GETTING CLOSER TO

USA IS A FOREIGN
POLICY BLUNDER??
BY

)
Saurabh Pandey
Junior research fellow(JRF)
NET, MA, B.TECH
3 Years teaching experience
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• Indian interests are being particularly

affected by the US decision to link its
sanctions on Iran and Russia with India,
with the Countering America‘s Adversaries
through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) having
the potential to damage India's defence
preparedness.
• There has been an overwhelming impression
that India is stooping to become a regional
ally of the US in the latter‘s new strategic
theatre of ―Indo-Pacific‖ to keep the sea lanes
of communication open, albeit in the pretext
of countering China.
• But moving closer to Washington has been seen as
having had a wide-ranging adverse impact.
• Firstly, it is forcing India to walk a diplomatic
tightrope between the US, Russia and China.

• Secondly, relying too much on fickle US

policies appears risky. As can be seen on the
trade front, Trump is backing out on his
commitments to other US friends and allies.
And there is a lurking feeling that the US was
not forthcoming in articulating clear support
for India during the Doklam standoff.
• Thirdly, closer military ties with the US could
draw India into a larger political quagmire in
terms of attracting the attention of global
Islamic terrorist groups which are committed to
undermining the interests of America and its
allies wherever possible.

• lastly, the process could eventually result in

the US making a Pakistan (a long-time client
state or banana republic) out of India..
•
• Atop all challenging issues lies the
escalating trade conflict between New
Delhi and Washington. India has decided to
retaliate against the US by increasing
import tariffs on 30 American products
amounting to $240 million. This is in
response to the US imposing tariffs on
aluminium and steel imports from India in
March 2018.
• For example, among the notable items on which the
import duty has been raised by India include US
products like Harley-Davidson motorbikes. These
retaliatory ‘protectionist’ measures seem simply
symbolic in nature and are not comparable to the
US-China trade war. While trade issues could still be
resolved through dialogue, any escalation of
retaliatory steps could widen the friction and even
spill over into other areas of cooperation.
• India has decided to defy the US diktat and
made it clear that Trump‘s ―me first
approach‖ is not acceptable and that it would
not be guided by any other country on its
import of weapons.

• It announced its commitment to follow UN

sanctions, not US sanctions on Iran.
•
• The abrupt postponement of the first 2+2
dialogue between India and the US, earlier
scheduled for July 6, appeared to have
everything to do with the issues of trade and
sanctions, among others.
• The above issues have probably triggered a
change in New Delhi‘s thinking, for they not
only caused serious unease in India but also
upset its strategic calculations.
• Russian Displeasure
• Obviously, the Russians couldn‘t have been pleased
with India switching over to the American military
supply chain system.

• However, Moscow hasn‘t made this a critical issue

and continues to transfer the most sensitive
strategic armaments to India – although it could
have virtually brought the entire Indian defence
system to its knees by stopping its supply chain
including spares.
• What really appears to have miffed Russia was
India‘s decision to forego its strategic balance by
joining the ‗Quadrilateral‘ talks with the US,
Australia and Japan since 2017. India‘s steps to
joining this bloc-type security architecture in the
‗Indo-Pacific‘ has evidently raised hackles in
Moscow, with Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov
strongly advising India to stick to "non-bloc
principle‖.
• Modi‘s keynote speech at the Shangri La Dialogue in
Singapore seemed a calibrated move to prevent India falling
into a dangerous geopolitical trap vis-à-vis US, Russia and
China.

• The subtext of the speech was to reaffirm India‘s

commitment to multi-polarity, uphold the principles
and values of peace and progress, and fight against
―global dominance‖. The world knew that India was as
a power bloc in itself with nations around the world
looking up to New Delhi for guidance and support.
Modi‘s Singapore speech was welcomed by every
country including China.
• Modi avoided making a reference to the ‗Quad‘ in
Singapore and instead spoke out strongly against
―protectionism‖ – an oblique reference to the Trump
policy.

• Although he praised the US ―Indo-Pacific‖ strategy, he

also made it clear that India does not see it ―as a club
of limited members (or) as a grouping that seeks to
dominate‖ which strongly implied that India is not
seeing it as an alliance system. In fact, when US
officials described India as the ―fulcrum‖ of or
―central‖ to US Indo-Pacific strategy, Modi deflected
the idea by affirming the centrality of the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
• Modi talked about seeking closer ties with China and termed
―stable relations‖ between the two countries as ―an important
factor for global peace and progress.‖

• Modi went a step further and advised other powers

to avoid taking a confrontationist line to prevent
―great power rivalries‖.

• These statements were significant given that they

were made about a week ahead of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Qingdao.
At Qingdao, he joined other leaders in committing to
the "Shanghai Spirit" – a term coined in 2006 to invert
the Cold War-era mentality.
India‘s Options
• Indian interlocutors seeking exemptions from
higher tariffs on Indian items in the US market
need to understand that Trump is likely to
agree to such a step only if he is able to make
enough profits by selling US arms to India.This
explains the US attempts to scuttle India‘s
ongoing defence deals with Russia.Trump
knows that America can sell India a glut of
arms by playing up Indians‘ Sinophobia.
• To be clear, there can‘t be an Asia without China
just as there can‘t be an Asia without India.

• Realising that India can no longer continue with

the old habit of remaining a geopolitical bystander
in Asia, a nuanced shift in Modi‘s policy of moving
away from the West-led confrontationist approach
is a welcome move.
• Yet, one should be cautiously optimistic about the Wuhan
process moving forward in the right direction.

• Possibly it does not represent a change of hearts but only a

tactical adjustment with both sides buying a temporary truce
due to the imperatives of their respective external and domestic
agenda.

• For the overall atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust to go will

take time and require sustained efforts by both sides. But the
process of resetting the ties may have begun in Wuhan, probably
with India‘s willingness to stop playing the Dalai Lama card in
return for China‘s willingness to end using Pakistan as a proxy.