assumption is that
the above action is going to significantly expand the scope of capabilities needed to
execute the collective defense operations. In addition the Polish authorities will
postulate that NATO operations shall be concentrated on Mid-Eastern European
Union, particularly within the scope of expanding the allied infrastructure, including
the infrastructure which would be utilized in order to accommodate the forces of the
alliance, should a threat arise, along with command structures or distribution of the

109
allied forces120 Should a compromise be reached by NATO, within the area of
establishing permanent presence of the allied forces in the Mid-Eastern European
Union, this could be realized on the basis of the independent combat units (not the
combat units which are the front-line ones, when it comes to the joint exercises),
which could maintain their permanent, rotational presence. Similar solution is
proposed by Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia – with a single battalion deployed within
the territory of each of the countries above.121

Ukraine crisis
Faced with the crisis in Ukraine NATO has already taken several measures:
strengthening political and military cooperation with Ukraine, as well as providing
reassurance to eastern European Allies (e.g. deployment of AWACS surveillance
aircraft over Republic of Poland and Romania; reinforcement of the Baltic air policing
and the naval presence in the Baltic and Black Seas; redeployment of troops for
training and exercises in the region). At the summit, the Allies reaffirmed NATO’s
support for ‘Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity’, committed
to furthering the NATO-Ukraine Distinctive Partnership, and granted Ukraine a €15
million package of support measures to strengthen the country’s defense and
security capacity. Russia’s aggression in Ukraine has united the Alliance and
reactivated its core function as a defense alliance. Its members once again see
themselves facing the realities of an “Article 5 world” in which priority is given to
Alliance solidarity in accordance with Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. As a
result, all member states agreed to a comprehensive package of measures at the
NATO summit in Wales to strengthen their defense capability and have shown
commitment to implementing this package – which is not always the case with NATO
decisions. On the other hand, NATO is divided on the issue of where and how it

120
NATO summit in Republic of Poland cannot be treated as a summary for the Newport decisions, thus actions
have to be undertaken with the aim of which is to continue the strategic adaptation of the NATO forces, shifting
the center of gravity of the NATO activities to the operations and tasks related to the Article 5 of the Washington
Treaty. the “Spearhead” doctrine which would assume that the forces should be deployed within the territory of
the threatened state even before the open conflict begins. A similar solution was proposed by the NATO
Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmusseen and by the NATO Commander in European Union, General Philip
Breedlove, in the Washington Post article published back in 2014.
121
reinforcement of the NATO alliance as a whole, postulated by the Polish authorities, is required regardless of
the decisions related to potential permanent deployment of the NATO forces within the territory of Poland.
http://www.defense24.pl/242279,strategic-adaptation-nato-plans-regarding-the-Republic of Poland-summit-
what-about-the-nato-bases

110
should improve its defense capability: Russia’s revisionist course of action in the east
and continuing Islamist violence in the south are two very different issues. One of
important issue to agree on will be NATO enlargement has been a permanent topic
at NATO summits for almost two decades now. Accession candidates such as
Georgia, Ukraine, Montenegro and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia will
again be a subject of disagreement in the coming year. But the realities of the Article
5 world are also bringing major changes to the process of NATO enlargement. The
Republic of Poland Summit will therefore have to respond to the growing debate on
NATO membership in both of these countries, whenever Helsinki and Stockholm ex-
press their wish to become members. To counter the Russian challenge, NATO is
facing three central decisions in the run-up to the Republic of Poland Summit. It is to
determine in the future whether the deterioration in relations with Russia will continue
for a sustained period – and whether, if the answer is yes, “deterrence from a
distance” through the current configurations of the VJTF and the NRF will be
sufficient. It will have to touch the sensitive issue of the nuclear dimension, which, so
as not to disturb efforts towards a détente with Russia has been almost completely
neglected (at least publicly). Finally, it should be observed that, facing at best
stagnating national defense budgets and an ongoing lack of military capabilities, the
member states will have to focus on the operational readiness of their respective
armed forces. All these topics would severely tax the consensus of Wales and are
likely to strain NATO solidarity.

Russia’s recent buzzes of American navy in April 2016 has meant that the
focus of attention has shifted to Sweden and Finland, two countries that in the past
considered NATO accession only as a very remote option.

111
Figure

Source: Reuters
According to the US European Command (Eucom) in Stuttgart, there were a
number of such close encounters on in April 2016122, involving both Russian fighter
jets and helicopters, while the Donald Cook was in international waters in the Baltic
Sea, off the coast of Republic of Poland. Those waters are also close to the Russian
enclave of Kaliningrad. Such behavior is entirely inconsistent with the professional
norms of militaries operating in proximity to each other in international waters and
international airspace.
Those incident appears to be the closest so far of a series of military
encounters between Russian and US forces since tensions intensified dramatically
with Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its subsequent covert military
intervention on the side of separatists in eastern Ukraine, and this behavior could

122
on April 29, 2016, a USA Air Force RC-135 aircraft flying a routine route in international airspace over
the Baltic Sea was intercepted by a Russian SU-27 in an unsafe and unprofessional manner.

112
easily lead to a miscalculation by a pilot or sailor leading to an accident and
repercussions that spiral out of control.123
In Sweden124 Social Democratic Party may be reversing its stance on
Swedish membership in the alliance, stating that Stockholm plans to join NATO's
Strategic Communications agency, which leads development of counter information
warfare, cyber defense and counter-disinformation and could consider joining
NATO if it can do so with neighboring Finland. Finland is particularly concerned about
the demilitarized Åland Islands, worrying Russia could use the same unconventional
methods of “little green men” it successfully employed to seize Crimea from Ukraine.
The Russian military staged an exercise in March that included practicing the capture
of Sweden’s Gotland Island.

Finland spends about 1.3 % of its gross domestic product on defense, while
the Swedish defense budget is around 1.2 %, both figures far below the NATO
requirement of 2 % one that only a few members meet.125 And with Latvia, Lithuania,
Estonia in already NATO and forming a buffer with Russia, Sweden and Finland can
no longer count on the alliance aiding them simply because of their strategic location.
But as the Kremlin has made abundantly clear, the two countries can expect grief
from Russia if they do join NATO. Though the issue has come up regularly, the two
countries have held off joining the alliance for quite some time, and public opinion of
accession is unfavorable right now. 126 Russia is alarmed by Swedish authority’s
decision and has made it clear that it will view a Swedish attempt to join NATO as a
direct threat, and without doubts such a decision by Sweden would have political,
military and foreign policy consequences requiring retaliatory measures from Russia.

Therefore strengthening the alliance's collective defense capability would be

the main point on the agenda at the summer summit, while warning that Russia
"should not be isolated". Russia was actively testing the defensive capabilities of

123
These actions have the potential to unnecessarily escalate tensions betUSen countries, and could result in a
miscalculation or accident that could cause serious injury or death
124
while SUSdish Foreign Minister Margot Wallström has signaled a tougher attitude towards Russia, she says
exploring NATO membership would send the wrong signals. Following the crisis in U. K. raine, Russian
military aircraft intrusions into or near SUSdish airspace, and a submarine hunt in the Stockholm archipelago,
some 73 % now say they are concerned about developments in Russia.
125
http://www.politico.eu/article/sUSden-finland-nato-russia-defense-nordic-military/
126
SUSden is already in the Partnership for Peace program with NATO and takes part in NATO exercises, but it
is not yet fully integrated and does not fall under the protection of Article 5, nor does it carry any obligations
toward NATO members.

113
NATO in the Baltic region" where a number of countries have come under pressure.
Russia will use rare talks with NATO to protest the alliance's "absolutely unjustified"
military buildup in. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania the Russian and NATO
ambassadors will meet in Brussels on April 20 2016 for their first formal talks in
nearly two years to discuss security issues, including the crisis in Ukraine where
Russia is accused of backing pro-Russian rebels against the pro-European Union
government in Kiev. The Federation of Russia’s actions against Ukraine represents a
wake-up call, questioning one of NATO’s main assumptions after the Cold War: that
The Federation of The Federation of Russia no longer poses a threat. They therefore
support the idea of refocusing NATO on territorial defense in European Union and
deterring The Federation of Russia. Other analysts conclude that NATO was already
experiencing an identity crisis stemming from an unclear post-Cold War role, limited
success in Afghanistan and declining defense budgets. According to James
Appathurai (NATO), the Allies set out the next steps in supporting Afghanistan after
the end of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operation: in the short
term, a training and advisory mission (‘Resolute Support’); in the medium term,
granting €46 billion to sustain Afghan forces; and in the long term, Afghanistan
becoming a political partner of NATO. Following the presidential election, Afghan
authorities signed the legal agreements allowing for a number of US and NATO
troops to stay in Afghanistan after 31 December 2014 and, implicitly, for Operation
Resolute Support.

It is noteworthy that the United States of America will maintain a continued

presence of 9,800 troops through most of 2016 before drawing down to 5,500 troops
by January 2017. The United States of America will support the continuation of the
NATO mission in Afghanistan in 2016 and beyond, and continue to consult with our
NATO allies and partners to ensure that the USA and NATO missions in Afghanistan
are mutually supportive.127 The Wales Summit was an opportunity to address long-
standing questions about NATO’s raison d’être and future role (global positioning or
concentrating on European security). In any event, the summit has reaffirmed the
importance of transatlantic relations and of the continued US security presence in
European Union. The NATO-EU relationship has also been emphasized, with

127
The budget provides $41.7 billion in FY 2017 for Operation Freedom’s Sentinel — including funding to
support our posture in USACentral Command, the full funding of $3.4 billion to support the ANDSF, Afghan
National Defense and Security Forces

114
cooperation between the two organizations now considered essential
to addressing hybrid threats.

Figure

http://ec.europa.eu/epsc/publications/notes/sn4_en.htm

2016 Summit meeting in Republic of Poland

NATO’s agreement on ‘adaptation’ and ‘reassurance’ measures was a central

feature of the 2014 Wales Summit,128 which confirmed that collective defense
remains the core task of the Alliance. The 2014 NATO Summit 129occurred in a

128
From a Polish perspective, the NATO summit in Wales correctly addressed a new security reality. The
Alliance has started to refocus on its core mission and the decision to strategically enhance its eastern flank was
reached. Currently, a full, swift and firm implementation of the NATO summit conclusions, especially the
Readiness Action Plan, remains a priority.
129
The member states reached agreement on the establishment of a so- called “Spearhead Force” (Very High
Readiness Joint Task Force, VJTF), the adaptation and expansion of its Multinational Corps Northeast in
Szczecin (Poland), as USll as the further development of the NATO Response Force (NRF) into the so-called
Enhanced NRF. The “NATO Readiness Action Plan” (RAP) is based on the dualism of “assurance measures”,
which emphasise the solidarity of the Alliance, and “adaptation measures” focussing on the reform of NATO.

115
challenging security context, marked by the crisis in Ukraine (largely seen as a The
Federation of Russia crisis), growing instability in the southern neighborhood and
rising transnational threats, such as the so-called Islamic State. While Allied leaders
were expected to concentrate on NATO’s withdrawal from Afghanistan at the end of
2014, The Federation of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and support for separatists in
eastern Ukraine changed the focus of the summit. With European security put into
question and growing concerns in central and eastern European Union over the
weakening of the security guarantee of the Washington Treaty’s Article 5 (collective
defense), NATO leaders examined the response to The Federation of Russia’s
involvement in the Ukraine crisis and re-engaged in the fundamental debate over
NATO’s strategic approach to The Federation of Russia, its deterrence and defense
posture as well as its core purpose (out-of-area operations or territorial collective
defense?) Besides the Summit Declaration, the Allies adopted several documents,
namely a Joint Statement of the NATO-Ukraine Commission; a Declaration on
Afghanistan and a Declaration on the transatlantic bond. Collective defense was
reaffirmed as NATO’s core mission.130

Relations with The Federation of Russia

Since April 2014, all practical civilian and military cooperation with The
Federation of The Federation of Russia has ceased and the US and EU have
imposed a series of economic sanctions. At the summit, NATO leaders condemned
The Federation of Russia’s actions in Ukraine, although stated that they remain open
to political dialogue with The Federation of Russia. They tried to define their
approach towards an increasingly assertive The Federation of Russia, but agreement
on a long-term strategy did not emerge from the summit. Even central European
countries have differed in their assessments: while some countries have called for
economic sanctions and the strengthening of NATO’s eastern flank, others have
criticized such measures for leading to an escalation in tensions.

Finally, the heads of state and government of NATO member states pledged a future increase of their defense
budgets and investment quotas.
130
European Union Diplomacy & Defense, Agence European Union Bulletin on CSDP and NATO, Nos 727 and
728, September 2014 Since 2014, NATO has been steadily implementing the decisions taken in Wales. Not least
because of their visibility, the public focus rests largely on the increased number and scope of exercises. In 2014,
NATO conducted 162 exercises, double the number originally planned. Added to these USre another 40
exercises conducted at national levels. For 2015, around 270 exercises had been planned, of which about a half
USre intended to reassure the eastern European Unionan allies.

116
 Figure

Source:http://www.ac24.cz/zpravy-ze-sveta/5883-breaking-defense-americka-obrnena-technika-
vypada-na-pozadi-ruske-spatne
Obviously NATO must demonstrate that it has the determination and the
capabilities to defend its members. NATO needs about seven brigades, of which
three must be heavy armored brigades, supported by airpower and other assets, to
deter Russia in the Baltic. Currently, NATO is three or four brigades short and the
Pentagon only plans to add one heavy armored brigade in the region. Due to
semantic sensitivities, it is unlikely that Western troops will be stationed there
‘permanently’. But the US intends to increase the number of its troops rotating
through Eastern European Union ‘persistently’, and the rest of NATO should follow
suit. NATO should also invest in equipment that offsets Putin’s A2/AD tactics: next-
generation aircraft and anti-submarine defenses that are less vulnerable to Russian
firepower are needed. NATO should invest in the territorial defense of its eastern
members. After years of training and equipping their militaries for missions outside
European Union, states like Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Poland must now re-learn

117
tactics for slowing a possible Russian advance and they need the alliance’s support
to do this. NATO must also develop a clear message on deterrence and leave no
doubt that NATO is a nuclear alliance. Three of its members possess nuclear
capabilities, and NATO should be clear that nuclear blackmail from Russia, or
anyone else, will never be tolerated. Moreover, NATO should stage more military
exercises in regions that are vulnerable to a Russian A2/AD challenge, like the Baltic
and Black Seas, and possibly the Arctic. Exercises should focus on increasing the
readiness of all of NATO’s forces to move across European Union – not just its rapid
response forces, as is the case now. Recent exercises, like ‘Allied Shield’ and
‘Trident Juncture’, which involved 15,000 and 36,000 personnel respectively, have
been promising. The NATO ‘Allied Shield’ exercise conducted in June 2015, which
brought under one framework four distinct exercises taking place along the Eastern
flank of the Alliance, totaling 15,000 personnel from 19 Members states and three
partner states. These exercises included a major naval exercise in the Baltic Sea,
amphibious assault operations in Sweden and Republic of Poland, and armored
maneuvers and other conventional force engagements involving US strategic aviation
in the Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and Republic of Poland. Allied Shield also saw
the first field deployment of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF)
designed to provide a response to low-level incursions into allied territory. This
activity was clearly intended to simulate the kinds of operations NATO forces would
need to engage in, in the context of a military crisis or confrontation with Russia
somewhere in the Baltic region.131

131
Some specific elements of exercises in NATO member states in 2014 and 2015 are clearly meant to send a
signal to Russia regarding NATO resolve. Perhaps the most glaring examples
include the presence of armoured vehicles from the US Army’s Second Cavalry Regiment, as USll as British,
Dutch, Spanish, Lithuanian, and Latvian troops at a military parade commemorating Estonia’s Independence
Day on February 24, 2015 in Narva – a town situated on the Estonian-Russian border and, for many, a symbol of
the vulnerability of the
Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia to a surprise attack.

118
Figure

Source: https://theaviationist.com/2015/06/13/infographic-allied-shield-series-of-ex/

But NATO should be able to train with larger numbers, particularly if Russia is
doing so. This also requires taking a fresh look at equipment storage and transport
across allied territory – not just along the borders. NATO should also agree on the
conditions required for its strategic commander to deploy and exercise the rapid
response force as he sees fit. At the moment he cannot respond quickly to
developments and must wait for the result of a slow decision-making process. NATO
should also help allies to respond to scenarios involving irregular forces, like the ‘little
green men’ Russia used in Crimea, without giving Russia a pretext for military
escalation132

132
http://www.policyreview.eu/no-denial-how-nato-can-deter-a-creeping-russian-threat/ Russia’s new aircraft
and air-defense systems had “closed the air force gap” with NATO. That same month, Admiral Mark Ferguson,
commander of US Naval Forces European Union, warned of the increasing capability of the Russian Navy.
Russia has invested in new nuclear-poUSred attack and ballistic missile defense submarines, partly equipped
with long-range cruise missiles, which could be used to close sea-lanes or disturb lines of communication.

119
The Readiness Action Plan and the Eastern Allies133
NATO leaders have adopted a Readiness Action Plan (RAP), in particular with
the setting-up of a ‘spearhead unit’ (or ‘very high-readiness joint task force’) of 4 000
troops within the NATO Response Force able to deploy at short notice (within 48
hours). NATO maintains that these deployments will not breach its commitment to
The Federation of The Federation of Russia not to permanently station ‘substantial
combat forces’ in central and eastern European Union. Other RAP measures include:
pre-positioning of equipment in, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania Republic of Poland and
Romania), increasing the frequency of exercises, more emphasis on advance
planning and response to ‘hybrid war’ (i.e. mix of military and non-military actions). In
June 2014, the US launched a $1 billion European Reassurance Initiative, still to
be approved by Congress, to ensure the continuing presence of US forces in the
region.

Defense expenditure
The Allies agreed to stop, and reverse, the declining trend in defense
expenditure. European Allies committed to moving towards the 2% guideline and to
reach 20% for annual expenditure on new major equipment, including research and
development, within a decade. In 2013, the US provided 73% of NATO’s defense
budget, while only three European nations reached the 2% threshold (Estonia,
Greece and the U. K.). Ahead of the summit, some Allies set the aim of reaching 2%
by 2017 (Romania) or by 2020 (Lithuania and Latvia).134

NATO’s Open Door policy and NATO partnerships

The Allies reaffirmed the importance of its Open Door policy (Article 10) and
the prospects for NATO membership for Georgia, Montenegro135, the Former

Similarly, since annexing Crimea, Russia has modernised its Black Sea Fleet – stationed in Sevastopol – shifting
the Black Sea’s military balance in Russia’s favour.
133
At the 2014 Wales Summit, NATO agreed to a Readiness Action Plan (RAP) to ensure the Alliance is ready
to respond swiftly and firmly to new security challenges. This is the most significant reinforcement of NATO's
collective defense since the end of the Cold War. The RAP addresses risks and threats from the east and the
south.The main points: An enhanced NATO Response Force (NRF) - a multinational force with land, air,
maritime and Special Operations Forces units capable of rapid deployment wherever needed;; A new Very High
Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) within the NRF of around 5,000 troops with some elements able to deploy
within 48 hours;
134
https://epthinktank.eu/2014/10/15/cfspcsdp-outcome-of-the-nato-summit-2014/
135
Since its independence, Montenegro has operated a fully-professional army, fielding increasingly
sophisticated equipment, defined by a doctrine of interoperability with NATO partners. Yet since the onset of the

120
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia136, and Bosnia and Herzegovina137. In particular,
NATO adopted a ‘substantial package’ for Georgia138, which includes defense
capacity-building, training, and enhanced interoperability opportunities. As
concerns partnerships, the Allies have adopted a ‘Partnership Interoperability
Initiative’ and an Interoperability Platform for NATO and partner forces to work better
together. Five partners (Australia, Finland, Georgia, Jordan and Sweden) will benefit
from an Enhanced Opportunities Program. The Allies also launched a Defense and
Related Security Capacity-Building Initiative to assist partners, at their request. The
Allies had a first meeting with EU and OSCE representatives, to ensure better
coordination among international organizations.

Enhanced cyber defense policy

The Allies adopted an ‘enhanced cyber defense policy‘, meant to improve
NATO’s governance of cyber-defense, create partnerships with industry, help
individual Allies to reinforce their cyber capabilities and focus more on training and
education. A novelty is the possibility to invoke Article 5 following a cyber-attack, thus
equating it with an ‘armed attack’ in certain situations.
Nevertheless, ambiguity persists about the exact conditions that would trigger an
Article 5 response and the nature of the response (military or cyber). The Wales
summit endorsed the Framework Nations Concept, proposed by The The Federal
Republic of Germany, which aims at applying multinational cooperation to defense
planning and policy. Three groups of Allies have been formed, each coordinated by a
framework nation, dedicated to: capability development (The The Federal Republic of
Germany); the creation of a joint expeditionary force (U. K.), and the improvement of
several capability areas (Italy). NATO also committed to further developing ballistic

Ukraine crisis, many NATO members have been reticent to keep the enlargement door open, and the EU
announced a 5 year moratorium on enlargement, making Montenegro's aspirations to fully integrate with the
Euro-Atlantic community an uphill battle
136
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has been assured that it will be invited to become a member as
soon as a mutually acceptable solution to the issue over the country’s name has been reached with Greece
137
Bosnia and Herzegovina was invited to join the Membership Action Plan (MAP) in April 2010 but its
participation is pending the resolution of a key issue concerning immovable defense property

138
At the 2008 Bucharest Summit, the Allies agreed that Georgia and Ukraine will become members of NATO
in future (since 2010, Ukraine has not been formally pursuing membership).

121
missile defense capabilities. Concerning the threat posed by Islamic State, it
emerged that NATO may have a potential role in supporting an international coalition.
Whether these measures have been sufficient to restore NATO’s ability to
deter and defend its members, especially along the Eastern flank, remains a subject
of ongoing debate in the lead-up to the 2016 Summit in Republic of Poland. NATO is
fundamentally reassessing its defenses in European Union, particularly in the East. In
early 2015, allies agreed to establish new command centers in Bulgaria, Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Republic of Poland, and Romania. The outposts, which are
expected to open in 2016, will support a new rapid reaction force of about five
thousand troops. In a major crisis, military leaders say that up to two more brigades,
for a total NATO force of about thirty thousand, could be marshaled. The United
States of America has shored up NATO's air presence over Republic of Poland and
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and other allies, including the U. K., The The Federal
Republic of Germany, and Denmark, are providing reinforcements as well. In 2014,
allied jets intercepted The Federation of Russia warplanes more than four hundred
times without altercation.
NATO members are also bolstering security collaboration with Ukraine, an
alliance partner since 1994. But as a non-member, Ukraine remains outside of
NATO's defense perimeter, and there are clear limits on how far it can be brought
into institutional structures. The United States of America plans to send an armored
brigade to train troops in European Union Ukraine on route clearance, counter-
battery fire, and electronic warfare. Meanwhile, President Barack Obama's
administration is considering providing Kiev with lethal, defensive weapons, but some
European Union European leaders worry this may escalate the conflict.139 In the
longer term, some defense analysts believe the alliance should consider advancing
membership to Finland and Sweden, two Partnerships for Peace countries with a
history of avoiding military alignment. (Nordic peers Denmark, Iceland, and Norway
are charter NATO members.)

139
USA General Philip Breedlove, NATO's top commander, has stressed that military force alone will not shift
the battle's momentum. "US don't want a war of grand proportions in U. K. raine. US must find a diplomatic and
political solution," he told Congress in February 2015. "What is clear is that this is not getting better. It is getting
worse every day."

122
Chapter IV Contemporary military strategy of NATO’s allies
The Federation of Russia’s annexation of Crimea, and its activities in Ukraine,
serve as a warning to all states in the region concerning the indeterminate nature of
the Kremlin’s future actions and intentions. Therefore it is noteworthy that in several
allies doctrines are similar elements how to combat this new Russian threat.

Figure: Forces

French Republic

The French government's decision to rejoin the integrated military command

structure of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) formalizes a decade-long
rethink of French military strategy and foreign policy. Under President Charles de
Gaulle, who perceived the alliance as dominated by the United States of America and
Britain, French Republic pulled its forces out of NATO in 1966 to pursue more
independent policies. The 2009 reversal, championed by French President Nicolas
Sarkozy, has broad support in the French policymaking community and the military,
though some dissent from traditional Gaullists persists. The full reintegration of
French forces into NATO's structure reflects The The French Republic’s view of a

123
changed world in which domestic security will rely on the ability to coordinate with
allies abroad. The move also acknowledges a diminished French ability to mount
significant expeditionary operations abroad without logistical and other support from
its closest allies, including the United States of America140

The size of the uniformed component of the French army, now the largest in
the European Union, is in line to drop by 24 % over the next several years, a
continuation of a trend which began at the end of the Cold War and picked up pace
when French Republic ended its national draft in 2001.

The doctrine makes clear The The French Republic’s nuclear arsenal will be
maintained and kept solely under French command. Sarkozy has shown no signs of
abandoning The The French Republic’s African patch, either. When Sudanese rebels
threatened to overthrow Chad's pro-Paris leader in 2008, French Republic made it
clear it was willing to intervene. Nor has Paris signaled an intention to give up on
power projection. French Republic operates European Union's only real fixed-wing
aircraft carrier, the Charles De Gaulle141, and even though a decision on a second
has been postponed, talks with Britain continue on a proposed jointly built class of
super carriers. Sarkozy in June 2008 told German officials he foresees eventual
formation of a European naval strike force with British and French carriers at its core,
and The The Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Spain, and a host of other nations
contributing frigates, submarines, and support vessels. Perhaps with Iran in mind,
Sarkozy announced that French Republic would build a new navy base in the United
Arab Emirates, and it has also ratcheted up efforts to sell its weapons (NPR) in the
region. Paris insisted on maintaining its place as one of three European military
forces (the other two are Britain and Russia) that can operate independently on far-
flung missions. Similarly, French Republic resisted the post-Cold War trend toward
downsizing and reorienting its forces, in part due to its insistence on "independence"
from the United States of America. French Republic continued to conscript soldiers,
for instance, right through the 1990s, long after most major militaries went to an "all
140
http://www.cfr.org/French Republic/frenchmilitarystrategynatoreintegration/p16619
141
The Charles de Gaulle holds the distinction of being the only nuclear poUSred aircraft carrier outside the US
Navy. It may not be the largest carrier in the world at 250 m and 40,000 tons, but it’s the most poUSrful carrier
in its category. It carries a mixed air wing of Rafale-M and Super Etendard fighters, E-2 Airborne Early Warning
aircraft, NH90, Gazelle and Puma helicopters which enables it to project poUSr for hundreds of kilometers
around it, thousands of kilometers from French soil. In fact, it is the only European Unionan carrier which is
participating in NATO ops from the past few years as other European Unionan nations lack a credible carrier
force and it will continue to do so for decades to come

124
volunteer" system. The white paper concluded that the size and capabilities of the
French military no longer reflected the likely missions it would undertake in the future.
"There is no risk of an invasion today ... but on the other hand we need to be able
deploy forces to participate in the stabilization of regions or zones in crisis French
Republic, to date, had charted a very different course from Britain. While the British,
too, have insisted on "punching above their weight," since 1956 at least, closeness
with America has underpinned their geopolitical thinking--"a bond forged through the
blood spilled together in the sands of Iraq and Afghanistan"--as Britain's senior
military officer, Gen. Sir Richard Dannatt, put it in a June 2008 speech. Laying out his
own country's future military vision, he declared "we must focus on operating with the
United States of America, and not necessarily as the United States of America." The
implied criticism of The The French Republic’s more independent stance would not
have been lost on his audience. French Republic defined its military role more
independently, often summing up its posture with the ambiguous phrase "friend, ally,
non-aligned." USA-French Republic ties often appeared strained, as in the run-up to
the Iraq war, though practical cooperation remained quite close. Still, French
Republic opted out of the Iraq war, and aside from a period just after 9/11 when
French Special Forces operated in Afghanistan, largely avoided that conflict, too. The
fundamental document DFT 3.2 Volume 1 (FT-03) is French Army doctrine at the
crossroads between recent documents (2013White Paper, the Concept for Military
Operations, the Doctrine on the Employment of Armed Forces) and the entire
doctrinal corpus of land forces necessary for developing combined arms maneuver. It
outlines the action of land forces in a most often multinational and interagency
joint operational environment. The French capstone concept CIA-01(A) _CEF
(2013)3142 bases military strategy on the notion of dynamic synergy of efforts.143

142
CIA-01(A)_CEF(2013), Concept d'emploi des forces, no. 130/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 12 September 2013.
English version available: (FRA) JC-01_CCMO(2013) Capstone Concept for Military Operations.
143
Dynamic synergy of efforts involves greater interaction betUSen strategic functions, greater ability to shift
effort betUSen missions and betUSen theatres, and increased flexibility in terms of organization, command and
action. It is a proper response to the military challenges of modern time. The armed forces are challenged more
than ever to become even more agile: agility in action, but most importantly, intellectual and doctrinal flexibility.

125
 Figure

Source:http://www.armedforces.co.uk/European defense/edcountries/countryfrance.htm

The employment of forces is directly linked to the use of force. The specificity
of the military is to fight in the name of the Nation. The use of force is regulated by
rules of command (especially Rules Of Engagement [ROE]) and by the law. The
legitimacy of an engagement is also determined by the purpose for which force will
be used, and by the behavior of the forces. Moreover, the legal dimension is always
part of operations, in various ways depending on their nature: intervention on the
national territory, crisis management, high intensity coercion action, etc. 114.
LBDSN-2013 and CIA-01 refer to various concepts that are important to define so as
to better understand the consequences on the forces. Indeed, these considerations
provide a structure with significant effects on force employment. The operations
community's common understanding has to be precise. 144

144
The three main missions defined in CIA-01 are likely to integrate actions of coercion (protecting the Nation
against any military threat, contributing to the settlement of situations threatening international peace and
security in compliance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter) or inherently include such actions (using coercion to
constrain the political will of a state adversary).

126
 President Francois Hollande and Minister for Foreign Affairs Laurent Fabius of
French Republic in September 2015 laid out The The French Republic’s foreign
policy priorities for the coming year, at the annual gathering of The The French
Republic’s chiefs of diplomatic mission in late August and at press conference held
by Mr. Hollande on September 7 2015145

Figure

Source:

French military ambitions are increasingly limited by the economic crisis and
The The French Republic’s fiscal problems. As a %age of French GDP, defense is
less of a national priority today. (In 1997, the military budget equaled 2 % of GDP;
today, it stands at approximately 1.5 %.) That said, The The French Republic’s
decision to intervene in Mali this past year is a sober reminder of The The French
Republic’s need to maintain serious military capabilities to protect its interests and
address the existing gaps in needed capabilities. But the actual risk French Republic
runs lies less in the condition of today's French forces than in their future state.
Essentially freezing the defense budget for several years as planned will cost the
French military in a number of ways. By not replacing equipment in an orderly

145
The The French Republic’s president enjoys strong prerogatives and, traditionally, few constraints on The
The French Republic’s foreign and security policies. The 1958 Constitution, enacted by the late General Charles
de Gaulle, makes the president the commander-in-chief of the military and enables him to nominate ambassadors
without prior consent from the Parliament.

127
fashion, an increasing portion of the defense budget will go to maintaining aging
equipment; already, the amount devoted to maintenance is up by 8 % in 2013.
Indeed, according to the French chief of the defense staff, estimates in 2013 for
the availability of armored personnel carriers, frigates, and combat planes would
be 40, 48, and 60 %, respectively. Mr. Hollande announced in April 2015 that The
The French Republic’s defense spending would grow by €3.8 billion Euros over the
next four years, likely bringing the country to around the NATO 2 % defense
spending target.)

Figure

Source: http://www.janes.com/article/51079/french-defense-budget-boost-swaps-a-7-cut-for-a-4-jump

Under static spending plans laid out by the Projet de Loi de Programmation
Militaire (LPM) 2014-2019, defense spending in French Republic would have
effectively been cut by 7% in real terms. The April announcement reverses this trend
and the defense budget will now reach EUR32.7 billion by 2019, a 4% increase in
real terms over the 2015 budget. Instead of French Republic spending sliding down
to 1.2% of GDP (excluding pensions), the defense budget will now be maintained at
1.4%.With pensions, spending will come to 1.8% of GDP, within striking distance of

128
the NATO mandate that members should spend 2% of GDP on defense.146 The
budget calls for an increase from roughly $18.7 billion to over $19 billion for military
equipment, covering a number of deliveries slated for next year, including nine Rafale
fighters, three A400M transport aircraft, five Tiger combat helicopters, and six NH90
transport helicopters, along with a frigate, missiles for the frigate and a Barracuda
attack submarine, and 25 heavy vehicles. Hence also The The French Republic’s
multiple military interventions abroad in the past few years, from Mali in 2013 to
Operation Barkhane today in the Sahel (where 3,000 French forces are fighting
resurgent terrorist groups in Mali, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Niger), and
the assistance provided to the USA-led coalition against the Islamic State. Paris’s
decision to contribute to NATO’s Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF),
created in the aftermath of the Ukraine crisis in September 2014 to speed the
alliance’s reaction to future crises, and has encountered some difficulties. A strong
French contribution to the VJTF was seen by some allies as a test of Paris’s real
commitment to an organization into whose military structures it only reintegrated in
2008. Despite a highly contested environment, French Republic will contribute forces
to the VJTF every year and will lead it in 2021. The The French Republic’s foreign
policy establishment believes that globalization makes it hard for European
countries—French Republic included—to project power and stability without pooling
their capacities and resources. Hence The The French Republic’s strong support for
EU common external and defense policies, despite their obvious shortcomings.

146
Instead of French Republic spending sliding down to 1.2% of GDP (excluding pensions), the defense budget
will now be maintained at 1.4%.With pensions, spending will come to 1.8% of GDP, within striking distance of
the NATO mandate that members should spend 2% of GDP on defense

129
 Figure

Source:

With the retirement of its tactical and strategic land based missiles, the bulk of
The The French Republic’s nuclear force rests with the Strategic Oceanic Force
(FOST - Force Océanique Stratégique) represented by the L'Inflexible and Le
Triomphant class strategic missile submarines. Each submarine has 16 ballistic
missiles147 The sea-based leg of the French nuclear force consists of four Le
Triomphant-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), based at Ile
Longue, Bretagne on the Atlantic coast. While at least one SSBN is always deployed,
three vessels must be operational at all times. The submarines are fitted with 16 M45
or M51 domestically-manufactured SLBMs that can carry up to six TN75 warheads.
148 The French Navy is currently transitioning from the aging M45 SLBMs to newer

147
The first L'Inflexible and was deployed on 1 April 1985. This class was actually an upgrade of the
existing Redoubtable class. The other three Redoubtables included in this upgrade USre returned to service from
October 1987 and February 1993
148
Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, "Worldwide deployments of nuclear USapons, 2014," Bulletin of
the Atomic Scientists, September 2014, p. 98-99; "The Military Balance 2009," International Institute of
Strategic Studies, (London: Routledge, 2009), p. 119; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI
Yearbook 2013: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, 44th ed, Oxford University Press, 2013.

130
M51s149. The European Union submarine in the French fleet, Le Terrible, entered into
service in September 2010, and is fully equipped with the extended-range M51.1
(estimated at 6,000 km).150 [4] French Republic began to place M51s on its remaining
three SSBNs in 2010 with plans to complete the process by 2020.151

It was not until the 1950s that French Republic embarked on a nuclear
weapons program; its first successful nuclear test was carried out in the Sahara
Desert of Algeria in 1960.152 The rationale for French Republic developing its own
nuclear weapons program has been largely attributed to reasons of security and
prestige. The The French Republic’s maintains up to 300 warheads and
deploys submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and fighter aircraft153

Figure

Source: http://www.armedforces.co.uk/European defense/edcountries/countryuk.htm#British Army

149
On USdnesday, September 30, 2015, at 10:28, the Directorate General of Armaments (DGA) carried out a
test flight of the M51 strategic ballistic missile from the DGA missile testing center at Biscarrosse (Landes
district). This launch is part of the development program of the new version of the M51 missile, as defined by
the 2014-2019 Military Program Law. This test was carried out without a nuclear warhead, and was completed
as planned. Throughout its flight phase, the missile was monitored by DGA’s tracking facilities, including the
"Monge" telemetry and tracking ship. The impact zone is located in the North Atlantic several hundred
kilometers away from the nearest coast. The M51 today is fitted to two of the four French navy’s new-
generation nuclear missile submarines (SSBN-NG). The transfer of the entire strategic submarine deterrent force
to this new USapon is expected by the end of the decad
150
La dissuasion nucléaire," (The Nuclear Deterrent), Ministère de la défense (Ministry of Defense), last
modified April 16, 2013, accessed June 16, 2014, www.defense.gouv.fr; Stéphane Ferrard, "SNLE NG + M51 =
une capacité de frappe intercontinentale," Défense et Sécurité Internationale, No.36, April 2008.
151
Obert Norris, "French Nuclear Forces, 2008" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Vol. 64, No. 4 (September
2008).
152
http://www.nti.org/learn/countries/French Republic/nuclear/
153
French Air Force (Armee de l’ Air) Strength: approximately 57,000 (reducing) with about 800 aircraft and
approximately 5,000 ready reserves.

131
 Some of them are carried by 54 ASMP missiles; the medium-range air-to-
surface cruise missiles that French military doctrine says can be used as a last resort
before a full-scale nuclear war. The rest compose the three sets of 16 submarine-
launched ballistic missiles, the M45 and M51. French Republic is in the process of
updating both its sea and air-based nuclear forces pursuant to a new Military
Programming Law passed in December 2013.154 In February 2015, President
François Hollande announced that Paris would allocate 12.3 % (180 billion Euros) of
its annual defense budget towards the enhancement of its nuclear deterrent
capabilities until 2019.155 In addition to the ongoing replacement of M45 SLBMs with
the M51 on its Le Triomphant-class SSBNs, French Republic aims to begin
deployment of an improved version, the M51.2, in 2016, which has a range of 9,000
km. The M51.2 will be equipped with a new warhead known as the TNO. Paris has
also initiated studies on a third generation SSBN, with hopes of replacing its current
vessels starting in 2035. This new SSBNs will be armed with further improved M51.3
SLBMs.156

French Republic relies on nuclear deterrence as an ultimate guarantee of

French sovereignty. French officials describe the function of nuclear deterrence as
"aiming to protect [the country] from any form of state actor aggression against the
[country's] vital interests, regardless of its origin or its form." 157 Over the years, this
core policy has been reaffirmed by various presidents, (Chirac, 158 Sarkozy, and
Holland) as well as in the 2008 and 2013 White Papers on National Defense and
Security. [25] Although the definition of The The French Republic’s vital interests is
left vague, analysts agree that it covers the free exercise of sovereignty as well as

154
Le ministère de la défense, (Ministry of Defense), "Loi n° 2013-1168 du 18 décembre 2013: Loi de
programmation militaire 2014-2019" (Military Programming Law), www.senat.fr. The French naval element of
the Strategic Nuclear Force (FOST) is based at Ile Longue near Brest. FOST consists of 4 x Le Triomphant
submarines each with 16 x M-45 SLBM (submarine launched ballistic missiles). Each missile has 6 x warheads.
At least one submarine is at sea at any one time and the permission to launch can only be given by the President
of the Republic
155
Véronique Guillemard, "Dissuasion nucléair: la French Republic ne baisse pas la garde," Le Figaro, February
19, 2015, www.lefigaro.fr.
156
Jean-Yves Le Drian, "Discours de clôture, colloque pour les 50 ans de la dissuasion, " November 20, 2014,
www.defense.gouv.fr.
157
Livre blanc de la défense et sécurité nationale, May 2013, p. 20, www.gouvernement.fr.
158
In a 19 January 2006 speech before an audience of MPs and military personnel at the L'ile Longue submarine
base in Brittany, French President Chirac expanded on France's nuclear defense doctrine, last enunciated in
2001, suggesting the possibility of a nuclear response to terrorist threats from "regional actors" (as opposed to
fanatical terrorists). Chirac noted the rise in WMD threats by "certain states, which seek to acquire nuclear,
biological or chemical USapons in violation of treaties," and indicated that France must be prepared to use its
"strategic forces" tactically, in addition to conventional means, to target their command control centers

132
integrity of national and overseas territories, and extends beyond the protection
against nuclear attack. 159

The The Federal Republic of Germany

The The Federal Republic of Germany has deemphasized its military after its
two disastrous defeats in the 20th Century. After its decisive defeat and partition, for
much of the last century, The The Federal Republic of Germany existed as two
states—one that was free and democratic and another that existed under a despotic
communist regime.160 On the issue of Ukraine, and what to do about Russian
activities in the Crimea and eastern Ukraine, when asked if it is more important to be
tough with Russia or to have a strong economic relationship with Russia, half of
Germans voice the view it is more important to be tough. The Germans perceive
Putin government as authoritarian and nationalist in character. The aim of
authoritarianism at home is to maintain the integrity of the Russian empire – for the
Russian The Federation is both an empire and a state – and thus the power of
Russia in international relations. Putin’s ultimate objective is to reconstitute the
USSR, the collapse of which he has called ‘the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of
the last century Putin’s regime has given rise to much alarm in The The Federal
Republic of Germany. The The Federal Republic of Germany has close relations with
Russia and needs them to be good. Close relations arise out of The The Federal
Republic of Germany’s ‘Mittellage’: its place in the centre of European Union. Russia
is its most powerful neighbor to its East. The need for good relations was driven
home very painfully by The The Federal Republic of Germany’s terrible defeat at
Russia’s hands in the Second World War, a defeat which ended its bid for European
dominance, cost it much of its territory and caused The The Federal Republic of
Germany to be divided into two states for almost half a century. The German policy-
making establishment is powerfully influenced by the memory of how the country’s
division was overcome. The strength of the alliances into which the Federal Republic
had entered over the Cold War period was shown during the revolutionary year 1989-

159
In September 1996, Paris signed and two years later ratifiedthe Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and
dismantled its nuclear testing sites at the Pacific Testing Center (CEP) in 1998
160
Both states maintained formidable forces during the Cold War—in fact, the Euroepan nion German
BundesUShr was a very USll equipped force. Federal Republic of Germany was reunited toward the end of the
Cold War—and almost immediately reduced its forces to the bare minimum.

133
90; its partners supported its bid for reunification and helped to determine the terms
on which it took place. The good relations with the Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev,
developed by the then European Union German chancellor, Helmut Kohl, helped in
1990 to persuade Gorbachev that a reunited The The Federal Republic of Germany
would not threaten Russia. For the German policy-making elite, Russia’s policy raises
three sets of issues: political, military and economic. The policy problem is that these
different issues present it with conflicting challenges. Putin’s political course is
objectionable to them, and to the German people, because it runs counter to the
entire trend of German foreign policy since the end of the Second World War: that of
commitment to democracy, respect for international obligations and human rights,
and adherence to multilateralism, especially in the resolution of bitter disputes. The
natural instinct of the German political class is to distance itself from Putin’s coercive
anti-democratic course. It knows that the German people expect this of it.161 The The
Federal Republic of Germany does not want the policy of military confrontation which
appeals to the United States of America. Together with French Republic, it resisted
the idea of Ukrainian and Georgian membership at the NATO summit in April and the
United States of America had to back down. The The Federal Republic of Germany
has a different view of how influence should be brought to bear on Russia. As with
the GDR in the last two decades of the Cold War, The The Federal Republic of
Germany favors engaging it. It believes that the Putin regime will not be able to stop
the trend towards democratization which began in Russia in the late 1980s; the
regime is too weak to maintain a situation in which the people have the vote but the
government has all the power. It sees here a parallel with the fragility of the GDR
regime and believes that engaging Russia, despite its breaches of international
public law, will nurture the confidence of Russians in European Union liberal
democracy. It seeks trade contacts as ways of binding Russia in to European Union
economic institutions.

161
http://www.e-ir.info/2008/05/26/what-to-do-about-russia-the-german-view/

134
Figure

Source:

A new round of significant economic sanctions on Russia would harm German

businesses and the European Union’s economy as a whole. Although German
Chancellor Angela Merkel has blamed Russia publicly for facilitating some of the
ongoing fighting in Ukraine, recently she has advocated adding separatist leaders to
the EU sanctions list and opposed an extension of sanctions that affect Russia's
economy. The German government is influential not only in the European Union, but
also in Kiev. Berlin will play a central role in determining the level of much-needed
financial aid and political support Ukraine will receive from the European Union.
Moreover, key members of the pro-European Union alliance in Kiev have
longstanding ties to The The Federal Republic of Germany and German institutions.
Putin's suggestion that Kiev must be influenced to cooperate in future negotiations is
an indirect reference to this relationship. The Kremlin is aware of The The Federal
Republic of Germany's ties to Ukraine and of Berlin's need to maintain good relations
with Russia. These relationships motivate The The Federal Republic of Germany to
continue acting as a mediator in efforts to alleviate tensions in eastern Ukraine. The
The Federal Republic of Germany is encouraged in this policy by its dependence on

135
Russia for energy supplies and export markets. The The Federal Republic of
Germany and Russia are natural trading partners: The The Federal Republic of
Germany supplies Russia with high-quality manufactured goods and in return obtains
from Russia industrial raw materials, particularly energy. Since the oil shocks of the
1970s, The The Federal Republic of Germany has tried to decrease its dependence
on Middle Eastern oil and is heavily reliant on Russian gas.

In spite of The The Federal Republic of Germany’s long-standing economic

and energy ties with Russia, only about a third (35%) says a strong economic
relationship is more important. Notably, younger Germans (53%), ages 18 to 29, are
much more supportive of standing up to Russia over Ukraine than are older Germans
(36%), ages 65 and older.162

Figure

Source: PEW

For a long time, German business organizations have—albeit grudgingly—

declared their willingness to bow to the “primacy of politics” in the Ukraine crisis.
162
In Federal Republic of Germany, supporters of the left-of-center Social Democratic Party (39%) are more
likely than adherents of the right-of-center Christian Democratic Union and Christian Social Union (23%) to
voice the view that the USA is being too tough on Russia. And East Germans (27%) are more likely than
Euroepan nion Germans (16%) to say that the EU is being too tough.
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/05/11/americans-and-germans-differ-on-approach-to-russia/

136
However, following the imposition of tough sanctions against Russia, which have also
had a telling effect on the German economy and threaten to throw European Union
back into recession, they are now breaking their silence. They advocate a foreign
policy that allows German politics and big business to pursue their own interests
independently, and not—as Steingart calls it—as a “vassal” of the United States of
America. This course would inevitably lead to an arms build-up, militarism and
eventual open conflict with the US and other imperialist powers. The The Federal
Republic of Germany retains a capable industrial base that builds the world best tank
in the Leopard 2163 and is also developing the new Leopard 3.164 The country also
builds conventional submarines—which are still referred to as U-boats like their WWII
counterparts. Operational German forces are well trained and are relatively well
equipped. But for obvious reasons, the Germans are very reluctant to get involved in
out of area military operations—though they have participated in some operations in
Afghanistan.

New published a strategy paper under the title “New Power, New
Responsibility: Elements of a German Foreign and Security Policy for a Changing
World” in the fall of 2013 provided a template for the return of German militarism. 165

German Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen in February 2015 on Tuesday stated
the adoption of a new military and security strategy for The The Federal Republic of
Germany. Her speech, on the occasion of the first meeting of those preparing the
“White Paper 2016,” underscored the turn by the German ruling elite to an aggressive
foreign policy 70 years after the end of the Second World War. Von der Leyen
announced her first weapons deal the same day as her speech. The Defense
Ministry plans to purchase 138 helicopters for the army, including 80 multi-purpose
NH90 helicopters166 and 40 “Tiger” combat helicopters. The deal will cost 8.7 billion

163
Developed and built by Krauss-Maffei USgmann GmbH, Germany’sLeopard 2A7 is arguably the best
operational tank in the world. Like all German tanks, it is an exceptionally USll-balanced and USll-engineered
design, but it comes at a price. Russian tanks on the other hand have traditionally emphasized quantity over
quality, but the T-14 Armata seems to break with that tradition
164
The German response to reneUSd Russian challenges in Eastern European Union and reneUSd emphasis on
tank development has been to start a new armored vehicle project of its own. Provisionally called the Leopard 3,
it’s not know what the new German tank will look like, but if the BundesUShr is prevented from using depleted
uranium ammunition, it will like have to move up to a 140mm cannon
165
http://www.swp-berlin.org/en/projects/new-poUSr-new-responsibility/the-paper.html
166
The NH90 is equipped with infrared and night vision systems and can therefore also operate in darkness and
adverse USather. Its state-of-the-art sonar can detect submarines at great distances. Thanks to its armament of
two torpedoes and a heavy 12.7 mm machine gun, the NH90 can wield great and more robust firepoUSr. The
aircraft also features self-defense systems in the form of flares against (radar guided) missiles. The helicopter can
be deployed in wide range of missions such as troop transport, search and rescue (SAR), medical evacuation

137
Euros. Defense Minister Thomas de Maiziere on Thursday (16.05.2013) announced
that the Bundeswehr is to get in shape for dealing with new forms of military threats
as s well as a changed demographic and financial context. Structures have to be
slimmed down to reach the target of a smaller professional army. In future, there are
to be no more than 240,000 soldiers and civilians employed by the Bundeswehr. That
means the number of soldiers will be cut down to 180,000 while some 31 facilities
and bases are to be shut down. Investment into the military is being reviewed. Large
military equipment like tanks and fighter jets will need to be reevaluated. A new field
will be a division for strategic intelligence (KSA) to launch attacks via the Internet.
The Bundeswehr would thus be able to join the cyber war with computer worms and
viruses. The goal of the restructuring is that the Bundeswehr will remain to get the
soldiers prepared for their new array of challenges. That includes aid in areas of
catastrophe, fighting international terrorists, evacuation of German citizens and
international employment as part of EU or UN missions - a new focus that requires a
restructuring of the troops into smaller, more flexible and better trained units.
Cooperation with other countries' forces will also need to be improved so that
missions like the one in Afghanistan or the anti-piracy mission off the horn of Africa
can be done in close and effective cooperation with the international partners. The
Bundeswehr wants to be able to send out some 10,000 troops in up to two
concurrent missions. In addition to that there are to be troops ready for rapid
intervention missions led by NATO or the EU. For those goals, some 50,000 soldiers
would be needed.

(MEDEVAC), casualty evacuation (CASEVAC), special operations including counter terrorism, electronic
warfare, airborne command post, VIP transport and utility support including disaster relief. It can transport up to
20 fully equipped troops. The poUSr-plant of the NH90 includes either two RTM322-01/9 or two GE
T700/T6E1 2000kW class engines equipped with dual channel Full Authority Digital Electronic Control
(FADEC) system. The high-performance engine enables the helicopter to reach a maximum altitude of 3,200m
(10,500ft) at a rate of climb of 2,200ft/min.

138
 Figure

Source:

Plans to provide the German Army 131 more Boxer armored personnel
carriers167 have passed the German Bundestag. On Wednesday, the
parliament's budget committee approved the procurement of the APCs, a Defense
Ministry spokesman confirmed. The wheeled fighting vehicles carry a price tag of
€654 million (US $709 million), including 19 % VAT, parliamentary sources
confirmed. While around €566 million will be spent on the vehicles, about €47 million
is earmarked for weapon stations. European armaments agency OCCAR will
implement the project. The vehicles in the configuration A2, which come with better
protection than previous batches, are due for delivery from 2017 to 2021. Lithuania
announced its intention to order 88 Boxers in infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) versions
with a 30 mm cannon and anti-tank missiles. The State Defense Council selected the
vehicle for the 8X8 requirement on Dec. 11. Those deliveries are set for 2017 through
2020. The production capacities in The The Federal Republic of Germany and the
Netherlands for Boxer vehicles can easily cope with the second batch for The The

167
Vehicle has a modular armor with special ceramic mix. The triple hull floor is shaped for maximum
protection against anti-tank mines. Every mission module has its own primary safety cell. It is claimed that front
armor can withstand 30-mm rounds, while the all-round protection can withstand 12.7-mm fire. Damaged armor
slabs can be easily replaced in field condition. Also this APC has low radar and acoustic signatures, making it
harder to detect. USapon fit can be configured to suit specific national requirements of every country. German
Boxers have a remotely operated gun mount with a 40-mm automatic grenade launcher, while the Dutch
vehicles are completed with a 12.7-mm machine gun

139
Federal Republic of Germany and the vehicles for Lithuania168 Lithuania has already
established military links to The The Federal Republic of Germany. Its MoD
announced plans a few months ago to buy 22 German self-propelled howitzers and
about 30 more vehicles from German surplus stocks.

The German Army's new Boxers will be configured as APCs with a light
weapon station that can hold either a machine gun or an automatic grenade
launcher. The vehicles will replace the wheeled APCs Fuchs (Fox) of the Army's
infantry battalions and are tailored to fit in with the advanced Future Soldier project
(IdZ-ES)169 used by infantry squads. The German Army now has 200 Boxers, which
have already been used to some extent in Afghanistan. The delivery of more 72
ambulance vehicles to the Medical Corps is ongoing. All buy three of these all have
been delivered, said Artec Manager Stefan Lischka. With the handover of the
remaining three in the first quarter of 2016, the delivery will be finished nine months
ahead of schedule.

In addition to the Bundeswehr, the Dutch armed forces employ the Boxer, of
which 200 were ordered to Dutch specifications. German forces not only want to
upgrade their infantry units but also want to improve their tank fleet. Army Inspector
Vollmer announced that in the future, two out of six German tank battalions – each
with 44 vehicles – are to be equipped with the most modern Leopard 2 A7 main
battle tank (MBT). The other units will keep Leopard A6s, he said. The Army already
uses 20 of the latest version of the MBT.

In 2015 the German MoD announced intentions to buy back 100 secondhand
Leopard 2 from industry to increase the Army's total stock to 328. According to

168
Concerning the Boxer, Lt. Gen. Jörg Vollmer, the inspector general of the German land forces, assumes that it
is in "mutual interest" for the Bundeswehr and the Lithuanian armed forces to cooperate. He considers the repair
of battle damage and common operational procedures as possible areas of collaboration,
169
The heart and brain of “IdZ-ES” is the core system with merges poUSr supply and command and control
(C4I) functions in a specifically designed “electronic backpack”, which monitors the processes of all individual
components within the core computer. A key feature is the squad radio communication (data and voice
simultaneously), allowing the integration into networked operations, providing the link to the squad’s support or
combat vehicle (e.g. Boxer multi-role armoured vehicle or the Puma infantry fighting vehicle). The squad leader
is additionally being equipped with a C4I system, which essentially consists of a portable, touchscreen operated
computer and a hand-held radio set, which connects to higher command levels (platoon / company) and provides
the squad leader additional C2 features The main USaponry is the G36 assault rifle, modularly adapted to the
requirements of the “IdZ-ES”. Picatinny rails enable mounting of a variety of targeting and sighting devices for
acquiring targets in daylight, at night or in poor visibility.

140
sources familiar with the subject, most of these tanks will be upgraded to the level
A7, while the remaining ones can be used as platforms for engineering vehicles and
the like. However, it is unclear when the upgrading process will start. 170 The German
government in March 2015 has approved plans to increase defense spending by 6.2
% over the next five years — an extra €8 billion (US $8.5 billion) by 2019. In 2016,
the defense budget will rise by €1.2 billion to €34.2 billion.171 The extra funds will
allow the defense ministry to push ahead with plans to reform and expand its armed
forces as well as commit to a "widened NATO engagement," according to the draft
budget. That includes involvement in the NATO response force to the ongoing
conflict between Russia and Ukraine, which Merkel has warned could take a long
time to resolve. The The Federal Republic of Germany currently spends about 1.2 %
of GDP on defense — less than the 2 % recommended by NATO for members of the
alliance. The The Federal Republic of Germany is playing a leading role in the
buildup of NATO in eastern European Union directed against Russia. It will
participate in the newly established Very High Readiness Joint Task Force with up to
2,700 soldiers who can be made operational within a 48-hour period. Since the
beginning of this year, leadership of the Rapid Response Force (NRF) has rested
with the 1 German-Netherlands Corp in Münster. According to the official web site of
the German military, 4,000 German soldiers committed to the NRF were certified last
year as “combat ready.” At the core of the German troops of the NRF is Armored
Infantry Battalion 371 from Marienberg, which has been prepared for “treaty-obligated
deployment” since the end of 2013.

The NATO buildup in eastern European Union is not the only project to be
financed with the new funds. The German elite are constructing an army with which
they can defend their geostrategic and economic interests worldwide. Another point
in the key issues document is euphemistically called “additional expenditures globally
for investments in our future” and estimated to cost a further €300 million per year172

170
http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/land/vehicles/2015/12/17/Federal Republic of Germanys-army-
procures-new-boxer-armored-personnel-carriers/77491026/
171
ibidem
172
https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2015/03/20/bund-m20.html

141
 Figure

Source:

Under the approved the 2016 budget and financial planning cycle until 2019
on 1 July plans, the 2016 defense budget is to rise by 4.2% compared with 2015
levels. In total the planning cycle envisages a further EUR8 billion (USD8.9 billion)
being spent on defense over the 2015-2019 period.173 Spending on defense currently
stands at EUR32.947 billion for 2015, rising to EUR34.366 billion in 2016, and ending
the planning period at EUR35.176 billion in 2019.174 Meanwhile, to commemorate 60
years of German NATO membership on 30 June, German defense minister Ursula
von der Leyen pledged to support the NATO 2% of GDP defense spending guideline.
Current annual defense expenditure stands at about EUR33 billion, or 1.2% of
national GDP. Given current economic trends a German defense expenditure equal
to 2% of GDP would amount to EUR58 billion

Great Britain

Britain is still a formidable force—but it’s not the globe spanning juggernaught
that held a dozen civilizations under its thrall. The United Kingdom still maintains a
nuclear arsenal, but the missiles are supplied by the United States of America. It also

173
http://www.janes.com/article/52745/germany-to-increase-defense-spending
174
ibidem

142
needs the United States of America to conduct nuclear testing—should anyone ever
start such tests ever again. Meanwhile, Britain’s once mighty defense industrial base
is a shadow of its former self. The British aerospace industry that once produced the
Spitfire and Gloster Meteor are mostly gone. Instead, the U. K. must partner with the
USA and other European powers to build its hardware. Protecting the U. K. includes
having the capacity to deter and defeat military threats or incursions. Protection
encompasses the integrity of the U. K. , its territorial waters and airspace, and
provides support to other government departments (termed military aid to civil
authorities in matters of security and law enforcement. Military aid to civil authorities
may also involve limited manpower to assist local authorities during unforeseen
contingencies or more significant resources to assist the civil power in countering, for
example, terrorism. If a direct military threat to the U. K. mainland occurs, appropriate
forces (either national or with allies and partners) would be provided to confront the
specific threat and to deter further aggression. In most cases, it is anticipated that
any substantial threat to the U. K. would involve using armed forces in a large-scale
alliance or coalition operation. The U. K. also has recourse to strategic nuclear
systems. Under Chapter VII, Articles 43 and 45 of the UN Charter, all members are to
make available armed forces to contribute to maintaining international peace and
security. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council responsible for making
the decision to use armed force in response to threats to the peace, breaches of the
peace and acts of aggression, the U. K. has a particular responsibility to act.
Membership of NATO involves political obligations (under the terms of the
Washington Treaty) which may include assisting an ally, even if the U. K.’s security is
not directly threatened. Also (or alternatively) the EU may request member states to
take action (under the modified Brussels Treaty) in certain circumstances. Armed
forces may also be deployed as part of a multinational force in a wide variety of
operations as a result of decisions taken, and direction, given by the North Atlantic
Council or the EU Council of Ministers.

143
 Figure

Source: Reuters

Even its once world beating shipbuilding capability has atrophied to the point
where the U.K. was forced to ask General Dynamics to help build the Astute-class
submarine Today, Britain maintains a fleet of 19 surface combatants, four ballistic
missile subs and six attack boats. It also has an amphibious assault ship. But until
the Queen Elizabeth-class carriers are complete—it has no operational aircraft
carriers. The two new carriers will carry the American developed F-35B Joint Strike
Fighter175—but threatens to cannibalize the rest of the fleet due to their expense. The
British army is well trained and well equipped with Challenger 2 main battle tanks and

175
The F-35 Lightning II is a 5th Generation fighter, combining advanced stealth with fighter speed and agility,
fully fused sensor information, network-enabled operations and advanced sustainment. Three variants of the F-
35 will replace the A-10 and F-16 for the U.S. Air Force, the F/A-18 for the U.S. Navy, the F/A-18 and AV-8B
Harrier for the U.S. Marine Corps, and a variety of fighters for at least ten other countries. The F-35 and the F-22
are the world's two premier fighters, but there are some differences betUSen the aircraft. The F-35 is optimized
to be a multirole fighter, with the ability to perform air-to-air, air-to-ground and intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance (ISR) missions. While the F-22 is superior to the F-35 in air-to-air missions, the F-35’s air-to-air
capability is superior to all other fighters. The F-35 is better than any other fighter aircraft, including the F-22,
for air-to-ground strike missions.

144
Warrior fighting vehicles. It also flies the Apache gunship. British special operations
forces such as the Special Air Service are almost legendary and remain formidable176
The Royal Air Force has roughly 220 combat aircraft—about 120 Typhoon air
superiority fighters and 100 Tornado bombers. It will eventually get some number of
F-35B strike fighters. It also has AWACS and ground surveillance aircraft. It’s small
but well trained—but not what it used to be during Britain’s heyday.177

Figure

Source: http://www.armedforces.co.uk/European defense/edcountries/countryuk.htm#British Army

Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01, U. K. Defense Doctrine (U. K. DD) (5th

Edition) outlines the broad philosophy and principles underpinning how Defense is
employed. U. K. DD is the basis from which all other subordinate national doctrine is
derived.178 British national security encompasses the safety of our state and
protecting it from external and internal threats. It also requires us to Endeavour to
preserve the security of U. K. nationals living overseas. External threats may lead to
invasion, attack or blockade. Internal threats may include terrorism, subversion, civil
disorder, criminality, insurgency, sabotage and espionage. Other threats include
instability caused by financial crisis, climatic events, cyber or other forms of attack on
critical national infrastructure and the possibility of pandemic disease. Great Britain
cannot maintain security in isolation; therefore national security is both integrated
within, and dependent upon, all European neighbors’ and partners’ security.179

176
http://www.nationalinterest.org/feature/European Unions-4-deadliest-military-poUSrs-12214?page=2
177
HQ Air Command is located at RAF High Wycombe in Buckinghamshire. The Command was formed in
April 2007 following the merger of RAF Strike Command and RAF Personnel and Training Command. HQ Air
Command works with the MoD and PJHQ (Permanent Joint Headquarters) to provide the correct mix of
airpoUSr to various operational areas
178
The document basically provides an overview of strategy. It outlines concepts of security, national interests,
understanding and the link betUSen strategy and policy. Chapter 1 also describes the instruments of national
poUSr, crisis management and the levels of warfare.
179
See more Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01 U. K. Defense Doctrine; Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01 (JDP 0-
01) (5th Edition), dated November 2014, As a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, the U.

145
Collective security is an essential pillar of the U. K.’s overall security strategy. This is
promoted through our membership of NATO, close relationships with the USA and
French Republic, the Five Powers Defense Arrangement, and membership of major
international organizations such as the UN, EU and the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in European Union. The Government’s national security priorities are
decided using the National Security Strategy (NSS) and by Strategic Defense and
Security Reviews (SDSRs), both led by the NSC. The SDSR identifies the means
and ways across Government which are needed to deliver the ends described in the
NSS. The Government has committed to producing a new NSS and SDSR every five
years. Defense policy establishes the ends of military strategy and shapes the
structures and capabilities of Defense’s contribution to national objectives within
resource and other constraints. U. K. and Defense interests and objectives must be
articulated clearly to provide the baseline for making decisions. Defense strategy
constitutes Defense’s overall contribution to national strategy and is a subset of it. It
is a Department of State function, owned by the Secretary of State for Defense. Its
delivery is the joint responsibility of the Permanent under Secretary (PUS) and Chief
of the Defense Staff (CDS). National strategy articulates national policy objectives
and the routes by which government departments, in combination, will deliver them.
Defense strategy translates the responsibilities allocated to Defense to more specific
outcomes and the outputs required to deliver them.180 Military strategy is a subset of
Defense strategy. It directs the use of the military instrument where it has been
identified by the Government as part of a U. K. response to a specific challenge.
Military strategy is a strategic headquarters function, owned by CDS and led on his
behalf by Deputy Chief of the Defense Staff (Military Strategy and Operations). The
NSS and SDSR inform strategy formulation. The SDSR process is overseen by PUS
and CDS, supported by Vice Chief of the Defense Staff. This is closely coordinated
with other government departments and includes our contribution to reviewing the
National Security Risk Assessment every two years. Each SDSR outlines the main
parts of an affordable force structure, which is planned for delivery in ten years time,
based on planning assumptions. The SDSR generates a defense strategic direction

K. has an important role, and/or responsibility, in maintaining the international world order. To enhance mutual
international security and prosperity, the U. K. also seeks to extend its influence internationally by collaborating
on a broad agenda of issues and challenges. Our ability to project and employ our Armed Forces is one factor
within this multilateral system.
180
Defense strategy directs how Defense will develop over time based on the anticipated requirements of the
future operating environment, balanced against the reality of finite resources and the need to prioritise.

146
document, which translates the outcome into long-term planning direction. The
interpretation of this direction for the next five years, particularly in terms of allocating
resources, is set out in the Defense Plan.181

Sweden’s government and military maintain the official view that The
Federation of The Federation of Russia does not pose an immediate direct threat,
despite the Kremlin’s unpredictability regionally and the increased activity of The
Federation of Russia’s modernizing armed forces in the High North and Baltic Sea
areas. Sweden may not have a direct threat to their national security, but they do
need to prepare and plan for the future having Sweden in NATO would strengthen
security in the Baltic region. Having Sweden outside the alliance just increases
uncertainty. A Sweden in NATO would also give us more influence over the security
issues that concern us, and a place at the table where the decisions that affect us are
made. Sweden needs a road map for NATO membership, Sweden’s defense
command in March 2016 has responded to the growing unpredictability of a changed
security landscape in the greater Baltic Sea area by toughening up the Military
Strategy Doctrine (MSD) under which the Swedish Armed Forces (SAF) deals with
threats against the country’s sovereignty. The new doctrine shifts the emphasis of
national defense from a post-Cold War era strategy largely based on containment to
a more aggressive model that will deploy advanced weapons systems and modern
warfare forces as part of a "sustained" and coordinated high-impact strike against
attackers. The revised MSD formats a framework under which the defense of
Sweden can be conducted either "alone" or potentially in collaboration with
multinational Nordic, European Union or NATO forces. Sweden considers adopting a
Total Defense strategy that would extend the SAF’s mission-based mandate to
bolstering air-defense and anti-submarine capabilities, as well as cyber warfare
counterstrike technologies and capacities. This envisaged Total Defense structure
would run parallel to building closer bilateral and general defense cooperation
agreements with Nordic Defense (NORDEFCO) partner nations, including nonaligned
Finland and NATO-member states Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania Sweden has also moved to strengthen military partnerships with NATO, the
USA and the EU, as well as pursuing single interstate defense cooperation
agreements with neighborhood states like Republic of Poland.

181
https://www.gov.U. K. /government/publications/defense-plan-2010-2014

147
Chapter V Contemporary military strategy of the Federation of Russia

Russian views of NATO as the primary source of military threat to the Russian
The Federation.

NATO was founded to stop the spread of Communism in European Union. But
after the collapse of the USSR and the Republic of Poland Pact in 1991, the new
Russia sought to become close to the European Union. The Russian government
made unprecedented concessions to the European Union, including removing its
troops from European Union and handing over its military bases to the countries of
Eastern European Union. The European Union took this as a demonstration of
Russian weakness, rather than an offer of peace and partnership. The US wanted to
be the sole superpower and chose to ignore Russian interests. Washington saw
Russia as a source of cheap resources that it would like to control. In order to
achieve these goals, the US has consistently sought to weaken Russia’s influence in
the international system and in the post-Soviet space. NATO has brought its military
infrastructure up to Russia’s borders. As a result, the entire territory of European
Russia is under the threat of NATO air attack, with the time it would take NATO
assets to reach critical Russian infrastructure having been cut in half. This is why a
number of military facilities in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, Republic of Poland,
Romania and Bulgaria have been modernized to NATO standard since 2008.
Furthermore, NATO is organizing military equipment storage bases on the territory of
a number of East European states. This will allow NATO to rapidly deploy its first
response forces near our borders and also decrease the amount of time it will take
for additional forces to be transferred from the continental US and from Britain.
Support agreements signed with Finland and Sweden have legitimized the presence
of NATO forces on the territory of these countries and will allow the use of their
infrastructure for the transfer of coalition forces to northern European Union.182

NATO has increased its military strength in recent years, as the US has
provided modern arms to its East European allies, including JASSM LRCMs. This will
allow NATO to attack targets deep in Russian territory while avoiding Russian air
defenses. At the same time, the US is still trying to convince Russia that its strategic
missile defense systems do not present a threat to Russia while refusing to take into

182
https://russiamil.wordpress.com/tag/nato/

148
account that Standard-3 missiles could in the future be capable of intercepting
Russian ICBMs.

Figure

Source: http://www.ratical.org/radiation/NuclearExtinction/StevenStarr022815.html

Furthermore, the vertical launchers used by missile defense systems could

also be used to launch Tomahawk missiles. Since the start of the crisis in Ukraine,
NATO activity has become strongly anti-Russian in its nature. Under the banner of
countering Russian expansion, the alliance has systematically expanded its military
presence on Russia’s borders. At the present time, NATO has instituted a constant
rotational presence of military forces in Eastern European Union, including up to 30
combat aircraft, at least 300 pieces of armor, and more than 1500 US military
personnel. WE and other NATO navies have almost constant ship presence in the
Black Sea, while the frequency of reconnaissance aircraft flights have doubled
compared to 2013. Since January 2015, there have been regular flights by Global
Hawk UAVs over the Black Sea and in March they were expanded to include flights

149
over Ukrainian airspace. NATO exercise activity increased by 80% in 2014.183
Exercises such as Baltops and Sabre Strike were carried out next to Russia’s
borders and were openly anti-Russian in their nature. During these exercises, the
NATO forces group in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania included 10,000 personnel, 1500
pieces of armor, up to 80 aircraft, and around 50 combat ships. Five US strategic
bombers were also involved, deploying from airfields in the U. K. . . In the aftermath
of the Wales summit, NATO is planning additional increases in force structure for
next year, including a rapid response force of 30,000 personnel and a spearhead
force of 5,000 personnel that can be ready to deploy in 2-7 days. Ate deployment of
these forces will be organized by six command centers that will be established in
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania Republic of Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria. NATO’s
activity and intentions highlighted US efforts to turn NATO into an instrument
designed to contain Russia and ensure US global dominance and bringing NATO
infrastructure to Russia’s borders will allow its air attack forces to penetrate deep into
Russian territory, while reducing their response time, and in the future may allow the
US to counter Russian strategic deterrence forces. Russia will have to take measures
in response and argued that instead of mindlessly expanding NATO to include new
members that were not ready for membership and placing members’ armed forces
next to Russia’s borders, NATO should have been focusing on more significant
threats (such as Islamic extremism and terrorism).184

183
Ibidem
184
Russia is not looking to start a military standoff with the Euroepan nion or to threaten anyone. But they will
not allow anyone to use the language of force against us and will stand up for our national interests using all of
the means at Russia disposal

150
Figure

Source:

The military threats and dangers facing Russia in the contemporary period.
The European Union saw Russia’s efforts to stabilize the situation in Ukraine are in
the yeas of Russia unacceptable independence in standing up for its national
interests. This reaction was the cause of the increase in international tension over the
last year, as the European Union countries have sought to put political and economic
pressure on Russia in order to “put it in its place.” While many European Union
experts believe that the Ukraine crisis has led to a sudden and rapid collapse of world
order, the reality is that the situation has been developing since the start of the
1990s. The problems were caused by the collapse of the bipolar system, which
allowed the US to consider itself the winner of the Cold War and to attempt to build a
system in which it had total domination over international security. In such a system,
the US would decide unilaterally which countries could be considered democratic and
which were “evil empires,” which were freedom fighters and which terrorists and
separatists. In doing so, the US stopped considering the interests of other states and
would only selectively follow the norms of international public law. Russia has had to
respond to this threat and has done so in its new military doctrine, which strictly
follows international norms. The key points include using violent means only as a last
resort, using military force to contain and prevent conflicts, and preventing all (but

151
especially nuclear) military conflicts. At the same time, the doctrine states that the
current international security system does not provide for all countries to have
security in equal measure. In other words, Russian military leaders continue to feel
that Russian security is infringed by the current international security system and
imply that they would like to see it revised

The most significant threat facing Russia comes from NATO. In particular, he
highlights the threat from NATO enlargement to the east, noting that all 12 new
members added since 1999 were formerly either member of the Republic of Poland
Pact or Soviet republics. This process is continuing, with the potential future inclusion
of former Yugoslav republics and continuing talk of perspective Euroatlantic
integration of Ukraine and Georgia. Political arguments about creating single
European Union sharing common values have outweighed purely military and
security in enlargement discussions, with many new members added even though
they did not fulfill the economic and military criteria for membership. This expansion
has had a serious negative effect on Russia’s military security.

In addition to NATO enlargement, NATO has also expanded cooperation with

non-member countries in the region through programs such as the Partnership
Interoperability Initiative, which includes Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine among 24
priority countries for cooperation, and Privileged Partnership, which will allow NATO
to use infrastructure in Finland and Sweden to transfer troops to northern European
Union. Furthermore, NATO is actively seeking to increase its influence in Central
Asia and the Caucasus.

152
 Figure

Source:

NATO is using the crisis in Ukraine as an excuse to strengthen the forces it

has arrayed against Russia. It has openly blamed Russia for aggressive policies in
the post-Soviet space and has made containment of Russia the prime force for future
development of NATO. The decisions made at the Wales NATO summit in
September 2014 confirm this. While NATO military activity near Russia was relatively
stable through 2013, it has increased substantially over the last year. NATO states’
naval presence in the Black Sea has quadrupled, flights by reconnaissance and
tactical aviation have doubled, and flights by long range early warning aircraft have
increased by a factor of nine. US UAVs are flying over the Black Sea, while German
and Polish intelligence ships are constantly present in the Baltic. The number of
NATO exercises increased by 80% in 2014 compared to the previous year. The
character of these exercises has also changed. Whereas in the past they were
focused primarily on crisis response and counter-terrorism, now they are clearly
aimed at practicing military action against Russia. The action plan approved in Wales
included a significant increase in NATO military presence in Eastern European Union
and the Baltic’s, including a rapid reaction force and a constant presence of a limited
contingent of forces rotating through the region. This will allow a large number of
NATO military personnel to be trained to conduct operations against Russia. At the
153
same time, military infrastructure, including weapons storage facilities, is being built
up in Eastern European Union. Gerasimov argued that on the basis of all of these
developments, it is clear that efforts to strengthen NATO’s military capabilities are not
primarily defensive in nature. Russia views the development of these systems as yet
another move by the US and its allies to dismantle the existing international security
system on their way to world domination. Over the last four years, US BMD systems
have begun to appear near Russian borders, including Aegis-equipped ships in the
Mediterranean and Black Seas, Aegis Ashore systems in Romania and Republic of
Poland, and anti-missile systems being deployed in the Asia-Pacific region with
Japanese and South Korean cooperation. These forces present a real threat to
Russian strategic nuclear forces and could also strike Russian satellite systems.
Washington has so far refused to share command authority for global BMD systems,
even with its allies, making it clear that it alone will decide which NATO member
states it will defend from missile threats. Since Russia will have no choice but to take
counter-measures against global BMD systems, this may subject non-nuclear NATO-
member states to the risk of being early targets of Russian response measures.
What’s more, the deployment of anti-missile systems violates the INF treaty, since
the Aegis Ashore systems can be armed with Tomahawk cruise missiles as easily as
with SM-3 anti-missile systems.

154
 Figure

Source:

Russia is also concerned with the development of the concept of Prompt

Global Strike, which will also damage the strategic nuclear balance that currently
provides the main guarantee for international stability. In its efforts to “put Russia on
its knees,” Washington and its NATO partners continue to create crises in territories
on Russia’s borders. Having successfully carried out regime change scenarios under
the guise of colored revolutions in Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova, the US was able
to place anti-Russian governments in power in a number of states bordering Russia.
The radicals and Russophobes who came to power in Ukraine in 2014 have based
their policies on blaming Russia for all of Ukraine’s problems while persecuting the
country’s Russophobe population.

155
 Figure

Source: Reuters

They are now trying to use force to repress their own citizens who expressed a
lack of confidence in this new government. As a result, Ukraine has been plunged
into civil war. Gerasimov said that it is difficult to know how the conflict will end, since
“we don’t know what directives Ukrainian leaders will receive from their European
Union ‘curators’ and where Kiev’s aggression may be directed in the future.” But it is
clear that these actions pose a military threat to Russia, much as the Georgian
attacks on Russian peacekeepers in South Ossetia in 2008 did. Gerasimov also
noted that Mikheil Saakashvili, who ordered these attacks, is now an advisor to
Ukrainian President Poroshenko.

Russian reactions to the NATO summit

The NATO summit in Wales was treated in Russia with a great deal of
equanimity. The official reaction was quite predictable, with the Foreign Ministry
putting out statement that claimed that interfering in the affairs of foreign states was

156
part of NATO’s “genetic code” and flowed directly from the organization’s desperate
search for a role in the global security system after the end of the Cold War. The
ministry went on to claim that NATO policy is dictated by hawks in European Union
and the United States of America who have been “striving for military domination in
European Union.” Moreover, the statement claimed, these hawks have shown
themselves willing to prevent the emergence of a common Euro-Atlantic security
system and sacrifice international efforts to counter real threats such as terrorism,
drug trafficking, and WMD proliferation in order to achieve this end.
Figure

Source:http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/fnews/3237180/posts
The Foreign Ministry argued that the build-up of NATO presence near
Russia’s borders is part of a long-nurtured plan to strengthen the alliance’s forces in
the east to counter Russia, with the Ukraine crisis serving as an excuse to begin its

157
implementation. The statement continued, insisting that these plans, together with
announced plans for joint exercises with Ukrainian forces, will escalate tensions in
the region and forestall progress toward a peaceful settlement in Ukraine. The head
of the State Duma’s International Affairs Committee, Alexei Pushkov, stated that the
buildup of NATO rapid reaction forces in Republic of Poland and the Latvia,
Lithuania, Estonia is a hostile act towards Russia.
The The Federation of Russia military has suffered years of neglect after the
collapse of USSR and no longer casts the shadow of a global superpower. However,
the The Federation of Russia armed forces are in the midst of a historic overhaul
with significant consequences for European Union security. The Federation of Russia
officials perceived that the reforms are necessary to bring a Cold War-era military into
the twenty-first century, but many European Union analysts fear they will enable The
Federation of Russia to pursue a more aggressive foreign policy, often relying on
force to coerce its weaker neighbors.

Figure: Russian perception of the repetition of military glory

Source: Reuters

158
 The Federation Of Russian interventions in Georgia in 2008185 and Ukraine in
2014–2015—both former Soviet republics seeking closer ties to the European
Union—clearly shows that President Vladimir Putin and present military assistance
in Syria is prepared to use military might to reestablish The Federation of Russia
hegemony in its near abroad. Several successive revisions of military doctrine have
been promulgated since 1990. These have included the military doctrines of May
1992 (in draft form), November 1993, and January 2000, as well as the two National
Security Concepts of December 1997 and October 1999 in 2010, the Kremlin
enacted the State Armaments Program (SAP) for the period 2010-2020. The scope
of the program includes the purchase of high-tech European Union military
equipment and technologies such as Mistral. European Union countries sanctions in
response to The Federation of Russia’s alleged involvement in the war in Ukraine
war EU and US sanctions forbid The Federation of Russia corporations to have
commercial transactions with European Union companies.

The most important aspect of The Federation of Russia’s naval modernization

plan, however, was botched purchase of two French Mistral-class warships, which
were expected to be delivered from the Saint-Nazaire-based STX shipyard in north
European Union French Republic in 2014 and 2015.186 However, as part of the
recent European Union sanctions against The Federation of Russia, the French
government has decided to put the delivery of the ships until sold the ships to Egypt.
Russian military personnel are less well trained and have inferior equipment
compared to their NATO counterparts. Russia also lags behind in purely numerical
terms, with for example, fewer tanks or battleships than the United States of America
in particular; nuclear weapons are the only area where parity has been preserved.

On February 5th 2010 President Dmitry Medvedev introduced a new “military

strategy” intended to serve as the basis of defense policy for the next ten years.
Signed the Military Doctrine and the Principles of State Nuclear Deterrence Policy

185
although Russia was victorious in the Georgian war, the conflict highlighted numerous USaknesses in its
armed forces. Shortly afterwards, Anatoliy SerdyU. K. ov, who was appointed Defense Minister in 2007,
announced his 'New Look' reforms leading to a radical overhaul of the Russian military.
186
The purchase of French hardware was designed to increase The Federation of The Federation Of Russia’s
capacity to intervene in short and medium range theatres of conflict. See more Military Modernization and the
Russian Ground Forces, Thornton, R., in Russian Military: Ground
Force Modernization and Georgia War Lessons, Ed. Guardano A., 2012.

159
to 2020187 within the plane is testing sea-based Zircon hypersonic cruise missile.
Zircon missiles would be mounted on the newest fifth-generation nuclear-powered
Husky-class submarines. The Russian Navy’s nuclear-powered guided-missile
cruiser Pyotr Velikiy (Peter the Great) would also be armed with hypersonic cruise
missiles by 2022. The cruiser will be refitted with the brand new multirole 3S-14
vertical launch systems, which house three types of anti-ship missiles, including
Zircon, Onyx and Kalibr. Zircon will probably replace P-800 Onyx and Kalibr NK
missiles. Both have supersonic anti-ship capabilities, while Kalibr can cover long-
range distances of up to 4,000 kilometers and carry a 500kg warhead. The combat-
proven cruise missile was seen in action last year, when it was deployed against
Islamic State’s (IS, formerly ISIS/ISIL) defenses in Syria Russia is also actively
developing other hypersonic systems, such as BrahMos, a short-range ramjet missile
based on the P-800 Onyx. A joint Russian-Indian project, BrahMos is a portmanteau
formed from the names of two rivers, the Brahmaputra and the Moskva. Traveling at
speeds of Mach 2.8 to 3, it’s widely believed to be the world's fastest anti-ship cruise
missile in operation188 In addition An air-droppable missile defense complex is being
developed for Russia’s airborne forces to ensure that after landing, troops have the
means to secure the skies and prevent inbound airstrikes. The system will be the first
operating version of its kind in the world.

Russia’s airborne troops will soon have the means to effectively establish local
no-fly zones with the help of a mobile crawler-mounted Ptitselov (Fowler) air defense
complex, a hybrid of the well-known Pantsir-S1 (NATO designation SA-22
Greyhound) cannon-missile system mounted on an air-droppable BMD-4M armored
vehicle.189 Army has also on their disposal to beat up Yankees the RS-28 Sarmat -

187
Taking part in the meeting USre Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, The Federation Council Speaker Sergei
Mironov, State Duma Speaker Boris Gryzlov, Chief of Staff of the Presidential Executive Office Sergei
Naryshkin, Secretary of the Security Council Nikolai Patrushev, Deputy Prime Minister and Government Chief
of Staff Sergei Sobyanin, Defense Minister Anatoly SerdyU. K. ov, Interior Minister Rashid Nurgaliyev,
Director of the Federal Security Service Alexander Bortnikov, and Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service
Mikhail Fradkov.
188
Hypersonic USapons are missiles and aircraft capable of reaching speeds of Mach 5 and more – or five times
the speed of sound. They are extremely difficult to intercept due to their overwhelming speed and maneuvering
capabilities. Hypersonic technologies in general, used in USapons systems and prospective aircraft, USre seen by
experts as a game changer in future warfare.
189
The characteristics of Pantsir-S1 suggest it can engage targets at altitudes of 15 meters to 15km at a distance
of up to 20km. The Pantsir-S1’s missiles intercept airborne objects traveling at speeds of up to 1,000 m/s (3,600
km/h), meaning it is capable of downing any aircraft, cruise missile or drone. The complex also effectively
engages “smart” air bombs, and was specifically designed to take down assault helicopters using its two
independently-operated 30mm cannons. Its radar spots targets at a distance of up to 36km.

160
the newest heavy liquid-propelled intercontinental ballistic missile currently being
developed for the Russian military. It is to replace the old Soviet R-36M missiles,
dubbed ‘Satan’ by NATO, as the heavy silo-based component of the Russian nuclear
deterrence. It has been in development since 2009 and is scheduled to start
replacing the old ICBM’s in 2018. Sarmat warheads are to have advanced antimissile
countermeasures meant to beat the US ABM shield. Some speculations say they
would have a conventional hypersonic variant like the American Advanced
Hypersonic Weapon or the Chinese WU-14 and could be used as a precision
intercontinental weapon in a non-nuclear conflict. The Russian military plans to put
Sarmat in service in late 2018 and complete replacing older variants of Satan by
2020. To beat up the NATO enemy butts

Figure

Source: SIPRI

On December 26th 2014, The Federation of Russia President Vladimir Putin

signed an updated version of this military doctrine, which details new threats to
national security.190 The 2010 doctrine spoke of NATO's (illegal, according to The

190
The new policy is a revision of The Federation of The Federation Of Russia's last doctrine, published in
February 2010. The new version repeats much of the language of the old and largely follows the same basic
precepts Under the new doctrine, The Federation of The Federation Of Russia continues to develop and
modernize its nuclear capability. "The Federation of The Federation Of Russia reserves the right to use nuclear
USapons in response to the use of nuclear and other types of USapons of mass destruction against it or its allies,

161
Federation of Russia) intent to develop a global role and capabilities, to deploy
military infrastructure near The Federation of Russia's borders, and to continue to
expand. The 2010 doctrine described The Federation of Russia's most important task
as the prevention of nuclear and other war. The 2014 doctrine, in comparison to its
predecessor, stands out for emphasizing domestic threats to national security. Such
threats include destabilization of the political situation, including terrorist activities as
well as outside political influence on The Federation of Russia’s population Changes
made since the 2010 version explain The Federation of Russia’s vital concerns vis-a-
vis its neighborhood, which are discussed under both headings of military dangers
and military threats. The implication of the latter is to show potential adversaries,
including NATO, that intervention in The Federation of Russia’s neighborhood could,
in certain circumstances, be interpreted by The Federation of The Federation of
Russia as a casus belli it sends European Union powers the message that The
Federation of Russia’s neighborhood should be regarded as its sphere of influence,
which The Federation Of The Federation of Russia is ready to defend, if necessary
by all means. The implicit concern in the doctrine over the threat to Kremlin-friendly
regimes in neighboring states is like a modern version of the Brezhnev doctrine,
where direct military intervention is camouflaged by hybrid war-type activity.191 The
Federation of Russia’s new military doctrine can be considered a component of a
“swaggering” strategy towards NATO and the European Union (EU). Swaggering in
international relations is usually expressed in displaying a country’s military power at
military exercises and parades and buying from foreign states the most prestigious
weapons available The Federation of The Federation of Russia promises to oppose
the efforts of others to “attain military superiority” by deploying missile defenses,
space weapons, or strategic conventional precision weapons. It calls for an
agreement, under UN auspices, to regulate the use of space. It states that “actions
aimed at violent change of the The Federation of Russia constitutional order,
destabilization of the political and social environment and disruption of the functioning
of governmental bodies, crucial civilian and military facilities and informational
infrastructure of The Federation of Russia” are a major threat deriving from these

and also in case of aggression against The Federation of The Federation Of Russia with the use of conventional
USapons when the very existence of the state is threatened
191
The successful use of hybrid tactics in Crimea and to an extent in eastern Republic of Ukrainehas been the
Kremlin’s most successful military endeavour in the past two decades for those states that The Federation of The
Federation Of Russia considers to be a part of its sphere of vital interests
http://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=830

162
sources.192 The The Federation of Russia military document states that there are
"many regional conflicts which remain unresolved. There is a tendency to force their
resolution, including those which are in the regions bordering the The Federation of
Russia The Federation. The existing architecture of the international security system
does not provide an equal level of security to all states." Other threats to The
Federation of Russia’s security and the global security system listed are actions
aimed at undermining global and regional stability, not least by hampering the work of
The Federation of Russia systems of state and military rule, and those aimed at
disrupting the functioning of strategic nuclear forces, missile attack early warning,
antimissile defense and space monitoring systems and their combat stability, nuclear
munitions storage facilities, nuclear power generation, nuclear and chemical
industries and “other potentially dangerous installations.”

In response to efforts by NATO to extend air and anti-missile defense

coverage over European Union, the document enables the joint setting up of missile
defense systems by The Federation of The Federation of Russia and allied countries,
which was not possible under the previous doctrine. The document says these efforts
by NATO states are "undermining global stability and violating the balance of power
in the nuclear-missile sphere." In references to the ongoing military conflict in
Ukraine, where The Federation Of The Federation of Russia is backing pro-The
Federation of Russia rebels in the country's east against the government in Kiev, the
document explicitly identifies "the expansion of NATO's military potential on the The
Federation of Russia border" as a security threat,193 which requires development of
new conventional compatibilities of Both in terms of troops and weapons, The
Federation of Russia conventional forces dwarf those of its Eastern European and
Central Asian neighbors, many of which are relatively weak ex-Soviet republics
closely allied with The Federation of Russia. The Federation of The Federation of

192
http://neUSasternEuropean Union.eu/articles-and-commentary/1559-The Federation of The Federation Of
Russia-s-revised-military-doctrine-putin-s-posturing-and-swaggering Военная доктрина Российской
Федерации является одним из основных документов стратегического планирования в Российской
Федерации и представляет собой систему официально принятых в государстве взглядов на подготовку
к вооруженной защите и вооруженную защиту Российской Федерации.Положения Военной доктрины
могут уточняться с изменением характера военных опасностей и военных угроз, задач в области
обеспечения военной безопасности и обороны, а также условий развития Российской Федерации.
193
The sanctions imposed on The Federation of The Federation Of Russia by the Euroepan nion following its
annexation of Republic of U. K. raine's Crimean peninsula, including those hampering imports and exports of
military gear, are another major factor contributing to The Federation Of The Federation Of Russia's drive
toward closer cooperation with the remaining four BRICS states, local analysts say.

163
Russia has a military pact with Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and
Tajikistan through the Collective Security Treaty Organization, formed in 1992. The
Federation of Russia also stations troops in the region: Armenia (3,300), Georgia's
breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (7,000), Moldova's separatist
Transnistria region (1,500), Kyrgyzstan (500), Tajikistan (5,000), and Crimea
(20,000).

Figure

Source: http://www.cfr.org/The Federation of Russian-the Federation/The Federation of Russian-

military/p33758

As part of defense reforms, most The Federation of Russia ground forces are
to be professionalized and reorganized into formations of a few thousand troops for
low- and medium-intensity conflicts. But for the foreseeable future many will remain
one-year conscripts with limited training (military service is compulsory for The
Federation of Russia men aged eighteen to twenty-seven). The Airborne Assault
Forces, which comprises about thirty-five thousand troops and whose commander
answers directly to Putin, is The Federation of Russia's elite crisis-reaction force. A
Special Operations Command, also a reserve of Putin, was created in 2013 to
manage special operators outside The Federation of Russia borders. As a response,
the doctrine calls for developing cooperation with other BRICS countries, which

164
stands for Brazil, The Federation of Russia, India,194 The People’s Republic of China
and South Africa. The document points to this as one of the "main tasks of the The
Federation of Russia The Federation to contain and prevent armed conflicts." "The
Federation of The Federation of Russia has always intended to have a more
sustained and fully structured cooperation between all the BRICS countries …. while,
at the same time, a number of security topics are much more ripe and relevant to
deal with not within BRICS, but, rather, within other formats [of The Federation of
Russia's international cooperation], To counter this perceived unequal level of
security, The Federation of Russia's new doctrine explicitly allows The Federation Of
The Federation of Russia and allied nations to jointly set up missile defense
systems. This new focus is likely aimed at the US's past plans of developing a missile
shield based in Republic of Poland, a The Federation of Russia neighbor and a
former member of the ex Soviet-led Republic of Poland Pact In addition, the 2014
doctrine highlights for the first time the deterrent capacity of The Federation of
Russia's conventional weapons (as opposed to only its nuclear arsenal) The
document reiterates that The Federation of The Federation of Russia has the right to
use nuclear weapons if the existence of the country or its allies is threatened by
WMDs or even conventional weapons attack. It also states that The Federation of
The Federation of Russia has every reason to be confident in the deterrence
capabilities of its strategic nuclear arsenal. The Federation of Russia's vast nuclear
arsenal remains on par with the United States of America and is the country's only
residual great power feature, according to military analysts. The Federation of The
Federation of Russia keeps about 1,500 strategic warheads on deployed
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarines, and heavy bombers. These
numbers comply with the so-called New START treaty, which came into force
February 2011.

194
"[T]he strategic partnership betUSen the two countries remains critical for India's defense needs, especially
now that India has permitted foreign direct investments in the defense sector, up to [a share of] 49 %. Until 2013,
India [represented] 38 % of The Federation of The Federation Of Russia's major USapons exports, with The
Federation Of The Federation Of Russia supplying 75 % of India's imports of major USapons,"

165
 Figure

Source: http://fas.org/category/russia/page/3/
The data show that Russia increased its deployed launchers by 25 from 473 to
498, and the warheads attributed to those launchers increased by 112 from 1,400 to
1,512 compared with the previous count in September 2013. During the same period,
the United States of America decreased its number of deployed launchers by 31 from
809 to 778, and the warheads attributed to those launchers decreased by 103 from
1,688 to 1,585. The Federation of The Federation of Russia is also believed to have
a few thousand nonstrategic nuclear weapons, which are lower-yield munitions that
can be deployed and used on the battlefield. The Federation of The Federation of
Russia leaned on its nuclear deterrent as its conventional force languished in the
years after the Soviet collapse. In 2000, The Federation of The Federation of Russia
lowered its nuclear threshold, permitting the use of atomic weapons in response to
conventional attacks that pose an existential threat. (By comparison, Soviet doctrine
had reserved nuclear weapons for use only in retaliation for a nuclear attack.) The
most recent military doctrine, approved in December 2014, reaffirmed the post-2000
policy. Much of the The Federation of Russia nuclear deterrent is being modernized:
A new class of ballistic missile submarine is coming into service; some strategic
bombers are being upgraded; and there are plans to replace all Soviet-era ICBMs
over the next decade or so. The Federation of Russia's new doctrine has explicitly
called for expanding a military presence in the Arctic. The Federation of The

166
Federation of Russia is training a commando detachment specifically for Arctic
warfare with a second Arctic-warfare brigade scheduled for 2017. The Federation of
The Federation of Russia is also constructing an additional 13 airfields and ten air-
defense radar stations. This cold-weather construction boom will "permit the use
of larger and more modern bombers,

Figure
Competing territorial claims in the Arctic region

Source: http://www.businessinsider.com/The Federation of Russia-has-a-new-military-doctrine-2015-1

The third leg of The Federation of Russia's new doctrine is the cultivation of
closer ties with the fellow BRICS nations — Brazil, India, People’s Republic of China,
and South Africa. The India-The Federation of The Federation of Russia relationship
is indicative of the relationship The Federation of The Federation of Russia would like
to cultivate with the other BRICS. On July 2016 the meeting took place on board
the frigate Admiral of the Soviet Navy Gorshkov. Participants included Deputy Prime
Minister Dmitry Rogozin, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, Commander of the Navy
Viktor Chirkov, and Commander of the European Union Military District Anatoly

167
Sidorov.195 The Marine Doctrine covers four functional areas and six regional areas.
The four functional areas are naval activity, marine transport, marine science,
and mineral resources development. The six regional areas are the Atlantic, Arctic,
Pacific, Caspian, and Indian Ocean, and we have added Antarctica, as a fair number
of events involving Antarctica have taken place of late and this region is
of considerable interest to The Federation of Russia... The main focus is on two
areas: the Arctic and the Atlantic. The reasons for this are the following. We
emphasize the Atlantic because NATO has been developing actively of late
and coming closer to our borders, and The Federation of The Federation of Russia is
of course responding to these developments. The second reason is that Crimea
and Sevastopol have been reunited with The Federation of The Federation of Russia
and we need to take measures for their rapid integration into the national economy.
Of course, we are also restoring The Federation of Russia’s naval presence
in the Mediterranean. As for the Arctic, several events motivate our decision. One is
the growing importance of the North Sea Route. Mr. President, I reported to you that
we have begun work on building a new fleet of atomic-powered icebreakers. Three
new atomic icebreakers will be ready for work accompanying ships along
the northern route in 2017, 2019, and 2020. Furthermore, the Arctic also assures us
free and unhindered access to the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. Then there are
the riches of the continental shelf, the development of which calls for an attentive
approach.

The State Armament Program for 2016–2025.

The The Federation of Russia government started drafting the 2016–2025 State
Armament Program in 2013. It will be the fifth big state program in this area in the last 20
years. The the Federation of Russia decided to establish a targeted program system that
makes it possible to substantially increase our defense and security agencies’ combat
and technical capability, overcome the economic crisis signs in the defense industry and put
the sector on a steady growth and modernization track. A total of 2.5 trillion rubles [more
than $67 billion] was allocated over 2001–2010, but already was allocated more than
20 trillion rubles for the current 2011–2020 program, and a further 3 trillion rubles was

195
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50060

168
allocated as targeted investment in defense industry companies.196 ”Over these
coming years we must achieve breakthrough development of all components of high-
precision weapons, develop unified models of general use weapons and equipment,
and provide the Navy with new ships that are universal with regard to weapons,
command and communications systems. The United States of America unilaterally
withdrew from the ABM Treaty a few years ago and is now busy building a missile
defense system. We have not seen any progress in the negotiations in this area so
far. What’s more, they are building missile defense systems in European Union
and in Alaska, in other words, close to our borders. They are working on the theory
of the so-called prompt global strike, and there are other things that are cause
for concern too. ”Concerning our plans to replace imports, we do not intend
to artificially break off cooperation with our partners abroad, but we do need to take
into account the existing risks. Our industry must be ready to produce the needed
equipment, parts and materials, and it must have the required production facilities,
technology, research and development work

In September 2015 Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy YatsenyU. K. said that

the country’s new draft military doctrine is the first in Ukraine’s history to clearly
identify The Federation of The Federation of Russia as an enemy and an
aggressor.197 According to the prime minister, Ukraine is currently modernizing its
armed forces, and its military objectives include "maintaining mutual relations
between our American partners and the Ukrainian Armed Forces," and upgrading
Ukraine’s naval capabilities with the construction of four new corvettes. YatsenyU. K.
said that the country’s government aims to intensify joint military activities to "turn the
Black Sea into a safe area and to make the The Federation of Russia The
Federation, which illegally annexed Crimea, realize that any illegal actions will be
curbed by our joint efforts.” 198

196
US proposed making changes to the Marine Doctrine adopted back in 2001 for the period through to 2020
for two reasons: above all, the changing international situation; and, of course, strengthening The Federation of
The Federation Of Russia’s position as a sea poUSr.
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/46589
197
http://www.realcleardefense.com/2015/09/05/ukraine039s_new_military_doctrine_273805.html
198
Vice Admiral James Foggo, commander of the US 6th Fleet, and US Ambassador to Ukraine Geoffrey R.
Pyatt took part in the ceremony, during which they visited a Ukrainianvessel and the Arleigh Burke-class guided
missile destroyer USS Donald Cook, the statement said. "We feel as one force with our partners, NATO
[member] states, with our American partners. Therefore, the American ships have entered and will enter the
Ukrainian territorial waters in the future. We will continue our joint exercise

169
Chapter V Contemporary military strategy of People’s Republic of China

The People’s Republic of The People’s Republic of China (PRC) continues to

pursue a long-term, comprehensive military modernization program designed to
improve its armed forces’ capacity to fight short-duration, high-intensity regional
conflicts. Preparing for potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait remains the focus and
primary driver of People’s Republic of China’s military investment; however, the PRC
is increasing its emphasis on preparations for contingencies other than Taiwan, such
as contingencies in the East The People’s Republic of China Sea and South The
People’s Republic of China Sea. People’s Republic of China’s military modernization
has the potential to reduce core USA military technological advantages. People’s
Republic of China’s officially-disclosed military budget grew at an average of 9.5 %
per year in inflation-adjusted terms from 2005 through 2014, and The People’s
Republic of China will probably sustain defense spending growth at comparable
levels for the foreseeable future. Moreover, The People’s Republic of China is
investing in capabilities designed to defeat adversary power projection and counter
third-party —including USA—intervention during a crisis or conflict

Figure

Source: OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and
Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of People’s Republic of China

170
 A Chinese military has warned that The People’s Republic of China must be
prepared for war in the Korean Peninsula, but not to sacrifice as much as it did in the
1950s, therefore The People’s Republic of China must take strong counter measures
as it faced various threats, and must adjust the force deployment along northeastern
borders and prepare militarily and diplomatically for all potential risks as soon as
possible. The threats named by military authorities — besides Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea ’s tests — included the United States of America’ decision to send
an aircraft carrier, strategic bombers and nuclear submarines to South Korean and
Japanese bases, and the deployment of an anti-ballistic missile system in South
Korea. The People’s Republic of China start planning to deal with potential cross-
border nuclear pollution were the US, Japan or South Korea to strike Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea n nuclear facilities, as well as to prepare for a massive
influx of refugees or guerrillas from the North.

Figure

Source: Military balance 2013

171
 During 2015, and continuing in 2006 the PLA continued to improve its
capabilities for theater contingencies, including: cruise missiles; short- and medium-
range ballistic missiles; high performance aircraft; integrated air defense; information
operations; and amphibious and airborne assault. The PLA is developing and testing
new intermediate- and medium-range conventional ballistic missiles, as well as long-
range, land-attack, and anti-ship cruise missiles that extend People’s Republic of
China’s operational reach, attempting to push adversary forces—including the United
States of America—farther from potential regional conflicts. At its September 2015
military parade commemorating the 70th anniversary of victory in the Second World
War, The People’s Republic of China showed several new or upgraded ballistic-
missile systems for the first time. The appearance of weapons including the DF-26
intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) and the DF-5B (US reporting name: CSS-
4 Mod. 3) liquid-fuelled intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) served as a reminder
that Beijing is continuing to make significant strides in ballistic-missile research and
development (R&D).199

Given the lack of transparency concerning People’s Republic of China’s

strategic weapons, there has been long-standing uncertainty over the nature of its
strategic R&D projects, whether it was capable of bringing them all to fruition and
what impact these programmers would have on the structure and capability of the
country’s nuclear forces. The limited deployment of the DF-31A (CSS-10) ICBM and
long-running difficulties with the JL-2 (CSS-NX-14) submarine-launched ballistic-
missile (SLBM) programmed, for example, served to underscore this caution.

199
https://www.iiss.org/en/publications/military%20balance/issues/the-military-balance-2016-d6c9/People’s
Republic of Chinas-ballistic-missiles-da5b See e. g. David Gompert and Terrence Kelly, “Escalation Cause:
How the Pentagon’s New Strategy Could Triggesr War with People’s Republic of China,” Foreign Policy
Magazine,
August 2, 2013,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/08/02/escalation_cause_air_sea_battle_People’s Republic of China;
T. X. Hammes, “Why the People’s Republic of China Military Strategy Debate Matters,” The National Interest,
January 13, 2014,
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/debating-military-
strategy-towards-People’s Republic of China-9692;
David Kearn, Jr., “Air-Sea Battle and People’s Republic of China’s Anti-Access and Area Denial Challenge,”
Orbis 58 (1) (2014) Ronald O’Rourke, “People’s Republic of China Naval Modernization: Implications for USA
Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, February 28, 2014,
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33153.pdf, pp

172
 In recent years, however, it has become increasingly clear that The People’s
Republic of China continues to make headway in the technical ambition of its
strategic systems. The JL-2, successor to People’s Republic of China’s first SLBM,
the JL-1, is on the brink of a first operational deployment on board one of the
People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Jin-class ballistic-missile submarines,
according to the US Office of Naval Intelligence. The US Department of Defense
(DoD) also claimed in its 2015 annual assessment of Chinese military capability that
the DF-5B ICBM had been deployed with a multiple independently targetable re-entry
vehicle (MIRV) capability. The People’s Republic of China is also focusing on
counter-space, offensive cyber operations, and electronic warfare capabilities meant
to deny adversaries the advantages of modern warfare. As the United States of
America builds a stronger foundation for a military-to-military relationship with
People’s Republic of China, it must also continue to monitor People’s Republic of
China’s evolving military strategy, doctrine, and force development, and encourage
The People’s Republic of China to be more transparent about its military
modernization program. In concert with its allies and partners, the United States of
America will continue adapting its forces, posture, and operational concepts to
maintain a stable and secure Asia-Pacific security environment.200

In order to offset rising demand and ensure both economic growth and its own
long-term survival, People’s Republic of China's Communist Party-led government
has "constructed or invested in energy projects in more than 50 countries," the
Department of Defense's 2015 report on the Chinese military notes. This has enabled

200
Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of People’s
Republic of China April 2015, p. 6 and ff; See e. g. Jonathan W. Greenert and Norton A. Schwartz, “Breaking
the Kill Chain: How to Keep America in the Game When Our Enemies are Trying to Shut Us Out,” Foreign
Policy Magazine, May 16, 2013,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/05/16/breaking_the_kill_chain_air_sea_battle
Steven Willis, “What if the USA Gave an ‘Air-Sea Battle’ and No One Came to Fight?” Center for International
Maritime Security, February 15, 2014
http://cimsec.org/u-sgave-airsea-battle-one-came-fight/
Richard A. Bitzinger and Michael Raska, “The AirSea Battle Debate and the Future of Conflict in East Asia,” S.
Rajaratnam School of International Studies Policy Brief (Singapore: Nanyang Technological University, 2013),
Andrew Erickson, Testimony during Q&A Session before the Senate Armed Services Committee on SeapoUSr
and Projection Forces, Dec. 11, 2013,
http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/2013/12/u-s-asia-pacific-strategic-considerations-relatedto-p-l-a-
naval-forces-modernization

173
The People’s Republic of China to import approximately 60 % of its oil supply in 2014
as well as about 32% of its natural gas supply.201

Figure

Source: Reuters

The People’s Republic of China imports at least 51% of its oil from the Middle
East. Approximately 43% of this oil has to pass through the Strait of Hormuz while
82% of all Chinese maritime oil imports must pass through the Strait of Malacca.
Both of these checkepoints are vital to global maritime traffic and susceptible to
potential conflict. In the midst of the 1980s Iran-Iraq War, Iran essentially closed
off the Strait of Hormuz against any maritime traffic it considered suspicious, which
lead to a brief US military engagement with Tehran in Persian Gulf. The Iranian
navy harassed two foreign-flagged vessels in the Strait in April, including a US-
flagged ship. Meanwhile, the Strait of Malacca has become a global piracy hotspot.

201
Such reliance on energy imports puts People’s Republic of China in a potentially uncomfortably position,
whereas oil and gas imports are a life-and-death matter for People’s Republic of China's rulers, meaning they
need a military strategy to defend crucial energy chokepoints.

174
With 82% of its maritime oil imports and 30% of its maritime natural gas imports
passing through here, Beijing is eager to develop more reliable alternate routes for
energy imports. This may be an especially urgent need around the Strait of Malacca,
which opens into the increasingly tense South The People’s Republic of China
Sea.202 The People’s Republic of China possesses the most rapidly maturing space
program in the world and is using its on-orbit and ground-based assets to support its
national civil, economic, political, and military goals and objectives. The People’s
Republic of China has invested in advanced space capabilities, with particular
emphasis on satellite communication (SATCOM), intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR), satellite navigation (SATNAV), and meteorology, as well as
manned, unmanned, and interplanetary space exploration. In addition to its on-orbit
assets, People’s Republic of China’s space program has built a vast ground
infrastructure supporting spacecraft and space launch vehicle (SLV) manufacture,
launch, C2, and data downlink. The PLA continues to strengthen its military space
capabilities, which includes advances with the Beidou navigation satellite system and
space surveillance capabilities that can monitor objects across the globe and in
space. The People’s Republic of China is seeking to utilize space systems to
establish a real-time and accurate surveillance, reconnaissance, and warning
system, and to enhance command and control in joint operations.

People’s Republic of China’s leaders routinely emphasizes the goal of

reaching critical economic and military benchmarks by 2020. In 2015, Beijing
introduced the ambitious first wave of Chinese President Xi Jinping's comprehensive
plan for military reform. The changes — which include a more powerful strategic
weaponry command, a new ground force headquarters and an organization called
the Strategic Support Force — are the culmination of a decade long effort to improve
the People's Liberation Army (PLA) As of Dec. 31, 2015, what had been the Second
Artillery Corps and in command of People’s Republic of China's nuclear and
conventional strategic missiles, was reorganized as the PLA Rocket Force. It
received an upgrade in organizational standing, from an "independent arm" (on the
same level as an intra-service branch such as the infantry) to a full service, on par

202
Republic of China naval aspirations, which include the construction of additional aircraft carrier groups, are
meant to project Chinese hard power into the navigation routes most important to the country's energy trade.

175
with the navy and air force — and for the first time, the army. This increases the
importance and heft of the Rocket Force when it comes to military decision-making.
In addition, all legs of People’s Republic of China's nuclear triad, including
submarine-launched ballistic missiles and strategic bombers, are reportedly unified
under the PLA Rocket Force's command — a responsibility the Second Artillery
Corps never held. Gen. Wei Fenghe, who had been the Second Artillery Corps
commander, is serving as the PLA Rocket Force commander. Given that the force
conducted missile drills early in the New Year, it seems likely that most of the Second
Artillery's organizational structure has been maintained — at least to the point where
normal operations are not significantly affected.203 The People's Liberation Army
reportedly plans to consolidate the functions of the Four General Departments into a
single Joint Staff Department. If this is the case, the amalgamation of the military
regions and their staffs will likely be implemented in the year ahead. Additionally, a
military reform guideline issued by the Central Military Commission stipulates that in
2016, People’s Republic of China's military will eliminate 300,000 personnel, improve
the quality of combat personnel and military education, and reform domestic security
forces.

203
https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/People’s Republic of China-takes-bold-steps-toward-military-reform

176
 Figure

Source: Strafor

These benchmarks include successfully restructuring the economy to maintain

growth and increase the quality of life of People’s Republic of China’s citizens to
promote stability; making major progress in military modernization; and attaining the
capability to fight and win potential regional conflicts, including those related to
Taiwan, protection of sea lines of communication (SLOCs), defense of territorial
claims in the South The People’s Republic of China Sea and East The People’s
Republic of China Sea, and the defense of European Union borders. Statements by
Chinese leaders indicate that, in their view, the development of a modern military is
necessary for The People’s Republic of China to achieve great power status. These
statements also indicate that People’s Republic of China’s leadership views a
modern military as a critical deterrent to prevent actions by outside powers that could
damage People’s Republic of China’s interests, or allow The People’s Republic of
China to defend itself against such actions, should deterrence fail. The People’s
Republic of China is investing in military programs and weapons designed to improve

177
extended-range power projection, anti-access and area denial (A2/AD), and
operations in emerging domains such as cyberspace, space, and the electro-
magnetic spectrum. Current trends in People’s Republic of China’s weapons
production will enable the PLA to conduct a range of military operations in Asia far
from People’s Republic of China’s traditional territorial claims. Key systems that
either have been deployed or are in development include ballistic missiles (including
anti-ship variants), anti-ship and land-attack cruise missiles, nuclear submarines,
modern surface ships, and an aircraft carrier.

Figure

Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security
Developments Involving the People’s Republic of People’s Republic of China

The People’s Republic of China’s nuclear weapons policy prioritizes

maintaining a nuclear force able to survive an attack and respond with sufficient
strength to inflict unacceptable damage on an enemy. A new generation of mobile

178
missiles, with warheads consisting of MIRVs and penetration aids, are intended to
ensure the viability of People’s Republic of China’s strategic deterrent in the face of
continued advances in USA and, to a lesser extent, Russian strategic ISR, precision
strike, and missile defense capabilities. Similarly, India’s nuclear force is an additional
driver behind People’s Republic of China’s nuclear force modernization. The PLA has
deployed new command, control, and communications capabilities to its nuclear
forces. These capabilities improve the Second Artillery Force’s ability to command
and control multiple units in the field. Through the use of improved communications
links, the ICBM units now have better access to battlefield information, uninterrupted
communications connecting all command echelons, and unit commanders are able to
issue orders to multiple subordinates at once, instead of serially, via voice
commands. People’s Republic of China’s nuclear arsenal currently consists of 50-60
ICBMs, including the silo-based CSS-4 Mod 2 and Mod 3(DF-5); the solid-fueled,
road-mobile CSS-10 Mod 1 and Mod 2 (DF-31 and DF-31A); and the more limited
range CSS-3 (DF-4). This force is complemented by liquid-fueled CSS-2
intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM) and road-mobile, solid-fueled CSS-5
(DF-21) MRBM for regional deterrence missions.204 The People’s Republic of China
continues to produce the JIN-class SSBN, with four commissioned and another under
construction. The JIN will eventually carry the CSS-NX-14 (JL-2) SLBM with an
estimated range of 7,400 km. Together these will give the PLA Navy its first credible
long-range sea-based nuclear capability. JIN SSBNs based at Hainan Island in the
South The People’s Republic of China Sea would then be able to conduct nuclear
deterrence patrols – The People’s Republic of China will probably send out the first in
2016.

204
Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of People’s
Republic of China April 2015, p. 40 and ff See e.g. Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security
Developments Involving the People’s Republic of People’s Republic of China 2013 (Washington: DoD, 2013);
The People’s Liberation Army Navy: A Modern Navy with Chinese Characteristics (Suitland, MD: Office of
Naval Intelligence [ONI], 2009), Gregory Kulacki, “Is January Chinese ASAT Testing Month?” All Things
Nuclear, Insights on Science and Security, 4 January 2013, http://allthingsnuclear.org/is-january-chinese-asat-
testing-month/; People’s Republic of China: PLA Activities Report 16–31 Oct 2012 (Washington: DoD, 31
October 2012), OSC ID: CPP20121120440020; “People’s Republic of China Dismisses Report on Planned Test
Launch of Anti-Satellite Missile,” Xinhua, 25 October 2012, OSC ID: CPP20121025968325; and Bill Gertz,
“People’s Republic of China to Shoot at High Frontier,” Washington Free Beacon, 16 October 2012,
http://freebeacon.com/People’s Republic of China-to-shoot-at-high-frontier/.

179
 Figure

Source: https://thaimilitaryandasianregion.wordpress.com/2015/12/page/4/

The People’s Republic of China is fielding an array of conventionally armed

ballistic missiles (The People’s Republic of China currently has at least 1,200), as
well as ground- and air-launched LACMs, SOF, and cyber warfare capabilities to hold
targets at risk throughout the region. USA bases in Japan are in range of a growing
number of Chinese MRBMs as well as a variety of LACMs. Guam could also possibly
be targeted by air-launched LACMs. Chinese LACM and ballistic missiles have also
become far more accurate and are now more capable against adversary air bases,
logistic facilities, communications, and other ground-based infrastructure. Chinese
military analysts have concluded that logistics and power projection are potential
vulnerabilities in modern warfare, given the requirements for precision in coordinating
transportation, communications, and logistics networks. The People’s Republic of
China has made efforts to go beyond defense from aircraft and cruise missiles to
gain a BMD capability in order to provide further protection of People’s Republic of
China’s mainland and strategic assets. People’s Republic of China’s existing long-
range SAM inventory offers limited capability against ballistic missiles. New
indigenous radars, the JL-1A and JY-27A, are designed to address the ballistic
missile threat, with the JL-1A advertised as capable of precision tracking of multiple
ballistic missiles. People’s Republic of China’s SA-20 PMU2 SAMs, one of the most

180
advanced SAM Russia offers for export, has the advertised capability to engage
ballistic missiles with ranges of 1,000 km and speeds of 2,800 meters per second
(m/s). People’s Republic of China’s domestic CSA-9 long-range SAM system is
expected to have a limited capability to provide point defense against tactical ballistic
missiles with ranges up to 500 km. The People’s Republic of China is proceeding
with the research and development of a missile defense umbrella consisting of kinetic
energy intercept at ego-atmospheric altitudes (greater than 80 km), as well as
intercepts of ballistic missiles and other aerospace vehicles within the upper
atmosphere

Figure

Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security
Developments Involving the People’s Republic of People’s Republic of China

The People’s Republic of China is working on a range of technologies to

attempt to counter USA and other countries’ ballistic missile defense systems,
including maneuverable reentry vehicles (MaRV), MIRVs, decoys, chaff, jamming,
and thermal shielding. The United States of America and The People’s Republic of
China acknowledge that the Chinese tested a hypersonic glide vehicle in 2014.

181
People’s Republic of China’s official media also cites numerous Second Artillery
Force training exercises featuring maneuver, camouflage, and launch operations
under simulated combat conditions, which are intended to increase survivability.

The People’s Republic of China has increasing numbers of advanced long-

range SAMs, including its indigenous CSA-9 (HQ-9), Russian SA-10 (S-300PMU),
and SA-20 (S-300PMU1/PMU2), all of which have the advertised capability to protect
against both aircraft and low-flying cruise missiles. In fall 2014, The People’s
Republic of China signed a contract for delivery of Russia’s extremely long-range SA-
X-21b (S-400) SAM system (400 km), and is also expected to continue research and
development to extend the range of the domestic CSA-9 SAM to beyond 200 km.

Figure

Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security
Developments Involving the People’s Republic of People’s Republic of China
The planned development of People’s Republic of China’s fifth-generation
fighter force that includes high-maneuverability, low observability, and an internal
weapons bay based on the J-20 or J- 31 prototypes, will bolster People’s Republic of

182
China’s air-to-air capability. Other key features of these aircraft are modern avionics
and sensors that offer more timely situational awareness for operations in network-
centric combat environments, radars with advanced tracking and targeting
capabilities, protection against enemy electronic countermeasures, and integrated
EW systems. These next-generation aircraft, which could enter service as early as
2018, will improve People’s Republic of China’s existing fleet of fourth-generation
aircraft (Russian-built Su-27/Su-30 and J-11A, and indigenous J-10 and J-11B
fighters) to support regional air superiority and strike operations. People’s Republic of
China’s continuing upgrades to its bomber fleet will give them the capability to carry
new, longer-range cruise missiles. In conjunction with procuring more capable
military equipment, The People’s Republic of China is increasing the complexity and
realism of air and air defense training.

On March 5, 2014, The People’s Republic of China announced a 9.3 %

inflation-adjusted increase in its annual military budget to $136 billion, continuing
more than two decades of sustained annual defense spending increases.

Figure

Source: Economist

183
 Analysis of data from 2005 through 2014 indicates People’s Republic of
China’s officially-disclosed military budget grew at an average of 9.5 % per year in
inflation-adjusted terms over the period. The People’s Republic of China has the
fiscal strength and political will to support defense spending growth at comparable
levels for the foreseeable future. Using 2014 prices and exchange rates, the DoD
estimates that People’s Republic of China’s total military-related spending for 2014
exceeds $165 billion USA dollars (USD). However, it is difficult to estimate actual
PLA military expenses due to People’s Republic of China’s poor accounting
transparency and incomplete transition from a command economy. People’s
Republic of China’s published military budget omits several major categories of
expenditure, such as procurement of foreign weapons and equipment, and research
and development. The People’s Republic of China is developing its own missile
defense capability, going beyond the long-range SAMs that it has acquired from
foreign suppliers that provide only a limited capability against ballistic missiles. The
People’s Republic of China continues to develop a missile defense umbrella
consisting of a kinetic energy intercept capability at exo-atmospheric altitudes, as well
as intercepts of ballistic missiles and other aerospace vehicles within the upper
atmosphere. The People’s Republic of China has tested a ground-based, midcourse
interceptor, with the first test occurring in January 2010. Shortly after the test, The
People’s Republic of China claimed that the test was defensive in nature and not
directed at any country. People’s Republic of China’s next test of the ground-based
interceptor came in January 2013. It too, was successful, prompting a Second
Artillery Force Engineering Institute professor to claim that “the success of this
missile defense test means that The People’s Republic of China has already
successfully resolved the issues of upper atmosphere target identification, tracking,
and terminal guidance issues and that its mid-course missile defense technology is at
the forefront of world technology.” Meanwhile, other Chinese commentators have
noted that The People’s Republic of China remains far behind the United States of
America, with a number of issues still needing to be addressed. These include
resisting electronic attack and the capacity to respond to multiple warheads. Finally, if
The People’s Republic of China is to deploy an effective BMD system, it will need to
be supported by a space-based early warning system, currently missing from
People’s Republic of China’s BMD infrastructure

184
Chapter VI Present USA military doctrine

In January 2012 President Barack Obama proposed a new military strategy, which
called for “pivoting” from the Middle East to the Far East, focusing partly on the
military buildup of People’s Republic of China. The USA government is moving slowly
but surely toward characterizing The Federation of Russia and The People’s
Republic of China as an aggressive superpower and is preparing for war, should it
become necessary buy increasing military spending.

Figure

Source: Reuters

Hence, the USA cannot safely continue to seek to turn The People’s Republic
of China into a partner before concluding that a course of confrontation is
unavoidable. The President’s budget submission accordingly adheres to that budget
deal — requesting a total of $582.7 billion for the Defense Department in Fiscal Year
(FY) 2017, for both the base budget and Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO)
funds combined. However, it should be remembered that the budget deal only
covered two years. Unless Congress addresses the years beyond it and heads off
sequestration, DoD will face $100 billion in cuts from 2018 to 2021, which would
introduce unacceptable risks. Therefore Washington will need to come together once
again — not unlike last year, and two years before that — to provide stability and
protect national security, whereas Russia and The People’s Republic of China are

185
US most stressing competitors, as they’ve both developed and are continuing to
advance military systems that threaten our advantages in specific areas, and in some
cases, they’re developing weapons and ways of war that seek to achieve their
objectives in ways they hope would preempt a response by the United States of
America. Because of these facts and because the implications of any great-power
conflict would be so dire for the United States of America and the world, and because
of those nations’ actions to date — from Ukraine to the South The People’s Republic
of China Sea — the military leadership has elevated their importance in defense
planning and budgeting to ensure US maintain our advantages in the future.

Figure

Source: Heritage

The flexibility provided by last 2015 budget deal allowed US to maintain

desired targets across the financial year defense spending (FYDP) for end-strength
and active-reserve mix for ground forces — without it, sequestration likely would have
forced further reductions. Therefore, the budget stabilizes US total ground force end-
strength by the end of FY 2018 with an Army of 450,000 active-duty soldiers,

186
335,000 soldiers in the Army National Guard, and 195,000 soldiers in the Army
Reserve — comprising 56 total Army brigade combat teams and associated enablers
— and a Marine Corps of 182,000 active-duty Marines and 38,500 Marine
reservists.205 For the Navy, the budget continues to grow the size, and importantly
the capability, of the battle fleet — providing for 380,900 active-duty and reserve
sailors in FY 2017, and an increase from 280 ships at the end of FY 2016 to 308
ships at the end of the FYDP. The budget also supports an Air Force of 491,700
active-duty, reserve, and National Guard airmen — maintaining 55 tactical fighter
squadrons over the next five years, and providing sufficient manpower to address
high operating tempo and shortfalls in maintenance specialists for both tactical
fighters and remotely-piloted aircraft.206 In FY 2017, the budget provides $177.9
billion in pay and benefits — including health care, housing allowances,
commissaries, retirement, and other benefits — for DOD’s 2.1 million military
personnel and their families. To help make sure DOD is competitive for the best
talent, the budget includes a department-wide pay raise of 1.6 % in FY 2017.This is
an increase above FY 2016’s pay raise of 1.3 %.207

On Jul6 6th 2015 General Martin Dempsey, outgoing Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, has just released a new, remarkably readable National Military
Strategy (NMS). This document, alongside the President’s National Security Strategy
(NSS) and the Secretary of Defense’s National Defense Strategy (NDS), forms the
three pillars of top-level US defense strategy. In July 2015 The Federation of Russia
explained that a new USA military strategy was confrontational and would not help
improve relations with The Federation of Russia. The strategy stated that the The
Federation of Russia had repeatedly demonstrated it does not respect the
sovereignty of its neighbors and that it was willing to use force to achieve its goals.

Also in July 2015 People’s Republic of China's Foreign Ministry expressed

anger on Friday after the Pentagon's updated National Military Strategy slammed
Chinese claims in the South The People’s Republic of China Sea as aggressive and
inconsistent with international public law. The People’s Republic of China has
become increasingly assertive in the South The People’s Republic of China Sea,

205
https://www.army.mil/article/151992/Army_to_realign_brigades__cut_40_000_Soldiers__17_000_civilians/
206
US Department of Defense DEFENSE POSTURE STATEMENT: Taking the Long View, Investing for the
Future Secretary of Defense Ash Carter February 2016, p. 12
207
Ibidem, p. 13

187
building artificial islands in areas where the Philippines and other countries have rival
claims, sparking alarm regionally and in Washington. "People’s Republic of China's
actions are adding tension to the Asia-Pacific region," says the paper, released this
week in the first update of the strategy since 2011, making specific reference to
People’s Republic of China's "aggressive land reclamation efforts" in the South The
People’s Republic of China Sea.208

National Military Strategy (NMS)

US forces must use forward presence to counter emerging threats, both state
and non-state. The document observes that the tactics of “hybrid war” confer many
new advantages on the aggressor; the best way to counter these is through forward
positioning of military forces for deterrence, and failing that, to enable rapid reaction.
Additionally, for hybrid actors like the self-declared Islamic State, defeating them
requires “widely distributing US military forces and leveraging globally integrated
command and control processes” to disrupt their trans-regional networks.

Figure

Source:http://blogs.cfr.org/davidson/2015/07/07/five-key-takeaways-from-the-new-u-s-national-
military-strategy/

208
People’s Republic of China claims most of the potentially energy-rich South People’s Republic of China Sea,
through which $5 trillion in ship-borne trade passes every year. The Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and
Taiwan also have overlapping claims. http://www.businessinsider.com/r-People’s Republic of China-angered-
by-new-us-military-strategy-report-2015-7

188
 Coalition-building and security cooperation are crucial, but each partnership
must be tailored for the job. In today’s complex operations — with their strong
emphasis on political, financial, and military sustainability — the United States of
America must build and optimize the power of friendly coalitions. This requires two
different sets of activities: promoting security cooperation with mature allies
and building capacity for emerging US partners. In particular, with the recognition that
prolonged campaigns against violent extremist organizations are here to stay, the
strategy envisions the US military’s role as an enabler of local forces, leaving them to
“secure their [own] homelands. The US military cannot solely rely on its traditional
technological advantages. According to the strategy, the current global environment
is characterized by complexity and rapid change. Emerging technologies also make it
far easier for adversaries to target US communications and sensing systems through
precision weaponry and offensive cyber capabilities. Consequently, future conflicts
between states may prove to be unpredictable, costly, and difficult to control. This is
especially true in fights against hybrid actors, whose asymmetric advantages offered
by information tools, IEDs, and cyber attack can circumvent many of the United
States of America’ biggest strengths. Future war fighting is not just about building
better robots, lasers, and satellites — it will continue to turn on smart planning and
strong, creative, and empowered leadership.

The threat of interstate war is low but growing. From Iran and The Federation
of Russia’s continual efforts to destabilize their regional neighbors to Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea’s growing ability to threaten the US homeland and
People’s Republic of China’s “aggressive land reclamation efforts” in the South The
People’s Republic of China Sea, the NMS observes that the odds of America coming
into conflict with a near-peer adversary are on the rise. Especially Russia continues
to violate the sovereignty of Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova, and actively seeks to
intimidate Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as well as Republic of Poland.

In Syria, Russia since 2015 has been fueling the very extremism Russia
claims to oppose. Russia’s decision, in September 2015, to deploy combat forces to
Syria resharpened focus on the capabilities of the Russian armed forces and the
results of Russia’s ongoing military-reform programmed. A year after they occupied
Crimea and deployed in support of separatists in eastern Ukraine, Russian troops

189
have remained active near the border with Ukraine – and some, it is widely reported,
are still in eastern Ukraine itself.

Figure

Source: Reuters

The decision to militarily support Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s

embattled regime and to take an active part in the Syrian civil war was a departure in
a relationship previously limited (at least publicly) to diplomatic support as well as the
supply of defense materiel, and constituted a significant step. At the end of October,
the intervention seemed to comprise mainly combat air assets, particularly air-to-
ground capabilities, operating primarily against rebel groups in direct combat with
regime forces in the European Union of the country, though Russian airstrikes have
also targeted Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham forces more widely in the country.

The Federation of Russia may be keen to avoid involving regular forces from
service branches other than the air force and any special forces operating in a
training-and-support role, particularly in extended ground operations. Broadly,
Russian activity is designed to support the actions of regime and allied ground forces.

190
But for military as well as political analysts, the deployment is significant as it allows a
chance to assess the performance of another arm of Russia’s armed forces on active
service. Since 2014 there has been an opportunity to examine elements of Russian
ground forces, but the Syria operation provides a chance to analyze the air force, in a
manner that has not been possible since the 2008 war in Georgia. It also allows for
the examination of the modernization process eight years after the start of the Novy
Oblik reforms (see previous editions of The Military Balance) and possibly also an
insight into how that process has changed since the defense-ministerial portfolio
passed from Anatoly SerdyU. K. ov to Sergei Shoigu.209

The US nuclear arsenal needs an overhaul. In response to The Federation of

Russia’s nuclear saber-rattling the strategy emphasizes the need to ensure US
nuclear capabilities are modernized. Maintaining credible nuclear strike capability to
counter proliferation by revisionist states is another stated objective. As Dempsey
observes in his introduction, “Control of escalation is becoming more difficult and
more important.” In all, there are few surprises in this NMS. The main themes track
closely with past speeches and testimony by Chairman Dempsey and Secretary of
Defense Ash Carter, as well as themes in the President’s National Security
Strategy released in February. That said, this new document stands as the boldest
statement to date of just how much the global strategic environment has transformed
in the past few years. In the NMS, the US military shows an appreciation for the
complexity of these threats and a recognition that our own technological edge is at
risk. Addressing these challenges will require as much investment in the next
generation of creative leaders and concept development as new technological
approaches to military operations. The most important document in the hierarchy of
the US security documents is the National Security Strategy (NSS) as a highly
significant document delineating the wide-ranging goals of the nation. The second
most important one is the National Defense Strategy (NDS) and in theory it concerns
the role of defense in implementing the strategy underlined in the NSS.

209
At sea, in the air, in space, and in cyberspace, Russian actors have engaged in challenging
international norms. And most disturbing, Russia’s nuclear saber-rattling raises questions about Russia’s leaders’
commitment to strategic stability, their respect for norms against the use of nuclear USapons.

191
National Security Strategy (NSS)

The US administration is periodically required by law to produce The National

Security Strategy (NSS),210 which provides a useful window into American strategic
worldview and a base on which to calibrate expectations for external policies, Section
603 of the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 – commonly known as
the Goldwater-Nichols Act – directs that, “the president shall transmit to Congress
each year a comprehensive report on the national security strategy of the United
States of America” that “shall be transmitted on the date on which the president
submits to Congress the budget for the next fiscal year.” Goldwater-Nichols also
directs the Secretary of Defense “shall include in his annual report to Congress,” the
National Defense Strategy (NDS), “(A) a description of the major military missions
and of the military force structure of the United States of America for the next fiscal
year; (B) an explanation of the relationship of those military missions to that force
structure; and (C) the justification for those military missions and that force structure.”
And in the report’s preparation, “the secretary shall take into consideration the
content of the annual national security strategy report of the president.” The NDS in
turn fuels a National Military Strategy, signed by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. Subsequent legislation directs the chairman to submit a Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR), which also shapes the NDS. All of these documents are part of the
planning phase of the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE)
System that determines which programs are developed to meet military strategy
requirements and how much funding they receive

Therefore the definition of the national interest articulated therein has been
stable, encompassing three elements: security of the territory and people of
the United States of America, security of the economy and American ‘way of life’, and
the spread of liberal values and government abroad. On February 6 2016 the

210
The National Security Strategy Report is published by the executive branch of the United States of America
government. It is intended to be a comprehensive statement articulating the worldwide interests, goals, and
objectives of the United States of America that are important to its security. Among the reporting requirements
are those actions needed to deter aggression and to implement the national security strategy. Under the
Goldwater-Nichols Defense Department Reorganization Act of 1986 (amending Title 50, Chapter 15, Section
404a of the US Code), the President must submit a report on the national security strategy of the United States of
America to Congress each year. See further https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/06/fact-sheet-
2015-national-security-strategy

192
Obama’s administration unveiled a NSS document,211 and outlined a strategy
consistent with his approach to national security since he first entered the White
House, seeking to strike a balance between “America must lead” and “strategic
patience,” particularly in leveraging American military might. The focus of the 2015
NSS is on long-term challenges such as cyber security, global health, climate
change, failing states, and energy security. Because the new NSS is so vague in its
prioritization, it doesn’t achieve the goals laid out in Goldwater-Nichols of articulating
“the foreign policy, worldwide commitments, and national defense capabilities of the
United States of America necessary to deter aggression and to implement the
national security strategy of the United States of America.” Nor does it assess “the
adequacy of the capabilities of the United States of America to carry out the NSS of
the United States of America, including an evaluation of the balance among the
capabilities of all elements of the national power of the United States of America to
support the implementation of the national security strategy.” Because the new NSS
is so vague in its prioritization, it doesn’t achieve the goals laid out in Goldwater-
Nichols of articulating “the foreign policy, worldwide commitments, and national
defense capabilities of the United States of America necessary to deter aggression
and to implement the national security strategy of the United States of America. Nor
does it assess the adequacy of the capabilities of the United States of America to
carry out the NSS of the United States of America, including an evaluation of the
balance among the capabilities of all elements of the national power of the United
States of America to support the implementation of the national security strategy.

The NSS assesses the top strategic risks to our interests as Catastrophic
attack on the USA homeland or critical infrastructure; Threats or attacks against USA
citizens abroad and our allies; Global economic crisis or widespread economic
slowdown; Proliferation and/or use of weapons of mass destruction; Severe global
infectious disease outbreaks; Climate change; Major energy market disruptions; and
Significant security consequences associated with weak or failing states (including
mass atrocities, regional spillover, and transnational organized crime). The Defense
Department could conceivably be called on to respond to most if not all of those

211
At the core of the 2015 national security strategy is a failure to identify the enemy the United States of
America and the free world faces in the Middle East, and increasingly in the Euroepan nion as USll—Islamist
terrorism and Islamist extremism. http://dailysignal.com/2015/02/06/obamas-national-security-strategy-USak-
underwhelming/

193
crises; indeed, USA Marines were dispatched last year to fight Ebola in Africa. The
document contains the standard boilerplate about the role of the military instrument of
power, observing that, “USA forces will continue to defend the homeland, conduct
global counterterrorism operations, assure allies and deter aggression through
forward presence and engagement. If deterrence fails, USA forces will be ready to
project power globally to defeat and deny aggression in multiple theaters. It demands
that, although our military will be smaller, it must remain dominant in every domain.
Indeed, it promises to build a versatile and responsive force prepared for a more
diverse set of contingencies. 212

While declaring that, “we shifted away from a model of fighting costly, large-
scale ground wars in Iraq and Afghanistan in which the United States of America—
particularly our military—bore an enormous burden,” and promising that, “instead, we
are now pursuing a more sustainable approach,” the aforementioned declaration that
“USA forces will be ready to project power globally to defeat and deny aggression in
multiple theaters” rightly means that the ability to fight future costly, large-scale
ground wars must be maintained. Still, the NSS “prioritizes targeted counterterrorism
operations, collective action with responsible partners, and increased efforts to
prevent the growth of violent extremism and radicalization that drives increased
threats.” Additionally, “our leadership will remain essential to disrupting the
unprecedented flow of foreign terrorist fighters to and from conflict zones.” This is
both necessary and a monumental task requiring that we “work to address the
underlying conditions that can help foster violent extremism such as poverty,
inequality, and repression. This means supporting alternatives to extremist
messaging and greater economic opportunities for women and disaffected youth. We
will help build the capacity of the most vulnerable states and communities to defeat
terrorists locally.” Some of these functions will at last partially be performed by others
in the interagency and, theoretically, by other nations. Indeed, the latter is a recurrent
theme of the NSS, including such declarations as “we will train and equip local
partners and provide operational support to gain ground against terrorist groups. This

212

http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2015/02/11/national_security_strategy_to_national_defense_strategy_1
07619.html

194
will include efforts to better fuse and share information and technology as well as to
support more inclusive and accountable governance.”213

The NSS keeps faith with longstanding US policy that, “as long as nuclear
weapons exist, the United States of America must invest the resources necessary to
maintain—without testing—a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent that
preserves strategic stability.” But, aside from some reductions in our own stockpiles,
there’s no cost savings or reprioritization to be had here; it’s status quo. Likewise, the
strategy continues to protect “shared spaces—cyber, space, air, and oceans—that
enable the free flow of people, goods, services, and ideas,” rightly noting that, “they
are the arteries of the global economy and civil society, and access is at risk due to
increased competition and provocative behaviors.” In the cyber realm, especially, the
document calls for stepped up capabilities. The document outlines ambitious
Prosperity and Values agendas, most of which only tangentially involve the DoD. The
International Order agenda, however, is very reliant on military forces – at least in a
supporting role – and offers no retrenchment.

In Asia, we’ll be “modernizing our alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia,
and the Philippines” while “deepening partnerships” with Vietnam, Indonesia and
Malaysia; welcoming “the rise of a stable, peaceful, and prosperous People’s
Republic of China” while preparing for the alternative; strengthening “our strategic
and economic partnership with India,” while we “continue to work with both India and
Pakistan.” We’ll be maintaining “a profound commitment to a European Union that is
free, whole, and at peace,” including “steadfastly support [in] the aspirations of
countries in the Balkans and Eastern European Union towards European and Euro-
Atlantic integration,” while also “continue [in] to transform our relationship with
Turkey, and enhance ties with countries in the Caucasus while encouraging
resolution of regional conflict.” Meanwhile, our commitment to “stability and peace in
the Middle East and North Africa” will continue. We’ll “dismantle terrorist networks
that threaten our people, confront external aggression against our allies and partners,
ensure the free flow of energy from the region to the world, and prevent the
development, proliferation, or use of weapons of mass destruction,” while “investing

213
ibidem

195
in the ability of Israel, Jordan, and our Gulf partners to deter aggression while
maintaining our unwavering commitment to Israel’s security.” 214

While there’s room for quibbling here and there, most of that agenda is
sufficiently inspirational that it enjoys widespread support on both sides of the aisle.
The problem, however, is that it’s all but useless as guidance. If everything is a
priority, nothing is. What, precisely, isn’t the USA military going to be prepared to do?
The watchword in DoD planning documents in recent years has been “risk.” Given
substantial budget cuts, there will simply be less military capability to bring to bear in
achieving the perfectly desirable goals laid out in the NSS. The strategy also lays out
in broad strokes the United States of America’ commitment to rebalancing to Asia
and the Pacific region, pursuing a stable Middle East and North Africa by “reducing
the underlying sources of conflict,” eliminating global poverty within 15 years,
strengthening global alliances (especially with NATO and European allies given the
Ukraine crisis and the worsening relationship with The Federation of Russia),
maintaining multilateral partnerships, reinforcing/updating international norms and
institutions, preventing “mass atrocities,” and pushing nuclear non-proliferation. The
new strategy also takes a multi-faceted approach to national security, urging the
utilization of military power but also diplomacy, economic strength, and the
exportation of American values as leverage to affect global events. The new national
security strategy recognizes “we have to walk and chew gum at the same time. This
means a diplomacy-first, highly selective use of force. We have moved beyond the
large ground wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that defined so much of American foreign
policy over the past decade. The USA now has fewer than 15,000 troops deployed
in Iraq and Afghanistan, compared to the 180,000 when he took office. He also
frames it as a cost-benefit analysis, reminding that those wars came with a heavy
price tag of not only American lives but also American dollars But as in the State of
the Union, it makes little mention of the fact that some 4,000 troops have now been
authorized to deploy and some $1.25 billion has been spent for the military operation
against the Islamic State. Nor does it really acknowledge the administration has
shifted the role of the forces that remain in Afghanistan despite declaring the formal

214
In Africa, “US will increase trade and business ties, generating export-driven growth,” while “investing in
tomorrow’s leaders,” “strengthening civilian and military institutions” and “deepening our security
partnerships.” And, of course, “US will continue to advance a Euroepan nionern Hemisphere that is prosperous,
secure, democratic and plays a greater global role.”

196
end to our war there. Recent reports indicate the White House may also be
reconsidering the timeline for withdrawal, and several of Obama’s military
commanders have said they would advise the president to do so were the security
situation in Afghanistan to worsen.215

Figure

Source: CTFF

In Iran, Obama has pursued a policy of appeasement in the guise of nuclear

negotiations with a tyrannical regime that has no intention of giving up its nuclear
ambitions. The US will advance an international order that promotes peace,
security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges by
strengthening our enduring commitment to a free and peaceful European Union by
countering aggression and modernizing the NATO alliance to meet emerging threats.
The US will advance the security of the United States of America, its citizens, and
USA allies and partners by maintaining a national defense that is the best trained,
equipped, and led force in the world while honoring our promises to service
members, veterans, and their families.

215
The strategy emphasizes operating multilaterally rather than unilaterally. The White House still invokes
multilateralism as a thinly veiled criticism of George W. Bush and a more blunt, force-first national security
strategy
http://www.defenseone.com/threats/2015/02/president-obamas-new-national-security-strategy-isnt-actually-
new/104793/

197
 The administration of Barack Obama has been reluctant to launch
major military operations abroad, even more so if substantial international backing
has been unavailable, and entirely unwilling to initiate new boots-on-the-ground or
nation-building operations in the mode of what its predecessor attempted in
Afghanistan and Iraq. Unforeseen threats in Iraq and Syria and, in Ukraine have
forced the administration to adjust its national security policy in practice. This calls for
the articulation – not yet effected – of a principle-based framework for determining
the conditions under which foreign intervention is in the national interest. Events have
led the administration to be more interventionist in practice than it would
have wished, and it will be the role of its revised strategy to articulate where the limits
of this interventionism are located It is the antithesis of Ronald Reagan’s peace
through strength approach, and the mark of an administration that is content for the
United States of America to take a back seat on the world stage, while the specter of
terrorism and totalitarianism is on the rise.

National Defense Strategy (NDS)

The National Defense Strategy (NDS) is used in the PPBE Process to

establish the objectives for the plans for military force structure, force modernization,
business processes, supporting infrastructure, and required resources (funding and
manpower). Along with the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System
(JCIDS) Process, the NDS plays a key role in identifying the capabilities required by
the war fighters to support the National Security Strategy (NSS). The NDS serves as
the DoD’s capstone document in this long-term effort. It flows from the National
Security Strategy (NSS) and informs the National Military Strategy (NMS). It also
provides a framework for other DoD strategic guidance, specifically on campaign and
contingency planning, force development, and intelligence. It reflects the results of
the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and lessons learned from on-going
operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. It addresses how the USA Armed
Forces will fight and win America’s wars and how we seek to work with and through
partner nations to shape opportunities in the international environment to enhance
security and avert conflict.

The NDS describes our overarching goals and strategy. It outlines how DoD
will support the objectives outlined in the NSS, including the need to strengthen

198
alliances and build new partnerships to defeat global terrorism and prevent attacks
against us, our allies, and our friends; prevent our enemies from threatening us, our
allies, and our friends with weapons of mass destruction (WMD); work with others to
defuse regional conflicts, including conflict intervention; and transform national
security institutions to face the challenges of the 21st century. The NDS acts on
these objectives, evaluates the strategic environment, challenges, and risks we must
consider in achieving them, and maps the way forward

Figure: Planning Phase of the PPBE Process

Source: http://www.acqnotes.com/acqnote/acquisitions/national-defense-strategy-nds

The strategy in 2015 is being updated to reflect the new global security
situation, one in which the US is facing near-peer adversaries like The Federation of
The Federation of Russia and The People’s Republic of China while simultaneously
having to handle diffuse militant groups like the Islamic State. The US now face
multiple, simultaneous security challenges from traditional state actors and trans
regional networks of sub-state groups — all taking advantage of rapid technological
change," In addition the US is more likely to face prolonged campaigns than conflicts
that are resolved quickly. The document focuses on the importance of partnerships
to maintain the delicate security balance around the globe, something Pentagon
officials have been pushing over the last several months. The new strategy
acknowledges that American success "will increasingly depend on how well our
military instrument supports the other instruments of national power, and how it
enables our network of allies and partners. The strategy specifically calls out Iran,
The Federation of The Federation of Russia and Democratic People’s Republic of

199
Korea as aggressive threats to global peace. It also mentions People’s Republic of
China, but notably starts that paragraph by saying the Obama administration wants to
"support People’s Republic of China's rise and encourage it to become a partner for
greater international security," continuing to thread the line between The People’s
Republic of China the economically and The People’s Republic of China the regional
competitor. "None of these nations are believed to be seeking direct military conflict
with the United States of America or our allies," the strategy reads. "Nonetheless,
they each pose serious security concerns which the international community is
working to collectively address by way of common policies, shared messages, and
coordinated action."216 The strategy also hits on the concerns, highlighted by
Secretary of Defense Ash Carter and Deputy Secretary Bob Work over the last six
months, that the US is no longer guaranteed technological superiority or that in
conflicts with groups like the Islamic State, that technological superiority may not be a
guarantee of victory.

Figure

Source: Reuters

216
http://www.defensenews.com/story/breaking-news/2015/07/01/pentagon-releases-new-national-military-
strategy/29564897/

200
 People’s Republic of China’s strategic community views the USA development
and deployment of ballistic missile defense capabilities as the most serious threat to
People’s Republic of China’s nuclear deterrent. Chinese analysts believe that the
deployment of early warning systems and interceptors gives the United States of
America a rudimentary missile defense capability against Chinese nuclear missiles.
People’s Republic of China’s strategic community also expects the system to become
more integrated and effective in the future. For many, the Obama administration has
only slightly altered the Bush administration’s missile defense plan, as USA missile
defense has bipartisan support and is now a permanent feature of the strategic
landscape.217

National Military Strategy

General Martin Dempsey, outgoing Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has
just released a new National Military Strategy (NMS).218 This document, alongside
the President’s National Security Strategy (NSS) and the Secretary of Defense’s
National Defense Strategy (NDS), forms the three pillars of top-level USA defense
strategy. According to the document USA forces must use forward presence to
counter emerging threats, both state and non-state. The US is more inclined to foster
partnerships and alliances around the globe; hence, from the point of view of military
strategy, success will increasingly depend on support of the US military instrument by
other instruments of power. Nonetheless, in the past US policy defined its role as
enabling capacity for assisting other nations to achieve security goals that could
advance common interests. It is clear that the US has globally repositioned and
become more explicit about its security intentions in a new strategy. Presumably, the
importance of state actors especially beyond NATO and the European Union will
increase. For example, the so-called “future newcomers” into NATO-Georgia,
Ukraine and Moldova-could be secured in order to avoid political pressure from The
Federation of Russia. US political presence and support in Eastern European Union
especially by “instruments of power” is expected. In previous US strategy, non-state
217
“Chinese concerns about USA capabilities are likely to further underscore the ambiguity that People’s
Republic of China has alloUSd to persist regarding its no-first-use policy. In the mid-2000s, a debate over
whether to maintain the policy occurred within People’s Republic of China amid concerns about a future
conflict over Taiwan’s unification involving the United States of America. The debate was prompted in large
part by the prospect of conventional strikes against Chinese nuclear capabilities and nonnuclear strategic
targets, such as the Three Gorges Dam.”
218
NMS highlights the role of the military in supporting NDS and NSS, emphasising the roles of air, sea and
land poUSr. http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2015/07/5-keys-new-us-national-military-strategy/117088/

201
actors, such as VEOs and non-state adversaries in the area of WMD proliferation and
nuclear terrorism were clearly emphasized and it is still kept as a top priority. But the
new strategy stresses state-actors, especially states challenging international norms.
In this regard, The Federation of The Federation of Russia breached sovereignty of
its neighbors and the achievement of goals for The Federation of Russia's political
establishment is perceived through the prism of military power. The Federation of
Russia’s military actions is considered as the violation of numerous agreements that
The Federation of The Federation of Russia has signed. The Federation of The
Federation of Russia was committed to act in accordance with international norms
after the signature of these agreements. The Federation of Russia's aggressive
attitude towards neighboring states should strengthen US-Georgian ties and security
co-operation between the US and Eastern European Union. As a result of the war in
Ukraine, the European Union has realized that The Federation of The Federation of
Russia is still a big threat to European security. Iran poses strategic challenges to
the international community because of nuclear and missile ambitions. The actions of
Tehran are marked as a source of destabilization for many nations. From a
geographical perspective, regional instability could affect the security environment
and economic growth in the countries of the Caucasus. In the list of violent extremist
organizations (VEOs) besides Al-Qaeda, the self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and
the Levant (ISIL) is a source of regional destabilization. Such radical groups serve to
radicalize people, spread violence, and leverage terror to impose their visions of
societal organization. The document observes that the tactics of “hybrid war confer
many new advantages on the aggressor; the best way to counter these is through
forward positioning of military forces for deterrence, and failing that, to enable rapid
reaction. Additionally, for hybrid actors like the self-declared Islamic State, defeating
them requires “widely distributing USA military forces and leveraging globally
integrated command and control processes” to disrupt their Trans regional networks.
Coalition building and security cooperation are crucial, but each partnership must be
tailored for the job. In today’s complex operations—with their strong emphasis on
political, financial, and military sustainability—the United States of America must build
and optimize the power of friendly coalitions.

This requires two different sets of activities: promoting security

cooperation with mature allies and building capacity for emerging USA partners. In

202
particular, with the recognition that prolonged campaigns against violent extremist
organizations are here to stay, the strategy envisions the USA military’s role as an
enabler of local forces, leaving them to “secure their [own] homelands.219 Emerging
technologies also make it far easier for adversaries to target USA communications
and sensing systems through precision weaponry and offensive cyber capabilities.
Consequently, “future conflicts between states may prove to be unpredictable, costly,
and difficult to control.” This is especially true in fights against hybrid actors,
whose asymmetric advantages offered by information tools, IEDs, and cyber attack
can circumvent many of the United States of America’ biggest strengths. Future war
fighting is not just about building better robots, lasers, and satellites—it will continue
to turn on smart planning and strong, creative, and empowered leadership. From Iran
and The Federation of Russia’s continual efforts to destabilize their regional
neighbors to Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s growing ability to threaten
the USA homeland and People’s Republic of China’s “aggressive land reclamation
efforts” in the South The People’s Republic of China Sea, the NMS observes that the
odds of America coming into conflict with a near-peer adversary are on the rise. But
in the words of the document: “None of these nations are believed to be seeking
direct military conflict with the United States of America or our allies.”
The USA nuclear arsenal needs an overhaul. In response to The Federation of
Russia’s nuclear saber-rattling the strategy emphasizes the need to
ensure USA nuclear capabilities are modernized. Maintaining credible nuclear strike
capability to counter proliferation by revisionist states is another stated objective this
new document stands as the boldest statement to date of just how much the global
strategic environment has transformed in the past few years. In the NMS,
the USA military shows an appreciation for the complexity of these threats and a
recognition that our own technological edge is at risk. Addressing these challenges
will require as much investment in the next generation of creative leaders and
concept development as new technological approaches to military operations

The big challenge is People’s Republic of China. It will with subtle and
cautious steps undermine the credibility and value of alliance with the US over time.
People’s Republic of China's view of time is unfamiliar to European Union politicians

219
The USA military cannot solely rely on its traditional technological advantages. According to the strategy, the
current global environment is characterized by “complexity and rapid change.”

203
who think in election cycles, completely inappropriate for the geopolitical "Great
Game" in which The People’s Republic of China has now engaged the US. The US
will be wrong footed when the reunification of the two Koreas suddenly occurs.
People’s Republic of China's price will be the removal of all foreign troops not just
north of the 38th parallel. Once the final foothold in mainland Asia is lost we will see
the progressive Finlandization of ASEAN, for which the South The People’s Republic
of China Sea island dance is little more than a vehicle with which to demonstrate the
powerlessness of the US to prevent it without looking like an overbearing, over
reacting hegemony. The US is no embroiled in a subtle sophisticated contest with the
rising power that it has yet to recognize for what it is; a contest for supremacy in Asia,
the key to global dominance in the 21st century. Unless and until Washington
appreciates the rules of the game that is being played it will be found profoundly
wanting in its responses, both tactical and strategic. The United States of America
should field nuclear forces that can under any circumstances confront any potential
adversary with the prospect of unacceptable damage, both to deter potential
adversaries and to assure NATO allies and other security partners that they can
count on America’s security commitments. These deterrence goals can be achieved
with a smaller nuclear force, which would reduce the number of nuclear weapons in
army’s inventory.

204
Chapter VII NATO response to Russian military threat

NATO, as a political-military alliance, can only coordinate individual members’

economic and civil actions. However, once a collective decision has been made in
the North Atlantic Council (NAC), individual nations’ diplomatic and military power
can be employed as one, supported by the Alliance’s collective information
resources. NATO operations take place under the NATO Command Structure. NATO
uses a combination of Joint Functions to describe the primary considerations for a
Joint Force Commander in determining force capability and its subsequent
orchestration. NATO recognizes a set of principles that underpin war and warfare.220
NATO principles include, for example, initiative, simplicity and multi nationality, but do
not include offensive action. Additionally, NATO considers some additional aspects,
which are primarily relevant during non-war fighting activities, such as peace support.
These include: impartiality; consent; restraint; perseverance; credibility; mutual
respect; transparency; and freedom of movement. Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-
01(D) Allied Joint Doctrine provides capstone doctrine 221for Allied Joint operations. It
is intended primarily for use by NATO forces and reflects recent changes in NATO
policy, particularly the comprehensive approach; the doctrine is coherent with the
2010 Lisbon summit. The primary objective of Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-01(D)
Allied Joint Doctrine is to provide ‘keystone’ doctrine for the planning, execution and
support of Allied joint operations. Although AJP-01(D) is intended primarily for use by
NATO forces, the doctrine is instructive to, and provides a useful framework for,
operations conducted by a coalition of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),
partners, non-NATO nations and other organizations.
The USA commitment toward Europe’s security will therefore persist, but
Europeans will have more responsibilities in their own defense. While the United
States of America has partially rebalanced in Europe, committing more of a presence

220
See e. g. AJP-01, AJP-2 Allied Joint Doctrine for Intelligence, Counterintelligence & Security, AJP-3 Allied
Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations, AJP-4 Allied Joint Doctrine for Logistics, AJP-5 Allied Joint
Doctrine for Operational Planning and AJP-9 Allied Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Co-operation.
221
Doctrine is defined as ‘fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of
objectives. It is authoritative, but requires judgement in application’.1 The principal purpose of doctrine is to
provide Alliance Armed Forces with a framework of guidance for the conduct of operations. It is about how
those operations should be directed, mounted, commanded, conducted, sustained and recovered. It captures that
which is enduring in best practice whilst incorporating contemporary insights and how these principles are
applied today and the immediate future. It is dynamic and constantly reviewed for relevance. It describes how
Alliance Armed Forces operate but not about why they do what they do, which is the realm of policy.

205
and offering assurances that a NATO enhanced rapid reaction force could be
deployed to counter any Article 5 aggression, European partners continue to rely on
their soft power assets (development aid, diplomacy, economic tools) to achieve their
foreign policy objectives. On the diplomatic front, French and German leadership in
Ukraine has been critical, but the United States of America remains the main security
provider in Central and Eastern Europe. For Washington, the current division of labor,
with the United States of America remaining responsible for the bulk of the military
burden and Europe not addressing this concern, is not sustainable. This asymmetry
has limited the scope of responses to new security challenges, which require the right
mix of both soft and hard power. It is important to preserve NATO’s military
superiority — the Alliance represent 55 % of global defense expenditures — by
investing in (advanced) hard power capabilities. Without proper investments, the
technological gap between the United States of America and Europe may increase.
Continued joint trainings and live exercises are also central to the credibility of
NATO’s reassurance and deterrence measures
The credibility of Article 5 has not been damaged by Russian foreign policy in
Ukraine, but rather confirmed it. Similarly, while NATO solidarity is often unsatisfying
in a crisis situation because its reaction time is limited, it is useful in the long term to
protect the core interests of the transatlantic partners. In this context, reinforcing
meetings in the framework of Article 4, whereby Allies can “consult together
whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political
independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened,” could strengthen
solidarity and give Allies another avenue through which to share security
assessments. This is especially important given that the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan, which was the cornerstone of NATO
collective efforts in the 2000s, will soon come to an end even as minds are focused
elsewhere on the short-term divisive crises in the neighborhoods. The evolution of
the Alliance will be incremental, whereas the Warsaw Summit will not trigger a
philosophical revolution but instead focus on capabilities and threats. 222 The 2016
Warsaw summit will conclude the first and crucial phase of Readiness Action Plan,
which was

222
Transatlantic partners must account for NATO’s strategic culture in their expectations of the Alliance.
Otherwise its apparently slow process may lead to frustrations and disappointments

206
Agreed during the 2014 Newport summit. NATO leaders are likely to announce the
operational capability of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF)—a fast
response element of the bigger multinational NATO Response Force (NRF).
Headquarters elements called NATO Force Integration Units (NFIU) will be ready to
facilitate VJTF deployment in Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Republic of Poland
and Romania. NATO will also raise the readiness of the Headquarters Multinational
Corps North East in Szczecin—the main NATO unit responsible for collective
defense of central and Eastern Europe.
The 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw will take place in a distressing period with
multiple security crises in the European neighborhood as well as risks of political
division within the Alliance. Yet, in the midst of an outstanding series of challenges,
the transatlantic partnership has also shown its unique resistance and provided
reasons for optimism. For instance, the United States of America, Canada, and
European allies have been able to resist Russia’s strategic objectives to divide
transatlantic unity and weaken the European project when it destabilized Ukraine.
Russia gambled that it could exploit Europe’s weaknesses: the ongoing effects of the
euro crisis, the increasing influx of asylum seekers into Europe and the United States
of America, energy security and dependence on Russian gas, and the increasing
influence of populist parties in European countries who respond to these threats and
the uncertain future of the U.K. in the EU, The The Federal Republic of Germany’s
strategic restraint, and the USA rebalancing toward Asia. Russia’s strategy has not
been successful, however, since the allies have managed to reach constructive
agreements on sanctions on the Russian economy and continue to coordinate their
approach to the Ukrainian and Syrian conflicts, at the same time building up state
resilience to emerging hybrid threats.
This illustrates the strength of the Alliance, as transatlantic partners continue
to rely primarily on each other to achieve their strategic goals he Warsaw Summit will
play a major role in pushing participants toward consolidating the foundations laid in
2014 in Wales and completing the Alliance’s adaptation to its new strategic
environment. In this brief, we argue that four challenges will be particularly decisive
for the Warsaw Summit’s outcomes: burden-sharing, NATO’s political role, divergent
threat perceptions, and expectations. In addition to these four critical and contentious
challenges, there is one well-known issue may be underplayed in the debates: EU-
NATO cooperation. Extra attention is particularly needed here. Indeed, the nature of

207
the security challenges faced by the Alliance today and the need for improved
strategic communication at the transatlantic level require more specific listing of EU’s
and NATO’s complementary assets. The contemporary strategic environment
provides a unique opportunity to encourage more ambitious cooperation between the
two organizations 223

Russia’s actions in Ukraine have had a direct impact on the security

perceptions of the Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania which seriously perceive military
threat. The Federation of Russia remains the single most powerful military force in
Europe even though its military forces and industrial base have greatly atrophied
since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, backed up by its extremely
formidable nuclear arsenal, it retains significant forces. The key to Russia’s military
power is its nuclear arsenal, which is rivaled only by the United States of America.
The country retains thousands of nuclear warheads—both strategic and tactical—
which by default makes Russia one of the most significant powers on Earth.

Russia’s conventional forces are not what they used to be. While the Soviet
Union maintained massive and well equipped conventional forces, Russia does not
have the money, manpower or industrial base that its communist forbearer did.
Nonetheless, Russia is one of the only European powers that retains the ability to
develop its own hardware ranging from nuclear submarines, and ballistic and cruise
missiles, to tanks, fighters, jet engines, to satellites without outside assistance—even
if the quality of the equipment isn’t the best. The other main thing Russia has going
for it is that its forces are very large—and relatively well trained compared to its
neighbors. However, while some of Russia’s forces are modern and well trained,
much of the country’s military consists of conscripts using dilapidated Soviet
hardware Russia is more dangerous than the Islamic State group.

Most probably NATO will approve the deployment of troops on the alliance's
eastern border at its upcoming July summit due to be held in Warsaw Summit on
June 8 and 9 2016 during which the major concerns will be to prevent a split in the
Alliance and to reconcile the interests of the Eastern and the Southern European
member states in view of different regional threats coming out from dangerous
Russia.

223
http://www.gmfus.org/publications/five-most-contentious-issues-road-warsaw

208
 A few other interesting points’ e. g. Russia’s aggression in Ukraine has united
the Alliance and reactivated its core function as a defense alliance. Its members once
again see themselves facing the realities of an “Article 5 world” in which priority is
given to Alliance solidarity in accordance with Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.
As a result, all member states agreed to a comprehensive package of measures at
the NATO summit in Wales to strengthen their defense capability and have shown
commitment to implementing this package – which is not always the case with NATO
decisions. But at this same time On the other hand, NATO is divided on the issue of
where and how it should improve its defense capability: Russia’s revisionist course of
action in the east and continuing Islamist violence in the south are two very different
issues. One of important issue to agree on will be NATO enlargement has been a
permanent topic at NATO summits for almost two decades now. Accession
candidates such as Georgia, Ukraine, Montenegro and the Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia will again be a subject of disagreement in the coming year.
But the realities of the Article 5 world are also bringing major changes to the process
of NATO enlargement. The Warsaw Summit will therefore have to respond to the
growing debate on NATO membership in both of these countries, whenever Helsinki
and Stockholm ex-press their wish to become members.

Russia’s recent buzzes of American navy in April 2016 has meant that the
focus of attention has shifted to Sweden and Finland, two countries that in the past
considered NATO accession only as a very remote option. According to the US
European Command (Eucom) in Stuttgart, there were a number of such close
encounters on in April 2016224, involving both Russian fighter jets and helicopters,
while the Donald Cook was in international waters in the Baltic Sea, off the coast of
Republic of Poland. Those waters are also close to the Russian enclave of
Kaliningrad. Such behavior is entirely inconsistent with the professional norms of
militaries operating in proximity to each other in international waters and international
airspace. Those incident appears to be the closest so far of a series of military
encounters between Russian and US forces since tensions intensified dramatically
with Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its subsequent covert military
intervention on the side of separatists in eastern Ukraine, and this behavior could

224
on April 29, 2016, a USA Air Force RC-135 aircraft flying a routine route in international airspace over
the Baltic Sea was intercepted by a Russian SU-27 in an unsafe and unprofessional manner.

209
easily lead to a miscalculation by a pilot or sailor leading to an accident and
repercussions that spiral out of control.225

In Sweden226 Social Democratic Party may be reversing its stance on

Swedish membership in the alliance, stating that Stockholm plans to join NATO's
Strategic Communications agency, which leads development of counter information
warfare, cyber defense and counter-disinformation and could consider joining
NATO if it can do so with neighboring Finland. Finland is particularly concerned about
the demilitarized Åland Islands, worrying Russia could use the same unconventional
methods of “little green men” it successfully employed to seize Crimea from Ukraine.
The Russian military staged an exercise in March that included practicing the capture
of Sweden’s Gotland Island.

Finland spends about 1.3 % of its gross domestic product on defense, while
the Swedish defense budget is around 1.2 %, both figures far below the NATO
requirement of 2 % one that only a few members meet.227 And with 3 Estonia, Latvia
and Lithuania in already NATO and forming a buffer with Russia, Sweden and
Finland can no longer count on the alliance aiding them simply because of their
strategic location. But as the Kremlin has made abundantly clear, the two countries
can expect grief from Russia if they do join NATO. Though the issue has come up
regularly, the two countries have held off joining the alliance for quite some time, and
public opinion of accession is unfavorable right now. 228 Sweden.

Russia is alarmed by the thought and has made it clear that it will view a
Swedish attempt to join NATO as a direct threat, and without doubts such a decision
by Sweden would have political, military and foreign policy consequences requiring
retaliatory measures from Russia will use rare talks with NATO next week to protest
the alliance's "absolutely unjustified" military buildup in the Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania , Russia's ambassador to Brussels said Friday, adding the alliance was

225
These actions have the potential to unnecessarily escalate tensions between countries, and could result in a
miscalculation or accident that could cause serious injury or death
226
while Swedish Foreign Minister Margot Wallström has signaled a tougher attitude towards Russia, she says
exploring NATO membership would send the wrong signals. Following the crisis in U. K. raine, Russian
military aircraft intrusions into or near Swedish airspace, and a submarine hunt in the Stockholm archipelago,
some 73 % now say they are concerned about developments in Russia.
227
http://www.politico.eu/article/sweden-finland-nato-russia-defense-nordic-military/
228
Sweden is already in the Partnership for Peace program with NATO and takes part in NATO exercises, but it
is not yet fully integrated and does not fall under the protection of Article 5, nor does it carry any obligations
toward NATO members.

210
using the Ukraine crisis as a pretext. The Russian and NATO ambassadors will meet
in Brussels on April 20 for their first formal talks in nearly two years to discuss
security issues, including the crisis in Ukraine where Russia is accused of backing
pro-Russian rebels against the pro-European Union government in Kiev. The
Federation of Russia’s actions against Republic of Ukraine represents a wake-up
call, questioning one of NATO’s main assumptions after the Cold War: that The
Federation of Russia no longer poses a threat. They therefore support the idea of
refocusing NATO on territorial defense in Europe and deterring The Federation of
Russia. Other analysts conclude that NATO was already experiencing an identity
crisis stemming from an unclear post-Cold War role, limited success in Afghanistan
and declining defense budgets. It is noteworthy that the United States of America will
maintain a continued presence of 9,800 troops through most of 2016 before drawing
down to 5,500 troops by January 2017. The United States of America will support the
continuation of the NATO mission in Afghanistan in 2016 and beyond, and continue
to consult with our NATO allies and partners to ensure that the USA and NATO
missions in Afghanistan are mutually supportive.229 North Atlantic Treaty
Organization the Wales Summit was an opportunity to address long-standing
questions about NATO’s raison d’être and future role (global positioning or
concentrating on European security). In any event, the summit has reaffirmed the
importance of transatlantic relations and of the continued US security presence in
Europe. The NATO-EU relationship has also been emphasized, with cooperation
between the two organizations now considered essential to addressing hybrid
threats.

229
The budget provides $41.7 billion in FY 2017 for Operation Freedom’s Sentinel — including funding to
support our posture in USACentral Command, the full funding of $3.4 billion to support the ANDSF, Afghan
National Defense and Security Forces

211
 Figure

http://ec.europa.eu/epsc/publications/notes/sn4_en.htm

2016 Summit meeting in Warsaw. NATO’s agreement on ‘adaptation’ and

‘reassurance’ measures was a central feature of the 2014 Wales Summit,230 which
confirmed that collective defense remains the core task of the Alliance.

230
From a Polish perspective, the NATO summit in Wales correctly addressed a new security reality. The
Alliance has started to refocus on its core mission and the decision to strategically enhance its eastern flank was
reached. Currently, a full, swift and firm implementation of the NATO summit conclusions, especially the
Readiness Action Plan, remains a priority.

212
The 2014 NATO Summit occurred in a challenging security context, marked by the
crisis in Republic of Ukraine (largely seen as a The Federation of Russia crisis),
growing instability in the southern neighborhood and rising transnational threats,
such as the so-called Islamic State. While Allied leaders were expected to
concentrate on NATO’s withdrawal from Afghanistan at the end of 2014, The
Federation of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and support for separatists in eastern
Republic of Ukraine changed the focus of the summit. With European security put
into question and growing concerns in central and eastern Europe over the
weakening of the security guarantee of the Washington Treaty’s Article 5 (collective
defense), NATO leaders examined the response to The Federation of Russia’s
involvement in the Republic of Ukraine crisis and re-engaged in the fundamental
debate over NATO’s strategic approach to The Federation of Russia, its deterrence
and defense posture as well as its core purpose (out-of-area operations or territorial
collective defense?) Besides the Summit Declaration, the Allies adopted several
documents, namely a Joint Statement of the NATO-Republic of Ukraine Commission;
a Declaration on Afghanistan and a Declaration on the Transatlantic bond. Collective
defense was reaffirmed as NATO’s core mission.231

Republic of Ukraine
Faced with the crisis in Republic of Ukraine, NATO has already taken
several measures: strengthening political and military cooperation with Republic of
Ukraine, as well as providing reassurance to eastern European Allies (e.g.
deployment of AWACS surveillance aircraft over Republic of Poland and Romania;
reinforcement of the Baltic air policing and the naval presence in the Baltic and Black
Seas; redeployment of troops for training and exercises in the region). At the summit,
the Allies reaffirmed NATO’s support for ‘Republic of Ukraine’s sovereignty,
independence and territorial integrity’, committed to furthering the NATO-Republic of
Ukraine Distinctive Partnership, and granted Republic of Ukraine €15 million package
of support measures to strengthen the country’s defense and security capacity.

231
Europe Diplomacy & Defense, Agence Europe Bulletin on CSDP and NATO, Nos 727 and 728, September
2014

213
Relations with The Federation of Russia
Since April 2014, all practical civilian and military cooperation with The
Federation of Russia has ceased and the US and EU have imposed a series of
economic sanctions. At the summit, NATO leaders condemned The Federation of
Russia’s actions in Republic of Ukraine, although stated that they remain open to
political dialogue with The Federation of Russia. They tried to define their approach
towards an increasingly assertive The Federation of Russia, but agreement on a
long-term strategy did not emerge from the summit. Even central European countries
have differed in their assessments: while some countries have called for economic
sanctions and the strengthening of NATO’s eastern flank, others have criticized such
measures for leading to an escalation in tensions.

The Readiness Action Plan and the Eastern Allies

NATO leaders have adopted a Readiness Action Plan (RAP), in particular with
the setting-up of a ‘spearhead unit’ (or ‘very high-readiness joint task force’) of 4 000
troops within the NATO Response Force able to deploy at short notice (within 48
hours). NATO maintains that these deployments will not breach its commitment to
The Federation of Russia not to permanently station ‘substantial combat forces’ in
central and eastern Europe. Other RAP measures include: pre-positioning of
equipment in the East (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, Republic of Poland and
Romania), increasing the frequency of exercises, more emphasis on advance
planning and response to ‘hybrid war’ (i.e. mix of military and non-military actions). In
June 2014, the US launched a $1 billion European Reassurance Initiative, still to
be approved by Congress, to ensure the continuing presence of US forces in the
region.

Afghanistan
According to James Appathurai (NATO), the Allies set out the next steps in
supporting Afghanistan after the end of the International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF) operation: in the short term, a training and advisory mission (‘Resolute
Support’); in the medium term, granting €46 billion to sustain Afghan forces; and in
the long term, Afghanistan becoming a political partner of NATO. Following the
presidential election, Afghan authorities signed the legal agreements allowing for a

214
number of US and NATO troops to stay in Afghanistan after 31 December 2014 and,
implicitly, for Operation Resolute Support.
Defense expenditure
The Allies agreed to stop, and reverse, the declining trend in defense
expenditure. European Allies committed to moving towards the 2% guideline and to
reach 20% for annual expenditure on new major equipment, including research and
development, within a decade. In 2013, the US provided 73% of NATO’s defense
budget, while only three European nations reached the 2% threshold (Estonia,
Greece and the U. K.). Ahead of the summit, some Allies set the aim of reaching 2%
by 2017 (Romania) or by 2020 (Lithuania and Latvia).

NATO’s Open Door policy and NATO partnerships

The Allies reaffirmed the importance of its Open Door policy (Article 10) and
the prospects for NATO membership for Georgia, Montenegro, the Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In particular, NATO adopted a
‘substantial package’ for Georgia, which includes defense capacity-building, training,
and enhanced interoperability opportunities. As concerns partnerships, the Allies
have adopted a ‘Partnership Interoperability Initiative’ and an Interoperability Platform
for NATO and partner forces to work better together. Five partners (Australia,
Finland, Georgia, Jordan and Sweden) will benefit from an Enhanced Opportunities
Program. The Allies also launched a Defense and Related Security Capacity-Building
Initiative to assist partners, at their request. The Allies had a first meeting with EU
and OSCE representatives, to ensure better coordination among international
organizations.
Enhanced cyber defense policy
The Allies adopted an ‘enhanced cyber defense policy‘, meant to improve
NATO’s governance of cyber-defense, create partnerships with industry, help
individual Allies to reinforce their cyber capabilities and focus more on training and
education. A novelty is the possibility to invoke Article 5 following a cyber-attack, thus
equating it with an ‘armed attack’ in certain situations.
Nevertheless, ambiguity persists about the exact conditions that would trigger an
Article 5 response and the nature of the response (military or cyber).

215
Other decisions
The summit endorsed the Framework Nations Concept, proposed by The The
Federal Republic of Germany, which aims at applying multinational cooperation to
defense planning and policy. Three groups of Allies have been formed, each
coordinated by a framework nation, dedicated to: capability development (The The
Federal Republic of Germany); the creation of a joint expeditionary force (U. K.), and
the improvement of several capability areas (Italy). NATO also committed to further
developing ballistic missile defense capabilities. Concerning the threat posed by
Islamic State, it emerged that NATO may have a potential role in supporting an
international coalition. Whether these measures have been sufficient to restore
NATO’s ability to deter and defend its members, especially along the Eastern flank,
remains a subject of ongoing debate in the lead-up to the 2016 Summit in Warsaw.
Defines a military doctrine as fundamental principles by which the military forces
guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in
application” NATO is fundamentally reassessing its defenses in Europe, particularly
in the East. In early 2015, allies agreed to establish new command centers in
Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Republic of Poland, and Romania. The outposts,
which are expected to open in 2016, will support a new rapid reaction force of about
five thousand troops. In a major crisis, military leaders say that up to two more
brigades, for a total NATO force of about thirty thousand, could be marshaled.
The NATO ‘Allied Shield’ exercise conducted in June 2015, which brought
under one framework four distinct exercises taking place along the Eastern flank of
the Alliance, totaling 15,000 personnel from 19 Members states and three partner
states. These exercises included a major naval exercise in the Baltic Sea,
amphibious assault operations in Sweden and Republic of Poland, and armored
maneuvers and other conventional force engagements involving US strategic aviation
in the Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and Republic of Poland. Allied Shield also saw
the first field deployment of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF)
designed to provide a response to low-level incursions into allied territory. This
activity was clearly intended to simulate the kinds of operations NATO forces would
need to engage in, in the context of a military crisis or confrontation with Russia
somewhere in the Baltic region.232

232
Some specific elements of exercises in NATO member states in 2014 and 2015 are clearly meant to send a
signal to Russia regarding NATO resolve. Perhaps the most glaring examples

216
The United States of America has shored up NATO's air presence over Republic of
Poland and the Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and other allies, including the U. K.,
The The Federal Republic of Germany, and Denmark, are providing reinforcements
as well. In 2014, allied jets intercepted The Federation of Russia warplanes more
than four hundred times without altercation.

NATO members are also bolstering security collaboration with Republic of

Ukraine, an alliance partner since 1994. But as a non-member, Republic of Ukraine
remains outside of NATO's defense perimeter, and there are clear limits on how far it
can be brought into institutional structures. The United States of America plans to
send an armored brigade to train troops in European Union Republic of Ukraine on
route clearance, counter-battery fire, and electronic warfare. Meanwhile, President
Barack Obama's administration is considering providing Kiev with lethal, defensive
weapons, but some European Union leaders worry this may escalate the conflict. In
the longer term, some defense analysts believe the alliance should consider
advancing membership to Finland and Sweden, two Partnerships for Peace countries
with a history of avoiding military alignment. (Nordic peers Denmark, Iceland, and
Norway are charter NATO members.) NATO should instead focus on developing a
new, public ‘Military Strategy’ document, which would provide a framework for
aligning all of the member states’ capabilities and posture to the new security
environment.

include the presence of armoured vehicles from the US Army’s Second Cavalry Regiment, as well as British,
Dutch, Spanish, Lithuanian, and Latvian troops at a military parade commemorating Estonia’s Independence
Day on February 24, 2015 in Narva – a town situated on the Estonian-Russian border and, for many, a symbol of
the vulnerability of the
Baltic States to a surprise attack.

217
Chapter VIII Contemporary military strategy of NATO’s allies

The Federation of Russia’s annexation of Crimea, and its activities in Republic

of Ukraine, serve as a warning to all states in the region concerning the indeterminate
nature of the Kremlin’s future actions and intentions Sweden’s government and
military maintain the official view that The Federation of Russia does not pose an
immediate direct threat, despite the Kremlin’s unpredictability regionally and the
increased activity of The Federation of The Federation Of Russia’s modernizing
armed forces in the High North and Baltic Sea areas. "We may not have a direct
threat to our national security, but we do need to prepare and plan for the future
having Sweden in NATO would strengthen security in the Baltic region. Having
Sweden outside the alliance just increases uncertainty. A Sweden in NATO would
also give us more influence over the security issues that concern us, and a place at
the table where the decisions that affect us are made. Sweden needs a road map for
NATO membership,"

Baltic leaders see Russia’s intervention in Ukraine as a potentially serious

precedent for future Russian actions against the Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
Russia’s statements declaring that it will protect ethnic Russians living outside the
Russian The Federation are of particular concern, given the large ethnic Russian
minorities in Estonia and Latvia. Russian naval maneuvers in the Baltic Sea that took
place at the time of Russia’s military intervention in Crimea were seen by regional
leaders as an attempt to put pressure on the Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
Furthermore, Lithuanian officials have accused Russian naval ships of harassing
Lithuanian civilian vessels in Lithuanian territorial waters in conjunction with a
Russian naval exercise held in May 2014. 233 Public sentiment in the Estonia, Latvia
and Lithuania is strongly anti-Russian in normal times, and has been exacerbated by
Russian actions in Ukraine. The public and most commentators are convinced that
Russian leaders would like to restore the territory lost in 1991 and that they still
consider the Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to be part of Russia’s sphere of interest.
Repeated Russian efforts, both overt and covert, to become involved in Baltic
domestic politics have further encouraged anti-Russian and nationalist attitudes. In
response, Baltic leaders have asked for and received assurances of an increased

233
For instance a Lithuanian fishing vessel was seized by Russian border guard vessels in international waters
near Kaliningrad in September 2014.

218
NATO presence in their region. Notably, to this end, President Obama has recently (3
September 2014) pledged in Estonia absolute non-discrimination in NATO collective
defense (Article 5) guarantees. The NATO nations have pledged additional presence
in the form of rapid rotation of troops from NATO states (including the United States
of America) through Republic of Poland and the Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania , where
they will participate in regular training and exercises but also provide
“persistent” presence as part of the European Reassurance Initiative. Maritime plans
include the deployment of a standing mine countermeasures group, increased Baltic
state participation in regular naval exercises, and planning for new naval exercises in
the Baltic Sea.

While Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania’ concerns about Russian interference in

the region are well placed, the likeliest form of threat is increased interference in
Baltic internal political affairs or covert actions, rather than direct military action.
Russia has a track record of promoting domestic instability in the Baltic, including
encouraging violence during incidents such as the Bronze Soldier protests in Tallinn
in 2007 and the annual protests on Latvian Legion Day. Russian intelligence
personnel are suspected of involvement in pro-Russian political parties and
movements in all three states. Russia may seek to use its influence and agents in the
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to destabilize domestic politics. These scenarios could
morph into an armed conflict over time. Baltic defense planners describe the range of
potential Russian actions in their region to include issuing Russian passports to
ethnic Russians living in the region, backing referendums on the status of the
Russian language in the Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and attempting to influence
Russians living in the region to support a scenario similar to the one taking place in
eastern Ukraine. Ethnic-based conflict is a possibility, given the lagging integration of
ethnic Russian and Russian-speaking populations in the region. Although recent
statements by Russian leaders about defending ethnic Russians abroad are likely to
feed distrust of local Russian populations, discrimination against these populations
will only serve to increase their resentment and make them more susceptible to the
Russian government’s influence. Covert actions, such as the recent kidnapping of an
Estonian security officer at a border post, are also seen as likely to continue. Latvia
and Estonia, with their large ethnic Russian populations, are seen as more vulnerable
than Lithuania in this regard.

219
 Baltic defense planners fear that these kinds of actions could lead to Russian
sponsorship of an insurgency in Latvia or Estonia that will be judged by NATO
leaders to fall short of a direct military attack, and thus leave the Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania to their own devices in dealing with a Russian-sponsored insurgency. While
statements made by President Obama during his visit to Tallinn and by NATO
leaders at the recent summit in Wales have made clear that NATO will defend the
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania from direct attacks, they have not indicated how the
alliance would respond to domestic instability or covert actions. Baltic planners
believe that a direct Russian military intervention is highly unlikely, both because of
the NATO security guarantee and because Russian military planning documents de-
emphasize the importance of the region for the Russian military. This is especially the
case in the maritime realm, where the Black Sea and Pacific Fleets remain the
primary focus of Russian naval development. Official Russian military journals and
publications argue that the primary purpose of the Baltic Fleet is to serve as a
location for new ships and submarines to be tested after launch and as a training
area for new sailors and officers.

Despite President Obama’s recent statements, Baltic leaders remain sensitive to the
possibility of abandonment by the NATO Nations given the lack of clarity on triggering
conditions for Article 5, and the extent of such a response should it occur. Statements in the
regional press suggest, while the symbolic significance of the president’s visit is well
received, there is interest in more tangible expressions of solidarity, e.g., the deployment of
military forces to bolster local defenses.

The Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania’ concerns about Russian interference in the region
are well placed. The European Reassurance Initiative provides an important set of signals
that the United States of America and NATO are serious about ensuring Baltic security and
will defend these countries from direct Russian aggression. These steps need to be
combined with reassurance from political leaders at the highest levels that NATO will also
provide support in the event that a Russian-sponsored insurgency is organized on part of the
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania ’ territory. Since Baltic State leaders and security officials
consider Russian efforts to destabilize these countries from within far more likely than a
direct military intervention, such reassurance will do much more for assuaging Baltic security
fears than the augmentation of military forces in the region. At the same time, Baltic leaders
need to know that the integration of ethnic Russian and Russian-speaking populations in
their countries must continue. Although recent statements by Russian leaders about

220
defending ethnic Russians abroad are likely to feed distrust of local Russian populations,
discrimination against these populations will only serve to increase resentment and make
these populations more susceptible to Russian government influence. EU and OSCE officials
need to make sure that integration programs continue and that local Russians are treated as
full and equal citizens throughout the Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

French Republic

The French government's decision to rejoin the integrated military command

structure of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) formalizes a decade-long
rethink of French military strategy and foreign policy. Under President Charles de
Gaulle, who perceived the alliance as dominated by the United States of America and
Britain, French Republic pulled its forces out of NATO in 1966 to pursue more
independent policies. The 2009 reversal, championed by French President Nicolas
Sarkozy, has broad support in the French policymaking community and the military,
though some dissent from traditional Gaullists persists. The full reintegration of
French forces into NATO's structure reflects The The French Republic’s view of a
changed world in which domestic security will rely on the ability to coordinate with
allies abroad. The move also acknowledges a diminished French ability to mount
significant expeditionary operations abroad without logistical and other support from
its closest allies, including the United States of America234 The size of the uniformed
component of the French army, now the largest in the European Union, is in line to
drop by 24 % over the next several years, a continuation of a trend which began at
the end of the Cold War and picked up pace when French Republic ended its
national draft in 2001. The doctrine makes clear The The French Republic’s nuclear
arsenal will be maintained and kept solely under French command. Sarkozy has
shown no signs of abandoning The The French Republic’s African patch, either.
When Sudanese rebels threatened to overthrow Chad's pro-Paris leader in 2008,
French Republic made it clear it was willing to intervene. Nor has Paris signaled an
intention to give up on power projection. French Republic operates Europe's only real
fixed-wing aircraft carrier, the Charles De Gaulle235, and even though a decision on a

234
http://www.cfr.org/French Republic/frenchmilitarystrategynatoreintegration/p16619
235
The Charles de Gaulle holds the distinction of being the only nuclear powered aircraft carrier outside the US
Navy. It may not be the largest carrier in the world at 250 m and 40,000 tons, but it’s the most powerful carrier
in its category. It carries a mixed air wing of Rafale-M and Super Etendard fighters, E-2 Airborne Early Warning
aircraft, NH90, Gazelle and Puma helicopters which enables it to project power for hundreds of kilometers
around it, thousands of kilometers from French soil. In fact, it is the only European carrier which is participating

221
second has been postponed, talks with Britain continue on a proposed jointly built
class of super carriers. Sarkozy in June 2008 told German officials he foresees
eventual formation of a European naval strike force with British and French carriers at
its core, and The The Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Spain, and a host of other
nations contributing frigates, submarines, and support vessels. Perhaps with Iran in
mind, Sarkozy announced that French Republic would build a new navy base in the
United Arab Emirates, and it has also ratcheted up efforts to sell its weapons
(NPR) in the region. Paris insisted on maintaining its place as one of three European
military forces (the other two are Britain and Russia) that can operate independently
on far-flung missions. Similarly, French Republic resisted the post-Cold War trend
toward downsizing and reorienting its forces, in part due to its insistence on
"independence" from the United States of America. French Republic continued to
conscript soldiers, for instance, right through the 1990s, long after most major
militaries went to an "all volunteer" system. The white paper concluded that the size
and capabilities of the French military no longer reflected the likely missions it would
undertake in the future. "There is no risk of an invasion today ... but on the other
hand we need to be able deploy forces to participate in the stabilization of regions or
zones in crisis French Republic, to date, had charted a very different course from
Britain. While the British, too, have insisted on "punching above their weight," since
1956 at least, closeness with America has underpinned their geopolitical thinking--"a
bond forged through the blood spilled together in the sands of Iraq and Afghanistan"--
as Britain's senior military officer, Gen. Sir Richard Dannatt, put it in a June 2008
speech. Laying out his own country's future military vision, he declared "we must
focus on operating with the United States of America, and not necessarily as the
United States of America." The implied criticism of The The French Republic’s more
independent stance would not have been lost on his audience. French Republic
defined its military role more independently, often summing up its posture with the
ambiguous phrase "friend, ally, non-aligned." USA-French Republic ties often
appeared strained, as in the run-up to the Iraq war, though practical cooperation
remained quite close. Still, French Republic opted out of the Iraq war, and aside from
a period just after 9/11 when French Special Forces operated in Afghanistan, largely
avoided that conflict, too.

in NATO ops from the past few years as other European nations lack a credible carrier force and it will continue
to do so for decades to come

222
The fundamental document DFT 3.2 Volume 1 (FT-03) is French Army doctrine at
the crossroads between recent documents (2013White Paper, the Concept for
Military Operations, the Doctrine on the Employment of Armed Forces) and the entire
doctrinal corpus of land forces necessary for developing combined arms maneuver. It
outlines the action of land forces in a most often multinational and interagency
joint operational environment. The French capstone concept CIA-01(A) _CEF
(2013)3236 bases military strategy on the notion of dynamic synergy of efforts.237
The employment of forces is directly linked to the use of force. The specificity of the
military is to fight in the name of the Nation. The use of force is regulated by rules of
command (especially Rules Of Engagement [ROE]) and by the law. The legitimacy of
an engagement is also determined by the purpose for which force will be used, and
by the behavior of the forces. Moreover, the legal dimension is always part of
operations, in various ways depending on their nature: intervention on the national
territory, crisis management, high intensity coercion action, etc. 114. LBDSN-2013
and CIA-01 refer to various concepts that are important to define so as to better
understand the consequences on the forces. Indeed, these considerations provide a
structure with significant effects on force employment. The operations community's
common understanding has to be precise. 238

President Francois Hollande and Minister for Foreign Affairs Laurent Fabius of
French Republic in September 2015 laid out The The French Republic’s foreign
policy priorities for the coming year, at the annual gathering of The The French
Republic’s chiefs of diplomatic mission in late August and at press conference held
by Mr. Hollande on September 7 2015239

236
CIA-01(A)_CEF(2013), Concept d'emploi des forces, no. 130/DEF/CICDE/NP as of 12 September 2013.
English version available: (FRA) JC-01_CCMO(2013) Capstone Concept for Military Operations.
237
Dynamic synergy of efforts involves greater interaction between strategic functions, greater ability to shift
effort between missions and between theatres, and increased flexibility in terms of organization, command and
action. It is a proper response to the military challenges of modern time. The armed forces are challenged more
than ever to become even more agile: agility in action, but most importantly, intellectual and doctrinal flexibility.
238

The three main missions defined in CIA-01 are likely to integrate actions of coercion (protecting the Nation
against any military threat, contributing to the settlement of situations threatening international peace and
security in compliance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter) or inherently include such actions (using coercion to
constrain the political will of a state adversary).
239
The The French Republic’s president enjoys strong prerogatives and, traditionally, few constraints on The
The French Republic’s foreign and security policies. The 1958 Constitution, enacted by the late General Charles
de Gaulle, makes the president the commander-in-chief of the military and enables him to nominate ambassadors
without prior consent from the Parliament.

223
 figure

Source:

French military ambitions are increasingly limited by the economic crisis and
The French Republic’s fiscal problems. As a %age of French GDP, defense is less of
a national priority today. (In 1997, the military budget equaled 2 % of GDP; today, it
stands at approximately 1.5 %.) That said, The The French Republic’s decision to
intervene in Mali this past year is a sober reminder of The The French Republic’s
need to maintain serious military capabilities to protect its interests and address the
existing gaps in needed capabilities. But the actual risk French Republic runs lies
less in the condition of today's French forces than in their future state. Essentially
freezing the defense budget for several years as planned will cost the French military
in a number of ways. By not replacing equipment in an orderly fashion, an increasing
portion of the defense budget will go to maintaining aging equipment; already, the
amount devoted to maintenance is up by 8 % in 2013. Indeed, according to the
French chief of the defense staff, estimates in 2013 for the availability of armored
personnel carriers, frigates, and combat planes would be 40, 48, and 60 %,
respectively. Mr. Hollande announced in April 2015 that The The French Republic’s
defense spending would grow by €3.8 billion Euros over the next four years, likely
bringing the country to around the NATO 2 % defense spending target.)

224
 Figure

Source: http://www.janes.com/article/51079/french-defense-budget-boost-swaps-a-7-cut-for-a-4-jump

Under static spending plans laid out by the Projet de Loi de Programmation
Militaire (LPM) 2014-2019, defense spending in French Republic would have
effectively been cut by 7% in real terms. The April announcement reverses this trend
and the defense budget will now reach EUR32.7 billion by 2019, a 4% increase in
real terms over the 2015 budget. Instead of French Republic spending sliding down
to 1.2% of GDP (excluding pensions), the defense budget will now be maintained at
1.4%.With pensions, spending will come to 1.8% of GDP, within striking distance of
the NATO mandate that members should spend 2% of GDP on defense The budget
calls for an increase from roughly $18.7 billion to over $19 billion for military
equipment, covering a number of deliveries slated for next year, including nine Rafale
fighters, three A400M transport aircraft, five Tiger combat helicopters, and six NH90
transport helicopters, along with a frigate, missiles for the frigate and a Barracuda
attack submarine, and 25 heavy vehicles.

Hence also The The French Republic’s multiple military interventions abroad
in the past few years, from Mali in 2013 to Operation Barkhane today in the Sahel
(where 3,000 French forces are fighting resurgent terrorist groups in Mali, Mauritania,
Burkina Faso, Chad, and Niger), and the assistance provided to the USA-led coalition

225
against the Islamic State. Paris’s decision to contribute to NATO’s Very High
Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), created in the aftermath of the Ukraine crisis in
September 2014 to speed the alliance’s reaction to future crises, and has
encountered some difficulties. A strong French contribution to the VJTF was seen by
some allies as a test of Paris’s real commitment to an organization into whose
military structures it only reintegrated in 2008. Despite a highly contested
environment, French Republic will contribute forces to the VJTF every year and will
lead it in 2021. The The French Republic’s foreign policy establishment believes that
globalization makes it hard for European countries—French Republic included—to
project power and stability without pooling their capacities and resources. Hence The
The French Republic’s strong support for EU common external and defense policies,
despite their obvious shortcomings The submarine fleet will eventually be re-
equipped with the M51 long range ballistic missile, and the ASMP nuclear missile
carried by the Mirage 2000N (and the Rafale after the turn of the century) will be
upgraded. The scale of all these programs has been reduced over original plans
however.

With the retirement of its tactical and strategic land based missiles, the bulk of
The The French Republic’s nuclear force rests with the Strategic Oceanic Force
(FOST - Force Océanique Stratégique) represented by the L'Inflexible and Le
Triomphant class strategic missile submarines. Each submarine has 16 ballistic
missiles240 The sea-based leg of the French nuclear force consists of four Le
Triomphant-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), based at Ile
Longue, Bretagne on the Atlantic coast. While at least one SSBN is always deployed,
three vessels must be operational at all times. [2] The submarines are fitted with 16
M45 or M51 domestically-manufactured SLBMs that can carry up to six TN75
warheads. 241[3] The French Navy is currently transitioning from the aging M45
SLBMs to newer M51s. The Euroepan Union submarine in the French fleet, Le
Terrible, entered into service in September 2010, and is fully equipped with the

240
The first L'Inflexible and was deployed on 1 April 1985. This class was actually an upgrade of the
existing Redoubtable class. The other three Redoubtables included in this upgrade were returned to service from
October 1987 and February 1993
241
Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, "Worldwide deployments of nuclear weapons, 2014," Bulletin of
the Atomic Scientists, September 2014, p. 98-99; "The Military Balance 2009," International Institute of
Strategic Studies, (London: Routledge, 2009), p. 119; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI
Yearbook 2013: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, 44th ed, Oxford University Press, 2013.

226
extended-range M51.1 (estimated at 6,000 km).242 [4] French Republic began to
place M51s on its remaining three SSBNs in 2010 with plans to complete the process
by 2020.243 It was not until the 1950s that French Republic embarked on a nuclear
weapons program; its first successful nuclear test was carried out in the Sahara
Desert of Algeria in 1960.244 The rationale for French Republic developing its own
nuclear weapons program has been largely attributed to reasons of security and
prestige. The The French Republic’s maintains up to 300 warheads and
deploys submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and fighter aircraft Some of
them are carried by 54 ASMP missiles; the medium-range air-to-surface cruise
missiles that French military doctrine says can be used as a last resort before a full-
scale nuclear war. The rest compose the three sets of 16 submarine-launched
ballistic missiles, the M45 and M51. French Republic is in the process of updating
both its sea and air-based nuclear forces pursuant to a new Military Programming
Law passed in December 2013.245 In February 2015, President François Hollande
announced that Paris would allocate 12.3 % (180 billion Euros) of its annual defense
budget towards the enhancement of its nuclear deterrent capabilities until 2019.246

In addition to the ongoing replacement of M45 SLBMs with the M51 on its Le
Triomphant-class SSBNs, French Republic aims to begin deployment of an improved
version, the M51.2, in 2016, which has a range of 9,000 km. The M51.2 will be
equipped with a new warhead known as the TNO. Paris has also initiated studies on
a third generation SSBN, with hopes of replacing its current vessels starting in 2035.
This new SSBNs will be armed with further improved M51.3 SLBMs. 247 French
Republic relies on nuclear deterrence as an ultimate guarantee of French
sovereignty. French officials describe the function of nuclear deterrence as "aiming to
protect [the country] from any form of state actor aggression against the [country's]

242
La dissuasion nucléaire," (The Nuclear Deterrent), Ministère de la défense (Ministry of Defense), last
modified April 16, 2013, accessed June 16, 2014, www.defense.gouv.fr; Stéphane Ferrard, "SNLE NG + M51 =
une capacité de frappe intercontinentale," Défense et Sécurité Internationale, No.36, April 2008.
243
Obert Norris, "French Nuclear Forces, 2008" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Vol. 64, No. 4 (September
2008).
244
http://www.nti.org/learn/countries/French Republic/nuclear/
245
Le ministère de la défense, (Ministry of Defense), "Loi n° 2013-1168 du 18 décembre 2013: Loi de
programmation militaire 2014-2019" (Military Programming Law), www.senat.fr.
246
Véronique Guillemard, "Dissuasion nucléair: la French Republic ne baisse pas la garde," Le Figaro, February
19, 2015, www.lefigaro.fr.
247
Jean-Yves Le Drian, "Discours de clôture, colloque pour les 50 ans de la dissuasion, " November 20, 2014,
www.defense.gouv.fr.

227
vital interests, regardless of its origin or its form." 248 Over the years, this core policy
has been reaffirmed by various presidents, (Chirac, Sarkozy, and Holland) as well as
in the 2008 and 2013 White Papers on National Defense and Security. [25] Although
the definition of The The French Republic’s vital interests is left vague, analysts
agree that it covers the free exercise of sovereignty as well as integrity of national
and overseas territories, and extends beyond the protection against nuclear attack. 249

The The Federal Republic of Germany

The The Federal Republic of Germany has deemphasized its military after its
two disastrous defeats in the 20th Century. After its decisive defeat and partition, for
much of the last century, The The Federal Republic of Germany existed as two
states—one that was free and democratic and another that existed under a despotic
communist regime.250 On the issue of Ukraine, and what to do about Russian
activities in the Crimea and eastern Ukraine, when asked if it is more important to be
tough with Russia or to have a strong economic relationship with Russia, half of
Germans voice the view it is more important to be tough. The Germans perceive
Putin government as authoritarian and nationalist in character. The aim of
authoritarianism at home is to maintain the integrity of the Russian empire – for the
Russian The Federation is both an empire and a state – and thus the power of
Russia in international relations. Putin’s ultimate objective is to reconstitute the Soviet
Union, the collapse of which he has called ‘the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of
the last century Putin’s regime has given rise to much alarm in The The Federal
Republic of Germany. The The Federal Republic of Germany has close relations with
Russia and needs them to be good. Close relations arise out of The The Federal
Republic of Germany’s ‘Mittellage’: its place in the centre of Europe. Russia is its
most powerful neighbor to its East. The need for good relations was driven home
very painfully by The The Federal Republic of Germany’s terrible defeat at Russia’s
hands in the Second World War, a defeat which ended its bid for European

248
Livre blanc de la défense et sécurité nationale, May 2013, p. 20, www.gouvernement.fr.
249
In September 1996, Paris signed and two years later ratifiedthe Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and
dismantled its nuclear testing sites at the Pacific Testing Center (CEP) in 1998
250
Both states maintained formidable forces during the Cold War—in fact, the Euroepan nion German
Bundeswehr was a very well equipped force. Federal Republic of Germany was reunited toward the end of the
Cold War—and almost immediately reduced its forces to the bare minimum.

228
dominance, cost it much of its territory and caused The The Federal Republic of
Germany to be divided into two states for almost half a century. The German policy-
making establishment is powerfully influenced by the memory of how the country’s
division was overcome. The strength of the alliances into which the Federal Republic
had entered over the Cold War period was shown during the revolutionary year 1989-
90; its partners supported its bid for reunification and helped to determine the terms
on which it took place. The good relations with the Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev,
developed by the then European Union German chancellor, Helmut Kohl, helped in
1990 to persuade Gorbachev that a reunited The The Federal Republic of Germany
would not threaten Russia. For the German policy-making elite, Russia’s policy raises
three sets of issues: political, military and economic. The policy problem is that these
different issues present it with conflicting challenges. Putin’s political course is
objectionable to them, and to the German people, because it runs counter to the
entire trend of German foreign policy since the end of the Second World War: that of
commitment to democracy, respect for international obligations and human rights,
and adherence to multilateralism, especially in the resolution of bitter disputes. The
natural instinct of the German political class is to distance itself from Putin’s coercive
anti-democratic course. It knows that the German people expect this of it.251 The The
Federal Republic of Germany does not want the policy of military confrontation which
appeals to the United States of America. Together with French Republic, it resisted
the idea of Ukrainian and Georgian membership at the NATO summit in April and the
United States of America had to back down. The The Federal Republic of Germany
has a different view of how influence should be brought to bear on Russia. As with
the GDR in the last two decades of the Cold War, The The Federal Republic of
Germany favors engaging it. It believes that the Putin regime will not be able to stop
the trend towards democratization which began in Russia in the late 1980s; the
regime is too weak to maintain a situation in which the people have the vote but the
government has all the power. It sees here a parallel with the fragility of the GDR
regime and believes that engaging Russia, despite its breaches of international
public law, will nurture the confidence of Russians in European Union liberal
democracy. It seeks trade contacts as ways of binding Russia in to European Union
economic institutions.

251
http://www.e-ir.info/2008/05/26/what-to-do-about-russia-the-german-view/

229
 Figure

A new round of significant economic sanctions on Russia would harm German

businesses and the European Union's economy as a whole. Although German
Chancellor Angela Merkel has blamed Russia publicly for facilitating some of the
ongoing fighting in Ukraine, recently she has advocated adding separatist leaders to
the EU sanctions list and opposed an extension of sanctions that affect Russia's
economy. The German government is influential not only in the European Union, but
also in Kiev. Berlin will play a central role in determining the level of much-needed
financial aid and political support Ukraine will receive from the European Union.
Moreover, key members of the pro-European Union alliance in Kiev have
longstanding ties to The The Federal Republic of Germany and German institutions.
Putin's suggestion that Kiev must be influenced to cooperate in future negotiations is
an indirect reference to this relationship. The Kremlin is aware of The The Federal
Republic of Germany's ties to Ukraine and of Berlin's need to maintain good relations
with Russia. These relationships motivate The The Federal Republic of Germany to
continue acting as a mediator in efforts to alleviate tensions in eastern Ukraine

The The Federal Republic of Germany is encouraged in this policy by its dependence
on Russia for energy supplies and export markets. The The Federal Republic of

230
Germany and Russia are natural trading partners: The The Federal Republic of
Germany supplies Russia with high-quality manufactured goods and in return obtains
from Russia industrial raw materials, particularly energy. Since the oil shocks of the
1970s, The The Federal Republic of Germany has tried to decrease its dependence
on Middle Eastern oil and is heavily reliant on Russian gas.

In spite of The The Federal Republic of Germany’s long-standing economic and

energy ties with Russia, only about a third (35%) says a strong economic relationship
is more important. Notably, younger Germans (53%), ages 18 to 29, are much more
supportive of standing up to Russia over Ukraine than are older Germans (36%),
ages 65 and older.252

Figure

Source: PEW

252
In Federal Republic of Germany, supporters of the left-of-center Social Democratic Party (39%) are more
likely than adherents of the right-of-center Christian Democratic Union and Christian Social Union (23%) to
voice the view that the USA is being too tough on Russia. And East Germans (27%) are more likely than
Euroepan nion Germans (16%) to say that the EU is being too tough.
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/05/11/americans-and-germans-differ-on-approach-to-russia/

231
 For a long time, German business organizations have—albeit grudgingly—
declared their willingness to bow to the “primacy of politics” in the Ukraine crisis.
However, following the imposition of tough sanctions against Russia, which have also
had a telling effect on the German economy and threaten to throw Europe back into
recession, they are now breaking their silence. They advocate a foreign policy that
allows German politics and big business to pursue their own interests independently,
and not—as Steingart calls it—as a “vassal” of the United States of America. This
course would inevitably lead to an arms build-up, militarism and eventual open
conflict with the US and other imperialist powers. The Federal Republic of
Germany retains a capable industrial base that builds the world best tank in the
Leopard 2 and is also developing the new Leopard 3. The country also builds
conventional submarines—which are still referred to as U-boats like their WWII
counterparts. Operational German forces are well trained and are relatively well
equipped. But for obvious reasons, the Germans are very reluctant to get involved in
out of area military operations—though they have participated in some operations in
Afghanistan.

New published a strategy paper under the title “New Power, New
Responsibility: Elements of a German Foreign and Security Policy for a Changing
World” in the fall of 2013 provided a template for the return of German militarism
German Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen in February 2015 on Tuesday stated
the adoption of a new military and security strategy for The The Federal Republic of
Germany. Her speech, on the occasion of the first meeting of those preparing the
“White Paper 2016,” underscored the turn by the German ruling elite to an aggressive
foreign policy 70 years after the end of the Second World War. Von der Leyen
announced her first weapons deal the same day as her speech. The Defense
Ministry plans to purchase 138 helicopters for the army, including 80 multi-purpose
NH90 helicopters and 40 “Tiger” combat helicopters. The deal will cost 8.7 billion
Euros. Defense Minister Thomas de Maiziere on Thursday (16.05.2013) announced
that the Bundeswehr is to get in shape for dealing with new forms of military threats
as s well as a changed demographic and financial context. Structures have to be
slimmed down to reach the target of a smaller professional army. In future, there are
to be no more than 240,000 soldiers and civilians employed by the Bundeswehr. That
means the number of soldiers will be cut down to 180,000 while some 31 facilities

232
and bases are to be shut down. Investment into the military is being reviewed. Large
military equipment like tanks and fighter jets will need to be reevaluated. A new field
will be a division for strategic intelligence (KSA) to launch attacks via the Internet.
The Bundeswehr would thus be able to join the cyber war with computer worms and
viruses. The goal of the restructuring is that the Bundeswehr will remain to get the
soldiers prepared for their new array of challenges. That includes aid in areas of
catastrophe, fighting international terrorists, evacuation of German citizens and
international employment as part of EU or UN missions - a new focus that requires a
restructuring of the troops into smaller, more flexible and better trained units.
Cooperation with other countries' forces will also need to be improved so that
missions like the one in Afghanistan or the anti-piracy mission off the horn of Africa
can be done in close and effective cooperation with the international partners. The
Bundeswehr wants to be able to send out some 10,000 troops in up to two
concurrent missions. In addition to that there are to be troops ready for rapid
intervention missions led by NATO or the EU. For those goals, some 50,000 soldiers
would be needed.

Figure

Source:

Plans to provide the German Army 131 more Boxer armored personnel
carriers have passed the German Bundestag. On Wednesday, the
parliament's budget committee approved the procurement of the APCs, a Defense

233
Ministry spokesman confirmed. The wheeled fighting vehicles carry a price tag of
€654 million (US $709 million), including 19 % VAT, parliamentary sources
confirmed. While around €566 million will be spent on the vehicles, about €47 million
is earmarked for weapon stations. European armaments agency OCCAR will
implement the project. The vehicles in the configuration A2, which come with better
protection than previous batches, are due for delivery from 2017 to 2021. Lithuania
announced its intention to order 88 Boxers in infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) versions
with a 30 mm cannon and anti-tank missiles. The State Defense Council selected the
vehicle for the 8X8 requirement on Dec. 11. Those deliveries are set for 2017 through
2020. Lithuania has already established military links to The The Federal Republic of
Germany. Its MoD announced plans a few months ago to buy 22 German self-
propelled howitzers and about 30 more vehicles from German surplus stocks.

The German Army's new Boxers will be configured as APCs with a light
weapon station that can hold either a machine gun or an automatic grenade
launcher. The vehicles will replace the wheeled APCs Fuchs (Fox) of the Army's
infantry battalions and are tailored to fit in with the advanced Future Soldier project
(IdZ-ES) used by infantry squads. The German Army now has 200 Boxers, which
have already been used to some extent in Afghanistan. The delivery of more 72
ambulance vehicles to the Medical Corps is ongoing. All buy three of these all have
been delivered, said Artec Manager Stefan Lischka. With the handover of the
remaining three in the first quarter of 2016, the delivery will be finished nine months
ahead of schedule. In addition to the Bundeswehr, the Dutch armed forces employ
the Boxer, of which 200 were ordered to Dutch specifications.

German forces not only want to upgrade their infantry units but also want to
improve their tank fleet. Army Inspector Vollmer announced that in the future, two out
of six German tank battalions – each with 44 vehicles – are to be equipped with the
most modern Leopard 2 A7 main battle tank (MBT). The other units will keep Leopard
A6s, he said. The Army already uses 20 of the latest version of the MBT In 2015 the
German MoD announced intentions to buy back 100 secondhand Leopard 2 from
industry to increase the Army's total stock to 328. According to sources familiar with
the subject, most of these tanks will be upgraded to the level A7, while the remaining

234
ones can be used as platforms for engineering vehicles and the like. However, it is
unclear when the upgrading process will start.253

The German government in March 2015 has approved plans to increase defense
spending by 6.2 % over the next five years — an extra €8 billion (US $8.5 billion) by 2019. In
2016, the defense budget will rise by €1.2 billion to €34.2 billion. The extra funds will allow
the defense ministry to push ahead with plans to reform and expand its armed forces as well
as commit to a "widened NATO engagement," according to the draft budget. That includes
involvement in the NATO response force to the ongoing conflict between Russia and
Ukraine, which Merkel has warned could take a long time to resolve. The The Federal
Republic of Germany currently spends about 1.2 % of GDP on defense — less than the 2 %
recommended by NATO for members of the alliance. The The Federal Republic of Germany
is playing a leading role in the buildup of NATO in Eastern Europe directed against Russia. It
will participate in the newly established Very High Readiness Joint Task Force with up to
2,700 soldiers who can be made operational within a 48-hour period. Since the beginning of
this year, leadership of the Rapid Response Force (NRF) has rested with the 1 German-
Netherlands Corp in Münster. According to the official web site of the German military, 4,000
German soldiers committed to the NRF were certified last year as “combat ready.” At the
core of the German troops of the NRF is Armored Infantry Battalion 371 from Marienberg,
which has been prepared for “treaty-obligated deployment” since the end of 2013. The NATO
buildup in Eastern Europe is not the only project to be financed with the new funds. The
German elite are constructing an army with which they can defend their geostrategic and
economic interests worldwide. Another point in the key issues document is euphemistically
called “additional expenditures globally for investments in our future” and estimated to cost a
further €300 million per year254

253
http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/land/vehicles/2015/12/17/Federal Republic of Germanys-army-
procures-new-boxer-armored-personnel-carriers/77491026/
254
https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2015/03/20/bund-m20.html

235
Figure

Source:

Under the approved the 2016 budget and financial planning cycle until 2019
on 1 July plans, the 2016 defense budget is to rise by 4.2% compared with 2015
levels. In total the planning cycle envisages a further EUR8 billion (USD8.9 billion)
being spent on defense over the 2015-2019 period. Spending on defense currently
stands at EUR32.947 billion for 2015, rising to EUR34.366 billion in 2016, and ending
the planning period at EUR35.176 billion in 2019. Meanwhile, to commemorate 60
years of German NATO membership on 30 June, German defense minister Ursula
von der Leyen pledged to support the NATO 2% of GDP defense spending guideline.
Current annual defense expenditure stands at about EUR33 billion, or 1.2% of
national GDP. Given current economic trends a German defense expenditure equal
to 2% of GDP would amount to EUR58 billion

Great Britain

Britain is still a formidable force—but it’s not the globe spanning juggernaught
that held a dozen civilizations under its thrall. The United Kingdom still maintains a
nuclear arsenal, but the missiles are supplied by the United States of America. It also
needs the United States of America to conduct nuclear testing—should anyone ever

236
start such tests ever again. Meanwhile, Britain’s once mighty defense industrial base
is a shadow of its former self. The British aerospace industry that once produced the
Spitfire and Gloster Meteor are mostly gone. Instead, the U. K. must partner with the
USA and other European powers to build its hardware. Protecting the U. K. Includes
having the capacity to deter and defeat military threats or incursions. Protection
encompasses the integrity of the U. K., its territorial waters and airspace, and
provides support to other government departments (termed military aid to civil
authorities in matters of security and law enforcement. Military aid to civil authorities
may also involve limited manpower to assist local authorities during unforeseen
contingencies or more significant resources to assist the civil power in countering, for
example, terrorism. If a direct military threat to the U. K. mainland occurs,
appropriate forces (either national or with allies and partners) would be provided to
confront the specific threat and to deter further aggression. In most cases, it is
anticipated that any substantial threat to the U. K. would involve using armed forces
in a large-scale alliance or coalition operation. The U. K. also has recourse to
strategic nuclear systems. Under Chapter VII, Articles 43 and 45 of the UN Charter,
all members are to make available armed forces to contribute to maintaining
international peace and security. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council
responsible for making the decision to use armed force in response to threats to the
peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression, the U. K. has a particular
responsibility to act. Membership of NATO involves political obligations (under the
terms of the Washington Treaty) which may include assisting an ally, even if the U.
K.’s security is not directly threatened. Also (or alternatively) the EU may request
member states to take action (under the modified Brussels Treaty) in certain
circumstances. Armed forces may also be deployed as part of a multinational force in
a wide variety of operations as a result of decisions taken, and direction, given by the
North Atlantic Council or the EU Council of Ministers.
Even its once world beating shipbuilding capability has atrophied to the point where
the U.K. was forced to ask General Dynamics to help build the Astute-class submarine
Today, Britain maintains a fleet of 19 surface combatants, four ballistic missile subs and six
attack boats. It also has an amphibious assault ship. But until the Queen Elizabeth-class
carriers are complete—it has no operational aircraft carriers. The two new carriers will carry
the American developed F-35B Joint Strike Fighter—but threatens to cannibalize the rest of
the fleet due to their expense.

237
The British army is well trained and well equipped with Challenger 2 main battle tanks
and Warrior fighting vehicles. It also flies the Apache gunship. British special
operations forces such as the Special Air Service are almost legendary and remain
formidable255 The Royal Air Force has roughly 220 combat aircraft—about 120
Typhoon air superiority fighters and 100 Tornado bombers. It will eventually get some
number of F-35B strike fighters. It also has AWACS and ground surveillance aircraft.
It’s small but well trained—but not what it used to be during Britain’s heyday.

Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01, U. K. Defense Doctrine (U. K.) (5th Edition)
outlines the broad philosophy and principles underpinning how Defense is employed.
U. K. is the basis from which all other subordinate national doctrine is derived.256
British national security encompasses the safety of our state and protecting it from
external and internal threats. It also requires us to Endeavour to preserve the security
of U. K. nationals living overseas. External threats may lead to invasion, attack or
blockade. Internal threats may include terrorism, subversion, civil disorder,
criminality, insurgency, sabotage and espionage. Other threats include instability
caused by financial crisis, climatic events, cyber or other forms of attack on critical
national infrastructure and the possibility of pandemic disease. Great Britain cannot
maintain security in isolation; therefore national security is both integrated within, and
dependent upon, all European neighbors’ and partners’ security.257 Collective
security is an essential pillar of the U. K.’s overall security strategy. This is promoted
through our membership of NATO, close relationships with the USA and French
Republic, the Five Powers Defense Arrangement, and membership of major
international organizations such as the UN, EU and the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe. The Government’s national security priorities are decided
using the National Security Strategy (NSS) and by Strategic Defense and Security
Reviews (SDSRs), both led by the NSC. The SDSR identifies the means and ways
across Government which are needed to deliver the ends described in the NSS. The
255
http://www.nationalinterest.org/feature/europes-4-deadliest-military-powers-12214?page=2
256
The document basically provides an overview of strategy. It outlines concepts of security, national interests,
understanding and the link between strategy and policy. Chapter 1 also describes the instruments of national
power, crisis management and the levels of warfare.
257
See more Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01
U. K. Defense Doctrine; Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01 (JDP 0-01) (5th Edition), dated November 2014, As a
permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, the U. K. has an important role, and/or
responsibility, in maintaining the international world order. To enhance mutual international security and
prosperity, the U. K. also seeks to extend its influence internationally by collaborating on a broad agenda of
issues and challenges. Our ability to project and employ our Armed Forces is one factor within this multilateral
system.

238
Government has committed to producing a new NSS and SDSR every five years.
Defense policy establishes the ends of military strategy and shapes the structures
and capabilities of Defense’s contribution to national objectives within resource and
other constraints. U. K. and Defense interests and objectives must be articulated
clearly to provide the baseline for making decisions. Defense strategy constitutes
Defense’s overall contribution to national strategy and is a subset of it. It is a
Department of State function, owned by the Secretary of State for Defense. Its
delivery is the joint responsibility of the Permanent Under Secretary (PUS) and Chief
of the Defense Staff (CDS). National strategy articulates national policy objectives
and the routes by which government departments, in combination, will deliver them.
Defense strategy translates the responsibilities allocated to Defense to more specific
outcomes and the outputs required to deliver them.258 Military strategy is a subset of
Defense strategy. It directs the use of the military instrument where it has been
identified by the Government as part of a U. K. response to a specific challenge.
Military strategy is a strategic headquarters function, owned by CDS and led on his
behalf by Deputy Chief of the Defense Staff (Military Strategy and Operations). The
NSS and SDSR inform strategy formulation. The SDSR process is overseen by PUS
and CDS, supported by Vice Chief of the Defense Staff. This is closely coordinated
with other government departments and includes our contribution to reviewing the
National Security Risk Assessment every two years. Each SDSR outlines the main
parts of an affordable force structure, which is planned for delivery in ten years time,
based on planning assumptions. The SDSR generates a defense strategic direction
document, which translates the outcome into long-term planning direction. The
interpretation of this direction for the next five years, particularly in terms of allocating
resources, is set out in the Defense Plan.259

Sweden’s defense command in March 2016 has responded to the growing

unpredictability of a changed security landscape in the greater Baltic Sea area by
toughening up the Military Strategy Doctrine (MSD) under which the Swedish Armed
Forces (SAF) deals with threats against the country’s sovereignty. The new doctrine
shifts the emphasis of national defense from a post-Cold War era strategy largely
based on containment to a more aggressive model that will deploy advanced

258
Defense strategy directs how Defense will develop over time based on the anticipated requirements of the
future operating environment, balanced against the reality of finite resources and the need to prioritise.
259
https://www.gov.U. K. /government/publications/defense-plan-2010-2014

239
weapons systems and modern warfare forces as part of a "sustained" and
coordinated high-impact strike against attackers. The revised MSD formats a
framework under which the defense of Sweden can be conducted either "alone" or
potentially in collaboration with multinational Nordic, European Union or NATO
forces. Sweden considers adopting a Total Defense strategy that would extend the
SAF’s mission-based mandate to bolstering air-defense and anti-submarine
capabilities, as well as cyber warfare counterstrike technologies and capacities. This
envisaged Total Defense structure would run parallel to building closer bilateral and
general defense cooperation agreements with Nordic Defense (NORDEFCO) partner
nations, including nonaligned Finland and NATO-member states Norway, Denmark,
Iceland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania Sweden has also moved to strengthen military
partnerships with NATO, the U.S. and the EU, as well as pursuing single interstate
defense cooperation agreements with neighborhood states like Poland

240
Chapter IX Contemporary military strategy of Republic of Poland

In November 2014 was signed into law a new national defense strategy that
addresses an intensifying policy of confrontation by The Federation o Russia and
threats to regional security from the conflict in Ukraine. The new plan involves
defense, political, and economic structures on all levels. It states that The Federation
of Russia has become a negative factor for regional security because of the
rebuilding of its power status at the expense of its surroundings and The Federation
of Russia’s intensifying policy of confrontation as shown not only by its seizure of the
Crimea Peninsula from Ukraine but also sponsoring rebels in Donbas region.

In October 2015 Republic of Poland’s Defense Ministry launched its much-

awaited Regional Security Assistance Program to help Eastern European armament
efforts by providing government, bank and export loans to purchase equipment, and
through non-commercial transfers of weapons by 2022, the program is expected to
boost defense and industrial cooperation with the Visegrad Group countries —
Republic of Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and the Czech Republic — as well as
Romania, Bulgaria and the three Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia of Lithuania, Latvia and
Estonia. The amount of the funds that are to be made available to these countries
has not been disclosed yet One of the first procurements to benefit could be
Slovakia’s plan to acquire 30 eight-wheel-drive Rosomak armored modular vehicles
from Polish state-run manufacturer Rosomak. The vehicle is produced in Republic of
Poland under a license obtained from Finland’s Patria. The move is part of a
comprehensive strategy by Republic of Poland to enhance regional defense and
security cooperation.

The National Security Strategy is the most important document on the security
and defense of the Republic of Republic of Poland. It is adopted by the government
and approved by the president. The strategy is the basis for the development of more
detailed documents such as the political and strategic defense directive. This paper
presents the goals of the latest version of the Security Strategy of the Republic of
Republic of Poland. The new National Security Strategy of the Republic of Republic
of Poland documents the most serious change in the national security policy so far,
involving the acknowledgement by the highest authorities of the country and saving

241
in a strategic document that, for the first time since independence in 1989, we may
be threatened with war.260 After the meeting in March 2015 of the Polish National
Security Council, stated that he would endorse change of the NATO strategic
concept in the light of the The Federation of Russia threat. During the meeting of the
Council of Ministers the government has adopted new Strategy for National Security
for the Republic of Republic of Poland, which has been created by the Minister of
Defense. The document covers the issues which are related to the widely understood
security of the Republic of Republic of Poland. It also takes the possible The
Federation of Russia Threat into account. The meeting of the National Security
Council covered the issue of changes that have been introduced into the The
Federation of Russia national security doctrine. The Federation of Russia decided to
adopt a confrontation stance towards the EU and in a response, both allied, as well
as the national defense systems should be reinforced.

The military composition of the Land Forces261, their organizational structure

and skills should enable them to face any form of military threat anywhere in Republic
of Poland. The national defense strategy anticipates that the Land Forces shall
participate in the realization of tasks resulting from Republic of Poland's international
obligations related to security, peace and humanitarian missions as well as natural
disaster recovery operations.

260
http://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/Republic of Poland-s-contemporary-national-security-the-goals-of-the-
national-security-strategy#ixzz43vs6yeQI
261
Polish Special Forces Consists of the following under joint command: a. Special Forces Command
Headquarters – Krakow b. Operational Mobile Reaction Group (GROM) – Gdans c. Operational Mobile
Reaction Group (GROM) – Republic of Poland d. 1st Special Commando Regiment – Lubiniec e. Naval Special
Operations Regiment - Gdynia

242
 Figure

Source:http://www.armedforces.co.uk/Europeandefense/edcountries/countrypoland.htm#Polish
Army

In January 2016, Defense Minister Antoni Macierewicz said that Republic of

Poland's armed forces, which currently numbered about 95,000 personnel, would
grow to 150,000 in the coming years. Minister announced 20 April 2016 that the
Polish army had plans to increase in size in the coming years. Speaking to
journalists at the opening of a new headquarters for NATO Force Integration Unit
(NFIU) in Bydgoszcz, central Republic of Poland, Macierewicz said that the army
would grow by at least 50%, and would include both new territorial defense forces
and operating units.262 The three new territorial defense brigades will be deployed
by the beginning of 2017, Macierewicz clarified. The reason for the massive
planned increase, the minister claimed, was the "threat from Russia, and its
occupation of parts of Ukraine.

According to ex president Komorowski, one of the most worrying issues

contained in the The Federation of Russia military doctrine stems from the fact, that
the new strategy legitimizes option of inflicting pressure on the neighboring
countries. Current NATO strategic doctrine, adopted back in 2010, assumes that
Mid-Eastern European Union is a calm area, within which there is little or no danger
of conventional attacks. According to the doctrine which is currently in force, NATO
is to expand its cooperation with The Federation of Russia, also within the scope of
anti-missile defense systems.

262
http://www.pap.pl/en/news/news,508358,army-to-grow-by-at-least-50-percent---minister.html

243
 The document defines Republic of Poland’s strategic security goals, and
indicates security policy priorities. Republic of Poland focuses its strategic efforts
mainly on ensuring security to its citizens and its territory, supporting defense of the
allies, and then on participation in reacting to threats outside the allied territory.
Republic of Poland will support NATO’s consolidation around the defense function,
including strategic strengthening of its eastern flank. Our country will support
actions aimed at maintaining the American security guarantees for European
Union, as well as US military presence in European Union, including Republic of
Poland.

Figure

http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/2399022/posts

What will be important in relations with The Federation of Russia will be

solving difficult issues, including international public law standards. The strategy
emphasizes that rebuilding its imperial status by The Federation of Russia at the cost
of its surroundings and an increase in confrontation policy, which is exemplified by
the conflict with Ukraine, including the annexation of Crimea, have a negative
influence on security in the region. New strategy is to completely cover the issues of
national security and indicate the optimal ways of using any state resources in order

244
to realize goals within the spheres of: defense, society, protection and economy”. The
preceding strategy of national security adopted in 2007 is to be valid until the
moment when the new document created by the Council of Ministers enters force on
21st October 2015.

The new strategy takes the The Federation of Russia threat into account,
particularly due to the The Federation of Russia attempts to reconstruct The
Federation of Russia’s superpower position in the region. There is a risk of local and
regional conflicts in direct vicinity of Republic of Poland, and threats for the Republic
of Republic of Poland may be of both military and non-military character. Any large
scale conflict is considered to be less plausible; however threat of armed activity
“below the threshold of classic war” has been taken into account.

National Security Strategy sets three priorities of the Polish security policy.
Polish Authorities will be focused on creating the national capabilities within the
scope of own security and NATO reinforcement, as well as within the defense and
security policy of the EU and strategic relationship with the partner states, including
USA. The strategy will also support widely understood security activities undertaken
by the international community, including the United Nations. When it comes to the
national capabilities Republic of Poland is to focus its strategic efforts mainly on
providing security to its own citizens and territory, considering support of the allied
defense capabilities and acting against threats located beyond the NATO territory.
The Polish authorities are particularly concerned about the areas of security policy,
within which allied (joint) operations may become difficult.

Within the scope of the second priority, Republic of Poland aims at reinforcing
the NATO defense capabilities and NATO eastern flank. It has been emphasized that
cooperation with the US is of paramount significance (including support for the US
presence in European Union). Additionally it has been underlined that there is a need
of maintaining a close cooperation with the neighboring countries and a need to
increase the political integrity. The activities undertaken by the Polish government will
also aim at “deepening the integration processes of the EU in a way which would

245
provide sufficient security potential, including defense capabilities”.263 In order to
realize the third priority, reinforcement of the UN and reconstruction of the
Organization for Security and Co-operation264 in European Union will be needed.
Additionally law enforcement within the arms control area needs to be executed more
effectively. In accordance with the strategy the Polish authorities will execute defense
activity (in the military sphere), which aims at maintaining and demonstrating multi-
faceted readiness of the country to react to the military threats to the Polish
independence and territorial integrity. Another primary goal is to protect Republic of
Poland, including provision of conditions which would make it possible to maintain
common security and public order, along with internal stability of the country and
functioning of the critical infrastructure. Last, but not least, the strategy will have a
social dimension which is to be focused on creating safe conditions in which the
citizens would live. This strategy assumes that certain preparations needs to be
undertaken,inter alia within the scope of tightening the way the Polish security system
functions in the military and non-military, as well as in the external area.265

The strategic concept states that cooperation with The Federation of Russia
shall be based on the NATO-The Federation n of Russia Founding Act on Mutual
Relations, Cooperation and Security266, signed back in 1997. Provisions of this
document have been breached by The Federation of Russiae. Because of
annexation of Crimea and subsequent armed activity in the eastern part of Ukraine.
In the light of annexation of Crimea NATO has decided to suspend its cooperation
with The Federation of Russia. Since the start of The Federation of Russia’s military
operation in Syria, there have been numerous reports regarding an upsurge in NATO

263
http://www.defense24.com/news_polish-government-adopts-new-strategy-for-national-security
264
The OSCE has a comprehensive approach to security that encompasses politico-military, economic and
environmental, and human aspects. It therefore addresses a wide range of security-related concerns, including
arms control, confidence- and security-building measures, human rights, national minorities, democratization,
policing strategies, counter-terrorism and economic and environmental activities. All 57 participating States
enjoy equal status, and decisions are taken by consensus on a politically, but not legally binding basis
265
The basic tasks are related to establishing the legal and organizational background for the integrated national
security system as well as implementation of rules and procedures of strategic national security control, which
will be unified in any state of national security.
266
the red line for the alliance's increased presence in Eastern Europe is the 1997 Founding Act on Mutual
Relations between NATO and Russia. It states that the alliance will not engage in "additional permanent
stationing of substantial combat forces" in the areas of the former Eastern Bloc. In principle NATO should be
stationing a substantial force, sufficient to give full assurance to the threatened Eastern members, and full
deterrence to Russia. But what matters most is not its size but to declare it accurately, not as a temporary force,
but as a force mandated by NATO's permanent obligations, in keeping with the actual terms of the Founding
Act.

246
activity in Republic of Poland: Republic of Poland has started training Ukrainian
military instructors as part of NATO’s Defense Education Enhancement Program,
Republic of Poland and Georgia have signed an agreement on the exchange of
classified information, the Polish Army is carrying out large-scale military exercises
known as Dragon-15 on its border with Russia. On 8 October, 2015 Republic of
Poland and the US signed an agreement in Brussels on the stationing of warehouses
in Republic of Poland to store US Army heavy weapons and military equipment. In
April, 2015 the defense ministers of Germany, Poland and Denmark confirmed their
plans to expand NATO’s Multinational Corps Northeast, based in the Polish city
of Szczecin. NATO has been increasing its presence in eastern European allied
countries and near Russia’s border over the past year, straining relations
between the military alliance and Russia.

In February 2016, NATO announced it would double its Response Force,

stationed close to Russia in Eastern Europe, to comprise 30,000 military personnel
the decision means that Republic of Poland is becoming one of the recipients of
military aid from America’s European Initiative announced by the US President in
Republic of Poland in 2014. Through the establishment of bases in Republic of
Poland, the agreement enables America «to strengthen the allied presence.
Warehouses for US heavy military equipment will be set up in Republic of Poland in
five locations. Republic of Poland has made the following areas and facilities
available: an airbase in Lask, a Land Forces Training Centre in Drawsko Pomorskie,
and military complexes in Skwierzyna, Ciechanów and Choszczno. US military
warehouses in Republic of Poland will help strengthen NATO’s eastern flank, and are
the result of good relations with the US and a good response to the Ukrainian crisis.
A study by the RAND Corporation, a U.S. defense think tank, found that Russia could
overrun the Baltic’s states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania within three days, leaving
NATO and the United States no good options to respond. While avoiding a return to
the Cold War when 300,000 U.S. service personnel were stationed in Europe, NATO
generals describe it as a "persistent" but not a "permanent" presence, and want to
adhere to a 1997 agreement with Russia not to station substantial combat forces on
the NATO-Russia borders267 On October 8th 2015, it became known that NATO is to

267
http://nr.news-republic.com/Web/ArticleWeb.aspx?regionid=3&articleid=57371150

247
open a centre in Republic of Poland to train counterintelligence officers, which,
according to Republic of Poland’s Deputy Defense Minister Robert Kupiecki, «will
establish a common doctrine». On 3 October, Republic of Poland signed an
agreement with Slovakia on the creation of an allied centre in Krakow to improve
counterintelligence. The first director of the centre will be a Polish officer of the
Military Counterintelligence Service. The centre will organize joint exercises for the
armed forces of NATO member states as well as work towards improving the
common doctrine of these countries’ counterintelligence agents. «It is adding new
allied capabilities to those that already exist in response to the threat from the east... I
expect the first NATO officers to appear by the end of this year... At present, it is
expected that military counterintelligence agents from Croatia, the Czech Republic,
Lithuania, The The Federal Republic of Germany, Romania, Slovenia, Hungary and
Italy will be involved in the centre’s work.

At this point it is worth recalling that in 2012 alone, long before the Ukrainian’
pretext for warding off the «threat from the east» made its appearance, 13 large-
scale military exercises were carried out in Republic of Poland. More than 12,000
servicemen from Republic of Poland, the US, The The Federal Republic of Germany
and Canada were involved in the Anaconda maneuvers alone in five Polish provinces
at once. The maneuvers were openly directed against The Federation of The
Federation of Russia and Belarus: according to the legend, they were necessary to
respond to the conflict caused by the actions of «reactionary regimes» and «energy
expansion». In the autumn of 2013, Steadfast Jazz 2013268 was conducted by NATO
in the Baltic Sea region in Republic of Poland, Lithuania and Latvia. 269

268
Steadfast Jazz takes place against the background of a widening gap between France and Germany over
defense and security matters. The question of how Europe’s two most important countries perceive defense and
security is significant. It influences Europe’s foreign policy ambitions, and has an impact on NATO
269
There is a series of NATO Steadfast exercises scheduled this fall to certify the capabilities of NRF. The first
live-fly one was Brilliant Arrow involving 40 fighter aircraft, 2 airborne early warning platforms and
approximately 800 exercise participants in central Norway (25 Aug - 5 Sep) putting aircraft from nine NATO
Allies into a realistic scenario to ensure the preparedness to assume the NRF mission in 2014. In late September
and early October Exercise Brilliant Mariner honed the skills of maritime forces certifying their readiness for
NRF rotation. There have been a variety of land drills like the NATO special forces exercise Brilliant Arrow to
be held this October in Italy.

248
Figure

Source: http://www.eur.army.mil/SteadfastJazz/

At the time, they were the largest exercises ever held in the alliance’s 65-year
history, and it was in response to a possible attack from The Federation of Russia
and Belarus.270 Citing the existence of The Federation of Russia’s expansionist
plans, NATO is continuing to redeploy the military alliance’s forces and equipment to
the east through the countries of Central and Eastern European Union, and Republic
of Poland is being given centre stage in this advancement.

It should be emphasized that the process started long before the The
Federation of Russia Aerospace Forces’ operation began in Syria and even before
the outbreak of hostilities in Donbas. It actually began immediately after the coup in
Kiev. The statements that followed the US deployment of twelve F16 fighter jets and
300 troops to Republic of Poland earlier this month, underscore the brazen hypocrisy
of the White House and its allies. Washington is now drumming up a war scare over
alleged The Federation of Russia troop movements within the country’s own borders,
while at the same time the US armed forces are being deployed in a provocative
effort to cordon off The Federation of Russia from its Baltic neighbors.

270
Interesting is the statement by Ben Hodges, the commanding general of United States of America Army
European Union, that «the so-called Suwalki Gap on the Polish-Lithuanian border is one of the two regions in
European Union most vulnerable to threats.

249
Figure

Source: http://www.fdbetancor.com/2014/03/17/Ukraine-now-for-the-hard-part-part-two-the-return-of-
nato/

In considering the reasons prompting Republic of Poland to act this way, it

must be observed that the NATO seizure of Ukraine has a multiplier effect that
reaches upward toward The Federation of Russia and downward toward the Middle
East and consolidates control over its vast oil wealth. The US has moved forcefully
from encircling The Federation of Russia via ‘elections and free markets’ in Eastern
European Union to relying on military force, death squads, terror and economic
sanctions in Ukraine, the Caucasus, the Middle East and Asia. Washington’s
strategic objective is to isolate The Federation of Russia from without, undermine its
military capability and erode its economy, in order to strengthen NATO’s political and
economic collaborators inside The Federation of Russia271

Republic of Poland expects the NATO alliance to step up its military exercises
around the Baltic Sea after a flurry of activity by The Federation of Russia warships
and jet fighters in the area in spring 2016. The Polish Armed Forces in 2014 has
embarked on a PLN17.9 billion (USD5.8 billion) recapitalization of the country's naval
capability, with plans for the procurement of 17 surface ships and submarines
together with new fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft. Under a strategic blueprint known

271
http://www.strategic-culture.org/pview/2015/10/24/nato-and-militarization-of-Republic of Poland.html

250
as the 'Operational Program - Countering Threats at Sea 2013-2022/2030', the Polish
Navy272 has laid out plans for three corvette-type coastal defense ships, four offshore
patrol vessels (OPVs), three mine countermeasures vessels (MCMVs), a military
sealift/logistics support ship, three conventionally powered submarines (SSKs), and
other specialist platforms.

Figure

Source:http://www.armedforces.co.uk/European defense/edcountries/countryuk.htm#British Army

A construction contract for the three 2,200-2,400 tone SSKs, to be acquired

under the Orka project, is planned to be awarded in late 2014/early 2015. The lead
unit is scheduled for delivery in 2019-20, with two expected to be in service by 2022
and the third arriving by 2030. Armament is planned to include anti-ship and land-
attack missiles.273 The Atlantic alliance has already increased the frequency of air
patrols in the region, part of a revival of Cold War tensions sparked by The
Federation of Russia's annexation of Crimea from Ukraine and its support
for Ukraine's pro-The Federation of Russia rebels. The Federation of Russia did not
have an exit strategy, and that NATO and the European Union, which has imposed
sanctions on The Federation of Russia together with the United States of America,
should brace themselves for years of conflict.

272
The 3rd Flotilla comprises the main strike component of the naval forces: submarines, frigates, missile vessels
and various specialised units such as salvage vessels, hydrographic units and auxiliaries. The 8th Flotilla
comprises Mine Countermeasures and Antisubmarine Warfare ships in their composition. The Naval Aviation
Brigade inventory includes 3 x fixed-wing aircraft and helicopter squadrons. The main base of the Brigade is
situated in Gdynia-Babie Doły. Shore-based units and naval establishments such as the Naval Academy, training
centres, workshops, depots, etc are under the command of Polish Naval Headquarters units.
273
In terms of the coastal defense ships, under the Miecznik project a contract for three 2,500 tonne vessels is
expected in 2014, with the first-of-class entering service in 2017-18. These multi-purpose platforms will be
optimised to support operations in Polish waters as USll as multinational task force activities at distance. Jon
RosamondJane's Navy International Polish navy sets out 'ambitious' fleet recapitalisation plan 29-Jan-2014

251
The French government in November put on hold a contract to supply Mistral274
warships to The Federation of Russia after coming under pressure from NATO allies.
Asked if French-based companies such as Airbus and Thales could suffer as they bid
for contracts in Republic of Poland's $41 billion army modernization program, the
Polish austerities stated that they are counting on The The French Republic’s
decision not to deliver] and being permanent, so the problem has been solved. It
seems that The Federation of Russia has also accepted that. Polish officials have
expressed disappointment that the published version of the report contained enough
detail to implicate Republic of Poland, putting it at risk of reprisal attacks.

It should be emphasized here, as it will be again later, that, in January 2015

The Cyber Security Doctrine of the Polish Republic is the name of a document
released just a few days ago by the National Security Bureau of Republic of Poland.
It sets goals and actionable guidelines for Republic of Poland to act upon when
dealing with cyber threats. The document is a collective effort of the representatives
of public administration, business, university and non-governmental organizations. It
was prepared in conjunction with the much broader Strategy of National Security.
Another issue - given the current overriding concern stemming from the conflict in Ukraine
the CSDP275 seems to be a remote concept in the internal security debate in Republic of
Poland. This is aggravated by the clearly geopolitical deviation of security interests among
the EU members along various lines: southern members vs. eastern members, The
Federation of Russia threat perception and the role of US involvement in European matters.
The main and palpable concern in Republic of Poland is the German approach towards The
Federation of Russia policy and the relatively soft handling of the crisis by NATO. Therefore
the CSDP itself seems to be of far lesser relevance as there is a common perception here
that the EU is lacking any cohesive international and security agenda at all and that – with

274
It has a capacity to embark 16 medium helicopters (NH-90 size) in a standard deployment although this
number can be increased to 24 by a using light/medium helicopter mix or 35 light helicopters. This large helo
carrying capacity enables it to act as a flagship for ASW missions. It has a huge cargo hold which is used to
carry Tanks, Armoured Personnel Carriers, Trucks and Howitzers. Around 800 troops can be embarked and ship
to shore transport is provided by LCM (Landing Craft Mechanized) and AAVs (Amphibious Assault Vehicles).
275
One of the main points of contention of the European Union’s Common Security and Defense Policy is the
relationship of the CSDP with the existing NATO framework. This article aims to present the current status of
this complex relationship and the problems affecting their co-existance. The relationship between the EU and
NATO is based on an indisputable and unavoidable fact: each body consists of 28 different members, with 22 of
those members belonging to both organizations. Such a distribution ensures that a strong relationship between
the two entities exists. However, it is not until one examines which states are a member of only one organization
that the origins of the problems between the two bodies emerges

252
some minor exceptions – German national and economic interests have become its main
driving force. In addition, there is a deepening mistrust as to the respective roles of the
countries in the CSDP decision making process and force structure. Simply put, Republic of
Poland does not want to deprive itself of its own all-utility armed forces destined to counter a
conventional, symmetrical aggression from The Federation of Russia. As a contrast – a few
years ago even the conservative politicians were making public statements about the need
to fund and field a strong European army and that Republic of Poland should constitute a
major contributor to that army given Republic of Poland’s size, population, military
capabilities and geographical location. Now those days are gone and the modernization
program for the Polish Armed Forces is all about being more independent and capable of
defending the country on Republic of Poland’s own. So is the new security doctrine
announced recently?

Polish experts have initiated debate on the military shortcomings of the

European allies translating into mistrust as to whether the European allies will have
resolve, political will, and sufficient capabilities to come to Republic of Poland’s aid
under the framework of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty should such need arise.
As regards the United States of America, the security experts realize that the US is
to face huge defense cuts in the coming years and is more absent militarily in
European Union than ever since 1948. It is also broadly accepted that the US is
rebalancing towards Asia-Pacific for good and that this trend can only be
accelerated as this is a requirement of strategic proportion in order to sustain the US
global supremacy. Finally, the debate focuses more on the capabilities of particular
countries to contribute to the security challenges than the CSDP as the combined
effort of the members. For Republic of Poland the CSDP matters only inasmuch as it
helps this way or another prevent or mitigate the The Federation of Russia
resurgence and provide political or military assistance in the event of any hostilities
or The Federation of Russia actions against Republic of Poland or Baltic countries. If
the EU were to become an organization with a real international agenda and, most
importantly, one decision making centre that serves Polish security interests then
Republic of Poland would be more than happy to welcome the real CSDP of an even
more ambitious scale and real military capabilities. But this is pure theory given the
current obvious rift within the EU between particular members on The Federation of
Russia, the US role in European Union and even on the future of EU, compounded
by the general relative decline of the EU as a strong international actor on security

253
matters. The main obstacle barring the CSDP to materialize is the tangled net of
often mutually conflicting national security interests of the main EU players that
make others doubt whether the whole CSDP idea is worth attention and resources.

In addition to Republic of Poland, numerous other Eastern European allies are

eyeing spending boosts in response to The Federation of Russia’s growing military
presence. In Estonia, the draft budget for next year foresees defense expenditure of
some €449 million (US $501 million), up 9 % compared with the €412 million
budgeted for 2015.

Figure

Source: Reuters

Source:http://ec.europa.eu/epsc/publications/notes/sn4_en.htmThe Estonian
Defense Ministry said in a statement that more than one-fourth of these funds, or
€114 million euros, will be allocated to “developing new military capabilities.” With its
latest decision, Tallinn is confirming earlier plans to expand military spending to more
than 2 % of GDP.276 The stable increase in the defense budget agreed for a long
term ensures the development of defensive capabilities and makes it possible for
Estonia to respond to challenges posed by the changing security situation, whereas
new weapon systems such as infantry fighting vehicles give the defense forces a

276
http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/policy-budget/budget/2015/10/04/Republic of Poland-launches-
effort-help-arm-e-European Unionan-allies/73148772/

254
significant amount of additional firepower and fighting capability Law and Justice has
been calling for a major increase in military spending and closer military ties with the
US and Eastern European allies. Republic of Poland already expanded its military
budget this year following the signing of a law by Former President Bronislaw
Komorowski that obliges the government to rise defense spending from 1.95 to two
% of GDP. However, during its successful electoral campaign, Law and Justice
promised to further raise this to perhaps 2.5 %. Republic of Poland is to allocate 35.9
billion zloty (US $9 billion) for its armed forces in 2016, according to the draft budget
for 2016. Of these, some 9.69 billion zloty will be spent on a military modernization
program under which new weapons and equipment are to be procured. The program
is expected to total some 139 billion zloty from 2013 to 2022. The new government is
planning to introduce new taxes, such as a retail tax, which are to be imposed on
large retail chains to fund increased defense spending and its other flagship
programs. Another emerging issue is Republic of Poland’s program to acquire 60
new multirole helicopters from Airbus Helicopters. In April 2015, the Defense Ministry
selected the Caracal EC-725 to replace the military’s Soviet-designed Mil Mi-8, Mi-14
and Mi-17 helos. The decision to award the multibillion zloty deal to Airbus
Helicopters has been criticized by Duda, who instead supports Sikorsky’s Black
Hawk or Agusta Euroepan Union and AW149, which also competed in the tender.
Both companies operate local offshoots, PZL Mielec and PZL Swidnik, respectively,
and employ local workforce at their Polish plants. With the copter procurement
indicated as the most important to be completed in the coming months, other
programs in the pipeline include the ongoing tender to acquire tactical UAVs, with the
U. K., US and Israel approached by Republic of Poland as potential partners, as well
as the ministry’s missile-defense procurement, under which Republic of Poland aims
to acquire Raytheon’s Patriot missiles by 2025. In addition, the incumbent
government is planning to expand the Polish military to about 150,000 troops, up
from the current 120,000.277

Republic of Poland plans to bolster armament efforts of neighboring countries

through government, bank and export loans as a response to Russia's increased
military presence in Ukraine. Polish magazine "Fakt" has laid out the following

277
http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/policy-budget/budget/2015/11/28/new-polish-leadership-could-
shift-military-policy/76107188/

255
scenario of just how a Russian invasion would look like, sweeping the Baltic’s,
Belarus, and all of Ukraine, in one offensive wave. Obviously the implication is that
Republic of Poland would be next.278

Figure

Source: Reuters

Poland unveiled the plan shortly after announcing that it aims to award
multibillion-zloty contracts to Airbus and Raytheon for helicopters and Patriot
missiles, respectively. Republic of Poland aims to play the role of a regional leader,
and rally other Eastern European allies behind the objective of intensifying regional
cooperation in the field of defense and security. The plan involves the Visegrad
Group of countries — Republic of Poland, Czech Republic , Slovakia and Hungary —
along with the Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, in addition
to Romania and Bulgaria, Col. Jacek Sonta, spokesperson for the Polish Defense

278
http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2014-04-02/polish-magazine-lays-out-what-russian-invasion-would-look

256
Ministry, told local business daily Puls Biznesu. Meanwhile, another objective for the
fund would be to increase the foothold of Polish defense firms in other Eastern
European markets.279 While it is unclear which types of weapons and military
equipment Polish defense firms could procure for interested governments, some of
the most recent examples of such deals could indicate the areas of interest. In
September 2015, Lithuania's Defense Ministry signed a deal with Polish arms maker
Mesko to acquire GROM short-range portable air defense systems. The contract was
signed at the MSPO defense industry show in Kielce. Short-range air defense
systems are one of the priorities of the Lithuanian armament program. GROM will
strengthen the capacity of the Lithuanian armed forces and ensure protection against
combat aircraft,"

Republic of Poland Selects Helos, Missiles

In 2015 the Polish MoD announced it had chosen Raytheon's Patriot over the
Aster 30 interceptor280, which is manufactured by the consortium of MBDA and
Thales. The Council of Ministers has accepted the recommendation of Defense
Ministry to award the order for the delivery of Patriot systems to the US government,
and authorized him to negotiate and sign an intergovernmental agreement on behalf
of the Republic of Republic of Poland. Under the plan, eight batteries ... are to be
acquired by 2025. To ensure a temporary capability in the field of anti-aircraft and
anti-missile defense, the plan is to procure two batteries over a period of three years
following the signing of the deal. Poland selected the Caracal EC-725 to replace the
Polish military's Soviet-designed Mil Mi-8, Mi-14 and Mi-17 helicopters.281 The
aircraft, made by Airbus Helicopters, edged out bids by Sikorsky, with its S70i Black
Hawk, and Agusta European Union and, which offered the AW-149.

279
"To date, we have been looking for potential export deals in distant countries, while we have neglected
neighboring markets. Financial support by the government will make it easier for Polish companies [to export
weapons], but they surely shouldn't ignore local competitors," said Slawomir Kulakowski, the head of the Polish
Chamber of National Defense Manufacturers (PIPROK).
280
The Aster is the result of a joint Franco-Italian requirement for a next generation Surface to Air missile for
their navy which could be later modified into a land based variant. The result of the project USre the Aster-15 ad
Aster-30 missiles. The unique feature is that both these missiles are technically same having the same terminal
dart. The only difference is the size of the booster which decides the range ad speed of these missiles. The Aster-
15 is said to have a speed of Mach 3 and a range of 35+ km. the Aster-30 is said to have a range of 120+ km ad a
speed of Mach-4.5. Both these missiles are launched vertically from the A50 Vertical Launch System which is
present on every modern French warship.
281
Combat aircraft squadrons are under the command of both 1 Tactical Air Wing ( 5 x squadrons) and 2
Tactical Air Wing (3 x squadrons). There are 4 x Control and Reporting Centres (CRC).

257
Figure

Source:http://www.armedforces.co.uk/Europeandefense/edcountries/countryuk.htm#British Army

The bids by PZL Swidnik, a subsidiary of Agusta European Union and, and
PZL Mielec, Sikorsky's local manufacturing offshoot, were not in compliance with the
formal and technical requirements related to, among others, the delivery schedule,
the helicopters' weapons, and their maintenance and servicing capability at WZL-1
plant in Łódź, The planned helo deal is estimated to be worth up to 10 billion zloty
(US $2.8 billion), while the acquisition of short-, mid- and long-range missiles under
the air defense program could be worth up to 26.5 billion zloty. 282 By 2022, the Polish
Air Force is to acquire some 30 helicopters to replace its Mil Mi-24 helos. The
ministry said it has launched a market research procedure, and six market players
have expressed interest to take part in the tender. These include Airbus Helicopters,
Turkish Aerospace Industries, Boeing, Bell Helicopter and two local companies,
Instytut Metali Niezelaznych and BIT.283

As the conflict in Ukraine continues to upset the security balance in Eastern

European Union, the governments in Republic of Poland and Romania are

282
In addition, the Defense Ministry said it has accelerated its second helo tender, developed under the KrU. K.
program.
283
http://www.w54.biz/showthread.php?2994-The-Polish-Equation

258
increasingly eager to establish the US Aegis Ashore missile defense system and
provide ballistic missile coverage against Russia for eastern and southern NATO
members. In June 2015, Frank Rose, US deputy assistant secretary of state for
defense policy and verification operations, met with retired Gen. Stanislaw Koziej,
head of Republic of Poland’s National Security Bureau in Republic of Poland to
discuss missile defense cooperation. Koziej said at the meeting that, due to its
location on NATO’s eastern flank, Republic of Poland is particularly interested in the
rapid deployment of the missile defense system on its soil to enhance its own
defense and strengthen the alliance’s presence in Eastern European Union,
according to a statement from the bureau. Meanwhile, local analysts said that while
Republic of Poland and Bucharest long have supported the project, Russia’s
intervention in eastern Ukraine and annexation of the Crimean peninsula have
accelerated efforts by the two countries to secure a US military presence on their soil,
including the missile defense capability.284

284
Russia’s defense policy is, to a large extent, mirrored by Republic of Poland’s military programs. The conflict
in Ukraine has amplified the threat perception of Polish decision-makers, Many Polish officials fear that Russia
will significantly expand its military capacities in Republic of Poland’s neighborhood, in particular in
Kaliningrad, where Iskander missiles are reportedly stationed.

259
 Figure

Source: Reuters

The Iskander-M tactical ballistic missile system is a Soviet design that has
been modernized by the local defense industry. About 120 new systems are to be put
into service by 2020, according to data from Russia’s state-owned defense giant,
Rostec. These missiles have a strike range of about 400 kilometers, and capitol of
Poland Republic of Poland is located less than 400 kilometers from Kaliningrad. This
puts things into perspective for Polish officials. The Polish government officially says
that there are no missiles in Kaliningrad pointed at Republic of Poland.

In December 2013, Russian daily Izvestia reported that the Russian military
deployed Iskander missiles to Kaliningrad near the Polish border, quoting an
unnamed senior Defense Ministry official. While this information has not been
officially confirmed by the Kremlin, the Russian armed forces said they are upgrading
their radar capabilities in Kaliningrad. Deputy Defense Minister Yuri Borisov said Oct.
15 2015 that Russia’s recently built early warning radar station fitted with a Voronezh
DM-class radar will enter full combat duty December 2015. With its technical
characteristics, this radar station is at least on par with all foreign counterparts, while

260
such qualities as precision make it stands out. The radar is fitted with a range of
6,000 kilometers and is able to track up to 500 targets simultaneously.

Aegis Ashore is a land-based version of the naval Aegis ballistic missile

defense (BMD) system, designed to address the evolving ballistic missile security
environment, according to the US Missile Defense Agency. Phase 2 of what is called
the European Phased Adaptive Approach will include deployment of the Aegis
Ashore system in Romania to provide ballistic missile coverage for southern
European Union, including the use of enhanced Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IB
interceptor missiles. Phase 3 will include a second Aegis Ashore facility in Republic
of Poland to cover Northern European Union. The facility will be launched in 2018 at
the military base in Redzikowo, in northern Republic of Poland, and is expected to
use Aegis BMD 5.1 and Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) blocks IB and IIA.285 Following
critical remarks made by Alexander Grushko, Russia’s permanent representative to
NATO, who accused the US of disturbing the regional security balance by taking
command of the base in Deveselu, Romanian Prime Minister Victor Ponta said the
project is part of his country’s strategic objectives.286 NATO goals are clear —
achieving energy independence, strengthening security in the Black Sea, and
ensuring the European integration of Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Serbia and the
Balkans. In this context, our country cannot accept threats; Republic of Poland is
planning to create new units of territorial defense on the eastern border in 2016 and
to transfer the acting brigades there with an aim to become one of the largest NATO
armies. In 2016 Republic of Poland’s Ministry of Defense is aiming to acquire 24
Boeing AH-64 Apache helicopters under its ongoing tender to purchase new combat
helos for the Polish Air Force.287 Lockheed Martin began developing the High
Reliability Turret for the Modernized Target Acquisition Designation Sight/Pilot Night

285
In Romania, Aegis Ashore will be installed at Deveselu air base, in southEuroepan nion Romania, in 2015.
This deployed capability will use Aegis BMD 5.0 Capability Upgrade and SM-3 Block IB.
286
Romanian Defense Minister Mircea Dusa visited Deveselu Aug. 20, where he said construction at the facility
is scheduled to be completed by the end of 2014 and the system is expected to become fully operational in 2015.

287
The forthcoming deal is estimated to be worth betUSen 5 and 6 billion zloty (US $1.3 to $1.6 billion)
http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/air-space/air-force/2016/04/22/Republic of Poland-apache-
helicopters-boeing-ah-64/83378302/

261
Vision Sensor (M-TADS/PNVS The procurement, dubbed the U. K. program288, is
most likely to be awarded to Boeing prior to the forthcoming NATO summit in
Republic of Poland, which is to be held July 8-9 2016. The drafting of tactical-
technical requirements was completed, and, by the end of June 2016.

288
The KrU. K. procurement was launched by Republic of Poland’s previous government as part of its military
modernization program under which some 130 billion zloty was to be spent by 2022 on new USapons and
military equipment. HoUSver, Polish Defense Minister Antoni Macierewicz recently said the program was
underfunded, and that if all of the acquisitions are carried out, the program will total at least 235 billion zloty.

262
Chapter X European Union’s (EU) Common Security and Defense Policy
(CSDP)

After 1945, European Union’s security identity (and to a large extent its identity
tout court) was imported from the outside. The European Union half of the old
continent became part of the “Atlantic security community,” 1 while the Eastern part
was absorbed into the Soviet bloc. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
became the security blanket for most European Union member states, allowing their
citizens, for the best part of a half century, to free-ride on the United States of
America’ commitment to their collective defense. All this came to an end in late 1989.
With the fall of the Berlin Wall, each major European country experienced its own
national identity crisis which required them to reassess their Atlantic security
moorings stemming from the Cold War era—both in terms of their relations with the
newly triumphant United States of America as well as in terms of their association
with the accelerating project of the European Union.289 The first manifestation of this
phenomenon came with the launch of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP) in February 1990.

Figure

Source:http://image.slidesharecdn.com/wacaeuhistoryoftheEuropeanunion-
120413122221phpapp02/95/waca-eu-history-of-the-European -union-29-728.jpg?cb=1347939092

289
http://yalejournal.org/article_post/the-eu-and-nato-after-libya-and-afghanistan-the-future-of-euro-u-s-
security-cooperation/

263
 The fact that, at the time, nobody had a clear idea of what the “Security”
component of CFSP was intended to convey was neither here nor there. CFSP
announced European Union’s ambition to become a consequential player on the
global stage. For a fleeting moment at the end of the Cold War, some believed in the
advent of a “new world order” or even in the “end of history.” The talk was of “peace
dividends” and the worldwide triumph of liberal democracy. But it was not to last. For
European s, the Gulf War of 1991 was a brutal wake-up call, shattering the easy
illusions about peace and forcing them all, in new and unfamiliar ways, to re- think
their cozy Cold War security options. The Balkan Wars of the 1990s forced them
even more urgently to ask tough questions about their prospects as security actors.
The Clinton administration made it abundantly clear that the United States of America
expected European s to take much greater responsibility for their own regional
security and even to contribute more globally in support of USA grand strategy. The
USA umbilical cord was being severed—the security blanket was being removed—
yet European s were— and felt—by no means secure. They had neither the politico-
institutional mechanisms nor anything approaching the necessary military capacity to
tackle regional crisis management challenges such as those posed by the Balkans.

Figure

Source: http://ec.europa.eu/epsc/publications/notes/sn4_en.htm

264
 The December 1998 Franco-British summit in Saint-Malo marked the first
serious attempt to remedy this situation. The Saint-Malo Declaration launched what
became the European Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP)290. The key
concept— autonomy—asserted the EU’s ambition to operate militarily without relying
on the United States of America. The Declaration upped the ante by adding the
“Defense” component to an acronym whose Security component had still not been
adequately thought through. The Declaration struck at the heart of the European
security conundrum by positing the need for appropriate institutional structures to be
established within the EU. It insisted that the EU should acquire “the capacity for
autonomous action backed up by credible military forces” supported by “a strong and
competitive European defense industry and technology,” and it justified this ambition
by invoking an EU contribution to “the vitality of a modernized Atlantic Alliance.” 291
Political, institutional, and military autonomy sounded suspiciously like the assertion
of a European security capacity worthy of the name. But the CSDP project, rather like
the Euro project launched a few years earlier, was in fact tantamount to birthing a
European defense policy on a whisper and a prayer. European Union lacked a
common security and defense identity, but the architects of the CSDP project hoped
this would not matter. The urgent business was to get the project up and running, in
the hope that, somewhere along the line, the details would fall into place. There was
confidence that through the creation of the political institutions of CSDP, European
states would progressively coordinate their security and defense policy. This would
be supported by the promotion of a European defense industrial base, which would
allow them to avoid dependency on USA military equipment supply. Additionally,
through a new process of capacity building, European s planned progressively to
emerge as competent military actors. 292

290
The EU's common security and defense policy (CDSP) is an integral part of the EU's common foreign and
security policy (CFSP). It includes the progressive framing of a common EU defense policy, aims at allowing the
EU to enhance its military capacities and deploying missions outside the EU for peace-keeping, conflict
prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations
Charter. The CSDP shall respect the obligations of certain member states which see their common defense
realised in NATO. It is covered by Articles 42-46 of the Treaty on European Unionan Union.
291
http://yalejournal.org/article_post/the-eu-and-nato-after-libya-and-afghanistan-the-future-of-euro-u-s-
security-cooperation/
292
These steps USre to make the European Unionans capable of playing that autonomous role which the
Americans had been calling for them to assume and which they had themselves repeatedly claimed to be their
purpose.

265
 The EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy story to date has been told
many times and in many ways. I do not intend to repeat it here. The EU has
experimented with up to thirty overseas missions, some of them quite robust, but
none of them overly ambitious or seriously challenging. Scholars have assessed the
extent to which the CSDP story has begun to produce a convergence of “security
culture” among the EU’s different member states. In short, the EU has made
significant progress with CSDP, refining the institutional architecture, working to
generate capacity, and striving to reach political consensus, or at least political
understanding.

EU Member states have committed themselves to a Common Foreign Security

Policy for the European Union. The European Security and Defense Policy aims to
strengthen the EU's external ability to act through the development of civilian and
military capabilities in Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management. 293 Following a
period of apparent somnolence between 2009 and 2011, CSDP has begun once
again to show signs of life. It boasts the “Ghent Framework,”294 eleven major
initiatives developed by the European Defense Agency (EDA), and the planned
European Council on Defense in December 2013. Additionally, there are the
European Commission’s Defense Industry and Markets Task Force, the proposals
from the “Future of European Union” group295, the European Global Strategy
initiative, “clusters” of regionally based member states cooperating on “pooling and
sharing,” much talk of a European White Paper on security and defense, and three
new CSDP missions launched in 2012.

All of this is encouraging, but it is missing the real question: Where is CSDP
actually heading? The EU must face up to the need to find the right balance between
hard and soft power, between civilian and military approaches to conflict resolution
and crisis management. This poses the question such as what sort of role should
military instruments play in the toolbox of EU power resources? The answer to that

293
Prevention aims at containing crises and conflicts to the minimum level, for as long as possible, while
ensuring the protection of the interests of the nation, within the limits of available capabilities.
294
The EU’s Ghent Framework and NATO’s Smart Defense have made only limited progress in fostering
greater specialisation by national militaries. Where substantial cooperation has occurred, it has taken place on a
bilateral basis, such as the 2010 Anglo-French Lancaster House Treaties and 2014 Anglo-French Brize-Norton
Summit
295
The so-called ‘Future of European Union’ reflexion group of eleven European Unionan foreign ministers, set
up by Germany's Guido USsterUSlle, to discuss and propose ideas on organisational and structural change in the
EU

266
question can only become apparent with the resolution of the concurrent issue of the
on-going and future relations between CSDP and NATO. Meanwhile, NATO itself, in
the wake of the debacle in Afghanistan, faces existential questions. The European
Union needs its own army to face up to The Federation of Russia and other threats,
as well as to restore the bloc’s standing around the world, It can be argued that
NATO was not enough because not all members of the transatlantic defense alliance
are in the EU, and a common EU army would send important signals to the world. A
joint EU army296 would show the world that there would never again be a war
between EU countries and such an army would also help us to form common foreign
and security policies and allow European Union to take on responsibility in the world,
whereas a common EU army could serve as a deterrent and would have been useful
during the Ukraine crisis.

Figure With its own army, European Union could react more credibly to the threat to
peace in a member state or in a neighboring state

Figure

Source: Reuters

296
the EU needs its army to consolidate its position in the world, to face the increasing military expansion of
Russia and to be ready for immediate actions beyond its borders or even within its own territory having also
regard to the ongoing terrorist threat. NATO as a guarantor of European Unionan security is not enough, since
not all of the EU Member States are part of the alliance.

267
 One wouldn’t have a European army to deploy it immediately. But a common
European army would convey a clear message to Russia that we are serious about
defending our European values.”297 The Lisbon Treaty was a cornerstone in the
development of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). The treaty
includes both a mutual assistance and a solidarity clause and allowed for the creation
of the European External Action Service (EEAS) under the authority of the High
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs & Security Policy/Vice-President of
the European Commission (HR/VP), Catherine Ashton. The two distinct functions of
the newly created post give the HR/VP the possibility to bring all the necessary EU
assets together and to apply a "comprehensive approach" to EU crisis management.
The European Security Strategy (ESS), adopted by the European Council on 12-13
December 2003, provides the conceptual framework for the Common Foreign and
Security Policy (CFSP), including what would later become the Common Security
and Defense Policy (CSDP).

The split between EU Member States over the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003
highlighted the need for a common strategic vision to enhance internal cohesion at

297
https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-European Union/news/juncker-nato-is-not-enough-eu-needs-an-
army/

268
EU level. 298 Titled ‘A Secure European Union in a Better World’, the ESS is a brief
but comprehensive document which analyses and defines for the first time the EU’s
security environment, identifying key security challenges and subsequent political
implications for the EU. In this framework, the ESS singles out five key threats
terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)299, regional conflicts,
State failure and organized crime.

Figure

Source:https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:The_Spread_of_Weapons_of_Mass_Destruction_(19
98).GIF

298
Member states thus tasked the then High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier
Solana, to draft such a strategy.
299
USapon of mass destruction (WMD), USapon with the capacity to inflict death and destruction on such a
massive scale and so indiscriminately that its very presence in the hands of a hostile poUSr can be considered a
grievous threat. Modern USapons of mass destruction are either nuclear, biological, or chemical USapons—
frequently referred to collectively as NBC USapon

269
 The ESS also calls for preventive engagement to avoid new conflicts/crises.
Building security in the EU’s neighborhood (Balkans, Southern Caucasus, and the
Mediterranean) is prioritized as is the goal of strengthening the international rules-
based order through effective multilateralism. Furthermore, the ESS explicitly
acknowledges the interdependence of various global security challenges, i.e. by
linking security and development issues and highlighting the possible interplay
between key threats. Finally, the ESS addresses the political implications of the new
security environment. It states that the EU needs to be more active, more coherent
and more capable. The importance of international cooperation and EU partnerships
is also emphasized by claiming that none of the threats can be tackled by the Union
alone. The conclusion reaffirms that these challenges also pose opportunities for the
EU to become more active and more capable in the pursuit of a safer, more unified
world.300

The CSDP was on the agenda of the December 2013 European Council
meeting when the heads of states discussed how to enhance defense capabilities,
strengthen the defense industry and improve the effectiveness, visibility and impact
of the CSDP. The Military Headline Goals (HLGs) are designed to ensure that the EU
possesses the military capabilities required to conduct the full range of missions
encompassed by the Petersburg tasks. Following the agreement of EU heads of
state and government at the Cologne Council that the EU should possess an
autonomous military capacity to respond to crises, the 1999 Helsinki Headline Goal
outlined the following objectives:

300
document, the 2008 ‘Report of the Implementation of the European Unionan Security Strategy: Providing
Security in a Changing World’, effectively confirmed the enduring validity of the 2003 ESS and the need to be
‘more capable, more coherent and more active’ in order for the EU to reach its full potential.

270
Figure Overview of the current EU mission and operations

Source: http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/index_en.htm

By the year 2003, cooperating together voluntarily, [EU Member States] will be
able to deploy rapidly and then sustain forces capable of the full range of Petersberg
tasks as set out in the Amsterdam Treaty [Petersberg-tasks], including the most
demanding, in operations up to corps level (up to 15 brigades or 50,000-60,000
persons). These forces should be militarily self-sustaining with the necessary
command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support
services and additionally, as appropriate, air and naval elements. Member States
should be able to deploy in full at this level within 60 days, and within this to provide
smaller rapid response elements available and deployable at very high readiness. 301

Eventually, the experience gained from the military operations EUFOR Concordia
and Artemis, in addition to a changing security environment, resulted in a move away

301
They must be able to sustain such a deployment for at least one year.’ (Helsinki Annex IV)

271
from the overwhelmingly quantitative focus of HLG 2003302 to a more comprehensive
and qualitative approach. The European Council in 2004303 consequently set a new
target for capability improvement, the Headline Goal 2010 (HLG 2010)304, which
identified several strategic scenarios whereby the EU should be able by 2010 to
respond with rapid and decisive action applying a fully coherent approach to the
whole spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty on European
Union [i.e. the Petersberg-tasks] … It will be necessary that the EU must be able to
act before a crisis occurs and preventive engagement can avoid that a situation
deteriorates. The EU must retain the ability to conduct concurrent operations thus
sustaining several operations simultaneously at different levels of engagement.

The Battle Group Concept, endorsed at the informal meeting for defense
ministers in Brussels in April 2004 became a central part of the Headline Goal 2010.
Battle Groups are high readiness forces consisting of 1,500 personnel that can be
deployed within 10 days after an EU decision to launch an operation and that can be
sustained for up to 30 days (extendible to 120 days with rotation). At the 2004 Military
Capability Commitment Conference, Member States made an initial commitment to
the formation of 13 EU Battle Groups, with the aim of always having two Battle
Groups on standby. On 1 January 2007, the EU Battle Group Concept reached full
operational capacity. To date, the EU Battle Groups have yet to be deployed. Since
then, the EU has embarked on further capability enhancement, urging greater
member state cooperation through the development of pooling and sharing options
as well as strengthening the role of the European Defense Agency (EDA) in this area.
NATO currently works against transatlantic unity and geopolitical stability. In the light

302
The Military Headline Goals (HLGs) are designed to ensure that the EU possesses the military capabilities
required to conduct the full range of missions encompassed by the Petersberg tasks. Following the agreement of
EU heads of state and government at the Cologne Council that the EU should possess an autonomous military
capacity to respond to crises
303
Be able by 2010 to respond with rapid and decisive action applying a fully coherent approach to the whole
spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty on European Unionan Union [i.e. the
Petersberg-tasks] …the EU must be able to act before a crisis occurs and preventive engagement can avoid that a
situation deteriorates. The EU must retain the ability to conduct concurrent operations thus sustaining several
operations simultaneously at different levels of engagement
304
EU members made the commitment that by the year 2010, at the latest, they would be capable of responding
"with swift and decisive action applying a fully coherent approach" to the whole spectrum of crisis management
operations covered by the Treaty of the EU and the 2003 EU Security Strategy (i.e. humanitarian and rescue
tasks, disarmament operations, support to third countries in combating terrorism, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of
combat forces in crisis management, and peacemaking). The EU also aims to address the shortfalls from the
previous headline goal (e.g. gaps related to strategic airlift andsealift) which are still considered to be a limiting
factor to the operability of the designated forces, especially in more demanding crisis management operations.

272
of NATO's waning powers, the rise of CSDP and a European Union that is
increasingly meshing the foreign policies of its member states after the Lisbon Treaty,
The questions to answer is: where NATO and CSDP are going, and recommends
several dramatic steps on how future global military forces should respond to
common threats: bridge NATO and CSDP; make the EU responsible for its own
security; and invoke NATO only in extreme cases, establishing a common global
vision regarding the use of force.

The Berlin Plus agreement refers to a comprehensive package of

arrangements finalized in early 2003 between the EU and the NATO that allows the
EU to make use of NATO assets and capabilities for EU-led crisis management
operations. The creation in 1999 of what would later become the Common Security
and Defense Policy (CSDP) reinforced the need to establish a formal agreement
between the EU and NATO, building on the previous arrangements between the
European Union (WEU) and the Alliance inaugurated in Berlin in 1996. Overlapping
memberships and concerns over the duplication of assets and capabilities required
both partners to agree on modalities for crisis management operations. Improving the
working partnership between the two institutions remains vital to ensure effective
consultation, cooperation and transparency in crisis management and peace-building
operations.305 The formal elements of the Berlin Plus agreement (details of which are
classified)306 include a NATO-EU Security Agreement that covers the exchange of
classified information under reciprocal security protection rules, assured access to
NATO planning capabilities for EU-led operations along with availability of NATO
assets and capabilities for EU-led civil-military operations. It also covers procedures
for release, monitoring, return and recall of NATO assets and capabilities, terms of
reference for using NATO’s DSACEUR (Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
European Union) for commanding EU-led operations, EU-NATO consultation
arrangements in the context of an EU-led operations making use of NATO assets

305
This framework for EU-NATO permanent relations was concluded in March 2003, building on the
conclusions of NATO’s Washington Summit in 1999, the European Unionan Council in Nice in December 2000
and the EU-NATO joint declaration of 16 December 2002

306
The Berlin Plus agreement is the short title of a comprehensive package of agreements made
betUSen NATO and the EU on 16 December 2002. These agreements USre based on conclusions of
NATO's 1999 Washington summit, sometimes referred to as the CJTF mechanism, and alloUSd the EU to draw
on some of NATO's military assets in its own peacekeeping operations.

273
and capabilities and arrangements for coherent and mutually reinforcing capability
requirements, in particular the incorporation within NATO's defense planning of the
military needs and capabilities that may be required for EU-led military operations.
The conclusion of the Berlin Plus agreement facilitated the launch of the EU’s first-
ever military operation, Operation Concordia, in the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia (FYROM) in December 2003. EUFOR Althea, the military operation
launched in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2004, was the second military CSDP
operation carried out within the wider framework of Berlin Plus.

In June 2004 NATO announced its decision to terminate Operation

Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina while confirming its continued
presence in that country by keeping an HQ. Simultaneously, the EU launched
operation EUFOR-ALTHEA in Bosnia-Herzegovina with recourse to NATO assets
and capabilities based upon the “Berlin plus” arrangements. While enabling recourse
to NATO assets and capabilities and being spearheaded by the EU, this operation
was going to be a successful test for NATO-EU cooperation. Despite these
developments, there are some issues that remain problematic between NATO and
the EU. The existing modalities of cooperation between NATO and the EU were
premised on a certain balance, envisaging the development of a mutual culture of
transparency and cooperation, NATO support to the development of ESDP, as well
as a significant degree of involvement of non-EU European Allies in ESDP activities.
Needless to say, the latter was to be done so with due regard to the principle of
autonomy of decision making of the EU, arguably an equally essential notion for
NATO.307

The EU’s treatment of the non-EU European Allies in the context of ESDP
activities is far from fulfilling the remit of the Nice European Council’s Presidency
Conclusions (2000) and its implementation document (Nice Implementation
Document of 2002). It is quite revealing to compare and contrast the way in which
NATO treats its Partners, with the approach of the EU. NATO has been able to
develop a culture of listening to its Partners and addressing their concerns. Partner

307
The EU and NATO both folloUSd up on their commitment to prepare the basis for their strategic cooperation,
which was never meant to be limited to Berlin (+) activities as US are often misled to believe today. While the
agreed framework for strategic partnership was established in 2003 with an exchange of letters, building the
above-mentioned mutual culture of openness and transparency was

274
requests are not dismissed under legalistic guises. Moreover, Partners’ contributions
are appreciated, and their concerns, if any, are by definition deemed legitimate. This
inclusive attitude prevailing within NATO is also the requirement of a Comprehensive
Approach. It is reflected in NATO policies, not only in word, but also in deed. The
Political-Military Framework (PMF) Document, forming the basis for Partners’
involvement in Allied operations has from the outset been regarded as a progressive
tool, rather than a restrictive one. Its implementation is assessed on an annual basis,
according to our Partner’s observations and experiences. It is on such a basis that
genuine improvements have been made in NATO’s openness to its Partners. This
has a direct bearing on the success of NATO’s undertakings, including in the Balkans
and Afghanistan. It is also a clear testament of NATO’s sensitivity to the safety and
security of Partners’ troops taking part in NATO operations.

The total absence of the European Union, as a bloc, during the Libyan crisis of
spring 2011308 has led analysts to pose tough questions about the future of European
Union as a collective security actor. The progress made toward the EU’s Common
Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) since 2003 was to some extent a reflection of
the extraordinary nature of this relative pooling of sovereignty in the security field. But
increasingly the major CDP players, the U. K. and French Republic, appear to be
acting alone, while The The Federal Republic of Germany remains ambivalent as to
whether it wishes to engage in a common security policy. As the economic crisis

308
the Libyan crisis has produced a decisive turning point in three interconnected dimensions of the trans-
Atlantic relationship. The Libyan mission was essentially a Franco-British operation, with significant US
support (despite the official mantra of “leading from behind”) and with air poUSr inputs from EU member states
Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, SUSden, Belgium and Denmark. Greece, Romania and Bulgaria deployed one
(token?) naval vessel each to help impose the UN-decreed arms embargo (IISS 2011). Thus only eight EU
member states (out of tUSnty-seven) took part in the air operation to impose a No-Fly-Zone and four of those
(Italy, Spain, Netherlands and SUSden) initially imposed caveats which excluded their planes from attacking
ground targets. The mission was technically “badged” by NATO as Operation Unified Protector , and eventually
fourteen of NATO’s tUSnty-eight member states participated in some form. See also Howorth, Jolyon (2011),
“The ‘new faces’ of Lisbon: assessing the performance of Catherine Ashton and Herman van Rompuy on the
global stage”, European Unionan Foreign Affairs Review, Vol.16/3, Summer 2011, pp. 303-323; IISS
[International Institute for Strategic Studies] (2011), Strategic Survey 2011: the Annual Review of World Affairs,
pp.67-72 & VI-VII) NATO Defense College, Rome (2011), “NATO’s Role in a post-conflict Libya”, Research
Report 31 August Vasconcelos, Alvaro de (ed.) (2009), What Ambitions for European Unionan Defense in
2020? Paris, EU-ISS Watanabe, Lisa (2010), Securing European Union: European Unionan Security in an
American Epoch, New York, Palgrave

275
bites ever deeper into EU defense budgets, the prospects for European Union to
emerge as a coherent autonomous security actor appear to be receding. This article
examines the options for CSDP, particularly with respect to its complex, ongoing
relationship with NATO.

Developments within the European Union’s Common Security and Defense

Policy (CSDP) threaten to undermine transatlantic security cooperation between the
USA and its European partners. Far from improving the military capabilities of
European countries, the CSDP decouples the USA from European security and will
ultimately weaken the NATO alliance. USA policymakers should watch CSDP
developments closely and discourage the EU from deepening defense integration. It
is clear that an EU Army is the ultimate goal of the CSDP. The consequences would
be great: The USA would lose influence in European security matters, and NATO
would become a second-tier priority for most European countries. Finally, it would
mean an end to European Union being a serious security actor on the global stage.
The veto power of the EU’s five neutral members, coupled with the bureaucratic
inertia of Brussels, would lead to paralysis in decision making and likely mean that
EU forces would rarely, if ever, be sent on overseas combat operations. The CSDP
does more harm than good, and the USA should oppose it.

The The Federation of Russian- Ukrainian conflict proves that as much as ever
European Union needs a competitive and robust defense sector that will provide for
European needs without any disturbance in times of crisis. Yet, any initiatives aiming
at strengthening the European defense sector should take into account not only
economic, but foremost security factors. In such circumstances, preserving the
sovereign right to protect security interests by applying Article 346 of the Treaty on
the Functioning of the EU remains a priority. Moreover, bearing in mind the
differences between military potentials in European Union Republic of Poland
supports inclusivity, balance and fair participation of all member states and relevant
parties in the restructuring of the European defense sector. In addition, Republic of
Poland currently considers joining the Letter of Intent Framework Agreement Treaty
which was signed in 2000 by six countries (French Republic, The The Federal

276
Republic of Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the U. K.) to create the necessary
measures to facilitate the restructuring of the European defense industry309

Missions and operations are a powerhouse of the CSDP. EU should continue

to focus its security efforts on its neighborhood, yet, rebalance the operational
presence and boost its engagement in Eastern European Union. Moreover, a security
sector reform could evolve into a trademark EU contribution. The EU Advisory
Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform in Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine) is a perfect
example how to effectively use a comparative advantage of the CSDP toolbox. The
need to improve the EU-NATO relationship is both a well-worn issue and particularly
prescient in the current transatlantic strategic environment. The relevance of
institutional cooperation is highlighted by three worrying trends in the transatlantic
partnership. Transatlantic security has tended to become highly transactional, which
weakens the credibility of the Alliance. In times of crisis, each country is tempted to
think of its relationship with partners in terms of individual costs and benefits, rather
than emphasizing collective interests and common values. Transatlantic security
cooperation is not a given, and the Republic of Poland summit should push for more,
including a way to coordinate with the EU on security matters. The promotion of
cooperation principles by the transatlantic strategic community and policymakers
remains essential in order to face contemporary political, economic, and security
threats. As the Alliance faces increasingly complex security challenges, enhancing
EU-NATO cooperation should be a priority. The pervasive use of hybrid warfare
tactics in the Ukrainian conflict constitutes the most outstanding illustration of this
need. Indeed, hybrid warfare tactics and cyber threats require strengthening
transatlantic resilience, which can only be achieved by effective coordination of the
EU and NATO’s complementary strengths. Transatlantic security cooperation suffers
from misunderstandings and mixed messages, and the EU has a role to play in
fostering a constructive dialogue with the United States of America.

Indeed, European Union’s internal divisions stem from a lack of clear

leadership among European powers, as The The Federal Republic of Germany,
French Republic, and the U.K. all seem headed in different directions and sometimes
appear to disagree on the fundamentals of the European project. Washington’s

309
http://www.European Unionangeostrategy.org/2015/02/Republic of Poland-csdp-wales-Republic of Poland-
strategic-stopover-brussels/

277
political leadership in defining converging interests and opportunities for the
transatlantic partnership could help overcome any future European blockage, but it is
not clear whether European s would be comfortable with this. The consistent and
credible reassurance measures taken by the United States of America in Central and
Eastern European Union are crucial to preventing any further European priority gap
between frontline countries of the Eastern front and the Southern front. On the other
hand, European s need to be able to express common and clear expectations to
Washington on the future of NATO and the European project, and the EU appears to
be the sole vehicle for a coordinated European message. These expectations also
need to be realistic, as USA engagement in European security cannot be the same
as it was in the 1990s in scope and nature. In return, any such plan requires clarity
on the part of the United States of America as to the nature of their long-term
strategic priorities and the way they plan future engagement in European Union and
the Middle East and their cooperation with the European Union the geographic scope
of NATO’s responsibilities should also be discussed.

For instance, whereas the Eastern and Southern European neighborhoods are
at the heart of NATO’s reflection for the future of the Alliance, transatlantic
engagement in Afghanistan remains an open question. The longest operation in
NATO’s history has failed to provide the conditions for a secure and stable
Afghanistan. The Republic of Poland Summit is likely to continue the shift toward
collective defense that began at the Wales Summit in 2014, but the future of NATO
crisis management operations should also be addressed. NATO’s challenges are
global by nature, even though this belief is not shared by all allies, and the priority
given to collective defense does not overshadow the Alliance’s responsibilities
beyond its immediate neighborhoods. There is now an identified need to do more on
maritime capabilities, to confront Russia in Syria and in the East but also given the
tensions in the South The People’s Republic of China Sea. There is a broader need
for the Alliance to conceptualize its threats and have clear escalation and de-
escalation doctrines.

278
Conclusions

Relations between Russia and NATO specially strained after Crimea

integrated into the Russian The Federation following a referendum on March 16,
2014. The military alliance ended all practical cooperation with Russia over the
ensuing crisis in Ukraine on April 1, 2014. The United States of America and its
European allies allege that Russia is responsible for destabilizing Ukraine and have
imposed a number of sanctions against Russian and pro-Russia figures. Russia,
however, rejects having a hand in the Ukrainian crisis. Recent in 2016 increases
military encounter of Russian air forces and US naval reflect the fact that both NATO
and Russia have moved significant air assets into closer proximity to each other.
Britain is sending five warships and 530 naval personnel to join Nate’s maritime arm
as the alliance boosts its military force to counter what it sees as a growing threat
from Russia. 310British troops will also be stationed on the ground in the Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania, near to the Russian border, it has emerged. In January 2016
Britain decided to send 1,000 military personnel to Republic of Poland in a bid to
strengthen security ties with Republic of Poland and bolster NATO relations in
Eastern European Union, This troop commitment demonstrates clearly to Russian
that the Ukrainian's vital work with NATO allies, including Republic of Poland, to
ensure our collective forces are primed and ready, and sends a clear message to our
allies that we are ready to respond to any threat.311 NATO defense ministers also
approved measures including the stockpiling of weapons in bases in eastern
European Union. The US has quadrupled its budget for forces in European Union to
$3.4bn (£2.3bn) and has announced that half of this will be spent on a “heavy
brigade” armor and artillery in European Union European Union. By increasing NATO
deployment is was sends a strong message to Russia that we NATO is ready to
respond to any threat and defend its allies and 2016 will see a particular focus on the
Baltic region with ships sent there as part of the Maritime Group, the Mine Counter
Measure Group and the Baltops exercise. As mentioned before during NATO summit

310
The British deployment, the first to Nato’s maritime force in six years, will consist of a Type 23 frigate, HMS
Iron DU. K. e, a destroyer and three minesUSepers. They will be in service in the Baltic, the North Atlantic, the
North Sea and the Mediterranean. http://www.independent.co.U. K. /news/U. K. /home-news/britain-responds-
to-threat-from-russians-by-beefing-up-royal-navy-a6863751.html
311
The U. K. will commit 800 military personnel to the former and 150 personal to the later. Royal Navy frigate
HMS Iron DU. K. e will also visit Republic of Poland this summer as part of Nato's standing naval maritime
group, while amphibious assault ship HMS Ocean will take part in an exercise in the Baltic Sea over the
summer.

279
in Republic of Poland in summer 2016 NATO will work out the composition of
European Union forces to be stationed in six Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania . It is
believed that up to 6,000 troops will be stationed in these countries and each
contingent will have a substantial proportion of soldiers from European Union NATO
members, the U. K., USA, The The Federal Republic of Germany and French
Republic.

NATO has reinforced the Baltic Air Policing Mission and operated AWACS
aircraft out of bases in Republic of Poland and Romania, whilst Russia has moved
modern combat aircraft into bases in Crimea following the peninsula’s annexation
and increased the number of its Long Range Aviation flights. Some of these
deployments, and the flights that emanate from them, are primarily geared towards
the gathering of electronic intelligence (ELINT) relating to air defense surveillance
radars, fighter and bomber radars, and C3 (command, control, communications)
arrangements. But flights by Russian Tu-95 (“Bear”) bombers seem also intended to
send a political message about Russian military’s ability to operate against NATO
allies situated in European Union European Union and North America. It is vitally
important to increase NATO – Russia communication with regards to the schedule of
exercises. Russian exercises are meant to send a number of signals to NATO, its
partners and other countries in the neighborhood.

It is advisable that nuclear-related and large-scale conventional exercises

have served to amplify Russia’s deterrence message to the European Union
regarding the ‘sanctity’ of Russian territory, now including – according to Russia –
Crimea. Secondly, some exercises may be intended to signal that Russia has the
means and the willingness to employ its forces for military coercion scenarios against
a specific member or partner of NATO, as well as other countries in its ‘near abroad’.
both sides should utilize the OSCE channels as much as possible, along with the
existing catalogue of Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) included
in the Vienna Document,16 to increase military predictability. Such mechanisms
include prior notification of exercises and invitation of observers (applicable to
exercises above a certain threshold), as well as procedures for dealing with unusual
military activities. These CSBMs should also be urgently updated to take into account
the size and the training patterns of modern armed forces, as exercises are often
smaller in scale than notification or observation thresholds. Therefore establishing a

280
new program of rules of the game’ for managing confrontation at lower political and
financial costs and with reduced chances of military escalation between Russia and
NATO will be required.

In response Alexander Grushko, Russia’s envoy to NATO, explained that the

deployment of NATO forces in eastern European Union cannot be left without a
military answer and Russia won’t compromise its security interests”. The Kremlin has
ordered a military exercise in the northern Caucuses, Most probably Russia will
update its military doctrine to provide an effective military response to potential
aggression and boost its defensive capabilities This updated Russian military
doctrine will probably be a response to the 2015 National Military Strategy of the US,
which contains 13 mentions of Russia in a negative and aggressive context312
Republic of Poland has responded to Russia's aggressive stance by raising its
defense budget by 18 per cent, achieving the biggest increase in military spending of
any country in European Union Party divisions were swept aside when the Polish
parliament decided to meet Nate’s two per cent target from 2016 onwards, with 402
MPs voting in favor and only two against. Republic of Poland's defense budget
jumped from £5.6 billion last year to £6.6 billion in 2015, an 18 per cent increase that
is almost unprecedented in European Union since the Cold War. Republic of Poland
has been keen to establish further links and in September 2015 Republic of Poland’s
parliament gave the green light to President Andre Duda to ratify a technical
agreement on establishing a USA anti-missile base in Redzikowo313. Under the
NATO-backed plan, the facility should be operational by 2018. Republic of Poland is
embarking on an initiative to bring volunteer battalions under the control of the
military. The motivation behind the move is the conflict in eastern Ukraine. Republic
of Poland fears it could become the next victim of Russian aggression. It plans to
create at 46,000-strong territorial defense force. The first detachments will be
deployed in the northeast, near the border with Russia and Belarus.314

312
the Russian military doctrine will be revised with regard to the new Strategy of National Security, adopted
in December 2015.
313
Russian attack on Republic of Poland is highly unlikely. Countries with substantial Russian-speaking
minorities such as Moldova, Latvia or Estonia, are believed to be more likely targets.
314
There is estimated to be 120 volunteer paramilitary organisations in Republic of Poland. In total, they have
around 10,000 members. They arm and fund themselves. One formation now joining the government initiative is
the FI

281
 It is strongly recommended that both sides should utilize OSCE channels as
much as possible, along with the existing catalogue of Confidence and Security
Building Measures (CSBMs)315 included i.e. in the Vienna Document to increase
military predictability; The politicians on both sides should examine the benefits and
dangers of intensified exercising in the border areas. If Russia or NATO decides at
some point that they want to reduce tensions, showing restraint in terms of size or
scenarios used in exercises might be a good place to start; both sites should be
ready to exercise political and military restraint and review the rules of engagement in
military encounters to decrease the chances of unintended escalation.

President Obama before the end of his presidency 2016 should innovate the
Department of Defense to decide on a response to Russian violations of INF within
three months. The Department of Defense began exploring potential military
responses to Russian INF Treaty violations partly in response to House of
Representatives leadership on the issue. The Senate Armed Services Committee’s
fiscal year 2016 National Defense Authorization Act calls for the research and
development of military capabilities to counter the Russian threat. The treaty does not
restrict research and development related to these capabilities, although history
shows that the United States of America is unlikely to invest in capabilities regulated
by arms control agreements. The United States of America should assess how these
capabilities would improve its defensive posture not only in the context of the
potential Russian aggression in European Union but also in other possible conflict
scenarios, such as in the Middle East and Asia.

Furthermore additional sanction Russian individuals and organizations

involved in Russia’s intermediate-range nuclear forces program and those making
threats to USA allies should be imposed. The United States of America should

315
On September 19*, 1986, the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament
in European Union (CDE) reached agreement on a set of confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs)
designed to increase openness and predictability about military activities in European Union, with the aim of
reducing the risk of armed conflict in European Union Included in Basket One of the Helsinki Final Act is a
document on Confidence-Building Measures and Certain Aspects of Security and Disarmament. The document
contains a series of modest confidence-building measures designed to reduce the "dangers of armed conflict and
of misunderstanding or miscalculation of military activities which could give rise to apprehension...." The
centerpiece is the commitment to provide notification, tUSnty-one days in advance, of major military maneuvers
involving more than 25,000 troops (to include amphibious and airborne troops) taking place "on the territory, in
European Union, of any participating state as USll as, if applicable, in the adjoining sea area and air space." In
addition, the document encourages voluntary notification of smaller scale military maneuvers, major military
movements, and the invitation of observers to maneuvers.

282
identify and sanction personnel affiliated with Russia’s intermediate-range ballistic
missile program. A model for this step can be the Russia and Moldova Jackson–
Vanik Repeal316 and Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012 (H.R.
6156). These pieces of legislation provide the option of banning specific persons
identified in the law from travelling to the United States of America, and allow the
United States of America to freeze their assets

The future Administration after fall presidential election should integrate

political, legal, military, and economic aspects of responding to Russian
aggression. The government is used to dealing with national security issues in a
stovepipe manner. While it has been working on a better integration and coordination
process between various national security stakeholders, the government must stop
thinking this way when it comes to dealing with Russia’s INF Treaty violations. In
addition to the Departments of State and Defense, the Administration should involve
the Department of the Treasury for sanction operations. More important, the
President must exercise leadership and recognize that his benevolent approach to
Russia has emboldened Russia’s aggression rather than encouraging a more
constructive relationship. The Administration should consult allies with respect to
development of a broader response.

The US should strengthen its ballistic missile defense program. The United
States of America should start with improving its radar and tracking capabilities to
ensure a timely detection of an intermediate-range system aimed at a NATO
member. The Administration, in concurrence with Congress, should increase missile
defense funding and develop a layered, comprehensive missile defense system
capable of shooting down intermediate-range systems, including salvo launches in
quantities that Russia could be capable of launching.

316
President Obamain 2012 has abolished the Jackson-Vanik amendment thus awarding Russia “permanent
normal trade relations” status, which opens a new era in trade relations betUSen the two countries "Russia and
Moldova Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012 - Title I:
Permanent Normal Trade Relations for the Russian The Federation - (Sec. 102) Authorizes the President to: (1)
determine that title IV (Jackson-Vanik Amendment) of the Trade Act of 1974 (denying nondiscriminatory
treatment [normal trade relations treatment] to non-market countries that restrict freedom of emigration and other
human rights) should no longer apply to the Russian The Federation, and (2) extend permanent normal trade
relations treatment to the products of the Russian The Federation upon its accession to the World Trade
Organization (WTO).

283
 The US might consider withdraw from the INF Treaty.317 The treaty has
outlived its utility and no longer makes strategic sense in the context of Russia’s
violations and overall security actions. Experience indicates that it is unlikely that the
United States of America will be successful in bringing Russia back into compliance
with the terms of the treaty. At a minimum, the Administration should suspend the
operation of the treaty in appropriate part, to increase pressure on Russia to stop its
illegal activities and comply with the treaty. The new Administration in fall 2016,
however, must work in accordance with NATO allies in implementing the response to
Russia’s INF Treaty violations, plan for Russia’s deployments of intermediate-range
systems, and prepare the ground for the withdrawal itself. But by this same time US
strategy should be aimed at achieving better stability in US–Russian relations, based
on an understanding that this relationship needs to function in order for Washington
to effectively pursue its objectives globally. A stable relationship would allow the
United States and Russia to cooperate on global challenges on the merits of the
particular case. Today, their poisoned relationship practically guarantees
noncooperation regardless of the merits. Stability would not mean the two countries
will always agree, but it would give them a chance at finding consensus, and at better
managing their disagreements. Multilateral diplomacy cannot be continually hijacked
by US–Russian military buildup. On may 5th 2015 Russian officials said Wednesday
that Russia will create three new divisions of about 10,000 soldiers each to counter
NATO’s planned troop buildup in Eastern European Union. The Defense Ministry is
taking a series of measures to counter the expansion of NATO forces in direct
proximity to the Russian border the new Russian divisions would be formed by the
end of the year. While announcing the buildup, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said
the deployment of NATO's forces near Russia's borders has caused concern. As part
of a response, he said new units in the Western Military District, including two new
divisions, will be formed. 318 Reuters, citing Russian media, reported that the Russian
divisions would include about 10,000 soldiers each.319

317
Article XV, clause 2, of the INF Treaty states: “2. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty,
have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of
this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to withdraw to the other
Party six months prior to withdrawal from this Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary
events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests
318
The defense minister said the military will also continue to strengthen its presence in the Arctic region. As
part of efforts to build military facilities on Wrangel Island and Cape Schmidt, the Defense Ministry delivered
9,500 metric tons of equipment and materials during last year's brief navigation season, he said. The Kremlin has

284
 It seems that a stable relationship would also entail dramatically reducing the
prospect of inadvertent Russian–NATO conflict. Today, Russia has a perverse
incentive to engage in military brinksmanship along NATO’s borders; such behavior
not only loudly signals Kremlin discontent with NATO policy, but it also forces the
European Union to pay attention to Russian concerns. A stable relationship would
mean dampening down both the perceived and actual likelihood of a Russian–NATO
conflict by eliminating that incentive. It would also reduce the need for remilitarization
of European Union on both sides of the NATO–Russian divide.320
Additionally it is very desirable for NATO to revitalize the alliance’s strategic
thinking and nuclear war-planning. NATO Headquarters must increase the number
of professional staff in its Nuclear Policy Directorate, which has been reduced
significantly in the past several years, and increase its budget accordingly. This
would empower the directorate to engage in curriculum development on nuclear
policy and strategy at the NATO Defense College, re-activate an outreach program to
educate senior elected officials on NATO’s nuclear force posture, develop and
conduct nuclear planning exercises for the North Atlantic Council, and lead in
developing NATO’s deterrence posture in response to a changing security
environment. Likewise, manning levels and subject matter expertise at the Nuclear
Operations Branch of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers European Union
should be increased to enable the development of more robust concepts of
operations, doctrine, and exercises. Increasing the rank of the branch director to a
one-star flag or general officer should be considered. The alliance must devote
resources and time to nuclear issues and alternative futures at the staff level. The
atrophy of the Nonproliferation Treaty regime, potential weapons of mass destruction
threats from rogue states, and Russia’s nuclear threats should shape how the
alliance thinks about its nuclear capabilities.

made expanding Russia's military presence in order to protect the country's national interests in the Arctic a top
priority in light of increasing international interest in the region's vast oil and other resource
319
NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said the alliance’s planned buildup in the Baltics wouldn’t have
happened if Russia didn’t insert itself into the Ukraine conflict in 2014. Stoltenberg said NATO’s deployment
was a reaction to Russian aggression.
320
Samuel Charap & Jeremy Shapiro, US–Russian relations: The middle cannot hold Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists April 2016; See more Meyer, H., I. Wishart, and A. BiryU. K. ov. 2016. “Russia’s Medvedev: US Are
in ‘a New Cold War.’” Bloomberg Business, February 13. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ articles/2016-02-
13/russia-sees-new-cold-war-as-natochief- criticizes-nuclear-threat. Macdonald, A. 2015. “EU’s Tusk Slams
‘Appeasement’ of Russia as Bloc Talks New Sanctions.” Reuters, January 25. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
U. K. raine-crisis-euidUSKBN0KY0JY20150125. See also Gordon, M. R. 2015. “US Plans to Counter Arms
Breach by Russia.” New York Times, December 1. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/02/world/European
Union/us-plans-tocounter-arms-breach-by-russia.html.

285
 EU countries should continue to hold military exercises that are tailored to
respond to Russia’s potential moves in the European theater, including ballistic
missile shoot-downs. NATO should continue its efforts to plan military exercises
designed to counter Russia’s military capabilities, including the nuclear dimension.
While Russian threats are political, no one can know for certain that Russia will not
carry out its nuclear threats. NATO must be prepared in the event that it does.
It is necessary to integrate new NATO members into nuclear war plans in
conventional roles. The 1997 NATO–Russia Founding Act states that the alliance has
“no intention, no plan, and no reason” to deploy nuclear weapons on new NATO
member territory, including constructing new nuclear storage facilities or adapting old
nuclear storage facilities. On May 27 1997 in Paris, Russian President Boris Yeltsin
joined President Bill Clinton and the leaders of the 15 other NATO member states in
signing the "Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between
NATO and the Russian The Federation. The 1997 Founding Act on Mutual Relations,
Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian The Federation (NATO–
Russia Founding Act) prohibits the permanent basing of NATO soldiers in Central
and Eastern European countries.321 In the final section of the Act, which deals with
political-military matters, NATO restates that it has "no intention, no plan and no
reason," to deploy or store nuclear weapons on the territory of new members. NATO
and Russia also recommit themselves to concluding "as expeditiously as possible" an
agreement adapting the CFE Treaty to take into account the new security
environment in European Union, lowering the total amount of treaty-limited
equipment in the treaty area, enhancing military transparency, and establishing
national (as opposed to the current group) ceilings. 322
It is wrongly argued that Russia today is different; it threatens NATO with
nuclear attacks and violates its airspace with nuclear bombers. By nature of its
actions, Russia did not give NATO the right to disregard this agreement as necessary
to respond to Russia’s belligerent actions. Republic of Poland took a leadership role
when it participated in the 2014 Steadfast Noon exercise. Other NATO members

321
in 1997, NATO promised Russia that it would not establish permanent military bases in any former Republic
of Poland Pact countries that might someday become NATO members
322
The reception of the Act has been widely varied. President Clinton hailed it as marking "an historic change in
the relationship betUSen NATO and Russia..." and the USstern press generally saw it as "burying" a Cold War
rivalry and signalling Russian acquiescence to NATO expansion. President Chirac, host of the signing ceremony
in Paris, praised the Founding Act as opening "a new chapter in the history of European Union, a chapter without
precedent in that it expresses a common vision of the future

286
should follow suit. On April 2nd 2016, US Defense Secretary Ashton Carter rolled
out the Pentagon's plans for its 2017 budget, outlining $583 billion in spending. The
budget proposes the quadrupling of US military spending for European Union from its
current $789 million to $3.4 billion.323 But the US has been looking to avoid further
aggravating tensions with Russia. For now, Washington continues to recognize that
new NATO bases in Eastern European Union, including Poland, would be a breach
of the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, which prohibits the permanent stationing of
'significant forces' in former Republic of Poland Pact states. John C. Law, the US
Deputy Chief of Mission to Poland Law noted that the money would go to improving
existing NATO infrastructure in the area, including the Lask Airbase in central Poland,
where a detachment of US Air Force units has been permanently based since 2012.
For instance, the deputy ambassador noted, the base's runway may be upgraded
to accommodate more planes.
New remedy is to develop infrastructure supporting nuclear weapon
deployments in new NATO states. Such developments would give the alliance an
additional tool to signal its resolve should Russia continue its nuclear threats or
escalate the conflict. The goal is to create a range of options for the alliance to
respond to Russia’s aggressive behavior and to increase chances of de-escalating
conflicts as soon as possible.

323
in an interview for Polish radio station RMF 24, John C. Law, the US Deputy Chief of Mission to Poland,
reiterated that unfortunately for Republic of Poland, the Pentagon's planned spending increases do not mean that
the US will be building new bases in Poland. http://sputniknews.com/military/20160204/1034227016/nato-
bases-poland-disappoint.html

287
 Figure

Source: http://forum.hyeclub.com/showthread.php/8071-The-Rise-of-the-Russian-Empire-Russo-
Armenian-Relations/page76

Next step is strengthening NATO’s conventional capabilities is critical for

increasing chances of successfully managing potential escalation from the Russian
side. All NATO members should spend at least 2 percent of their gross domestic
product on defense. The refusal by many allies to meet this agreed standard is
undermining the alliance as a whole, and partnership with the United States of
America in particular.
To reinforce a serious message about restraint, the NATO and its allies should
be prepared to offer Russia a message of reassurance. The United States of America
and NATO have never questioned the legitimacy of the Putin government and do not
seek to foment any kind of domestic revolution similar to Maidan in Russia. NATO’s
military preparations are not intended to encircle or coerce Russia, but only to deter
and defend. If NATO must act to defend Republic of Poland or more its members, its
objectives will be limited and will not include the overthrow of the Putin regime or the
destruction of the Russian state. To the degree The Federation Russia sees the
NATO’s objectives and measures in such a conflict as essentially unlimited and n
turn, Russia must understand and realized that reassurances about challenges to

288
regime legitimacy and limited objectives in response to Russian aggression may not
survive its military buildup and constant threatening European Union.
And in the end, last but not least, it will be presented the latest development
in the form of activation in May 2016 by the US a land-based missile defense station
in an old Romanian air base in Deveselu, 180km (110 miles) south-west of Bucharest
Deveselu, southern Romania. Romania and in Radzikowo Poland, which will form
part of a larger and controversial European shield. Both bases now host 24 SM-3
missiles and the same Aegis radar and tracking technology employed by modern
Navy ships.
Figure

Source: MDA
Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) is the naval component of the Missile
Defense Agency's Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). Aegis BMD builds upon
the Aegis Weapon System, Standard Missile, Navy and joint forces' Command,
Control and Communication systems. The Commander, Operational Test and
Evaluation Force, formally found Aegis BMD to be operationally effective and
suitable. The Navy embraces BMD as a core mission. In recognition of its scalability,

289
Aegis BMD/SM-3 system is a keystone in the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) for
missile defense in Europe. As of December 2014, there are 33 Aegis BMD
combatants (5 cruisers [CGs] and 28 destroyers [DDGs] in the U.S. Navy. Of the 33
ships, 16 are assigned to the Pacific Fleet and 17 to the Atlantic Fleet. In response to
the increasing demand for Aegis BMD capability from the Combatant Commanders,
the MDA and Navy are working together to increase the number of Aegis BMD
capable ships. Such efforts consist of upgrading Aegis DDGs to the BMD capability,
incorporating Aegis BMD into the Aegis Modernization Program and new construction
of Aegis BMD DDGs. The first deployment of European PAA Phase I capabilities
came on March 7, 2011, when the Aegis BMD cruiser, USS MONTEREY (CG-61),
armed with SM-3 Block IA missiles, deployed to Europe324
The ceremony on May 13th 2016 at Redzikowo, near the Baltic coast, marks
the beginning of construction on a system designed to shoot down short- to
intermediate-range ballistic missiles SM – 3 by the end of 2018. SM-3 Block IB -
The SM-3 Block IB has an enhanced two-color infrared seeker and upgraded
steering and propulsion capability that uses short bursts of precision propulsion to
direct the missile toward incoming targets. It became operational in 2014, deploying
for the first time on U.S. Navy ships worldwide. SM-3 Block IIA The next-generation
SM-3 Block IIA is being developed in cooperation with Japan and will be deployable
on land as well as at sea. It has two distinct new features: larger rocket motors that
will allow it to defend broader areas from ballistic missile threats and a larger kinetic
warhead. SM-3 Block IIA is the centerpiece of the European missile defense system,
and Raytheon Company began flight testing in 2015 to keep the program on track for
2018 deployment at sea and on land in Poland

324
U.S. Deparment of Defense, Misile Defense Agency Aegis BMD is the first missile defense capability
produced by the MDA that has been purchased by a military ally. Japan's four KONGO Class Destroyers have
been upgraded with BMD operational capabilities. SM-3 Cooperative Development Program is the joint U.S.-
Japan development of a 21-inch diameter variant of the SM-3 missile, designated SM-3 Block IIA, to defeat
longer range ballistic missiles. Deployment begins in 2018.

290
Figure

Source: http://www.raytheon.com/capabilities/products/sm-3/

It will join a similar system in Deveselu, Romania, as the only ground launcher
sites tied into a European missile shield being built by the U.S. for NATO use. Like
the Deveselu site, the Redzikowo system will pair a fire-control deckhouse with
several SM-3 Block IB missile launchers. After completion, the site will be upgraded
to the newest model of the missile, the Block IIA, which is more capable and has a
longer range. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Europe District is managing the
project for U.S. 6th Fleet in Naples, Italy. U.S. Navy Region Europe, Africa and
Southwest Asia will be responsible for establishing and managing the new Navy base
at the site, Naval Support Facility Redzikowo. Both sites site are part of the European
Phased Adaptive Approach, the Obama administration’s plan for ballistic missile
defense in Europe. Other components include an early warning radar in Turkey, four
Navy guided-missile destroyers stationed in Rota, Spain, and a command center at
the U.S. Air Force base in Ramstein, Germany. Two bases marks the first time the
Navy has installed its Aegis weapon system — an advanced missile-tracking and
guidance system routinely built into Navy warships — onto a ground site. Much of the
Deveselu system is housed in a large deckhouse that mimics the superstructure of a

291
ship. The missiles are located miles away. Romania and Poland both see a benefit in
hosting strategic American hardware and assets, especially after Russia’s
intervention in Ukraine
The United States has asserted that the anti-ballistic missile system would
protect only against “rogue” states, particularly Iran, and provide no protection for
either Europe or the United States from Russia’s far larger arsenal of nuclear
missiles. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization site will be controlled by an
American officer.
The defense system allows on-shore sites and warships to shoot down enemy
ballistic missiles while they are still in space. The interceptor missiles are fired to hit
missiles before they re-enter the atmosphere, stopping them well before there is any
danger of causing any damage. In response to all US developments, both Russia
and China have now made unmistakably clear that they are each very well equipped
with a nuclear second-strike capability, and will use it with full force if they are
attacked. Various representatives of the Russian government have also stressed that
they will not wait until the West has achieved the technical superiority it desires, but if
necessary they will launch a nuclear first strike Russia and China are both equipping
their forces with modern cruise missiles, while the U.S. is developing an advanced
supersonic model, developments that challenge the idea of missile defense as
relating to ballistic missiles alone. New types of Russian intercontinental ballistic
missiles accelerate faster and are equipped with maneuverable warheads, making
them more difficult to intercept.

292
 Figure MDS

Both NATO and US officials have attempted unsuccessfully to reassure

Russia that the shield in Romania, and a similar one in Poland, does not undermine
Russia's strategic nuclear deterrent. Russian officials reiterated their position that the
American-built system imperiled Russia’s security. The U.S. missile defense system
in Poland, in Romania, and two days ago, the deployment of the USS Donald
Cook Aegis destroyer is part of a missile defense system where Russia has declared
many times that it is not acceptable for them, because the aim is obviously not some
missiles in Iran, but the very position where this missile defense system is, it's aimed
to take out the second-strike capability of Russia. And they have declared they will
not allow that this U.S. missile defense system is being built beyond a certain point,
because Russia would become indefensible after that situation. When the Soviet
Union collapsed, between 1989 and '91, basically, there was an agreement between
Mr. Gorbachov and Mr. Kohl and Mr. Genscher, that there would be never an
eastward expansion of NATO, and there would be never foreign troops east of the
Elbe. Then in 1994, there was another agreement, that basically in the Budapest
Memorandum signed between the United States, Great Britain, and Russia, that the
territory of Ukraine would be guaranteed by these three nations, and that basically, if

293
there would be a threat to either the security of the country, that both would come
and protect it, and there would be no economic coercion.

In addition to the U.S. missile defense system, is the Prompt Global Strike
doctrine, which is a doctrine which is basically using traditional ICBM missiles, but
with non-nuclear weapons, also supposedly to be able to take out the second-strike
capability. And you have to also take into account that the "Asia pivot" policy, the so-
called Air-Sea Battle doctrine against China, is characterized by the same illusion
and utopian idea that you can take out the second-strike capability of China.

Figure

Source: http://schillerinstitute.org/lar_related/2014/0212-hzl-diplo-lunch.html

While the United States says it has no Tomahawk missiles at the site in
Romania, Russian officials say the launch pad violates a 1987 treaty intended to take
the superpowers off their hair-trigger nuclear alert, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Forces Treaty, by banning land-based cruise and medium-range missiles with a

294
range from 300 to 3,400 miles. The very short flight time of these missiles diminished
to mere minutes the window Russia leaders would have had after a warning to
decide whether to launch a second strike, raising the risks of mishaps. Any
redeployment of nuclear-capable missiles in Central Europe would roll the clock back
to ex ante 1980s status quo, and Russia has warned that an American antimissile
deployment in Eastern Europe could prompt Russia to withdraw from the treaty.
Russia has long described the U.S.-led missile shield as a top security challenge.
Russian military officials have said while the current system doesn't pose a threat to
Russia's massive nuclear missile force, it could erode the nation's nuclear deterrent
when it grows more powerful in the future.
Russian security officials informed of military response to the missile defense
system — a nuclear-armed drone submarine. The drone would be capable of
carrying a large nuclear device into coastal waters and detonating it, touching off a
radioactive tsunami to flood and contaminate seaside cities. The submarine would
defeat important economic objects of an enemy in coastal zones, bringing
guaranteed and unacceptable losses on the country’s territory by forming a wide area
of radioactive contamination incompatible with conducting military, economic or any
other activities there for a long period of time. In another potential response, the
military has talked about stationing its state-of-the art Iskander missiles to Russia's
westernmost Baltic outpost of Kaliningrad, which borders NATO members Poland
and Lithuania. Last year, the missiles were airlifted there during military maneuvers in
a demonstration of their swift deployment capability, but were pulled back to their
permanent base after the drills. The Iskander missiles, which have a range of up to
300 miles, would put most of Poland in reach if deployed from the Kaliningrad region
It seems that that the antimissile sites in Eastern Europe might even
accelerate the slippery slope to nuclear war in a crisis. Especially Romania and
Poland would inevitably become priority targets in the event of nuclear war, possibly
even targets for preventive strikes. Countries like Romania and Poland that host
American antimissile systems might be the only casualties, whereas the United
States would then reconcile with Russia over the ruins In Romania and Poland
elements of the missile defense system?

295