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REMEDIAL LAW 2017- CASE DOCTRINES AND

DIGESTS

JURISDICTION

Although a trial judge who voluntarily inhibits loses jurisdiction to hear a case, he or
she may decide to reconsider the self-inhibition and re-assume jurisdiction after a re-
assessment of the circumstances giving cause to the inhibition. The discretion to reconsider
acknowledges that the trial judge is in the better position to determine the issue of
inhibition, and a reviewing tribunal will not disturb the exercise of that discretion except
upon a clear and strong finding of arbitrariness or whimsicality. (City Government of Butuan
vs. Consolidated Broadcasting System, Inc., G.R. No. 157315, December 1, 2010, 651 PHIL
37-56)

The Sandiganbayan has exclusive original jurisdiction over the criminal action
involving petitioner notwithstanding that he is a private individual considering that his
criminal prosecution is intimately related to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth of the
Marcoses, their immediate family, subordinates and close associates. (Disini vs.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 169823-24 & G.R. Nos. 174764-65, September 11, 2013)

The non-payment of the prescribed filing fees at the time of the filing of the
complaint or other initiatory pleading fails to vest jurisdiction over the case in the trial court.
Yet, where the plaintiff has paid the amount of filing fees assessed by the clerk of court, and
the amount paid turns out to be deficient, the trial court still acquires jurisdiction over the
case, subject to the payment by the plaintiff of the deficiency assessment. (Fedman Dev.
Corp. vs. Agcaoili, G. R. No. 165025, August 31, 2011)

The authority of Land Management Bureau (LMB)under Act No. 1120, being limited to
the administration and disposition of friar lands, does not include an action for reconveyance
– LMB ceases to have jurisdiction once the friar land is disposed of in favor of a private
person and title duly issues in the latter’s name. (Heirs of Spouses Reterita vs. Spouses
Lopez, GR. NO. 159941, AUGUST 17, 2011)

In a motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction, the movant hypothetically admits


the veracity of the allegations in the complaint, and accordingly, jurisdiction is not affected
by the pleas and theories set forth in an answer or a motion to dismiss; otherwise, it would
become almost entirely dependent upon the whims and caprices of the defendant or
movant. (Mahogany Grove Homeowners Associations, Inc. (MGHAI) vs. Spouses Turno, G.R.
No. 206243, December 10, 2014)

A case involving the validity of the termination of employment of an officer or


employee of the Civil Service is under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission not the
RTC. (Buenaflor vs. Ramirez, GR 201607, February 15, 2017)
CIVIL PROCEDURE

The Court has no power to review on certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final
resolution issued by a Division of the COMELEC. (Cagas vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 191439,
January 24, 2012)

The term grave abuse of discretion is defined as a capricious and whimsical exercise
of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
and despotic manner because of passion or hostility. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough;
it must be grave. (Gold Lines Tours, Inc. vs. Heirs of Maria Concepcion Lacsa, G.R. No.
159108, June 1, 2012)

The 6-6 tie-vote by the Court en banc on the second motion for reconsideration
necessarily resulted in the denial of the second motion for reconsideration. Since the Court
was evenly divided, there could be no reversal of the 18 November 2008 Decision, for a tie-
vote cannot result in any court order or directive. The tie-vote plainly signifies that there is
no majority to overturn the prior 18 November 2008 Decision and 31 March 2009 Resolution
denying reconsideration, and thus the second motion for reconsideration must be denied.
(League of the Cities of the Philippines (LCP) vs. COMELEC, et. al., GR No. 176951, November
18, 2008)

The substitution of the third party complaint could not produce the effect that an
amendment of an existing pleading produces. Under Section I, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court,
an amendment is done by adding or striking out an allegation or the name of any party, or
by correcting a mistake in the name of a party or a mistaken or inadequate allegation or
description in any other respect. (Air Ads Incorporated, Vs. Tagum Agricultural Development
Corporation (TADECO), G.R. No. 160736, March 23 , 2011).

An appeal (for the denial of the motion for reconsideration) is an action to be


prosecuted by a party in interest before a higher court. In order for the appeal to prosper,
the litigant must of necessity continue to hold a real or present substantial interest that
entitles him to the avails of the suit on appeal. If he does not, the appeal, as to him, is an
exercise in futility. (Francisco Alonso, et. Al vs. Cebu Century Country Club, Inc., G.R. No.
188471, April 20, 2010)

No person who has not been impleaded and duly served with the summons should be
adversely affected by the outcome of the action. (Borromeo vs CA, GR No. 194226, Feb. 15,
2017)

If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing
of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of
the others. Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment or decree on the merits
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or
their privies in all later suits and on all points and matters determined in the previous suit.
(Chu vs. Spouses Cunanan, G.R. No. 156185, September 12, 2011, 673 PHIL 12-25)

The settled rule is that defenses not pleaded in the answer may not be raised
for the first time on appeal. A party cannot, on appeal, change fundamentally the
nature of the issue in the case. When a party deliberately adopts a certain theory
and the case is decided upon that theory in the court below, he will not be
permitted to change the same on appeal, because to permit him to do so would be
unfair to the adverse party (Peňa vs. Sps. Tolentino, Gr 155227, Feb 2011).

In several decisions of the Court, the banks, defendants therein, were made liable for
negligence, even without sufficient proof of malice or bad faith on their part, and the Court
awarded moral damages of P100,000.00 each time to the suing depositors in proper
consideration of their reputation and their social standing. (Citytrust Banking Corp. vs. Cruz,
G.R. No. 157049, August 11, 2010).

The mere failure to attach copies of pleadings and other material portions of the
record as would support the allegations should not cause the outright dismissal of a petition
for review. The allegations of the petition must be examined to determine the sufficiency of
the attachments appended thereto. (Galvez vs. CA, G. R. No. 157445, April 3, 2013).

The appeal by notice of appeal under Rule 41 is a matter or right, but the appeal by
petition for review under Rule 42 is a matter of discretion. An appeal as a matter of right,
which refers to the right to seek the review by a superior court of the judgment rendered by
the trial court, exists after the trial in the first instance. In contrast, the discretionary appeal,
which is taken from the decision or final order rendered by a court in the exercise of its
primary appellate jurisdiction, may be disallowed by the superior court in its
discretion. (Heirs of Arturo Garcia I. vs. Municipality of Iba, Zambales, G.R. No. 162217,July
22, 2015)

An absolute identity of the parties was not necessary, because a shared


identity of interest sufficed for res judicata to apply. Moreover, mere substantial
identity of parties, or even community of interests between parties in the prior and
subsequent cases, even if the latter were not impleaded in the first case, would be
sufficient. (Heirs of Sotto vs. Palicte, G.R. No. 159691, June 13, 2013)

The denial of a motion for reconsideration of an order granting the defending party’s
motion to dismiss is not an interlocutory order but a final order because it puts an end to the
particular matter involved, or settles definitely the matter therein disposed of, as to leave
nothing for the trial court to do other than to execute the order. Accordingly, the claiming
party has a fresh period of 15 days from notice of the denial within which to appeal the
denial. (Alma Jose vs. Javellana, GR. NO. 158239, January 25, 2012)

The RTC is not limited in its review of the decision of the MTC to the issues assigned
by the appellant, but can decide on the basis of the entire records of the proceedings of the
trial court and such memoranda or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by
the RTC. (Macaslang vs. Zamora, GR NO. 156375, May 30, 2011)

No person who has not been impleaded and duly served with the summons should be
adversely affected by the outcome of the action. (Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Mgmt.
Corp. (PSALM) vs. CA and LABAO, G.R. No. 194226, February 15, 2017)

The test to determine whether the causes of action are identical is to ascertain
whether the same evidence will sustain the actions, or whether there is an identity in the
facts essential to the maintenance of the actions. If the same facts or evidence will sustain
the actions, then they are considered identical, and a judgment in the first case is a bar to
the subsequent action. (Spouses Mendiola vs. CA, G.R. No. 159746; July 18, 2012)

The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, may order a separate


trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party complaint, or of any separate
issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party complaints or
issues. But a separate trial may be denied if a party is thereby deprived of his right to be
heard upon an issue dealt with and determined in the main trial. (Metropolitan Bank and
Trust Co. vs. Sandoval, G.R. No. 169677, February 18, 2013)

Voluntary appearance and participation of petitioner, through his counsel, during the
temporary restraining order application hearing had already cured, any defect in the alleged
improper service of summons upon him. A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in
equity so exception in nature that it may be availed of only when other remedies are
wanting, and only if the judgment, final order or final resolution sought to be annulled was
rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud. (Milla vs. Spouses Luis,
G.R. No. 214930, December 10, 2014)

Only the Supreme Court has the power to issue TROs involving contracts of the
national government. (Nerwin Industries Corporation vs. PNOC-Energy Development
Corporation, G.R. No. 167057, April 11, 2012)

The failure to attach clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the
judgment, order, resolution, or ruling subject thereof, such material portions of the record as
are referred to therein, and other documents relevant or pertinent thereto in a petition for
certiorari is fatal and ground for dismissal. RTC’s dismissal of NHAs petition for
reconstitution, albeit with prejudice, does not bar NHA from filing another petition for
reconstitution. (National Housing Authority vs. Roxas, G.R. No. 161204, April 6, 2011)

Nothing is more settled in law than that once a judgment attains finality it thereby
becomes immutable and unalterable. The enforcement of judgment should not be hampered
or evaded, for the immediate enforcement of the parties rights confirmed by final judgment,
is a major component of the ideal administration of justice. (Pahila-Garrido vs. Tortogo, G.R.
No. 156358, August 17, 2011)

The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period laid down by law is
mandatory and jurisdictional. Failure to perfect the appeal within the time prescribed causes
the judgment or final order to become final and unappealable as to preclude the appellate
court from acquiring the jurisdiction to review. (Spouses Lebin vs. Mirasol, GR. No. 164255,
September 7, 2011)

The issue of citizenship of the winning party cannot anymore be raised to forestall
the execution of a final and executory judgment where the objecting party had the
opportunity to raise the issue prior to the finality of the judgment. The time for assailing the
capacity of the winning party to acquire the land was during the trial, not during the
execution of a final decision. (Balais-Mabanag vs. QC RD, GR. No. 153142, March 29, 2010)
As a rule, a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading however, when
a motion for leave to file and admit a second motion for reconsideration is granted by the
Court, the Court therefore allows the filing of the second motion for reconsideration and the
second motion for reconsideration is no longer a prohibited pleading. (League of Cities of the
Philippines vs. COMELEC, Gr 176951, April 2011)

Only one motion for reconsideration is allowed except when the second motion for
reconsideration is exceptionally meritorious and not pro forma. (Yinlu Bicol Mining Corp. Vs.
Trans-Asia, G.R. No. 207942, January 12, 2015)

The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period laid down by law is
mandatory and jurisdictional. (Spouses Lebin vs. Mirasol, Gr 164255 , September 2011)

Any liberality in the application of the rules of procedure may be properly invoked
only in cases of some excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading. (Heirs of Garcia [n
Substitution of the Heirs of Bueno] vs. Municipality of Iba, Zambales, Gr 162217 , July 2015)

In all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be to
the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 not by
ordinary appeal under Rule 41. (Escoto vs. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation,
G.R. No. 192679, October 17, 2016)

An appeal under Rule 43 is a discretionary mode of appeal, which the CA may either
dismiss if it finds the petition to be patently without merit, or prosecuted manifestly for
delay, or that the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration; or
may process by requiring the respondent to file a comment on the petition; These rules are
not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may result in
prejudicing a party’s substantive rights. (Justina Maniebo vs. Court of Appeals and Civil
Service Commission, G.R. No. 158708, August 10, 2010)

A petition for certiorari shall be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or


certified true copy of the judgment, order, resolution, or ruling subject thereof, such material
portions of the record as are referred to therein, and other documents relevant or pertinent
thereto. The failure to comply with such requirement shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal of the petition. (National Housing Authority vs. Hon. Vicente Roxas, G.R. No.
161204, April 6, 2011)

An alias is thus a name that is different from the individual's true name, and does not
refer to a name that is not different from his true name. (Revelina Limson vs. Eugenio Juan
Gonzales, G.R. No. 162205. March 31, 2014)

Agricultural tenancy is not presumed. It is established only by adducing evidence


showing that all the essential requisites of the tenancy relationship concur, namely: (a) the
parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (b) the subject matter of the
relationship is an agricultural land; (c) there is consent between the parties to the
relationship; (d) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (e)
there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (f) the
harvest is shared between the landowner and tenant or agricultural lessee. (Romeo T.
Caluzor,vs. Deogracias Llanillo and The Heirs of the Late Lorenzo Llanillo, and Moldex Realty
Corporation, G.R. No. 155580. July 1, 2015)
For forum shopping to exist, both actions must involve the same transaction,
same essential facts and circumstances and must raise identical causes of action,
subject matter and issues. Clearly, it does not exist where different orders were
questioned, two distinct causes of action and issues were raised, and two objectives
were sought. (In Re: Reconstitution of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 303168 and
303169 and Issuance of Owner’s Duplicate Certificates of Title in Lieu of Those Lost,
Rolando Edward G. Lim, petitioner, G.R. No. 156797, [July 6, 2010], 638 PHIL 80-93))

The fact that the order granting the motion to dismiss was a final order for thereby
completely disposing of the case, leaving nothing more for the trial court to do in the action,
truly called for an appeal, instead of certiorari, as the correct remedy. (Heirs of Spouses
Reterita vs. Spouses Lopez, G.R. No. 159941 August 17, 2011)

A compromise agreement is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal


concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced. It encompasses
the objects specifically stated therein, although it may include other objects by necessary
implication and is binding on the contracting parties, being expressly acknowledged as a
juridical agreement between them. It has the effect and authority of res judicata upon the
parties. (Chu vs. Spoiuses Cunanan, G.R. No. 156185 September 12, 2011)

A compromise agreement is a contract whereby the parties make reciprocal


concession to avoid litigation or to put an end to one already commenced. IT is an accepted
and highly encouraged practice in the courts of law of this jurisdiction. It attains the
authority and effect of re judicata upon the parties upon its execution, and becomes
immediately final and executory, unless rescinded by grounds which vitiate consent. Once
stamped with judicial imprimatur, it ceases to be a mere contract between the parties, and
becomes a judgment of the court, to be enforced through writ of execution. (Chung vs.
Huang, G.R.No. 170679 9 Mar. 2016)

It is elementary that a judgment of court is conclusive and binding only upon the
parties and those who are their successors in interest by title after the commencement of
action in court. The principle that a person cannot be prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an
action or proceeding in which he has not been made a party conforms to the constitutional
guarantee of due process of law. (Dare Adventure Farm vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
161122 24 SEP. 2012

Gross negligence of counsel alone would not even warrant a deviation from the
principle of finality of judgment, for the client must have to show that such negligence
resulted in the denial of due process to the client. (Sofia vs. Valenzuela, G.R. No.157810 15
Feb. 2012)

The purpose of exclusive method of a raffle is two-fold: 1) to equalize the distribution


of the cases among the several branches, and foster the Court’s policy of promoting speedy
and efficient disposition of cases; and 2) to ensure the impartial adjudication of cases and
thereby obviate any suspicion regarding assignment of case to predetermined judges. (GSIS
vs. Executive Judge Erum, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2182 5 SEP. 2012)

To warrant the substituted service of the summons and copy of the complaint, the
serving officer must first attempt to effect the same upon the defendant in person. Only
after the attempt at personal service has become futile or impossible within a reasonable
time may the officer resort to substituted service. (Macasaet vs. Co Jr., G.R. No. 156759,
June 5, 2013)

The personality of a corporation is distinct and separate from the personalities of its
stockholders. Hence, its stockholders are not themselves the real parties in interest to claim
and recover compensation for the damages arising from the wrongful attachment of its
assets. Only the corporation is the real party in interest for that purpose. (Stronghold
Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Cuenca, G.R. No. 173297, March 6, 2013)

The intervening rendition by the trial court of a decision on the merits of the case
renders moot and academic the resolution of any issue raised on certiorari against
interlocutory orders setting the pre-trial and declaring the petitioner to have waived its right
to present its evidence. The resolution of the issue, having been pre-empted by the decision
in the main action, ceased to have any practical value. (Republic vs. Manila Electric
Company, G.R. No. 201715, December 11, 2013)

The rigid policy is to make the consolidation of all cases and proceedings resting on
the same set of facts, or involving identical claims or interests or parties mandatory. Such
consolidation should be made regardless of whether or not the parties or any of them
requests it. The policy eliminates conflicting results concerning similar or like issues between
the same parties or interests and enhances the administration of justice. (Re: Letter of
Complaint of Merlita Fabiana Against Justice Reyes; Assoc. Justice Dicdican and Cruz, A.M.
NO. CA-13-51-J, JULY 2, 2013)

The defense of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, litis pendencia, res
judicata and prescription of action may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. (Sps. Dico
and Vizcaya Management Corporation (VMC), G.R.NO 161211, July 17, 2013)

In the concurrence of jurisdiction among the SC, CA and the RTCs to issue the writs of
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, the
hierarchy of courts must be strictly observed. It must not be taken by parties as unrestrained
freedom of choice of court forum. (Sps. Dacudao vs. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 188056,
January 8 2013)

A litigant who brought a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules
of Court cannot anymore avail himself of an action for annulment of judgment under Rule
47 of the Rules of Court based on the same grounds available to him for the prior remedy.
(Aquino vs. Tangengko, G.R. No. 197356. August 24, 2016)

Appeal as a remedy is not a matter of right, but a mere statutory privilege to be


exercised only in the manner and strictly in accordance with the provisions of the law. (FYFE
vs. Philippine Airlines, G.R. No. 160071, June 6, 2016)

To declare the defendant in default,: (1) plaintiff must file a motion; (2) defendant
must be notified of the motion; (3) plaintiff must prove that the defending party failed to
answer the complaint within the period provided. (Momarco Import Co., Inc. vs. Villamena,
G.R. No. 192477, July 27, 2016)

Once a judgment becomes immutable and unalterable by virtue of its finality, its
execution should follow as a matter of course. A supervening event, to be sufficient to stop
the execution must alter or modify the situation of the parties under the decision as to
render the execution inequitable, impossible and unfair. The supervening event cannot rest
on unproved or uncertain facts. (Abrigo vs. Flores, G.R. NO. 160786, June 17, 2013)

The failure to serve and file the required number of copies of the appellant's brief
within the time provided by the Rules of Court does not have the immediate effect of
causing the outright dismissal of the appeal. The CA has the discretion to dismiss the appeal
on that basis or to still allow the appeal to proceed when the circumstances so warrant its
liberality. (Diaz vs. People of the Philippines and Levi Strauss [Phils.], Inc. G.R. No. 180677,
February 18, 2013)

Pre-Trial is mandatory, under Section 6 Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, whereby the
failure of the plaintiff to appear would mean dismissal of the action with prejudice. The filing
of a pre-trial brief has the same import . (Spouses Pascual vs. First Consolidated Rural Bank
(Bohol), GR No. 202597 FEBRUARY 8, 2017)

The filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if allowed under the procedural
rules of the Commission concerned, interrupts the period; hence, should the motion be
denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, which shall not
be less than five days in any event, reckoned from the notice of denial. (Fortune Life
Insurance Company, Inc. vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 213525 (Resolution), [January
27, 2015])

The trial court may render a judgment on the pleadings upon motion of the claiming
party when the defending party's answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the
material allegations of the adverse party's pleading. For that purpose, only the pleadings of
the parties in the action are considered. (Fernando Medical Enterprises vs. Wesleyan
University of the Philippines, G.R. No. 207970. January 20, 2016)

The consequence of failure to perfect an appeal was to render the dismissal final and
immutable. Courts and tribunals with the same or equal authority — even those exercising
concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction — are not permitted to interfere with each other's
respective cases, much less their orders or judgments therein. (Dy Chiao vs. Bolivar, G.R.
No. 192491, [August 17, 2016])

The provision for separate trials is intended to further convenience, avoid delay and
prejudice, and serve the ends of justice. It is the interest of efficient judicial administration
that is to be controlling rather than the wishes of the parties. The piecemeal trial of separate
issues in a single suit is not to be the usual course. It should be resorted to only in the
exercise of informed discretion when the court believes that separation will achieve the
purposes of the rule. (Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, as successor-in-interest of
Asian Bank Corporation vs. Hon. Edilberto G. Sandoval, G.R. No. 169677; February 18, 2013)

The writ of execution issued upon a final judgment adjudicating the ownership of land
to a party may authorize putting her in possession although the judgment does not
specifically direct such act. (Leonora A. Pascual vs. Josefino L. Daquiaoag, G.R. No. 162063,
March 31, 2014)

Once a judgment becomes immutable and unalterable by virtue of its finality, its
execution should follow as a matter of course. A supervening event, to be sufficient to stay
or stop the execution, must alter or modify the situation of the parties under the decision as
to render the execution inequitable, impossible, or unfair. The supervening event cannot rest
on unproved or uncertain facts. (Abrigo vs. Flores, G.R. No. 160786; June 17, 2013)

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS

In matters involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, mandamus cannot be


used to direct the manner or the particular way the judgment and discretion are to be
exercised. (Ampatuan vs. De Lima, GR No. 197291, Apr. 3, 2013)

An appeal by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 shall raise only questions
of law. (Moises Andrada vs Pilhino Sales Corporation, GR No. 156448, Feb. 23, 2011)

The injunctive relief protects only a right in esse. Where the plaintiff does not
demonstrate that he has an existing right to be protected by injunction, his suit for
injunction must be dismissed for lack of a cause. (Barayuga vs. Adventist University of the
Philippines, GR No. 168008, Aug. 17, 2011)

As a general rule, the Court does not interfere with the Office of the Ombudsman's
exercise of its investigative and prosecutoral powers. However, the Ombudsman's finding as
to whether or not probable cause exists cannot escape judicial scrutiny where there is grave
abuse of discretion, which the Court finds to be absent in this case. As such the dismissal of
the charge against the respondent must perforce be upheld. (Bondad vs Sarona)

Omission of the People of the Philippines as a party in his action for certiorari in the
Court of Appeals was fatal and already enough cause for the summary rejection of his
petition for certiorari. (Jowett K. Golangco vs. Jone B. Fung, G.R. No. 157952, September 8,
2009)

Contempt is a disregard of, or disobedience to, the rules or order of a legislative or


judicial body or an interruption of its proceedings by disorderly behavior or insolent
language in its presence or so near thereto as to disturb its proceedings or to impair the
respect due to such a body, while in its restricted and more usual sense, contempt
comprehends a despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of a court. (Lorenzo Shipping
Corp. vs. DMAP, GR. NO. 155849, August 31, 2011)

The RTC in an appeal of the judgment in an ejectment case, shall not conduct a
rehearing or trial de novo. (Manalang vs. Bacani, GR NO. 156995, January 12, 2015)

After the consolidation of the title in respondent Allied Banking Corporation’s name
for failure of the mortgagor to redeem the properties, the writ of possession becomes a
matter of right. Its issuance to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale, as in this
case, is merely ministerial functions. (Ortiz vs. Allied Banking, G.R. No. 214205, December 8,
2014)

A petition for certiorari is to be filed “not later than sixty (60) days form notice of the
judgment, order or resolution,” or, in a case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is
timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, “the sixty (60) day period shall be
counted from notice of the denial of the said motion.” The 60-day limitation is considered
inextendible, because limitation has been prescribed to avoid any unreasonable delay that
violates the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of cases. (Mallari vs. GSIS,
G.R. No. 157659, 25 Jan. 2010)

A petition for mandamus will issue only when the petitioner has a clear legal right to
the performance of the act sought to be compelled and the respondent has an imperative
duty to perform the same. The petitioner bears the burden to show that there is such a
clear legal right to the performance of the act, and a corresponding compelling duty on the
part of the respondent to perform the act. (Special People Inc. vs. Canda, G.R. No. 160932.
January 14, 2013)
.
Ombudsman has jurisdiction over administrative cases involving grave misconduct
committed by the officials and employees of government-owned or -controlled corporations
are expressly defined and delineated by the law. Private individuals are outside the
jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman as employees of a private corporation registered
with the Securities and Exchange Commission. (Antonio M. Carandang vs. Office of the
Ombudsman,
G.R. No. 148076, 153161, January 12, 2011)

An injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse, or a right which is merely
contingent and may never arise; or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of
action; or to prevent the perpetration of an act prohibited by statute. Indeed, a right, to be
protected by injunction, means a right clearly founded on or granted by law or is enforceable
as a matter of law. (Sps. Delos Santos vs. Metrobank, G.R. No. 153852. October 24, 2012)

The office of a petition for certiorari seeks solely to correct defects in jurisdiction, and
does not correct just any error or mistake committed by a court, board, or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions unless such court, board, or officer thereby acts without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction. (Spouses Yasay vs. CA, G.R. No. 156684 April 6, 2011)

A person should not be condemned for contempt where he contends for what he
believes to be right and in good faith institutes proceedings for the purpose, however
erroneous may be his conclusion as to his rights. To constitute contempt, the act must be
done willfully and for an illegitimate or improper purpose. (Lorenzo Shipping Corp. Vs.
Distribution Management Assoc. Of the Philippines, G.R. No. 155849 August 31, 2011)

The implementation of a writ of possession issued pursuant to Act No. 3135 at the
instance of the purchaser at the foreclosure sale of the mortgaged property in whose name
the title has been meanwhile consolidated cannot be prevented by the injunctive writ.
(Untited Coconut Planters Bank vs. Lumbo, G.R. No. 162757, December 11, 2013)
A stockholder has the right to inspect the books of the corporation of which he is a
member. In issuing the writ of mandamus, the court will exercise a sound discretion. The writ
should not be granted for speculative purposes or to gratify idle curiosity or to aid a
blackmailer, but it may not be denied to the stockholder who seeks the information for
legitimate purposes. (Terelay Investment and Development Corporation vs. Yulo, G.R. No.
160924, August 5, 2015)

In the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, the RTC shall decide the appeal of the
judgment of the MTC in Unlawful Detainer or Forcible Entry cases on the basis of the entire
record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as
may be required by the RTC. There is no trial de novo or rehearing of the case. (Ruben
Manalang, Carlos Manalang, Concepcion Gonzales and Luis Manalang vs. Bienvenido and
Mercedes Bacani, G.R. No. 156995, January 12, 2015)

To enable the extra judicial foreclosure of the REM of the petitioners, the special
power to sell should have been either inserted in the REM itself or embodied in a separate
instrument attached to the REM. The omission of the special power to sell the property
subject of the mortgage was fatal to the validity and efficacy of the extrajudicial foreclosure,
and warranted the invalidation of the entire proceedings conducted by the sheriff. (Spouses
Benito Baysa and Victoria Baysa vs. Spouses Fidel Plantilla and Susan Plantilla, Register of
Deeds of Quezon City, and the Sheriff of Quezon City)

The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate


special civil action under Rule 65, provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without
or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Then is certiorari under Rule 65
allowed to be resorted to. (Jose vs. Javellana, GR 158239 January 31, 2012)

Injunction should not issue except upon a clear showing that the applicant has a right
in esse to be protected, and that the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of such right. A
preliminary injunction should not determine the merits of a case, or decide controverted
facts, because being a preventive remedy, it only seeks to prevent threatened wrong,
further injury, and irreparable harm or injustice until the rights of the parties can be settled.
(Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Hon. Judge Agapito L. Hontanosas, Jr ., G.R. No. 157163;
June 25, 2014)

An action to recover the deficiency after extrajudicial foreclosure of a real property


mortgage is a personal action because it does not affect title to or possession of real
property, or any interest therein. As such, the venue of the action is where the plaintiff
resides or where the defendant resides, at the election of the plaintiff. (BPI Family Savings
Bank vs. Spouses Yujuico, G.R. No. 175796; July 22, 2015)

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

Restraint that is lawful and pursuant to a court process cannot be inquired into
through habeas corpus. (Mangila vs. Judge Pangilinan, G.R. 160739, July 17, 2013)
The proper mode of appealing a judgment or final order in special proceedings is by
notice of appeal and record on appeal. The failure to file the record on appeal results to
failure to perfect the appeal and will render the judgment final and beyond review on
appeal. (Chipongian vs. Benitez-Lirio, GR No. 162692, August 26, 2015)

Restraint that is lawful and pursuant to a court process cannot be inquired into
through habeas corpus. The function of habeas corpus, where the party who has appealed to
its aid is in custody under process, does not extend beyond an inquiry into the jurisdiction of
the court by which it was issued and the validity of the process upon its face. It is not a writ
of error. (Mangila vs. Hon. Pangilinan, G.R. No. 160739, July 17, 2013)

The validity of the adoption decree should not be assailed in an action for partition.
The RTC do not have the jurisdiction to determine or to review the validity of the decree of
adoption issued by the CFI by virtue of the equal rank and category between the RTC and
the CFI. The proper court with jurisdiction to do so is the Court of Appeals. (Berlinda Oribello
vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 163504, August 05, 2015)

The jurisdiction of the RTC as a probate court relates only to matters having to do
with the settlement of the estate and probate of a will of a deceased person, and does not
extend to the determination of a question of ownership that arises during the proceedings .
(Gilda Jardeleza vs. Spouses Melecio, G.R. No. 167975, June 17, 2015)

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

The national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value
the worth and dignity of every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to those
charged in criminal proceedings but also to extraditees upon a clear and convincing
showing: (1 ) that the detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and
(2 ) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances. (Juan Ponce Enrile
vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 213847, August 18, 2015)

The determination of the existence of probable cause lies within the discretion of the
public prosecutor after conducting a preliminary investigation upon the complaint of an
offended party. A public prosecutor alone determines the sufficiency of evidence that
establishes the probable cause justifying the filing of a criminal information against the
respondent because the determination of existence of a probable cause is the function of
the public prosecutor. (Marie Callo-Claridad vs. Philip Esteban and Teodora Esteban, G.R. No.
191567, March 20, 2013)

An independent civil action based on fraud initiated by the defrauded party does not
raise a prejudicial question to stop the proceedings in a pending criminal prosecution of the
defendant for estafa through falsification. This is because the result of the independent civil
action is irrelevant to the issue of guilt or innocence of the accused. (Consing vs. Republic,
G.R. No. 161075, July 15, 2013)

The criminal action for violation of BP 22 shall be deemed to include the


corresponding civil action and no reservation to file such civil action separately shall be
allowed. (Heirs of Eduardo Simon vs. Elvin Chan and the Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157547,
February 23, 2011)

Courts will not interfere with the executive determination of probable cause for the
purpose of filing an information, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. That abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law,
such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or hostility. (Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. vs. Tobias III, G.R. No. 177780,
January 25, 2012)

The use of the term “treachery,” standing alone, does not constitute a sufficient
averment for such was nothing but a conclusion of law, not an averment of a fact. The
requirement of sufficient factual averments is meant to inform the accused of the nature and
cause of the charge against him in order to enable him to prepare his defense . (People vs.
PO2 Valdez, G.R. No. 175602, January 18, 2012)

The failure to allege the qualifying circumstance of relationship in the information in a


Criminal Case of Rape precludes a finding of qualified rape against the accused (People vs.
Dadulla, Gr 172321, February 9, 2011)

The rescission of contract of sale is not a prejudicial question that will warrant the
suspension of the criminal proceedings commenced to prosecute the buyer for violations of
the Bouncing Checks Law (Batas Pambansa Blg. 22) arising from the dishonor of the checks
the buyer issued in connection with the sale (Reyes vs. Ettore Rossi, Gr 159823, Feb 18, 2013)

Although a waiver of the right to present evidence by the accused is not a trivial
matter to be lightly regarded by the trial court, the filing of the demurrer to evidence without
express leave of court operates as a waiver that binds the accused pursuant to the express
provision of the Rules of Court (People vs. Cristobal, Gr 159450, March 30, 2011).

In fixing exemplary damages as an award in criminal convictions, the term


aggravating circumstances should be understood in its broad or generic sense. The ordinary
or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance should be a distinction that was of
consequence only to the criminal, as contrasted from the civil liability, thereby entitling the
offended party to an award of exemplary damages regardless of whether the aggravating
circumstance was ordinary or qualifying. (People vs. Taguibuya, G.R. No. 180497, October 5,
2011)

An accused arrested during a valid entrapment operation is not entitled to an


acquittal on the ground that his arrest resulted from instigation. Entrapment is sanctioned by
law, instigation is not. (People vs. Tapere, G.R. No. 178065, February 20, 2013)

The recantation of her testimony by the victim of rape is to be disregarded if the


records show that it was impelled either by intimidation or by the need for the financial
support of the accused. (People vs. Teodoro, G.R. No. 175876, February 20, 2013)

Together with Ramon Salcedo, Jr. and Raul Salcedo, who have remained at
large, appellant Ruel Tuy was charged with murder in the Regional Trial Court in
Calabanga, Camarines Sur (RTC) for the killing of Orlando Barrameda. Both the RTC
and CA rejected his defenses of denial and alibi. (People of the Philippines, vs. Ruel
Tuy, G.R. No. 179476 (Resolution), [February 9, 2011], 657 PHIL 547-551)
The recantation of her testimony by the victim of rape is to be disregarded if the
records show that it was impelled either by intimidation or by the need for the financial
support of the accused. (People vs. Teodoro y Angeles, G.R. No. 175876, February 20, 2013)

The rape of a female over 12 years but under 18 years of age by the common-law
spouse of her mother is qualified rape. Yet, the crime is only simple rape because although
the State successfully proves the common-law relationship, the information does not
properly allege the qualifying circumstance of relationship between the accused and the
female. This is because the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him is inviolable. (People vs. Arcillas, G.R. No. 181491, July 30, 2012)

The pendency of an administrative case for specific performance brought by the


buyer of residential subdivision lots before the HLURB to compel seller to deliver the TCTs of
the fully paid lots is properly considered a ground to suspend a criminal prosecution for
violation of Sec. 25 of PD 957 on the ground of prejudicial question. The administrative
determination is logical antecedent of the resolution of the criminal charges based on non-
delivery of the TCTs. (San Miguel Properties Inc. vs. Perez, G.R. No. 166836, September 4,
2013)

The failure to file the memorandum on appeal is a ground for the RTC to dismiss the
appeal only in civil cases. The same rule does not apply in criminal cases. (Jose “Pepe”
Sanico vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 198753, March 25, 2015)

The sworn application for the search warrant and the search warrant itself were upon
the behest of the People of the Philippines. The immutable truth is that every search warrant
is applied for and issued by and under the authority of the State, regardless of who initiates
its application or causes its issuance. (Charlie Te vs. Hon. Augusto vs. Breva, G.R. No.
164974, August 05, 2015)

Any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged
in or excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon
motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court.
(Balindong vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 177600, October 19, 2015)

The plain view doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law
enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in
a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in
plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he
observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The law
enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from
which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came
inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open
to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent. (Revaldo vs. People, GR NO. 170589, April
16, 2009)

A hearing upon notice is mandatory before the grant of bail, whether bail is a matter
of right or discretion. (Gacal vs. Infante, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1845, [October 5, 2011], 674 PHIL
324-343)
Bail exists to ensure society's interest in having the accused answer to a criminal
prosecution without unduly restricting his or her liberty and without ignoring the accused's
right to be presumed innocent. It does not perform the function of preventing or licensing
the commission of crime. (Juan Ponce Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 213847
(Resolution), [July 12, 2016])

After all, the purpose of preliminary investigation is not only to determine whether
there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and the respondent therein is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial;
it is just as well for the purpose of securing the innocent against hasty, malicious and
oppressive prosecution, and to protect him from an open and public accusation of a crime,
from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial. More importantly, in the appraisal of
the case presented to him for resolution, the duty of a prosecutor is more to do justice
and less to prosecute. (Sales vs. Adapon, G.R. No. 171420, October 5, 2016)

The acquittal of the accused does not necessarily mean his absolution from civil
liability. (Lumanas vs. Calapiz, GR 163753, January 25 2014)

The determination of probable cause by the prosecutor and the DOJ may be reviewed
by the courts if there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
(Microsoft Corporation vs. Rolando Manansala, GR NO 166391, October 21, 2015)

EVIDENCE

The Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of a written document are the
subject of the inquiry. In an action for quieting of title based on the inexistence of a
deed of sale with right to repurchase that purportedly cast a cloud on the title of a
property, the Best Evidence Rule does not apply, and the defendant is not precluded from
presenting evidence other than the original document. (Heirs of Prodon vs. Heirs of
Alvarez, G.R. No. 170604, September 2, 2013)

The rule excluding hearsay as evidence is based upon serious concerns about the
trustworthiness and reliability of hearsay evidence due to its not being given under oath or
solemn affirmation and due to its not being subjected to cross-examination by the opposing
counsel to test the perception, memory, veracity and articulateness of the out-of-court
declaring or actor upon whose reliability the worth of the out-of-court statement depends.
(Patula vs. People, G.R. No. 164457 11 Apr. 2012)

The accused [had] waived her right to present evidence because she did not obtain
the express leave of court for her demurrer to evidence, thereby reflecting her voluntary and
knowing waiver of her right to present evidence. (People vs. Cristobal, G.R. No. 157049,
August 11, 2010)

The presentation as evidence in court of the dangerous drugs subject of and


recovered during the illegal sale is material in every prosecution for the illegal sale of
dangerous drugs. Without such dangerous drugs being presented as evidence, the State
does not establish the corpus delicti, which, literally translates to ‘body of the crime’, or the
actual commission by someone of the particular offense charged. (People vs. Gonzales y
Santos, G.R. No. 182417, 3 Apr 2013)

The law makes no distinction between direct evidence of a fact and evidence of
circumstance from which the existence of a fact may be inferred; hence no greater degree of
certainty is required when the evidence is circumstantial than when it is direct. In both
cases, the trier must still be convinced beyond reasonable doubt of guilt of the accused.
(People vs. Villaflores Y Olano, GR. No. 184926, April 11, 2012)

An antemortem declaration of a victim of murder, homicide, or parricide that meets


the conditions of admissibility under the Rules of Court and pertinent jurisprudence is
admissible either as a dying declaration or as a part of the res gestae, or both. (People vs.
Salafranca, GR. No. 173476, February 22, 2012)

It is essential that the identity of the dangerous drugs be established beyond doubt.
What is more, the fact that the dangerous drugs bought during the buy-bust operation are
the same dangerous drugs offered in court should be established. The chain of custody
requirement performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning
the identity of the evidence are removed. (People vs. Zakaria, G.R. No. 181042. November
26, 2012)

The burden rests in the Prosecution to see to it that the evidence of guilt satisfies the
standard of moral certainty demanded in all criminal prosecutions. The standard demands
that all the essential elements of the offense are established as to leave no room for any
doubt about the guilt of the accused. The courts should unfailingly impose the standard in
order to prevent injustice from being perpetrated against the accused. (Rogelio Reyes vs.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 180177. April 18, 2012)

A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no
longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is intended to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the
highest court of the land. (Sofio vs. Valenzuela, G.R. No. 157810. February 15, 2012)

The lack or absence of direct evidence does not necessarily mean that the guilt of the
accused cannot be proved by evidence other than direct evidence. Direct evidence is not the
sole means of establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, because circumstantial evidence,
if sufficient, can supplant the absence of direct evidence. (Gilfredo Bacolod vs. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 206236. July 15, 2013)

Every child is presumed qualified to be a witness. The party challenging the child's
competency as a witness has the burden of substantiating his challenge. (People of the
Philippines vs Alvin Elsugon, G.R. No. 195244, June 22, 2015)
The trial judge’s evaluation of the credibility of a witness and of his testimony is
accorded the highest respect because of the trial judge’s unique opportunity to directly
observe the demeanor of the witness. (People vs. Del Castillo, G.R. No. 169084, January 18,
2012)

The non –compliance by the buy-bust team with Section 21, RA No. 9165, was held
not to be fatal for as long as there was justifiable ground for it, and for as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated or seized articles were properly
preserved by the apprehending officer or articles were properly preserved by the
apprehending officer or team. (Reyes vs. CA, G.R. No. 1801177. April 28, 2012)

A stock certificate is prima facie evidence that the holder is a shareholder of the
corporation, but the possession of the certificate is not the sole determining factor of one’s
stock ownership. A certificate of stock is merely the paper representative or tangible
evidence of the stock itself and of the various interests therein. (Grace Borgona Insigne,
Diosdado Borgona, Osbourne Borgona, Imelda Borgona Rivera, and Aristotle Borgona vs.
Abra Valley Colleges, Inc. and Francis Borgona, G.R. No. 204089, July 29, 2015)

The Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of a writing are in issue. When
the evidence sought to be introduced concerns external facts, such as the existence,
execution or delivery of the writing, without reference to its terms, the Best Evidence Rule
cannot be invoked. In such a case, secondary evidence may be admitted even without
accounting for the original. (Heirs of Prodon Vs. Heirs of Alvarez, GR No. 170604, September
2, 2013)

Circumstantial evidence is admissible as proof to establish both the commission of a


crime and the identity of the culprit. (People vs. Villaflores y Olano, Gr No.184926 April 11,
2012)

Under the rule on preponderance of evidence, the court is instructed to find for and
to dismiss the case against the defendant should the scales hang in equipoise and there is
nothing in the evidence that tilts the scales to one or the other side. The plaintiff who had
the burden of proof has failed to establish its case, and the parties are no better off than
before they proceeded upon their litigation. In that situation, the court should leave the
parties as they are. (Republic of the Philippines vs. Reyes- Bakunawa, G.R. No. 180418,
August 28, 2013)

Such identification, to be positive, need not always be by direct evidence from an


eyewitness, for reliable circumstantial evidence can equally confirm it as to overcome the
constitutionally presumed innocence of the accused. (People of the Philippines vs. Gilberto
Villarico, Sr. @ “Berting” et. al. , G.R. No. 158362, April 4, 2011)

Testimonial Evidence not based on personal knowledge are hearsay and are
unreliable for purposes of determining the guilt or innocence of the accused. Also, private
documents not duly authenticated could not be presented and admitted as evidence. These
defects cannot be cured by the adverse party's waiver of her cross-examination or failure to
rebut. (Patula vs. People, GR 164457, April 11, 2012)

Under the Rules of Court, a child may be a competent witness, unless the trial court
determines upon proper showing that the child's mental maturity is such as to render him
incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which he is to be examined and of relating the
facts truthfully. (People vs. Edison Magbitang, GR 175592, 14 June 2016)
JUAN PONCE ENRILE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 213847, August 18, 2015
DOCTRINE
The national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value
the worth and dignity of every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to those
charged in criminal proceedings but also to extraditees upon a clear and convincing
showing: (1 ) that the detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and
(2 ) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances.

FACTS
On June 5, 2014, Petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile was charged with plunder in the
Sandiganbayan on the basis of his purported involvement in the Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF) Scam. Enrile in an Omnibus Motion requested then to post bail,
which the Sandiganbayan denied. On July 3, 2014, a warrant for Enrile's arrest was issued,
which lead to Petitioner's voluntary surrender. Petitioner for the second time asked the
Sandiganbayan to allow him to post bail through a Motion to Fix Bail arguing that: (a)
Prosecution had not yet established that the evidence of his guilt was strong; (b) that,
because of his advanced age and voluntary surrender, the penalty would only be reclusion
temporal, thus allowing for bail and; (c) he is not a flight risk due to his age and physical
condition. Sandiganbayan denied this again in its assailed resolution. Motion for
Reconsideration was likewise denied.

ISSUE
Whether or not Juan Ponce Enrile shall be allowed to post bail?

HELD
YES. Article III, Sec. 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution provides that in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. This right
is safeguarded by the constitutional right to be released on bail. Admission to bail in offenses
punished by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion perpetua is subject to judicial
discretion. In Concerned Citizens vs. Elma, the court held: “[S]uch discretion may be
exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the
purpose of whether or not he should be granted provisional liberty.” Bail hearing with notice
is indispensable (Aguirre vs. Belmonte). The hearing should primarily determine whether the
evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. The procedure for discretionary bail is
described in Cortes vs. Catral.
Petitioner's poor health also justifies his admission to bail. The Supreme Court took
note of the Philippine's responsibility to the international community arising from its
commitment to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We therefore have the
responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due
process and for detainees to avail of such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right
to liberty.
x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of
every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which
provides: “The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect
for human rights.” The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and
promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained
or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without
delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other words, the
Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under
detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies
include the right to be admitted to bail.

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) VS. COMELEC, ET AL.


G.R. No. 176951, November 18, 2008
DOCTRINE
The 6-6 tie-vote by the Court en banc on the second motion for reconsideration
necessarily resulted in the denial of the second motion for reconsideration. Since the Court
was evenly divided, there could be no reversal of the 18 November 2008 Decision, for a tie-
vote cannot result in any court order or directive. The tie-vote plainly signifies that there is
no majority to overturn the prior 18 November 2008 Decision and 31 March 2009 Resolution
denying reconsideration, and thus the second motion for reconsideration must be denied.

FACTS
The 11th Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities.
However, it did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities. Subsequently,
the 12th Congress enacted Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), which took effect on 20 June
2001, amending Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income
requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20million to P100million.
Thereafter, 16 municipalities filed their individual cityhood bills, containing a common
provision exempting all of them from the P100million income requirement of RA 9009. The
cityhood bills were approved by the House of Representatives and the Senate, and lapsed
into law without the President’s signature.
Petitioners sought to declare the 16 Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and the equal protection clause, lamenting that the
wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities would reduce the share of existing cities in
the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA). On 18 November 2008, the Supreme Court En Banc,
by a majority vote, declared the 16 Cityhood Laws to be in violation of Section 10, Article X
of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that no city shall be created except in accordance
with the criteria established in the local government code. On 31 March 2009, the Supreme
Court En Banc, also by a majority vote, denied the respondent municipalities’ first motion for
reconsideration. On 28 April 2009, the Supreme Court En Banc, by a split vote, denied the
respondent municipalities’ second motion for reconsideration. The 18 November 2008
Decision became final and executory and was recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments
on 21 May 2009.
However, on 21 December 2009, the Supreme Court En Banc reversed the 18
November 2008 Decision and upheld the constitutionality of the Cityhood Laws.

ISSUE
Whether or not the 16 Cityhood Laws violated Section 10, Article X of the 1987
Constitution and the equal protection clause, therefore making it unconstitutional?

HELD
YES, the 16 Cityhood Laws are unconstitutional.
(1) Section 10, Article X of the Constitution is clear – the creation of local government
units must follow the criteria established in the Local Government Code and not in any other
law. From the moment RA 9009 took effect (on 30 June 2001), the LGC required that any
municipality desiring to become a city must satisfy the P100million income requirement.
Section 450 of the LGC, as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any exemption from this
income requirement, even for municipalities with pending cityhood bills in Congress when RA
9009 was passed. The uniform exemption clause in the Cityhood Laws, therefore, violated
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. To be valid, such exemption must be written in the
Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.
RA 9009 is not a law different from the Local Government Code. RA 9009, by
amending Section 450 of the Local Government Code, embodies the new and prevailing
Section 450 of the Local Government Code. Since the law is clear, plain and unambiguous
that any municipality desiring to convert into a city must meet the increased income
requirement, there is no reason to go beyond the letter of the law. Moreover, where the law
does not make an exemption, the Court should not create one.
On the split or tie-vote on the second motion for reconsideration of the 18
November 2008 Decision:
The dissenting opinion stated that “a deadlocked vote of six is not a majority and a
non-majority does not constitute a rule with precedential value.”
However, Section 7, Rule 56 of the Rules of Court provides that when, in appealed
cases, the court en banc is equally divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be
had, the judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed and on all incidental matters,
the petition or motion shall be denied.
The 6-6 tie-vote by the Court en banc on the second motion for reconsideration
necessarily resulted in the denial of the second motion for reconsideration. Since the Court
was evenly divided, there could be no reversal of the 18 November 2008 Decision, for a tie-
vote cannot result in any court order or directive. The tie-vote plainly signifies that there is
no majority to overturn the prior 18 November 2008 Decision and 31 March 2009 Resolution
denying reconsideration, and thus the second motion for reconsideration must be denied.
Hence, the 18 November 2008 judgment and the 31 March 2009 resolution stand in full
force. These prior majority actions of the Court en banc can only be overruled by a new
majority vote, not a tie-vote because a tie-vote cannot overrule a prior affirmative action.
The 18 November 2008 Decision, declaring the 16 Cityhood Laws unconstitutional,
was reinstated.

AIR ADS INCORPORATED, VS. TAGUM AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT


CORPORATION (TADECO)
G.R. No. 160736, March 23 , 2011

DOCTRINE
The substitution of the third party complaint could not produce the effect that an
amendment of an existing pleading produces. Under Section I, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court,
an amendment is done by adding or striking out an allegation or the name of any party, or
by correcting a mistake in the name of a party or a mistaken or inadequate allegation or
description in any other respect.

FACTS
TADECO was a defendant in an action to recover damages for the death of Elva O.
Pormento’s husband. As defendant, it filed through counsel ACCRA Law Office an answer
with compulsory counterclaims and motion for leave to file third party complaint, impleading
petitioner Air Ads, Inc. and Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation (Pioneer) as third-party
defendants which the RTC admitted. However, ACCRA Law Office, upon realizing that Pioneer
was a client of its Makati Office, filed a notice of dismissal without prejudice to third party
complaint only against Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation.
Later, TADECO filed through another counsel (Dominguez Law Office) a motion to
withdraw notice of dismissal without prejudice to third party complaint only against Pioneer
Insurance & Surety Corporation or motion for reconsideration, alleging that the notice of
dismissal filed by ACCRA Law Office had been made without its consent. Both of these
motions were granted. Subsequently, TADECO filed a motion to admit third party
complaint, explaining that the substitute third party complaint was being filed to avoid
putting ACCRA Law Office in an awkward situation, and to avoid the appearance that new
counsel Dominguez Law Office was merely adopting the previous third party complaint,
which was likewise granted. Air Ads then filed a motion to dismiss against the third party
complaint averring that it had been dropped as third party defendant under TADECO's
substitute third party complaint; and arguing that the filing of the substitute third party
complaint had the effect of entirely superseding the original third party complaint, which
should consequently be stricken out from the records.

ISSUES
Whether or not a substitute third party complaint has the effect of superseding the
original third party complaint?

HELD
NO. Substitution of the third party complaint did not supersede original third party
complaint. The substitution of the third party complaint could not produce the effect that an
amendment of an existing pleading produces. Under Section I, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court,
an amendment is done by adding or striking out an allegation or the name of any party, or
by correcting a mistake in the name of a party or a mistaken or inadequate allegation or
description in any other respect. A perusal of the original and the substitute third party
complaints shows that their averments are substantially the same; and that the
substitute third party complaint did not strike out any allegation of the prior one.
Furthermore, It is not the caption of the pleading that determines the nature of the
complaint but rather its allegations.

FRANCISCO ALONSO, et.al vs. CEBU COUNTRY CLUB, INC.,


G.R. No. 188471, April 20, 2010

DOCTRINE
An appeal (for the denial of the motion for reconsideration) is an action to be
prosecuted by a party in interest before a higher court. In order for the appeal to prosper,
the litigant must of necessity continue to hold a real or present substantial interest that
entitles him to the avails of the suit on appeal. If he does not, the appeal, as to him, is an
exercise in futility.
FACTS
In 1992, Francisco discovered documents showing that his father Tomas N. Alonso
had acquired Lot No. 727 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate from the Government in or about
the year 1911. Francisco subsequently found that the certificate of title covering the said
land had been "administratively reconstituted from the owner’s duplicate" of Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-1310 in the name of United Service Country Club, Inc., the
predecessor of respondent Cebu Country Club; and that upon the order of the court that had
heard the petition for reconstitution of the TCT, the name of the registered owner in TCT No.
RT-1310 had been changed to that of Cebu Country Club. With his discoveries, Francisco
formally demanded upon Cebu Country Club to restore the ownership and possession of Lot
727 to him. However, Cebu Country Club denied Francisco’s demand and claim of
ownership, and refused to deliver the possession to him. Thus, he commenced an action for
the declaration of nullity and non-existence of deed/title, the cancellation of certificates of
title, and the recovery of property. However, RTC and CA consistently decided in the favor of
Cebu Country Club. Upon appeal to the SC, it was declared that the disputed land legally
belongs to the government. Petitioner, upon the denial of its motion for reconsideration in
opposition of the motion for the issuance of a writ of execution went to the SC to appeal by
petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioners were the real parties-in-interest to question the denial
by the RTC of the OSG’s motion for the issuance of a writ of execution.

HELD
NO, Every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in
interest, unless otherwise authorized by law or the rules. A real party in interest is one who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit. "Interest" within the meaning of the rule means material interest, an
interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the
question involved, or a mere incidental interest. The rule refers to a real or present
substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy; or from a future, contingent,
subordinate, or consequential interest. One having no right or interest to protect cannot
invoke the jurisdiction of the court as a party-plaintiff in an action.
Thus, an appeal, like this one, is an action to be prosecuted by a party in interest
before a higher court. In order for the appeal to prosper, the litigant must of necessity
continue to hold a real or present substantial interest that entitles him to the avails of the
suit on appeal. If he does not, the appeal, as to him, is an exercise in futility. In contrast, the
Government, being the legal owner of Lot No. 727-D-2, is the only party adversely affected
by the denial, and is the proper party entitled to assail the denial. However, its manifest
desistance from the execution of the decision effectively barred any challenge against the
denial, for its non-appeal rendered the denial final and immutable.

AMPATUAN VS DE LIMA
GR No. 197291, Apr. 3, 2013

DOCTRINE
In matters involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, mandamus cannot be
used to direct the manner or the particular way the judgment and discretion are to be
exercised.

FACTS
Corresponding informations for murder against petitioner Andal Ampatuan pertaining
the Maguindanao Massacre were resolved to be filed by the DOJ. Petitioner
Ampatuan pleaded not guilty to each of the informations during arraignment. Thereafter,
the Panel of Prosecutors issued a joint resolution charging certain individuals with multiple
murder which was based on the twin affidavits executed by one Kenny Dalandag who was
then admitted into the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ. Petitioner Ampatuan
requested respondent Secretary of Justice De Lima to include Dalandag in the informations
for murder considering that Dalandag had already confessed his participation in the
massacre through his two sworn declarations. Petitioner Ampatuan reiterated his request
twice but respondent De Lima denied his request. Thus petitioner brought a petition for
mandamus in the RTC in Manila seeking to compel respondents to charge Dalandag as
another accused in the various murder cases undergoing trial in the QC RTC.

ISSUE
Whether or not respondents may be compelled by writ of mandamus to charge
Dalandag as an accused for multiple murder in relation to the Maguindanao massacre
despite his admission to the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ

HELD
No, because mandamus shall issue only when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer
or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act that the law specifically enjoins as a
duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. And in matters involving the exercise of
judgment and discretion, mandamus may only be resorted to in order to compel respondent
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person to take action, but it cannot be used to direct
the manner or the particular way discretion is to be exercised, or to compel the retraction or
reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of judgment or discretion.
Consequently, respondent Secretary of Justice De Lima may be compelled to act on the
letter-request of petitioner, but may not be compelled to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or
deny such letter-request. Considering that respondent Secretary of Justice already denied
the letter-request, mandamus was no longer available as petitioner's recourse.

MOISES ANDRADA VS PILHINO SALES CORPORATION


GR No. 156448, Feb. 23, 2011

DOCTRINE
An appeal by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 shall raise only questions
of law.

FACTS
Respondent Pilhino sued Jose Andrada, Jr. for the recovey of a sum of money and
upon its application, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary attachment against the two trucks
owned by Jose Andrada. However, the two trucks could not be transferred to Pilhinos' name,
it being the highest bidder, because it appeared to have been already registered in the
name of petitioner Moises Andrada through a sale made by Jose Andrada to the latter.
Consequently, Moises Andrada was impleaded as well by Philhino. But after a compromise
agreement between Philhino and Jose Andrada had been validly entered into, the RTC
dismissed the case and the claim for damages filed by the petitioner by way of
counterclaim. The CA affirmed the RTC's decision thereby prompting petitioner Moises
Andrada to file a petition for review on certiorari before the SC.

ISSUE
Whether or not Pilhino is guilty of bad faith and thus should be held liable for the
damages the petitioners sustained from Pilhinos' levy on execution upon the trucks

HELD
No, the appeal cannot succeed because an appeal by petition for review
on certiorari cannot determine factual issues. As such, the petition shall raise only
questions of law which must be distinctly set forth. The petitioner's insistence, which
represents his disagreement with the CA's declaration that the second and third elements of
abuse of rights, supra, were not established, requires the consideration and review of factual
issues. In the exercise of the Court's power of review, the Court is not a trier of facts and
does not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the
contending parties during the trial. Perforce, the findings of fact by the CA are conclusive
and binding on the Court. Thus, the herein petition for review must fail for raising a question
essentially of fact.

BARAYUGA VS ADVENTIST UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES


GR No. 168008, Aug. 17, 2011

DOCTRINE
The injunctive relief protects only a right in esse. Where the plaintiff does not
demonstrate that he has an existing right to be protected by injunction, his suit for
injunction must be dismissed for lack of a cause.

FACTS
Petitioner Barayuga was appointed President of Adventist University of the Philippines
by the latter's Board of Trustees. Sometime therafter, he was removed as President by a
vote obtained through secret ballots by the members of the Board on the ground of his
serious violations of fundamental rules and procedures in the disbursement and use of funds
as revealed by the special audit and the Board's deliberations after he was given opportunity
to explain the irregularities of his acts. He, then, filed with the RTC a petition for injunction
and damages with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO),
impleading AUP and its Board of Trustees alleging that the Board of Trustees had relieved
him as President without valid grounds despite his five-year term; that the Board of Trustees
had thereby acted in bad faith; and that he was denied ample and reasonable time to
present his evidence depriving him of his right to due process.

ISSUE
Whether the CA correctly ruled that the petitioner had no legal right to the position of
President of AUP that could be protected by the injunctive writ issued by the RTC.

HELD
Yes. A valid writ of preliminary injunction rests on the weight of evidence submitted
by the plaintiff establishing: (a) a present and unmistakable right to be protected; (b) the
acts against which the injunction is directed violate such right; and (c) a special and
paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damages. In the absence of a clear legal
right, the issuance of the injunctive writ constitutes grave abuse of discretion and will result
to nullification thereof. Where the complainant's right is doubtful or disputed, injunction is
not proper. The possibility of irreparable damage sans proof of an actual existing right is not
a ground for a preliminary injunction.
Given that the lifetime of the writ of preliminary injunction was co-extensive with the
duration of the act sought to be prohibited, this injunctive relief already became moot in the
face of the admission by the petitioner himself, through his affidavit, that his term of office
premised on his alleged five-year tenure as President had lasted only until December 2005.

BONDAD VS SARONA
(A Resolution)

As a general rule, the Court does not interfere with the Office of the Ombudsman's exercise
of its investigative and prosecutoral powers. However, the Ombudsman's finding as to
whether or not probable cause exists cannot escape judicial scrutiny where there is grave
abuse of discretion, which the Court finds to be absent in this case. As such the dismissal of
the charge against the respondent must perforce be upheld.
BORROMEO VS CA
GR No. 194226, Feb. 15, 2017

DOCTRINE
No person who has not been impleaded and duly served with the summons should be
adversely affected by the outcome of the action.

FACTS
National Power Corporation (NPC) set a public bidding for the security package in NPC
MinGen. San Miguel Protective Security Agency (SMPSA), was one of the bidders as
represented by Labao. But NPC's Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) disqualified SMPSA for
its alleged failure to meet the equipage requirements. The disqualification prompted Labao,
to bring a petition for certiorari against NPC and its officials in the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
in Lanao del Norte. RTC issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) directing NPC and its
officials to desist from awarding the security package, as well as from declaring a failure of
bidding. But in the meantime, NPC and PSALM entered into an operation and maintenance
agreement whereby the latter, had the obligation to provide for the security of all the plants,
assets and other facilities. Therafter, PSALM received the TRO issued by the CA even though
Labao did not furnish PSALM a copy of SMPSA's Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a TRO
and/or Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction. CA issued the assailed resolution granting the TRO
in order to maintain the status quo, and expressly included PSALM as subject of the writ.

ISSUE
Whether a non-party to a suit may be subjected to the injunctive writ issued against
one of the parties.

HELD
No. The CA unquestionably exceeded its jurisdiction in including PSALM within the
coverage of the TRO and the writ of injunction issued against NPC. There is no question that
as a provisional remedy to prevent irreparable injury pending the final determination of the
action, injunction can bind only the parties in the action, or their privies or successors-in-
interest. No person who has not been impleaded and duly served with the summons should
be adversely affected by the outcome of the action. The principle that a person cannot be
prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an action or proceeding in which it has not been made a
party conforms to the constitutional guarantee of due process of law.

MARIE CALLO-CLARIDAD VS. PHILIP ESTEBAN AND TEODORA ESTEBAN


G.R. No. 191567, March 20, 2013

DOCTRINE
The determination of the existence of probable cause lies within the discretion of the
public prosecutor after conducting a preliminary investigation upon the complaint of an
offended party. A public prosecutor alone determines the sufficiency of evidence that
establishes the probable cause justifying the filing of a criminal information against the
respondent because the determination of existence of a probable cause is the function of
the public prosecutor.

FACTS
Cheasare Armani “Chase” Callo Claridad lifeless but bloodied body was discovered in
between vehicles parked at the carport of a residential area. Allegedly, Chase had been last
seen alive with respondent less than an hour before the discovery of his lifeless body. The
Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Quezon City dismissed the complaint. The OCP
observed that there was lack of evidence, motive, and circumstantial evidence sufficient to
charge Philip with homicide, much less murder; that the circumstantial evidence could not
link Philip to the crime; that several possibilities would discount Philip’s presence at the time
of the crime, including the possibility that there were more than one suspect in the fatal
stabbing of Chase; that Philip was not shown to have any motive to kill Chase; that their
common friends attested that the two had no ill-feelings towards each other; that no
sufficient evidence existed to charge Teodora with the crime, whether as principal,
accomplice, or accessory; and that the allegation that Teodora could have been the female
person engaged in a discussion with a male person inside the car with plate JTG 333 was
unreliable being mere hearsay. Secretary of Justice affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.

ISSUE
Whether the CA committed a reversible error in upholding the decision of the
Secretary of Justice finding that there was no probable cause to charge Philip and Teodora
with murder for the killing of Chase.

HELD
No. The filing of a petition for review under Rule 43 to review the Secretary of
Justice’s resolution on the determination of probable cause was an improper remedy. Indeed,
the CA had no appellate jurisdiction vis-à- vis the Secretary of Justice. A petition for review
under Rule 43 is a mode of appeal to be taken only to review the decisions, resolutions or
awards by the quasi-judicial officers, agencies or bodies, particularly those specified in
Section 1 of Rule 43. In the matter before us, however, the Secretary of Justice was not an
officer performing a quasi-judicial function. In reviewing the findings of the OCP of Quezon
City on the matter of probable cause, the Secretary of Justice performed an essentially
executive function to determine whether the crime alleged against the respondents was
committed, and whether there was probable cause to believe that the respondents were
guilty thereof.

CAPALLA VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS


G.R. No. 201112, June 13, 2012

FACTS
COMELEC posted and published an invitation to apply for eligibility and to bid for the
2010 Poll Automation Project. The COMELEC awarded the contract for the Project to
respondent Smartmatic-TIM. The COMELEC signed a resolution to approve a Deed of Sale
between COMELEC and Smartmatic-TIM to purchase the latter's PCOS machines (hardware
and software) to be used in the upcoming May 2013 elections and to authorize Chairman
Brillantes to sign the Deed of Sale for and on behalf of the COMELEC. The Deed of Sale was
forthwith executed.
Petitioners alleged that the forgoing issuances and transactions entered pursuant
thereto are illegal and unconstitutional to declare COMELEC Resolutions on the purchase of
PCOS machines, null and void as it was imputed that grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in the issuance of the assailed Resolutions and in executing the
assailed Extension Agreement and Deed by the COMELEC.
A TRO was issued enjoining the implementation of the assailed contract. The
petitioners were asked to submit their Memoranda as the case was set for Oral Arguments.

ISSUE
Whether or not COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in entering into a contract
with SMARTMATIC-TIM for the purchase of its PCOS machines and related systems in
connection with the forthcoming 2013 elections.
HELD
No. The COMELEC was open to using a new AES since it applied with Congress for the
amount of money this will require and held out for as long as it could on its option to
purchase from SMARTMATIC-TIM the equipment and systems used in the 2010 Elections.
When the money did not come, COMELEC settled for buying the latter equipment and
systems under an extended option that the owners gave it. COMELEC is right that it bought
SMARTMATIC-TIM's equipment and systems based on the terms of the option to purchase.
These positions are not exactly incompatible. They can actually be reconciled.
As the COMELEC is confronted with time and budget constraints, and in view of
the COMELEC's mandate to ensure free, honest, and credible elections, the acceptance of
the extension of the option period, the exercise of the option, and the execution of the Deed
of Sale, are the more prudent choices available to the COMELEC for a successful 2013
automated elections. The alleged defects in the subject goods have been determined and
may be corrected as in fact fixes and enhancements had been undertaken by Smartmatic-
TIM.

NOTE: Bersamin, J:
The petitions are inappropriate remedies against Resolution No. 9376 and
the Deed of Sale. The Court should dismiss them for that reason.
Furthermore, the petitions should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter.
The Court has classified the functions the COMELEC exercises into the quasi-judicial,
quasi-legislative, and administrative. The Court has clarified that Rule 64 applies only to the
judgments or final orders or final resolutions rendered by the COMELEC in the exercise of its
quasi-judicial function (that is, "the power to resolve controversies arising from the
enforcement of election laws, and to be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies;
and of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications”).
Rule 65 provides another remedy to a party who is aggrieved by the act of the
COMELEC in the exercise of its administrative function, but the questioned act or issuance
must have been attended by grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
The resolution resulted from the COMELEC's exercise of its quasi-legislative function
through the adoption of an automated election system for the 2013 elections.
Considering that the assailed Deed of Sale entered into on March 30, 2012 pursuant
to Resolution No. 9376 was clearly not the product of the COMELEC's quasi-judicial function,
the Court cannot exercise its certiorari jurisdiction herein in order to review and set it aside.
The RTC still has exclusive and original jurisdiction notwithstanding that the
petitioners' theory is that the assailed Resolution No. 9376 was invalid and illegal for
violating RA No. 9184 (The Government Procurement Reform Act). The Court's power to
evaluate and pass upon the validity of an implementing rule or regulation like Resolution No.
9376 is generally only appellate in nature.
The involvement of the national interest in a controversy and the serious implications
on the national life of the issue, may justify a direct resort to the Court. Yet, the Court should
still desist from giving due course to and resolving the consolidated petitions upon bare
assertions of transcendental importance or the paramountcy of public interest. Verily,
jurisdiction over the subject matter of any action is determined by the basic allegations of
the initiating pleading, but such determinant allegations should not include conclusions of
fact and law; otherwise, the laws on jurisdiction and pleadings will be easily thrown in
disarray. The Court cannot arbitrarily ignore the statutory rules on jurisdiction in order to
repose in itself an original authority that the Constitution and the statutes have not seen fit
to repose in the Court.

ANTONIO M. CARANDANG VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN


G.R. No. 148076, 153161, January 12, 2011

DOCTRINE
Ombudsman has jurisdiction over administrative cases involving grave misconduct
committed by the officials and employees of government-owned or -controlled corporations
are expressly defined and delineated by the law. Private individuals are outside the
jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman as employees of a private corporation registered
with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

FACTS
RPN, a private corporation duly registered with the SEC was ordered the
sequestration of its assets, properties, and business by the PCGG. Carandang assumed office
as general manager and chief operating officer of RPN. Carandang had entered into a
contract with AF Broadcasting Incorporated despite his being an incorporator, director, and
stockholder of that corporation; and that the transaction was prohibited R.A. No. 6713,
thereby rendering him administratively liable for grave misconduct, thus, charged by the
Ombudsman. Carandang sought the dismissal of the administrative charge on the ground
that the Ombudsman had no jurisdiction over him because RPN was not a government-
owned or -controlled corporation. The Ombudsman found Carandang guilty of grave
misconduct and ordered his dismissal from the service.

ISSUE
Whether or not the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the Carandang.

HELD
No. The law defines GOCCs in Section 2 (13) of E.O. No. 292 renders a similar
definition of government-owned or -controlled corporations: government-owned or
controlled corporations refer to any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation
vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in
nature, and owned by the government directly or indirectly through its instrumentalities
either wholly, or where applicable as in the case of stock corporations to the
extent of at least 51% of its capital stock.
RPN was neither a government-owned nor a controlled corporation because of the
Government's total share in RPN's capital stock being only 32.4%. May it be that an
unresolved transfer of shares to the PCGG could represent 72.4% of the total issued and
outstanding capital stock of RPN, concluding that the Government held the majority of
RPN's capital stock as to make RPN a government-owned or -controlled corporation would
be bereft of any factual and legal basis.

CHU V. SPOUSES CUNANAN


G.R. No. 156185, [September 12, 2011], 673 PHIL 12-25

DOCTRINE
If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing
of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of
the others. Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment or decree on the merits
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or
their privies in all later suits and on all points and matters determined in the previous suit.

FACTS
Spouses Chus executed a deed of sale with assumption of mortgage involving their 5
parcels of land, registered in favor of Trinidad N. Cunanan with a “side arrangement”
clarifying that Cunanan had only paid P1M despite acknowledgement by the latter of
receiving full purchase price. The parties further stipulated that the ownership of the lots
would remain with the Chus as the vendors and would be transferred to Cunanan only upon
complete payment of the total consideration and compliance with the terms of the deed of
sale with assumption of mortgage. Cunanan was able to transfer the title of the 5 lots to her
name without the knowledge of the Chus, and to borrow money with the lots as security
without paying the balance of the purchase price. The Chus commenced a civil case in the
RTC to recover the unpaid balance from Spouses Cunanan together with other defendants. A
compromise agreement "for and in consideration of the full settlement of their case" was
approved.
Thereafter, petitioners herein brought another civil against seeking the cancellation
of the TCTs and the issuance of new TCTs in their favor, plus damages.

ISSUE
Whether or not the second civil case by the Chus was barred by res judicata.
HELD
Yes. A compromise agreement is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal
concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced. It encompasses the
objects specifically stated therein, although it may include other objects by necessary
implication, and is binding on the contracting parties, being expressly acknowledged as a
juridical agreement between them. It has the effect and authority of res judicata upon the
parties. In order that res judicata may bar the institution of a subsequent action, the
following requisites must concur: — (a) the former judgment must be final; (b) it must have
been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties; (c) it
must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be between the first and second
actions (i) identity of parties, (ii) identity of the subject matter, and (iii) identity of cause of
action.
The Chus could not be permitted to split up a single cause of action and make that
single cause of action the basis of several suits.

CITY GOVERNMENT OF BUTUAN V. CONSOLIDATED BROADCASTING


SYSTEM, INC.,
G.R. No. 157315, December 1, 2010, 651 PHIL 37-56

DOCTRINE
Although a trial judge who voluntarily inhibits loses jurisdiction to hear a case, he or
she may decide to reconsider the self-inhibition and re-assume jurisdiction after a re-
assessment of the circumstances giving cause to the inhibition. The discretion to reconsider
acknowledges that the trial judge is in the better position to determine the issue of
inhibition, and a reviewing tribunal will not disturb the exercise of that discretion except
upon a clear and strong finding of arbitrariness or whimsicality.

FACTS
City Mayor Plaza wrote to the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Butuan City to solicit its
support for her decision to deny the application for mayor's permit of respondent Bombo
Radyo/Consolidated Broadcasting System (CBS), and to eventually close down CBS's radio
station. She justified her decision by claiming that CBS is operating its broadcasting business
in a residential area, thus, violating the City's zoning ordinance. The Sangguninang
Panlungsod adopted Resolution-057-2002 "to strongly support the decision of the City Mayor
to deny the application of Consolidated Broadcasting System Development Corporation
(Bombo Radyo-Butuan) for a Mayor's Permit and thereafter close the radio station." The
City's licensing officer served on CBS's station manager a final/last notice of violation and
demand to cease and desist illegal operation, with a warning that he would recommend the
closure of its business in case of non-compliance. The case was raffled to several judges, yet
they inhibited. Without any other judge to handle the case, Judge Tomaneng formally
returned the case to Judge Dabalos, stating in his letter that Judge Dabalos' reason for
inhibition did not amount to a plausible ground to inhibit.

ISSUE
Whether or not Judge Dabalos acted with grave abuse of discretion when he took
cognizance of and re-assumed jurisdiction over the case after he had already effectively
inhibited himself.

HELD
No. “Section 1. Disqualification of judges. — xxx A judge may, in the exercise of his
sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just and valid reason xxx” does
not expressly enumerate the specific grounds for inhibition. This means that the
determination of the grounds is left to the sound discretion of the judge, who must discern
with only his or her conscience as guide on what may be just and valid reasons for self-
inhibition. The vesting of discretion necessarily proceeds from the reality that there may be
many and different grounds for a judge to recuse from a case, and such grounds cannot all
be catalogued in the Rules of Court.

CITYTRUST BANKING CORP. VS. CRUZ


G.R. No. 157049, August 11, 2010

DOCTRINE
In several decisions of the Court, the banks, defendants therein, were made liable for
negligence, even without sufficient proof of malice or bad faith on their part, and the Court
awarded moral damages of P100,000.00 each time to the suing depositors in proper
consideration of their reputation and their social standing.

FACTS
Respondent, an architect and businessman, maintained a savings and checking
accounts at the petitioner’s Loyola Heights Branch. He filed a claim for damages before the
RTC after his savings account was closed due to oversight committed by one of petitioner’s
tellers, resulting in the extreme embarrassment of respondent, for checks that he had issued
could not be honored although his savings account was sufficiently funded. The RTC ruled in
favor of respondent and ordered the payment of moral and exemplary damages plus
attorney’s fees. It ruled that petitioner was negligent for failing to properly supervise its
teller. The CA affirmed, ruling that petitioner bank must bear the blame for not discovering
the mistake of its teller for lack of proper supervision. The CA also denied petitioner’s MR for
lack of merit. Petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari, maintaining that there were
decisive facts showing excusable negligence and good faith that did not justify the award of
moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.

ISSUE
Whether or not the award of moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees is
proper.

HELD
Yes. Firstly, the errors sought to be reviewed focused on the correctness of the factual
findings of the CA. Such review will require the Court to again assess the facts. Yet, the Court
is not a trier of facts. Thus, the appeal is not proper, for only questions of law can be
elevated to the Court via petition for review on certiorari. Moreover, in several decisions of
the Court, the banks, defendants therein, were made liable for negligence, even without
sufficient proof of malice or bad faith on their part, and the Court awarded moral damages of
P100,000.00 each time to the suing depositors in proper consideration of their reputation
and their social standing. The respondent should be similarly awarded for the damage to his
reputation as an architect and businessman. Lastly, the CA properly affirmed the RTC's
award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees. It is never overemphasized that the public
always relies on a bank's profession of diligence and meticulousness in rendering
irreproachable service. Its failure to exercise diligence and meticulousness warranted its
liability for exemplary damages and for reasonable attorney's fees.

CONSING VS. REPUBLIC


G.R. No. 161075, July 15, 2013

DOCTRINE
An independent civil action based on fraud initiated by the defrauded party does not
raise a prejudicial question to stop the proceedings in a pending criminal prosecution of the
defendant for estafa through falsification. This is because the result of the independent civil
action is irrelevant to the issue of guilt or innocence of the accused.

FACTS
Petitioner obtained loans for himself and his mother various loans from Unicapital Inc.
and secured them by constituting a real estate mortgage constituted on a parcel of land
registered under his mother’s name. In accordance with its option to purchase the
mortgaged property, Unicapital agreed to purchase one-half of the property. The other half
of the property was purchased by Plus Builders, Inc., a joint venture partner of Unicapital.
Before Unicapital and Plus Builders could develop the property, they learned that the title to
the property was really in the names of Po Willie Yu and Juanito Tan Teng, the parties from
whom the property had been allegedly acquired by petitioner’s mother. Unicapital
demanded the return of its payment received by petitioner and his mother, but the latter
ignored the demands. Unicapital sued Consing in the RTC in Makati City for the recovery of a
sum of money and damages. Later, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City filed
against petitioner and his mother an information for estafa through falsification of public
document in the RTC in Makati City. Petitioner moved to defer his arraignment in the Makati
criminal case on the ground of existence of a prejudicial question due to the pendency of the
civil case for the collection of sum of money. The RTC issued an order suspending the
proceedings in the Makati criminal case on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial
question. The CA upheld the RTC order. Meanwhile, Plus Builders commenced his own suit for
recovery of damages in the RTC in Manila. Another information for estafa through
falsification of public document was filed against petitioner and his mother in the RTC in
Imus, Cavite. Again, petitioner filed a motion to defer the arraignment on the ground of the
existence of a prejudicial question. However, this time, the RTC handling the Cavite criminal
case denied his motion. Thereafter, Consing commenced in the CA a special civil action for
certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction, seeking
to enjoin his arraignment and trial in the Cavite criminal case. The CA granted the TRO. Not
satisfied, the State assailed the decision of the CA orders.

ISSUE
Whether or not prejudicial question exists in this case.

HELD
No. It is well settled that a civil action based on defamation, fraud and physical
injuries may be independently instituted pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, and does
not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of a criminal case. This
is because the result of the independent civil action is irrelevant to the issue of guilt or
innocence of the accused. In the case at bar, the Court finds no prejudicial question that
would justify the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal cases.
DISINI VS SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. Nos. 169823-24 & G.R. Nos. 174764-65, September 11, 2013

DOCTRINE
The Sandiganbayan has exclusive original jurisdiction over the criminal action
involving petitioner notwithstanding that he is a private individual considering that his
criminal prosecution is intimately related to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth of the
Marcoses, their immediate family, subordinates and close associates.

FACTS
The Office of the Ombudsman filed two informations dated June 30,2004 charging
Disini in the Sandiganbayan with corruption of public officials, for bribing former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, with accused’s shares of stock in various corporations, all for and in
consideration of seeking and obtaining for Burns and Roe, the engineering and architectural
contract and for Westinghouse Electrical Corporation, the construction contract, for the
Nuclear Power Plant Project, as in fact Pres. Marcos did award to said Burns and Roe and
Westinghouse, said contracts. Disini was then the close personal friend and golfing partner
of said Ferdinand E. Marcos, and being further the husband of the first cousin of then First
Lady Imelda Romualdez-Marcos and family physician of the Marcos family. Disini filed a
special civil action for certiorari before the Supreme Court, arguing that the Sandiganbayan
gravely erred when it assumed jurisdiction without having met the requisite under section 4
of RA 8249 that the accused must be a public officer, among other issues.

ISSUE
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the criminal cases.

HELD
Yes. Sandiganbayan has exclusive and original jurisdiction over the offenses charged.
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606 was the law that established the Sandiganbayan and
defined its jurisdiction. The law was amended by R.A. No. 7975 and R.A. No. 8249. Under
Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan was vested with original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all cases involving “criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986 (with regard to Marcos’ ill-gotten
wealth).” The same law also provides that in “case private individuals are charged as co-
principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees, including those
employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with
said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive
jurisdiction over them.” This provision must be read with Section 2 of E.O. No.1, which allows
recovery of ill-gotten wealth covered President Marcos’ immediate family, relatives,
subordinates and close associates, without distinction as to their private or public status. In
view of this, the Sandiganbayan properly took cognizance of the criminal cases despite
Disini’s being a private individual, and despite the lack of any allegation of his being the co-
principal, accomplice or accessory of a public official in the commission of the offenses
charged.

FEDMAN DEV. CORP. VS. AGCAOILI


G. R. No. 165025, August 31, 2011

DOCTRINE
The non-payment of the prescribed filing fees at the time of the filing of the
complaint or other initiatory pleading fails to vest jurisdiction over the case in the trial court.
Yet, where the plaintiff has paid the amount of filing fees assessed by the clerk of court, and
the amount paid turns out to be deficient, the trial court still acquires jurisdiction over the
case, subject to the payment by the plaintiff of the deficiency assessment.

FACTS
Respondent lodged a complaint for damages against petitioner, arguing that the
disconnection of the electric supply of Unit 411 on April 22, 1986 had unjustly deprived him
of the use and enjoyment of the unit; and that the disconnection had seriously affected his
law practice and had caused him sufferings, inconvenience and embarrassment. The RTC
rendered judgment in favor of respondent. The CA affirmed the judgment rendered by the
RTC. Petitioner asked the Supreme Court to review the ruling of the CA on the grounds that
there was a failure to pay the correct amount of docket fee herein because the complaint did
not specify the amounts of moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees; that
the payment of the prescribed docket fee by Agcaoili was necessary for the RTC to acquire
jurisdiction over the case; and that, consequently, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over
this case.

ISSUE
Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the case.

HELD
Yes. The filing of the complaint or other initiatory pleading and the payment of the
prescribed docket fee are the acts that vest a trial court with jurisdiction over the claim. In
an action where the reliefs sought are purely for sums of money and damages, the docket
fees are assessed on the basis of the aggregate amount being claimed. The non-
specification of the amounts of damages does not immediately divest the trial court of its
jurisdiction over the case, provided there is no bad faith or intent to defraud the Government
on the part of the plaintiff. Even where the clerk of court fails to make a deficiency
assessment, and the deficiency is not paid as a result, the trial court nonetheless continues
to have jurisdiction over the complaint, unless the party liable is guilty of a fraud in that
regard, considering that the deficiency will be collected as a fee in lien. The reason is that to
penalize the party for the omission of the clerk of court is not fair if the party has acted in
good faith. Herein, the docket fees paid by respondent were insufficient considering that the
complaint did not specify the amounts of moral damages, exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees. Nonetheless, it is not disputed that respondent paid the assessed docket
fees. Such payment negated bad faith or intent to defraud the Government. Nonetheless,
respondent must remit any docket fee deficiency to the RTC’s clerk of court.

GALVEZ VS. CA
G. R. No. 157445, April 3, 2013

DOCTRINE
The mere failure to attach copies of pleadings and other material portions of the
record as would support the allegations should not cause the outright dismissal of a petition
for review. The allegations of the petition must be examined to determine the sufficiency of
the attachments appended thereto.

FACTS
Eustacio sold a conjugal property to his daughter Jovita without the knowledge or
consent of his wife Segundina. After the sale, Jovita constituted a mortgage on the property
to secure her loan from the PNB. Jovita failed to pay her obligation. Hence, PNB had the
property extrajudicially foreclosed. PNB was the highest bidder. Spouses Montaño purchased
the property from PNB. Thereafter, the Montaños tried to get the actual possession of the
property, but Segundina refused to vacate. Accordingly, the Montaños sued Segundina for
recovery of ownership and possession, and damages in the MTC in Leyte. The MTC ruled in
favor of the Montaños. The RTC affirmed the MTC’s decision. Thereafter, Segundina appealed
to the CA by petition for review. The CA dismissed the case because “no copies of pleadings
and other material portions of the record as would support the allegations thereof were
attached as annexes in violation of Section 2, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.”

ISSUE
Whether or not the petition was properly dismissed for failure to attach copies of
pleadings and records of the lower courts.

HELD
No. The mere failure to attach copies of the pleadings and other material portions of
the record as would support the allegations of the petition for review is not necessarily fatal
as to warrant the outright denial of due course when the clearly legible duplicate originals or
true copies of the judgments or final orders of both lower courts, certified correct by the
clerk of court of the RTC, and other attachments of the petition sufficiently substantiate the
allegations. Here, the Court considers the attachments of Segundina’s petition for review
(i.e., the certified true copies of the MTC decision, the RTC decision, and the RTC order)
already sufficient to enable the CA to pass upon her assigned errors and to resolve her
appeal even without the pleadings and other portions of the records. To still deny due course
to her petition for not attaching the complaint and the answer despite the MTC decision
having substantially summarized their contents was to ignore the spirit and purpose of the
requirement to give sufficient information to the CA. Likewise, were a reference to the
records of the trial court be held by the CA to be still necessary to settle any remaining
doubt as to the propriety of the factual findings of the lower courts, the CA could have itself
called upon Segundina to submit additional documents, or could have itself directed the
clerk of court of the RTC to elevate the original records to enable it to make a complete
adjudication of the case. Outright denial of due course under the circumstances contravened
Segundina's right to be heard on her appeal, and constituted a gross error on the part of the
CA.

JOWETT K. GOLANGCO vs. JONE B. FUNG


G.R. No. 157952, September 8, 2009

DOCTRINE
Omission of the People of the Philippines as a party in his action for certiorari in the
Court of Appeals was fatal and already enough cause for the summary rejection of his
petition for certiorari.|||

FACTS
Petitioner filed a case for libel against the petitioner. Allegedly, the respondent had
issued an office memorandum maliciously imputing against the petitioner the commission of
bribery. After almost 6 years, the Prosecution had presented only two witnesses. The
Prosecution requested that a subpoena ad testificandum be issued to and served on Atty.
Oscar Ramos. The Prosecution still failed to present Atty. Ramos because no subpoena had
been issued to and served on him for the purpose. Consequently, the RTC judge issued an
order terminating the Prosecution's presentation of evidence. The petitioner, by his
lonesome, assailed on certiorari in the Court of Appeals the order claiming that the RTC
judge thereby committed grave abuse of discretion for not issuing the subpoena to require
Atty. Ramos to appear and testify.

ISSUE
Whether or not there was a gross procedural misstep committed by the petitioner to
the Court of Appeals.

HELD
Yes. The petitioner did not join the People of the Philippines as a party in his action
for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. He ignored that omission of the People of the
Philippines was fatal. The petitioner did not also obtain the consent of OSG to his petition
for certiorari. At the very least, he should have furnished a copy of the petition for
certiorari to the OSG prior to the filing. He violated Section 35 (l), Chapter 12, Title III of Book
IV of Executive Order No. 292 (The Administrative Code of 1987), which mandates the OSG
to represent "the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal
proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which
the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party.
HEIRS OF EDUARDO SIMON vs. ELVIN CHAN AND THE COURT OFAPPEALS
G.R. No. 157547, February 23, 2011

DOCTRINES
The criminal action for violation of BP 22 shall be deemed to include the
corresponding civil action and no reservation to file such civil action separately shall be
allowed.

FACTS
The late Eduardo Simon was charged with a violation of BP 22 by the Office of the
Prosecutor Manila for issuing a bouncing check to the respondent. More than three years
later, respondent commenced in the MeTC in Pasay a civil action for the collection of money
with an application for a writ of preliminary attachment based on the same facts. Simon
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of litis pendencia. MeTC and RTC granted the Motion
to Dismiss while CA overturned the decision of the RTC ruling that the second case is an
independent civil action.

ISSUE
Whether or not Chan's civil action to recover the amount of the unfunded check was
an independent civil action.|||

HELD
No. There is no independent civil action to recover the value of a bouncing check
issued in contravention of BP 22 as stated in Rule 111 effective Dec. 1, 2000. Also, according
to SC Circular no. 57-97 “The criminal action for violation of BP 22 shall be deemed to
include the corresponding civil action and no reservation to file such civil action separately
shall be allowed. This rule was enacted to help declog court dockets which are filed with BP
22 cases as creditors usually use the courts as collectors because ordinarily no filing fee is
charged in criminal cases for actual damages, the payee uses the intimidating effect of a
criminal charge to collect his credit gratis and sometimes, upon being paid, the trial court is
not even informed thereof.
HEIRS OF GARCIA I V. MUNICIPALITY OF IBA, ZAMBALES
G.R. No. 162217,July 22, 2015

DOCTRINE
The appeal by notice of appeal under Rule 41 is a matter or right, but the appeal by
petition for review under Rule 42 is a matter of discretion. An appeal as a matter of right,
which refers to the right to seek the review by a superior court of the judgment rendered by
the trial court, exists after the trial in the first instance. In contrast, the discretionary appeal,
which is taken from the decision or final order rendered by a court in the exercise of its
primary appellate jurisdiction, may be disallowed by the superior court in its discretion. ||

FACTS
Late Melecio Bueno brought an ejectment suit in the MTC of Iba. MTC ruled in favor of
Bueno. Municipality of Iba filed its notice of appeal but the MTC denied due course of the
notice. The Municipality of Iba filed its petition for certiorari in the RTC in Iba, Zambales to
assail the denial of due course by the MTC. The case was assigned to Branch 69 which
ultimately granted the petition for certiorari. The petitioners, who meanwhile substituted
Bueno upon his death, moved for the reconsideration of the judgment granting the petition
for certiorari, but the RTC denied their motion for reconsideration. Aggrieved, the petitioners
appealed to the CA by petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. the CA
"dismissed" the petitioners' petition for review on October 28, 2003 for not being the proper
mode of appeal, observing that the assailed orders had been issued by the RTC in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction. The motion for reconsideration of the petitioners was
ultimately denied by the CA.

ISSUE
Whether or not the Court shall exercise equity jurisdiction since there was a
substantial compliance with the requirements of an ordinary appeal under Rule 41.

HELD
No. The distinctions between the various modes of appeal cannot be taken for
granted, or easily dismissed, or lightly treated. The appeal by notice of appeal under Rule 41
is a matter or right, but the appeal by petition for review under Rule 42 is a
matter of discretion. An appeal as a matter of right, which refers to the right to seek the
review by a superior court of the judgment rendered by the trial court, exists after the trial in
the first instance. In contrast, the discretionary appeal, which is taken from the decision or
final order rendered by a court in the exercise of its primary appellate jurisdiction, may be
disallowed by the superior court in its discretion. Verily, the CA has the discretion whether to
due course to the petition for review or not. The plea for liberality is unworthy of any
sympathy from the Court. We have always looked at appeal as not a matter of right but a
mere statutory privilege. As the parties invoking the privilege, the petitioners should have
faithfully complied with the requirements of the Rules of Court. Their failure to do so
forfeited their privilege to appeal.
HEIRS OF SOTTO V. PALICTE
G.R. No. 159691, June 13, 2013

DOCTRINE
An absolute identity of the parties was not necessary, because a shared
identity of interest sufficed for res judicata to apply. Moreover, mere substantial
identity of parties, or even community of interests between parties in the prior and
subsequent cases, even if the latter were not impleaded in the first case, would be
sufficient.

FACTS
Filemon had four children namely: Marcelo, Pascuala, Miguel, and Matilde. Marcelo
and Miguel were the predecessors in interest of petitioners. Pilar and other heirs of Carmen
(the deceased wife of Filemon) filed in the CFI of Cebu City a complaint against the Estate
of Sotto seeking to recover certain properties that Filemon had inherited from Carmen. The
CFI rendered judgment awarding to Pilar and other heirs of Carmen damages and other
reliefs. Levy on execution was effected against the properties belonging to the Estate of
Sotto. Matilde redeemed 4 parcels of land in her own name. Matilde filed a motion to
transfer to her name the title to 4 properties but CFI denied it and declared that the deed
of redemption issued in her favour is null and void since she did not qualify as successor-
in-interest with the right to redeem. Matilde appealed via petition for review but allowed
her co-heirs the opportunity to join Matilde as co-redemptioners for a period of 6 months
before the probate court would grant her motion to transfer the title to her name. Heirs of
Miguel filed MR so that they be included as Matilde’s co-redemptioners. RTC denied the
MR. CA also dismissed the petition for certiorari and prohibition for being filed out of time.
The heirs of Marcelo subsequently filed an action for partition against Matilde.

Issue:
Whether or not the present action for partition was already barred by prior
judgment.

Held:
Yes. The first three elements were present. The decision of the Court in the first three
cases– all of which dealt with Matilde’s right to the four properties – had upheld Matilde’s
right to the four properties and had all become final. Such rulings were rendered in the
exercise of the respective courts’ jurisdiction over the subject matter, and were
adjudications on the merits of the cases. In all the five cases, an identity of parties existed
because the parties were the same, or there was privity among them, or some of the parties
were successors-in-interest litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the
same capacity. An absolute identity of the parties was not necessary, because a shared
identity of interest sufficed for res judicata to apply. Moreover, mere substantial
identity of parties, or even community of interests between parties in the prior and
subsequent cases, even if the latter were not impleaded in the first case, would be
sufficient. As such, the fact that a previous case was filed in the name of the
Estate of Sotto only was of no consequence.
|||
HEIRS OF PRODON V. HEIRS OF ALVAREZ
G.R. No. 170604, September 2, 2013

DOCTRINE
The Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of a written document are the
subject of the inquiry. In an action for quieting of title based on the inexistence of a
deed of sale with right to repurchase that purportedly cast a cloud on the title of a
property, the Best Evidence Rule does not apply, and the defendant is not precluded from
presenting evidence other than the original document.

FACTS
In their complaint for quieting of title and damages against Margarita Prodon, the
respondents averred that the late spouses Alvarez and Clave were the registered owner of
TCT No. 8479. The TCT of the land was intact and that the original copy of TCT contained
an entry stating that the property had been sold to defendant Prodon subject to the right
of repurchase, and that the entry had been maliciously done by Prodon because the deed
of sale with right to repurchase covering the property did not exist. During the trial, the
custodian of the records of the property attested that the copy of the deed of sale with
right to repurchase could not be found in the files of the ROD of Manila. RTC rendered
judgment, finding untenable the plaintiffs' contention that the deed of sale with right to
repurchase did not exist. It opined that although the deed itself could not be presented as
evidence in court, its contents could nevertheless be proved by secondary evidence in
accordance with Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court upon proof of its execution or
existence and of the cause of its unavailability being without bad faith.

ISSUE
Whether or not the Best Evidence Rule shall apply in this case.

HELD
No. It is not denied that this action does not involve the terms or contents of the
deed of sale with right to repurchase. The principal issue raised by the respondents as the
plaintiffs, which Prodon challenged head on, was whether or not the deed of sale with right
to repurchase, duly executed by the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr., had really existed. Despite the
fact that the terms of the writing were not in issue, the RTC inexplicably applied the Best
Evidence Rule to the case and proceeded to determine whether the requisites for the
admission of secondary evidence had been complied with, without being clear as to what
secondary evidence was sought to be excluded. On appeal, the CA seconded the RTC's
mistake by likewise applying the Best Evidence Rule. Its application of the Best Evidence
Rule naturally led the CA to rule that secondary evidence should not have been admitted,
but like the RTC the CA did not state what excluded secondary evidence it was referring to.
Considering that the Best Evidence Rule was not applicable because the terms of the
deed of sale with right to repurchase were not the issue, the CA did not have to address and
determine whether the existence, execution, and loss, as pre-requisites for the
presentation of secondary evidence, had been established by Prodon's evidence. It should
have simply addressed and determined whether or not the "existence" and
"execution" of the deed as the facts in issue had been proved by
preponderance of evidence.
HEIRS OF SPOUSES RETERTA V. SPOUSES LOPEZ
GR. NO. 159941, AUGUST 17, 2011

DOCTRINE
The authority of Land Management Bureau (LMB)under Act No. 1120, being limited to
the administration and disposition of friar lands, does not include an action for reconveyance
– LMB ceases to have jurisdiction once the friar land is disposed of in favor of a private
person and title duly issues in the latter’s name.

FACTS
The petitioners commenced an action for quieting of title and reconveyance in the
RTC averring that they were the true and real owners of the parcel of land which was
inherited from their father who was a grantee of the land by virtue of his occupation and
cultivation. Also, that their late father and his predecessors in interest had been in open,
exclusive, notorious and continuous possession of the land for more than 30 years. The
respondents, as defendants, filed a motion to dismiss, insisting that the RTC had no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of Civil Case No. TM-983 due to the land being friar land, and
that petitioners had no legal personality to commence Civil Case No. TM-983. RTC granted
the motion to dismiss on the basis that the land subject of the case is a friar land and not of
public domain, consequently, Act No. 1120 is the law prevailing on the matter which gives to
the Director of Lands the exclusive administration and disposition of Friar Lands. Petitioners
then timely filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the RTC. Then, petitioners
assailed the dismissal via petition for certiorari, but the CA dismissed the petition.

ISSUE
Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction over the nature of the action.
HELD
Yes. As the provisions indicate, the authority of LMB under Act 1120, being limited to
the administration and disposition of friar lands, did not include the petitioners’ action for
reconveyance. LMB ceases to have jurisdiction once the friar lands are disposed of in favor
of a private person and title duly issues in the latter’s name. By ignoring the petitioners’
showing of its plain error in dismissing Civil Case No. TM-983, and by disregarding the
allegations of the complaint, the RTC acted whimsically and capriciously.
ALMA JOSE V. JAVELLANA
GR. NO. 158239, January 25, 2012

DOCTRINE
The denial of a motion for reconsideration of an order granting the defending party’s
motion to dismiss is not an interlocutory order but a final order because it puts an end to the
particular matter involved, or settles definitely the matter therein disposed of, as to leave
nothing for the trial court to do other than to execute the order. Accordingly, the claiming
party has a fresh period of 15 days from notice of the denial within which to appeal the
denial.

FACTS
Margarita Marquez Alma Jose sold to respondent Ramon Javellana by deed of
conditional sale two parcels of land. They agreed that Javellana would pay Php 80,000.00
upon the execution of the deed and the balance of Php 80,000.00 upon the registration of
the parcels of land under the Torrens System; and that should Margarita become
incapacitated, her son and attorney-in-fact, Juvenal M. Alma Jose, and her daughter,
petitioner Priscilla M. Alma Jose, would receive the payment of the balance and proceed with
the application for registration. However, Priscilla did not comply with the undertaking to
cause the registration of the properties under the Torrens System, and, instead, began to
improve the properties by dumping filling materials therein with the intention of converting
the parcels of land into a residential or industrial subdivision. Faced with Priscilla’s refusal to
comply, Javellana commenced an action for specific performance, injunction, and damages
against her in the Regional Trial Court. Priscilla filed a motion to dismiss which was granted
by the Regional Trial Court. Javellana moved for reconsideration but was denied. Javellana
filed a notice of appeal. Priscilla countered that the order was not appealable.

ISSUE
Whether or not the order denying the motion for reconsideration was not appealable.

HELD
First of all, the denial of Javellana’s motion for reconsideration left nothing more to be
done by the RTC because it confirmed the dismissal of the Civil Case No. 79-M-97. It was
clearly a final order, not an interlocutory one. And secondly, whether an order is final or
interlocutory determined whether appeal is the correct remedy or not. A final order is
appealable, to accord with the final judgment rule enunciated in Section 1, Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court to the effect that “appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that
completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these
Rules to be appealable, but the remedy from an interlocutory one is not an appeal but a
special civil action for certiorari.

LORENZO SHIPPING CORP. V. DMAP


GR. NO. 155849, August 31, 2011

DOCTRINE
Contempt is a disregard of, or disobedience to, the rules or order of a legislative or
judicial body or an interruption of its proceedings by disorderly behavior or insolent
language in its presence or so near thereto as to disturb its proceedings or to impair the
respect due to such a body, while in its restricted and more usual sense, contempt
comprehends a despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of a court.

FACTS
The Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA) issued a Letter-Resolution advising
respondent Distribution Management Association of the Philippines (DMAP) that a
computation of the required freight adjustment by MARINA was no longer required for freight
rates officially considered or declared deregulated in accordance with MARINA Memorandum
Circular No. 153 (MC 153). For clarity, MARINA issued MC 153 pursuant to EO No. 213
entitled Deregulating Domestic Shipping Rates. DMAP commenced in the CA a special civil
action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction or
temporary restraining order, however the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari and
prohibition and upheld the constitutionality of EO 213, MC 153 and the Letter-Resolution.
DMAP appealed to the court but was denied for petitioner’s failure to take the appeal within
the reglementary period and pay the deposit for sheriff’s fee and clerk’s commission. DMAP
held a general membership meeting (GMM) on the occasion of which DMAP publicly
circulated the Sea Transport Update. Thereupon, the petitioners filed a special civil action
for contempt against the respondents, insisting that the publication of the Sea Transport
Update constituted indirect contempt of court for patently, unjustly and baselessly
insinuating that the petitioners were privy to some illegal act, and, worse, that the
publication unfairly debased the SC by making “scurrilous, malicious, tasteless, and baseless
innuendo” to the effect that the SC had allowed itself to be influenced by the petitioners as
to led the respondents to conclude that the “SC ruling issued in one month only, normal lead
time is at least 3 to 6 months.”

ISSUE
Whether or not the statements contained in the Sea Transport Update constitute or
amount to indirect contempt of court?

HELD
Yes. Contempt of court has been defined as a willful disregard or disobedience of a
public authority. In its broad sense, contempt, is a disregard of, or disobedience to, the rules,
or orders of a legislative or judicial body or an interruption of its proceedings by disorderly
behavior or insolent language in its presence or so near thereto as to disturb its proceedings
or to impair the respect due to such body. In its restricted and more usual sense, contempt
comprehends a despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of a court. The phrase contempt
of court is generic, embracing within its legal signification a variety of different acts.

MANALANG V. BACANI
GR NO. 156995, January 12, 2015
DOCTRINE
The RTC in an appeal of the judgment in an ejectment case, shall not conduct a
rehearing or trial de novo.

FACTS
Petitioners Ruben Manalang, Amado Manalang, Carlos Manalang, Concepcion M.
Gonzales, Ladislao Manalang and Luis Manalang were co-owners of Lot No. 4236 and
declared for taxation purposes. The petitioners caused the relocation and verification survey
of lot no. 4236 and the adjoining lots, and the result showed that the respondents had
encroached on lot no. 4236. A preliminary survey conducted by Lands Management Section
of the DENR confirmed the result on the encroachment. When the respondents refused to
vacate the encroached portion and to surrender peaceful possession thereof despite
demands, the petitioners commenced this action for unlawful detainer in the MTC of
Guagua. The MTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. On appeal, the RTC reversed the
MTC and remanded the case for further proceedings. Upon remand, the MTC, ultimately
dismissed the complaint and counterclaim for lack of merit. The petitioners appealed to the
RTC. The RTC ordered the petitioners to conduct a relocation survey to determine their
allegation of encroachment, and also heard the testimony of the surveyor. Respondents
appealed. The CA concluded that the RTC, by ordering the relocation and verification survey
“in aid of its appellate jurisdiction” had acted as a trial court in complete disregard of the
second paragraph of Section 18, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. It declared such action by the
RTC as unwarranted because it amounted to the reopening of the trial, which was not
allowed under Section 13(3) Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE
Whether or not RTC had the authority to receive additional evidence on appeal in an
ejectment case.

HELD
No. The RTC, in an appeal of the judgment in an ejectment case, shall not conduct a
rehearing or trial de novo.
Hence, the RTC violated the foregoing rule by ordering the conduct of the relocation
and verification survey “in aid of its appellate jurisdiction” and by hearing the testimony of
the surveyor, for its doing so was tantamount to its holding of a trial de novo. The violation
was accented by the fact that the RTC ultimately decided the appeal based on the survey
and surveyor’s testimony instead of the record of the proceedings had in the court of origin.

MACASLANG V. ZAMORA
GR NO. 156375

DOCTRINE
The RTC is not limited in its review of the decision of the MTC to the issues assigned
by the appellant, but can decide on the basis of the entire records of the proceedings of the
trial court and such memoranda or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by
the RTC.

FACTS
The respondents filed a complaint for unlawful detainer in the MTCC, alleging that the
petitioners sold to respondents a residential land and that the petitioner requested to be
allowed to live in the house with a promise to vacate as soon as she would be able to find
and a new residence. They further alleged that despite their demand after a year, the
petitioner failed or refused to vacate the premises. Despite the due service of summons and
copy of the complaint, the petitioner did not file her answer. The MTCC declared her in
default and rendered judgement against her. The petitioner appealed to the RTC averring
that there was an extrinsic fraud and defendant-appellant has a meritorious defense. RTC
resolved the appeal and rendered dismissing the complaint for failure to state a cause of
action. The respondents appealed to the CA. The CA reversed and set aside the RTC’s
decision and reinstated the MTCCs decision in favor of the respondents for having no basis in
fact and in law.

ISSUE
Whether or not the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction is limited to the
assigned errors in the memorandum or brief filed before it.

HELD
No. The petitioners appeal herein, being taken from the decision of the MTCC to the
RTC, was governed by a different rule, specifically Section 18 of Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court, to wit:
Section 18. xxx
Xxx
The judgement or final order shall be appealable to the appropriate RTC which shall
decide the same on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of
origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by
the RTC.
As such, the RTC, in exercising appellate jurisdiction, was not limited to the errors
assigned in the petitioner’s appeal memorandum, but could decide on the basis of the entire
record of the proceedings had in the trial court and such memoranda and/or briefs as may
be submitted by the parties or required by the RTC.

MAHOGANY GROVE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. (MGHAI) vs.


SPOUSES TURNO
G.R. No. 206243, December 10, 2014
DOCTRINE
In a motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction, the movant hypothetically admits
the veracity of the allegations in the complaint, and accordingly, jurisdiction is not affected
by the pleas and theories set forth in an answer or a motion to dismiss; otherwise, it would
become almost entirely dependent upon the whims and caprices of the defendant or
movant.

FACTS
A complaint was filed by Spouses Turno against MGHAI to which a motion to dismiss
questioning the jurisdiction of the regular court was filed by the latter. Spouses Turno’s
complaint did not allege that they were members of MGHAI and denied that they were
affiliated with it. The CA denied the motion to dismiss. Hence, this petition was filed.

ISSUE
Whether or not the motion to dismiss should be granted

HELD
No. According to the Supreme Court, given that the complaint does not show their
membership in the said homeowners association, it cannot be said that the HLURB had
jurisdiction over the case. The allegations in the complaint and the reliefs prayed for
determine the nature of the action and of which court has jurisdiction over the subject
matter, as in this case.

MANGILA vs. JUDGE PANGILINAN


G.R. 160739; July 17, 2013
DOCTRINE
Restraint that is lawful and pursuant to a court process cannot be inquired into
through habeas corpus.

FACTS|
Complaints for syndicated estafa were filed against Mangila and others before the
MTCC. Judge Pangilinan, after examining one of the complainants, issued a warrant for the
arrest of Mangila and her cohorts without bail. The entire records of the cases were
transmitted to the City Prosecutor for further proceedings. As a consequence, Mangila was
arrested and detained. Claiming that Judge Pangilinan did not have the authority to conduct
the preliminary investigation; that the preliminary investigation he conducted was not yet
completed when he issued the warrant of arrest; and that the issuance of the warrant of
arrest was without sufficient justification or without a prior finding of probable cause,
Mangila filed in the CA a petition for habeas corpus to obtain her release from detention. Her
petition averred that the remedy of habeas corpus was available to her because she could
no longer file a motion to quash or a motion to recall the warrant of arrest considering that
Judge Pangilinan had already forwarded the entire records of the case to the City Prosecutor
who had no authority to lift or recall the warrant.

ISSUE
Whether or not a petition for habeas corpus is a proper remedy

HELD
No. The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus has been devised as a speedy and
effective remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. The object of the writ of habeas
corpus is to inquire into the legality of the detention, and, if the detention is found to be
illegal, to require the release of the detainee. When the criminal complaints were lodged
against Mangila and her cohorts, Judge Pangilinan, as the Presiding Judge of the MTCC, was
empowered to conduct preliminary investigations involving "all crimes cognizable by the
proper court in their respective territorial jurisdictions." Consequently, the CA properly
denied Mangila's petition for habeas corpus because she had been arrested and detained by
virtue of the warrant issued for her arrest by Judge Pangilinan, a judicial officer undeniably
possessing the legal authority to do so. With Mangila's arrest and ensuing detention being by
virtue of the order lawfully issued by Judge Pangilinan, the writ of habeas corpus was not an
appropriate remedy to relieve her from the restraint on her liberty.
Note: The authority of the MTC and MTCC judges to conduct preliminary investigations was
removed only effective on October 3, 2005 pursuant to A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC.

SPOUSES MENDIOLA vs. CA


G.R. No. 159746; July 18, 2012

DOCTRINE
The test to determine whether the causes of action are identical is to ascertain
whether the same evidence will sustain the actions, or whether there is an identity in the
facts essential to the maintenance of the actions. If the same facts or evidence will sustain
the actions, then they are considered identical, and a judgment in the first case is a bar to
the subsequent action.

FACTS
Shell entered into an agreement for the distribution of Shell petroleum products by
Pacific, a single proprietorship belonging to Ramon Mendiola. Pacific defaulted on its
obligations, impelling Shell to commence extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings. Petitioners
proceeded to the announced venue on the scheduled date and time but did not witness any
auction being conducted. They later learned that the auction had been held at the RTC in
Makati. After application of the proceeds of the sale to the obligation of Pacific, a deficiency
remained. The deficiency was not paid by Ramon. Thus, Shell sued in the RTC in Manila to
recover the deficiency. Ramon averred a compulsory counterclaim asserting that the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage had been devoid of basis in fact and in law; and
that the foreclosure and the filing of the action had been made in bad faith, with malice,
fraudulently and in gross and wanton violation of his rights. Petitioners commenced in the
RTC in Makati an action to annul the extrajudicial foreclosure. Shell moved for the dismissal
of the case. Pending the trial of the Makati case, the Manila RTC rendered its judgment in
favor of Shell which became final and executory. The Makati RTC resolved the Makati case,
finding that petitioners had been consequently deprived of notice and hearing as to their
liability. Shell sought the reconsideration of the decision, contending that Makati RTC became
bereft of jurisdiction to render judgment on the same issues pursuant to the principle of res
judicata, which was denied.

Issue
Whether or not the RTC Makati is barred by res judicata

Held
Yes. Bar by res judicata avails if the following elements are present, to wit: (a) the
former judgment or order must be final; (b) the judgment or order must be on the merits; (c)
it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; (d) there must be, between the first and the second action, identity of parties, of
subject matter and cause of action. The Manila RTC had jurisdiction to hear and decide on
the merits Shell's complaint to recover the deficiency, and its decision on the merits already
became final and executory. Hence, the first, second and third elements were present. As to
the fourth element, petitioners' Makati case and Shell's Manila case undeniably required the
production of the same evidence. Also, both cases arose from the same transaction ( i.e., the
foreclosure of the mortgage), such that the success of Ramon in invalidating the
extrajudicial foreclosure would have necessarily negated Shell's right to recover the
deficiency.

METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST CO. vs. TOBIAS III


G.R. No. 177780; January 25, 2012

DOCTRINE
Courts will not interfere with the executive determination of probable cause for the
purpose of filing an information, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. That abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law,
such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or hostility.

FACTS
Tobias opened an account in the name of Adam Merchandising, his frozen meat
business. He applied for a loan from METROBANK, which proceeded to appraise the
property Tobias offered as collateral by asking him for a photocopy of the title and other
related documents. Due to Tobias’ default, the mortgage was foreclosed, and the property
was sold to METROBANK as the lone bidder. However, when the certificate of sale was
presented for registration to the Registry of Deeds, no corresponding original copy of the
title was found in the registry vault and that the title he submitted belongs to different
persons. The Office of the City Prosecutor of Malabon ultimately charged Tobias with estafa
through falsification of public documents through the following information. Tobias
appealed to the Department of Justice (DOJ) which issued a resolution directing the
withdrawal of the information filed against Tobias. Acting Secretary of Justice Gutierrez
opined that Tobias had sufficiently established his good faith in purchasing the property.
METROBANK maintains that what the Secretary of Justice did was to determine the
innocence of the accused, which should not be done during the preliminary investigation;
and that the CA disregarded such lapse.

ISSUE
Whether or not the Court may order the nullity of the DOJ’s resolution

HELD
No. A preliminary investigation for the purpose of determining the existence of
probable cause is not part of a trial. A preliminary investigation is designed to secure the
respondent involved against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution. At a preliminary
investigation, the investigating prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice only determines
whether the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. The
presumption that whoever possesses or uses a spurious document is its forger applies only
in the absence of a satisfactory explanation. Accordingly, the Court cannot hold that the
Secretary of Justice erred in dismissing the information in the face of the controverting
explanation by Tobias showing how he came to possess the spurious document. Much less
can we consider the dismissal as done with abuse of discretion, least of all grave.

Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. v. Sandoval


G.R. No. 169677; February 18, 2013

DOCTRINE
The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, may order a separate
trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party complaint, or of any separate
issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party complaints or
issues. But a separate trial may be denied if a party is thereby deprived of his right to be
heard upon an issue dealt with and determined in the main trial.
FACTS
The Republic brought a complaint in the Sandiganbayan against the Marcoses. The
Republic moved for the amendment of the complaint in order to implead Asian Bank as an
additional defendant. The Sandiganbayan granted the motion. Asian Bank claims ownership
and possession of two parcels of land subject of the complaint. When the Republic was about
to terminate its presentation of evidence against the original defendants, it moved to hold a
separate trial against Asian Bank. Asian Bank sought the deferment of any action on the
motion until it was first given the opportunity to test and assail the testimonial and
documentary evidence the Republic had already presented against the original defendants,
and contended that it would be deprived of its day in court if a separate trial were to be held
against it without having been sufficiently apprised about the evidence the Republic had
adduced before it was brought in as an additional defendant. The Republic maintained that a
separate trial for Asian Bank was proper because its cause of action against Asian Bank was
entirely distinct and independent from its cause of action against the original defendants.
The Sandiganbayan granted the motion for separate trial. Hence, Metrobank commenced
this special civil action for certiorari as the successor-in-interest of Asian Bank and transferee
of the properties.

ISSUE
Whether or not the Republic was entitled to a separate trial against Asian Bank

HELD
No. As a general rule, a single trial will generally lessen the delay, expense, and
inconvenience to the parties and the courts. As we see it, however, the justification of the
Sandiganbayan for allowing the separate trial did not constitute a special or compelling
reason like any of the exceptions. To begin with, the issue relevant to Asian Bank was not
complicated. In that context, the separate trial would not be in furtherance of convenience.
And, secondly, the cause of action against Asian Bank was necessarily connected with the
cause of action against the original defendants. Should the Sandiganbayan resolve the issue
against Spouses Genito in a separate trial on the basis of the evidence adduced against the
original defendants, the properties would be thereby adjudged as ill-gotten and liable to
forfeiture in favor of the Republic without Metrobank being given the opportunity to rebut or
explain its side. The outcome would surely be prejudicial towards Metrobank.

MILLA VS. SPOUSES LUIS


G.R. No. 214930, December 10, 2014

DOCTRINE
Voluntary appearance and participation of petitioner, through his counsel, during the
temporary restraining order application hearing had already cured, any defect in the alleged
improper service of summons upon him. A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in
equity so exception in nature that it may be availed of only when other remedies are
wanting, and only if the judgment, final order or final resolution sought to be annulled was
rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud.
FACTS
A case was filed before the CA wherein Engr. Milla filed a petition for annulment of
judgment because of improper service of summons upon him and questioned the jurisdiction
of RTC over him. In said hearing, Engr. Milla appeared through his counsel. The CA dismissed
the case hence this petition.

ISSUES
1. Whether the appearance and participation of the counsel of petitioner cured the
defect in the alleged improper service of summons
2. Whether a petition for annulment of judgment is proper in this case

HELD
1. Yes. Voluntary appearance and participation of petitioner, through his counsel,
during the temporary restraining order application hearing had already cured, any
defect in the alleged improper service of summons upon him. Verily, Section 20,
Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides that a defendant’s voluntary appearance in
the action is equivalent to service of summons, as in this case.

2. No. Likewise, the CA correctly held that petitioner had erroneously resorted to the
remedy of filing a petition for annulment of judgment, instead of an appeal or a
motion to lift the order of default. Case law explains that “a petition for annulment
of judgment is a remedy in equity so exception in nature that it may be availed of
only when other remedies are wanting, and only if the judgment, final order or
final resolution sought to be annulled was rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction
or through extrinsic fraud.” Petitioner failed to convincingly show circumstances
that warrant the application of said exception remedy in this case

NERWIN INDUSTRIES CORPORATION VS. PNOC-ENERGY DEVELOPMENT


CORPORATION
G.R. No. 167057, April 11, 2012

DOCTRINE
Only the Supreme Court has the power to issue TROs involving contracts of the
national government.

FACTS
In a bid for a contract for the supply and delivery of pieces of woodpoles and
crossarms needed in the country’s Rural Electrification Project published by National
Electrification Adminsitration (NEA), herein petitioner Nerwin Industries Corp. (Nerwin)
emerged as the winner. However, NEA Board of Directors passed Resolution No. 32 reducing
by 50% the material requirements for IBP No. 80. Nerwin protested alleging that the same
was a ploy to accommodate a losing bidder. In the mean time, PNOC-Energy Development
Corporation purporting to be under the Department of Energy, issued an invitation to pre-
qualify and to bid for wooden poles needed for its Samar Rural Electrification Profect (O-ILAW
project). Nerwin filed a civil action before the RTC praying for the issuance of TRO. The same
was granted but subsequently reversed by the CA upon appeal.

ISSUE
Whether the RTC judge committed grave of discretion amounting to lack of excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the TRO in blatant violation of the Rules of Court and established
jurisprudence.

HELD
Yes. It contravened Section 3 and 4 of RA 8975. Section 3 states that “No court,
except the Supreme Court shall issue any temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction
or preliminary mandatory injunction against the government, or any of its subdivisions, or
officials or any person or entity whether public or private, acting under the governments
direction, to restrain, prohibit or compel the following acts: xxx (b) bidding or awarding of
contract/project of the national government as defined under Section 2 hereof.” Section 4
further states that “Any temporary restraining order, xxx, issued in violation of Section 3
hereof is void and of no force and effect”. The text and tenor of the provisions being clear
and unambiguous, nothing was left for the RTC to do except to enforce them and to exact
upon Nerwin obedience to them. The RTC could not have been unaware of the prohibition
under RA 8975 considering that the Court had itself instructed all judges and justices of the
lower courts, through Administrative Circular no. 11-2000, to comply with and respect the
prohibition against the issuance of TROs or writs of preliminary prohibitory or mandatory
injunction involving contracts and projects of the Supreme Court.

NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY VS. ROXAS


G.R. No. 161204. April 6, 2011

DOCTRINE
The failure to attach clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the
judgment, order, resolution, or ruling subject thereof, such material portions of the record as
are referred to therein, and other documents relevant or pertinent thereto in a petition for
certiorari is fatal and ground for dismissal. RTC’s dismissal of NHAs petition for
reconstitution, albeit with prejudice, does not bar NHA from filing another petition for
reconstitution.

FACTS
Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC), predecessor of NHA, distributed
its parcels of land to its beneficiaries. It submitted its title to Quezon City Register of Deeds
(QCRD) for its cancellation and issuance of new title to its beneficiaries. Unfortunately, a fire
razed the entire premises of QCRD destroying all the titles submitted by the petitioner. It
then filed petition for reconstitution before the RTC. For failure to submit the necessary
documents, the RTC dismissed the case with prejudice. Petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari before the CA but the sae was dismissed on the ground that NHA failed to attach to
the petition the certified true copies of all the relevant pleadings and documents. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUES
1. Whether the CA erred in dismissing NHA’s petition for certiorari on technical grounds
2. Whether another petition for reconstitution may be filed despite the previous
dismissal with prejudice.

HELD
1. No. Section 3 of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court which governs original cases filed in the
CA reiterates the requirements prescribed in Rule 65 that it shall be accompanied by
clearly legible duplicate original or certified true cop y of the judgment, order,
resolution, or ruling subject thereof, such material portions of the record as are
referred to therein, and other documents relevant or pertinent thereto. The omission
was fatal to the petition for certiorari of NHA. Section 3, Rule 46, of the Rules of Court
expressly provides that “The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the
foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.”

2. Yes. RTC’s dismissal of NHAs petition for reconstitution, albeit with prejudice, does not
bar NHA from filing another petition for reconstitution. The RTCs express barring of
NHAs right to refile its petition for reconstitution emanated more from judicial
disapproval of NHAs mishandling of the petition than from any other reason. Yet, the
bar was not insuperable, considering that the stated reason of thereby preventing
NHAs possible forum shopping was unnecessary. Moreover, considering that at the
time the orders of dismissal were issued NHA had not yet established the facts
essential for the RTC to proceed on its petition for reconstitution, the RTCs dismissal
did not amount to an adjudication on the merits of the petition and was thus not a
viable basis for a bar by res judicata.

ORTIZ VS. ALLIED BANKING


G.R. No. 214205, December 8, 2014

DOCTRINE
After the consolidation of the title in respondent Allied Banking Corporation’s name
for failure of the mortgagor to redeem the properties, the writ of possession becomes a
matter of right. Its issuance to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale, as in this
case, is merely ministerial functions.

FACTS
Allied Banking Corporation was able to acquire the subject land in an extrajudicial
foreclosure sale, it requested for the issuance of a writ of possession before the RTC to which
the latter granted. Such writ was appealed by Ortiz before the CA but the latter upheld the
RTC. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE
Whether the issuance of the writ of possession is proper.
HELD
Yes. As correctly found by the CA, after the consolidation of the title in respondent
Allied Banking Corporation’s name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem the properties the
writ of possession becomes a matter of right. Its issuance to a purchaser in an extrajudicial
foreclosure sale, as in this case, is merely ministerial functions.

PAHILA-GARRIDO VS. TORTOGO


G.R. No. 156358, August 17, 2011

DOCTRINE
Nothing is more settled in law than that once a judgment attains finality it thereby
becomes immutable and unalterable. The enforcement of judgment should not be hampered
or evaded, for the immediate enforcement of the parties rights confirmed by final judgment,
is a major component of the ideal administration of justice.

FACTS
In an action for ejectment filed by Pahila against the respondents, the MTCC rendered
its decision in favour of Pahila. As a consequence, a writ of execution was issued upon
Pahila’s motion. Respondents filed a motion to quash on the basis of supervening finding
that the lot covered by the writ of execution was foreshore land belonging to the State but
said motion was denied. One year from the issuance of the writ, Tortogo filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition in the RTC in Negros with prayer for the issuance of TRO. The same
was granted. Hence this petition

ISSUE
Whether the RTC lawfully issued the TRO and the writ of preliminary prohibitory
injunction to enjoin the execution of the already final and executory decision of MTCC.

HELD
No. Under the circumstances, the principle of immutability of a final judgment must
now be absolutely and unconditionally applied against the respondents. They could not
anymore be permitted to interminably forestall the execution of the judgment through their
interposition of new petitions or pleadings. Their move should not frustrate the enforcement
of the judgment, the fruit and the end of the suit itself. Their right as the losing parties to
appeal within the prescribed period could not defeat the correlative right of the winning
party to enjoy at last the finality of the resolution of her case through the execution and
satisfaction of the judgment, which would be the fie of the law.

PATULA V. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 164457 11 Apr. 2012

DOCTRINE
The rule excluding hearsay as evidence is based upon serious concerns about the
trustworthiness and reliability of hearsay evidence due to its not being given under oath or
solemn affirmation and due to its not being subjected to cross-examination by the opposing
counsel to test the perception, memory, veracity and articulateness of the out-of-court
declaring or actor upon whose reliability the worth of the out-of-court statement depends.

FACTS
Patula works as Footluckers’ sales representative and was authorized to take orders
from wholesale customers and collect payments from them. Her initial influx of sales were
high, but later on, they dropped dramatically and led Footluckers’s branch manager Go to
confront her about it. Go discovers from the accounting clerk erasures on collection receipts
made by Patula. On audit, Go learned that some outstanding balances were already paid. He
found out from Patula’s parents’ that Patula was misappropriating money, with Patula
promising to settle her account on a monthly basis. Patula stopped reporting for work.
Prosecution presented as sole witness auditor Guivencan, who singly declared that some
customers had told him that their outstanding balances had already been collected, and
supported it by her ledger entries, and varied receipts with the ‘received amounts’. Patula
questioned the admissibility of the ledgers, claiming them to be hearsay as the ‘customers’
alleged were not the one to bring the testimony to Court. Thereafter, Patula’s defense no
longer saw it fit to file a demurrer to evidence or present her evidence for defense; hence,
prosecution’s evidence remained unrelated and uncontroverted. The RTC found Patula guilty
of estafa beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUE
Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in finding her guilty and
blatantly ignoring the rules on admission of evidence in the documentary evidence
admitted.

HELD
YES. The Prosecution’s hearsay evidence was unreliable and untrustworthy, and thus
devoid of any probation value. Section 36, Rule 130, Rules of Court states that a witness
can testify only to those facts which she knows of her personal knowledge, derived from her
own perception, except as provided for in the Rules. Hence, bereft of any personal
knowledge of the disputed fact, witness’ testimony cannot be accorded value. The rule
against hearsay testimony rests mainly on the ground that there was no opportunity to
cross-examine the declaration. Another consideration is on the opposing party’s right to
cross-examine the original declaration claiming to have direct knowledge of the
transactions. Both considerations are essential to testing the credibility of witnesses and
their testimonies. Therefore, to address the inadmissibility of hearsay evidence and establish
truth, two solutions are given: 1) require all the witnesses in a judicial trial or hearing to be
examined only in Court under oath or affirmation, or 2) require all witnesses to be subject to
the cross-examination by the adverse party.

PEOPLE V. CRISTOBAL
G.R. No. 157049, August 11, 2010

DOCTRINE
The accused [had] waived her right to present evidence because she did not obtain
the express leave of court for her demurrer to evidence, thereby reflecting her voluntary and
knowing waiver of her right to present evidence.

FACTS
Cristobal is a teller from Prudential Bank. She was accused of qualified theft for
stealing away cash money amounting to 10,00USD. Prosecution presented their version of
facts and evidence, and thereafter rested its case. Defense Counsel filed a Demurrer to
Evidence and Motion to Defer Defense Evidence, praying for the dismissal of the charge on
ground that the evidence of the State is insufficient. RTC denied the Demurrer and Motion,
and submitted the case for decision without Cristobal presenting evidence because her
motion is considered to be filed without leave of court as required by the Rules. RTC and CA
found her guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUE
Whether or not RTC correctly found that Cristobal waived her right to present
evidence in her defense.
HELD
YES. Section 15, Rule 119, Rules of Court provides that “when an accused files
[Demurrer to Evidence] to dismiss without express leave of court, he waives the right to
present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the
prosecution”. Cristobal’s filing of ‘Demurrer to Evidence and Motion To Defer Defense
Evidence’ does not function as ‘filed with prior leave of Court’; a ‘motion to defer evidence’
does not constitute a request for leave to file a demurrer to evidence. Hence, Cristobal’s
counsel’s negligence in failing to secure the prior leave of court before filing, cannot be an
excuse—the negligence of appellants counsel binds her. Although, the Court has deemed the
failure of the trial courts to conduct and inquiry into the voluntariness and intelligence of the
waiver to be a sufficient cause to remand the case, the herein case cannot be afforded such
benefit.
PEOPLE V. GONZALES Y SANTOS
G.R. No. 182417, 3 Apr 2013

DOCTRINE
The presentation as evidence in court of the dangerous drugs subject of and
recovered during the illegal sale is material in every prosecution for the illegal sale of
dangerous drugs. Without such dangerous drugs being presented as evidence, the State
does not establish the corpus delicti, which, literally translates to ‘body of the crime’, or the
actual commission by someone of the particular offense charged.

FACTS
An informant reported to PDEG that Gonzales was an illegal drug pusher. A buy-bust
operation was set and marked money was made. Poseur-Buyer was PO1 Dimla with PO2
Chan, they met Gonzales and subsequently bought from him a ‘sachet’ of white substances.
Upon handing over the marked money, Dimla and Chan gave the signal and Gonzales was
immediately apprehended. Dimla marked the sachet with his initials ‘ED’. The Crime
Laboratoy certified the contents as ‘0.194 grams of shabu’. The RTC convicted Gonzales for
violation of the CDDA of 2002. On appeal, Gonzales insisted that the RTC erred in finding him
guilty beyond reasonable doubt, CA, however, affirms his conviction.

ISSUE
Whether or not Gonzales’ guilt was proved beyond reasonable doubt for violation of
RA 9165.

HELD
NO. The State must establish the concurrence of elements for a definitive conviction.
In the case, the State failed to establish the corpus delicti in form of the sachet confiscated
during the buy-bust operation. RA 9165 and its IRR clearly presents a procedure to
establishing the chain of custody, and when such chain is broken or would have substantial
gaps in possession is apparent, it raises doubts about the authenticity of the evidence
presented in court. The presentation as evidence in court of the dangerous drugs subject of
and recovered during the illegal sale is material in every prosecution for the illegal sale of
dangerous drugs. Without such dangerous drugs being presented as evidence, the State
does not establish the corpus delicti, which, literally translates to ‘body of the crime’, or the
actual commission by someone of the particular offense charged. However, noncompliance
may still be justified by the agents of the State—yet, Dimla offered no justification for the
lack of compliance, and should then effect to invalidate the seizure of the drug and followed
by the absolution of Gonzales. The Court cannot deny that the observance of the chain of
custody as defined by the law was the only assurance to him that his incrimination for the
very serious crime had been legitimate and insulated from either invention or malice.

MALLARI V. GSIS
G.R. No. 157659, 25 Jan. 2010
DOCTRINE
A petition for certiorari is to be filed “not later than sixty (60) days form notice of the
judgment, order or resolution,” or, in a case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is
timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, “the sixty (60) day period shall be
counted from notice of the denial of the said motion.” The 60-day limitation is considered
inextendible, because limitation has been prescribed to avoid any unreasonable delay that
violates the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of cases.

FACTS
Mallari obtained 2 loans from GSIS and mortgaged two parcels of land he owns with
his wife. He partially paid GSIS ten years later, after which the remainder was never paid.
GSIS then applied for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgages for his failure to settle
his account. A month from the extrajudicial foreclosure, GSIS commenced the extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings against Mallari. Mallari sought an injunction against GSIS with the
RTC, and was granted. RTC was reversed on appeal by the CA. CA decision was elevated by
petition for review on certiorari to the SC, but the SC denied the petition and the subsequent
motion for reconsideration on 15 Jan. 1997. GSIS filed an ex parte motion for execution and
for a writ of possession. The RTC granted both the motion and writ and ordered the Sheriff to
put GSIS in possession of both properties. However, Mallari filed a motion for reconsideration
to quash the writ of execution. RTC denied the motion due to res judicata. Mallari appealed
the denial to the CA. Due to pending incidents in a related case, GSIS motioned to inhibit the
Presiding Judge of the RTC for partiality to Mallari. The case was re-assigned and the RTC
then denied the motions filed by Mallari on 30 Jul. 2001, and directed the Clerk of Court to
cause the re-implementation of the writ of execution cum writ of possession. Mallari sought
for reconsideration, but the RTC denied it on 11 Feb. 2002. Mallari elevated the case by
Certiorari to the CA, buy was dismissed on 17 Mar. 2003.

ISSUE
Whether or not the petition for Certiorari was filed beyond the reglementary period.

HELD
YES. The motion for reconsideration denied on 11 Feb. 2002 was in reality and effect
a prohibited second motion for reconsideration by the orders granting the ex parte motion
for execution and/or issuance of the writ of execution cum writ of possession, the assailed
orders could no longer be subject to attack by certiorari. Hence, the petition for certiorari
filed only in March 2002 was already improper and tardy for being made beyond the 60-day
limitation in Section 4, Rule 65, which requires a petition for certiorari to be filed “not later
than sixty (60) days form notice of the judgment, order or resolution,” or, in a case a motion
for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, “the
sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of the said motion.” The 60-
day limitation is considered inextendible, because limitation has been prescribed to avoid
any unreasonable delay that violates the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy
disposition of cases.
PEOPLE V. VILLAFLORES Y OLANO
G.R. No. 184926, 11 Apr. 2012

DOCTRINE
The law makes no distinction between direct evidence of a fact and evidence of
circumstance from which the existence of a fact may be inferred; hence no greater degree of
certainty is required when the evidence is circumstantial than when it is direct. In both
cases, the trier must still be convinced beyond reasonable doubt of guilt of the accused.

FACTS
The body of 4-year-old Marita was found by her parents covered by a sack inside a
comfort room of an abandoned house. The police investigation resulted to two witnesses:
Bautista and Solidum, whose testimonies indicated to accused Villaflores. Villaflores was
arrested, and an information was filed against him for rape with homicide with the RTC. He
pleaded ‘not guilty’. Prosecution presented nine witnesses that could be grouped in four by
their testimonies: first, Marita’s father who testified finding her covered with a sack, and a
white nylon rope tied to her throat; second, were of Villaflores’ friends, Bautista and Solidum,
who testified seeing Marita being brought to the back of the abandoned house in a sack, and
heard her screams and crying during one of their Shaba-sessions in Batman (aka Villaflores)
premises; third, were the Policemen who identified the body at the crime scene, observed
the confrontation between Solidum, Bautista and Villaflores when they initially indicated him
during investigation, heard Villaflores’ wife’s confession—eventually sworn statement—of
seeing Villaflores’ take a sack to the back of the abandoned house and evidently saw an
‘elbow’ protrude from its opening and eventually saw the child; and finally, the medico-
legal’s findings of causes of death by strangulation with evident multiple lacerations at the
hymen. The RTC convicted him of rape with homicide, holding that the circumstantial
evidence led to no other conclusion but that his guilt was shown beyond reasonable doubt.
The CA affirmed the conviction.

ISSUE
Whether or not RTC and CA committed grave abuse when they found Villaflores’ guilt
was established beyond reasonable doubt through circumstantial evidence.

HELD
The State has proven all the elements of rape with homicide, namely: (a) Villaflores
had carnal knowledge of Marita; (b) carnal knowledge was consummated without Marita’s
consent; and (c) Villaflores killed Marita by reason of rape. For the first and second element,
the accused is a female under 12 years of age it falls as statutory rape, and consummation
of the sexual act is always done without consent. Despite the difficulty of proving
commission when the victim is left to testify on the circumstance of its commission, the
State allows for circumstantial evidence to establish the commission of the crime and
identity of the culprit. Circumstantial evidence may be resorted to when to insist on direct
testimony would ultimately lead to setting a felon free. The law makes no distinction
between direct evidence of a fact and evidence of circumstance from which the existence of
a fact may be inferred; hence no greater degree of certainty is required when the evidence
is circumstantial than when it is direct. In both cases, the trier must still be convinced
beyond reasonable doubt of guilt of the accused.

PEOPLE v PO2 VALDEZ


G.R. No. 175602, January 18, 2012

DOCTRINE
The use of the term “treachery,” standing alone, does not constitute a sufficient
averment for such was nothing but a conclusion of law, not an averment of a fact. The
requirement of sufficient factual averments is meant to inform the accused of the nature and
cause of the charge against him in order to enable him to prepare his defense.

FACTS
Accused PO2 Eduardo Valdez petitions the Court to overturn his conviction of three
counts of murder. It is shown in his Informations that he and his co-accused brother
conspired to kill "qualified with treachery" the three victims in this case. The Regional Trial
Court and the Court of Appeals convicted and affirmed the conviction, respectively. On
appeal, Valdez now challenges that the State did not establish the qualifying circumstance of
treachery, despite it being shown and written on the Informations. Hence, the petition.

ISSUE
Whether or not a mere inclusion of the words “qualified with treachery” satisfies the
procedural requirement in alleging the qualifying circumstance of murder

HELD
NO, while the Supreme Court upheld the convictions, it downgraded the convictions
to homicide because the Informations have not sufficiently shown the presence of treachery.
Treachery is the employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of any of the
crimes against persons which tend to directly and specially insure its execution, without risk
to the offending party arising from the defense which the offended party might make. It
encompasses a wide variety of actions and attendant circumstances, the appreciation of
which is particular to a crime committed. The Informations, as worded: “[that the two
accused] with intent to kill, qualified with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of
superior strength did xxx assault, attack and employ personal violence upon” the victims..."
did not sufficiently set forth the facts and circumstances describing how treachery attended
each of the killings. The use of the term “treachery,” standing alone, does not constitute a
sufficient averment for such was nothing but a conclusion of law, not an averment of a fact.
In short, the particular acts and circumstances constituting treachery as an attendant
circumstance in murder were missing from the Informations. The requirement of sufficient
factual averments is meant to inform the accused of the nature and cause of the charge
against him in order to enable him to prepare his defense. It emanates from the presumption
of innocence in his favor, pursuant to which he is always presumed to have no independent
knowledge of the details of the crime he is being charged with.

PEOPLE v. SALAFRANCA
G.R. No. 173476, February 22, 2012

DOCTRINE
An antemortem declaration of a victim of murder, homicide, or parricide that meets
the conditions of admissibility under the Rules of Court and pertinent jurisprudence is
admissible either as a dying declaration or as a part of the res gestae, or both
FACTS
Johnny Bolanon met his untimely death three hours after accused Rodrigo Salafranca
stabbed him from behind without affording him defense. During the three-hour ordeal,
Bolanon, already with a stab wound in the chest, was able to walk to the house of his uncle
Rodolfo Estao. Estao immediately rushed Bolanon to the hospital. On their way, Estao asked
the victim who stabbed him, to which Bolanon, already suffering from hard breathing,
answered that it was accused Salafranca. Upon arrival in the hospital, Bolanon died. An
Information for murder was filed against Salafranca, who went hiding for eight years. During
trial, Estao was presented as witness and testified in open court that Bolanon told him that it
was Salafranca who stabbed him. The Regional Trial Court convicted Salafranca. On appeal,
Salafranca challenged the credibility of the witnesses who had incriminated him. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the accused’s conviction. Hence, the petition.

ISSUE
Whether or not Bolanon’s ante-mortem declaration is an exception to the hearsay
rule

HELD
YES. The Court has recognized that the statement of Bolanon an hour before his
death and right after the hacking incident bore all the earmarks either of a dying declaration
or part of the res gestae either of which was an exception to the hearsay rule. A dying
declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its hearsay character, may
nonetheless be admitted when the following requisites concur, namely: (a) that the
declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarants death;
(b) that at the time the declaration is made, the declarant is under a consciousness of an
impending death; (c) that the declarant is competent as a witness; and (d) that the
declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the
declarant is a victim. All the requisites were met herein. Bolanon communicated his ante-
mortem statement to Estao, identifying Salafranca as the person who had stabbed him. At
the time of his statement, Bolanon was conscious of his impending death, having sustained
a stab wound in the chest and, according to Estao, was then experiencing great difficulty in
breathing. Bolanon succumbed in the hospital emergency room a few minutes from
admission, which occurred under three hours after the stabbing. There is ample authority for
the view that the declarant's belief in the imminence of his death can be shown by the
declarants own statements or from circumstantial evidence, such as the nature of his
wounds, statements made in his presence, or by the opinion of his physician. Bolanon would
have been competent to testify on the subject of the declaration had he survived. Lastly, the
dying declaration was offered in this criminal prosecution for murder in which Bolanon was
the victim.

PEOPLE v. TAGUIBUYA
G.R. No. 180497, October 5, 2011

DOCTRINE
In fixing exemplary damages as an award in criminal convictions, the term
aggravating circumstances should be understood in its broad or generic sense. The ordinary
or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance should be a distinction that was of
consequence only to the criminal, as contrasted from the civil liability, thereby entitling the
offended party to an award of exemplary damages regardless of whether the aggravating
circumstance was ordinary or qualifying.
FACTS
Patricio Taguibuya was charged with two counts of rape and a violation of Republic
Act No. 7610 (Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination
Act), committed against his own daughter, then a minor. The first instance of rape was when
AAA was still 15 years old, and the second instance when she was 17 years old. The
Regional Trial Court convicted Taguibuya over the two counts of rape but acquitted him in
the charge of RA 7610. It ordered to pay Taguibuya civil indemnities and moral damages for
each count of rape. The Court of Appeals arrived at the same ruling as to the civil liabilities
of Taguibuya.

ISSUE
Whether or not AAA should be awarded with exemplary damages

HELD
YES. The Supreme Court held that exemplary damages must be awarded. The CA
awarded only the civil indemnity of P75,000 and moral damages of P50,000 for each of the
two counts of rape, and said nothing about exemplary damages. Exemplary damages, which
are intended to serve as deterrents to serious wrongdoings and as a vindication of undue
sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured, or as a punishment for those
guilty of outrageous conduct, are awarded under Article 2230 of the Civil Code when the
crime is committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. The term aggravating
circumstances as used by the Civil Code should be understood in its broad or generic sense,
not in the sense of prescribing a heavier punishment on the offender (People v.Catubig);
hence, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance should be a
distinction that was of consequence only to the criminal, as contrasted from the civil liability,
thereby entitling the offended party or victim to an award of exemplary damages regardless
of whether the aggravating circumstance was ordinary or qualifying. The Court ordered
Taguibuya is ordered to pay P30,000 as exemplary damages, due to the attendance of the
qualifying circumstances of minority of AAA and the relationship between her and the
accused.

PEOPLE v. TAPERE
G.R. No. 178065, February 20, 2013

DOCTRINE
An accused arrested during a valid entrapment operation is not entitled to an
acquittal on the ground that his arrest resulted from instigation. Entrapment is sanctioned by
law, instigation is not.

FACTS
Arnold Tapere was accused of illegally selling shabu in violation of the Republic Act
9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002). Tapere was already included in the
drug watch list of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) as a drug pusher based
on the frequent complaints made against him by residents of Purok San Antonio, Iligan City.
After a legitimate and successful buy-bust operation, where PDEA informant Gabriel Salgado
acted as poseur buyer, an Information against him was prepared, filed before the Regional
Trial Court. He was convicted therein. Before the Court of Appeals, accused Tapere argued
that the RTC gravely erred in not ruling that instigation, not entrapment, had led to his
apprehension by PDEA agents. The CA affirmed his conviction. Hence, the petition.

ISSUE
Whether or not Tapere should be acquitted because his apprehension was the
product of instigation, not entrapment

HELD
NO. The Supreme Court did not rule that the apprehension is an instigation, which is
an absolutory cause. It is a valid entrapment procedure. Instigation, on one hand, takes
place when a peace officer induces a person to commit a crime. Without the inducement,
the crime would not be committed. Hence, it is exempting by reason of public policy.
Entrapment, on the other hand, signifies the ways and means devised by a peace officer to
entrap or apprehend a person who has committed a crime. With or without the entrapment,
the crime has been committed already. Hence, entrapment is not mitigating. Although
entrapment is sanctioned by law, instigation is not. The difference between the two lies in
the origin of the criminal intent – in entrapment, the mens rea originates from the mind of
the criminal, but in instigation, the law officer conceives the commission of the crime and
suggests it to the accused, who adopts the idea and carries it into execution. Court rejects
the contention of Tapere for its being contrary to the established facts. The buy-bust
operation was consonant with standard procedure. Even if, as Tapere claims, he was
unaware that Salgado was then working as an undercover agent for the PDEA, he had no
justification for accepting the offer of Salgado to buy the shabu. He did not show how
Salgado could have influenced him at all into doing something so blatantly illegal. What is
clear to the Court, therefore, is that the decision to peddle the shabu emanated from his own
mind, such that he did not need much prodding from Salgado or anyone else to engage in
the sale of the shabu; hence, he was not incited, induced, instigated or lured into
committing an offense that he did not have the intention of committing.

PEOPLE v. TEODORO
G.R. No. 175876, February 20, 2013

DOCTRINE
The recantation of her testimony by the victim of rape is to be disregarded if the
records show that it was impelled either by intimidation or by the need for the financial
support of the accused.

FACTS
Tomas Teodoro faced two counts of statutory rape against AAA, the daughter of his
common-law wife BBB. Initially in May 1999, AAA testified during trial how Teodoro carried
on the act of rape on those two occasions. However, in November 2000, when AAA testified
she broke down into tears and then recanted her previous testimony, saying that Teodoro
did not rape her nor even inserted his finger in her vagina. Despite the recantation, the
Regional Trial Court convicted Teodoro. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision.
Before the Supreme Court, Teodoro is now assailing the supposed error made in the RTC and
CA in not giving weight on AAA’s recantation. Hence, the petition.

ISSUE
Whether or not the recantation of AAA is credible to overturn Teodoro's conviction

HELD
NO. As a rule, recantation is viewed with disfavor firstly because recantation may be
exceedingly unreliable, and secondly because there is always the possibility that such
recantation may later be repudiated. Court proceedings, in which testimony upon oath or
affirmation is required to be truthful under all circumstances, are trivialized by the
recantation. Before allowing the recantation, must test its value in a public trial with
sufficient opportunity given to the party adversely affected to cross-examine the recanting
witness both upon the substance of the recantation and the motivations for it. The
recantation is subject to the test of credibility based on the relevant circumstances,
including the demeanor of the recanting witness on the stand. In that respect, the finding of
the trial court on the credibility of witnesses is entitled to great weight because the trial
court is in a better position to hear first-hand and observe the deportment, conduct and
attitude of the witnesses. To disregard testimony solemnly given in court simply because the
witness recants it ignores the possibility that intimidation or monetary considerations may
have caused the recantation, which happens in this case. During AAA's recantation, she
cried most of the time. Such demeanor reflected how much she despised what he had done
to her twice. As such, her supposed recantation did not conceal the impelling motive for it
being that her mother and her family still needed the material support of Teodoro. This was
confirmed even by BBB, who was rearing ten children at such time, including AAA, when BBB
said: “I want him to get out from jail so that I could have somebody to help me and to assist
me in rearing my children specially so, Your Honor, my children are now growing up.”

PEOPLE V. ZAKARIA
G.R. No. 181042. November 26, 2012

DOCTRINE
It is essential that the identity of the dangerous drugs be established beyond doubt.
What is more, the fact that the dangerous drugs bought during the buy-bust operation are
the same dangerous drugs offered in court should be established. The chain of custody
requirement performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning
the identity of the evidence are removed.

FACTS
An entrapment operation was conducted whereby PO2 Aninias apprehended the
defendant for selling a 34.23 gram of shabu. Thereafter, PO2 Aninias immediately placed his
initials on the three sachets received from Danny, while PO3 Valdez recovered the boodle
money from Joana. Danny was identified as Samin Zakaria y Makasulay and Joana as
Joana Zakaria y Silungan.
Bearing the Request for a Laboratory Examination prepared by Chief Supt.
Lemos, PO2 Aninias turned over the seized sachets and their contents to the PNP Regional
Crime Laboratory, where Forensic Chemist Sr. Insp. Donna Villa Huelgas conducted
qualitative and quantitative examinations on the contents. Thereafter, a certificate of
inventory was issued by the PDEA Regional Office and was signed by Insp. Ablang, Bell
Desolo of Abante-Tonite, and Victor Penid, an official of Barangay Mapayapa. The RTC, as
affirmed by the CA, convicted the defendant for having sold shabu, which is a prohibited
drug.

ISSUE
Whether or not the chain of custody was observed by the police officers.

HELD
In every prosecution for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the presentation of the
seized dangerous drugs as evidence in court is indispensable. It is essential that the identity
of the dangerous drugs be established beyond doubt. What is more, the fact that the
dangerous drugs bought during the buy-bust operation are the same dangerous drugs
offered in court should be established. The chain of custody requirement performs this
function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence
are removed.
Crucial in proving the chain of custody is the marking of the seized dangerous drugs
or other related items immediately after they are seized from the accused, for the marking
upon seizure is the starting point in the custodial link that succeeding handlers of the
evidence will use as reference point. Moreover, the value of marking of the evidence is to
separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from
the time of seizure from the accused until disposition at the end of criminal proceedings,
obviating switching, "planting" or contamination of evidence. A failure to mark at the time
of taking of initial custody imperils the integrity of the chain of custody that the law requires.

ROGELIO REYES V. COURT OF APPEALS


G.R. No. 180177. April 18, 2012

DOCTRINE
The burden rests in the Prosecution to see to it that the evidence of guilt satisfies the
standard of moral certainty demanded in all criminal prosecutions. The standard demands
that all the essential elements of the offense are established as to leave no room for any
doubt about the guilt of the accused. The courts should unfailingly impose the standard in
order to prevent injustice from being perpetrated against the accused.

FACTS
A buy-bust operation was conducted by the police based on the information of a lady
confidential informat informing them that petitioner was engaged in selling prohibited drugs
(shabu). The operations went through and the defendant was apprehended for selling drugs.
Back at the police station, PO2 Payumo placed on the plastic sachet that petitioner had
handed him the marking "RRS-1" and on the other sachet recovered from petitioner's right
hand the marking "RRS-2." The seized items were thereafter turned over to the Western
Police District Crime Laboratory for examination by P/Insp. Judycel Macapagal, who found the
items positive for methampethamine hydrochloride or shabu.
The defendant contends that the state failed to observe the chain of custody
requirements.

ISSUE
Whether or not the guilt of the petitioner was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD
In this jurisdiction, we convict the accused only when his guilt is established beyond
reasonable doubt. Conformably with this standard, we are mandated as an appellate court to
sift the records and search for every error, though unassigned in the appeal, in order to
ensure that the conviction is warranted, and to correct every error that the lower court has
committed in finding guilt against the accused.
This duty of seeing to the integrity of the dangerous drugs and substances is
discharged only when the arresting law enforcer ensures that the chain of custody is
unbroken. Here, the Prosecution failed to demonstrate a faithful compliance by the arresting
lawmen of the rule on chain of custody. To start with, the fact that the dangerous drugs were
inventoried and photographed at the site of arrest upon seizure in the presence of petitioner,
a representative of the media, a representative of the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official, was not shown. As such, the arresting lawmen did not at all comply
with the further requirement to have the attending representative of the media,
representative of the DOJ, and elected public official sign the inventory and be furnished a
copy each of the inventory. Instead, the records show that PO2 Payumo placed the
markings of "RRS-1" on the sachet allegedly received from petitioner and "RRS-2" on the two
sachets allegedly seized from petitioner's hand already at the police station with only
petitioner present. Yet, the Prosecution did not also present any witness to establish that an
inventory of the seized articles at least signed by petitioner at that point was prepared.

SOFIO V. VALENZUELA
G.R. No. 157810. February 15, 2012

DOCTRINE
A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no
longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is intended to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the
highest court of the land.

FACTS
The defendants instituted an action before the DARAB seeking the cancellation of the
Emancipation Patents, recovery of possession and damages. They contended that the act of
the respondents in cultivating their land had been illegal because they never consented to
the act. The PARAD initially ruled in defendant’s favor and thus cancelling the petitioner’s
EPs, but on appeal with the DARAB, the latter agency set aside the decision of PARAD.
Thereafter, the petitioners appealed before the CA and in its decision dated May 27,
1998, set aside the decision of DARAB and reinstating the decision of PARAD. This decision
became final and executory, hence, a motion for execution was filed. Subsequently, they
moved for the recall of writ of execution on the ground that they only learned about the
decision on on December 11, 2001.

ISSUE
Whether or not the motion should be granted.

HELD
A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no
longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is intended to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the
highest court of the land.
Given this doctrine, courts must guard against any scheme calculated to bring about
that result, and must frown upon any attempt to prolong controversies. The only exceptions
to the general rule are: (a) the correction of clerical errors; (b) the so-called nunc pro
tunc entries that cause no prejudice to any party; (c) void judgments;
and (d) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the judgments rendering
execution unjust and inequitable. None of the exceptions obtains here.
The object of a judgment nunc pro tunc is not the rendering of a new judgment and
the ascertainment and determination of new rights, but is one placing in proper form on the
record, the judgment that had been previously rendered, to make it speak the truth, so as to
make it show what the judicial action really was, not to correct judicial errors, such as to
render a judgment which the court ought to have rendered, in place of the one it did
erroneously render, nor to supply nonaction by the court, however erroneous the judgment
may have been.
Based on such definition and characterization, the petitioners' situation did not fall within
the scope of a nunc pro tunc amendment, considering that what they were seeking was not
mere clarification, but the complete reversal in their favor of the final judgment and the
reinstatement of the DARAB decision.
SPECIAL PEOPLE INC. V. CANDA
G.R. No. 160932. January 14, 2013

DOCTRINE
A petition for mandamus will issue only when the petitioner has a clear legal right to
the performance of the act sought to be compelled and the respondent has an imperative
duty to perform the same. The petitioner bears the burden to show that there is such a
clear legal right to the performance of the act, and a corresponding compelling duty on the
part of the respondent to perform the act.

FACTS
The petitioner applied for a Certificate of Non-Coverage (CNC) with the Environmental
Management Bureau seeking to be exempt from the requirement of Environmental
Compliance Certificate (ECC). Where its application has been denied by RD Lipayon because
the project it sought to undertake is located in a critical area.
Petitioner then filed a petition for mandamus before the RTC alleging that RD Lipayon
already exercised his discretion in its case when he made his finding that the application
substantially complied with the procedural requirements for review. As such, he was then
obliged to issue the CNC once the petitioner had submitted the required certifications. The
RTC denied and the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE
Whether or not mandamus is the proper remedy for petitioner.

HELD
A key principle to be observed in dealing with petitions for mandamus is that such
extraordinary remedy lies to compel the performance of duties that are purely ministerial in
nature, not those that are discretionary. A purely ministerial act or duty is one that an officer
or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the
mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of its own judgment upon the
propriety or impropriety of the act done. The duty is ministerial only when its discharge
requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment.
The petitioner failed to show that it has a clear legal right to the performance of RD
Lipayon’s act. RD Lipayon had not yet fully exercised his discretion with regard to the CNC
application when he made his finding. It is clear that his finding referred to the "procedural
requirements for review" only. He had still to decide on the substantive aspect of the
application, that is, whether the project and the project area were considered critical to the
environment. In fact, this was the reason why RD Lipayon required the petitioner to submit
certifications from the various government agencies concerned. Surely, the required
certifications were not mere formalities, because they would serve as the bases for his
decision on whether to grant or deny the application.

SPS. DELOS SANTOS V. METROBANK


G.R. No. 153852. October 24, 2012

DOCTRINE
An injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse, or a right which is merely
contingent and may never arise; or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of
action; or to prevent the perpetration of an act prohibited by statute. Indeed, a right, to be
protected by injunction, means a right clearly founded on or granted by law or is enforceable
as a matter of law.

FACTS
The petitioners acquired a loan from the respondent bank and they executed a
promissory note and constituted a mortgage on their parcel of land. The parties agreed to an
interest rate of 15.75% per annum for long term loans, and 22.2014% rate per annum on
short term loans. Furthermore, they agreed that these rates are subject to escalation and
de-escalation clause. After they defaulted in the payment of their loans, the respondent
sought the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage. Prior to the date of the sale, the
petitioners instituted an action on the ground that the respondent increased the rates on
some of their loans without basis except on the escalation clause indicated in their
agreement and prayed for an injunction to prevent the sale.
They base their petition for injunction on the ground that the trial court has to
determine with certainty the exact amount of their obligation to Metrobank.

ISSUE
Whether or not injunction is the proper remedy to prevent the sale.

HELD
As with all equitable remedies, injunction must be issued only at the instance of a
party who possesses sufficient interest in or title to the right or the property sought to be
protected. It is proper only when the applicant appears to be entitled to the relief demanded
in the complaint, which must aver the existence of the right and the violation of the right, or
whose averments must in the minimum constitute a prima facie showing of a right to the
final relief sought. Accordingly, an injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse, or a
right which is merely contingent and may never arise; or to restrain an act which does not
give rise to a cause of action; or to prevent the perpetration of an act prohibited by statute.
Indeed, a right, to be protected by injunction, means a right clearly founded on or granted
by law or is enforceable as a matter of law.
The foreclosure of a mortgage is but a necessary consequence of the non-payment of
an obligation secured by the mortgage. Where the parties have stipulated in their
agreement, mortgage contract and promissory note that the mortgagee is authorized to
foreclose the mortgage upon the mortgagor's default, the mortgagee has a clear right to the
foreclosure in case of the mortgagor's default. Thereby, the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction upon the application of the mortgagor will be improper. Mindful that an injunction
would be a limitation upon the freedom of action of Metrobank, the RTC justifiably refused to
grant the petitioners' application for the writ of preliminary injunction.

SPOUSES LEBIN VS. MIRASOL


G.R. No. 164255, September 7, 2011

DOCTRINE
The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period laid down by law is
mandatory and jurisdictional. Failure to perfect the appeal within the time prescribed causes
the judgment or final order to become final and unappealable as to preclude the appellate
court from acquiring the jurisdiction to review.

FACTS
In a special proceeding involving the settlement of estate of the late L.J. Hodges, the
RTC issued an order ruling that a property of the estate sold to Sps Lebin and Mirasol shall
be divided in 2 equal portions between them. Sps Lebin received the order on May 15, 1995.
They filed an MR on May 24,1995, to which they received the order of denial on March 23,
1998. Sps Lebin filed a notice of appeal on March 27, 1998 and yet filed a record on
appeal on May 5, 1998 or 22 days from March 23, 1998, the date they received the order of
denial of their MR. Mirasol moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground of tardiness of the
record on appeal. The RTC granted the motion to dismiss. With their MR dismissed, they now
allege that the RTC erred in dismissing their appeal for their failure to timely file a record on
appeal.

ISSUE
Whether or not there was a perfection of appeal

HELD
The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period laid down by law is
mandatory and jurisdictional. Failure to perfect the appeal within the time prescribed causes
the judgment or final order to become final and unappealable as to preclude the appellate
court from acquiring the jurisdiction to review.
First, determine whether the action is an ordinary or special proceedings.
Special Proceedings Ordinary Proceedings
Period of Perfection 30 days from the notice of final 15 days from the notice of final
order or judgment order or judgment
Reason for Period To consider the need for trial court Faster process since all original
to approve record on appeal records of the case are elevated
What to file Both Notice of Appeal and Record Notice of Appeal
on Appeal
Other Requirements Payment in full of docket and other lawful fees
*Period of appeal in habeas corpus cases is only 48 hrs from notice
**Rules under special proceedings are also applicable in cases in which the Rules of Court
allows multiple appeals

The ostensible reason for requiring a record on appeal in special proceedings is the
multi-part nature of nearly all special proceedings, with each part susceptible of being finally
determined and terminated independently of the other parts. It enables the court to
continue with the rest of the case because the original records remain with the trial court
even as it affords to the appellate court the full opportunity to review and decide the
appealed matter. In contrast, an appeal by notice of appeal envisions the elevation of the
original records to the appellate court to obstruct the trial court in its further proceedings
regarding the other parts of the case.
SULPICIO LINES INC. VS CURSO
G.R. No. 157009, March 17, 2010

DOCTRINE
As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages
predicated on a breach of contract. However, in accordance with Art. 1764, in relation to Art.
2206 of the Civil Code, moral damages may be recovered when: a.) where death of
passenger results, or b.) it is proved that the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, even if
death does not result.

FACTS
Dr. Curso died single and without issue upon the sinking of M.V. Dona Marilyn, an
interisland vessel owned and operated by Sulpicio Lines. The surviving brothers and sisters
of Dr. Curso who alleged that their parents predeceased Dr. Curso sued for breach of
contract of carriage and claim for moral and other damages. The RTC dismissed the
complaint upon finding that the sinking of the vessel was due to force majeure. The CA,
however, awarded moral damages upon finding that there was negligence attending the loss
of the vessel and that the brothers and sisters have suffered great grief due to the loss and
non-recovery of the body of Dr. Curso.
Sulpicio Lines questions the award of moral damages contending that no moral
damages may be recovered from an action for breach of contract of carriage; and assuming
that there is, brothers or sisters cannot be granted such.

ISSUE
1. Whether moral damages may be recovered from breach of contract of carriage.
2. Are surviving brothers and sisters of a passenger of a vessel that sinks entitled to
recover moral damages?

RULING
1. As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages
predicated on a breach of contract. However, in accordance with Art. 1764, in relation
to Art. 2206 of the Civil Code, moral damages may be recovered when: a.) where
death of passenger results, or b.) it is proved that the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad
faith, even if death does not result.
2. Art. 2206 of the Civil Code entitles the descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children,
and the surviving spouse of the deceased passenger to demand moral damages for
mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased. It is true that under Art.
1003 of the Civil Code, the brothers and sisters succeeded to the entire estate of the
late Dr. Curso in the absence of latters descendants, ascendants, illegitimate
children, and surviving spouse. However, they (the brothers and sisters) were not
included among the persons entitled to recover moral damages. The law does not
include succession in the collateral line as a source of the right to recover moral
damages.

ULASO VS LACSAMANA
A.C. No. 7297, September 29, 2009

DOCTRINE
The jurat is that end of the affidavit in which the notary certifies that the instrument
is sworn before her. As such, the notarial certification is essential and the faithful observance
and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of the oath in the jurat is sacrosanct.

FACTS
Atty. Lacsamana notarized the jurat of the amended verification and affidavit of non-
forum shopping of her client Irene Bides. Above the printed name of Irene Bides (space
where Bides is supposed to sign) was the word for followed by a signature that bore a
positive resemblance to the signature of Atty. Lacsamana. Ulaso filed a disbarment case
against Lacsamana alleging that she notarized the document without the presence of the
affiant Bides. In defense, Atty. Lacsamana claimed that the subject document were sample
draft intended to instruct the secretary on where Bides should sign, but the draft were
instead submitted to the court by mistake. The IBP concluded that in effect, Atty. Lacsamana
notarized her own signature constituting an inexcusable and gross negligence and found the
lawyer guilty of violation of the Notarial Law by notarizing the jurat even before the client
affixed her signature and without her presence.

ISSUE
Whether or not the notarization of the jurat before the client has affixed her own
signature amounts to censurable conduct on the part of the counsel.

HELD
The jurat is that end of the affidavit in which the notary certifies that the instrument
is sworn before her. As such, the notarial certification is essential and the faithful observance
and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of the oath in the jurat is sacrosanct. The
necessity of the physical presence of the affiant and the fact that the signing was done in
the presence of the notary is required in order to have the affiant swear before the notary
that she was that person at same time it will enable the notary to ascertain whether the
affiant had voluntarily and freely executed the affidavit. The notary, by signing as such
before the affiant could appear before her, failed to give due observance and respect to the
solemnity of the oath in the jurat, an act which is censurable because a lawyer is expected
to be in the forefront in the observance and maintenance of the rule of law.

BALAIS-MABANAG VS QC RD
G.R. No. 153142, March 29, 2010

DOCTRINE
The issue of citizenship of the winning party cannot anymore be raised to forestall
the execution of a final and executory judgment where the objecting party had the
opportunity to raise the issue prior to the finality of the judgment. The time for assailing the
capacity of the winning party to acquire the land was during the trial, not during the
execution of a final decision.

FACTS
Ramona was able to obtain a favorable decision from the RTC in an action for specific
performance she filed against the Coronels and where Mabanag intervened having bought
the land subject of the action from the Coronels. The court ordered Mabanag to surrender
the TCT in her possession and for the Coronels to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of
Ramona. This decision was affirmed by both the CA and the SC. When the RTC issued the
writ of execution, the Coronels and Mabanag filed a motion to stay the execution, but the
same was denied. As they did not comply with the writ of execution, the RTC caused the
execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Ramona by the Clerk of Court. Then again,
the Coronels and Mabanag filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, which was denied.
The MR suffered the same fate. In the petition filed before the SC, Mabanag raised for the
first time Ramona’s disqualification to own land in the Philippines being a foreign citizen.

ISSUE
Whether or not the issue of citizenship and other disqualifications of the winning
party may be assailed after the Decision has already become final and executory.

HELD
The issue of citizenship of the winning party cannot anymore be raised to forestall
the execution of a final and executory judgment where the objecting party had the
opportunity to raise the issue prior to the finality of the judgment. The time for assailing the
capacity of the winning party to acquire the land was during the trial, not during the
execution of a final decision. Otherwise, it shall be deemed as a waiver to object, pursuant to
Sec.1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court. In every action the parties are enjoined to present all
available defenses and objections in order that the matter in issue can finally be laid to rest.
Without the rule, there will be no end to a litigation, because the dissatisfied litigant may
simply raise new or additional issues in order to prevent defeat or delay implementation of
an already final and executory judgment.
It should also be pointed out that the proper party to challenge the capacity of a
person to acquire or to own land based on non-citizenship is only the Government through
the Solicitor General (Sec.7 BP 185). Even assuming that the winning party was disqualified
from owning the subject property for being a foreign citizen, the decision will not inure to the
benefit of the opposing party since the subject property will be escheated in favor of the
State.

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES VS COMELEC


Gr 176951, April 2011

DOCTRINE
As a rule, a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading however, when
a motion for leave to file and admit a second motion for reconsideration is granted by the
Court, the Court therefore allows the filing of the second motion for reconsideration and the
second motion for reconsideration is no longer a prohibited pleading.

FACTS
In March 2007, LCP filed a case with the Supreme Court seeking to declare as
unconstitutional the conversion of the 16 from municipalities to cities for failing to meet
income requirements. On March 2009 the court denied the first motion for reconsideration.
On April 28, 2009, the Court, with a 6-6 vote, denied the 2nd MR due to lack of required
number of votes to overturn the decision, Thereafter, the Respondents filed a “Motion to
Amend Resolution of April 28, 2009” which was resolved by the Supreme Court wherein
majority of the justices voted to grant the 2nd MR, declaring the cityhood laws valid and
constitutional. The SC flip-flopped 3 times on this case. On February 15, 2011, the 16
became cities again after the SC made a third reversal. The petitioners aver that the
controversy on the Cityhood Laws ended with the April 28, 2009 Resolution denying the
respondents' second motion for reconsideration for being a prohibited pleading.

ISSUE
Whether the the rule that “second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited
pleading” is absolute, thus SC erred in granting the 2nd MR.

HELD
No. As a rule, a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading pursuant
to Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Civil Procedure which provides that: "No second motion
for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be entertained."
Thus, a decision becomes final and executory after 15 days from receipt of the denial of the
first motion for reconsideration.However, when a motion for leave to file and admit a second
motion for reconsideration is granted by the Court, the Court therefore allows the filing of
the second motion for reconsideration. In such a case, the second motion for reconsideration
is no longer a prohibited pleading. In the present case, the Court voted on the second
motion for reconsideration filed by respondent cities. In effect, the Court allowed the filing of
the second motion for reconsideration.
YINLU BICOL MINING CORP. VS TRANS-ASIA
G.R. No. 207942, January 12, 2015

DOCTRINE
Only one motion for reconsideration is allowed except when the second motion for
reconsideration is exceptionally meritorious and not pro forma.

FACTS
YINLU informed the DENR by letter that it had acquired the mining patents of PIMI
from BDO by way of a deed of absolute sale from PIMI which held mining patent over said
area as early as 1930. However, Trans-asia countered this claim by alleging that Yinlu failed
to register the patent. DENR rejected this claim. Trans-Asia elevated the case to the Office
the President but the later ruled in favor of YUNLI. After the dismissal of the 2nd motion for
reconsideration filed by Trans-Asia before the Office Office of the President,it filed a petition
for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE
Whether the Petition was filed beyond the reglementary period.

HELD
Yes. Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court provides that a judgment rendered by
the OP in the exercise of its quasi-judicial function is appealable to the CA. Section 4 of the
Rule states that the appeal must be taken within 15 days "from notice of the award,
judgment, final order or resolution, or from the date of its last publication, if publication is
required by law for its effectivity, or of the denial of petitioner's motion for new trial or
reconsideration . . . ." Trans-Asia filed the petition for review only on nearly 10 months from
its receipt of the denial of the 1st motion for reconsideration. Under the circumstances, its
petition for review was filed way beyond the prescribed 15-day period. The rule remains to
be only one motion for reconsideration is allowed except when the second motion for
reconsideration is exceptionally meritorious and not pro forma. In the case at bar, the
second motion was not meritorious.
SPOUSES LEBIN vs. MIRASOL
Gr 164255 , September 2011

DOCTRINE
The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period laid down by law is
mandatory and jurisdictional.

FACTS
In Special Proceedings No. 1307 involving the settlement of the estate of the late L.J.
Hodges, the RTC, issued an order ruling that a property of the estate sold to the petitioners
be divided in two equal portions between the petitioners and the respondent. The RTC
affirmed the order thereafter, the petitioners moved for reconsideration and/or new trial. On
March 23, 1998, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration and/or new trial of the
petitioners. on March 27, 1998, the petitioners filed a notice of appeal in the RTC. Mirasol
filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, insisting that the record on appeal had been filed late.
The RTC granted the motion to dismiss the appeal prompting the petitioners to
appeal via petition for review oncertiorari .

ISSUE
Whether or not the RTC erred in dismissing the petitioners' appeal for their failure to
timely file a record on appeal

HELD
No. The RTC did not err in dismissing the petitioners' appeal for their failure to timely
file a record on appeal. Section3 Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that a record on
appeal shall be required only in special proceedings. The appellant shall file a notice of
appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days after notice of the judgment or final
order.In the case at bar, they filed the record on appeal 43 days from March 23, 1998, the
date they received the denial of their motion for reconsideration and/or new trial. They
should have filed the record on appeal within 30 days from their notice of the judgment.
Their appeal was not perfected which rendered the orders of the RTC final and
unappealable. Thereby, the appellate court lost the jurisdiction to review the challenged
orders, and the petitioners were precluded from assailing the orders. The perfection of an
appeal in the manner and within the period laid down by law is mandatory and jurisdictional.
HEIRS OF GARICA (IN SUBSTITUTION OF THE HEIRS OF BUENO) VS
MUNICIPALITY OF IBA, ZAMBALES
Gr 162217 , July 2015

DOCTRINE
Any liberality in the application of the rules of procedure may be properly invoked
only in cases of some excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading

FACTS
The late Mr. Bueno brought an ejectment suit in the MTC of Iba against the
Municipality of Iba, Province of Zambales. After due proceedings, the MTC ruled in favor of
Bueno. The Municipality of Iba filed its petition for certiorari in the RTC but was ultimately
granted the petition for certiorari. cThe petitioners, who meanwhile substituted Bueno upon
his death, moved for the reconsideration of the judgment the RTC denied their motion for
reconsideration. Aggrieved, the petitioners appealed to the CA by petition for review under
Rule 42 of the Rules of Court but was "dismissed" for not being the proper mode of appeal,
observing that the assailed orders had been issued by the RTC in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction. Although admitting that their petition for review under Rule 42 was
inappropriate, the petitioners maintain that they substantially complied with the
requirements of an ordinary appeal under Rule 41, and pray that the Court exercise its
equity jurisdiction because a stringent application of the Rules of Court would not serve the
demands of substantial justice.

ISSUE
Whether the court may be liberal in the application of the rules

HELD
The plea for liberality is unworthy of any sympathy from the Court. We have always
looked at appeal as not a matter of right but a mere statutory privilege. As the parties
invoking the privilege, the petitioners should have faithfully complied with the requirements
of the Rules of Court. Their failure to do so forfeited their privilege to appeal. Indeed, any
liberality in the application of the rules of procedure may be properly invoked only in cases
of some excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading, but definitely not in cases like
now where a liberal application would directly subvert the essence of the proceedings or
results in the utter disregard of the Rules of Court.
ESCOTO VS PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 192679, October 17, 2016

DOCTRINE
In all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be to
the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 not by
ordinary appeal under Rule 41.

FACTS
Petitioner and Laxamana were promoters/agents of Legend International Resort
Limited (LIRL). As one of their promotional schemes, they organized a tourist-oriented
cockfighting derby within the premises of LIRL within the Subic Bay Freeport Zone. They
obtained a permit to conduct the event from the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority
(SBMA). The respondent immediately advised LIRL to desist because cockfighting activity
was outside its competence as a hotel casino resort. The promoters then filed a suit for
injunction with application for a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction in the RTC .They
averred that the respondent should be enjoined from ordering LIRL to desist from holding the
cockfighting derby because the charter of the respondent did not include the supervision,
control and regulation of cockfighting activities in the premises of LIRL within the Subic Bay
Freeport Zone; that the authority to regulate such activities was within the powers of the
SBMA under Republic Act No. 7227. Respondent objected to the issuance of the TRO, and
urged the dismissal and the RTC ordered the dismissal of the complaint. The petitioners
appealed in the CA. The respondent moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing that based on
their appellant's brief, the promoters were submitting issues of a purely legal nature and
that consequently their appeal should be taken to the Court by petition for review on
certiorari to raise only questions of law. The CA granted the motion to dismiss.

ISSUE
Whether or not the appeal was proper?

HELD
No. The appeal is not proper. An appeal under Rule 41 taken from the Regional Trial
Court to the Court of Appeals raising only questions of law shall be dismissed, issues purely
of law not being reviewable by said court. An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of
Appeals shall not be transferred to the appropriate court but shall be dismissed outright.
Similarly, an appeal by notice of appeal instead of by petition for review from the appellate
judgment of a Regional Trial Court shall be dismissed. In all cases where only questions of
law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review
on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45.

CHIPONGIAN VS BENITEZ – LIRIO


GR No. 162692, August 26, 2015

DOCTRINE
The proper mode of appealing a judgment or final order in special proceedings is by
notice of appeal and record on appeal. The failure to file the record on appeal results to
failure to perfect the appeal and will render the judgment final and beyond review on
appeal.

FACTS
Vicente was married to Isabel, Nilo’s sister. The spouses had no children. When
Isabel, Vicente and Nilo executed a deed of extrajudicial settlement with respect to Isabel’s
estate, where Nilo waived his rights to the estate of Isabel in favour or Vicente. The latter, in
turn executed an affidavit on the same day affirming that the waiver did not extend to the
paraphernal properties of Isabel. When Vicente died, his sister, Victoria, and a nephew,
Feodor, initiated proceedings to settle the estate of Vicente. Nilo then moved that the
paraphernal properties of Isabel be excluded from Vicente’s estate. Before the RTC could
rule on the motion, Nilo withdrew it, filing instead a complaint-in-intervention. The RTC
admitted the complaint-in-intervention. The RTC rendered judgment dismissing the
complaint-in-intervention. The petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the judgment, but
the RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration. He filed a notice of appeal. The RTC denied
due course to the notice of appeal for having been filed beyond the reglementary period. He
then filed a Motion for Reconsideration vis-a-vis the order denying due course to his notice of
appeal. The RTC then conceded that the petitioner had timely filed the notice of appeal, but
still denied the Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that he had not perfected his
appeal because of his failure to pay the appellate court docket fees. The petitioner brought
his Motion to Set Aside the order denying his Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC denied
the Motion to Set Aside. A petition for certiorari was then filed in the CA.

ISSUE
Whether or not the appeal should be given due course?

HELD
No. The proper mode of appealing a judgment or final order in special proceedings is
by notice of appeal and record on appeal. The dismissal of the petitioner's intervention
constituted "a final determination in the lower court of the rights of the party appealing,"
that is, his right in the paraphernal properties of his deceased sister which made Rules 41
Section 3 applicable which provides that “. . . No record on appeal shall be required except in
special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or these
Rules so require.” In connection to the period of appeal provided under Rule 109 “. . . Where
a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on
appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of judgment or final order.” Considering that the
petitioner did not submit a record on appeal in accordance with Section 3 of Rule 41, he did
not perfect his appeal of the judgment dismissing his intervention. As a result, the petitioner
lost his right to appeal through his failure to file the record on appeal, and rendered the
dismissal of his intervention final and immutable.

JUSTINA MANIEBO VS COURT OF APPEALS AND CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION


G.R. No. 158708, August 10, 2010

DOCTRINE
An appeal under Rule 43 is a discretionary mode of appeal, which the CA may either
dismiss if it finds the petition to be patently without merit, or prosecuted manifestly for
delay, or that the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration; or
may process by requiring the respondent to file a comment on the petition; These rules are
not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may result in
prejudicing a party’s substantive rights.

FACTS
Petitioner was issued a promotional appointment as Cashier III in the Office of the
Municipal Treasurer, Municipality of Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro because she appeared
to possess the qualifications for the position. But when the CSC Regional Office No. IV
verified her name against the Master list of Eligibles, she was found out to have actually
failed in the examination for obtaining a rating of only 60%. She was then charged with
possessing of spurious report of rating, falsification, grave misconduct and dishonesty after
having indicated in her Personal Data Sheet that she had passed the CSC (professional)
examination with a rating of 74.01%. CSCRO No. IV then rendered its decision that petitioner
is guilty of the charge and order its dismissal. The CSC affirmed such decision. The petitioner
then filed a petition for review and was dismissed by the CA as well as the motion for
reconsideration for failure to attach certified copy of the annexes of the material portions of
the record.

ISSUE
Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition for review?

HELD
No. The CA did not commit any error, least of all a reversible one. Its dismissal was
founded on the correct application of the applicable rule. Indeed, Section 6, Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court clearly requires the petition for review to be accompanied by a clearly
legible duplicate original or a certified true copy of the award, judgment, final order or
resolution appealed from, together with certified true copies of such material portions of the
record referred to therein and other supporting papers. The requirement is intended to
immediately enable the CA to determine whether to give due course to the appeal or not by
having all the material necessary to make such determination before it. This is because an
appeal under Rule 43 is a discretionary mode of appeal, which the CA may either dismiss if it
finds the petition to be patently without merit, or prosecuted manifestly for delay, or that
the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration; or may process
by requiring the respondent to file a comment on the petition, not a motion to dismiss,
within 10 days from notice.

NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY VS HON. VICENTE ROXAS


G.R. No. 161204, April 6, 2011

DOCTRINE
A petition for certiorari shall be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or
certified true copy of the judgment, order, resolution, or ruling subject thereof, such material
portions of the record as are referred to therein, and other documents relevant or pertinent
thereto. The failure to comply with such requirement shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal of the petition.

FACTS
People's Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC), NHA's predecessor, was the
registered owner of two large parcels of land. In 1987, NHA delivered its owner's copy of TCT
No. 1356 to the Quezon City Registry of Deeds to facilitate the numerous partial
cancellations of TCT No. 1356 on account of the deeds of sale executed by NHA in favor of
the beneficiaries. However, in1988, fire razed the entire premises of QCRD and destroyed
the original and the owner's duplicate copies of TCT No. 1356, along with many other
records and documents then in the possession and custody of QCRD.|||The NHA filed a
petition for reconstitution. The RTC dismissed the petition due to failure to attach necessary
documents to the petition and also the Motion to Reconsideration for failure to present any
additional documents in compliance with jurisdictional requirements. A petition for certiorari
was then file to the CA and was dismissed.

ISSUE
Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition?

HELD
No. The CA correctly dismissed NHA's petition for certiorari, the Court stresses that
NHA, as the petitioner, had the obligation to comply with the basic requirements for the
filing of a petition for certiorari prescribed in Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, specifically to
accompany the petition with a "certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution
subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a
sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3,
Rule 46. The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall
be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.

REVELINA LIMSON vs. EUGENIO JUAN GONZALEZ


G.R. No. 162205. March 31, 2014.

DOCTRINE
An alias is thus a name that is different from the individual's true name, and does not
refer to a name that is not different from his true name

FACTS
Limson filed a criminal charge against Gonzales for falsification. He claimed that
respondent was pretending to be a certain “Eugenio Gonzalez”, an architect, but he was
actually “Eugenio Juan Gonzalez”. Upon dismissal of his first complaint, petitioner filed
another complaint with the same facts but this time claiming respondent violated RA 6085,
the Anti-Alias Law. For respondent used the following names: "Eugenio Gonzalez", "Eugenio
Gonzales", "Eugenio Juan Gonzalez", "Eugenio Juan Gonzalez y Regalado", "Eugenio C.R.
Gonzalez", "Eugenio J. Gonzalez", and — per Limson — "Eugenio Juan Robles Gonzalez.”
However, said complaint was also dismissed after investigation. Appealed on certiorari that
the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

ISSUE
Whether or not the respondent was guilty of the falsification and violation of the Anti-
Alias law.

HELD
No, Gonzales is not guilty. An alias is a name or names used by a person or intended
to be used by him publicly and habitually, usually in business transactions, in addition to the
real name by which he was registered at birth or baptized the time, or to the substitute
name authorized by a competent authority; a man's name is simply the sound or sounds by
which he is commonly designated by his fellows and by which they distinguish him, but
sometimes a man is known by several different names and these are known as aliases. An
alias is thus a name that is different from the individual's true name, and does not refer to a
name that is not different from his true name

ROMEO T. CALUZOR, vs. DEOGRACIAS LLANILLO and THE HEIRS OF THE


LATE LORENZO LLANILLO, and MOLDEX REALTY CORPORATION
G.R. No. 155580. July 1, 2015.

DOCTRINE
Agricultural tenancy is not presumed. It is established only by adducing evidence
showing that all the essential requisites of the tenancy relationship concur, namely: (a) the
parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (b) the subject matter of the
relationship is an agricultural land; (c) there is consent between the parties to the
relationship; (d) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (e)
there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (f) the
harvest is shared between the landowner and tenant or agricultural lessee.

FACTS
The petitioner averred that Lorenzo LLanillo took him into the land as a tenant. To
effectively till the land, the petitioner and his family were allowed to build a makeshift
shanty thereon. Even after the death of Lorenzo, the petitioner continued giving a share of
his produce to the family of Lorenzo through Ricardo Martin (Ricardo), Lorenzo's overseer. In
1990, respondent Deogracias Lanillo (Deogracias), the son of Lorenzo, offered to pay the
petitioner for the land. In the end, Deogracias did not pay the petitioner. Instead, Deogracias
and persons acting under his orders forcibly ejected the petitioner and his family by levelling
their shanty and plantation with the use of a bulldozer. The efforts of the Barangay Agrarian
Reform Council to conciliate failed; hence, the authority to file a case was issued to the
petitioner.

ISSUE
Whether or not petitioner was an agricultural tenant.

HELD
No, he is not. The third and sixth elements of agricultural tenancy were not
shown to be presented in this case. The sketch did not establish that Lorenzo had
categorically taken the petitioner in as his agricultural tenant. This element demanded
that the landowner and the tenant should have agreed to the relationship freely and
voluntarily. The sharing of harvest was not also established. Even assuming that Lorenzo
had verbally permitted the petitioner to cultivate his land, no tenancy relationship
between them thereby set in because they had not admittedly discussed any fruit
sharing scheme, with Lorenzo simply telling him simply that he would just ask his share
from him.
The de jure tenant should allege and prove, firstly, the cost and expenses
incurred in the cultivation, planting or harvesting and other expenses incidental to the
improvement of his crop; and, secondly, the necessary and useful improvements made in
cultivating the land. Without the allegation and proof, the demand for indemnity may be
denied.

IN RE: RECONSTITUTION OF TRANSFER CERTIFICATES OF TITLE NOS.


303168 AND 303169 AND ISSUANCE OF OWNER'S DUPLICATE
CERTIFICATES OF TITLE IN LIEU OF THOSE LOST,

ROLANDO EDWARD G. LIM, petitioner


G.R. No. 156797, [July 6, 2010], 638 PHIL 80-93)

DOCTRINE
For forum shopping to exist, both actions must involve the same transaction, same
essential facts and circumstances and must raise identical causes of action, subject matter
and issues. Clearly, it does not exist where different orders were questioned, two distinct
causes of action and issues were raised, and two objectives were sought.

FACTS
Petitioner Rolando Edward Lim filed in the RTC his petition for judicial reconstitution of
two Transfer Certificate of Title. He did this because the original copies of the TCTs kept in
the custody of the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City had been lost or destroyed as a
consequence of the fire that had burned certain portions of the Quezon City Hall, including
the Office of said Registry of Deeds. The RTC denied the petitioner when it found out that
Lim also applied for administrative reconstitution.

ISSUE
Whether or not the Lim was guilty of forum shopping.

HELD
Lim was not guilty of forum shopping, because the factual bases of his application for
the administrative reconstitution of the TCTs and of his petition for their judicial
reconstitution, and the reliefs thereby sought were not identical. When he applied for the
administrative reconstitution in the LRA on July 21, 1988, he still had his co-owner's
duplicate copies of the TCTs in his possession, but by the time the LRA (Land Registration
Authority) resolved his application on November 3, 1998, allowing the relief prayed for, his
co-owner's duplicate copies of the TCTs had meanwhile been destroyed by fire.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. RUEL TUY


G.R. No. 179476 (Resolution), [February 9, 2011], 657 PHIL 547-551)

FACTS
Together with Ramon Salcedo, Jr. and Raul Salcedo, who have remained at
large, appellant Ruel Tuy was charged with murder in the Regional Trial Court in
Calabanga, Camarines Sur (RTC) for the killing of Orlando Barrameda. Both the RTC
and CA rejected his defenses of denial and alibi.
|
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA committed reversible error in affirming his conviction.
HELD
Yes. Firstly, there was no showing that the RTC and the CA erred in appreciating the
worth of Severino's (son of victim that witnessed the murder) eyewitness testimony.
Secondly, we agree with the CA and the RTC rejecting the alibi of Tuy. The failure of Tuy to
prove the physical impossibility of his presence at the crime scene negated his alibi. And,
thirdly, the medico-legal evidence indicating that the victim sustained several hack wounds
entirely corroborated Severino's recollection on the hacking.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. RENATO DADULLA y CAPANAS


Gr 172321, February 9, 2011

DOCTRINE
The failure to allege the qualifying circumstance of relationship in the information in a
Criminal Case of Rape precludes a finding of qualified rape against the accused.

FACTS
On January 28, 1998, the accused was charged in the RTC with rape and attempted
rape through separate informations. In the evening of January 15, 1998, AAA, then sleeping
in the bedroom that she and her five younger siblings shared with their father, was roused
from sleep by someone undressing her. It was her father and he then forcibly had carnal
knowledge of her. On January 22, 1998, AAA was again roused from sleep by her father
touching her body, however, she was able to go under the wooden bed to evade him. As
soon as the father had left, BBB (younger sister) approached the crying AAA and asked what
had happened to her. Together, they went to their uncle, CCC, to report the incident and CCC
requested his wife to accompany AAA to the barangay to file a complaint. Later on, they
went to Camp Crame for the physical and genital examinations, which established that AAA
had a deep healed hymenal laceration at 5:00 oclock position.
The RTC found the accused guilty of rape and imposed the death penalty, ordering
him to pay to AAA P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P20,000.00 as moral damages; and of
attempted rape and imposed the indeterminate penalty of four years, nine months, and
eleven days of prision correccional, as minimum, to five years, four months, and twenty
days, as maximum, ordering him to pay to AAA P20,000.00 as moral damages.
The CA held that the correct penalty in the 1 st case was reclusion perpetua because
the accused was liable only for simple rape by virtue of the information not alleging any
qualifying circumstances; and that in the second, the accused was guilty only of acts of
lasciviousness, not attempted rape, because his act of opening the zipper and buttons of
AAAs shorts, touching her, and pulling her from under the bed constituted only acts of
lasciviousness.

ISSUE
Whether or not the failure to allege the qualifying circumstance of relationship in the
information in the Criminal Case precludes a finding of qualified rape against the accused?

HELD
YES. The failure to allege the qualifying circumstance of relationship in the
information in Criminal Case No. 98-2304-MK precluded a finding of qualified rape against
the accused. Section 8, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court has expressly required that qualifying
and aggravating circumstances be specifically alleged in the information. Due to such
requirement being pro reo, the Court has authorized its retroactive application in favor of
even those charged with felonies committed prior to December 1, 2000 (i.e., the date of the
effectivity of the 2000 revision of the Rules of Criminal Procedure that embodied the
requirement).
The term aggravating circumstance is strictly construed when the appreciation of the
modifying circumstance can lead to the imposition of the maximum penalty of death.
Consequently, the qualifying circumstance of relationship, even if established during trial,
could not affect the criminal penalty of the accused by virtue of its non-allegation in the
information. The accused could not be convicted of the graver offense of qualified rape,
although proven, because relationship was neither alleged nor necessarily included in the
information. Accordingly, the accused was properly convicted by the CA for simple rape and
justly punished with reclusion perpetua.

EMILIANA G. PEŇA, AMELIA C. MAR, and CARMEN REYES, VS. SPOUSES


ARMANDO TOLENTINO AND LETICIA TOLENTINO
Gr 155227, Feb 2011

DOCTRINE
The settled rule is that defenses not pleaded in the answer may not be raised for the
first time on appeal. A party cannot, on appeal, change fundamentally the nature of the
issue in the case. When a party deliberately adopts a certain theory and the case is decided
upon that theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change the same on appeal,
because to permit him to do so would be unfair to the adverse party.

FACTS
The petitioners are lessees of three distinct and separate parcels of land owned by
the respondents. On August 15, 1995, the respondents wrote a demand letter to each of the
petitioners, informing that they were terminating the respective month-to-month lease
contracts effective September 15, 1995. After the petitioners refused to vacate within the
period allowed, the respondents filed on October 9, 1995 three distinct complaints for
ejectment against the petitioners in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila. The three
cases were consolidated upon the respondents’ motion.
The MeTC ruled in favor of the respondent. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
modified the MeTC’s decisio. The CA then promulgated its decision SETTING ASIDE the
decision of the RTC Manila and REINSTATING the decision of the MTC Manila with the
modification that the defendants shall pay their respective agreed rentals which may be
gradually increased in accordance with the Rent Control Law for the use and occupancy of
the premises from 1 October 1995 until the same is finally vacated.

ISSUE
Whether or not the provisions of P.D. 1517 and R.A. No. 3516, although cited by
petitioners for the first time only on appeal may be considered?

HELD
NO. The petitioners did not invoke their supposed right of first refusal from the time
when the respondents filed their complaints for ejectment against them on October 9, 1995
until they brought the present recourse to this Court. Neither did they offer any explanation
for their failure to do so. It is notable that the only defense they raised is that their eviction
from the premises on the sole ground of expiration of the lease contract violated R.A. No.
9161.
The petitioners are precluded from invoking their supposed right of first refusal at this
very late stage after failing to assert it within a reasonable time from the respondents’
purchase of the respective properties where their premises were respectively located. The
presumption that they had either abandoned or declined to assert their rights becomes fully
warranted.
It is clear that the petitioners are changing their theory of the case on appeal. That
change is impermissible on grounds of its elemental unfairness to the adverse parties, who
would now be forced to adapt to the change and to incur additional expense in doing so.
Besides, such a change would effectively deprive the lower courts of the opportunity to
decide the merits of the case fairly. It is certainly a basic rule in appellate procedure that the
trial court should be allowed the meaningful opportunity not only to consider and pass upon
all the issues but also to avoid or correct any alleged errors before those issues or errors
become the basis for an appeal.32 In that regard, the Court has observed in Carantes v.
Court of Appeals:
The settled rule is that defenses not pleaded in the answer may not be raised for the
first time on appeal. A party cannot, on appeal, change fundamentally the nature of the
issue in the case. When a party deliberately adopts a certain theory and the case is decided
upon that theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change the same on appeal,
because to permit him to do so would be unfair to the adverse party.
Although the CA correctly reinstated the MeTC’s decision as far as it ordered the
petitioners’ ejectment from the leased premises, we cannot uphold its modification by
requiring the petitioners instead to pay their "respective agreed rentals which shall be
gradually increased in accordance with the Rent Control Law for the use and occupancy of
the premises from 1 October 1995 until the same is finally vacated" without any elucidation
of the reasons for ordering the payment of agreed rentals for the use and occupancy of the
premises in lieu of the MeTC’s requiring the petitioners to pay reasonable compensation.
It is true that the MeTC had not also given any justification for fixing reasonable
compensation in the respective amounts found in the dispositive portion of its decision,
instead of rentals. However, we discern that the MeTC had taken off from the demand letters
of the respondents to each of the petitioners, which included the warning to them that
should they refuse to vacate as demanded they would each be charged ₱3,000.00/month as
reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy of the premises from October 1, 1995
until they would actually vacate. We opt not to disturb the MeTC’s holding on reasonable
compensation, in lieu of agreed rentals, considering that the petitioners did not raise any
issue against it, and considering further that the CA did not find any error committed by the
MeTC as to that. At any rate, it is worthy to note that the award of reasonable compensation,
not rentals, is more consistent with the conclusion of the MeTC that the leases of the
petitioners had expired. Indeed, to peg the respondents’ monetary recovery to the
unadjusted rentals, instead of reasonable compensation, is not fair.
Accordingly, we modify the CA’s decision by reinstating the MeTC’s decision without
qualification.

TEODORO A. REYES VS. ETTORE ROSSI


Gr 159823, Feb 18, 2013

DOCTRINE
The rescission of contract of sale is not a prejudicial question that will warrant the
suspension of the criminal proceedings commenced to prosecute the buyer for violations of
the Bouncing Checks Law (Batas Pambansa Blg. 22) arising from the dishonor of the checks
the buyer issued in connection with the sale.

FACTS
On October 1997, petitioner Teodoro A. Reyes and Advanced Foundation Construction
Systems Corporation, represented by respondent Ettore Rossi, executed a deed of
conditional sale involving the purchase by Reyes of equipment consisting of a Warman
Dredging Pump HY 300A worth ₱10M. But on July 1998, Reyes commenced an action for
rescission of contract and damages in the RTC in Quezon City and sought judgment
declaring the deed of conditional sale "rescinded and of no further force and effect”.
Meanwhile on September 1998, Rossi charged Reyes with five counts of estafa and five
counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati
for the dishonor of the checks.
On November 20, 1998, the Assistant City Prosecutor handling the preliminary
investigation recommended the dismissal of the charges of estafa and the suspension of the
proceedings relating to the violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 based on a prejudicial
question. On January 5, 1999, the City Prosecutor of Makati approved the recommendation
of the handling Assistant City Prosecutor. Rossi appealed the resolution of the City
Prosecutor to the Department of Justice, but the Secretary of Justice, by resolution of July 24,
2001, denied Rossi’s petition for review. After the denial of his motion for reconsideration on
April 29, 2002, Rossi challenged the resolutions of the Secretary of Justice by petition for
certiorari in the CA but CA ruled that there was no prejudicial question that warranted the
suspension of the criminal proceedings against Reyes.

ISSUE
Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that there was no prejudicial question that
warranted the suspension of the criminal proceedings against Reyes?

HELD
NO. To properly appreciate if there is a prejudicial question to warrant the suspension
of the criminal actions, reference is made to the elements of the crimes charged. The
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 requires the concurrence of the following elements,
namely: (1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for
value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does
not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in
full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank
for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.21 The issue in the criminal
actions upon the violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 is, therefore, whether or not Reyes
issued the dishonoured checks knowing them to be without funds upon presentment. On the
other hand, the issue in the civil action for rescission is whether or not the breach in the
fulfilment of Advanced Foundation’s obligation warranted the rescission of the conditional
sale. If, after trial on the merits in the civil action, Advanced Foundation would be found to
have committed material breach as to warrant the rescission of the contract, such result
would not necessarily mean that Reyes would be absolved of the criminal responsibility for
issuing the dishonored checks because, as the aforementioned elements show, he already
committed the violations upon the dishonor of the checks that he had issued at a time when
the conditional sale was still fully binding upon the parties. His obligation to fund the checks
or to make arrangements for them with the drawee bank should not be tied up to the future
event of extinguishment of the obligation under the contract of sale through rescission.
Indeed, under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, the mere issuance of a worthless check was already
the offense in itself. Under such circumstances, the criminal proceedings for the violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 could proceed despite the pendency of the civil action for rescission
of the conditional sale.
In this light, it is clear that the pendency of the civil case does not bar the
continuation of the proceedings in the preliminary investigation on the ground that it poses a
prejudicial question. Considering that the contracts are deemed to be valid until rescinded,
the consideration and obligatory effect thereof are also deemed to have been validly made,
thus demandable. Consequently, there was no failure of consideration at the time when the
subject checks were dishonored.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. OLIVIA ALETH GARCIA CRISTOBAL
Gr 159450, March 30, 2011

DOCTRINE
Although a waiver of the right to present evidence by the accused is not a trivial
matter to be lightly regarded by the trial court, the filing of the demurrer to evidence without
express leave of court operates as a waiver that binds the accused pursuant to the express
provision of the Rules of Court.

FACTS
On January 2 1996, in the City of Angeles, OLIVIA ALETH GARCIA CRISTOBAL, being
then the teller of Prudential Bank, Angeles Main Branch, and as such is entrusted with cash
and other accountabilities, with grave abuse of trust and confidence reposed upon her by
her employer, with intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner
thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away
cash money amounting to $10,000.00, belonging to the Prudential Bank, Angeles Main
Branch, represented by its Branch Manager, EDGARDO PANLILIO, to the damage and
prejudice of Prudential Bank, Angeles Main Branch, in the aforementioned amount of TEN
THOUSAND DOLLARS ($10,000.00) or its equivalent of TWO HUNDRED SIXTY THOUSAND
PESOS (₱260,000.00), Philippine Currency and parity rate. On May 2000, the RTC rendered
its decision finding and pronouncing the accused guilty of qualified theft, so the accused
appealed, but the CA affirmed her conviction on July 31, 2003, albeit modifying the penalty.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA gravely erred in affirming the ruling of the trial court that the
accused had waived her right to present evidence-in-chief despite the expressed motion to
defer its presentation when the demurrer to evidence was filed.

HELD
NO, findings of CA and RTC are affirmed due to being based on the evidence. As to
whether or not the Trial Court correctly ruled that appellant waived the presentation of her
evidence when she filed her "Demurrer To Evidence and Motion to Defer Evidence" without
prior leave of court, We rule in the affirmative.
Appellant’s theory that prior leave of court had been requested because her
demurrer was, at the same time, also a motion to defer defense evidence, cannot be
sustained. A motion to defer evidence does not constitute a request for leave to file a
demurrer to evidence. In fact, such motion indicates that appellant wanted the Trial Court to
consider the demurrer before proceeding to hear her evidence. Furthermore, there is nothing
in appellant’s Demurrer from which it can be inferred that appellant was asking the Trial
Court permission to move for the dismissal of the case.
Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that after the
prosecution has rested its case, the court may dismiss the case on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence: (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution an opportunity
to be heard; or (2) on motion of the accused filed with prior leave of court. If the court
denies the motion for dismissal, the accused may adduce evidence in his defense. When the
accused files such motion to dismiss without express leave of court, he waives the right to
present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the
prosecution. Clearly, when the accused files such motion to dismiss without express leave of
court, he waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the
basis of the evidence for the prosecution. In such a case, the waiver of the right to present
defense evidence is unqualified.
Unavoidably, Our attention is drawn to the apparent negligence of appellant’s counsel in
failing to secure prior leave of court before filing her Demurrer to Evidence. However, We
cannot lose sight of the fact that in law, the negligence of appellant’s counsel binds her.
Indeed, jurisprudence teems with pronouncements that a client is bound by the conduct,
negligence and mistakes of his counsel. The CA did not thereby err.
SPOUSES YASAY V. CA
G.R. No. 156684 April 6, 2011

DOCTRINE
The office of a petition for certiorari seeks solely to correct defects in jurisdiction, and
does not correct just any error or mistake committed by a court, board, or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions unless such court, board, or officer thereby acts without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction.

FACTS
The Sanggunian Panglungsod of Mandaluyong City adopted a resolution authorizing
the Mayor to expropriate the land owned by the petitioners which land will be used,
according to the ordinance, for low cost housing for the less privileged but deserving city
inhabitants. Thereafter, they filed a petition seeking for the nullity of the ordinance for being
unconstitutional. The RTC dismissed the petition, which decision was affirmed by the CA,
holding that certiorari is not the proper remedy considering that the enactment of the
ordinance did not include any exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial act.

ISSUE
Whether or not a petition for certiorari is the proper remedy to assail the
constitutionality of an ordinance.

HELD
The first requisite is that the respondent tribunal, board, or officer must be exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Judicial function, according to Bouvier, is the exercise of
the judicial faculty or office; it also means the capacity to act in a specific way which
appertains to the judicial power, as one of the powers of government. Moreover, the Local
Government Code requires the LGU concerned to enact an ordinance, and not a resolution,
in exercising the power of expropriation.
Another element is lacking, which is the presence of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. No rights can be conferred by and be inferred
from a resolution, which is nothing but an embodiment of what the lawmaking body has to
say in the light of attendant circumstances. In simply expressing its sentiment or opinion
through the resolution, therefore, the Sangguniang Panglungsod in no way abused its
discretion, least of all gravely, for its expression of sentiment or opinion was a
constitutionally protected right. Moreover, the Local Government Code required the City to
pass an ordinance, not adopt a resolution, for the purpose of initiating an expropriation
proceeding.

HEIRS OF SPOUSES RETERTA V. SPOUSES LOPEZ


G.R. No. 159941 August 17, 2011

DOCTRINE
The fact that the order granting the motion to dismiss was a final order for thereby
completely disposing of the case, leaving nothing more for the trial court to do in the action,
truly called for an appeal, instead of certiorari, as the correct remedy.

FACTS
A petition for quieting of title has been instituted by the petitioners over a parcel of
land located at Tanza, Cavite. After learning of the petition, the respondents moved to
dismiss the case on the ground that the parcel of land covered in the petition is a friar land
and therefore, the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case and alleging that petitioners have
no legal capacity to maintain the petition. The RTC granted the motion to dismiss by the
respondents and it denied the subsequent motion for reconsideration of the petitioners on
February 1, 2002. Thereafter, on May 15, 2002 they filed a petition for certiorari to assail the
dismissal before the CA, but the latter court dismissed the petition on the ground that a
petition for certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for a lost appeal.

ISSUE
Whether or not the holding of the CA is correct.

HELD
The enumeration of the orders that were not appealable made in the 1997 version of
Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court — the version in force at the time when the CA
rendered its assailed decision on May 15, 2002 — included an order denying a motion
for new trial or motion for reconsideration. It is true that Administrative Matter No. 07-
7-12-SC, effective December 27, 2007, has since amended Section 1, Rule 41, supra, by
deleting an order denying a motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration from the enumeration of non-appealable orders, and that such a
revision of a procedural rule may be retroactively applied. However, to reverse the CA on
that basis would not be right and proper, simply because the CA correctly applied the rule of
procedure in force at the time when it issued its assailed final order.
The order that the petitioners really wanted to obtain relief from was the order
granting the respondents' motion to dismiss, not the denial of the motion for
reconsideration. The fact that the order granting the motion to dismiss was a final order for
thereby completely disposing of the case, leaving nothing more for the trial court to do in
the action, truly called for an appeal, instead of certiorari, as the correct remedy.
The restriction against an appeal of a denial of a motion for
reconsideration independently of a judgment or final order is logical and reasonable.
A motion for reconsideration is not putting forward a new issue, or presenting new evidence,
or changing the theory of the case, but is only seeking a reconsideration of the judgment or
final order based on the same issues, contentions, and evidence either because: (a) the
damages awarded are excessive; or (b) the evidence is insufficient to justify the decision or
final order; or (c) the decision or final order is contrary to law. By denying a motion for
reconsideration, or by granting it only partially, therefore, a trial court finds no reason either
to reverse or to modify its judgment or final order, and leaves the judgment or final order to
stand. The remedy from the denial is to assail the denial in the course of an appeal of the
judgment or final order itself.

LORENZO SHIPPING CORP V. DISTRIBUTION MANAGEMENT ASSOC. OF THE


PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 155849 August 31, 2011

DOCTRINE
A person should not be condemned for contempt where he contends for what he
believes to be right and in good faith institutes proceedings for the purpose, however
erroneous may be his conclusion as to his rights. To constitute contempt, the act must be
done willfully and for an illegitimate or improper purpose.

FACTS
The respondent initially went to the Supreme Court to challenge the constitutionality
of EO 213 issued by then President Ramos, but the petition was denied due course by the
Court on failure of the respondent to comply with the rules. After reaching the finality of the
decision, a Sea Transport Update (STU)was circulated by the respondent following a general
membership meeting called by it. In the STU, the respondents expressed their dismay on the
petition. Finding that the remarks made by the respondent was malicious on their part, and
with the intent to defy the orders of the Court, the petitioners moved to cite the respondents
in contempt.

ISSUE
Whether or not the statements uttered by the respondents amount to an indirect
contempt.

HELD
The unmistakable intent behind the phrases was to inform DMAP's members of the
developments in the case, and on the taking of the next viable move of going back to
MARINA on the issues, as the ruling of the Court of Appeals instructed. We have long
recognized and respected the right of a lawyer, or of any other person, for that matter, to be
critical of the courts and their judges as long as the criticism is made in respectful terms and
through legitimate channels.
The test for criticizing a judge's decision is, therefore, whether or not the criticism
is bona fide or done in good faith, and does not spill over the walls of decency and propriety.
Viewed through the prism of the test, the Sea Transport Update was not disrespectful,
abusive, or slanderous, and did not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. Thereby,
the respondents were not guilty of indirect contempt of court. In this regard, then, we need
to remind that the power to punish for contempt of court is exercised on the preservative
and not on the vindictive principle, and only occasionally should a court invoke its inherent
power in order to retain that respect without which the administration of justice must falter
or fail. As judges, we ought to exercise our power to punish contempt judiciously and
sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the end in view of utilizing the power for the
correction and preservation of the dignity of the Court, not for retaliation or vindictiveness.

CHU V. SPOUSES CUNANAN


G.R. No. 156185 September 12, 2011

DOCTRINE
A compromise agreement is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal
concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced. It encompasses
the objects specifically stated therein, although it may include other objects by necessary
implication and is binding on the contracting parties, being expressly acknowledged as a
juridical agreement between them. It has the effect and authority of res judicata upon the
parties.

FACTS
The Chus executed a deed of sale with assumption of mortgage in favor of the
respondents involving their parcel of land situated in Pampanga. Cunanan later transferred
two of the lots to Spouses Amado and Gloria Carlos (Carloses). Thereafter, Cunanan still
assigned the remaining three lots to Cool Town Realty and the Carloses transferred the
properties to Bernalda Estate (Bernalda).
The Chus sought to recover the unpaid balance from the Cunanan (Civil Case
No. G-1936), and amended the same to include Bernalda Estate as an additional
defendant. In this case, it reached the Supreme Court when Bernalda filed a petition for
certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion on the denial of its motion to dismiss. However,
the Court upheld the dismissal of the case.
Thereafter, Cool Town Realty entered into a compromise with the Chus which was
approved by the RTC. After which, the petitioners filed another action (Civil Case No.
12251) against Cunanan and Bernalda seeking the cancellation of the TCTs in the name
of Benalda Estate. Expectedly, the respondents sought the dismissal of Civil Case No. 12251
on the ground of res judicata. The RTC denied the motion, and the respondents filed a
petition for certiorari before the CA against the order of the RTC dismissing their motion. The
CA ruled that the compromise agreement ended the legal controversy between the parties
with respect to the cause of action arising from the deed of sale with assumption of
mortgage covering all the five parcels of land.

ISSUE
Whether or not the decision of the CA is correct.

HELD
In order that res judicata may bar the institution of a subsequent action, the following
requisites must concur: — (a) the former judgment must be final; (b) it must have been
rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties; (c) it must be a
judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be between the first and second actions (i)
identity of parties, (ii) identity of the subject matter, and (iii) identity of cause of action.
The first requisite was attendant. Civil Case No. G-1936 was already terminated
under the compromise agreement, for the judgment, being upon a compromise, was
immediately final and unappealable. As to the second requisite, the RTC had jurisdiction over
the cause of action in Civil Case No. G-1936 for the enforcement or rescission of the deed of
sale with assumption of mortgage, which was an action whose subject matter was not
capable of pecuniary estimation. That the compromise agreement explicitly settled the
entirety of Civil Case No. G-1936 by resolving all the claims of the parties against each other
indicated that the third requisite was also satisfied.
There is identity of parties when the parties in both actions are the same, or there is
privity between them, or they are successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the
commencement of the action litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in
the same capacity. The requirement of the identity of parties was fully met, because the
Chus, on the one hand, and the Cunanans, on the other hand, were the parties in both
cases along with their respective privies. The fact that the Carloses and Benelda Estate,
defendants in Civil Case No. 12251, were not parties in the compromise agreement was
inconsequential, for they were also the privies of the Cunanans as transferees and
successors-in-interest.
CHUNG v. HUANG
G.R.No. 170679 9 Mar. 2016

DOCTRINE
A compromise agreement is a contract whereby the parties make reciprocal
concession to avoid litigation or to put an end to one already commenced. IT is an accepted
and highly encouraged practice in the courts of law of this jurisdiction. It attains the
authority and effect of re judicata upon the parties upon its execution, and becomes
immediately final and executory, unless rescinded by grounds which vitiate consent. Once
stamped with judicial imprimatur, it ceases to be a mere contract between the parties, and
becomes a judgment of the court, to be enforced through writ of execution.

FACTS
Island Information and Technology, Inc. sold to Chung shares of stock in the
corporation by contract to sell. However the sale didn’t push through, and Chung filed a
complaint for recovered of sum of money and damages against ISTI. The RTC ruled in favor
of Chung. However, the parties filed their Joint Motion for Approval of a Compromise
Agreement on 19 Aug. 2003, to settle their monetary obligations via installment basis. The
RTC approved the compromise on 20 Oct. 2003. ISTI only paid the first installment, which
resulted to Chung filing a motion for execution of judgment with the RTC to enforce the
compromise agreement. RTC granted the motion on 14 Dec. 2004, and issued the writ of
execution and became final upon denial of ISTI’s motion for reconsideration. On 7 Mar. 2005,
ISTI files a petition for certiorari with the CA. CA annulled and set aside the approved
compromise agreement.

ISSUE
WON the judicial compromise agreement could no longer be assailed due to the lapse
of time between approval of compromise agreement, hence it being conclusive and
immutable.

HELD
YES. A compromise agreement, once stamped with judicial imprimatur, it ceases to
be a mere contract between the parties, and becomes a judgment of the court, to be
enforced through writ of execution. The CA failed to recognize that the compromise
agreement annulled is already the judgment based on the compromise agreement, and in
doing so the CA acted without jurisdiction. Furthermore, the action for certiorari brought on 7
Mar. 2005, was way beyond the 6—day period from the rendition of the judgment based on
the compromise on 20 Oct. 2003. Even assuming the grounds for petition for certiorari were
true, the judgment based on the compromise agreement could not be assailed on that basis.

DARE ADVENTURE FARM v. COURT OF APPEALS


G.R. No. 161122 24 SEP. 2012

DOCTRINE
It is elementary that a judgment of court is conclusive and binding only upon the
parties and those who are their successors in interest by title after the commencement of
action in court. The principle that a person cannot be prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an
action or proceeding in which he has not been made a party conforms to the constitutional
guarantee of due process of law.

FACTS
Goc-ong sold to DAF a piece of land that was already used as a mortgage on a loan
with the Ngs. The mortgage held an automatic transfer of ownership clause if the debt is not
paid. Goc-ongs failed to pay, and foreclosure proceedings were ensued, where the RTC
ordered the lot to be transferred to Ngs. DAF filed an action for annulment of judgment and
was dismissed outright.

ISSUE
Whether or not the action for annulment of judgment was a proper recourse for DAF
to set aside RTC order.

HELD
NO. Annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exception in nature that is may
only be availed of when other remedies are wanting, and only if grounded on lack of
jurisdiction or extrinsic fraud. Action for annulment of judgment, herein, cannot prosper for
two reasons: first, the glaring and elementary condition that the party who brought it is not
a real-party-in-interest nor a successor-in-interest, and cannot bring action for annulment
due to unavailability to it of the remedies of new trial, reconsideration, appeal or setting the
judgment aside through petition for relief; and second, a petition for annulment of judgment
due to its exceptional character is not allowed to be so easily and readily abused by parties
aggrieved with final judgments, orders or resolutions when the grounds are not proven nor
the proof that ordinary remedies were resulted to.
SOFIO V. VALENZUELA
G.R. No.157810 15 FEB. 2012

DOCTRINE
Gross negligence of counsel alone would not even warrant a deviation from the
principle of finality of judgment, for the client must have to show that such negligence
resulted in the denial of due process to the client.

FACTS
The Valenzuelas owned a parcel of land. A portion this was tilled by the Sofios with
the consent of the Mother of the Valenzuelas for free. Eventually, Gloria Valenzuela
discovered the arrangement and sought the return of the tilled portion to them, and the
cancellation of the emancipation patents issued to Sofios. Sofios brought their action to the
DARAB. PARAD cancelled the EPs. On appeal, DARAB reversed the ruling, on the tenancy
relationship between Sofios and Valenzuela. On appeal to the CA, PARAD decision was
reinstated and became final for Sofios lack to move for reconsideration or appeal by
certiorari to the SC. 4 years later, Sofio, represented by new counsel, seeks a declaration for
relief of judgment on account of negligence of the previous counsel.

ISSUE
Whether or not the gross negligence of the counsel barred the application of
immutability of judgment.

HELD
NO. The only exceptions to the doctrine of immutability of judgment are: a) correction
of clerical errors; b) nunc pro tunic entries; c) void judgments; and d) whenever
circumstances transpire after the finality of the judgments rendering execution unjust and
inequitable. The claim of counsel’s guilt of gross negligence does not warrant a deviation
from the principle. The counsel’s mistake must be proven to be so great and so serious that
the client is prejudiced and is denied his day in court. However, the failure to file a motion
for reconsideration does not qualify as gross negligence amount to clear abandonment of
the client’s cause.
GSIS v. EXECUTIVE JUDGE ERUM
A.M. No. RTJ-09-2182 5 SEP. 2012

DOCTRINE
The purpose of exclusive method of a raffle is two-fold: 1) to equalize the distribution
of the cases among the several branches, and foster the Court’s policy of promoting speedy
and efficient disposition of cases; and 2) to ensure the impartial adjudication of cases and
thereby obviate any suspicion regarding assignment of case to predetermined judges

FACTS
Martizano, an insurance agent, filed a suit to restrain DOTC, LTO, GSIS and
STRADCOM with he RTC from implementing DOTC DO 2007-28 as it constitutes the LTO to be
the sole insurance provider of CPTL required for registration of vehicles (Civ. Cas. No. MC08-
3660). Grounded on the threat to her livelihood, Martizano filed an action for TRO and
Injunction with RTC-Mandaluyong. During the raffle of cases, Judge Erum, as executive
judge, announced that MC08-3660 will be assigned to Br. 213 as all the other branches
already have Injunction cases, and that Br. 213 would be excluded in the raffle until all other
branches are assigned injunction cases. GSIS sought clarification on the non-raffling of
MC08-3660 with Judge Erum, but Judge Erum replied that it was rotation scheme long
practiced in RTC-Mandaluyong. The OCA rendered a report stating that there was a violation
on the raffle procedure, and recommended that to the SC that Judges Erum and Valenzuela
be sternly warned, and that MC08-3660 be re-docketed. Hence this motion for
reconsideration.

ISSUE
Whether or not Judges Erum and Valenzuela are properly held liable for violating the
standing rules on the raffle cases.

HELD
NO. The purpose of exclusive method of a raffle is two-fold: 1) to equalize the
distribution of the cases among the several branches, and foster the Court’s policy of
promoting speedy and efficient disposition of cases; and 2) to ensure the impartial
adjudication of cases and thereby obviate any suspicion regarding assignment of case to
predetermined judges. Although the applied procedure did not absolutely follow Circ. No. 7,
the practice did not contravene the same, because there were obviously less TRO or
injunctions cases available at anytime for ruffling than the number of branches. Hence, the
rule on equal distribution is followed. Also, the urgent nature of an injunction or TRO must be
considered, as it demands prompt action and immediate attention of a proper court without
delay. Judge Erum’s assigning of the case follows the rule on equal distribution and still
follows the two-fold objective of the Circ. No. 7, thus Judge Erum and Valenzuela should be
absolved.

CAGAS VS. COMELEC


G.R. No. 191439, January 24, 2012

DOCTRINE
The Court has no power to review on certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final
resolution issued by a Division of the COMELEC

FACTS
Cagas and Bautista contested the position of Governor of the Province of Davao del
Sur. Cagas was proclaimed the winner hence, Bautista filed a protest which was raffled to
the COMELEC First Division. Cagas averred as his special affirmative defense that Bautista
did not make the requisite cash deposit on time and did not render a detailed specification
of the acts or omissions complained of. COMELEC First Division issued an order denying the
special affirmative defenses of the petitioner. Cagas moved to reconsider on the ground that
the order did not discuss whether the protest specified the alleged irregularities in the
conduct of the elections in violation of the COMELEC resolution 8804 requiring all decisions
to clearly and distinctly express the facts and the law on which they were based. The
tribunal denied the motion for reconsideration hencethis petition for certiorari

ISSUE
Whether a special civil action of certiorari is proper in this case.

HELD
No. A party aggrieved by an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC
in an election protest may not directly assail the order in this Court through a special civil
action for certiorari. The remedy is to seek the review of the interlocutory order during the
appeal of the decision of the Division in due course. Although Section 7 of Article IX of the
1987 Constitution confers on the Court the power to review any decision, order or ruling of
the COMELEC, it limits such power to a final decision or resolution of the COMELEC en banc,
and does not extend to an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC.

PEOPLE VS. DEL CASTILLO


G.R. No. 169084, January 18, 2012
DOCTRINE
The trial judge’s evaluation of the credibility of a witness and of his testimony is
accorded the highest respect because of the trial judge’s unique opportunity to directly
observe the demeanor of the witness.

FACTS
Melanio, Hermogenes, Rico, Arnold and Joven were accused of the crime of murder of
Sabino, Graciano, and Victor. To support their conviction, several witnesses were presented
one of whom was Perfinian. Perfinian narrated before the RTC the events which took place in
killing the 3 victims. On the other hand, Arnold and Joven admitted to the killing of the
victims. RTC rendered a decision convicting all the accused which was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals. Melanio, Germogenes and Rico questioned the decision submitting before this
Court that the they should have been exculpated in view of the fact that Arnold and Joven
had already admitted killing the victims.

ISSUE
Whether the accused should be convicted based on the testimony of the prosecution.

HELD
Yes. We reiterate that the trial judge’s evaluation of the credibility of a witness
and of his testimony is accorded the highest respect because of the trial judge’s unique
opportunity to directly observe the demeanor of the witness that enabled him to determine
whether the witness is telling the truth or not. Such evaluation, when affirmed by the CA, is
binding on the Court unless the appellant reveals facts or circumstances of weight that were
overlooked, misapprehended, or misinterpreted that, if considered, would materially affect
the disposition of the case.

REYES VS. COURT OF APPEALS


G.R. No. 1801177. April 28, 2012

DOCTRINE
The non –compliance by the buy-bust team with Section 21, RA No. 9165, was held
not to be fatal for as long as there was justifiable ground for it, and for as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated or seized articles were properly
preserved by the apprehending officer or articles were properly preserved by the
apprehending officer or team.

FACTS
Buy-bust team one of whom was PO2 Payumo, acting as buyer conducted a buy-bust
operation. Reyes was apprehended and was charged with illegal sale of shabu and illegal
possession of shabu as defined and punished respectively by sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165.
Upon arriving at the police station, PO2 payumon placed on the plastic shachet that
petitioner had handed him with the marking “RRS-1” and on the other sachey recovered
from petitioner’s right hand the marking “RRS-2.” The same were delivered to Crime
laboratory where it was found to be a shabu. RTC convicted him of the crimes hence this
appeal.

ISSUE
Whether there are lapses in the conduct of the buy-bust operation that would result
to accused’s acquittal

HELD
Yes. Here, the Prosecution failed to demonstrate a faithful compliance by the
arresting lawmen of the rule on chain of custody. To start with, the fact that the dangerous
drugs were inventoried and photographed at the site of arrest upon seizure in the presence
of petitioner, a representative of the media, a representative of the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official, was not shown. As such, the arresting lawmen did not
at all comply with the further requirement to have the attending representative of the
media, representative of the DOJ, and elected public official sign the inventory and be
furnished a copy each of the inventory. Instead, the records show that PO2 Payumo placed
the markings of "RRS-1" on the sachet allegedly received from petitioner and "RRS-2" on the
two sachets allegedly seized from petitioner’s hand already at the police station with only
petitioner present. Yet, the Prosecution did not also present any witness to establish that an
inventory of the seized articles at least signed by petitioner at that point was prepared

the omissions noted herein indicated that the State did not establish the identity of the
dangerous drugs allegedly seized from petitioner with the same exacting certitude required
for a finding of guilt.

To be sure, the buy-bust operation was infected by lapses. Although PO2 Payumo declared
that he was the one who had received the sachet of shabu ("RRS-1") from petitioner and
who had confiscated the two sachets of shabu ("RRS-2") from petitioner, all of which he had
then sealed, nothing more to support the fact that the evidence thus seized had remained
intact was adduced.

GOLD LINE TOURS, INC. VS. HEIRS OF MARIA CONCEPCION LACSA


G.R. No. 159108, June 1, 2012

DOCTRINE
The term grave abuse of discretion is defined as a capricious and whimsical exercise
of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
and despotic manner because of passion or hostility. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough;
it must be grave.

FACTS
Concepcion, a graduate of Nursing course who is about to take her licensure exam in
Manila, died from a collision involving Gold line bus where she was a passenger. A case was
therefore filed against Travel & Tours Advisers, Inc., the owner of Goldline Bus. RTC ruled in
favor of the heirs. Pursuant to the writ of execution, goldline bus was levied. In the
meantime, the Articles of incorporation of Travel & Tours was amended and a new
corporation was formed in the name of the petitioner. Petitioner filed a third party claim
demanding the return of the Goldline bus. RTC denied the third party claim because of the
identity of the two corporations being one and the same. The same was affirmed by the CA
on appeal. Hence this special civil action for certiorari alleging that RTC committed grave
abuse of discretion because it denied its third party claim based on insufficient evidence that
it is a corporation similar to that of the Travel & Tours.

ISSUE
Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

HELD
No. As already stated, there was sufficient evidence that petitioner and Travel and
Tours Advisers, Inc. were one and the same entity. Moreover, we remind that a petition for
the writ of certiorari neither deals with errors of judgment nor extends to a mistake in the
appreciation of the contending parties evidence or in the evaluation of their relative weight.
[52] It is timely to remind that the petitioner in a special civil action
for certiorari commenced against a trial court that has jurisdiction over the proceedings
bears the burden to demonstrate not merely reversible error, but grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the respondent trial court in issuing
the impugned order. The term grave abuse of discretion is defined as a capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised
in an arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or hostility. Mere abuse of discretion
is not enough; it must be grave. Yet, here, petitioner did not discharge its burden because
it failed to demonstrate that the CA erred in holding that the RTC had not committed grave
abuse of discretion. A review of the records shows, indeed, that the RTC correctly rejected
petitioners third-party claim. Hence, the rejection did not come within the domain of the writ
of certioraris limiting requirement of excess or lack of jurisdiction.

MANGILA v HON. PANGILINAN


G.R. No. 160739, July 17, 2013

DOCTRINE
Restraint that is lawful and pursuant to a court process cannot be inquired into
through habeas corpus. The function of habeas corpus, where the party who has appealed to
its aid is in custody under process, does not extend beyond an inquiry into the jurisdiction of
the court by which it was issued and the validity of the process upon its face. It is not a writ
of error.
FACTS
Petitioner Anita Mangila and four others face criminal charges of syndicated estafa
relative to an illegal recruitment scheme. Public respondent Judge Heriberto Pangilinan,
Presiding Judge of the MTCC, conducted a preliminary investigation on the complaints. After
examining one of the complainants, Judge Pangilinan issued a warrant for the arrest of
Mangila and her cohorts without bail. The entire records of the cases, including the warrant
of arrest, were then transmitted to the City Prosecutor for further proceedings. On the
strength of the arrest warrant, Mangila was arrested and detained at the headquarters of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Claiming, among others, that Judge Pangilinan did not
have the authority to conduct the preliminary investigation; that the preliminary
investigation conducted was not yet completed when the warrant of arrest of arrest was
issued; and that she could no longer file a motion to quash or a motion to recall the warrant
of arrest because the judge already forwarded the case records to the city prosecutor who
has no authority to lift or recall the warrant, Mangila filed in the Court of Appeals a petition
for habeas corpus for her release. The CA denied the petition, ratiocinating that habeas
corpus does not obtain in her case because her arrest is lawful one. Hence, the petition.

ISSUE
Whether or not a habeas corpus is the proper remedy to obtain the release of
Mangila from detention

HELD
NO. The inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is addressed to the question of
whether the proceedings and the assailed order are, for any reason, null and void. The writ is
not ordinarily granted where the law provides for other remedies in the regular course, and
in the absence of exceptional circumstances. Moreover, habeas corpus should not be
granted in advance of trial. Habeas corpus cannot be issued as a writ of error or as a means
of reviewing errors of law and irregularities not involving the questions of jurisdiction
occurring during the course of the trial, subject to the caveat that constitutional safeguards
of human life and liberty must be preserved, and not destroyed. In the case at bar, Judge
Pangilinan issued the order of arrest after examining Palayon, one of the complainants
against Mangila and her cohorts. If he, as the investigating judge, considered Palayon's
evidence sufficient for finding probable cause, Mangila’s petition for habeas corpus could not
be the proper remedy by which she could assail the adequacy of the adverse finding. Sec. 2
of Rule 112 allows judges of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts to
conduct preliminary investigation. Relative to that, Section 6 (b) of Rule 112 gives the
investigating judge the power to issue a warrant of arrest during the preliminary
investigation. Mangila’s proper recourse is to bring the errors into the attention of the City
Prosecutor.

N.B.: The authority of the MTC and MTCC judges to conduct preliminary investigations was
removed only effective on October 3, 2005 pursuant to A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC. The preliminary
investigation made against Mangila is in 2003.

UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK v. LUMBO


G.R. No. 162757, December 11, 2013

DOCTRINE
The implementation of a writ of possession issued pursuant to Act No. 3135 at the
instance of the purchaser at the foreclosure sale of the mortgaged property in whose name
the title has been meanwhile consolidated cannot be prevented by the injunctive writ.

FACTS
Respondents Christopher and Milagros, both Lumbo, took a loan from petitioner
United Coconut Planters Bank. They constituted a real estate mortgage thereon.
Respondents failed to settle the obligation; hence, moved to extrajudicially foreclose the
mortgage, where it emerged as the highest bidder. The Lumbos brought against UCPB an
action for the annulment of the foreclosure. UCPB filed an ex-parte petition for the issuance
of a writ of possession to recover possession of the property. The RTC granted the petition of
UCPB. Respondents filed a petition to cancel the writ of possession and to set aside the
foreclosure sale, including an application for a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order to prevent the implementation of the writ of possession. The RTC denied
the respondents’ application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. However, on
appeal, the Court of Appeals set aside the RTC decision and granted the issuance of an
injunctive writ. Hence, the petition.

ISSUE
Whether or not the injunctive writ to enjoin the implementation of the writ of
possession was correctly issued

HELD
NO. Preliminarily, a writ of possession commands the sheriff to place a person in
possession of real property. The grant of the writ of possession is but a ministerial act on the
part of the issuing court, because its issuance is a matter of right on the part of the
purchaser. UCPB as the registered owner of the property is unquestionably entitled to the full
implementation of the writ of possession. The pendency of an action for the annulment of
the mortgage or of the foreclosure sale does not constitute a legal ground to prevent the
implementation of a writ of possession. As to writ of injuction, Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules
of Court outlines the circumstances when a writ of preliminary injunction--an order granted
at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order requiring a party
or a court, an agency, or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts--may be justified. In
the case of injunction, the right sought to be protected should at least be shown to exist
prima facie. Unless such a showing is made, the applicant is not entitled to an injunctive
relief. Accordingly, the conditions for the issuance of the injunctive writ are: (a) that the right
to be protected exists prima facie; (b) that the act sought to be enjoined is violative of that
right; and (c) that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious
damage. An injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse, or a right which is merely
contingent and may never arise; or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of
action; or to prevent the perpetration of an act prohibited by statute. Indeed, a right, to be
protected by injunction, must be a right in esse, which a right existing in fact, a right clearly
founded on or granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of law. Respondent Lumbos made
no such showing of their holding a right in esse. The absence of such right is a compelling
reason to undo the CA's reversal.

MACASAET v. CO JR.
G.R. No. 156759, June 5, 2013

DOCTRINE
To warrant the substituted service of the summons and copy of the complaint, the
serving officer must first attempt to effect the same upon the defendant in person. Only
after the attempt at personal service has become futile or impossible within a reasonable
time may the officer resort to substituted service.

FACTS
Petitioners Allen Macasaet and six others are defendants in a suit for libel brought by
respondent Francisco Co Jr. After raffle, the Regional Trial Court issued summons to be
served on each petitioner. Sheriff Raul Medina proceeded to effect the personal service of
the summons. Medina tried twice, by morning and by afternoon, to personally serve the
summonses but such efforts were futile because the defendants were out of the office and
unavailable. Medina decided to resort to substituted service of the summons. In his return,
Medina said that the summonses of petitioners Macasaet and Nicolas Quijano were received
Lu-Ann Quijano, while the summonses of petitioners Isaias Albano, Janet Bay, Jesus Galang,
Randy Hagos and Lily Reyes, were given to Rene Esleta, editorial assistant of Abante. Both
Lu-Ann and Esleta are persons of sufficient age working in Abante Tonite, who signed to
acknowledge receipt the summonses. Medina included in his return that that efforts to
personally serve the summons were made, but were unavailing because petitioners were
"always out and not available" or "always roving outside and gathering news." Petitioners
moved for the dismissal of the complaint through counsel’s special appearance, alleging lack
of jurisdiction over their persons because of the invalid and ineffectual substituted service of
summons. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss, citing proper conduct of the substituted
service of summonses. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals,
which denied the petition. Hence, the petition.

ISSUE
Whether or not the conduct of the substituted service is proper

HELD
YES. The statutory requirements of substituted service must be followed strictly,
faithfully and fully. Hence, the impossibility of prompt personal service should be shown by
stating the efforts made to find the defendant himself and the fact that such efforts failed,
which statement should be found in the proof of service or sheriff’s return. In the case at
bar, Sheriff Medina twice attempted to serve the summons upon each of petitioners in
person at their office address, the first in the morning and the second in the afternoon of
September 18, 2000. Each attempt failed. After Medina learned from those present in the
office address on his second attempt that there was no likelihood of any of the petitioners
going to the office during the business hours of that or any other day, he concluded that
further attempts to serve them in person within a reasonable time would be futile. The
circumstances fully warranted substituted service. He was not expected or required as the
serving officer to effect personal service by all means and at all times, considering that he
was expressly authorized to resort to substituted service should he be unable to effect the
personal service within a reasonable time. In that regard, what was a reasonable time was
dependent on the circumstances obtaining. In reality, petitioners’ insistence on personal
service by the serving officer was demonstrably superfluous. They had actually received the
summonses served through their substitutes, as borne out by their filing of several pleadings
in the RTC. While the Court is strict in insisting on personal service on the defendant, it does
not cling to such strictness should the circumstances already justify substituted service
instead. It is the spirit of the procedural rules, not their letter, that governs.
TERELAY INVESTMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. YULO
G.R. No. 160924, August 5, 2015

DOCTRINE
A stockholder has the right to inspect the books of the corporation of which he is a
member. In issuing the writ of mandamus, the court will exercise a sound discretion. The writ
should not be granted for speculative purposes or to gratify idle curiosity or to aid a
blackmailer, but it may not be denied to the stockholder who seeks the information for
legitimate purposes.

FACTS
Respondent Cecilia Teresita Yulo is a stockholder in petitioner Terelay Investment and
Development Corp. In 1999, she wrote a letter addressed to Terelay to be allowed to
examine its books and records in asserting her right as a stockholder. Terelay denied the
request for inspection and instead demanded that she show proof that she was a bona fide
stockholder. Yulo once more sent another letter to clarify that her request was to inquire into
the financial condition of Terelay and the conduct of its affairs by the principal officers. Yulo
received a letter from Terelay's counsel advising her not to continue with the inspection in
order to avoid trouble. Yulo filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission a Petition for
Issuance of a Writ of Mandamus. Following the enactment of the The Securities Regulation
Code, the case was transferred to the Regional Trial Court, which approved the petition. On
appeal, Terelay argued that Yulo's petition for mandamus was premature because she failed
to exhaust all available remedies before filing the instant petition. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the RTC decision in issuing the writ of mandamus. Hence, the petition.

ISSUE
Whether or not the writ of mandamus was erroneously issued

HELD
NO. A writ of mandamus is a remedy provided by law where despite the stockholder's
request for record inspection, the corporation still refuses to allow the stockholder the right
to inspect. In the instant case, Yulo, through counsel, sent a letterrequest for inspection of
corporate records, books of accounts and other financial records, but the same was denied
by Terelay. Yulo sent another letter which was denied. Clearly then, Yulo's right is not pre-
mature and may be enforced by a writ of mandamus. Jurisprudence recognizes the right of
the shareholder, for proper purposes and under reasonable regulations as to place and time,
to inspect the books of the corporation of which he is a member. In issuing the writ of
mandamus, the court will exercise a sound discretion and grant the right under proper
safeguards to protect the interest of all concerned. The writ should not be granted for
speculative purposes or to gratify idle curiosity or to aid a blackmailer, but it may not be
denied to the stockholder who seeks the information for legitimate purposes.

STRONGHOLD INSURANCE CO., INC. vs. CUENCA


G.R. No. 173297 March 6, 2013

DOCTRINE
The personality of a corporation is distinct and separate from the personalities of its
stockholders. Hence, its stockholders are not themselves the real parties in interest to claim
and recover compensation for the damages arising from the wrongful attachment of its
assets. Only the corporation is the real party in interest for that purpose.

FACTS
Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. assails the decision promulgated by the CA
affirming the judgment rendered by the RTC of Paranaque holding Stronghold Insurance and
respondent Manuel D. Marañon, Jr. jointly and solidarily liable for damages to respondents
Tomas Cuenca, Marcelina Cuenca, Milagros Cuenca (collectively referred to as Cuencas), and
Bramie Tayactac, upon the latter's claims against the surety bond issued by Stronghold
Insurance for the benefit of Marañon.
Marañon filed a complaint in the RTC against the Cuencas and Tayactac for the
collection of a sum of money and damages with application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment. The RTC granted the writ conditioned upon the posting of a bond.
Marañon posted a bond issued by Stronghold Insurance. In enforcing the writ, the sheriff
levied upon the property belonging to Arc Cuisine, Inc. where the respondents are officers.
The Cuencas and Tayactac presented a Motion to Dismiss and to Quash Writ of Preliminary
Attachment. Where the motion and MR having been denied, they appealed the case to the
CA which granted the petition for certiorari and remanded to the RTC for hearing and
resolution of the Cuencas and Tayactac's claim for the damages sustained from the
enforcement of the writ of preliminary attachment. Hence, the Cuencas and Tayactac filed a
Motion to Require Sheriff to Deliver Attached Properties and to Set Case for Hearing. The
RTC rendered its judgment holding Marañon and Stronghold Insurance jointly and solidarily
liable for damages to the Cuencas and Tayactac.

ISSUE
Whether or not the Cuencas and Tayactac are the proper parties to claim any
damages from the attachment of the properties

HELD
No. According to the Supreme Court, the properties subject to the levy on attachment
belonged to Arc Cuisine, Inc. alone, not to the Cuencas and Tayactac in their own right. They
were only stockholders of Arc Cuisine, Inc., which had a personality distinct and separate
from that of any or all of them. The damages occasioned to the properties by the levy on
attachment, wrongful or not, prejudiced Arc Cuisine, Inc., not them. As such, only Arc
Cuisine, Inc. had the right under the substantive law to claim and recover such damages.

PEOPLE vs. TEODORO Y ANGELES


G.R. No. 175876 February 20, 2013

DOCTRINE
The recantation of her testimony by the victim of rape is to be disregarded if the
records show that it was impelled either by intimidation or by the need for the financial
support of the accused.

FACTS
This is an appeal from the affirmance by the CA of the conviction for two counts of
rape of Tomas Teodoro y Angeles, in which the victim, AAA, was the 8-year old daughter of
BBB, his common-law wife. The Regional Trial Court had pronounced Teodoro guilty of two
counts of statutory rape.
Based on the medical certificate, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor charged
Teodoro with two counts of statutory rape. During the trial, AAA and BBB testified for the
Prosecution, but two years later recanted and turned hostile towards the Prosecution, now
telling the RTC that Teodoro had only touched AAA's vagina. However, the RTC rejected
AAA's recantation of her accusation for being inconsistent with the testimony of Dr. Abrenillo
showing that the redness on the edges of the protective structure of her vaginal opening
had been caused by friction from the forceful introduction of an erect penis. Hence, it
convicted Teodoro. On appeal, Teodoro argued that no rape was committed considering that
the Cebuano-Visayan word guihilabtan used by AAA in describing what he did to her
signified only touching, as contrasted with lugos, the proper Cebuano-Visayan term for rape
that AAA did not use. Unimpressed, the CA sustained the RTC, and ignored AAA's recantation
for being dictated by her family's financial difficulties.

ISSUE
Whether or not AAA’s recantation of her initial testimony should be admitted

HELD
No. The Court declares that the findings of the RTC and the CA on the commission of
the two counts of statutory rape by Teodoro were well-founded. AAA's recollections given in
court when she was only eight years old disclosed an unbroken and consistent narration of
her ordeals at his hands. She thereby revealed details that no child of her very tender age
could have invented or concocted. The only rational and natural conclusion to be made by
any objective arbiter is to accord the fullest credence to her. Teodoro’s opinion regarding the
words used, already by its nature argumentative, should not prevail over the physical
evidence. The Court opined that BBB needed the material support of Teodoro since she was
rearing their children; hence, she prevailed on AAA to withdraw her charges against him. But
a recantation under such insincere circumstances was unacceptable. The recantation, like
any other testimony, is subject to the test of credibility based on the relevant circumstances,
including the demeanor of the recanting witness on the stand. AAA was crying while she was
giving her testimony retracting her previous testimony.

PEOPLE vs. ARCILLAS


G.R. No. 181491 July 30, 2012

DOCTRINE
The rape of a female over 12 years but under 18 years of age by the common-law
spouse of her mother is qualified rape. Yet, the crime is only simple rape because although
the State successfully proves the common-law relationship, the information does not
properly allege the qualifying circumstance of relationship between the accused and the
female. This is because the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him is inviolable.

FACTS
AAA, allegedly Arcillas' step-daughter, brought a complaint for qualified rape against
him. After due proceedings, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor filed an information
charging him with qualified rape in the RTC. The RTC convicted Arcillas of qualified rape and
meted the death penalty on him. On appeal, the CA affirmed the finding of guilt against
Arcillas but downgraded the crime to simple rape on the ground that the information did not
allege that he was her mother's common-law husband, instead of the victim's step-father,
the qualifying circumstance the information alleged. In his defense, Arcillas denied
committing rape against AAA. He insisted that he merely touched her body during a moment
of intoxication.

ISSUE
Whether or not the CA was correct in convicting the accused only with simple rape

HELD
Yes. The Court held that an accused cannot be found guilty of qualified rape unless
the information alleges the circumstances of the victim's over 12 years but under 18 years
of age and her relationship with him. The reason is that such circumstances alter the nature
of the crime of rape and increase the penalty; hence, they are special qualifying
circumstances. As such, both the age of the victim and her relationship with the offender
must be specifically alleged in the information and proven beyond reasonable doubt during
the trial; otherwise, the death penalty cannot be imposed.
Arcillas' being the common-law husband of BBB at the time of the commission of the
rape, even if established during the trial, could not be appreciated because the information
did not specifically allege it as a qualifying circumstance. Otherwise, he would be deprived of
his right to be informed of the charge lodged against him.

REPUBLIC vs. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY


G.R. No. 201715 December 11, 2013

DOCTRINE
The intervening rendition by the trial court of a decision on the merits of the case
renders moot and academic the resolution of any issue raised on certiorari against
interlocutory orders setting the pre-trial and declaring the petitioner to have waived its right
to present its evidence. The resolution of the issue, having been pre-empted by the decision
in the main action, ceased to have any practical value.

FACTS
Under appeal via petition for review on certiorari is the decision promulgated
whereby CA dismissed the original and the supplemental petitions for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus of petitioner, and in effect upheld the assailed interlocutory orders and the
pre-trial order issued by the RTC in an action for declaratory relief by respondent.
MERALCO and NAPOCOR had entered into the contract for the sale of electricity (CSE)
at the rates approved by the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC). A dispute arose between
the parties which was submitted to mediation. The Settlement Agreement contained a pass-
through provision that allowed MERALCO to pay NAPOCOR the net settlement amount from
collections recovered from MERALCO's consumers once the ERC approved the pass-through.
The Settlement Agreement was duly approved by the respective Boards of MERALCO and
NAPOCOR. They filed their joint application in the ERC, seeking the approval of the pass-
through provision of the Settlement Agreement, and a provisional authority to implement
the pass-through provision subject to a final decision after hearing on the merits.
Considering the opposition by the OSG to the validity of the Settlement Agreement, the ERC
suspended the proceedings and deferred the approval of the joint application. This prompted
MERALCO to initiate in the RTC an action for declaratory relief. The OSG filed a motion to
dismiss or to stay the proceedings, and to refer the parties to arbitration. However, the RTC
denied the motion to dismiss or to stay the proceedings and to refer the parties to
arbitration through the first assailed order. The case was then set to pre-trial, the OSG filed a
motion to cancel that pre-trial, and a motion for the inhibition of the RTC Judge. Petitioner
brought in the CA a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus which was denied. The
CA directed the RTC to proceed to the trial on the merits and to resolve the case with
dispatch where the RTC complied and rendered its decision on the merits granting
MERALCO's petition for declaratory relief and declaring the Settlement Agreement between
NAPOCOR and MERALCO as valid and binding, save for the pass-through provision that was
reserved for the consideration and approval of the ERC.

ISSUE
Whether or not the appeal made by petitioner may still be entertained

HELD
No. With the intervening rendition of the decision on the merits, the challenge against
the interlocutory orders of the RTC designed to prevent the RTC from proceeding with the
pre-trial and the trial on the merits was rendered moot and academic. In other words, any
determination of the issue on the interlocutory orders was left without any practical value. A
case that is moot and academic because of supervening events ceases to present any
justiciable controversy. The courts of law will not determine moot and academic questions,
for they should not engage in academic declarations and determine moot questions.

RE: LETTER OF COMPLAINT OF MERLITA FABIANA AGAINST JUSTICE REYES;


ASSOC. JUSTICE DICDICAN AND CRUZ.
A.M. NO. CA-13-51-J, JULY 2, 2013

DOCTRINE
The rigid policy is to make the consolidation of all cases and proceedings resting on
the same set of facts, or involving identical claims or interests or parties mandatory. Such
consolidation should be made regardless of whether or not the parties or any of them
requests it. The policy eliminates conflicting results concerning similar or like issues between
the same parties or interests and enhances the administration of justice.

FACTS
This administrative matter stems from a claim for death benefits by the heirs of
Marlon Fabiana against manning agent Magsaysay Maritime and its principal Air Sea Holiday,
to which the NLRC modified the award adjudged by the Labor Arbiter. The heirs filed a
petition for certiorari before the CA assailing the jurisdiction of the NLRC to act on the appeal
of Magsaysay and seeking for the reinstatement of moral and exemplary damages.
Magsaysay on the other hand filed its separate petition before the CA challenging the
propriety of the monetary awards granted to the heirs of Fabiana. The heirs sought for a
consolidation of the separate petitions but was mooted by the First Division of the CA when
it rendered a decision over the heirs’ petition. The heirs moved to dismiss the petition filed
by Magsaysay claiming that the decision on their (heirs’) petition rendered Magsaysay’s
petition moot. The CA dismissed the motion to dismiss stating that the petition filed by
Magsaysay consist of different issue raised by the heirs. The heirs filed an administrative
case against the Justices.

ISSUE
Whether or not the Justices may be subjected to disciplinary proceedings for not
consolidating the petitions filed by the heirs and Magsaysay.

HELD
No. The recourse open to the heirs was to move for the correction of the resolution, if
they disagreed with it, and should their motion be denied, to assail the denial with the SC
through the remedy warranted under the law. A proper judicial remedy cannot be
substituted by an administrative complaint. On the other hand, the 2 petitions showed that
they involved the same parties, and the same facts, and the parties are also assailing the
same decision by the NLRC. The request for consolidation should have been granted, and
the petitions consolidated. The consolidation of 2 or more actions is authorized where the
cases arise from the same act, event or transaction, involve the same or like issues and
depend largely on the same evidence, provided that the court has jurisdiction and that the
consolidation will not prejudice the substantial rights of any of the parties. The consolidation
should have been required as a matter of course even without any of the parties seeking the
consolidation, considering the 2 cases rested on the same set of facts and involved claims
arising from the death of the late Marlon Fabiana.

SPS DICO AND VIZCAYA MANAGEMENT CORPORATION (VMC)


G.R.NO 161211, July 17, 2013

DOCTRINE
The defense of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, litis pendencia, res
judicata and prescription of action may be raised at any stage of the proceedings

FACTS
The Land Registration Authority approved the application for consolidation filed by
VMC for Lots 1426-B, 1426-C, 29-B, and 1412. The VMC derived their title for the said lots
from the Lopezes who’s TCTs were registered in 1934. Meanwhile, Sps Dico were owners of
an adjacent titled Lot 486. They filed an action for reconveyance on May 12, 1986 alleging
that VMC encroached a portion of Lot 486 and that they were possessors-by-succession of
Lot 1412, to which they have an application for free patent but somehow VMC had
spuriously acquired a TCT therefore. The RTC ruled in favor of the Dicos. The CA upheld the
RTC’s findings that Sps Dico were absolute owners of Lot 486 by virtue of their TCT. However,
their claim over Lot 1412 should be dismissed for being barred by prescription and/or laches
as pointed out by VCM. The Dicos maintain that prescription could not be used to bar their
claim for they have established that VCM acquired their titled through fraud and VCM’s
failure to aver prescription before the RTC.

ISSUE
Whether or not the action for reconveyance of lot 1412 filed by Sps Dico is barred by
prescription; and whether VCM is barred from raising the defense of prescription for the first
time on appeal.

HELD
The action for reconveyance of Lot 1412 was properly dismissed. Under Art.1456 of
the Civil Code, the person obtaining property through mistake or fraud is considered by
force of law a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the
property comes. Under Art.1144, an obligation created by law must be brought within 10
years from the time the right of action accrues. The reckoning point for the Sps Dico to
demand of for reconveyance based on fraud was their discovery of the fraud. Such discovery
is properly pegged on the date of the registration of the TCTs in the adverse partie’s names,
because registration is a constructive notice to the world. The Dicos were deemed to have
discovered the fraud as early as 1934, when the TCT of the Lopezes were registered or in
1956 when the TCT of VCM was registered. When they filed their action in 1986, it was way
beyond the prescriptive period of 10 years. VCM on the other hand is not barred from raising
the defense of prescription because it may be raised at any time during the proceedings.
SPS DACUDAO vs SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
G.R. No. 188056, January 8 2013

DOCTRINE
In the concurrence of jurisdiction among the SC, CA and the RTCs to issue the writs of
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, the
hierarchy of courts must be strictly observed. It must not be taken by parties as unrestrained
freedom of choice of court forum.

FACTS
Sps Dacudao were among the investors defrauded by the Legacy Group owned by
Delos Angeles. They filed syndicated estafa against Delos Angeles, et. al. in the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Davao City. Several other victims filed cases in Cagayan de Oro and other
cities. The DOJ Sec issued DO 182 directing all prosecutors to forward all the cases already
filed against Delos Angeles to the Secretariat of the DOJ Special Panel in Manila for
appropriate action. Aggrieved by the turn of events, Sps Dacudao directly come to the SC
via petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus ascribing to the DOJ Sec grave abuse of
discretion in issuing DO 182, claiming that the order violated their right to due process and
right to speedy disposition of cases.

ISSUE
Whether or not petitioners properly bring their petition directly to the SC?

HELD
Sps Dacudao unduly disregarded the hierarchy of courts by coming directly to the SC
without tendering any special, important or compelling reason to justify the direct filing of
the petition. The undue disregard of the hierarchy of courts will cause the dismissal of the
recourse. Extraordinary writs against first level courts (MTCs, MeTCs) should be filed with the
RTC; writs against the RTCs should be filed with the CA; those against the CA should be filed
before the SC. A direct invocation of the SC’s original jurisdiction shall be allowed only when
there are special and important reasons therefore, clearly and specifically set out in the
petition. This established policy is to prevent inordinate demands upon the court’s time and
attention which are better devoted to matters within its exclusive jurisdiction. Assuming that
the direct resort to the SC was permissible, the petition must still be dismissed. For a special
civil action for certiorari to prosper it must be directed against a tribunal, board or officer
exercising quasi-judicial functions; which must have acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction. The DOJ as the primary prosecution arm of the government does not function as
a quasi-judicial agency. Its preliminary investigation of cases and its reviews of the findings
of a public prosecutor are not quasi-judicial proceedings. Nor did the Secretary of justice
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. His action was fully justified by taking into account
the relative distance between CDO and Manila where the preliminary investigation would be
conducted by the special panel.

SAN MIGUEL PROPERTIES INC VS PEREZ


G.R. No. 166836, September 4, 2013
DOCTRINE
The pendency of an administrative case for specific performance brought by the
buyer of residential subdivision lots before the HLURB to compel seller to deliver the TCTs of
the fully paid lots is properly considered a ground to suspend a criminal prosecution for
violation of Sec. 25 of PD 957 on the ground of prejudicial question. The administrative
determination is logical antecedent of the resolution of the criminal charges based on non-
delivery of the TCTs.

FACTS
San Miguel Properties purchased from BF Homes, then represented by Atty. Orendain
the authorized rehabilitation receiver, 130 residential lots in its subdivision, of which 20 TCTs
were undelivered even after full payment and several demands. The reason given was that
Atty. Orendain ceased to be the receiver at the time of transaction. San Miguel filed 2 cases
against BF Homes: 1 criminal case for violation of Sec. 25 of PD 957, and 1 admin case for
specific performance in the HLURB, praying to compel BF Homes to release the 20 TCTs. The
DOJ to which San Miguel appealed the dismissal of the criminal case ruled that “complainant
cannot invoke the penal provisions of PD 957 until such time that the HLURB shall have ruled
and decided on the validity of the transactions involving the lots in question, the issue being
a prejudicial question.

ISSUE
Whether or not the HLURB case presented prejudicial question that called for the
suspension of the criminal action.

HELD
YEes. The concept of prejudicial question involves a civil action and a criminal case. It
contemplates a situation where the resolution of the civil case is determinative of the issue
involved in the criminal case filed in another tribunal. The action for specific performance
filed by the buyer of a subdivision against the seller could not be instituted elsewhere except
in the HLURB through an administrative proceeding, although by nature, it is a civil case.
This is because HLURB’s jurisdiction over the action is exclusive and original. Although
HLURB is an administrative agency, action for specific performance pending before it raises
a prejudicial question. The determination of whether the proceedings ought to be suspended
because of prejudicial question rested on whether the facts and issues raised in the specific
performance case were so related with the issues raised in the criminal complaint, such that
the resolution of the specific performance case would be determinative of the question of
guilt in the criminal case. The HLURB case will determine whether or not San Miguel was
legally entitled to demand the delivery of the TCTs, while the criminal action will determine
whether or not the directors and officers of BF Homes were criminally liable for withholding
the TCTs. The resolution of the HLURB case must precede over the criminal case because
should the HLURB decide that San Miguel is not entitled to the delivery of the TCTs by reason
of Atty. Orendain’s lack of authority, the basis of the criminal liability would evaporate,
thereby negating the need to proceed with the criminal case. For this reason, the specific
performance case poses as a prejudicial question.

ABRIGO VS FLORES
G.R. NO. 160786, June 17, 2013
DOCTRINE
Once a judgment becomes immutable and unalterable by virtue of its finality, its
execution should follow as a matter of course. A supervening event, to be sufficient to stop
the execution must alter or modify the situation of the parties under the decision as to
render the execution inequitable, impossible and unfair. The supervening event cannot rest
on unproved or uncertain facts.

FACTS
The heirs of Francisco, desiring to terminate their co-ownership with the heirs of
Gaudencia over a parcel of residential land, filed for judicial partition before the RTC. The
RTC ordered the partition of the land such that the western half shall pertain to the heirs of
Francisco while the eastern half, to the heirs of Gaudencia. The CA affirmed the judgment.
With no further appellate proceedings having taken by the heirs of Gaudencia, the RTC
issued several writs of execution to enforce the judgment. When the heirs of Francisco
moved to demolish the improvements which encroached their portion of the land, the heirs
of Gaudencia moved to defer the demolition alleging that they have become one of the
owners of the western half because one of the heirs of Francisco sold to them his share, a
supervening event that rendered the writ of execution inequitable as to them. The motion to
defer was denied by the RTC. The CA also denied the petition for certiorari and directed the
RTC to implement its final and executory decision.

ISSUE
Whether or not the sale of one of the heirs of Francisco of his portion of the land to
the heirs of Gaudencia constituted a supervening event that rendered the execution of final
judgment inequitable.

HELD
No. The sale of the supposed share, assuming it to be true, did not modify or alter the
judgment regarding the partition of the property in litis. The correct course of action was to
initiate in the proper court a proceeding for partition of the western portion based on the
supposed sale. The RTC decision directing the partition of the land became final after the CA
affirmed the decision, there being no further appellate proceedings after the affirmance. The
execution of the decision followed as a matter of course, because the prevailing party was
entitled to its execution as a matter of right. The decision could no longer be altered,
amended or modified, even if it was meant to correct what was perceived to be an
erroneous conclusion of fact or of law, pursuant to the doctrine of immutability of final
judgment. Although a supervening event is a recognized exception, it may be applied only if
it directly affects the matter already litigated and settled, or directly affects the rights or
relations of the parties as to render the execution unjust. Here, they were unable to adduce
evidence of the transaction so that the claim of supervening event is unsubstantiated and
cannot frustrate the conclusiveness of a final judgment.

AQUINO vs. TANGKENGKO


G.R. No. 197356. August 24, 2016

DOCTRINE:
A litigant who brought a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules
of Court cannot anymore avail himself of an action for annulment of judgment under Rule 47
of the Rules of Court based on the same grounds available to him for the prior remedy

FACTS:
The petitioner filed a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus in the RTC
in Malolos City, Bulacan in order to recover parental custody of his minor child, Azilimson
Aquino, from his mother-in-law and his brothers-in-law, herein respondents. After due
proceedings, the RTC dismissed the petition, observing that it was for the best interest of
Azilimson that his custody remained with the respondents in Bulacan. The petitioner's MR
was denied, the RTC declared that the ruling had attained finality because the petitioner had
filed the motion for reconsideration out of time. Petitioner brought the petition for relief from
judgment to seek the nullification of RTC's aforesaid rulings, contending that his MR had
been filed on time. RTC denied the petition for relief from judgment, opining that the petition
was in the nature of a second motion for reconsideration and was, therefore, prohibited by
the Rules of Court. Petitioner assailed the dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus in the
CA via the petition for annulment of judgment on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and denial of
due process which CA dismissed, pointing out that the petition did not comply with the
conditions set for the remedy by Sec. 1 and 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court; and that the
petition suffered from other infirmities. CA also denied the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition filed
before it for Annulment of Judgment based on purely technical grounds without
even touching on the merits of the case.
2. Whether the Decision of respondent judge should be annulled under Rule 47 of
the Rules of Court based on extrinsic fraud and denial of due process.
HELD:
The court sustained the decision of CA, and opine that it correctly and justly
dismissed the petition for annulment of judgment and deemed the case closed and
terminated. First of all, a petition for annulment of judgment initiated under Rule 47 of the
Rules of Court is a remedy granted only under exceptional circumstances provided the
petitioner has failed to avail himself of the ordinary or other appropriate remedies provided
by law without fault on his part. It has often been stressed that such action is never resorted
to as a substitute for the petitioner's own neglect in not promptly availing himself of the
ordinary or other appropriate remedies. Secondly, the ground of extrinsic fraud was available
to petitioner when he initiated the petition for relief from judgment in the RTC. If he did not
raise it then, he was justifiably precluded from raising it in the CA to advocate the annulment
of the ruling of the RTC reposing the custody of his minor son in the respondents instead of
in him.

GILFREDO BACOLOD vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES


G.R. No. 206236. July 15, 2013.

DOCTRINE:
The lack or absence of direct evidence does not necessarily mean that the guilt of the
accused cannot be proved by evidence other than direct evidence. Direct evidence is not the
sole means of establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, because circumstantial evidence,
if sufficient, can supplant the absence of direct evidence.

FACTS:
Regional Trial court (RTC) in Cebu City convicted the petitioner of arson. The
petitioner submits that both the RTC and the CA erred in their appreciation of the evidence.
He insists that no witness had actually seen him set the house on fire; that the State did not
show that he had the motive to commit the arson; and that only circumstantial evidence was
presented against him, but such evidence, not being incompatible with the hypothesis
favoring his innocence, was insufficient to support a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUE:
Whether the direct evidence is necessary to prove the guilt of the accused.

HELD:
No. The crime charged may also be proved by circumstantial evidence.
Circumstantial evidence has been defined as that which "goes to prove a fact or series of
facts other than the facts in issue, which, if proved, may tend by inference to establish a fact
in issue."

Rule 133, Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides that for circumstantial evidence to
warrant the conviction of an accused it is necessary that:firstly, there are more than one
circumstance; secondly, the facts from which the circumstances arose are duly established
in court; and, thirdly, the circumstances form an unbroken chain of events leading to the fair
conclusion of the culpability of the accused for the crime for which he is convicted.
Ostensibly, the rules "make no distinction between direct evidence of a fact and evidence of
circumstances from which the existence of a fact may be inferred. No greater degree of
certainty is required when the evidence is circumstantial than when it is direct, for in either
case, the trier of fact must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the
accused.

Thus, the State's circumstantial evidence sufficed for the conviction of the petitioner.
Indeed, the unbroken chain of circumstances established from the recollections of witnesses
whose motives had not been impugned at all by the petitioner warranted no conclusion but
that the petitioner had deliberately caused the burning of the house.
PHILWORTH ASIAS, INC., SPOUSES LUISITO AND ELIZABETH MACTAL, AND
SPOUSES LUIS AND ELOISA REYES v. PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL
INTERNATIONAL BANK

G.R. No. 161878, June 05, 2013

FACTS:
On May 31, 1991, the former Philippine Commercial International Bank (PCIB) sued
petitioners in the RTC to recover upon an unpaid debt (Civil Case No. 91-1536), 2 alleging that
on September 22, 1988, petitioner Philworth Asia, Inc. (Philworth) had borrowed P270,000.00
from PCIB to be paid on or before November 8, 1988 in accordance with a promissory note;
that petitioners Spouses Luisito and Elizabeth Mactal (Mactals) and Spouses Luis and Eloisa
Reyes (Reyeses) had executed a deed of suretyship binding themselves to pay Philworth’s
obligations under the promissory note should Philworth refuse to perform its obligation; that
Philworth had paid only partially, leaving an unpaid balance of P225,533.33, inclusive of
interest and penalty charges; that Philworth had not paid its balance despite repeated
demands; and that attempts to collect from the Mactals and Reyeses had likewise failed. On
July 5, 1991, the Reyeses filed their answer with special and affirmative
defenses,3 specifically countering that PCIB had no cause of action against them; that Luis
Reyes had signed the promissory note as an employee of Philworth, but had not signed the
deed of suretyship in November 1988 because he had already resigned from Philworth on
October 16, 1988; that Luisito Mactal, the President and General Manager of Philworth,
should be the person liable under the deed of suretyship; that PCIB had not made demands
upon all the parties; and that PCIB did not exhaust all the available properties of Philworth
before bringing the suit also against them. On September 15, 1997, the RTC declared
petitioners to have waived their right to present evidence, and directed the parties to submit
their respective memoranda, after which the case would be deemed submitted for decision.
Petitioners appealed to the CA, claiming that the RTC had thereby violated their right to
substantive and procedural due process mainly due to its decision being solely based on the
evidence of PCIB The court a quo, therefore, has judiciously exercised its discretion when it
considered the defendants-appellants to have waived their right to present evidence on their
behalf and decided the case based on the evidence presented by the PCIB. The appeal is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit, and the assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against defendants-appellants.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners were denied of due process of law.

RULING:
The appeal is absolutely devoid of any merit. Parties and their counsel are enjoined to
avoid undue and excessive delay in presenting their own evidence. Their failure to obey this
injunction surely contributes to the clogging of court dockets and expands the burdens of
the entire Judiciary. It may justify a trial court into declaring them to have waived the right to
present their evidence. The permissiveness and tolerant attitude of the trial judge should not
give them the license to cause undue and excessive delay. The Court upholds the liability of
petitioners as laid down by the RTC and affirmed without modification by the CA, considering
that petitioners did not present evidence in refutation.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS ALVIN ESUGON

G.R. No. 195244; June 22, 2015

DOCTRINE:
Every child is presumed qualified to be a witness. The party challenging the child's
competency as a witness has the burden of substantiating his challenge.

FACTS:
Alvin Esugon was charged with the crime of robbery with homicide. He stabbed the
victim Josephine Castro while feloniously taking the cash that she was carrying. The
prosecution’s witness was the child Carl or Muymoy, the 5-year old son of the victim. He
testified that he saw the Alvin stab his mother and that the Alvin took his mother’s money.
RTC found Alvin guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide. Alvin contended that the
testimony of Carl should not have been admitted as he was not a credible witness and such
testimony was full of inconsistencies.

ISSUE:
Whether a 5-year old child may be considered as credible and competent witness

HELD:
YES. The qualification of a person to testify rests on the ability to relate to others
the acts and events witnessed. Under Section 20 of Rule 130, anyone who is sensible and
aware of a relevant event or incident, and can communicate such awareness, experience,
or observation to others can be a witness. Age, religion, ethnicity, gender, educational
attainment, or social status are not necessary to qualify a person to be a witness, so long
as he does not possess any of the disqualifications as listed the rules. That the witness is a
child cannot be the sole reason for disqualification. Under the Rule on Examination of a
Child Witness every child is now presumed qualified to be a witness. To rebut this
presumption, the burden of proof lies on the party challenging the child's competency.
Only when substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the child to perceive,
remember, communicate, distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell
the truth in court will the court, motu proprio or on motion of a party, conduct a
competency examination of a child.
JOSE “PEPE” SANICO VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 198753, March 25, 2015

DOCTRINE:
The failure to file the memorandum on appeal is a ground for the RTC to dismiss the
appeal only in civil cases. The same rule does not apply in criminal cases.

FACTS:
Jose Sanico and Marsito Batiquin were charged with the crime of trespassing and
theft of minerals. The MCTC found them guilty as charged. Sanico’s counsel filed an appeal.
The RTC ordered Sanico to file his memorandum of appeal. Sanico was not able to comply,
thus the RTC dismissed the appeal with prejudice. Another lawyer for Sanico filed a motion
for reconsideration stating that his failure to file such memorandum was due to the death of
his wife. RTC denied the MR, stating that his reasons were not justifiable reasons. Sanico
filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, which was also denied by the CA.

ISSUE:
Whether the failure to file a Memorandum on Appeal in criminal cases is mandatory

HELD:
NO. In dismissing the appeal for the sole reason that Sanico did not file the
memorandum on appeal, the RTC wrongly relied on the Rules of Court, which authorizes the
dismissal of the appeal once the appellant fails to file the memorandum on appeal. Rule 122
of the Rules of Court states that failure to file the memorandum on appeal is a ground for
the RTC to dismiss the appeal only in civil cases. The same rule does not apply in criminal
cases, because the Rules impose on the RTC the duty to decide the appeal "on the basis of
the entire record of the case and of such memoranda or briefs as may have been filed" upon
the submission of the appellate memoranda or briefs, or upon the expiration of the period to
file the same.
Since he perfected his appeal by filing his notice of appeal with the MCTC on time,
Sanico was entitled to expect that the RTC would resolve his appeal in due course, whether
he filed his memorandum on appeal or not. The unwarranted dismissal of the appeal by the
RTC was an outright denial of due process to him in a manner that severely prejudiced him
because his conviction was not reviewed despite his first-time appeal being a matter of
right, and because his conviction was then declared to have attained finality, causing the
execution of the decision as to its civil aspect.
RUBEN MANALANG, CARLOS MANALANG, CONCEPCION GONZALES AND
LUIS MANALANG v. BIENVENIDO AND MERCEDES BACANI

G.R. No. 156995, January 12, 2015

DOCTRINE
In the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, the RTC shall decide the appeal of the
judgment of the MTC in Unlawful Detainer or Forcible Entry cases on the basis of the entire
record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as
may be required by the RTC. There is no trial de novo or rehearing of the case.

FACTS
The Manalangs were co-owners of a lot. The adjacent lot belongs to the Bacanis. The
Manalngs caused a relocation and verification survey which showed that the Bacanis had
encroached on a portion of their lot. When respondents refused to vacate the encroached
portion and to surrender peaceful possession thereof despite demands, the Manalangs filed
an action for unlawful detainer. The MTC dismissed the civil case based on lack of
jurisdiction. RTC reversed the decision and remanded the case on appeal. MTC ultimately
dismissed the case and upon appeal, RTC ordered the Manalangs to conduct a survey to
determine their allegation of encroachment and also heard the testimony of the surveyor.

ISSUE
Whether or not RTC can, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, conduct a
relocation and verification survey of the lot in question

HELD
NO. The RTC, in an appeal of the judgment in an ejectment case, shall not conduct a
rehearing or trial de novo. Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides that the judgment or final
order shall be appealable to the appropriate RTC which shall decide the same on the basis of
the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda and/or
briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by the RTC. Hence, RTC violated the
foregoing rule by ordering the conduct of the relocation and verification survey “in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction” and by hearing the testimony of the surveyor, for its doing so was
tantamount to its holding of a trial de novo. The violation was accented by the fact that the
RTC ultimately decided the appeal based on the survey and the surveyor’s testimony instead
of the record of the proceedings had in the court of origin.
GRACE BORGONA INSIGNE, DIOSDADO BORGONA, OSBOURNE BORGONA,
IMELDA BORGONA RIVERA, AND ARISTOTLE BORGONA vs. ABRA VALLEY
COLLEGES, INC. AND FRANCIS BORGONA

G.R. No. 204089, July 29, 2015

DOCTRINE
A stock certificate is prima facie evidence that the holder is a shareholder of the
corporation, but the possession of the certificate is not the sole determining factor of one’s
stock ownership. A certificate of stock is merely the paper representative or tangible
evidence of the stock itself and of the various interests therein.

FACTS
Petitioners Grace Borgoña Insigne, Diosdado Borgoña, Osbourne Borgoña, Imelda
Borgoña Rivera, Aristotle Borgoña are siblings of the full blood. Respondent Francis Borgoña
(Francis) is their older half-blood brother. Petitioners are the children of the late Pedro
Borgoña (Pedro) by his second wife, Teresita Valeros, while Francis was Pedro’s son by his
first wife, Humvelina Avila. In his lifetime, Pedro was the founder, president and majority
stockholder of respondent Abra Valley Colleges, Inc. (Abra Valley), a stock corporation. After
Pedro’s death, Francis succeeded him as the president of Abra Valley. Petitioners filed a
complaint and damages in the RTC against Abra Valley praying that the RTC direct Abra
Valley to allow them to inspect its corporate books and records, and the minutes of
meetings, and to provide them with its financial statements. RTC rendered judgment due to
Abra Valley’s failure to file its responsive pleading. MR was subsequently denied so Abra
Valley appealed to the CA which ordered RTC to admit Abra Valley’s answer despite its
belated filing and remanding the case for further proceedings. Petitioners amended their
complaint and ellege that they were bona fide stockholders of Abra Valley. Abra Valley and
Francis filed their respective answers. Respondents filed a Motion for Preliminary Hearing of
Special and Affirmative Defenses. RTC ordered the petitioners to present their stock
certificates issued by Abra Valley under their names. Petitioners submitted their Compliance
and manifestation as well as Motion for Production/Inspection of Documents asking that the
RTC direct the respondents to produce Abra Valley’s Stock and Transfer Book. RTC issued the
assailed order dismissing the case pertinently holding that the documents presented are not
Stock Certificates as boldly announced by the plaintiff’s counsel, hence, plaintiffs failed to
comply with the order of the Court dated March 8, 2010. Hence, this case is dismissible
under Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court. Going into the merits, the Court is of the
considered opinion that the documents presented in the compliance failed to defeat the
challenge of the defendant. "A mere typewritten statement advising a stockholder of the
extent of his ownership in a corporation xxx cannot be considered a formal Certificate of
Stock".

ISSUE
Whether or not the RTC properly dismissed the case on the ground of the petitioners’
failure to comply with the order issued by the RTC to produce stock certificates. In other
words, the Court should determine whether or not the petitioners were bona fide
stockholders of Abra Valley.

HELD
Under the circumstances, the dismissal of Special Civil Action Case No. 2070 on June
28, 2010 on the basis that "the documents presented are not Stock Certificates as boldly
announced by the plaintiff’s counsel, hence, plaintiffs failed to comply with the order of the
Court dated March 8, 2010" was unwarranted and unreasonable. Although Section 3, Rule 17
of the Rules of Court expressly empowers the trial court to dismiss the complaint motu
proprio or upon motion of the defendant if, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to
comply with any order of the court, the power to dismiss is not to wielded indiscriminately,
but only when the non-compliance constitutes a willful violation of an order of consequence
to the action. Dismissal of the action can be grossly oppressive if it is based on
noncompliance with the most trivial order of the court considering that the dismissal
equates to "an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the court." A line
of demarcation must be drawn between an order whose non-compliance impacts on the
case, and an order whose noncompliance causes little effect on the case. For example, the
non-compliance of an order to the plaintiff to amend his complaint to implead an
indispensable party as defendant should be sanctioned with dismissal with prejudice unless
the non-compliance was upon justifiable cause, like such party not within the jurisdiction of
the court. As we have seen, however, the dismissal of Special Civil Action Case No. 2070 by
virtue of Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court should be undone because the petitioners’
production of the stock certificates was rendered superfluous by their submission of other
competent means of establishing their shareholdings in Abra Valley.
FYFE v PHILIPPINE AIRLINES

G.R. No. 160071. June 6, 2016.

DOCTRINE:
Appeal as a remedy is not a matter of right, but a mere statutory privilege to be
exercised only in the manner and strictly in accordance with the provisions of the law.

FACTS:
Philippine Airlines Inc (PAL) underwent rehabilitation proceedings in the Securities
Exchange Commission (SEC). To convince its creditors, they decided to hire technical
advisers. Peter Foster of Cathay Pacific and Michael Scantlebury organized Regent Star
Services Ltd. (Regent Star). Regent Star and PAL entered into a Technical Services
Agreement (TSA) effective for five years. Regent Star subsequently engaged with Fyfe, Wald
and Nuttall and commenced to render their services immediately after the TSA was
executed. PAL dispatched a notice to Regent Star terminating the TSA on the ground of lack
of confidence. In its notice the respondent demanded the offsetting of the penalties due with
the two year advance advisory fees it had paid to Regent Star. Regent Star proposed that
the issue be submitted to arbitration with the Philippine Dispute Resolution Center Inc
(PDRCI) pursuant to the TSA. PDRCI rendered judgment ordering PAL to pay the termination
penalties. PAL filed its application to Vacate Arbitral Award in the RTC of Manila.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing their appeal for being an inappropriate
remedy that a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is the sole remedy?

HELD:
No. The CA emphasized that the petitioners should have led the petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 considering that Section 29 of the Arbitration Law has limited the
ground of review to "questions of law." Although the Special Rules of Court on Alternative
Dispute Resolution provides that the appropriate remedy from an order of the RTC vacating a
domestic arbitral award is an appeal by petition for review in the CA, not an ordinary appeal
under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, the Court cannot set aside and reverse the assailed
decision on that basis because the decision was in full accord with the law or rule in force at
the time of its promulgation.
SPOUSES BENITO BAYSA and VICTORIA BAYSA vs. SPOUSES FIDEL
PLANTILLA and SUSAN PLANTILLA, REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY,
and THE SHERIFF OF QUEZON CITY

G.R. No. 159271, July 13, 2015

DOCTRINE:
To enable the extra judicial foreclosure of the REM of the petitioners, the special
power to sell should have been either inserted in the REM itself or embodied in a separate
instrument attached to the REM. The omission of the special power to sell the property
subject of the mortgage was fatal to the validity and efficacy of the extrajudicial foreclosure,
and warranted the invalidation of the entire proceedings conducted by the sheriff.

FACTS
The case involves a real estate mortgage (REM) entered into by the petitioners
involving their parcel of land in Cubao, Quezon City to secure the payment of their obligation
amounting to P2.3 Million in favor of the respondent spouses. Based on the terms of the
REM, the petitioners agreed to pay interest on the principal amount. Upon the default of the
petitioners, the respondent spouses commenced the extrajudicial foreclosure of the REM to
recover from the petitioners their total liability. The petitioners sued the respondent spouses
in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Quezon City to annul the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
REM and the public auction conducted pursuant to the extrajudicial foreclosure. They alleged
that all the proceedings relevant to the extrajudicial foreclosure were null and void, pointing
out that there had been no power or authority to sell inserted in the REM or attached thereto
as required by Section 1 Act No. 3135; and that the interest rate of 8% was unconscionable
and violative of the Anti-Usury Law.

ISSUE
Whether or not the extrajudicial foreclosure is valid despite the lack of provision in
the mortgage deed granting special power to sell to the mortgagee?

HELD
No, to enable the extra judicial foreclosure of the REM of the petitioners, the special
power to sell should have been either inserted in the REM itself or embodied in a separate
instrument attached to the REM. But it is not disputed that no special power to sell was
either inserted in the REM or attached to the REM. Hence, the respondent spouses as the
foreclosing mortgagees could not initiate the extrajudicial foreclosure, but must resort to
judicial foreclosure pursuant to the procedure set forth in Rule 68 of the Rules of Court. The
omission of the special power to sell the property subject of the mortgage was fatal to the
validity and efficacy of the extrajudicial foreclosure, and warranted the invalidation of the
entire proceedings conducted by the sheriff.
CHARLIE TE vs. HON. AUGUSTO V. BREVA
G.R. No. 164974, August 05, 2015

DOCTRINE
the sworn application for the search warrant and the search warrant itself were upon
the behest of the People of the Philippines. The immutable truth is that every search warrant
is applied for and issued by and under the authority of the State, regardless of who initiates
its application or causes its issuance.

FACTS
It appears that respondent Presiding Judge issued a search warrant against the
petitioner upon the application of respondent Special Investigator U R. Bahinting on the
basis of his finding of probable cause for a violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 33 for hoarding
large quantities of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) in steel cylinders belonging to respondent
Pryce Gases, Inc. (Pryce Gases). The application for the search warrant was filed at the
instance of Pryce Gases to the NBI SARDO complaining about the collection and hoarding by
the petitioner of embossed or name-plated Pryce Gases' LPG cylinders in violation of the
Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines. Respondent Presiding Judge denied the
petitioner's Omnibus Motion to Quash Warrant and/or Suppress Evidence and to Order
Return of Seized Items on several grounds. Upon reaching the CA, the latter dismissed the
case for failure to implead the People of the Philippines as a respondent, an alleged
indispensable party to the case.

ISSUE
Whether or not the failure to implead the People of the Philippines as an
indispensable party is a fatal defect?

HELD
Yes, impleading the People of the Philippines in the petition for certiorari did not
depend on whether or not an actual criminal action had already been commenced in court
against the petitioner. It cannot be denied that the search warrant in question had been
issued in the name of the People of the Philippines, and that fact rendered the latter
indispensable parties in the special civil action for certiorari brought to nullify the questioned
orders of respondent Presiding Judge. We also note that the impleading is further expressly
demanded in Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court. Accordingly, the omission of the
People of the Philippines from the petition was fatal. Equally clear is that the sworn
application for the search warrant and the search warrant itself were upon the behest of the
People of the Philippines. It defies logic and common sense for the petitioner to contend,
therefore, that the application against him was not made by the People of the Philippines but
by the interested party or parties. The immutable truth is that every search warrant is
applied for and issued by and under the authority of the State, regardless of who initiates its
application or causes its issuance.
GUILLERMO SALVADOR v. PATRICIA, INC.

G.R. No. 195834, November 09, 2016

FACTS:

This is an action for injunction and quieting of title to determine who owns the
property occupied by the plaintiffs and intervenor, Ciriano C. Mijares. The complaint was
amended to include different branches of the Metropolitan Trial Courts of Manila. A
Complaint-in-Intervention was filed by the City of Manila as owner of the land occupied by
the plaintiffs. All parties agreed and admitted in evidence by stipulation as to the
authenticity of the Transfer Certificates of Title of both Patricia Inc. and the City of Manila are
admitted as genuine.

To resolve the question as to the boundaries based on the description in the respective
titles.the RTC appointed, three geodetic engineers as commissioners,RTC rendered judgment
in favor of the petitioners . The RTC deemed it more sound to side with two of the
commissioners who had found that the land belonged to the City of Manila. The CA reversed
the rtc decision, declaring that the petitioners were without the necessary interest, either
legal or equitable title, to maintain a suit for quieting of title; opined that the RTC should
have conducted hearings on the reports of the commissioners; ruled as highly improper the
adjudication of the boundary dispute in an action for quieting of title. The CA denied the
motions for reconsideration of the petitioners Hence, this appeal by the petitioners.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners are real parties in interest

HELD:

Jurisdiction over a real action is determined based on the allegations in the


complaint of the assessed value of the property involved. The silence of the
complaint on such value is ground to dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction
because the trial court is not given the basis for making the determination.

The petitioners did not show that they were real parties in interest to demand
either injunction or quieting of title, the petitioners failed to allege and prove
their interest to maintain the suit. Hence, the dismissal of this cause of action
was warranted. The petitioners did not claim ownership of the land itself, and did not show
their authority or other legal basis on which they had anchored their alleged lawful
occupation and superior possession of the property. On the contrary, they only contended
that their continued possession of the property had been for more than 30 years; that they
had built their houses in good faith; and that the area had been declared an Area for Priority
Development under Presidential Decree No. 1967, as amended. Yet, none of such reasons
validly clothed them with the necessary interest to maintain the action for quieting of title.
as alleged in the respondent's comments,which they did not deny, they had been lessees of
Patricia, Inc. Such circumstances indicated that they had no claim to possession in good
faith, their occupation not being in the concept of owners.
HEIRS OF PRODON VS. HEIRS OF ALVAREZ

GR No. 170604, September 2, 2013

DOCTRINE
The Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of a writing are in issue. When
the evidence sought to be introduced concerns external facts, such as the existence,
execution or delivery of the writing, without reference to its terms, the Best Evidence Rule
cannot be invoked. In such a case, secondary evidence may be admitted even without
accounting for the original.

FACTS
Prodon claimed that the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had executed the deed of sale with
right to repurchase on September 9, 1975 and that she then become the absolute owner of
the property. However, the heirs of Alvarez contended that they could not find the owner’s
duplicate copy of the deed, and that the entry of the deed of sale with right to repurchase
did not exist. The custodian of the records of the property attested that the said copy of the
deed of sale could not be found in their files. RTC ruled in favor of Prodon stating that the
contents of the deed of sale could be proved by secondary evidence in accordance with
Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. CA reversed the decision, as evidence on record
showed that Maximo Alvarez was hospitalized between August 23, 1975 to September 3,
1975, and was again hospitalized and died on October of 1975 without having left the
hospital.

ISSUE
Whether or not the Best Evidence Rule applies in an action for quieting of title based
on the inexistence of a deed of sale with right to repurchase.

HELD
NO, the CA and the RTC both misapplied the Best Evidence Rule to this case. This
action does not involve the terms or contents of the deed of sale with right to repurchase.
The principal issue was whether or not the deed of sale with right to repurchase, duly
executed by the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr., had really existed. The Best Evidence Rule was not
applicable because the terms of the deed of sale with right to repurchase were not the issue.
The lower court should have simply addressed and determined whether or not the
"existence" and "execution" of the deed as the facts in issue had been proved by
preponderance of evidence. The presentation of evidence other than the original document,
like the testimonies of Prodon and Jose Camilon, the Notarial Register of Notary Eliseo Razon,
and the Primary Entry Book of the Register of Deeds, would have sufficed even without first
proving the loss or unavailability of the original of the deed.
JOSE VS JAVELLANA

GR 158239 January 31, 2012

DOCTRINE:
The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate
special civil action under Rule 65, provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without
or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Then is certiorari under Rule 65
allowed to be resorted to.

FACTS:
Margarita sold to Javellana land for a consideration. They agreed that Javellana would
pay half upon the execution of the deed and the other half upon the registration of the
parcels of land under the Torrens System and that should Margarita become incapacitated,
her son and attorney-in-fact and her daughter, petitioner Priscilla M. Alma Jose, would
receive the payment of the balance and proceed with the application for registration.
Margarita and the Atty in fact died, and vendors undertaking fell on Priscilla. Priscilla did not
comply with the undertaking and instead began to improve the land. Javallena filed an
action for specific performance, injunction and damages. Priscilla filed a motion to dismiss.
RTC denied the motion to dismiss but reversed this decision in the motion for
reconsideration. Javallena filed a motion for reconsideration with the RTC but was denied for
lack of any reason to disturb. Javallena filed a notice of appeal to RTC which was elevated to
the CA.

ISSUE:
w/n the motion for reconsideration was a final or interlocutory order

HELD:
The denial of a motion for reconsideration of an order granting the defending party’s
motion to dismiss is not an interlocutory but a final order because it puts an end to the
particular matter involved, or settles definitely the matter therein disposed of, as to leave
nothing for the trial court to do other than to execute the order. Accordingly, the claiming
party has a fresh period of 15 days from notice of the denial within which to appeal the
denial. The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well known. The
first disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or
action, leaving nothing more to be done except to enforce by execution what the court has
determined, but the latter does not completely dispose of the case but leaves something
else to be decided upon. An interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and the trial
on the merits is yet to be held and the judgment rendered. The test to ascertain whether
or not an order or a judgment isinterlocutory or final is: does the order or judgment leave
something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, the
order or judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final. And, secondly, whether an order is
final or interlocutory determines whether appeal is the correct remedy or not. A final order is
appealable, to accord with the final judgment rule enunciated in Section 1, Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court to the effect that “appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that
completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these
Rules to be appealable;”[23] but the remedy from an interlocutory one is not an appeal but a
special civil action for certiorari. The explanation for the differentiation of remedies given in
Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo is apt: The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an
appeal is an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65, provided that the interlocutory
order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Then
is certiorari under Rule 65 allowed to be resorted to.
MOMARCO IMPORT CO., INC. V. VILLAMENA,

G.R. No. 192477, July 27, 2016

DOCTRINE

To declare the defendant in default,: (1) plaintiff must file a motion; (2) defendant
must be notified of the motion; (3) plaintiff must prove that the defending party failed to
answer the complaint within the period provided.

FACTS

Plaintiff filed a motion to declare defendant in default despite the filing of defendant’s
counsel of an Entry of Appearance. Nonetheless, defendant filed its Answer with
Counterclaim which denied the allegations in the complaint. Subsequently, the petitioner
was declared in default, and its answer was ordered stricken from the records. RTC allowed
the respondent to present plaintiff’s evidence ex parte and rendered the judgment in favor
of plaintiff. CA confirmed the RTC decision.

ISSUE
Whether or not the RTC was correct in ordering its answer stricken off the records;
in allowing the respondent to adduce her evidence ex parte; and in rendering the default
judgment based on such evidence.

HELD

Yes. The court ruled that the filing of the formal entry of appearance indicated that,
as it was not for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the trial court, constituted the
petitioner's voluntary appearance in the action, which was the equivalent of the service of
summons.

Under ROC, all the requisites to declare the defendant in default existed, hence, RTC
appropriately directed the answer filed to be stricken from the records and declared the
petitioner in default. The petitioner's logical remedy was to have moved for the lifting of the
declaration of its default, but despite notice it did not do the same. However, while the
courts should avoid orders of default, and should be, as a rule, liberal in setting aside orders
of default, they could not ignore the abuse of procedural rules by litigants like the petitioner,
who only had themselves to blame.
PEOPLE V. VILLAFLORES Y OLANO

Gr No.184926 April 11, 2012

DOCTRINE:
Circumstantial evidence is admissible as proof to establish both the
commission of a crime and the identity of the culprit.

FACTS:
The lifeless body of a 5-year old child, Marita was discovered by her father,
Manito beside a toilet bowl at an unoccupied house. She was covered with a blue
sack with her face bloodied and her body soaked with blood. He found a yellow sack
under her head and a white rope around her neck. 2 witnesses, Aldrin Bautista and
Jovie Solidum, came forward and narrated that they saw Edmundo Villaflores, known
as “Batman”, leading Marita by the hand. At about noon time they were at Batman’s
house where they used shabu for a while. While in Batman’s place, although he did
not see Marita, Jovie presumed that Batman was hiding the child at the back of the
house. Jovie related that he heard cries of a child as he passed by the house of
Batman. Jovie then saw again Batman carrying a yellow sack towards a vacant
house. He thought that the child must have been in the sack because it appeared
heavy. The wife of the accused narrated that she saw the sack filled with something
but when she asked her husband, he said it was nothing. She looked at the sack and
she saw a protruding elbow inside it.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the guilt of Villaflores for rape with homicide was established
beyond reasonable doubt through circumstantial evidence?

HELD:
Yes. The State must thus prove the concurrence of the following facts,:
(a) that Villaflores had carnal knowledge of Marita; (b) that he consummated
the carnal knowledge without the consent of Marita; and (c) that he killed
Marita by reason of the rape. Rules of Court also allows circumstantial
evidence to establish the commission of the crime as well as the identity of
the culprit. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:(a) There is
more than one circumstance;(b) The facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such
as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. RTC and the CA
considered several circumstances, which when appreciated together
,according to the CA, were seen as strands which create a pattern when
interwoven, and formed an unbroken chain that led to the reasonable
conclusion that Villaflores, to the exclusion of all others, was guilty of rape
with homicide.
POWER SECTOR ASSETS AND LIABILITIES MGMT. CORP. (PSALM) vs. CA and
LABAO

G.R. No. 194226, February 15, 2017

DOCTRINE
No person who has not been impleaded and duly served with the summons should be
adversely affected by the outcome of the action.

FACTS
National Power Corp. (NPC) set a public bidding for the security package in NPC
MinGen. Among the bidders was San Miguel Protective Security Agency (SMPSA),
represented by Labao. However, NPC's Bids and Awards Committee disqualified SMPSA for
its alleged failure to meet the equipage requirements. Labao thus brought a petition for
certiorari against NPC and its officials in the Lanao del Norte RTC. The court issued a TRO
and a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining NPC and its officials from awarding the security
package and from declaring a failure of bidding. Meanwhile, NPC and PSALM entered into an
agreement whereby the latter, as owner of all assets of NPC, had the obligation to provide
for the security of all the plants and other facilities. PSALM conducted a public bidding of its
own for the security package of NPC MinGen. PSALM received the TRO issued by the CA.
Despite the fact that PSALM was not a party in the case brought by Labao against NPC, and
that PSALM was not furnished a copy of Labao's Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a TRO
and/or Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction, the CA issued the assailed resolution granting the
TRO to maintain the status quo, and expressly included PSALM as subject of the writ.

ISSUE
Whether or not the CA acted in excess of its jurisdiction in holding PSALM bound by
the decision of the lower court although it was not a party to the case between private
respondents NPC and Labao.

HELD
Yes, the CA exceeded its jurisdiction in including PSALM within the coverage of the
TRO and the writ of injunction issued against NPC. Labao was quite aware that PSALM
became the owner as early as mid-2001 of all of NPC's existing generation assets, liabilities,
IPP contracts, real estate and all other disposable assets, as well as all facilities of NPC, NPC-
MinGen being among them. As such owner, PSALM was an indispensible party without whom
no final determination could be had if it was not joined. An indispensable party is one who
has such an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be
made in its absence without injuring or affecting that interest. As such, Labao should have
impleaded PSALM in the proceedings in the RTC, or the RTC should have itself seen to PSALM
's inclusion as an indispensable party.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. REYES - BAKUNAWA

G.R. No. 180418, August 28, 2013

DOCTRINE:
Under the rule on preponderance of evidence, the court is instructed to find for and
to dismiss the case against the defendant should the scales hang in equipoise and there is
nothing in the evidence that tilts the scales to one or the other side. The plaintiff who had
the burden of proof has failed to establish its case, and the parties are no better off than
before they proceeded upon their litigation. In that situation, the court should leave the
parties as they are.

FACTS:
Respondent Luz Reyes-Bakunawa had served as Imelda Marcos' Social Secretary
during the Marcos administration; that it was during that period of her incumbency in that
position that Luz Bakunawa and her husband Manuel Bakunawa had acquired assets, funds
and other property grossly and manifestly disproportionate to her salaries and their other
lawful income; and that Luz Bakunawa, "by herself and/or in unlawful concert with
Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, taking undue advantage of her
position, influence and connection with the latter Defendant spouses, for their benefit and
unjust enrichment and in order to prevent disclosure and recovery of assets illegally
obtained, engaged in devices, schemes and stratagems.”

ISSUE:
Whether or not the quantum of proof required to prove petitioner’s case against the
Bakunawas is mere preponderance of evidence

RULING:
No. The Bakunawas filed a motion to dismiss, by which they specifically demurred to
the evidence adduced against them. A demurrer to evidence is an objection by one of the
parties in an action to the effect that the evidence that his adversary produced, whether
true or not, is insufficient in point of law to make out a case or to sustain the issue. The
demurring party thereby challenges the sufficiency of the whole evidence to sustain a
judgment. The court, in passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence, is required merely to
ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or
claim, or to support a verdict of guilt or liability. Moreover, although the evidence of the
plaintiff may be stronger than that of the defendant, there is no preponderance of evidence
on the plaintiff's side if its evidence alone is insufficient to establish its cause of action.
Similarly, when only one side is able to present its evidence, and the other side demurs to
the evidence, a preponderance of evidence can result only if the plaintiff's evidence is
sufficient to establish the cause of action. For this purpose, the sheer volume of the
evidence presented by one party cannot tip the scales in its favour. Quality, not quantity, is
the primordial consideration in evaluating evidence.
DIAZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND LEVI STRAUSS [PHILS.], INC.
G.R. No. 180677, February 18, 2013

DOCTRINE
The failure to serve and file the required number of copies of the appellant's brief
within the time provided by the Rules of Court does not have the immediate effect of
causing the outright dismissal of the appeal. The CA has the discretion to dismiss the appeal
on that basis or to still allow the appeal to proceed when the circumstances so warrant its
liberality.

FACTS:
The Department of Justice filed 2 Informations charging Diaz with violation of the
Intellectual Property Code. Diaz was alleged to be selling counterfeit LEVI'S 501 jeans in his
tailoring shops. Diaz admitted being the owner of the shops searched, but he denied any
criminal liability. RTC found Diaz guilty. Diaz filed an appeal. However, the CA dismissed such
appeal on the ground that Diaz had not filed his appellant's brief on time despite being
granted his requested several extension periods.

ISSUE:
Whether the CA correctly dismissed the appeal on the ground of late filling of
appellant’s brief

RULING:
YES. Diaz's counsel thrice sought an extension of the period to file the appellant's
brief. Notwithstanding the liberality of the CA, the counsel did not comply and filed the
appellant's brief only on the 18th day beyond the third extension period granted. The failure
to file the appellant's brief on time rightly deserved the outright rejection of the appeal. The
acts of his counsel bound Diaz like any other client. It was, of course, only the counsel who
was well aware that the Rules of Court fixed the periods to file pleadings and equally
significant papers like the appellant's brief with the lofty objective of avoiding delays in the
administration of justice. However, despite the CA being right in dismissing the excuses of
oversight and excusable negligence tendered by Diaz's counsel to justify the belated filing of
the appellant's brief as unworthy of serious consideration, Diaz should not be made to suffer
the dire consequence. Hence, the SC was impelled to look beyond the technicality and delve
into the merits of the case.
BALINDONG vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 177600, October 19, 2015

DOCTRINE:
Any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged
in or excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon
motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court.

FACTS
A shooting incident took place which resulted to the death of Dante Limbona and
Ante Maguindanao, and the serious wounding of Azis Panda and Kiri Hadji Salik. In the
course of the preliminary investigation, the investigating prosecutor found probable cause
to charge private respondents with Double Murder with Multiple Frustrated Murder. The
Information was thereupon filed. However, after reinvestigation, the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor downgraded the charges against private respondents and dropped the charges
against the other respondents. Private complainant Zenaida Limbona, the widow of Dante
Limbona, filed a petition for review questioning the Provincial Prosecutor's Resolution
before the DOJ. Then DOJ Secretary modified the assailed resolution and directed the
Provincial Prosecutor to file instead 2 Informations for frustrated murder with attempted
murder, 2 Informations for frustrated murder and an information for attempted murder
against private respondents.

ISSUE:
Whether the accused are precluded from invoking Sec 14, Rule 110 of the laws on
Criminal Procedure

HELD:
YES. Any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense
charged in or excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only
upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court.
The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall
be furnished all parties, especially the offended party. If it appears at any time before
judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court shall
dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the
proper offense in accordance with section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused would not be
placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for their
appearance at the trial.
REVALDO VS. PEOPLE

GR NO. 170589, April 16, 2009

DOCTRINE
The plain view doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law
enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in
a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in
plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he
observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The law
enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from
which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came
inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open
to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent.

FACTS
Petitioner was charged with the offense of illegal possession of premium hardwood
lumber (96.14 board ft.) in violation of Section 68 of the Forestry Code. Upon arraignment,
petitioner, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty. Trial was ensued. The prosecution
presented SPO4 Maceda, Saguing, and Lasala as witnesses. Maceda testified that they went
to the petitioner’s house without a warrant of arrest to verify the report. They confiscated 20
pieces of lumber lying around the house of the petitioner. Maceda asked petitioner who the
owner of the lumber was and petitioner replied that he owned the lumber and stated that he
would use the lumber to repair his house and to make furniture for sale. RTC ruled that the
Forestry Code is a special law where criminal intent is not necessary, petitioner appealed to
the CA and ruled that motive or intention is immaterial for the reason that mere possession
of the lumber without legal documents give rise to criminal liability.

ISSUE
Whether or not the evidence obtained without search warrant is admissible in court

HELD
There is no question that the police officers went to the house of petitioner because
of the information relayed by Sunit that petitioner had in his possession illegally cut lumber.
When the police officers arrived at the house of petitioner, the lumber was lying around the
vicinity of petitioners house. The lumber was in plain view. Under the plain view doctrine,
objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that
view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.
SPOUSES PASCUAL vs. FIRST CONSOLIDATED RURAL BANK (BOHOL)

GR No. 202597 FEBRUARY 8, 2017

DOCTRINE:
Pre-Trial is mandatory, under Section 6 Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, whereby the
failure of the plaintiff to appear would mean dismissal of the action with prejudice. The filing
of a pre-trial brief has the same import.

FACTS:
Petitioners filed a petition for annulment of judgment in the Court of Appeals in order
to nullify and set aside the decision rendered in Special Proceedings Case. Court of appeals
scheduled the preliminary conference after the responsive pleadings to the petition were
filed. CA also ordered the parties to file their respective pre-trial briefs. But instead of filing,
the petitioners filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and a Motion to Hold Pre-Trial in
Abeyance. At the scheduled preliminary conference, the petitioners and their counsel did not
appear. CA promulgated the first assailed resolution dismissing the petition for annulment of
judgment. Instead of complying, petitioners filed twin motions, averring that it behoves us to
rule first on their motions before pre-trial could be conducted.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners can validly insist that CA should have resolved their
Motion for Summary Judgment before holding the pre-trial

RULING:
No. The contentions of the petitioners have no merit. The Supreme Court ruled that
filing of the motion for summary judgment may be done prior to pre-trial. To be clear, the
rule only spells out that unless the motion for such judgment has earlier been filed the pre-
trial may be the occasion in which the court considers the propriety of rendering judgment
on the pleadings or summary judgment. If no motion was earlier filed, the pre-trial judge
may then indicate to the proper party to initiate the rendition of such judgment by filing the
necessary motion.
The pre-trial judge cannot motu proprio render the judgment on the pleadings or
summary judgment. In the case of the motion for summary judgment, the adverse party is
entitled to counter the motion. Moreover, petitioners cannot validly insist that the CA should
have resolved first their Motion for Summary Judgment before holding the pre-trial. They
could not use the inaction on their motion to justify nonappearance with their counsel at the
pre-trial, as well as their inability to file their pre-trial brief. In that regard, their appearance
at the pre-trial with their counsel is mandatory.

The court affirms the assailed resolutions of the Court of Appeals.


BERLINDA ORIBELLO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 163504, August 05, 2015

DOCTRINE:
The validity of the adoption decree should not be assailed in an action for partition.
The RTC do not have the jurisdiction to determine or to review the validity of the decree of
adoption issued by the CFI by virtue of the equal rank and category between the RTC and
the CFI. The proper court with jurisdiction to do so is the Court of Appeals.

FACTS:
An action for partition and damages involving parcels of land under the name of
Toribio Oribello was filed before the RTC by Remedios Oribello. According to Remedios, she is
an adopted daughter of Toribio and his first wife, Emilia. Toribio’s second wife, Berlinda
Oribello denied that Remedios is an adopted daughter of Toribio. She averred that the
adoption decree was fraudulently secured by Remedios’ natural father.
RTC dismissed the action for partition and ruled that Remedios Oribello is not a co-
owner of the properties. On appeal, the CA set aside the decision of the RTC. It remanded
the case for the second phase of a partition suit without prejudice to the filing of either a
petition for relief from the decree of adoption or an action for annulment thereof. The CA
pointed out that even if the adoption proceedings had suffered from infirmities, the RTC did
not have the authority to annul the adoption decree and to dismiss the complaint for
partition for that reason.

ISSUE:
Whether the RTC has the authority to annul the adoption decree in the complaint for
partition

HELD:
NO. The validity of the adoption decree in favor of the respondent should not be
assailed in an action for partition. The RTC do not have the jurisdiction to determine or to
review the validity of the decree of adoption issued by the CFI of Occidental Mindoro by
virtue of the equal rank and category between the RTC and the CFI. The proper court with
jurisdiction to do so was the CA, which has been vested by Section 9 of BP 129 with the
exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for the annulment of the judgments of the RTC. No
court has the authority to nullify the judgments or processes of another court of equal rank
and category, having the equal power to grant the reliefs sought.
Also, the judgment or final order of a court of law can be set aside only through a
direct attack commenced in the court of competent jurisdiction. For this reason, any attack
in this action for partition against the validity of the adoption decree issued by the CFI of
Occidental Mindoro cannot be permitted because such would constitute a collateral attack
against the judgment in the adoption.
GILDA JARDELEZA vs. SPOUSES MELECIO

G.R. No. 167975, June 17, 2015

DOCTRINE
The jurisdiction of the RTC as a probate court relates only to matters having to do
with the settlement of the estate and probate of a will of a deceased person, and does not
extend to the determination of a question of ownership that arises during the proceedings.

FACTS:
Spouses Gilda and Ernesto Jardeleza commenced a Civil Case against Spouses
Melecio and Elizabeth Jardeleza, JMB Traders and Teodoro Jardeleza before the RTC.
Ernesto died. Administration proceedings were commenced before another RTC
branch, (herein Probate Court), and Teodoro was appointed as the administrator of the
estate. Teodoro, in his capacity as the administrator, filed a motion to dismiss the Civil Case
on the ground that Melecio is also an heir of Ernesto. Thus, the properties subject of the
action for reconveyance should be considered as "advances in the inheritance”. He averred
that the claim for reconveyance should be heard in the Administration Proceedings.
The court granted the Motion to Dismiss.
Gilda sought reconsideration, arguing that she had a personal cause of action of her
own distinct from that of Ernesto; that she neither signed nor consented to the dismissal of
the Civil Case; and that Teodoro should have first sought the approval of intestate court
considering that the estate could potentially recover properties belonging to it. The MR was
denied.

ISSUE:
Whether the RTC as probate court has jurisdiction to determine questions of
ownership

HELD:
NO. The jurisdiction of the RTC as a probate court relates only to matters having to do
with the settlement of the estate and probate of a will of a deceased person, and does not
extend to the determination of a question of ownership that arises during the proceedings.
Except:
1. The claimants to the property are all heirs of the deceased and they agree to submit the
question for determination by the probate or administration court and the interests of third
parties are not prejudiced
2. The purpose is to determine whether or not certain properties should be included in the
inventory but the determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final
decision in a separate action to resolve title by a court of competent jurisdiction.

The RTC, in dismissing the civil case, evaded its responsibility to decide the issue of
ownership and in letting the probate court decide the same. It did not consider that any
decision that the probate court would render on the title and on whether or not property
should be included or excluded from the inventory of the assets of the estate would at best
be merely provisional in character, and would yield to a final determination in a separate
action.
FORTUNE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

G.R. No. 213525 (Resolution), [January 27, 2015])

DOCTRINE:
The filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if allowed under the procedural
rules of the Commission concerned, interrupts the period; hence, should the motion be
denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, which shall not
be less than five days in any event, reckoned from the notice of denial.

FACTS:
The case sprung from the denial of COA to grant payment of the life insurance
procured for the qualified barangay secretaries, treasurers and tanod of the respondent
Provincial Government of Antique from the respondents Fortune Life Insurance Company.
Consequently, the petitioner filed its petition for money claim with the COA. On November
15, 2012, the COA issued its decision denying the petition. The petitioner received a copy of
the COA decision on December 14, 2012, and filed its motion for reconsideration on January
14, 2013. However, the COA denied the motion, the denial being received by the petitioner
on July 14, 2014. Hence, the petitioner filed the petition for certiorari on August 12, 2014,
but the petition for certiorari was dismissed through the resolution promulgated on August
19, 2014 for (a) the late filing of the petition; (b) the non-submission of the proof of service
and verified declaration; and (c) the failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the respondents.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for certiorari was filed within the reglementary period
following the fresh period rule enunciated in Neypes v. Court of Appeals

HELD:
The filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if allowed under the procedural
rules of the Commission concerned, interrupts the period; hence, should the motion be
denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, which shall not
be less than five days in any event, reckoned from the notice of denial. The petitioner filed
its motion for reconsideration on January 14, 2013, which was 31 days after receiving the
assailed decision of the COA on December 14, 2012. Pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 64, it had
only five days from receipt of the denial of its motion for reconsideration to file the petition.
Considering that it received the notice of the denial on July 14, 2014, it had only until July 19,
2014 to file the petition. However, it filed the petition on August 13, 2014, which was 25
days too late.
FERNANDO MEDICAL ENTERPRISES VS. WESLEYAN UNIVESRSITY OF THE
PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 207970. January 20, 2016

DOCTRINE:
The trial court may render a judgment on the pleadings upon motion of the claiming
party when the defending party's answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the
material allegations of the adverse party's pleading. For that purpose, only the pleadings of
the parties in the action are considered.

FACTS:
Petitioner alleged that the respondent still has an unpaid sum for the delivered and
installed medical equipment and supplies at the respondent's hospital. The petitioner and
the respondent subsequently entered into an agreement whereby to reduce its claim to only
P50,400,000.00, payable in 36 months. In the letter, the respondent notified the petitioner
that the contracts were defective and rescissible due to economic prejudice or lesion; and
that it was consequently declining to recognize the agreement. The petitioner sent a
demand letter to the respondent. Due to the respondent's failure to pay as demanded, the
petitioner filed its complaint for sum of money in the RTC. The respondent moved to dismiss
the complaint. RTC denied the motion to dismiss. The respondent filed its answer. The
petitioner filed its Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings. The respondent opposed the
Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings, arguing that it had specifically denied the
material allegations in the complaint. The RTC denied the motion for judgment. The CA ruled
that a judgment on the pleadings would be improper because the outstanding balance due
to the petitioner remained to be an issue in the face of the allegations of the respondent in
its complaint for rescission in the RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in going outside of the respondent's answer by
relying on the allegations contained in the latter's complaint for rescission .

HELD:
Yes, the Court of Appeals erred in going outside of the respondent's answer by
relying on the allegations contained in the latter's complaint for rescission. In order to
resolve the petitioner's Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings, the trial court could
rely only on the answer of the respondent filed in Civil Case No. 09-122116. Under Section 1,
Rule 34 of the Rules of Court, the answer was the sole basis for ascertaining whether the
complaint's material allegations were admitted or properly denied. As such, the respondent's
averment of payment of the total of P78,401,650.00 to the petitioner made in its complaint
for rescission had no relevance to the resolution of the Motion for Judgment Based on the
Pleadings.
GACAL VS. INFANTE
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1845, [October 5, 2011], 674 PHIL 324-343)

DOCTRINE:
A hearing upon notice is mandatory before the grant of bail, whether bail is a matter
of right or discretion.

FACTS:
Judge Balanag of MTC Sarangani issued a warrant for the arrest of Ancheta in
connection with a murder case, without recommendation for bail. Upon review, the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor, affirmed the findings and recommendation of Judge Balanag on
the offense to be charged, and accordingly filed in the RTC an information for murder but
with a recommendation for bail. The criminal case was raffled to Judge Infante's Branch.
Judge Infante issued twin orders, one granting bail to Ancheta, and another releasing
Ancheta from custody. Atty. Gacal, upon learning of the twin orders issued by Judge Infante,
filed a so-called Very Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. Atty. Gacal appeared as private
prosecutor with authority. With that, Atty. Gacal moved for the reconsideration of the grant
of bail to Ancheta. The public prosecutor filed a comment, stating that he had recommended
bail as a matter of course; that the orders dated April 23, 2003 approving bail upon his
recommendation and releasing the accused were proper; and that his recommendation of
bail was in effect a waiver of the public prosecutor's right to a bail hearing.

ISSUE:
Whether or not bail hearing was mandatory.

HELD:
The willingness of Judge Infante to rely on the mere representation of the public
prosecutor that his grant of bail upon the public prosecutor's recommendation had been
proper, and that his (public prosecutor) recommendation of bail had in effect waived the
need for a bail hearing perplexes the Court. Judge Infante apparently acted as if the
requirement for the bail hearing was a merely minor rule to be dispensed with. Although, in
theory, the only function of bail is to ensure the appearance of the accused at the time set
for the arraignment and trial; and, in practice, bail serves the further purpose of preventing
the release of an accused who may be dangerous to society or whom the judge may not
want to release a hearing upon notice is mandatory before the grant of bail, whether bail is a
matter of right or discretion. With more reason is this true in criminal prosecutions of a
capital offense, or of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Rule
114, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, as amended, states that: "No person charged with a
capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment when
the evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of criminal
action."
JUAN PONCE ENRILE vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 213847 (Resolution), [July 12, 2016])

DOCTRINE:
Bail exists to ensure society's interest in having the accused answer to a criminal
prosecution without unduly restricting his or her liberty and without ignoring the accused's
right to be presumed innocent. It does not perform the function of preventing or licensing
the commission of crime.

FACTS:
This case warrants the reversal of the August 18, 2015 which granted the petition for
certiorari of herein petitioner, granting his request for provisional release. The People argued
that the decision is inconsonant with deeply-embedded constitutional principles on the right
to bail; that the express and unambiguous intent of the 1987 Constitution is to place persons
accused of crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua on a different plane, and make their
availment of bail a matter of judicial discretion, not a matter of right, only upon a showing
that evidence of their guilt is not strong. The People contend that the grant of provisional
should also consider whether he will endanger other important interests of the State, the
probability of him repeating the crime committed, and how his temporary liberty can affect
the prosecution of his case; that the petitioner's fragile state of health does not present a
compelling justification for his admission to bail; that age and health considerations are
relevant only in fixing the amount of bail; and that even so, his age and health condition
were never raised or litigated in the Sandiganbayan because he had merely filed thereat
a Motion to Fix Bail and did not thereby actually apply for bail. Lastly, the People observe
that the decision specially accommodated the petitioner, and thus accorded him preferential
treatment that is not ordinarily enjoyed by persons similarly situated.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Petitioner should be entitled to bail.

HELD:
Yes. The People were not kept in the dark on the health condition of the petitioner.
The medical opinions and findings were also included in the petition for certiorari and now
form part of the records of the case. The Court has recognized his right to bail by
emphasizing that such right should be curtailed only if the risks of flight from this jurisdiction
were too high. In our view, however, the records demonstrated that the risks of flight were
low, or even nil. The Court has taken into consideration other circumstances, such as his
advanced age and poor health, his past and present disposition of respect for the legal
processes, the length of his public service, and his individual public and private
reputation. There was really no reasonable way for the Court to deny bail to him simply
because his situation of being 92 years of age when he was first charged for the very serious
crime in court was quite unique and very rare. To ignore his advanced age and unstable
health condition in order to deny his right to bail on the basis alone of the judicial discretion
to deny bail would be probably unjust. The petitioner has proven with more than sufficient
evidence that he would not be a flight risk. For one, his advanced age and fragile state of
health have minimized the likelihood that he would make himself scarce and escape from
the jurisdiction of our courts.
DY CHIAO VS. BOLIVAR

G.R. No. 192491, [August 17, 2016])

DOCTRINE:
The consequence of failure to perfect an appeal was to render the dismissal final and
immutable.
Courts and tribunals with the same or equal authority — even those exercising
concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction — are not permitted to interfere with each other's
respective cases, much less their orders or judgments therein.

FACTS:
The CA promulgated its decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 44261 declaring the petitioner
subsidiarily liable to pay the exact amount of P5,711,164.00. The decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
44261 was ultimately affirmed by the Court, and thus attained finality. Execution
proceedings followed in due course upon issuance of the writ of execution by the RTC
(Branch 19) as the court of origin, but respondent Branch Sheriff of the RTC (Branch 19) filed
a sheriff's report to the effect that, one, the amount of P5,711,164.00 could not be satisfied
by principal obligor Arevalo because he had no assets that could be levied on execution; and
that, two, the liability could be paid out of the assets of the petitioner under her subsidiary
liability as decreed in the final judgment. Accordingly, the respondent recommended that an
alias writ of execution be issued against the properties of the latter. To fend off the public
auction, the petitioner filed on May 13, 2009 a so-called Petition for Prohibition with
Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction with RTC (Branch 23).
After receiving the respondent's comment and opposition, the petitioner's reply, and the
respondent's rejoinder, the RTC (Branch 23) dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction, opining that the processes being undertaken by the respondent were deemed
proceedings in the same civil case assigned to and still pending before the RTC (Branch 19);
and that the RTC (Branch 19) continued to exercise general supervision and control over
such proceedings. After the RTC (Branch 23) denied the petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration, she filed in the CA her Motion for Extension of Time to File Verified Petition
for Review on Certiorari indicating therein that she would be raising a question of law, but
the same was denied due

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the denial for Motion for extension of time was proper.
2. Whether or not it was proper for the original petition for prohibition before the RTC
to be denied on the ground of lack of Jurisdiction.

HELD:
1. Firstly, the CA properly denied the petitioner's Motion for Extension of Time to File
Verified Petition for Review on Certiorari and justifiably considered the case
closed and terminated. The petitioner was patently guilty of taking an erroneous
appeal in view of her manifest intention to limit her appeal to questions of law.
Secondly, the petitioner, as the party appealing, had only a limited period of 15
days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from within which to
perfect her appeal to the Court pursuant to Section 2, Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. The petitioner obviously failed to perfect her appeal from the dismissal by
the RTC (Branch 23) of the case commenced through her so-called Petition with
Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. The
consequence of such failure to perfect the appeal was to render the dismissal
final and immutable.

2. To allow the petitioner's action in the RTC (Branch 23) would disregard the
doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference, under which no court has the
power to interfere by injunction with the judgments or decrees of a court of
concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. Courts and tribunals with the same or equal
authority — even those exercising concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction — are
not permitted to interfere with each other's respective cases, much less their
orders or judgments therein. This is an elementary principle of the highest
importance essential to the orderly administration of justice. Its observance is
not required on the grounds of judicial comity and courtesy alone; it is enforced to
prevent unseemly, expensive, and dangerous conflicts of jurisdiction and of
processes. A contrary rule would dangerously lead to confusion and seriously
hamper the administration of justice.
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, as successor-in-interest of
ASIAN BANK CORPORATION vs. HON.EDILBERTO G. SANDOVAL
G.R. No. 169677; February 18, 2013

DOCTRINE:
The provision for separate trials is intended to further convenience, avoid delay and
prejudice, and serve the ends of justice. It is the interest of efficient judicial administration
that is to be controlling rather than the wishes of the parties. The piecemeal trial of separate
issues in a single suit is not to be the usual course. It should be resorted to only in the
exercise of informed discretion when the court believes that separation will achieve the
purposes of the rule.

FACTS:
A case for reversion was filed by the Republic against the Marcoses et. Al to recover
the so-called ill-gotten wealth. Asian Bank claimed ownership of 2 of the parcels of land. The
complaint was then amended to implead Asian Bank but later, the Republic moved to have a
separate trial against Asian Bank. Republic averred that the separate trial is proper because
its cause of action against the Bank was entirely distinct and independent from its cause of
action against the original defendants. Metrobank was the successor in interest of Asian
Bank.

ISSUE:
Whether the Republic is entitled to a separate trial against Asian Bank

HELD:
NO. According to Section 3 of Rule 31 of the Rules of Court in connection with Rule 42
of the US Federal Rules, as a general rule, all the issues in a case should be tried at one time
except in exceptional instances where there are special and persuasive reasons for
departing from this practice. Here, there exist no special reason to order the separate trial
for the issue involved is not complicated. The issue relevant to Asian Bank was not
complicated. Likewise, the court added that the separate trial will only result to the prejudice
of MetroBank. only a joint trial could afford Metrobank the equal opportunity to contest all
evidence to prove its ownership of the subject properties.
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. HON. JUDGE AGAPITO L.
HONTANOSAS, JR.
G.R. No. 157163; June 25, 2014

DOCTRINE:
Injunction should not issue except upon a clear showing that the applicant has a
right in esse to be protected, and that the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of such
right. A preliminary injunction should not determine the merits of a case, or decide
controverted facts, because being a preventive remedy, it only seeks to prevent threatened
wrong, further injury, and irreparable harm or injustice until the rights of the parties can be
settled.

FACTS:
Private respondents obtained a loan from BPI secured by promissory notes, real
estate mortgages on several lands and chattel mortage on thei Pajero. Since they failed to
pay the entire amount, BPI required them to issue postdated checks to cover for the loan
under the threat that their mortgages will be foreclosed. The respondents sought to annul
the promissory notes, real estate mortgages issued and likewise sought for the issuance of a
TRO or a writ of preliminary injunction.

ISSUE:
Whether private respondents are entitled to the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction against BPI, its agents and representatives

HELD:
NO. A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or
proceeding prior to the judgment orfinal order requiring a party or a court, an agency, or a
person to refrain from a particular act or acts. Accordingly, the conditions for the issuance of
the injunctive writ are:
(a) that the right to be protected exists prima facie;
(b) that the act sought to be enjoined is violative of that right; and
(c) that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious
damage

Here, the respondents were fully aware that in making their properties as securities
for their loan obligation with BPI, those properties will answer should in case they failed to
pay the loan. All the conditions for the issuance of the injunctive writ was not sufficiently
proven by the respondents.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GILBERTO VILLARICO, SR. @ "BERTING" et
al.

G.R. No. 158362, April 4, 2011

DOCTRINE
Such identification, to be positive, need not always be by direct evidence from an
eyewitness, for reliable circumstantial evidence can equally confirm it as to overcome the
constitutionally presumed innocence of the accused.

FACTS:
Haide Cagagtan was busy preparing dinner in the kitchen of his family’s residence.
The kitchen, had a wall which was made of three-feet high bamboo slats arranged like a
chessboard with four-inch gaps in between. At that time, Remedios saw all the accused as
they stood at the rear of the kitchen aiming their firearms at the door. She was noticed by
one of the accused and pointed the gun at her. At that instant, Remedios heard three
gunshots. The father of Haide, Francisco, also heard the gunshots making him instinctively
jump into a hole, from where he was able to see and recognize the accused who were then
standing by the kitchen door. Lolita also heard the gunshots while she was in the sala. She
recalled that Haide then came towards her from the kitchen, asking for help and saying: I
was shot by Berting. He succumbed shortly, at the hospital due to hypovolemic shock or
massive loss of blood.

ISSUE:
Whether or not identification, to be positive, have to be made by a witness who
actually saw the assailants

HELD:

No. The established circumstances unerringly show that the four accused were the
perpetrators of the fatal shooting of Haide. Their identification as his assailants by Remedios
and Francisco was definitely positive and beyond reasonable doubt. The statement of Haide
to his mother that he had just been shot by the group of Berting – uttered in the immediate
aftermath of the shooting where he was the victim – is a part of the res gestae. The
statement was admissible against the accused as an exception to the hearsay rule under
Section 42, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. The term res gestae refers to "those
circumstances which are the undesigned incidents of a particular litigated act and which are
admissible when illustrative of such act.” In a general way, res gestae includes the
circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate
its character and which are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to
exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. The rule on res gestae encompasses the
exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a
crime immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission of the crime when
the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or
utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the
declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement.
SALES VS. ADAPON

G.R. No. 171420, October 5, 2016

DOCTRINE:

After all, the purpose of preliminary investigation is not only to determine whether
there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and the respondent therein is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial;
it is just as well for the purpose of securing the innocent against hasty, malicious and
oppressive prosecution, and to protect him from an open and public accusation of a crime,
from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial. More importantly, in the appraisal of
the case presented to him for resolution, the duty of a prosecutor is more to do justice
and less to prosecute.

FACTS:

Prosecutor Cuevas recommended the dismissal albeit without prejudice of the instant
complaint on the ground that the affidavit was not sworn to by the private respondent before
a fiscal, state prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath as required.
However, upon manifestation of private respondent that she is submitting her affidavit
sworn to before a Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General of New York City, the case
was reopened. Prosecutor Cuevas issued a Resolution dismissing the instant complaint on
the ground that it is impossible for him to proceed with the preliminary investigation without
the appearance of private respondent who will be subjected to some clarificatory questions
on certain matters.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the personal appearance of the complainant for clarificatory


questioning is essential for a finding of probable cause by the prosecutor.

HELD:

No. A preliminary investigation is in effect a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of


the case; sufficient proof of the guilt of the criminal respondent must be adduced so that
when the case is tried, the trial court may not be bound, as a matter of law, to order an
acquittal. Although a preliminary investigation is not a trial and is not intended to usurp the
function of the trial court, it is not a casual affair; the officer conducting the same
investigates or inquires into the facts concerning the commission of the crime
with the end in view of determining whether or not an information may be
prepared against the accused. In fine, the personal presence of the petitioner at the
clarificatory hearing was unnecessary to establish probable cause against the respondents,
and requiring it was legally untenable.
ELSIE S. CAUSINGv. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND HERNAN D. BIRON,
SR.

G.R. No. 199139, 09 September 2014

FACTS
Elsie Causing assumed office as the Municipal Civil Registrar of Barotac Nuevo,
Iloilo. Mayor Biron issued Memorandum No. 12, Series of 2010 (Office Order No. 12),
commanding for the detailing of Causing at the Office of the Municipal Mayor.
Causing filed the complaint claiming that issuance made by Mayor Biron ordering
her detail to the Office of the Municipal Mayor, being made within the election
period and without prior authority from the COMELEC, was illegal . Mayor Biron
countered that the purpose of transferring the office of Causing was to closely
supervise the performance of her functions after complaints regarding her negative
behavior in dealing with her co-employees and with the public transacting business
in her office. The Provincial Election Supervisor recommended the dismissal of the
complaint-affidavit for lack of probable cause. COMELEC En Banc affirmed the
findings and recommendation.

ISSUE
Is the relocation of Causing by Mayor Biron during the election period from her
office as the Municipal Civil Registrar to the Office of the Mayor constitute a
prohibited act under the Omnibus Election Code and the relevant Resolution of the
COMELEC?

HELD
No. Reassignment was not prohibited by the Omnibus Election Code there was
no probable cause to criminally charge Mayor Biron with the violation of the
Omnibus Election Code. The movement involving Causing did not equate to either a
transfer or a detail within the contemplation of the law if Mayor Biron only physically
transferred her office area from its old location to the Office of the Mayor. Causing is
not stripped of her functions as Municipal Civil Registrar. She was merely required to
physically report to the Mayor’s Office and perform her functions as Municipal Civil
Registrar therein. Definitely, she is still the MCR, albeit doing her work physically
outside of her usual work station. She is also not deprived of her supervisory
function over the staff as she continues to review their work and signs documents
they prepared.

The Rules of Court contains a separate rule on the review of the decisions of the
COMELEC and the COA. Rule 64 is generally identical with certiorari under Rule 65,
except as to the period of the filing of the petition for certiorari, that is, in the
former, the period is 30 days from notice of judgement or final order or resolution
sought to be reviewed but, in the latter, not later than 60 days from notice of the
judgement, order or resolution assailed. In addition, the motion for reconsideration
is an indispensable condition before the filing of certirari under Rule 65.
LEONORA A. PASCUAL v. JOSEFINO L. DAQUIOAG

G.R. No. 162063, March 31, 2014

DOCTRINE:
The writ of execution issued upon a final judgment adjudicating the ownership of land
to a party may authorize putting her in possession although the judgment does not
specifically direct such act.

FACTS:
Leonora Pascual filed a Free Patent Application over several lots located in Ilocos
Norte. Catalina Villamor presented a protest, claiming that Pascual had no right to apply for
title over the properties. The protest was given due course by the Regional Executive
Director. Thus, Pascual appealed to the Secretary of the DENR, who affirmed the decision.
Pascual thereafter appealed to the Office of the President, which affirmed the decision of the
Secretary of the DENR. Pascual elevated the decision of the OP to the CA by petition for
review, but the CA outrightly denied due course to her petition for review because of
procedural lapses. The decision of the OP attained finality upon her failure to timely move
for the reconsideration of the denial of due course by the CA. Thus, the Regional Executive
Director issued a writ of execution directing CENRO to execute the decision.
CENRO Officer Josefino Daquioag issued a memorandum to execute the decision by
putting Catalina Villamor in possession of the lots in question. Pascual is now assailing the
execution proceedings because the decision of the Regional Executive Director did not
authorize such action.

ISSUE
Whether the Writ of Execution is valid

HELD
YES.
As a general rule, a writ of execution should strictly conform to every particular of the
judgment to be executed, and not vary the terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce, nor
may it go beyond the terms of the judgment sought to be executed; the execution is void if
it is in excess of and beyond the original judgment or award.
In this case, although “placing the winning party, Catalina Villamor in the premises of
the land in question” was not expressly stated in the dispositive portion of the decisioin, the
absence of such phrase did not render the directive invalid because it is necessarily included
therein. A judgment is not confined to what appears on the face of the decision, for it
embraces whatever is necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.
BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK VS. SPOUSES YUJUICO

G.R. No. 175796; July 22, 2015

DOCTRINE:
An action to recover the deficiency after extrajudicial foreclosure of a real property
mortgage is a personal action because it does not affect title to or possession of real
property, or any interest therein. As such, the venue of the action is where the plaintiff
resides or where the defendant resides, at the election of the plaintiff.

FACTS:
The City of Manila filed a complaint for Expropriation of the 5 parcels of lands owned
by the Spouses Yujuico. 2 of the 5 parcels of land were previously mortgaged to Citytrust
Bank, BPI’s predecessor-in-interest. RTC Manila declared the 5 parcels of land expropriated
and such judgment became final. BPI filed a Motion to Intervene but it was denied as it was
filed out of time. Thus, BPI extrajudicially foreclosed the 2 parcels of land and the sheriff
awarded the 2 lots to BPI as the highest bidder. Since there was a deficiency, BPI sued the
Spouses to recover such deficiency in RTC Makati. The Spouses moved to dismiss the case
on grounds of res judicata to which, BPI filed its comment/opposition.
The Spouses filed their reply wherein they raised for the first time, the ground of
improper venue. They contended that the action for the recovery of the deficiency, being a
supplementary action of the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, was a real action that
should have been brought in the RTC Manila because Manila was the place where the
properties were located.

ISSUE:
Where is the proper venue of an action to recover the deficiency after extrajudicial
foreclosure of a real property mortgage?

HELD:
The venue of an action depends on whether it is a real or a personal action. A real
action is one that affects title to or possession of real property, or an interest therein. An
action for foreclosure of mortgage on real property is a real action. The real action is to be
commenced and tried in the proper court having jurisdiction over the area wherein the real
property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated. In contrast, all other actions are personal
actions. The venue of a personal action is the place where the plaintiff or any of the principal
plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the
case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
Based on the distinctions between real and personal actions, an action to recover the
deficiency after the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real property mortgage is a personal
action, for it does not affect title to or possession of real property, or any interest therein. In
this case, BPI correctly brought the Civil Case in RTC Makati because Makati was the place
where the main office of the petitioner was located. Moreover, assuming that the venue had
been improperly laid, the Spouses failed to raise such ground in their Motion to Dismiss.
They did so belatedly.
LUMANTAS VS. CALAPIZ

GR 163753; January 25 2014

DOCTRINE:
The acquittal of the accused does not necessarily mean his absolution from civil
liability.

FACTS:
Spouses Calapiz brought their 8-year-old son, Hanz to a hospital for an emergency
appendectomy. Hanz was attended to by Dr. Lumantas who suggested that Hanz also
undergo circumcision. With the parents' consent, the doctor performed the circumcision
after the appendectomy. Weeks later, Hanz was confined because of the swelling between
the base and the shaft of his penis. Dr. Lumantas referred him a urologist, who diagnosed
Hanz to have a damaged urethra. Thus, Hanz underwent cystostomy, and thereafter was
operated on 3 times to repair his damaged urethra. When his damaged urethra could not be
fully repaired and reconstructed, Hanz's parents brought a criminal charge against Dr.
Lumantas for reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries. The RTC acquitted
the Dr. Lumantas for insufficiency of the evidence. Nonetheless, the RTC ruled that Dr.
Lumantas was liable for moral damages because there was a preponderance of evidence
showing that Hanz had received the injurious trauma from his circumcision by the doctor.

ISSUE:
Whether the acquittal of an accused of the crime charged also extinguish civil liability

HELD:
NO. Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. Nevertheless, the
acquittal of an accused of the crime charged does not necessarily extinguish his civil liability.
In case of an acquittal, the judgment shall state whether the evidence of the
prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or
omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. Thus, the acquittal of an
accused does not prevent a judgment from still being rendered against him on the civil
aspect of the criminal case unless the court finds and declares that the fact from which the
civil liability might arise did not exist.
BUENAFLOR VS. RAMIREZ

GR 201607; February 15, 2017

DOCTRINE:
A case involving the validity of the termination of employment of an officer or
employee of the Civil Service is under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission not the
RTC.

FACTS:
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission Chairman Domingo appointed Jose Ramirez, Jr. as
Executive Assistant III and designated him as Assistant Accountant. Later, Chairman
Domingo resigned, and Cesar Buenaflor succeeded him. Buenaflor terminated Ramirez as of
the same date as Chairman Domingo’s resignation because his tenure had expired since his
position is co-terminous with that of Chairman Domingo. Ramirez sued in the RTC to declare
his dismissal null and void. Buenaflor filed his answer and contended that Ramirez had failed
to exhaust administrative remedies and should have instead filed an administrative
complaint in the Civil Service Commission. The RTC rendered judgment declaring Buenaflor
guilty of unlawful termination. Buenaflor assailed the order of the RTC alleging that the RTC
thereby gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Buenaflor
submits that it was the CSC, not the RTC, that had jurisdiction over Ramirez's complaint that
involved matters relative to the Civil Service.

ISSUE:
Whether RTC has jurisdiction over a case involving the validity of the termination of
employment of an officer or employee of the Civil Service

HELD:
NO. The jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of a particular action is
determined by the plaintiff's allegations in the complaint and the principal relief he seeks in
the light of the law that apportions the jurisdiction of courts.
In this case, Ramirez's complaint was challenging the validity of his termination from
the service, and that he thereby wanted the RTC to pry into the circumstances of the
termination. Such challenge was outside of the RTC's sphere of authority. Disciplinary cases
and cases involving personnel actions affecting employees in the Civil Service, like
appointment or separation from the service, are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the CSC.
The Constitution vests in the CSC the jurisdiction over all employees of the Government,
including all its branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies, as well as
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.
PATULA VS. PEOPLE

GR 164457; April 11, 2012

DOCTRINE:
Testimonial Evidence not based on personal knowledge are hearsay and are
unreliable for purposes of determining the guilt or innocence of the accused. Also, private
documents not duly authenticated could not be presented and admitted as evidence. These
defects cannot be cured by the adverse party's waiver of her cross-examination or failure to
rebut.

FACTS:
Anna Patula was charged with Estafa for allegedly misappropriating the funds
collected by her as the sale representative of Footlucker's Chain of Stores, Inc. To establish
the elements of estafa, the Prosecution presented the testimonies of Go (the manager) and
Guivencan (the auditor), and various documents consisting of: (a) the receipts allegedly
issued by Patula to each of her customers upon their payment, (b) the ledgers listing the
accounts pertaining to each customer with the corresponding notations of the receipt
numbers for each of the payments, and (c) the confirmation sheets accomplished by
Guivencan herself. The ledgers and receipts were marked and formally offered as Exhibits B
to YY. Patula’s counsel interposed a continuing objection on the ground that the figures
entered in Exhibits B to YY were hearsay because the persons who had made the entries
were not themselves presented in court. Patula also contends that the RTC erred in admitting
as evidence, Exhibits B to YY despite their being private documents not duly authenticated.

ISSUE:
Whether the testimonial and documentary evidence presented proved Patula’s guilt
beyond reasonable doubt - NO

HELD:
Testimonial Evidence not based on Personal Knowledge
Guivencan conceded having no personal knowledge of the amounts actually received
by Patula from the customers or remitted by her to Footlucker's. This means that Guivencan
based her testimony on the entries found in the receipts supposedly issued by Patula and in
the ledgers held by Footlucker's corresponding to each customer, as well as on the unsworn
statements of some of the customers. Her being the only witness who testified on the
entries deprived the RTC of the opportunity to validate and test the veracity and reliability of
the entries as evidence through cross-examination. The denial of that opportunity rendered
the entire proof of misappropriation or conversion hearsay, and thus unreliable and
untrustworthy for purposes of determining the guilt or innocence of the accused.

Private Documents not duly authenticated


There was lack of proper authentication as to the ledgers that were presented to
prove the discrepancies. Since none of the exhibits came under any of the 4 exceptions
under Rule 132, they could not be presented and admitted as evidence against Patula
without authentication. Hence, Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive, were
inescapably bereft of probative value as evidence.
The flaws of the Prosecution's evidence were fundamental and substantive, not
merely technical and procedural, and were defects that cannot be waived. The SC has to
acquit Patula for failure of the State to establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

ABRIGO vs. FLORES


G.R. No. 160786; June 17, 2013

DOCTRINE:
Once a judgment becomes immutable and unalterable by virtue of its finality, its
execution should follow as a matter of course. A supervening event, to be sufficient to stay
or stop the execution, must alter or modify the situation of the parties under the decision as
to render the execution inequitable, impossible, or unfair. The supervening event cannot rest
on unproved or uncertain facts.

FACTS:
Francisco Faylona and Gaudencia Faylona inherited the subject lot from their parents.
After Francisco’s death, his widow and Gaudencia entered into an extra judicial partition over
the lot but no actual partition took place. The western half of the lot was assigned to
Francisco’s heirs, here in private respondents, while the eastern to Gaudencia and later on to
her heirs, herein petitioners.
Since no actual partition took place, in effect, all the heirs were co-owners of the lot.
The heirs of Gaudencia started building garage, poultry and a small portion of their
residence extending to the western part which forced the private respondents to file their
complaint for judicial partition. The RTC Rendered judgement ordering the partition of the
lot. The CA affirmed this decision. The judgment attained finality since no further appellate
proceedings were taken by petitioners. Subsequently, a motion for execution was issued,
wherein petitioners were granted a certain period of time to remove all the improvements
built on the western part.
Thereafter, the return of the writ showed that it was partially satisfied prompting
private respondents to file a motion for demolition. On their part, petitioners filed a Motion
to defer resolution on Motion for Demolition on ground that they have become one of the co-
owners of the western half to the extent of 53.75 square meters thereof, purportedly
because one of the successors in interest of Francisco who was a co-plaintiff of the private
respondents in the case, sold to them his share in the western half. According to the
petitioners, this transaction is a supervening event making the execution unjust and
inequitable.
The RTC Denied the petitioner’s motion to defer resolution on demolition. hence the
present petition.

ISSUE:
Can the sale of the 1/4 share of the successor in interest of Francisco to the
petitioners be considered a supervening event?

HELD:
NO, a supervening event is an exception to the execution as a matter of right and
immutable judgment rule, only if it directly affects the matter already litigated and settled,
or substantially changes the rights or relations of the parties therein to render the execution
unjust, impossible or inequitable.
In this case, The sale by the successor in interest of Francisco of his supposed 1/4
share in the western portion of the property in litis, assuming to be true did not modify or
alter the judgment regarding the partition of the property in litis. To accept their contention
would be to reopen the final and immutable judgement in order to further partition the
western portion thereby adjudicated to the heirs and successors-in-interest of Francisco
contrary to the doctrine of immutability of judgment.

MICROSOFT CORPORATION VS ROLANDO MANANSALA


GR NO 166391, October 21, 2015
DOCTRINE:
The determination of probable cause by the prosecutor and the DOJ may be
reviewed by the courts if there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction

FACTS:
Petitioner (Microsoft Corporation) is the copyright and trademark owner of all rights
relating to all versions and editions of Microsoft software while respondent Rolando
Manansala was engaged in distributing and selling Microsoft computer software programs
without any authority from the petitioner. As a result of the test-purchase conducted by the
private investigator and an NBI agent where 6 CD-ROMs were purchased from petitioner, the
agent from the NBI applied for a search warrant to search the premises of the respondent.
The search yielded several illegal copies of Microsoft programs. As a result, Petitioner filed
an Affidavit-Complaint in the DOJ based on the results of the search and seizure operations
conducted on Respondent’s premises.
However, the state prosecutor of the DOJ dismissed the charge against respondent
for violation of Sec 29 of PD 49 starring that there is no proof that respondent printed or
copied the products of the complainant for sale in his store. The petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but the same was denied. The Petition for Review with the DOJ was likewise
denied. Hence, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA to annul the DOJ's
dismissal of its petition for review but the CA denied the same. The petitioner insists that
printing or copying was not essential in the commission of the crime of copyright
infringement under Sect 29 of PD 49 hence, contrary to the gelding of the DOJ, as upheld by
the CA: The mere selling of pirated computer software constituted copyright infringement.

ISSUE:
May the determination of probable case which is an executive function be reviewed
by the courts?

HELD:
Yes. Although the general rule is that the determination of the existence of the
probable causeway the public prosecutor is not to be judicially scrutinized because it is an
executive function, an exception exists when the determination is tainted with grave abuse
of discretion. The DOJ committed grave abuse of discretion in sustaining the public
prosecutor’s dismissal of the charge of copyright infringement under Sec 29 of PD 49 on the
ground of lack of evidence because the public prosecutor flagrantly disregarded the
existence of acts sufficient to engender the well-founded belied that the crime of copyright
infringement has been committed and that the respondent was probably guilty thereof.
The mere sale of the illicit copies of the software programs was enough by itself to
show the existence of probable cause for copyright infringement. There was no need for the
petitioner to still prove who copied, replicated or reproduced the software programs. Indeed,
the public prosecutor and the DOJ gravely abused their discretion in dismissing the
Petitioner’s charge for copyright infringement against the respondent’s lack of evidence.
Accordingly, the CA erred in upholding the dismissal by the DOH of the petitioner’s petition
for review.
Therefore, the determination of probable cause which is an executive function may
be reviewed by the courts.
PEOPLE vs. EDISON MAGBITANG
GR 175592, 14 June 2016

DOCTRINE:
Under the Rules of Court, a child may be a competent witness, unless the trial court
determines upon proper showing that the child's mental maturity is such as to render him
incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which he is to be examined and of relating the
facts truthfully.

FACTS:
Magbitang was charged with rape with homicide under the information filed by the
Provincial Prosecutor of Nueva Ecija on 22 February 1999. RTC found Magbitang guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of rape with homicide sentencing him of death penalty and
payment of damages to the heirs. The court held that the witness (6 years of age) had the
capacity to observe, recollect and communicate what he had witnessed, hence he was
entitled to credence. CA affirmed the conviction and agreed with the RTC that the witness
was competent despite his tender age because he showed his capacity to observe, recollect
and communicate whatever he had witnessed; that being only a child, was not expected to
give the exact details of the incident he had witnessed; that the witness was able to
positively identify Magbitang during the trial as the culprit; and that the evidence adduced
by the Defense consisted only of the uncorroborated and self-serving testimony by
Magbitang.

ISSUE:
1. WON the trial court gravely erred in giving credence to the materially inconsistent
testimony of a 6-year old witness
2. WON the lower court gravely erred in convicting Magbitang of rape with homicide
despite the fact that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt

HELD:
1. NO. A review of the records persuades the Court to declare that the RTC and the CA
correctly appreciated the evidence adduced herein. Hence, their factual findings are
upheld. The Court generally defers to the factual findings of the trial court by virtue
of the latter's better position to observe and determine matters of credibility of the
witnesses, having heard the witnesses and observed their deportment during trial.
This deference becomes firmer when the factual findings of the trial court were
affirmed by the intermediate reviewing court. The Court does not disturb such factual
findings unless the consideration of certain facts of substance and value that were
plainly overlooked or misappreciated by the lower courts could affect the outcome of
the case.

2. NO. Magbitang's contention that the witness, being a child of tender age, was not a
competent witness because his testimony was filled with inconsistencies and suffered
from improbabilities was unfounded. Under the Rules of Court, a child may be a
competent witness, unless the trial court determines upon proper showing that the
child's mental maturity is such as to render him incapable of perceiving the facts
respecting which he is to be examined and of relating the facts truthfully. The
testimony of the child of sound mind with the capacity to perceive and make known
the perception can be believed in the absence of any showing of an improper motive
to testify. Once it is established that the child fully understands the character and
nature of an oath, the testimony is given full credence. In the case of the 6-year old
witness, the Defense did not persuasively discredit his worthiness and competence
as a witness. As such, the Court considers the reliance by the trial court on his
recollection fully justified.