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G.R. No.

L-33646 January 28, 1975 instituted with the Philippine Fisheries Commission on April 1,
1965 3 the administrative protest against Doromal's fishpond
AMADO LACUESTA, petitioner, vs. A. MELENCIO permit over the whole area and filed his application over one-
HERRERA in her capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch half of the area and asked for the partition thereof with
HEIRS OF ROBERTO DOROMAL Represented by Florita
Doromal, respondents. The Commissioner of Fisheries denied petitioner's protest and
application. On timely appeal, however, then Secretary of
Gregorio A. Palabrica for petitioner. Agriculture and Natural Resources Fernando Lopez rendered
O. F. Santos, Nolasco and Caunca for private respondents. his decision of November 21, 1968 in favor of petitioner.

TEEHANKEE, J.: The Secretary cited in his decision the Davao court's findings
which "conclusively proved that a partnership was established
The Court grants the petition for certiorari and sets aside the between the parties" and noted that "this fact is also admitted by
challenged preliminary injunction issued by respondent court appellees Doromal's in their reply memorandum." He then made
restraining the enforcement of the administrative decision his own factual findings supporting his conclusion that
rendered by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources "indispensable aid both material or otherwise (was) extended by
awarding one-half of the disputed fishpond area to petitioner and spouses appellants [petitioner and his spouse] in securing
sustained on appeal by the Office of the President. It is (Doromal's) permit" pursuant to their oral partnership
established doctrine that where as in the case at bar there is no agreement. 4
showing of fraud, collusion, arbitrariness, illegality, imposition or
mistake on the part of the executive and administrative officials The Secretary in his decision further ruled that "this office cannot
in rendering their questioned decision or of a total lack of just simply ignore the equitable rights of [petitioner] over one-
evidence to support the same, such administrative decisions are half of the fishpond in question" as judicially determined by the
entitled to great weight and respect and will not be interfered Davao court and rejected respondents Doromals' contention
with by the courts. that petitioner should be deemed as having abandoned the
partnership and barred from claiming in further interest in the
By final and executory judgment of September 3, 1963 of the fishpond as a result of the judgment obtained by them in the
Davao court of first instance, in an action 1 for specific Davao court, holding that
performance, partition and accounting of a 125.5-hectare
fishpond area, 2 the said court found that herein petitioner as ... Suffice it to say that the amount of money ordered by the court
plaintiff therein was indeed a partner with defendants therein to be paid by appellees to appellants represent the latter's
(the spouses Roberto Doromal and Florita Lacuesta Doromal, contribution and share in the development of and income from
brother-in-law and sister of petitioner and subsequently the fishpond in question. This cannot be taken to mean that
substituted after Doromal's death by respondents heirs of appellants have abandoned the partnership or that they are
Roberto Doromal, represented by Florita Doromal) in the said barred from claiming interest in the fishpond. Precisely Civil
fishpond, having contributed money, property and effort thereto Case No. 3107 was brought to court for specific performance,
in pursuance of their partnership agreement. It accordingly partition and accounting in view of the breach of contract by the
rendered judgment in favor of petitioner, as follows: appellees. Specifically, the Court resolved only specific
performance and accounting, leaving the issue the on partition
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby entered sentencing the to this Office for resolution. This being the case, and considering
defendants to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P14,945.10 the foregoing, findings of facts and the law applicable herein, we
representing plaintiffs' contribution in the development of the cannot see our way clear why the whole area of 125.5 hectares
fishpond in litigation; and additional sum of P8,889.87 of the disputed fishpond should be held solely by the appellees
representing the share of the plaintiffs in the income from the on lease.
fishpond from 1951 to 1959, and that defendants shall further
render an accounting of the income from the fishpond from 1960 The Secretary therefore ordered in his decision that
up to the date when this decision becomes final and pay to the
plaintiffs one-half (½) of the amount of the total income for the IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the
said period as plaintiffs' share in the income. letter-order of the Fisheries Commissioner dated January 4,
1968 is hereby declared without force and effect; that the area
As the fishpond formed part of the public lands, however, the of 125.5 hectares covered by FP No. F-1250-F in the name of
Davao court declared itself without authority over the complaint's Roberto Doromal should be divided into two equal parts in such
prayer for partition, holding that "(T)he only difficulty in the case a manner that the parties should share equally both the
is whether that portion of the agreement wherein the parties developed and the undeveloped portions including the portions
should divide the fishpond after its development may be carried leased to third parties which leases are hereby also declared
out. A fishpond does not become the property of the applicant without force and effect. Appellees are hereby directed to render
after approval of the permit. The title is still in government. Since an accounting of rentals paid by them and of all expenses
it is the government that grants the permit, the plaintiffs may not incurred as fees, surcharges and the like and in the development
compel the defendants to have the fishpond divided between or improvement of and all income received from the fishpond
them for before the plaintiffs may operate what might pertain to from the date the last accounting per the decision in Civil Case
them, it is necessary that they should secure a permit from the No. 3107 was complied with up to the date when the partition
government." herein ordered shall be actually effected and all such rentals,
expenses and income shall be divided and/or shared equally by
Armed with the explicit findings of the said court as to his right both parties. The District Fisheries Officer concerned is hereby
as a partner to one-half of the fishpond in question, petitioner
directed to effect the partition if the parties herein cannot come Undaunted, respondents (as petitioners below) then filed on
to an agreement as to the manner thereof. December 8, 1970 a petition for certiorari and injunction
docketed as Civil Case No. 81623 of respondent judge's court 7
Not content therewith, respondents Doromals appealed the wherein they prayed that the decisions of the Office of the
Secretary's adverse decision to the Office of the President. President and of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Under date of February 27, 1970, said Office thru Honorable Resources in favor of petitioner be annulled "for having been
Ponciano G. A. Mathay as Acting Assistant Executive Secretary rendered without and/or in excess of jurisdiction and/or with
and acting by authority of the President, rendered its decision grave abuse of discretion and contrarily to law and public policy
which "dismiss(ed) the instant appeal and affirm(ed) the and vitiated by mistake" and for a writ of preliminary injunction
decision appealed from." 5 against enforcement of said decisions.

The Office of the President once again rejected as "untenable" Respondent court required petitioner to answer respondents'
and "deserving of scant consideration" respondents' repetitious petition and after a summary hearing and receiving the parties'
contention of abandonment and loss by petitioner of his memoranda issued on March 7, and March 29, 1971 its order
partnership rights to the fishpond as a result of the Davao court and writ of preliminary injunction 8 against the enforcement of
judgment, as follows: the administrative decisions rendered in favor of petitioner, by
virtue of its inclination to respondents' oft-repeated view that the
In support of their appeal, the Heirs of Roberto Doromal contend Davao court judgment adjudicated the partnership as terminated
that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources erred in and petitioner thereby lost all right to claim his half of the
ordering partition and accounting, since the court's decision in fishpond area.
Civil Case No. 3107 had settled and put to finality the rights of
the parties over the fishpond area. This contention is untenable. Hence, the petition at bar for certiorari and prohibition. The Court
It appears that what the court ordered was merely the specific per its resolution of June 22, 1971 required respondents to
performance and accounting of profits because of the breach of answer the petition and ordered the issuance of a preliminary
partnership agreement between Amado Lacuesta and Roberto injunction against respondent court's questioned preliminary
Doromal over the fishpond area. However, it did not touch on, injunction order and writ upon a P5,000-bond.
and in fact disclaimed jurisdiction over, the issue of partition of
the fishpond area, the reason therefor being that the same is still Petitioner filed his memorandum in lieu of oral argument and the
government land. case was deemed submitted for decision on February 11, 1972,
after respondents without explanation of any sort failed to file
Indeed, jurisdiction over public lands, including subject fishpond their memorandum notwithstanding seven extensions
area is vested in the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural requested by their counsel and granted by the Court.
Resources the Public Land Act and the Fisheries Act (Director
of Lands vs. Abordo, 74 Phil. 44; Francisco vs. Rodriguez, 99 The Court finds the petition to be meritorious. A mere reading of
Phil. 1033), and over such lands the courts of justice have no the facts and findings of record which are undisputed by
jurisdiction (Francisco vs. Verdadero, CA-G.R. No. 16421-R, respondent and of the legal basis of the Secretary's action and
May 30, 1959). It is axiomatic that the court must have decision in dividing the fishpond area into two equal parts (both
jurisdiction over the subject matter or parties in order that its developed and undeveloped portions) and awarding one-half
decision may operate as a valid adjudication of the controversy thereof to petitioner as a recognized partner entitled thereto in
(2 Moran 321, citing Gotamco vs. Chan Seng, 46 Phil 523). the exercise of his jurisdiction over lands of the public domain, 9
as sustained on appeal by the Office of the President which
xxx xxx xxx expressly found no abuse of discretion on the Secretary's part
in rendering the decision, supra, 10 suffices to show that
Finally, appellants maintain that the appealed decision would respondent court exceeded its authority and acted with grave
honor and still recognize the partnership agreement which was abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned injunction in
terminated by the decision of the court in Civil Case No. 3107. derogation of the administrative authority legitimately exercised
In other words, then allege that with the return, as ordered by by said officials.
the court, to the Lacuesta couple of the amount contributed by
them in the partnership, the latter have no more right over the As stressed in Deluao vs. Casteel, 11 "(I)n this jurisdiction, the
fishpond area and the former, by virtue of their fishpond permit, Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources possesses
are the only ones entitled thereto. This proposition deserves executive and administrative powers with regard to the survey,
scant consideration. The court, it is noted, recognized the classification, lease, sale or any other form of concession or
validity and enforceability of the agreement between Amado disposition and management of the lands of the public domain,
Lacuesta and Roberto Doromal in fact, it decided the issues on and, more specifically, with regard to the grant or withholding of
specific performance and accounting but left that on partition of licenses, permits, leases and contracts over portions of the
the fishpond area to the Department of Agriculture and Natural public domain to be utilized as fishponds. Thus, we held in Pajo,
Resources for resolution because the same was still a part of et al., vs. Ago, et al. (L-15414, June 30, 1960), and reiterated in
the public domain. The appealed decision of the Secretary of Ganitanao vs. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
Agriculture and Natural Resources is a logical consequence of et al., (L-21167, March 31, 1966), that
the court decision that, while partition of the fishpond area is a
proper relief for Amado Lacuesta, only land authorities can grant "... (T)he powers granted to the Secretary of Agriculture and
such relief. Hence, there is really no merit in the contention of Commerce (Natural Resources) by law regarding the disposition
the Heirs of Roberto Doromal that the Secretary of Agriculture of public lands such as granting of licenses, permits, leases, and
and Natural Resources exceeded his jurisdiction or abused his contracts, or approving, rejecting, reinstating, or cancelling
discretion in rendering the appealed decision. 6 applications, or deciding conflicting applications, are all
executive and administrative in nature. It is a well-recognized
principle that purely administrative and discretionary functions EVANGELISTA v. JARENCIO
may not be interfered with by the courts (Coloso v. Board of G.R. No. L-29274 November 27, 1975
Accountancy, G. R. No. L-5750, April 20, 1953). In general,
courts have no supervising power over the proceedings and FACTS:
actions of the administrative departments of the government. This is an original action for certiorari and prohibition with
This is generally true with respect to acts involving the exercise preliminary injunction, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
of judgment or discretion, and findings of fact. (54 Am. Jur. 558- seeking to annul and set aside the order of respondent Judge,
559). Findings of fact by an administrative board or official, the Honorable Hilarion J. Jarencio, Presiding Judge of the Court
following a hearing, are binding upon the courts and will not be of First Instance of Manila, dated July 1, 1968, in Civil Case No.
disturbed except where the board or official has gone beyond 73305, entitled "Fernando Manalastas vs. Sec. Ramon D.
his statutory authority, exercised unconstitutional powers or Bagatsing, etc
clearly acted arbitrarily and without regard to his duty or with
grave abuse of discretion ..." Pursuant to his special powers and duties under Section 64 of
the Revised Administrative Code, the President of the
The main prop of respondents' contention before respondent Philippines created the Presidential Agency on Reforms and
court that the Davao court judgment adjudicated the partnership Government Operations (PARGO) under Executive Order No. 4
between the principal parties as terminated and petitioner has of January 7, 1966. Purposedly, he charged the Agency with the
no more right to the fishpond area was succinctly correctly following functions and responsibilities:
disposed of by the Office of the President when it pointed out  To investigate all activities involving or affecting
that "the court ... recognized the validity and enforceability of the immoral practices, graft and corruptions, smuggling (physical or
partnership agreement between Amado Lacuesta and Roberto technical), lawlessness, subversion, and all other activities
Doromal in fact, it decided the issues on specific performance which are prejudicial to the government and the public interests,
and accounting but left that on partition of the fishpond area to and to submit proper recommendations to the President of the
the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources for Philippines.
resolution because the same was still a part of the public
domain."  To investigate cases of graft and corruption and
violations of Republic Acts Nos. 1379 and 3019, and gather
Even assuming arguendo that the Davao court's judgment necessary evidence to establish prima facie, acts of graft and
terminated the partnership between the parties, the DANR acquisition of unlawfully amassed wealth ... .
Secretary administratively acted within the legitimate exercise of  To receive and evaluate, and to conduct fact-finding
his authority over public lands in considering in effect that investigations of sworn complaints against the acts, conduct or
Doromal's original fishpond permit application, although behavior of any public official or employee and to file and
obtained solely in his name contrary to his agreement with prosecute the proper charges with the appropriate agency.
petitioner, was in fairness and equity deemed to be held in trust For a realistic performance of these functions, the President
for both of them, and in consequently granting petitioner's vested in the Agency all the powers of an investigating
protest and awarding him one-half of the fishpond area. committee under Sections 71 and 580 of the Revised
Administrative Code, including the power to summon witnesses
The petition must therefore be granted on the strength of the by subpoena or subpoena duces tecum, administer oaths, take
established doctrine that where as in the case at bar there is no testimony or evidence relevant to the investigation.
showing that there was fraud, collusion, arbitrariness, illegality,
imposition or mistake on the part of the Office of the President Whereupon, on June 7, 1968, petitioner Quirico Evangelista, as
or a department head, (such as the Secretary of Agriculture and Undersecretary of the Agency, issued to respondent Fernando
Natural Resources in the present case), in rendering their Manalastas, then Acting City Public Service Officer of Manila, a
questioned decisions or of a total lack of substantial evidence to subpoena ad testificandum commanding him "to be and appear
support the same, such administrative decisions are entitled to as witness at the Office of the PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY ON
great weight and respect and will not be interfered with by the REFORMS AND GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS ... then and
courts. 12 there to declare and testify in a certain investigation pending
With the disposition of the case on this decisive issue, the Court
deems it unnecessary to pass upon the other issue raised by ISSUE: Whether the Agency, acting thru its officials, enjoys the
petitioner questioning the jurisdiction of respondent court to authority to issue subpoenas in its conduct of fact-finding
issue the injunction writ to be enforced against acts to be investigations.
performed outside its territorial boundaries. 13
HELD: YES. It has been essayed that the life blood of the
ACCORDINGLY, the petition for a writ of certiorari is granted administrative process is the flow of fact, the gathering, the
and the questioned injunction order and writ of respondent court organization and the analysis of evidence. Investigations are
dated March 7, 1971 and March 29, 1971, respectively, are useful for all administrative functions, not only for rule making,
hereby annulled and set aside; and respondent court is directed adjudication, and licensing, but also for prosecuting, for
to dispose of the case below in accordance with the settled supervising and directing, for determining general policy, for
doctrine of non-interference by the courts with decisions of recommending, legislation, and for purposes no more specific
executive and administrative officials as stated in the Court's than illuminating obscure areas to find out what if anything
opinion. With costs against private respondents. should be done. An administrative agency may be authorized to
make investigations, not only in proceedings of a legislative or
judicial nature, but also in proceedings whose sole purpose is to
obtain information upon which future action of a legislative or
judicial nature may be taken and may require the attendance of
witnesses in proceedings of a purely investigatory nature. It may On September 9, 1969, the Mayor of San Juan, Rizal issued a
conduct general inquiries into evils calling for correction, and to business license and/or permit authorizing petitioner Austin
report findings to appropriate bodies and make Hardware Company, Inc. to engage in the business of general
recommendations for actions. hardware manufacture at No. 115 Lope K. Santos St., San Juan,
Rizal. On July 7, 1970, said Mayor issued a business license
We recognize that in the case before Us, petitioner Agency indorse permit authorizing All Steel Products, Inc. to engage in
draws its subpoena power from Executive Order No. 4, para. 5 the business of manufacturing steel products, also at No. 115
which, in an effectuating mood, empowered it to "summon Lope K. Santos St., San Juan, Rizal. In accordance with the
witness, administer oaths, and take testimony relevant to the licenses thus issued, petitioners Austin Hardware Company,
investigation" with the authority "to require the production of and All Steel Products, Inc. have been engaged in the business
documents under a subpoena duces tecum or otherwise, therein described, and to maintain the same they had, of the
subject in all respects to the same restrictions and qualifications year 1974, in good faith invested considerable amounts s
as apply in judicial proceedings of a similar character." Such capital.
subpoena power operates in extenso to all the functions of the
Agency as laid out in the aforequoted sub-paragraphs (b),(e), On September 19, 1973, the Parents-Teachers Association of
and (h). It is not bordered by nor is it merely exercisable, as Pedro Cruz Elementary School addressed a letter to the Mayor
respondents would have it, in quasi-judicial or adjudicatory of San Juan, Rizal, alleging that the operations of the two
function under sub-paragraph (b). The functions enumerated in petitioners produce nuisance, by reason of the facts that (1)
all these sub-paragraphs (b), (e), and (h) interlink or intertwine Lope K. Santos being a very narrow street, the heavy trucks by
with one another with the principal aim of meeting the very petitioners cause a traffic jam thereon and the blowing of horns
purpose of the creation of the Agency, which is to forestall and disturbs the classes going on in the school; (2) the unloading of
erode nefarious activities and anomalies in the civil service. To steel bars creates much noise detrimental to the pupils learning;
hold that the subpoena power of the Agency is confined to mere (3) the shop already in operation emits a foul odor, causing air
quasi-judicial or adjudicatory functions would therefore imperil pollution dangerous to the pupils' health; and (4) it is possible
or inactiviate the Agency in its investigatory functions under sub- that chemicals and other combustible materials are stored inside
paragraphs (e) and (h). More than that, the enabling authority the factory, which materials constitute fire lizards to the school
itself (Executive Order No. 4, para. 5) fixes no distinction when and other nearby residential houses.
and in what function should the subpoena power be exercised.
Similarly, We see no reason to depart from the established rule On September 20,1973, a number of residents of L.K.. Santos
that forbids differentiation when the law itself makes none. Basa Streets and the Fernandez Compound likewise addressed
a letter of the same tenor to the Mayor, further stating therein
There is no doubt that the fact-finding investigations being that the drainage system of petitioners' compound is faulty thus
conducted by the Agency upon sworn statements implicating causing seepage of liquid into the neighborhood, and that the
certain public officials of the City Government of Manila in warehouse causes so much noise even at nightime, by reason
anomalous transactions fall within the Agency's sphere of of the machineries therein installed, that restlessness is caused
authority and that the information sought to be. in the community.

On September 26, 1973, private respondent Elenita H. Manzano

G.R. No. L-41754 February 27, 1976 wrote a similar letter to the Mayor, also complaining of the
alleged nuisance.
PRODUCTS, INC., petitioners, The Mayor of San Juan, Rizal, acting upon the aforesmentioned
vs. complaints, referred the matter to the Municipal Engineer and to
THE COURT OF APPEALS, ELENITA H. MANZANO and the Municipal Health Officer. The matter was likewise referred
FRANCISCO INOCENCIO, respondents. by the Mayor to the Municipal Council for investigation, on the
basis of its power "to declare and abate nuisances" in
Antonio Gaw & Associates and Edit Barot for petitioners. accordance with Section 2242(h) of the Revised Administrative
Vicente Raul Almacen for private respondents. Code. In turn, the Council, by Resolution No. 228, dated October
25, 1973, referred the same to the National Pollution Control
ANTONIO, J.: Commission for verification. In their reports dated November 27
and 28, 1973, the senior mechanical engineer and another
The basic issue in this petition for certiorari and prohibition is mechanical engineer of the Commission stated that, with
whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals acted in excess respect to Austin Hardware, the "noise level created by the
of its jurisdiction in enjoining the respondent judge "from loading and unloading of steel sheets was 56db's, which is
continuing with the proceedings in Civil Case No. 19233", considered normal in a residential area", and that, with respect
(Austin Hardware Company, Inc., et al. vs. The Mayor of San to All Steel Products, Inc., "sampling the noise level conducted
Juan, defendant, and Elenita H. Manzano, et al., intervenors) at the complaint's house and located at the back of the firm's
and the private respondents (Austin Hardware Company, Inc., residential area." They, however, remarked that "although at the
et al) "from continuing the construction of a commercial house time of the inspection, the noise level was normal — it is
from maintaining a hardware business and a factory for the apparent that the noise created during actual construction would
manufacture of steel products at or in the vicinity of No. 115 L.K.. be above normal. Added to this would be the noise resulting
Santos St., San Juan, Rizal" and in declaring them in contempt from the operation of the machine shop, mainly coming out from
for disregarding such order. the building openings at the upper walls of the All Steel Products
Shop." They recommended that the "municipality should be very
The instant petition is premised upon the following allegations: careful in issuing building permits specially for structures that will

be used for industrial or manufacturing purposes, that will be to further restrain the officials concerned "from enforcing or
located in residential areas." implementing the order of defendant Mayor revoking their
business as hardware and steel products manufacturers."
On February 13, 1974, the Municipal Council rendered its
decision on the matter, the dispositive portion of which decision Private respondents intervened in the above-named case and
reads as follows: filed therein a motion to lift the restraining order but the same
was denied by the court in an order dated September 5, 1974.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this Council in Session A motion for reconsideration of said order was likewise denied.
Assembled, holds; Thereupon, private respondents filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition in the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. No.
1. That the license and/or permit to operate the Austin 03932-SP, entitled "Elenita H. Manzano and Francisco
Hardware Co., Inc. should be as it is hereby declared valid, legal Inocencio, etc. vs. Hon. Gregorio G. Pineda, Austin Hardware
and subsiiisting; and Company, Inc., and All Steel Products, Inc.", praying for a writ
of preliminary injunction restraining respondent judge from
2. That the Municipal Mayor should cancel and/or revoke continuing with the proceedings in Civil Case No. 19233, and,
the license and/or permit to operate the manufacturing activities after due hearing, declaring the writ of injunction permanent,
of the Austin Hardware Co., Inc. and the All Steel Products, Inc. ordering the dismissal of Civil Case No. 19233, setting aside as
as the chief executive officer of the municipal government null and void all the proceedings thereon, and such other relief
pursuant to his duties under Section 2194 of the Revised as may be just and equitable under the premises.
Administrative Code to see to it that the laws are faithfully
executed. On March 17, 1975, in accordance with its resolution issued on
the same day, the Court of Appeals issued the writ of preliminary
Accordingly, the Mayor addressed a letter to the petitioners, injunction complained of in this petition, which enjoined "the
advising them that: respondent Judge from continuing with the proceedings in Civil
Case No. 19233, and the private respondents from continuing
By virtue of the Decision of the Municipal Council, dated the construction of a commercial house and from maintaining a
February 13, 1974, the licenses-permits issued in your favor to hardware business and a factory for the manufacture of steel
establish and, operate manufacturing activities, at the premises products at or in the vicinity of No. 115 L.K. Santos St., San
complained of, to wit: Juan, Rizal, until further orders."

(a) Application for Business License of Austin Hardware On March 19, 1975, private respondents filed a petition in the
Co., approved on September 8, 1969, as general hardware appellate, court citing petitioners for contempt. The petition for
manufacturer; prohibition and certiorari, as well as the petition to cite petitioners
for contempt, was orally argued on April 16, 1975. During the
(b) Application for Business License of All Steel Products, hearing, petitioners raised the issue that the restraining order
Inc., approved on July 7, 1970, as manufacturer of steel should not have included the stopping of their hardware
products; and business, since Austin Hardware's license to operate a
hardware store with storage facilities is not involved in Civil Case
(c) Permit to operate (No. JR-73-1145) issued to All Steel No. 19233 because neither the Municipal Council nor the Mayor
Products, Inc., dated January 31, 1973, for steel manufacturing, of San Juan, Rizal, cancelled or revoked it.
is/are hereby cancelled and/or revoked and, therefore, without
force and effect, after five (5) days from receipt hereof. The Appellate Court in its resolution of August 19, 1975, found
petitioners' contention devoid of merit, declared them guilty of
Please be guided accordingly. contempt and imposed upon them a fine of P500.00.

Two motions for the reconsideration of the revocation having I

been denied by the Mayor, petitioners filed an ordinary action
for injunction in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Civil Case We find the petition without merit.
No. 19233), alleging among others, that the revocation of their
licenses or permits violated the requirements of procedural due The Appellate Court's action is based on the following:
process because the investigation which led to the revocation of
their licenses/permits was not to determine the presence of a Careful examination of their pleadings and annexes do not
ground for revocation, namely, violation of a zonification clearly bear private respondents' pretensions. The maintenance
ordinance of San Juan, but an alleged nuisance produced by of a hardware store is squarely dismissed by defendants in
their operations. intervention in the basic case (Par. 6, sub-par. 2, Answer in
Intervention, Page 31, Records), while the construction of a
Upon application of petitioners, the Court of First Instance, bodega or warehouse or storage facilities was raised by no less
presided over by Judge Gregorio G. Pineda, issued a restraining than private respondents themselves-in their 2nd cause of
order enjoining the. Mayor of San Juan "and all municipal action (page 150, Records) in Civil Case No. 19233, in their
officers, their agents, representatives and/or persons acting petition for the reconsideration of Exhibit '13', to include the
upon their orders or in their place and stead from enforcing or construction of a warehouse (p. 154, Records). Similarly, the
implementing the order of defendant Mayor revoking the Annexes '2' to '7' and '9' to their Additional Comment found on
building permit and stopping the construction of Austin pages 193-194 of Records refer to a Mayor's Permit but say
Hardware's warehouse or bodega at No. 115 L.K.. Santos Street nothing about a limit to operate a hardware store. The Mayor's
... or in any manner or form interfering with the construction of Permit which the records yield is that found on page 87 of the
said hardware or bodega" The writ was subsequently amended records introduced as Annex to Intervenor's Motion for
Reconsideration which bears Permit No. 309-5-69, dated At two (2:00) p.m., after lunch and before returning to the court
January 15, 1969, expiring on December 31, 1969. the undersigned requested Mrs. Manzano to bring her back to
the premises. Upon arrival at the compound, even while in the
On their part, the petitioners opposed any amendment to the street yet, the undersigned heard a loud disturbing noise she
preliminary injunction alleging that private respondents' claim of could feel a strong vibration coming from a machine i the new
having a license to operate a hardware store with store facilities warehouse.
from their interpretation of the decision of the Municipal council.
The fact, however, is that said decision merely mentioned Upon verification, she saw a forklift in operation, lifting the
payment of a business permit from 1966, which was never painted metal rods and/or steel bars or metal bars and lowering
exhibited to the Municipal Council. Noteworthy also is the fact them at another place. While operating the forklift emanated a
that license fees for storage facilities began, as stated in same loud disturbing noise while the movement of the forklift as well
decision, only in 1970, thereby supporting the petitioners' of the falling of the long bars on the place where its transferred
contention that Austin Hardware was using just one permit — caused strong vibrations.
that one approved on September 8, 1969 — which was for a
general hardware manufacturer. Inside the machine shop — at the back portion thereof, three
laborers were operating a machine attached to a big ' acetylene
As We have stated, the Deputy Clerk of Court of the Division, tank welding a big metal or steel part; three (3) others were
Atty. Catalina C. Buena, accompanied by the lawyers of both around another machine which was apparently to start work
parties, was ordered to repair to the premises to verify whether thereon while a Chinese was tinkering with another machine
or not the steel production has been stopped and report her which was also plugged on.
findings to the Court. Here are the observations of the Deputy
Clerk of Court: The laborers in the middle bodega were just moving about to
start work but undersigned did not same the machine there
OBSERVATIONS — being operated.'

1. More than twenty (20) machines still connected and xxx xxx xxx
plugged to power source;
On these findings the representative of the Court made the
2. All fuse boxes of said machines on 'ON' position following remarks in her report:
indicating that machines were ready for use;
3. Some machines had steel rods mounted on them
indicating that machine work was going on before we arrived; 1. Definitely there is evidence that the steel
manufacturing operations of private respondents were being
4. Steel filings and copper filings, new — (evidenced lack continued even up to the morning of the date of 'said hearing
of rust on steel and shiny sheen of be the copper and steel and were in the afternoon of said date;
2. That even the hardware business and bodega of
5. One heavy drill had a piece of work mounted and the private respondent cannot be carried out without causing too
manager admitted they had worked on that (in-Ride new much noise and disturbance AS the goods stored therein are so
building); huge that they cannot be moved without the use of big machines
like a forklift or enormous lifting chains (like those used by boats
6. Acetylene and oxygen tanks inside new warehouse for anchorage) which produces disturbing loud noises and
and inside the shop were all plugged to electrical connections; strong vibrations while in operation. The undersigned also notes
that said parts and metals cannot be taken in and out of the
7. The stripper machine inside new warehouse had a compound except in big trucks — for besides being very heavy
steel plate mounted and a stripped plate beside it and metal was they are either very long or very wide.
still hot;
The foregoing facts prove that notwithstanding the restraining
8. Steel bars on floor just Painted, smell of paint strong. order and the injunction issued by this Court, private
respondents did not stop altogether operating their
Questioned by undersigned were several laborers seated manufacturing business. The observations of Atty. Buena that
resting outside the new warehouse, namely: she found —

1. Adolfo Ehen Dionisio Ng, Gomer Abad, who limited 1. About twenty (20) big machines were plugged in to
they were welding that morning, electrical connections with their individual switches open;

2. Alejandro Cabasa, Crispulo Colomba and Leodegario 2. The presence of scrap of iron on the flooring of the
de los Reyes — helpers and machinists in shop who admitted cutting machines showing recent use of said machines;
working on the shop in the morning,
3. The presence of another machine for cutting and/or for
3. Romeo de los Reyes — who claimed he was a the boring holes in metals in the middle of the bodega or warehouse
delivery truck. and which was plugged into a long extension electrical wire;

xxx xxx xxx 4. The presence of steel plates cut into strips with the use
of acetylene and oxygen cutters by the side of a stripper
machine which was still connected with acetylene and oxygen II
tanks nearby, and the steel strips still hot, showing that laborers
had just worked on them upon their arrival; The power to license necessarily carries with it the authority to
provide reasonable terms and conditions under which the
5. The fact that upon returning to the premises after lunch licensed business shall be conducted. The authority which
the investigator heard a loud disturbing noise and could feel a grants the license always retains the power to revoke it, "either
strong vibration coming from a machine inside the warehouse for cause of forfeiture or upon a change of policy and legislation
even while they were yet in the street; touching the subject. 2 In the case at bar, the permit to the Austin
Hardware Company, Inc. and the All Steel Products, Inc. was
6. The fact that a forklift was in operation lifting newly granted subject to the provisions of existing ordinances.
painted rods and/or steel bars and lowering them at another Likewise, petitioners' permit to construct a warehouse at 115
place causing a loud disturbing noise with strong vibration in the L.K. Santos St., San Juan, Rizal was subject to the condition
premises and inside the warehouse, a machine attached to the that its construction or use will not conflict with the provisions of
acetylene tank welding a big metal was being operated by 3 the zoning ordinance, otherwise the construction will be
laborers while 3 others around another while were about to start removed by the government at the expense of the permitee or
working on it, and a Chinese was tinkering with another machine licensee.
that was also plugged in;
It is not disputed that the business establishments of petitioners
show beyond doubt that private respondents have not complied were situated within the residential zone and, therefore, the
with the injunction issued by this Court. issuance of a license or permit in favor of the petitioners appears
violative of Section 2 of Municipal Ordinance No. 90, Series of
Moreover, it is admitted that respondents have continued to 1968, of San Juan, which provides that "No building permit,
operate a hardware store with storage facilities. But as found business license, or any other certificate of approval shall be
out, machineries were also installed in that store and warehouse issued by the municipality for commercial or industrial
which were undoubtedly in operating during the ocular establishments which shall be erected, operated, and
inspection. If in the operation of a hardware store private maintained within any residential zone, unless the site has been
respondents must also operate house machineries as found out, or so declared as commercial or industrial zone in the municipal
then with greater reason, the order of injunction should apply to council." It is precisely for this reason that the Municipal Mayor
the said business. It must be noted that the writ clearly enjoins of San Juan cancelled or revoked (a) the business license of the
the respondents ... from continuing the construction of a Austin Hardware Company, Inc. dated September 8, 1969 as
commercial house and from maintaining a hardware business general hardware manufacturer; (b) the business license of the
and a factory for the manufacture of steel products ... .' This All Steel Products, Inc. dated July 7, 1970 as manufacturer of
order is so worded specifically mentioning a hardware business steel products; and (c) the permit to operate issued ' to All Steel
to be included in its restriction. The private respondents tried to Products, Inc. dated January 31, 1973 for steel manufacturing.
justify their continuing operation of a hardware store with Since the obvious purpose of zoning is the protection of public
storage facilities with the excuse that the permit to run store was safety, health, convenience and welfare, it would have been
never nullified by the decision of the Municipal Council of San inconsistent with such purpose to have allowed the operation of
Juan, Rizal. The petitioners disagree and impute that private petitioners' manufacturing business in a residential zone.
respondents were probably misled by the wordings of the
decision of the Municipal Council. Considering that no separate It is true that petitioners insist that they have a separate permit
permit for the operation of a hardware store was exhibited by to operate the business of hardware store, but as found by the
private respondents, and that the various receipts of payments Court of Appeals, no separate permit for the operation of a
presented by private respondents do not show that they were in hardware store was shown by them and that the various receipts
payment of a license or permit to run a hardware store, we are of payments presented by petitioners do not show that they were
inclined to agree with the petitioners. Moreover if private in payment of a license or permit to run a hardware store. On
respondents ever had a license to operate a hardware store, the the contrary, as shown by the joint manifestation of the
new zonification ordinance of the town of San Juan Rizal shall petitioners and the private respondents dated November 27,
have nullified said permit. 1975, said parties admitted that in their conference with the
Municipal Mayor of San Juan, in the afternoon of November 22,
We therefore find that the petition to cite private respondents for 1975, "the Mayor informed them that he would maintain his act
contempt is meritorious. They have not stopped running their of revoking the permits and/or licenses of the petitioners as
store in which machines were found in operation. They try to hardware and steel products manufacturers and that he had not
justify their operations by saying that their right to operate a issued any Permit for the hardware store with storage facilities."
hardware is not covered by the injunction. The injunction order
has been received them. If they failed to get the exact scope of WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is
the injunction, they should have addressed themselves to this hereby dismissed and, accordingly, the writs prayed for denied,
Court for a clarification of the order, or for an amendment with costs against the petitioners.
thereof, as they subsequently did. Instead they have willfully
disobeyed a legal order of this Court.

The afore-mentioned findings are neither based on speculation

nor on a misapprehension of facts, but on substantial evidence.
This Court has consistently respected, with some few
exceptions, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals. Such
exceptions do not obtain here. 1

COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE FILIPINAS vs. matters whatsoever, to the exclusive discretion of the board, is
THE BOARD OF PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSIONERS not expressing its own will or the will of the State with respect to
the public utilities to which it refers.
Such a provision does not declare, or set out, or indicate what
COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DEFILIPINAS is a information the State requires, what is valuable to it, what it
foreign corporation organized under the laws of Spain and needs in order to impose correct and just taxation, supervision
engaged in business in the Philippine Islands as a common or control, or the facts which the State must have in order to deal
carrier of passengers and merchandise by water: On June 7, justly and equitably with such public utilities and to require them
1915, the Board of Public Utility Commissioners issued and to deal justly and equitably with the State. The Legislature
caused to be served an order to show cause why they should seems simply to have authorized the Board of Public Utility
not be required to present detailed annual reports respecting its Commissioners to require what information the board wants. It
finances and operations respecting the vessels owned and would seem that the Legislature, by the provision in question,
operated by it, in the form and containing the matters indicated delegated to the Board of Public Utility Commissioners all of its
by the model attached to the petition. They are ordered to powers over a given subject-matter in a manner almost
present annually on or before March first of each year a detailed absolute, and without laying down a rule or even making a
report of finances and operations of such vessels as are suggestion by which that power is to be directed, guided or
operated by it as a common carrier within the Philippine Islands, applied. The true distinction is between the delegation of power
in the form and containing the matters indicated in the model of to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to
annual report which accompanied the order to show cause what shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its
herein. execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.
The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be
made. The Supreme Court held that there was no delegation of
the authority of the board to require the report asked for on the
legislative power, it said: The Congress may not delegate its
ground that the provision of Act No.2307 relied on by said board
purely legislative powers to a commission, but, having laid down
as authority for such requirement was, if construed as conferring
the general rules of action under which a commission shall
such power, invalid as constituting an unlawful attempt on the
proceed, it may require of that commission the application of
part of the Legislature to delegate legislative power to the board.
such rules to particular situations and the investigation of facts,
It is cumbersome and unnecessarily prolix and that the
with a view to making orders in a particular matter within the
preparation of the same would entail an immense amount of
rules laid down by the Congress. In section 20 (of the Commerce
clerical work."
Act),Congress has authorized the commission to require annual
ISSUE: reports.

(1) Whether or not it is constitutional to require COMPANIA The act itself prescribes in detail what those reports shall
GENERAL DETABACOS DE FILIPINAS to pass a detailed contain. In other words, Congress has laid down general rules
report to the Board of Public Utility Commissioners of the for the guidance of the Commission, leaving to it merely the
Philippine Islands? carrying out of details

(2) Whether the power to require the detailed report is strictly in the exercise of the power so conferred. This, we think, is not
legislative, or administrative, or merely relates to the execution a delegation of legislative authority. In the case at bar the
of the law? provision complained of does not law "down the general rules of
action under which the commission shall proceed." nor does it
HELD: itself prescribe in detail what those reports shall contain.
Practically everything is left to the judgment and discretion of the
The order appealed from is set aside and the cause is returned
Board of Public Utility Commissioners, which is unrestrained as
to the Board of Public Utility Commissioners with instructions to
to when it shall act, why it shall act, how it shall act, to what
dismiss the proceeding.
extent it shall act, or what it shall act upon. The Legislature, by
RULING: the provision in question, has abdicated its powers and functions
in favor of the Board of Public Utility Commissioners with respect
The section of Act No. 2307 under which the Board of Public to the matters therein referred to, and that such Act is in violation
Utility Commissioners relies for its authority, so far as pertinent of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. The Legislature, by the
to the case at hand, reads as follows: provision referred to, has not asked for the information which the
State wants but has authorized and board to obtain the
Sec. 16. The Board shall have power, after hearing, upon notice, information which the board wants.
by order in writing, to require every public utility as herein
defined: (e) To furnish annually a detailed report of finances and
operations, in such form and containing such matters as the
Board may from time to time by order prescribe. The statute
which authorizes a Board of Public Utility Commissioners to
require detailed reports from public utilities, leaving the nature
of the report, the contents thereof, the general lines which it shall
follow, the principle upon which it shall proceed, indeed, all other

US vs TANG HO (1922) G.R. 17122 fixing the price of rice, and thesale of it at any price would not be
acrime. That is to say, in the absence of aproclamation, it was
Facts: not a crime to sellrice at any price. Hence, it must followthat, if
the defendant committed a crime,it was because the Governor-
At its special session of 1919, thePhilippine Legislature passed
Generalissued the proclamation. There was noact of the
Act No.2868, entitled "An Act penalizing themonopoly and
Legislature making it a crimeto sell rice at any price, and without
holding of, andspeculation in, palay, rice, and cornunder
theproclamation, the sale of it at any pricewas to a crime.When
extraordinary circumstances,regulating the distribution and
Act No. 2868 is analyzed, it is theviolation of the proclamation of
salethereof, and authorizing the Governor-General, with the
theGovernor-General which constitutes thecrime. Without that
consent of the Councilof State, to issue the necessary rules
proclamation, it was no crime to sell rice at any price. In
andregulations therefor, and making anappropriation for this
otherwords, the Legislature left it to the solediscretion of the
Governor-General to saywhat was and what was not "any
Section 3 defines what shall constitute amonopoly or hoarding cause"for enforcing the act, and what was andwhat was not "an
of palay, rice orcorn within the meaning of this Act, butdoes not extraordinary rise inthe price of palay, rice or corn," andunder
specify the price of rice ordefine any basic for fixing the certain undefined conditions to fixthe price at which rice should
price.August 1, 1919, the Governor-Generalissued a be sold,without regard to grade or quality, alsoto say whether a
proclamation fixing the price atwhich rice should be sold. Then, proclamation should beissued, if so, when, and whether or
onAugust 8, 1919, a complaint was filedagainst the defendant, notthe law should be enforced, how long itshould be enforced,
Ang Tang Ho,charging him with the sale of rice at anexcessive and when the lawshould be suspended. The Legislature didnot
price. Upon this charge, hewas tried, found guilty and specify or define what was "anycause," or what was "an
sentenced. The official records show that the Act wasto take extraordinaryrise in the price of rice, palay or corn,"Neither did it
effect on its approval; that it wasapproved July 30, 1919; that specify or define theconditions upon which the
theGovernor-General issued hisproclamation on the 1st of proclamationshould be issued. In the absence of
August, 1919;and that the law was first published onthe 13th of theproclamation no crime was committed. The alleged sale was
August, 1919; and that theproclamation itself was first published made a crime, if atall, because the Governor-General issuedthe
onthe 20th of August, 1919. proclamation. The act orproclamation does not say
anythingabout the different grades or qualities of rice, and the
Issue: defendant is charged withthe sale "of one ganta of rice at the
priceof eighty centavos (P0.80) which is aprice greater than that
WON the delegation of legislative powerto the Governor
fixed by Executiveorder No. 53."We are clearly of the opinion
General was valid.
and holdthat Act No. 2868, in so far as itundertakes to
Held: authorized the Governor-General in his discretion to issue
aproclamation, fixing the price of rice, andto make the sale of
By the Organic Law, all Legislative poweris vested in the rice in violation of theprice of rice, and to make the sale of ricein
Legislature, and thepower conferred upon the Legislature violation of the proclamation a crime,is unconstitutional and
tomake laws cannot be delegated to theGovernor-General, or void.
anyone else. TheLegislature cannot delegate thelegislative
power to enact any law. The case of the United States
SupremeCourt, supra dealt with rules andregulations which PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC.
were promulgated bythe Secretary of Agriculture forGovernment petitioner, vs. HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, as Secretary of the
land in the forest reserve. These decisions hold that the
Department of Labor & Employment, and JOSE N.
legislativeonly can enact a law, and that it cannotdelegate it
legislative authority. The line of cleavage between what is
andwhat is not a delegation of legislativepower is pointed out
101279. August 6, 1992.]
and clearly defined.As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin says:
That no part of the legislative powercan be delegated by the FACTS:
legislature toany other department of thegovernment, executive
or judicial, is afundamental principle in constitutionallaw, DOLE Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued Department Order No.
essential to the integrity andmaintenance of the system of 16 Series of 1991 temporarily suspending the recruitment by
government established by theconstitution.Where an act is private employment agencies of “Filipino domestic helpers going
clothed with all theforms of law, and is complete in andof itself, to Hong Kong”. As a result of the department order DOLE,
it may be provided that itshall become operative only uponsome through the POEA took over the business of deploying Hong
certain act or event, or, in likemanner, that its operation shall Kong bound workers.
besuspended. The legislature cannot delegate itspower to make
The petitioner, PASEI, the largest organization of private
a law, but it can makea law to delegate a power todetermine
employment and recruitment agencies duly licensed and
some fact or state of thingsupon which the law makes, or
authorized by the POEA to engage in the business of obtaining
intendsto make, its own action to depend.It must be conceded
overseas employment for Filipino land-based workers filed a
that, after thepassage of act No. 2868, and before anyrules and
petition for prohibition to annul the aforementioned order and to
regulations were promulgatedby the Governor-General, a dealer
prohibit implementation.
in ricecould sell it at any price, even at a pesoper "ganta," and
that he would notcommit a crime, because there would beno law

ISSUES: expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. The agency
shall take appropriate measures to make emergency rules
(1) whether or not respondents acted with grave abuse of known to persons who may be affected by them. (Chapter 2,
discretion and/or in excess of their rule-making Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987).
authority in issuing said circulars;
(2) whether or not the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars Prohibition granted.
are contrary to the Constitution, are unreasonable,
unfair and oppressive; and
(3) whether or not the requirements of publication and
filing with the Office of the National Administrative ANGELES
Register were not complied with.
G.R. No. 108461. October 21, 1996
HELD: FIRST, the respondents acted well within in their Facts:
authority and did not commit grave abuse of discretion. This is
because Article 36 (LC) clearly grants the Labor Secretary to The Philippine International Trading Corporation, a government
restrict and regulate recruitment and placement activities, to wit: owned and controlled corporation issued Administrative Order
No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 under which application to the PITC for
Art. 36. Regulatory Power. — The Secretary of Labor shall have importation from the People’s Republic of China (PROC) must
the power to restrict and regulate the recruitment and placement be accompanied by a viable and confirmed Export Program of
activities of all agencies within the coverage of this title the Philippine Products to China carried out by the importer
[Regulation of Recruitment and Placement Activities] and is himself or through a tie-up with a legitimate importer from PROC
hereby authorized to issue orders and promulgate rules and in an amount equivalent to the value of importation from PRC
regulations to carry out the objectives and implement the being applied for, or simply at one-to one ratio.
provisions of this title.
Two domestic corporations, Remington and Firestone, both
SECOND, the vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial applied for authority to import from PROC, which were granted,
powers in administrative bodies is constitutional. It is but later on were withheld for failure to comply with the require
necessitated by the growing complexities of the modern society. one to one ratio of import and export.
THIRD, the orders and circulars issued are however, invalid and They filed a complaint asserting that the administrative order is
unenforceable. The reason is the lack of proper publication and unconstitutional. The RTC ruled that the order was a restraint of
filing in the Office of the National Administrative Registrar as trade in violation of Section 1 and 19 of Article XII of the 1987
required in Article 2 of the Civil Code to wit: Constitution. PITC elevated the case to the Supreme Court.
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the Issue:
completion of their publication in the Official Gazatte, unless it is
otherwise provided; Whether or not Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 is
Article 5 of the Labor Code to wit:
Art. 5. Rules and Regulations. — The Department of Labor and
other government agencies charged with the administration and The order was not valid. The PITC is a line agency of the
enforcement of this Code or any of its parts shall promulgate the Department of Trade and Industry which was the primary
necessary implementing rules and regulations. Such rules and coordinative, promotive, facilitative and regulatory arm of the
regulations shall become effective fifteen (15) days after government for the country’s trade. The PITC as an integral part
announcement of their adoption in newspapers of general of the DTI was given the task of the implementing the
circulation; and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the departments’ program. It has the authority to issue the
Administrative Code of 1987 which provide: questioned order and may legally exercise that authority under
the supervision of the DTI. The grant t quasi-legislative powers
Sec. 3. Filing. — (1) Every agency shall file with the University in administrative bodies are not unconstitutional. It has become
of the Philippines Law Center, three (3) certified copies of every necessary to create more administrative bodies to help in the
rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this regulation of its activities. Because hey specializes in the field
Code which are not filed within three (3) months shall not assigned to them, they can deal and dispatch problems with
thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or more expertise than the legislature or the courts of justice.
persons. (Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of
1987.) In sum, the PITC was legally empowered to issue the
Administrative Orders as a valid exercise of a power ancillary to
Sec. 4. Effectivity. — In addition to other rule-making legislation; however, it does not imply that the order was valid.
requirements provided by law not inconsistent with this Book, First, it was never published, thus it is not effective. Second, the
each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the date same is inconsistent with the declared policy of the government
of filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by law, to then effect that it will develop and strengthen trade relations
or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to public with the PROC. Since the order was a unnecessary barrier to
health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must be trade, the same is not a valid exercise of its authority.

GR No. 82849, August 2, 1989 Whether or not an Implementing Order of the Secretary of Labor
and Employment (DOLE) can provide for a prohibition not
Facts: contemplated by the law it seeks to implement.
•Petitioner Cebu Oxygen & Acetylene Co., Inc. (COACO) Held: NO.
entered into a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the
union of its rank and file employees, Cebu Oxygen, Acetylene The Implementing Order cannot provide such prohibition.
and Central Visayas Employees Association (COAVEA),
covering the years 1986-1988, which grants salary increases to Ratio:
all regular covered employees during the 3 year effectivity of the
•RA No. 6640 does not prohibit the crediting of CBA anniversary
wage increases.
•Salaries for 1st year (to be paid on Jan. 14, 1986) —P200 to
•Implementing rules cannot add or detract from the provisions of
each covered employee.
law it is designed to implement.
•Salaries for 2nd year (to be paid on Jan. 16, 1987) — P200 to
•And so, the implementing rules cannot provide for such a
each covered employee.
prohibition not contemplated by the law.
•Salaries for 3rd year (to be paid on Jan. 16, 1988) — P300 to
•Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority
each covered employee.
should be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should
•But if any mandated government wage adjustment or allowance be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general
increase is issued by way of legislation, decree or presidential provisions. The law cannot be expanded by such regulations.
edict from the specified date of payment to the next increase,
•An administrative act cannot amend an act of Congress.
the provided salary increases shall be credited as payment.
Furthermore, if the wage adjustment in any particular year will B. Marginal Issue:
be any higher than the salary increases provided in that
particular year, then the company shall pay the difference. Whether or not petitioner should have first appealed to the
Secretary of Labor before going directly to the Court.
On Dec. 14, 1987, Republic Act No. 6640 was passed,
increasing the minimum wage by 10 pesos per day for private Held:
sector employees and 11 pesos per day for non-agricultural
NO. Failure to exhaust administrative remedies cannot be
workers outside Metro Manila (Sec. 2, RA No. 6640).
considered fatal to this petition.
•The Secretary of Labor issued an Implementing Order which
prohibits the employer from crediting CBA anniversary wage
increases for purposes of compliance with Section 8 of RA No. •It is fundamental that in a case where only pure questions of
6640. law are raised, The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies cannot apply because issues of law cannot be
•Accordingly, petitioner credited the first year increase of
resolved with finality by the administrative officer.
P200.00 under the CBA and added the difference of P62.00 and
P31.00 to the monthly salary and the 13th month pay, •Appeal to the administrative officer of orders involving
respectively, of its employees from the effectivity of RA No. 6640 questions of law would be an exercise in futility since
on Dec. 14 1987 to Feb. 15, 1988 (a period of 2 months). administrative officers cannot decide such issues with finality.
The questions raised in this petition are questions of law. Hence,
•From Feb. 22 - Mar. 10, 1988, a Labor and Employment
the failure to exhaust administrative remedies cannot be
Development Officer conducted a routine inspection of
considered fatal to this petition.
petitioner’s establishment and alleged that petitioner committed
violations of the law, constituting underpayment of both basic C. Conclusion
wage (for the mentioned period of 2 months) and 13th month
pay (for the year 1987), representing 208 employees in the •Petition is hereby GRANTED.
aggregate amount of P131,248.00. Soon after, on April 7, 1988,
respondent Assistant Regional Director issued an Order •Section 8 of the rules implementing RA No. 6640 is hereby
instructing petitioner to said amount to its 208 employees. declared null and void in so far as it excludes the anniversary
wage increases negotiated under CBA’s from being credited to
•Petitioner protested the Order, bringing the case immediately the wage increase provided for under RA No. 6640. Decision is
to this Court with the argument that Section 8 of the rules immediately executory.
implementing the provisions of RA No. 6640, particularly the its
provision excluding anniversary wage increases from being V. Notes
credited to the wage increase, is null and void on the ground that
•Section 2, Republic Act No. 6640:
it unduly expands the provisions of the said law.IV.Issue/s and
HeldA. Principal

“Sec. 2. The statutory minimum wage rates of workers and - Cu Unjieng filed an application for probation before the trial
employees in the private sector, whether agricultural or non- court, under the provisions of Act4221 of the defunct Philippine
agricultural shall be increased by ten pesos (P10.00) per day, Legislature. He states he is innocent of the crime; he has
except non-agricultural workers and employees outside Metro nocriminal record; and that he would observe good conduct in
Manila who shall receive an increase of eleven pesos (P11.00) the future.
per day: Provided, That those already receiving above the
minimum wage up to one hundred pesos (P100.00) shall receive - CFI Manila Judge Jose Vera set the petition for hearing for
an increase of ten pesos (P10.00) per day. Excepted from the probation on April 5, 1937.
provisions of this Act are domestic helpers and persons
- HSBC questioned the authority of Vera to hold such hearings
employed in the personal service of another.”
and assailed the constitutionalityof the Probation Act since it
•Section 8, Implementing Order of Secretary of Labor and violates the equal protection of laws and gives unlawful
Employment: andimproper delegation to provincial boards.

“Sec. 8. Wage Increase Under Individual/Collective - Section 11 of Art 4221 states that the act shall only be applied
Agreements. in those provinces wherein theprobationary officer is granted
salary not lower than provincial fiscals by respective
— No wage increase shall be credited as compliance with the provincialboards.
increase prescribes herein unless expressly provided under
valid individual written/collective agreements; and provided - The City Fiscal of Manila files a supplementary petition
further, that such wage increase was granted in anticipation of affirming issues raised by HSBC, arguingthat probation is a form
the legislative wage increase under the act. Such increases of reprieve, hence Act 4221 bypasses this exclusive power of
shall not include anniversary wage increase provided on the Chief Executive.
collective agreements.”
- Hence this petition in the Supreme Court.
The rule of exhaustion of all administrative remedies before ISSUES:
resorting to court is not absolute except where the questions
involved are essentially judicial. 1. Whether or not the constitutionality of Act 4221 has been
properly raised in these proceedings;
•Administrative remedies need not be exhausted where issue is
a purely legal and constitutional one. 2. If in the affirmative, whether or not Act 4221 is constitutional
based on these three grounds:

a. It encroaches upon the pardoning power of the executive

KONG & SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION(HSBC) v. b. It constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power
JOSE VERA, Judge ad interim of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, and MARIANO CUUNJIENG c. It denies the equal protection of the laws

(65 Phil 56) November 16, 1937 HELD/RATIO:

FACTS: 1. Yes. Constitutional questions will not be determined by the

courts unless properly raised andpresented in appropriate cases
- The criminal case, People v. Cu Unjieng was filed in the Court and is necessary to a determination of the case, lis
of First Instance (CFI) in Manila,with HSBC intervening in the mota.Constitutionality issues may be raised in prohibition and
case as private prosecutor. certiorari proceedings, as they may alsobe raised in mandamus,
quo warranto, and habeas corpus proceedings. The general rule
- The CFI rendered a judgment of conviction sentencing Cu
states that constitutionality should be raised in the earliest
Unjieng to an indeterminate penaltyranging from four years and
possible opportunity (during proceedings ininitial/inferior courts).
two months of prision correccional to eight years of prison
It may be said that the state can challenge the validity of its own
laws, asin this case. The well-settled rule is that the person
(Jan. 8, 1934)- Upon appeal, it was modified to an indeterminate impugning validity must have personal andsubstantial interest in
penalty of from five years and six months of prison correccional the case (i.e. he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a
to seven years, six months and twenty-seven days of prison result of itsenforcement). If Act 4221 is unconstitutional, the
mayor, butaffirmed the judgments in all other respects. People of the Philippines have substantialinterest in having it set
- Cu Unjieng filed a Motion for Reconsideration and four
successive motions for new trial whichwere all denied on 2.a. No. There exists a distinction between pardon and
December 17, 1935. Final judgment was entered on Dec. 18, probation. Pardoning power is solelywithin the power of the
1935. He filedfor certiorari to the Supreme Court but got denied Executive. Probation has an effect of temporary suspension,and
on Nov 1936. The SC subsequently denied Cu Unjieng’s petition the probationer is still not exempt from the entire punishment
for leave to file a second alternative motion for reconsideration which the law inflictsupon him as he remains to be in legal
or new trial,then remanded the case to the court of origin for custody for the time being.
execution of judgment.
b. Yes. The Probation Act does not lay down any definite reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or
standards by which theadministrative boards may be guided in beyond the scope of his authority.
the exercise of discretionary powers, hencethey have the power
to determine for themselves, whether or not to apply the law Further, although Sec. 68 provides the qualifying clause “as the
ornot. This therefore becomes a surrender of legislative power public welfare may require” – which would mean that the
to the provincial boards. Itis unconstitutional. President may exercise such power as the public welfare may
require – is present, still, such will not replace the standard
c. Yes. Due to the unwarranted delegation of legislative power, needed for a proper delegation of power. In the first place, what
some provinces maychoose to adopt the law or not, thus the phrase “as the public welfare may require” qualifies is the
denying the equal protection of laws. It is unconstitutional. text which immediately precedes hence, the proper
interpretation is “the President may change the seat of
government within any subdivision to such place therein as the
public welfare may require.” Only the seat of government may
be changed by the President when public welfare so requires
15 SCRA 569 – Political Law – Sufficient Standard Test and and NOT the creation of municipality.
Completeness Test
The Supreme Court declared that the power to create
FACTS: In 1964, President Ferdinand Marcos issued executive municipalities is essentially and eminently legislative in
orders creating 33 municipalities – this was purportedly pursuant character not administrative (not executive).
to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code which
provides in part:

The President may by executive order define the boundary… of

any… municipality… and may change the seat of government
within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare
may require…

The then Vice President, Emmanuel Pelaez, as a taxpayer, filed

a special civil action to prohibit the auditor general from
disbursing funds to be appropriated for the said municipalities.
Pelaez claims that the EOs were unconstitutional. He said that
Section 68 of the RAC had been impliedly repealed by Section
3 of RA 2370 which provides that barrios may “not be created or
their boundaries altered nor their names changed” except by Act
of Congress. Pelaez argues: “If the President, under this new
law, cannot even create a barrio, how can he create a
municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios
are units of municipalities?”

The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal and that
only barrios were barred from being created by the President.
Municipalities are exempt from the bar and that a municipality
can be created without creating barrios. He further maintains
that through Sec. 68 of the RAC, Congress has delegated such
power to create municipalities to the President.

ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to

create barrios to the President by virtue of Sec. 68 of the RAC.

HELD: No. There was no delegation here. Although Congress

may delegate to another branch of the government the power to
fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration
of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of
separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself —
it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate — and (b) fix a standard — the
limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable — to
which the delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions. In this case, Sec. 68 lacked any such standard.
Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate
would, in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the
essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned
standard, there would be no means to determine, with