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Held:
the damage - NO
The liability referred to in this article shall cease
when the persons mentioned therein prove that
they employed all the diligence of a good father
of a family to avoid the damage.
accident he obtained employment as a
mechanical draftsman and continued in that
ART. 1908 The owners shall also be liable for the
employment for 6 months at a salary of
damage caused —
P2.50 a day; and it appears that he was a
1 By the explosion of machines which may not boy of more than average intelligence, taller
have been cared for with due diligence, and for and more mature both mentally and
kindling of explosive substances which may not physically than most boys of 15
have been placed in a safe and proper place. The series of experiments made by him in
his attempt to produce an explosion, as
described by Jessie who even ran away
in order to establish his right to a recovery, True, he may not have known and probably
must establish by competent evidence: did not know the precise nature of the
1. Damages to the plaintiff explosion which might be expected from the
2. Negligence by act or omission of which ignition of the contents of the cap, and of
defendant personally, or some person for course he did not anticipate the resultant
whose acts it must respond, was guilty. injuries which he incurred; but he well knew
3. The connection of cause and effect that a more or less dangerous explosion
between the negligence and the damage. might be expected from his act, and yet he
while we hold that the entry upon the willfully, recklessly, and knowingly
property without express invitation or produced the explosion. It would be going
permission would not have relieved Manila far to say that "according to his maturity
Electric from responsibility for injuries and capacity" he exercised such and "care
incurred, without other fault on his part, if and caution" as might reasonably be
such injury were attributable to his required of him, or that defendant or
negligence, the negligence in leaving the anyone else should be held civilly
caps exposed on its premises was not the responsible for injuries incurred by him
proximate cause of the injury received under such circumstances.
cutting open the detonating cap and putting The law fixes no arbitrary age at which a
match to its contents was the proximate minor can be said to have the necessary
cause of the explosion and of the resultant capacity to understand and appreciate the
injuries inflicted nature and consequences of his own acts,
Manila Electric is not civilly responsible for so as to make it negligence on his part to
the injuries thus incurred fail to exercise due care and precaution in
2 years before the accident, David spent 4 the commission of such acts; and indeed it
months at sea, as a cabin boy on one of the would be impracticable and perhaps
interisland transports. Later he took up impossible so to do, for in the very nature
work in his father's office, learning of things the question of negligence
mechanical drawing and mechanical necessarily depends on the ability of the
engineering. About a month after his
4 passengers trapped inside. It was also found later in
minor to understand the character of his trial that the tires of the bus were old.
own acts and their consequences ISSUE: Whether or not the proximate cause of the
he was sui juris in the sense that his age death of Bataclan et al was their burning by reason of
the torches which ignited the gasoline.
and his experience qualified him to
HELD: No. The proximate cause was the overturning
understand and appreciate the necessity for of the bus which was caused by the negligence of the
the exercise of that degree of caution which driver because he was speeding and also he was
already advised by Medina to change the tires yet he
would have avoided the injury which did not. Such negligence resulted to the overturning of
the bus. The torches carried by the would-be helpers
resulted from his own deliberate act; and are not to be blamed. It is just but natural for the
that the injury incurred by him must be held villagers to respond to the call for help from the
passengers and since it is a rural area which did not
to have been the direct and immediate have flashlights, torches are the natural source of
result of his own willful and reckless act, so lighting. Further, the smell of gas could have been all
over the place yet the driver and the conductor failed
that while it may be true that these injuries to provide warning about said fact to the villagers.
would not have been incurred but for the WHAT IS “PROXIMATE CAUSE”?
negligence act of the defendant in leaving Proximate cause is that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
the caps exposed on its premises, intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
nevertheless plaintiff's own act was the which the result would not have occurred.
proximate and principal cause of the And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause
is that acting first and producing the injury, either
accident which inflicted the injury immediately or by setting other events in motion, all
rule of the Roman law was: Quod quis ex constituting a natural and continuous chain of events,
each having a close causal connection with its
culpa sua damnum sentit, non intelligitur immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and
sentire probable result of the cause which first acted, under
just thing is that a man should suffer the such circumstances that the person responsible for the
first event should, as an ordinary prudent and
damage which comes to him through his intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at
own fault, and that he can not demand the moment of his act or default that an injury to some
person might probably result therefrom.
reparation therefor from another
Negligence is not presumed, but must be
proven by him who alleges it.
Fernando V. CA (1992)
Salud Villanueva Vda. De Bataclan vs
Mariano Medina FACTS:
Pass-midnight in September 1952, Juan Bataclan rode November 7, 1975: Bibiano Morta, market
a bus owned by Mariano Medina from Cavite to Pasay.
While on its way, the driver of the bus was driving master of the Agdao Public Market filed a
fast and when he applied the brakes it cause the bus
requisition request with the Chief of
to be overturned. The driver, the conductor, and some
passengers were able to free themselves from the bus Property of the City Treasurer's Office for
except Bataclan and 3 others. The passengers called
the help of the villagers and as it was dark, the villagers the re-emptying of the septic tank in Agdao
brought torch with them. The driver and the conductor wherein Bascon won
failed to warn the would-be helpers of the fact that
gasoline has spilled from the overturned bus so a huge November 22, 1975: bidder Bertulano with
fire ensued which engulfed the bus thereby killing the
four other companions namely Joselito
Garcia, William Liagoso, Alberto Fernando standard supposed to be supplied by the
and Jose Fajardo, Jr. were found dead inside imaginary conduct of the discreet pater
the septic tank. familias of the Roman law
The bodies were removed by a fireman. Conduct is said to be negligent when a
The body of Joselito Garcia, was taken out prudent man in the position of the
by his uncle, Danilo Garcia and taken to the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an
Regional Hospital but he expired there. effect harmful to another was sufficiently
The City Engineer's office investigated the probable warrant his foregoing the conduct
case and learned they entered the septic or guarding against its consequences
tank without clearance from it nor with the The question as to what would constitute
knowledge and consent of the market the conduct of a prudent man in a given
master. situation must of course be always
Since the septic tank was found to be determined in the light of human
almost empty, they were presumed to be experience and in view of the facts involved
the ones who did the re-emptying. in the particular case
Dr. Juan Abear of the City Health Office Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by
found them to have died from "asphyxia" - the ignoring of the suggestion born of this
diminution of oxygen supply in the body provision, is always necessary before
and intake of toxic gas negligence can be held to exist
November 26, 1975: Bascon signed the Distinction must be made between the
purchase order accident and the injury
RTC: Dismissed the case Where he contributes to the principal
CA: Reversed - law intended to protect the occurrence, as one of its determining
plight of the poor and the needy, the factors, he can not recover
ignorant and the indigent Where, in conjunction with the occurrence,
ISSUE: W/N Davao city is negligent and its he contributes only to his own injury, he
negligence is the proximate cause therefore can may recover the amount that the defendant
be liable for damages responsible for the event should pay for
such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable
equivalent for his own imprudence
HELD: NO. CA affirmed. Toilets and septic tanks are not
test by which to determine the existence of nuisances per se as defined in Article 694 of
negligence in a particular case: the New Civil Code which would necessitate
Did the defendant in doing the alleged warning signs for the protection of the
negligent act use that reasonable care and public
caution which an ordinarily prudent person While the construction of these public
would have used in the same situation? If facilities demands utmost compliance with
not, then he is guilty of negligence safety and sanitary requirements, the
regarding the accident. Suspecting that the tablet he
putting up of warning signs is not one of took may have caused the accident, he returned to
those requirements Dr. Sy and the latter was shocked because of the
wrong medicine sold to his patient.
accident such as toxic gas leakage from the
septic tank is unlikely to happen unless one Respondent thereafter filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) complaint for damages against
removes its covers petitioner.
Considering the nature of the task of
The RTC ruled in favour of the plaintiff; decision of
emptying a septic tank especially one which
which was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals.
has not been cleaned for years, an Hence this present petition.
ordinarily prudent person should
undoubtedly be aware of the attendant
risks. The victims are no exception; more so Issue: Whether or not petitioner was negligent, if so,
whether such negligence was the proximate cause of
with Mr. Bertulano, an old hand in this kind respondent’s accident?
of service, who is presumed to know the
hazards of the job. His failure, therefore,
and that of his men to take precautionary Ruling:
measures for their safety was the proximate
YES.
cause of the accident.
proximate and immediate cause of the Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides that
“Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
death of the victims was due to their own
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
negligence. Consequently, the petitioners pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no re-existing contractual relation between
cannot demand damages from the public the parties, is called a quasi-delict”.
respondent.
The Court also enumerated the three (3) elements of
Quasi-delict, to wit:
Mercury Drug Corporation vs.
1. Damage suffered by the plaintiff;
Sebastian Baking (Torts –
2. Fault or negligence of the defendant
Proximate Cause)
3. Connection of the cause and effect between the
fault or negligence of the defendant and the
Facts: damage incurred by the plaintiff
Respondent Sebastian Baking went to the clinic of The Court stressed that there is no dispute that
Dr. Cesar Sy for a medical check-up. Subsequently, respondent suffered damages. It is generally
after several tests, Dr. Sy prescribed two medical recognized that the drugstore business is imbued with
prescriptions – Diamicron for his blood Sugar and public interest. The health and safety of the people
Benalize tablets for his triglyceride. will be put into jeopardy if the drugstore employees
will not exercise the highest degree of care and
diligence.
Respondent then proceeded to petitioner Mercury
Drug Store (MDC) to buy the prescribed medicines.
However, the saleslady misread the prescription for That petitioner’s employee was grossly negligent. The
Diamicron for Dormicrum – a potent sleeping tablet. care required must be commensurate with the danger
involved, and the skill employed must correspondent
with the superior knowledge of the business which the
Unaware of the mistake, Respondent took it for three
law demands.
consecutive days. On the third day, he figured in a
vehicular accident. His car collided with another car
driven by one Josie Peralta. It turned out that Hence, the Court sustained that the proximate cause
Respondent fell asleep while driving and has no idea of the accident was the petitioner’s employee’s
negligence. The vehicular accident could have not Negligence on the part of the owner, if any, must be
occurred had the employee been careful to his job. sought in the immediate setting and circumstances of
the accident, that is, in his failure to detain
the driver from pursuing a course which not only gave
CAEDO et al vs. YU KHE THAI and him clear notice of the danger but also sufficient time
RAFAEL BERNARDO to act upon it. We do not see that such negligence may
be imputed. The car, as has been stated, was not
running at an unreasonable speed. The road was wide
G.R. No. L-20392 December 18, and open, and devoid of traffic that early morning.
1968 There was no reason for the car owner to be in any
special state of alert. He had reason to rely on the skill
and experience of his driver. He became aware of the
FACTS:
presence of the carretela when his car was only twelve
meters behind it, but then his failure to see it earlier did
Plaintiff Caedo was driving his Mercury car at about not constitute negligence, for he was not himself at the
5:30 in the morning of March 24, 1958 along E. de los wheel. And even when he did see it at that distance, he
Santos Ave., in the vicinity of San LorenzoVillage could not have anticipated his driver’s sudden decision
bound for the airport. Several members of his family to pass the carretela on its left side in spite of the fact
were in the car. Coming from the opposite direction that another car was approaching from the opposite
was the Cadillac car of defendant Yu Khe Thai driven direction. The time element was such that there was no
by his driver Rafael Bernardo. The two cars were reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the
traveling at a moderate speed with their headlights on. risks involved and warn the driver accordingly. The
Ahead of the Cadillac was a caretela. thought that entered his mind, he said, was that if he
Defendant’s driver did not notice it until he was about sounded a sudden warning it might only make the
eight (8) meters away. Instead of slowing down behind other man nervous and make the situation worse. It
the caretela defendant’s driver veered to the left with was a thought that, wise or not, connotes no absence of
the intention of passing by the caretela but in doing so that due diligence required by law to prevent the
its rear bumper caught the ream of thecaretela’s left misfortune. Under the facts the owner of the car was
wheel wrenching it off. Defendant’s car skidded not liable.
obliquely to the other end and collided with the on-
coming vehicle of the plaintiff. The plaintiff on his part,
slackened his speed and tried to avoid the collision by
veering to the right but the collisionoccurred just the KAPALARAN BUS LINE vs. CORONADO
same injuring the plaintiff and members of his family. (G.R. No. 85331; August 25, 1989)
Plaintiff brought an action for damages against both Legal Issue:
the driver and owner of the Cadillac car. There was no Whether or not KAPALARAN BUS LINE
question that defendant’s driver was negligent and
(KBL) is liable for damages from the collision.
liable.
Facts of the Case: T h e j e e p n e y d r i v e n b y
ISSUE:
Lope Grajera was then coming from
P i l a , L a g u n a a n d traversing the an old
Whether or not defendant Yu Khe Thai, owner of the highway to wards Sta. Cruz collided with a
car, who was in the car, was solidarily liable with
KBL bus driven by its regular driver Virgilio
the driver under Art. 2184, of the Civil Code.
Llamoso. As testified to by Atty. Conrado L.
Manicad who was driving a Mustang car coming
RULING:
from the direction of Sta. Cruz and proceeding
towards the direction of Manila, he stopped at
The applicable law is Article 2184 of the Civil Code. the intersection to give way to the jeepney
Under the said provision, if the causative factor was the
driven by G r a j e r a . T h e s k e t c h m a r k e d
driver’s negligence, the owner of the vehicle who was
present is likewise held liable if he could have very clearly that the jeepney had
prevented the mishap by the exerciseof due diligence. a l r e a d y t r a v e r s e d t h e intersection when it met
The basis of the master’s liability in civil law is not the KBL bus head-on. It is also obvious that the point
respondent superior but rather the relationship of of impact was on the right lane of the highway which
paterfamilias. The theory is that ultimately the is the lane properly belonging to the jeepney. Judging
negligence of the servant, if known to the master and from the testimony of Atty. Conrado L. Manicad and
susceptible of timely correction by him, reflects his own the sketch (Exhibit 'E'), the s e q u e n c e o f e v e n t s
negligence if he fails to correct it in order to prevent
shows that the first vehicle to arrive at
injury or damage.
t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n w a s t h e jeepney. Seeing that
the road was clear, the jeepney which had stopped at
the intersection began to move forward, and for his
part, Atty. Manicad stopped his car at the intersection turn towards Libertad Street when the collision
to give way to the jeepney. The KBL bus had no occurred. Villagracia sustained serious
more room within which to stop without slamming injuries and had to undergo four operations.
into the rear of the vehicle behind the car of
Atty. Manicad. The KBL driver chose to Villagracia instituted an action for damages against
gamble on proceeding on its way, unfortunately, the P&G Phils., Inc. and
jeepney driven by Grajera, which had the right-of-
Añonuevo before the RTC. He had also filed a criminal
way, was about to cross the center of the highway
and was directly on the path of the KBL bus. complaint against Añonuevo
The impact indicates that the KBL bus was before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong,
travelling at a fast rate of speed because, but the latter was subsequently
after the collision, it did not stop; it acquitted of the criminal charge. Añonuevo claims
travelled for another 50meters and stopped only that Villagracia violated traffic
when it hit an electric post. regulations when he failed to register his bicycle or
install safety gadgets. He posits that
Ruling of the Court:YES
. KBL is liable for the damages in the collision. Article 2185 of the Civil Code applies by analogy.
Reason behind the Ruling:
Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it
The patent and gross negligence on the part
of the petitioner Kapalaran's driver raised the is presumed that a person
legal presumption that Kapalaran as driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the
employer was guilty of negligence either in time of the mishap he was
the selection or in the supervision of its bus violating any traffic regulation.
driver, where the employer is held liable for
damages; it has of course a right of recourse against 1. W/N Art. 2185 of the New Civil
its own negligent employee. The liability of the Code should apply to non-
employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is motorized vehicles, making
direct and immediate; it i s n o t c o n d i t i o n e d Villagracia presumptively negligent
upon prior recourse against the neglige --> N
n t e m p l o y e e a n d a p r i o r showing of the There is pertinent basis for segregating between
insolvency of such employee. So far as the motorized and non-motorized
record shows, petitioner Kapalaran was unable
vehicles. A motorized vehicle, unimpeded by the
to rebut the presumption of negligence on its own
part. The award of moral damages against petitioner limitations in physical exertion. is
Kapalaran is not only entirely in order; it is also quite capable of greater speeds and acceleration than non-
modest consideirng Dionisio Shinyo's death during motorized vehicles. At the same
the pendency of this petition, a death hastened by, time, motorized vehicles are more capable in
if not directly due to, the grievous injuries inflicting greater injury or damage in the
sustained by him in the violent collision. event of an accident or collision. This is due to a
combination of factors peculiar to the
JONAS AÑONUEVO, petitioner vs. motor vehicle, such as the greater speed, its relative
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and JEROME greater bulk of mass, and greater
combustibility due to the use of fuel.
VILLAGRACIA, respondent
Tinga, J. 2. W/N Villagracia was negligent for
failure to comply with traffic
regulations --> N
FACTS The existence of negligence in a given case is not
Villagracia was traveling along Boni Ave. on his determined by the personal
bicycle, while Añonuevo, judgment of the actor in a given situation, but rather,
traversing the opposite lane was driving a Lancer car it is the law which determines what
owned by Procter and Gamble would be reckless or negligent. Añonuevo asserts that
Inc., the employer of Añonuevo’s brother. Añonuevo Villagracia was negligent as the
was in the course of making a left latter had transgressed traffic regulations. However,
Añonuevo was speeding as he the pedestrian overpass. Also, the complainants
made the left turn, and such negligent act was the presented no evidence to support their allegation of
proximate cause of the accident. the petitioner’s negligence.
Even assuming that Añonuevo had failed to see
CA reversed trial court’s decision.
Villagracia because the bicycle was not
equipped with headlights, such lapse on the cyclist’s Issue:
part would not have acquitted the
driver of his duty to slow down as he proceeded to Was there sufficient legal basis to award damages?
make the left turn.
[G.R. No. L-53401; November 6, Calalas v Court of Appeals & Eliza Sunga
1989] Obligations and Contracts|Fortuitous
(Torts – Proximate Cause)
Events|
Facts:
RULING:
No.
FACTS:
1. The jeepney driven by Lope Grajera was then coming from Pila, Laguna and traversing the old highway towards Sta.
Cruz collided with a KBL bus driven by its regular driver Virgilio Llamoso.
2. As testified to by Atty. Conrado L. Manicad who was driving a Mustang car coming from the direction of Sta. Cruz and
proceeding towards the direction of Manila, he stopped at the intersection to give way to the jeepney driven by Grajera.
3. The sketch marked very clearly that the jeepney had already traversed the intersection when it met the KBL bus head-on.
It is also obvious that the point of impact was on the right lane of the highway which is the lane properly belonging to the
jeepney.
4. Judging from the testimony of Atty. Conrado L. Manicad and the sketch (Exhibit 'E'), the sequence of events shows that
the first vehicle to arrive at the intersection was the jeepney.
5. Seeing that the road was clear, the jeepney which had stopped at the intersection began to move forward, and for his part,
Atty. Manicad stopped his car at the intersection to give way to the jeepney.
6. The KBL bus had no more room within which to stop without slamming into the rear of the vehicle behind the car of
Atty. Manicad. The KBL driver chose to gamble on proceeding on its way, unfortunately, the jeepney driven by Grajera,
which had the right-of-way, was about to cross the center of the highway and was directly on the path of the KBL bus.
7. The impact indicates that the KBL bus was travelling at a fast rate of speed because, after the collision, it did not stop; it
travelled for another 50meters and stopped only when it hit an electric post.
8. On 14 September 1982, Kapalaran, apparently believing that the best defense was offense, filed a complaint for damage
to property and physical injuries through reckless imprudence against respondents Angel Coronado and Lope Grajera in the
Regional Trial Court. Respondents answered with their own claims (counter-claims) for damages. A third-party complaint
and/or a complaint for intervention was also filed in the same case against Kapalaran by jeepney passenger Dionisio Shinyo.
9. The petitioner contended that the jeepney should have stopped before entering the "Y-intersection" because of the
possibility that another vehicle behind the cars which had stopped might not similarly stop and might swerve to the left to
proceed to the highway en route to Manila, is more ingenious than substantial.
10. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court but modified the award of damages by setting aside the
grant of exemplary damages as well as the award of attorney's fee and litigation expenses made to Dionisio Shinyo.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Kapalaran's driver exercised the diligence required of common carriers.
HELD: NO.
RATIO:
1. Kapalaran's driver had become aware that some vehicles ahead of the bus and travelling in the same direction had already
stopped at the intersection obviously to give way either to pedestrians or to another vehicle about to enter the intersection.
2. The bus driver, who was driving at a speed too high to be safe and proper at or near an intersection on the highway, and
in any case too high to be able to slow down and stop behind the cars which had preceded it and which had stopped at the
intersection, chose to swerve to the left lane and overtake such preceding vehicles, entered the intersection and directly
smashed into the jeepney within the intersection.
3. Immediately before the collision, the bus driver was actually violating the following traffic rules and regulations, among
others, in the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, Republic Act No. 4136, as amended:
Sec. 35. Restriction as to speed. — (a) Any person driving a motor vehicle on a highway shall drive the same at a careful and
prudent speed, not greater nor less than is reasonable and proper, having due regard for the traffic, the width of the highway,
and or any other condition then and there existing; and no person shall drive any motor vehicle upon a highway at such a
speed as to endanger the life, limb and property of any person, nor at a speed greater than will permit him to bring the vehicle
to a stop within the assured clear distance ahead.
Sec. 41. Restrictions on overtaking and passing. 1 (a) The driver of a vehicle shall not drive to the left side of the center line
of a highway in overtaking or passing another vehicle, proceeding in the same direction, unless such left side is clearly
visible, and is free of oncoming traffic for a sufficient distance ahead to permit such overtaking or passing to be made in
safety.
(c) The driver of a vehicle shall not overtake or pass any other vehicle proceeding in the same direction, at any railway
grade crossing, or at any intersection of highways, unless such intersection or crossing is controlled by traffic signal, or
unless permitted to do so by a watchman or a peace officer, except on a highway having two or more lanes for movement of
traffic in one direction where the driver of a vehicle may overtake or pass another vehicle on the right. Nothing in this section
shall be construed to prohibit a driver overtaking or passing, upon the right, another vehicle which is making or about to
make a left turn.
4. Thus, a legal presumption arose that the bus driver was negligent 3 a presumption Kapalaran was unable to overthrow.
5. The jeepney driver, seeing the cars closest to the intersection on the opposite side of the highway come to a stop to give
way to him, had the right to assume that other vehicles further away and behind the stopped cars would similarly come to a
stop and not seek illegally to overtake the stopped vehicles and come careening into the intersection at an unsafe speed.
6. Petitioner's bus was still relatively far away from the intersection when the jeepney entered the same; the bus collided
head on into the jeepney because the bus had been going at an excessively high velocity immediately before and at the time
of overtaking the stopped cars, and so caught the jeepney within the intersection. It was also the responsibility of the bus
driver to see to it, when it overtook the two (2) cars ahead which had stopped at the intersection, that the left lane of the road
within the intersection and beyond was clear. The point of impact was on the left side of the intersection (the light lane so
far as concerns the jeepney coming from the opposite side), which was precisely the lane or side on which the jeepney had
a right to be.
7. Kapalaran argues that there was no justification for holding it, the employer, liable for damages, considering that such
liability was premised upon the bus driver's negligence and that petitioner "as mere employer" was not guilty of such
negligence or imprudence. This contention in thoroughly unpersuasive. The patent and gross negligence on the part of the
petitioner Kapalaran's driver raised the legal presumption that Kapalaran as employer was guilty of negligence either in the
selection or in the supervision of its bus driver.
8. Where the employer is held liable for damages, it has of course a right of recourse against its own negligent employee. If
petitioner Kapalaran was interested in maintaining its right of recourse against or reimbursement from its own driver, it
should have appealed from that portion of the trial court's decision which had failed to hold the bus driver is not "merely
subsidiary," and is not limited to cases where the employee "cannot pay his liability" nor are private respondents compelled
first to proceed against the bus driver.
9. The liability of the employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior
recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee. So far as the record shows,
petitioner Kapalaran was unable to rebut the presumption of negligence on its own part. The award of moral damages against
petitioner Kapalaran is not only entirely in order; it is also quite modest considering Dionisio Shinyo's death during the
pendency of this petition, a death hastened by, if not directly due to, the grievous injuries sustained by him in the violent
collision.
10. The law requires petitioner as common carrier to exercise extraordinary diligence in carrying and transporting their
passenger safely "as far as human care and foresight can proved, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with
due regard for all circumstances."
11. In requiring the highest possible degree of diligence from common carriers and creating a presumption of negligence
against them, the law compels them to curb the recklessness of their drivers. While the immediate beneficiaries of the
standard of extraordinary diligence are, of course, the passengers and owners of cargo carried by a common carrier, they are
not only persons that the law seeks to benefit. For if common carriers carefully observed the statutory standard of
extraordinary diligence in respect of their own passengers, they cannot help but simultaneously benefit pedestrians and the
owners and passengers of other vehicles who are equally entitled to the safe and convenient use of our roads and highways.
12. The law seeks to stop and prevent the slaughter and maiming of people (whether passengers or not) and the destruction
of property (whether freight or not) on our highways by buses, the very size and power of which seem often to inflame the
minds of their drivers. Article 2231 of the Civil Code explicitly authorizes the imposition of exemplary damages in cases of
quasi-delicts "if the defendant acted with gross negligence."
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: In requiring the highest possible degree of diligence from common carriers and creating a
presumption of negligence against them, the law compels them to curb the recklessness of their drivers. While the immediate
beneficiaries of the standard of extraordinary diligence are, of course, the passengers and owners of cargo carried by a
common carrier, they are not only persons that the law seeks to benefit. For if common carriers carefully observed the
statutory standard of extraordinary diligence in respect of their own passengers, they cannot help but simultaneously benefit
pedestrians and the owners and passengers of other vehicles who are equally entitled to the safe and convenient use of our
roads and highways.
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S): WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on certiorari is DENIED for lack
of merit and the Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED, except (1) that the award of exemplary damages
to Dionisio Shinyo shall be restored and increased from P10,000.00 to P25,000.00, and (2) that the grant of attorney's fees
and litigation expenses in the sum of P15,000.00 to Dionisio Shinyo shall similarly be restored. Costs against petitioner.