BUENAFLOR C. UMALI, MAURICIA M. VDA.

DE CASTILLO, VICTORIA
M. CASTILLO, BERTILLA C. RADA, MARIETTA C. ABAÑEZ, LEOVINA
C. JALBUENA and SANTIAGO M. RIVERA
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, BORMAHECO, INC. and PHILIPPINE
MACHINERY PARTS MANUFACTURING CO., INC.
Gr No. 89561
September 13, 1990

Facts:

Rivera is the nephew of Mauricia de Castillo, who owns a parcel of land

located in Lucena City, given as security for a loan with DBP, because of the
failure to pay the load, foreclosure proceeding was initiated. This was made
known to Rivera, however the latter proposed the conversion of the parcel of
land to a subdivision, with this agreement, Rivera obliged himself to pay the
Castillo family the amount of P400,000.00. Rivera approached Cervantes
(Bormaheco) and proposed to purchase from the latter 2 tractor under a
Chattel Mortgage agreement over said equipment, with Insurance
Corporation of the Philippines as mortgagee. In this agreement, ICP
guaranteed the obligation of Rivera with Bormaheco in the amount of
P180,000.00, on the pretext that Rivera would be required to issue a
mortgage over parcels of land in favour of ICP.

For a violation of a term in the agreement between Bormaheco and

Rivera, ICP foreclosed to mortgages in favour of them, later this parcels of
land were sold to Philippine Machinery Parts.

The RTC rendered a decision nullifying the agreement of Rivera with

ICP for being fictitious and without consideration. However the Court of
Appeals reversed this decision on the ground of presumption that private
transactions have been fair and regular and that the ordinary course of
business have been followed.
 The petitioners, by way of appeal with the Supreme Court interposed
the issue that no notice of default was issued by Bormaheco with ICP,
voiding the foreclosure sale. However under the surety contract of Rivera
with ICP, the latter would only be liable if a claim has been filed

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the decision on

the basis of the legal presumption that private transactions have been fair
and regular and that the ordinary course of business have been followed.

Held:

Yes, the Supreme Court held that no evidence was presented to show
that Bormaheco demanded payment from ICP nor was there any action
taken by Bormaheco on the bond posted by ICP to guarantee the payment
of plaintiffs obligation, such failure released the ICP from the obligation.

Furthermore, the allegation that ICP paid Bormaheco is not supported

by any evidence, Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides that the
burden of evidence lies with the party who assess an affirmative
allegation.Since ICP failed to duly prove the fact of payment, the disputable
presumption that private transactions have been fair and regular, as
erroneously relied upon by respondent Court of Appeals, finds no application
to the case at bar.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. SANTIAGO O. TAÑADA, as
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch V, and SPOUSES
JACINTO K. RAFANAN and VICENTA L. RAFANAN
G.R. No. L-34199
May 30, 1983

Facts:

In one Civil Case filed by the Republic, the latter sought for the
reversion of two parcels of land from the herein private respondents on the
ground of the violation that the sale made by the spouses to one Delfin N.
Lopez was made without the approval of the President of the Philippines as
required by law (Section 4 of Executive Order No. 372) providing that

"The Board of Liquidators shall, with the approval of the

President of the Philippines, and subject to the provisions of
existing law, sell, lease, transfer, assign, or otherwise dispose of,
the properties, funds, other assets, development projects,
demonstration plantations, experimental stations, and nurseries of
the corporations herein abolished; …".

The herein parties agreed to the approval of the stipulation of facts

and the case considered submitted for the decision, however, the RTC Cebu
Branch V has dismissed the same. Hence this Petition for Review on
Certiorari directly with the Supreme Court. The Defendants invoked three
legal presumptions (a) that official duty has been regularly performed; (b)
that the ordinary course of business has been followed and (c) that the law
has been obeyed.

Issue:

Whether or not the three legal presumption may availed of and be

applicable to the case at hand.

Held:
 No, the Supreme Court held that the presumption in unavailing and
that the approval of the President of the Philippines is a requirement sine
qua non before any transfer may be made. The Supreme Court held that
such requirement must be shown affirmatively and not presumed.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, and NIELSON & COMPANY, INC.
Gr no L-38540
April 30, 1987

Facts:

In this case, the Bureau of Internal Revenue sent Demand Letter with
the private respondent on July 1955, this was reiterated on April 1956 the
Regional Trial Court has ordered the private respondent to pay its tax
deficiency amounting to 14,449.00 with the Bureau of Internal Revenue. On
Appeal with the Court of Appeals, the appellate court reversed the decision
together with the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Republic. The
reversal is hinged upon that the Republic did not proved that it sent the
assessment letter in 1955.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in deciding that the

assessment was not sent in the ordinary course of business.

Held:

No. While there is a presumption that a mailed letter is deemed

received in the ordinary course of mail, this is just a presumption and must
be proven as a fact. A direct of denial the receipt shifts the burden of proving
the same by the adverse party. In this case there was a denial of the private
respondent of receiving the demand letter in 1955, and the burden was
shifted to the Republic of disproving of the same, however it failed to do so.

However, since the demand letter was reiterated in a follow up letter in

1956, this was considered as a notice of the assessment duly received,
hence the private respondent is still liable thereto.
SPOUSES FERNANDO and LOURDES VILORIA
vs
CONTINENTAL AIRLINES
GR NO. 188288
January 16, 2012

Facts:

In 1997, while the spouses Viloria were in the United States, they
approached Holiday Travel, a travel agency working for Continental Airlines,
to purchase tickets from Newark to San Diego. The travel agent, Margaret
Mager, advised the couple that they cannot travel by train because it was
already fully booked; that they must purchase plane tickets for Continental
Airlines; that if they won’t purchase plane tickets; they’ll never reach their
destination in time. The couple believed Mager’s representations and so they
purchased two plane tickets worth $800.00.

The Regional Trial Court held the petitioners to be entitled to a refund in

view of Mager’s misrepresentation. By way of appeal, the Court of Appeals
reversed the decision of the RTC on the ground that the sole basis for the claim
of the petitioner is a piece of hearsay evidence advertisement appearing on a
newspaper.

Issue:

Whether or not that the newspaper clippings are admissible as evidence.

Held:

No, the Supreme Court held that newspaper clippings has no probative
value nor admissible being a “hearsay evidence twice removed” if they are
offered for the purpose of proving the truth of the fact alleged. Citing Feria v.
Court of Appeals:
 “Newspaper articles amount to “hearsay evidence, twice removed” and
are therefore not only inadmissible but without any probative value at all
whether objected to or not, unless offered for a purpose other than proving the
truth of the matter asserted. In this case, the news article is admissible only as
evidence that such publication does exist with the tenor of the news therein
stated.
4”