Isip v. People – Venue in Criminal Cases is Jurisdictional
Belista – Venue in Criminal Cases is
FACTS: Petitioner Manuel Isip (and his wife Marietta) were convicted of Estafa before
the RTC of Cavite City. Marites, however, died during the pendency of the appeal before
the CA. The spouses were engaged in the buying and selling of pledged and unredeemed
jewelry pawned by gambling habitués. However, in their dealings with Complainant Atty.
Leonardo Jose, they failed to account for the jewelries given to them to be sold on
commission. Also, certain checks they’ve issued in favor of Jose bounced. Procedurally,
petitioner contends that the RTC of Cavite has no jurisdiction over the case since the
elements of the crime did not occur there. Instead, he argues that the case should have
been filed in Manila where their supposed transactions took place.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC of Cavite has jurisdiction over the case.
RULING: YES. The concept of venue of actions in criminal cases, unlike in civil cases,
is jurisdictional. The place where the crime was committed determines not only the
venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction. It is a fundamental rule
that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense should have
been committed or any one of its essential ingredients should have taken place within
the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
The jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the
complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance
of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial shows that the offense
was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of
jurisdiction.
Complainant had sufficiently shown that the transaction covered by the case took place
in his ancestral home in Cavite City when he was on approved leave of absence from
the Bureau of Customs. Since it has been shown that venue was properly laid, it is now
petitioner's task to prove otherwise, since he claims that the transaction was entered
into in Manila. He who alleges must prove his allegations applies.
Here, petitioner failed to prove that the transaction happened in Manila. He argues that
since he and his late wife actually resided in Manila, convenience suggests that the
transaction was entered there. The Court wasn’t persuaded. The fact that Cavite is a bit
far from Manila doesn’t necessarily mean that the transaction cannot or did not happen
there. Distance will not prevent any person from going to a distant place where he can
procure goods that he can sell so that he can earn a living. It is not improbable or
impossible them to have gone, not once, but twice in one day, to Cavite if that is the
number of times they received pieces of jewelry from complainant. Also, the fact that
the checks issued were drawn against accounts with banks in Manila or Makati doesn’t
mean that the transactions were not entered into in Cavite City.
When it comes to credibility, the trial court's assessment deserves great weight, and is
even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact
or circumstance of weight and influence.
Landbank of the Philippines v.
Jurisdictional
FACTS: Belista is the owner of 8 parcels of land placed by the Dept. of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (PD No. 27 & EO No. 228).
He and DAR/LBP disagreed on the amount of just compensation he deserved, which
caused him to file a Petition for Valuation and Payment of Just Compensation before the
DARAB-Regional Adjudicator for Region V (RARAD-V). The RARAD-V decided in his
favor. Aggrieved, LBP filed an original Petition for Determination of Just Compensation
at the same sala of the RTC sitting as SAC. It was dismissed on the ground of failure to
exhaust administrative remedies.
ISSUE: Whether it is necessary that in cases involving claims for just compensation
under RA No. 6657 that the decision of the Adjudicator must first be appealed to the
DARAB before a party can resort to the RTC sitting as SAC.
RULING: Sections 50 and 57 of RA No. 6657 provide:
Section 50. Quasi-judicial Powers of the DAR. – The DAR is hereby vested with primary
jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian
reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of
Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
Section 57. Special Jurisdiction. – The Special Agrarian Court shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to
landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under this Act. x x x
Clearly, under Section 50, DAR has primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters and exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction
of the DA and the DENR. Further exception to the DAR's original and exclusive
jurisdiction are all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners
and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under RA No. 6657, which are within the
jurisdiction of the RTC sitting as a SAC. Thus, jurisdiction on just compensation cases
for the taking of lands under RA No. 6657 is vested in the courts.
Here, the trial court properly acquired jurisdiction over Wycoco’s complaint for
determination of just compensation. It must be stressed that although no summary
administrative proceeding was held before the DARAB, LBP was able to perform its legal
mandate of initially determining the value of Wycoco's land pursuant to Executive Order
No. 405, Series of 1990.
In accordance with settled principles of administrative law, primary jurisdiction is vested
in the DAR to determine in a preliminary manner the just compensation for the lands
taken under the agrarian reform program, but such determination is subject to challenge
before the courts. The resolution of just compensation cases for the taking of lands
under agrarian reform is, after all, essentially a judicial function.
Ilusorio v. Bildner – Venue in Criminal Cases is Jurisdictional Navaja v. De Castro – Venue in Criminal Cases is Jurisdictional

FACTS: The action for perjury must be tried and instituted in the municipality or territory
where the deliberate untruthful statement was made. Ma. Erlinda Bildner (Bildner) and
Lily Raqueno (Raqueno) were charged by Erlinda Ilusorio (Ilusorio) before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City with perjury arising from their filing, on behalf of
Lakeridge Development Corp. (LDC), of a petition in the Makati RTC and Tagaytay RTC
for issuance of new owner‘s duplicate copy of Certificate of Condominium Title (CCT)
covering condominium units in both Makati and Tagaytay. Bildner and Raqueno claimed,
in their statement before notary public Rafael Dizon, that the owner‘s copies of the
condominium units could no longer be found ―despite earnest and diligent efforts‖ to
locate the same. Using as bases the contents of the original petitions filed in the Makati
and Tagaytay RTCs, Ilusorio filed charges of falsification of public documents and perjury
against Bildner and Raqueno before the Pasig Prosecutor‘s Office. Investigating
Prosecutor Edgardo Bautista dismissed the falsification charges but found probable
cause to indict Bildner and Raqueno for perjury. Bildner and Raqueno moved for the
quashal of the Information filed against them on the following grounds: a.) lack
jurisdiction due to improper venue; b.) lack of bases of the charges as the original
petitions had already been withdawn, since it had already been amended upon the
instance of Bildner of Raqueno; and the alleged perjurious statements were made in the
jurisdictional territories of Makati and Tagaytay, respectively. The MeTC found in favor
of Ilusorio, holding that the vital point is the allegation in the complaint or information
of the situs of the offense charged. The court held that since the information alleges
that the offenses were committed in Pasig City, then the Pasig City MeTC has jurisdiction
over the case of perjury.

ISSUE: Whether or not the place were perjurious statements are made control the
jurisdiction to hear perjury cases

HELD: It is the deliberate making of untruthful statements upon any material matter,
however, before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which
the law so requires, which is imperative in perjury. Venue, in criminal cases, being
jurisdictional, the action for perjury must be instituted and tried in the municipality or
territory where the deliberate making of an untruthful statement upon any matter was
made, in this case, in Makati and Tagaytay. It was in Makati and Tagaytay where the
intent to assert an alleged falsehood became manifest and where the alleged untruthful
statement finds relevance or materiality in deciding the issue of whether new owner‘s
duplicate copies of the CCT and TCTs may issue. Whether the perjurious statements
contained in the four petitions were subscribed and sworn in Pasig is immaterial, the
gist of the offense of perjury being the intentional giving of
Unionbank v. People – Venue in Criminal Cases is Jurisdictional
Facts: Union bank filed two complaints for sum of money with prayer for a writ of
replevin against spouses Eddie and Eliza Tamondong and a John Doe. The first
complaint was filed before the RTC, Branch 109, Pasay City on April 13, 1998. The
second complaint was filed on March 15, 2000 and was raffled in the MeTC, Branch
47, Pasay City.
In both cases, Desi Tomas executed and signed the Certification against Forum
Shopping. Then, she was charged of deliberately violating Article 183 of the RPC
(perjury) "by falsely declaring under oath in the Certificate against Forum Shopping in
the second complaint that she did not commence any other action or proceeding
involving the same issue in another tribunal or agency". The Certification was notarized
in Makati City but was submitted and used in Pasay City, while the Information against
Union Bank and Tomas was filed in Makati.
Tomas filed a Motion to Quash on the grounds that the venue was improperly
laid and that the facts do not constitute an offense. On the first ground, Tomas argued
that since it is the Pasay City Court where the Certificate was submitted and used, it
should have the jurisdiction over the case against her. The MeTC-Makati City denied the
Motion to Quash, ruling that it has jurisdiction over the case since the Certificate was
notarized there and the allegations in the Information sufficiently charged Tomas with
perjury. Her subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was denied.
authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires. The constitutive
act of the offense is the making of an affidavit, so, the criminal act is consummated
when the statement containing a falsity is subscribed and sworn before a duly authorized
person.'
The SC finds the ruling in Sy Tiong as more in accord with Art. 183 of the RPC.
The Court ruled that the crime of perjury committed through the making of a false
affidavit under Art. 183 of the RPC is committed at the time the affiant subscribes and
swears to his or her affidavit since it is at that time that all the elements of the crime of
perjury are executed. When the crime is committed through false testimony under oath
in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, venue is at the place where the
testimony under oath is given.
If in lieu of or as supplement to the actual testimony made in a proceeding that
is neither criminal nor civil, a written sown statement is submitted, venue may either be
at the place where the sworn statement is submitted or where the oath was taken as
the taking of the oath and the submission are both material ingredients of the crime
committed. In all cases, the determination of venue shall be based on the acts alleged
in the Information to be constitutive of the crime committed.

When the case was elevated to the RTC-Makati City, the petitioners prayed that
the ruling of the MeTC-Makati City be annulled and set aside on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion. They also cited the rulings in US vs. Canet and Ilusorio v. Bildner
which state that "venue and jurisdiction should be in the place where the false document
was presented".

The petition, however, was found to have no merit as a recent jurisprudence, Sy

Tiong Shiou v. Sy. In the Sy Tiong Shiou case, the high court ruled that the criminal
action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality where the perjury was
committed, or where any of its essential ingredients occured. The petitioners then filed
this petition to the Supreme Court to address the seeming conflict between the rulings
in Illusorio v. Bildner and Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy.

Issue: Where is the proper venue of perjury under Art. 183 of the RPC - the place,
where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized or where the Certification
was presented to the trial court?

Held: The place where the Certificate was notarized, the MeTC-Makati City, is the proper
venue for the criminal action.

The criminal act charged was for the execution of an affidavit that contained a
falsity. Art. 183 of the RPC is the applicable provision for this case; and following so, the
jurisdiction and venue should be determined on the basis of this article which penalizes
one who makes an affidavit upon any material matter before a competent person
Mondejar v. Buban – Jurisdiction to Issue Hold Departure Orders
FACTS: Mondejar seeks to hold Judge Buban of the Tacloban City MTCC administratively
liable for gross ignorance of the law, partiality, serious irregularity and grave misconduct,
in relation to a BP 22 case against Mondejar. Judge Buban allegedly issued a “hold
departure order” against her, in violation of SC Circular No. 39-97, which says that “hold
departure orders” may only be issued in criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the RTC. She also claims that said order was issued without giving her an opportunity
to be heard.
The judge responded, stating that he was only made aware of said order when he
instructed his staff to secure a copy from the Executive Judge of the RTC of Tacloban.
After which, he immediately issued an order setting aside and lifting the “hold departure
order”. As regards the supposed due process, he sent a notice of hearing to her and her
counsel, but neither appeared.
Court Administrator recommended a severe reprimand with a stern warning that should
it happen again, he would be dealt with more severely.
ISSUE: W/N the judge is administratively liable?
HELD: YES. The judge is administratively liable.
Circular No. 39-97 limits the authority to issue hold-departure orders to criminal cases
within the jurisdiction of second level courts. Paragraph No. 1 of the said circular
specifically provides that “hold-departure orders shall be issued only in criminal cases
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regional trial courts.” Clearly then, criminal cases
within the exclusive jurisdiction of first level courts do not fall within the ambit of the
circular, and it was an error on the part of respondent judge to have issued one in the
instant case.
Foz v. People – Jurisdiction determined by the allegations of the complaint
Facts: Vicente Foz (columnist) and Danny Fajardo (editor-publisher) of Panay News were
charged with libel for writing and publishing an article against Dr. Edgar Portigo. The RTC
found them guilty as charged which was affirmed by the CA hence this petition for review.
Foz and Fajardo raised for the first time that the information charging them with libel did not
contain allegations sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the RTC of Iloilo City.
Issue: W/N the RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction over the offense
Held: NO
Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. The offense should have been
committed or any one of its essential elements took place within the territorial jurisdiction of
the court. The jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations in the complaint or
information.
The rules on venue for written defamation are as follows:
1. When offended party is a public official or a private person = filed in RTC of province
or city where the libelous article is printed and first published
2. When offended party is a private individual = filed in RTC of province where he
actually resided at the time of commission of offense
3. When offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila = filed in RTC of
Manila
4. When offended party is a public officer holding office outside Manila = filed in RTC
of province or city where he held office at the time of commission of the offense
Dr. Portigo is a private individual at the time of the publication of the libelous article, the
venue may be the RTC of the province/city where the libelous article was printed and first
published OR where he actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense.
The Information [relevant to REM] states only that “x x x both the accused as columnists and
editor-publisher, respectively of Panay News, a daily publication with a considerable
circulation in the City of Iloilo and throughout the region x x x”. such did not establish that
the said publication was printed and published in Iloilo City. As cited in 2 other cases, the SC
held that if it would be held that the information sufficiently vests jurisdiction on the allegation
that the publication was in general circulation in [place where case is filed], there would be
no impediment to the filing of the libel action in other location where the publication is in
general circulation. Such was not the intent of RA 4363.
On residence – the information failed to allege the residence of Dr. Portigo. While the
information alleges that “Dr. Portigo is a physician and medical practitioner in Iloilo City”, it
did not clearly and positively indicate that he was actually residing in Iloilo City at the time of
the commission of the offense. It was possible that he was actually residing in another place.
Residence of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation or his actual residence or
place of abode provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency; no particular
length of time is required. Residence must be more than temporary.
Morillo v. People – Jurisdiction determined by the allegations of the complaint
Facts: Sometime in July 2003, respondent Richard Natividad, Milo Malong and Bing Nanquil,
introducing themselves as contractors doing business in Pampanga City under the name and
style of RB Custodio Construction, purchased construction materials for their project inside
the Subic Freeport Zone from petitioner Armilyn Morillo, owner of Amasea General
Merchandize and Construction Supplies. The parties agreed that twenty percent (20%) of the
purchases shall be paid within seven (7) days after the first delivery and the remaining eighty
percent (80%) to be paid within thirty-five (35) days after the last delivery, all of which shall
be via postdated checks. Pursuant to the agreement, petitioner delivered construction
materials amounting to a total of P500,054.00 at the construction site where respondent and
his partners were undertaking their project. After the last delivery, respondent paid
P20,000.00 in cash and issued two (2) post-dated checks, drawn from Metrobank, Pampanga
branch, in the amounts of P393,000.00 and P87,054.00. Upon maturity, petitioner attempted
to deposit the checks in her savings account at Equitable PCI Bank, San Lorenzo, Makati City.
They were, however, dishonored by the drawee bank. Immediately thereafter, petitioner
communicated the dishonor to respondent and his partners and demanded for payment.
Again, respondent issued two (2) post-dated Metrobank checks and assured petitioner that
they will be honored upon maturity. Upon deposit in her savings account at Equitable PCI
Bank, Makati Branch, the checks were once again dishonored for the reason that the account
from which they were drawn was already a closed account. Consequently, petitioner made
several demands from respondent and his partners, but to no avail, prompting her to file a
complaint with the City Prosecution Office, Makati City. Thus, on August 12, 2004, two (2)
Informations were filed against respondent and Milo Malong.
Issue: Whether or not MeTC of Makati City has jurisdiction over the case.
Held: Yes. It is well settled that violation of BP 22 cases is categorized as transitory or
continuing crimes, which means that the acts material and essential thereto occur in one
municipality or territory, while some occur in another. Accordingly, the court wherein any of
the crime’s essential and material acts have been committed maintains jurisdiction to try the
case; it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the same excludes the
other. Stated differently, a person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly
tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed. Applying these
principles, a criminal case for violation of BP 22 may be filed in any of the places where any
of its elements occurred – in particular, the place where the check is drawn, issued, delivered,
or dishonored.
Guided by the foregoing pronouncements, there is no denying, therefore, that the court of
the place where the check was deposited or presented for encashment; can be vested with
jurisdiction to try cases involving violations of BP 22. Thus, the fact that the check subject of
the instant case was drawn, issued, and delivered in Pampanga does not strip off the Makati
MeTC of its jurisdiction over the instant case for it is undisputed that the subject check was
deposited and presented for encashment at the Makati Branch of Equitable PC IBank. The
MeTC of Makati, therefore, correctly took cognizance of the instant case and rendered its
decision in the proper exercise of its jurisdiction.
First of all, the Court stresses that the appellate court’s dismissal of the case is not an acquittal
of respondent. Basic is the rule that a dismissal of a case is different from an acquittal of the
accused therein. Except in a dismissal based on a Demurrer to Evidence filed by the accused,
or for violation of the right of the accused to a speedy trial, the dismissal of a criminal case
against the accused will not result in his acquittal. In the oft-cited People v. Salico, the Court
explained: This argument or reasoning is predicated on a confusion of the legal concepts of
dismissal and acquittal. Acquittal is always based on the merits, that is, the defendant is
acquitted because the evidence does not show that defendant’s guilt is beyond a reasonable
doubt; but dismissal does not decide the case on the merits or that the defendant is not
guilty. Dismissal terminates the proceeding, either because the court is not a court of
competent jurisdiction, or the evidence does not show that the offense was committed within
the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or the complaint or information is not valid or sufficient
in form and substance, etc. The only case in which the word dismissal is commonly but not
correctly used, instead of the proper term acquittal, is when, after the prosecution has
presented all its: evidence, the defendant moves for the dismissal and the court dismisses
the ease on the ground that the evidence fails to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant is guilty; for in such case the dismissal is in reality an acquittal because the case
is decided on the merits. If the prosecution fails to prove that the offense was committed
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court and the case is dismissed, the dismissal is not an
acquittal, inasmuch as if it were so the defendant could not be again prosecuted before the
court of competent jurisdiction; and it is elemental that in such case, the defendant may
again be prosecuted for the same offense before a court of competent jurisdiction.
Thus, when the appellate court herein dismissed the instant case on the ground that the
MeTC lacked jurisdiction over the offense charged, it did not decide the same on the merits,
let alone resolve the issue of respondent’s guilt or innocence based on the evidence proffered
by the prosecution. The appellate court merely dismissed the case on the erroneous reasoning
that none of the elements of BP 22 was committed within the lower court’s jurisdiction, and
not because of any finding that the evidence failed to show respondent’s guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Clearly, therefore, such dismissal did not operate as an acquittal, which,
as previously discussed, may be repudiated only by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, showing a grave abuse of discretion. Thus, petitioner’s resort to Rule 45
of the Rules of Court cannot be struck down as improper. In a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45, the parties raise only questions of law because the Court, in its exercise of its
power of review, is not a trier of facts. There is a question of law when the doubt or difference
arises as to what the law is on certain state of facts and which does not call for an existence
of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties-litigants.
In the instant case; the lone issue invoked by petitioner is precisely “whether the Court of
Appeals erred when it ruled that the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City did not have
jurisdiction over the case despite clear showing that the offense was committed within the
jurisdiction of said court.” Evidently, therefore, the instant petition was filed within the bounds
of our procedural rules for the issue herein rests solely on what the law provides on the given
set of circumstances insofar as the commission of the crime of BP 22 is concerned. In criminal
cases, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the averments of the complaint or
Information, in relation to the law prevailing at the time of the filing of the complaint or
Information, and the penalty provided by law for the crime charged at the time of its
commission. Thus, when a case involves a proper interpretation of the rules and jurisprudence
with respect to the jurisdiction of courts to entertain complaints filed therewith, it deals with
a question of law that can be properly brought to this Court under Rule 45.
People v. Sandiganbayan – Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
FACTS: Victoria Amante was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City,
Province of Cebu at the time pertinent to this case. On January 14, 1994, she was able
to get hold of a cash advance in the amount of P71,095.00 under a disbursement
voucher in order to defray seminar expenses of the Committee on Health and
Environmental Protection, which she headed. As of December 19, 1995, or after almost
two years since she obtained the said cash advance, no liquidation was made.
Commission on Audit sent a report to Office of the Deputy Ombudsman, which then
issued a resolution recommending the filing of an Information for violating the Auditing
Code of the Philippines against respondent Amante. The Office of the Special Prosecutor
(OSP), upon review of the OMB-Visayas' Resolution, on April 6, 2001, prepared a
memorandum finding probable cause to indict respondent Amante.
The OSP filed an Information with the Sandiganbayan accusing Victoria Amante of
violating Section 89 of P.D. No. 1445 alleging that “with deliberate intent and intent to
gain, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to liquidate said cash
advances of P71,095.00.” The OSP filed an Information with the Sandiganbayan
accusing Victoria Amante of violating Section 89 of P.D. No. 1445,
Amante countered by saying amongst others that Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction
over the said criminal case because respondent Amante was then a local official who
was occupying a position of salary grade 26, whereas Section 4 of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 8249 provides that the Sandiganbayan shall have original jurisdiction only in cases
where the accused holds a position otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989, R.A. No. 6758.
ISSUE: Whether or not a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod under Salary Grade
26 who was charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines falls within
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
RULING: The applicable law in this case is Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975 which took effect on May 16, 1995, which was again amended
on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. The alleged commission of the offense, as shown
in the Information was on or about December 19, 1995 and the filing of the Information
was on May 21, 2004. The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined
at the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the
offense. The exception contained in R.A. 7975, as well as R.A. 8249, where it expressly
provides that to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases involving
violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title
VII of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable in the present case as the offense
involved herein is a violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines. The last clause of
the opening sentence of paragraph (a) of the said two provisions states:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in
all cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book
II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying
the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim
capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense
The present case falls under Section 4(b) where other offenses and felonies committed
by public officials or employees in relation to their office are involved. Under
the said provision, no exception is contained. Thus, the general rule that jurisdiction of
a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of the
action, not at the time of the commission of the offense applies in this present case.
Since the present case was instituted on May 21, 2004, the provisions of R.A. No. 8249
shall govern.
This Court had ruled that as long as the offense charged in the information is
intimately connected with the office and is alleged to have been perpetrated
while the accused was in the performance, though improper or irregular, of
his official functions, there being no personal motive to commit the crime and
had the accused not have committed it had he not held the aforesaid office,
the accused is held to have been indicted for "an offense committed in
relation" to his office.
Note also that:
Those that are classified as Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan provided that they hold the positions thus enumerated by R.A. No.
3019. Particularly and exclusively enumerated are provincial governors, vice-governors,
members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other provincial department heads; city mayors, vice-mayors, members
of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers , and other
citydepartment heads; officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position as consul
and higher; Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of
higher rank; PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank; City and
provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of
the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; and presidents, directors or trustees, or
managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or
educational institutions or foundations. In connection therewith, Section 4(b) of the
same law provides that other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection (a) in relation to their office also fall under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Serrana v. Sandiganbayan – Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan 3. Petitioner UP student regent is a public officer.

Facts: Serana was a senior student and a government scholar of UP-Cebu. She was Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27; she is, in fact, a
appointed by then President Estrada as a student regent of UP, to serve a one-year regular tuition fee-paying student. This is likewise bereft of merit. It is not only the
term. She discussed with President Estrada the renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex in UP salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The
Diliman. Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606.

With her siblings and relatives, Serana registered with the SEC the Office of the Student While the first part of Section 4(A) covers only officials with Salary Grade 27 and higher,
Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI). One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation its second part specifically includes other executive officials whose positions may not be
of the Vinzons Hall Annex. President Estrada gave P15M to the OSRFI as financial of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of law placed under the
assistance for the proposed renovation. The source of the funds, according to the jurisdiction of the said court. Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
information, was the Office of the President. as she is placed there by express provision of law.

However, the renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize. Hence, the As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar to those of a
succeeding student regent, filed a complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and board of trustees of a non-stock corporation. Moreover, it is well established that
Property with the Office of the Ombudsman. And the Ombudsman, after due compensation is not an essential element of public office. At most, it is merely incidental
investigation, found probable cause to indict Serana and her brother for estafa. to the public office.

Serana moved to quash the information. She claimed that the Sandiganbayan does not
have any jurisdiction over the offense charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP
student regent.
Issue: Whether Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction to try a government scholar and a
student regent, along with her brother (a private individual), of swindling government
funds? YES
4. The offense charged was committed in relation to public office, according
to the Information.
It is axiomatic that jurisdiction is determined by the averments in the information. In
the case at bench, the information alleged, in no uncertain terms that petitioner, being
then a student regent of U.P., "while in the performance of her official functions,
committing the offense in relation to her office and taking advantage of her position,
with intent to gain…”

Ratio: 1. The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is set by P.D. No. 1606, as

amended, not by R.A. No. 3019, as amended.

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in

all cases involving:
A.xxxn
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
xxx
" (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations.

2. Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the offense of estafa.

Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 reads:

B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes
committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this
section in relation to their office.

The jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin requirements that (a) the offense is
committed by public officials and employees and that (b) the offense is committed in
relation to their office. Plainly, estafa is one of those other felonies.
Esquival v. Ombudsman - Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
FACTS: PO2 Eduardo and SPO1 Catacutan are assigned to the Regional Intelligence
and Investigation Division of San Fernando Pampanga. They filed their complaint-
affidavits with the CIDG against petitioners Antonio Esquivel (the municipal mayor Jaen,
Nueva Ecija) and his brother Eboy Esquivel. They crimes complained of were illegal
arrest, arbitrary detention, maltreatment, attempted murder and grave threats. Several
other police officers were accused with the Esquivels.
The initial investigation showed that on March 1998, Eduardo was in his
parents’ house, about to eat lunch when Equivels arrived with other police officers. They
disarmed Eduardo and forced him to board their vehicle and brought him to the
municipal hall. On the way, Mayor Esquivel mauled him and threatened to kill him while
pointing a gun at Eduardo.
can Barangay Captain Mark Anthony Esquivel claim that since he is not a municipal
mayor, he is outside the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction. R.A. 7975, as amended by R.A.
No. 8249, provides that it is only in cases where "none of the accused (underscoring
supplied) are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade ‘27’ or higher" that
"exclusive original jurisdiction shall be vested in the proper regional trial court,
metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit court, as the case
may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, as amended." Note that under the 1991 Local Government Code, Mayor Esquivel
has a salary grade of 27. Since Barangay Captain Esquivel is the co-accused in Criminal
Case No. 24777 of Mayor Esquivel, whose position falls under salary grade 27, the
Sandiganbayan committed no grave abuse of discretion in assuming jurisdiction over
said criminal case, as well as over Criminal Case No. 24778, involving both of them.
Hence, the writ of certiorari cannot issue in petitioners’ favor.

Upon arrival at the town hall, Mayor Esquivel ordered a certain SPO1 Espiritu
to kill Eduardo but SPO1 Catacutan arrived to verify what happened to Eduardo. The
mayor threatened him as well. The mayor continued to harass, threaten and inflict
physical injuries upon Eduardo until he lost consciousness. When he woke up, he was
released but no before he signed a statement in a police blotter that he was in good
physical condition. The alleged motive for this was because the mayor believed Eduardo
and Catacutan were among the law enforcers who raided a jueteng den connected to
the mayor.
After investigation, the CIDG forwarded the findings to the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman, which conducted a preliminary investigation and required the submission
of counter-affidavits. In their counter-affidavits, the Esquivels allege that Eduardo was
actually a fugitive with a warrant of arrest for malversation and they just confiscated his
gun for illegal possession.
In June 1998, the Deputy Ombudsman issued a resolution recommending that
both Esquivels be indicted for less serious physical injuries and grave threats. As to the
charges against other petitioners, they were dismissed. Then Ombudsman Desierto
approved this. So, the separate informations were filed against the Esquivels in the
Sandiganbayan.
Accused filed an MR but this was denied. Esquivels were arraigned, pleaded
not guilty. With the denial of their MR, they elevate the matter to the SC alleging GADLEJ
in the issuance of the resolution of the deputy ombudsman.
Petitioners theorize that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over their
persons as they hold positions excluded in Republic Act No. 7975. As the positions of
municipal mayors and barangay captains are not mentioned therein, they claim they are
not covered by said law under the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
ISSUE: W/N the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the cases against both Mayor
Esquivel and Eboy Esquivel.
HELD/RATIO: Yes, Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. Esquivels are wrong!
Petitioners’ claim lacks merit. In Rodrigo, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, Binay vs.
Sandiganbayan, and Layus vs. Sandiganbayan, we already held that municipal mayors
fall under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Nor
Duncano v. Sandiganbayan – Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
Facts: Petitioner Danilo A. Duncano is, at the time material to the case, the Regional
Director of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) with Salary Grade 26 as classified
under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6758. On March 24, 2009, the Office of the Special
Prosecutor (OSP), Office of the Ombudsman, filed a criminal case against him for
violation of Section 8, in relation to Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713, allegedly committed as
follows:
That on or about April 15, 2003, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon
City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused DANILO
DUNCANO y ACIDO, a high ranking public officer, being the Regional Director of
Revenue Region No. 7, of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Quezon City, and as such is
under an obligation to accomplish and submit declarations under oath of his assets,
liabilities and net worth and financial and business interests, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and criminally fail to disclose in his Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities
and Networth (SALN) for the year 2002, his financial and business interests/connection
in Documail Provides Corporation and Don Plus Trading of which he and his family are
the registered owners thereof, and the 1993 Nissan Patrol motor vehicle registered in
the name of his son VINCENT LOUIS P. DUNCANO which are part of his assets, to the
damage and prejudice of public interest.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the petitioner.
Held: No. The creation of the Sandiganbayan was mandated by Section 5, Article XIII
of the 1973 Constitution. By virtue of the powers vested in him by the Constitution and
pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081, dated September 21, 1972, former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos issued P.D. No. 1486. The decree was later amended by P.D. No.
1606, Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, P.D. No. 1860, and P.D. No. 1861.
With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, the special court was retained as provided for
in Section 4, Article XI thereof. Aside from Executive Order Nos. 14 and 14-a, and R.A.
7080, which expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, P.D. No. 1606 was further
modified by R.A. No. 7975, R.A. No. 8249, and just this year, R.A. No. 10660.
For the purpose of this case, the relevant provision is Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, which
states: SEC. 4. Section 4 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as
follows:
“SEC. 4. Jurisdiction.– The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in
all cases involving:
“A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII,
Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials
occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or
interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
“(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
“(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;
“(b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
“(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
“(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
“(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial
director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher;
“(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in
the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
“(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations.
“(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
“(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
“(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission, without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution; and
“(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
“B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed
by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation
to their office.
“C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos.
1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
Yet, those that are classified as Salary Grade 26 and below may still fall within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, provided that they hold the positions enumerated by
the law. In this category, it is the position held, not the salary grade, which determines
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The specific inclusion constitutes an exception to
the general qualification relating to “officials of the executive branch occupying the
positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher,
of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.”38 As ruled in Inding:
Following this disquisition, the paragraph of Section 4 which provides that if the accused
is occupying a position lower than SG 27, the proper trial court has jurisdiction, can only
be properly interpreted as applying to those cases where the principal accused is
occupying a position lower than SG 27 and not among those specifically included in the
enumeration in Section 4 a. (1) (a) to (g). Stated otherwise, except for those officials
specifically included in Section 4 a. (1) (a) to (g), regardless of their salary grades, over
whom the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction, all other public officials below SG 27 shall be
under the jurisdiction of the proper trial courts “where none of the principal accused are
occupying positions corresponding to SG 27 or higher.” By this construction, the entire
Section 4 is given effect. The cardinal rule, after all, in statutory construction is that the
particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated
expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing
the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce a harmonious whole. And courts
should adopt a construction that will give effect to every part of a statute, if at all
possible. Ut magis valeat quam pereat or that construction is to be sought which gives
effect to the whole of the statute – its every word.
The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over violations of Section 3(a) and (e), Republic
Act No. 3019, as amended, unless committed by public officials and employees
occupying positions of regional director and higher with Salary Grade “27” or higher,
under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758)
in relation to their office.
In ruling in favor of its jurisdiction, even though petitioner admittedly occupied the
position of Director II with Salary Grade “26” under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), the Sandiganbayan incurred in serious
error of jurisdiction, and acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in suspending petitioner from office, entitling petitioner to the reliefs prayed
for.
DOJ v. Liwag - Jurisdiction of the Ombudsman / Review of the Decisions of the
Ombudsman
FACTS: Alleging that she was a former undercover agent of the Presidential Anti-Organized
Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) Narcotics Group, Mary
Ong filed a complaint-affidavit on before the Ombudsman against PNP General Panfilo M.
Lacson, PNP Colonel Michael Ray B. Aquino, other high-ranking officials of the PNP, and
several private individuals. Her complaint-affidavit gave rise to separate cases involving
different offenses imputed to respondents Lacson and Aquino. The Ombudsman found the
complaint-affidavit of Mary Ong sufficient in form and substance and thus required the
respondents therein to file their counter-affidavits on the charges. On February 28, 2001,
said respondents submitted their counter-affidavits and prayed that the charges against them
be dismissed.
Subsequently, on March 9, 2001, Mary Ong and other witnesses executed sworn statements
before the NBI, alleging the same facts and circumstances revealed by Mary Ong in her
complaint-affidavit before the Ombudsman. NBI Director Wycoco, in a letter dated May 4,
2001 addressed to then Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez, recommended the investigation
of Lacson, Aquino, other PNP officials, and private individuals for the following alleged crimes:
kidnapping for ransom and murder of several individuals. On May 7, 2001, a panel of
prosecutors from the DOJ sent a subpoena to Lacson, et al named in the witnesses’ sworn
statements directing them to submit their counter-affidavits and controverting evidence at
the scheduled preliminary investigation on the complaint filed by the NBI. However, Lacson
and Aquino manifested in a letter dated May 18, 2001 that the DOJ panel of prosecutors
should dismiss the complaint filed therewith by Mary Ong since there are complaints pending
before the Ombudsman alleging a similar set of facts against the same respondents, and
claimed that the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction over criminal cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, he may take over, at any
stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases involving
public officials, including police and military officials such as private respondent. DOJ, which
construed the letter as a motion to dismiss, denied the motion.
Lacson, et al. filed before the RTC a petition for prohibition, which the RTC granted, saying
that the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the case, and directing the DOJ to desist from
conducting preliminary investigation. Thus, the DOJ filed a Petition for certiorari and
prohibition in the SC.
ISSUE/RULING: W/N the DOJ has jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary investigation despite
the pendency before the Ombudsman of a complaint involving the same accused, facts, and
circumstances – NO
RATIO: The question is whether or not the Ombudsman has in effect taken over the
investigation of the case or cases in question to the exclusion of other investigatory agencies,
including the DOJ. Since the Ombudsman has taken hold of the situation of the parties in the
exercise of its primary jurisdiction over the matter, respondents cannot insist on conducting
a preliminary investigation on the same matter under the pretext of a shared and concurrent
authority. In the final analysis, the resolution on the matter by the Ombudsman is final. In
the preliminary investigation conducted by the Ombudsman itself, the other investigative
agencies of the Government have no power and right to add an input into the Ombudsman’s
investigation. Only in matters where the other investigative agencies are expressly allowed
by the Ombudsman to make preliminary investigation may such agencies conduct the
investigation, subject to the final decision of the Ombudsman.
The public respondents cannot find comfort in that provision of the law that the Ombudsman
may take over, at any stage, from any investigative agency of the Government, the
investigation of cases involving public officials, including police and military officials such as
the petitioners. That situation presupposes the conduct by other Government agencies of
preliminary investigations involving public officials in cases not theretofore being taken
cognizance of by the Ombudsman. If the Ombudsman, as in the case, has already taken
hold of the situation of the parties, it cannot take over, at any stage of the proceedings, the
investigation being conducted by another agency. It has the case before it. Rudimentary
common sense and becoming respect for power and authority would thus require the
respondents to desist from interfering with the case already handled by the
Ombudsman. Indeed, as conceded by the respondents, they are deputized prosecutors by
the Ombudsman. If that is so, and that is the truth, the exercise by the principal of the
powers negates absolutely the exercise by the agents of a particular power and
authority. The hierarchy of powers must be remembered.
Petitioners cannot seek sanctuary in the doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction. While the
doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction means equal jurisdiction to deal with the same subject
matter, the settled rule is that the body or agency that first takes cognizance of the
complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others. Thus, assuming
there is concurrent jurisdiction between the Ombudsman and the DOJ in the conduct of
preliminary investigation, this concurrence is not to be taken as an unrestrained
freedom to file the same case before both bodies or be viewed as a contest between
these bodies as to which will first complete the investigation. In the present case, it is the
Ombudsman before whom the complaint was initially filed. Hence, it has the authority to
proceed with the preliminary investigation to the exclusion of the DOJ.
The subsequent assumption of jurisdiction by the DOJ in the conduct of preliminary
investigation over the cases filed against the respondents would not promote an orderly
administration of justice. Although a preliminary investigation is not a trial, it is not a
casual affair either. A preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of
determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime
has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for
trial. To allow the same complaint to be filed successively before two or more
investigative bodies would promote multiplicity of proceedings. It would also
cause undue difficulties to the respondent who would have to appear and defend
his position before every agency or body where the same complaint was filed. This
would leave hapless litigants at a loss as to where to appear and plead their cause or defense.
There is yet another undesirable consequence. There is the distinct possibility that the
two bodies exercising jurisdiction at the same time would come up with
conflicting resolutions regarding the guilt of the respondents.
Lazatin v. Desierto - Jurisdiction of the Ombudsman
FACTS: The Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman filed
a Complaint-affidavit, charging petitioners Lazatin et al. with Illegal Use of Public Funds
as defined and penalized under Article 220 of the RPC and violation of Section 3 (a) and
(e) of RA 3019. The complaint alleged that there were irregularities in the use of
Congressman Lazatin of his Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) for 1996 (he was
both proponent and implementer of the projects funded from his CDF; he signed
vouchers and supporting papers pertinent to the disbursement as Disbursing Officer;
and he received, as claimant, eighteen (18) checks amounting to P4,868,277.08). Thus,
Lazatin, with the help of Morales, Pelayo, David, was allegedly able to convert his CDF
into cash.
A preliminary investigation was conducted and the Evaluation and Preliminary
Investigation Bureau (EPIB) thereafter issued a resolution recommending the filing
against petitioners of 14 counts each of Malversation of Public Funds and violation of
Section 3(e) of RA 3019. This resolution was approved by Ombudsman Desierto. Hence,
28 informations were filed against petitioners in the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioners Lazatin et al. filed their respective Motions for
reconsideration/reinvestigation which were granted. The Office of Special Prosecutors
(OSP) recommended the dismissal of the cases for lack or insufficiency of evidence.
However, Desierto ordered the Office of the Legal Affiars (OLP) to review the OSP
resolution. In a memorandum, the OLA recommended that the OSP resolution be
disapproved and the OSP be directed to proceed with the trial. Desierto adopted the
OLA memorandum. The cases were then returned to the Sandiganbayan for continuation
of criminal proceedings.
Hence, petitioners Lazatin et al. filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
They contend that the Ombudsman had no authority to overturn the OSP's Resolution
because, under Section 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman is
clothed only with the power to watch, investigate and recommend the filing of proper
cases against erring officials, but it was not granted the power to prosecute. They point
out that under the Constitution, the power to prosecute belongs to the OSP, which was
intended by the framers to be a separate and distinct entity from the Office of the
Ombudsman. Petitioners conclude that, as provided by the Constitution, the OSP being
a separate and distinct entity, the Ombudsman should have no power and authority over
the OSP. Thus, petitioners maintain that R.A. No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989),
which made the OSP an organic component of the Office of the Ombudsman, should be
struck down for being unconstitutional.
ISSUE: Whether Ombudsman Desierto acted with GADLEJ – NO.
HELD: Petitioners' attack against the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6770 is stale. It has
long been settled that the provisions of R.A. No. 6770 granting the Office of the
Ombudsman prosecutorial powers and placing the OSP under said office have no
constitutional infirmity.
 The Court cited the case of Acop v. Office of the Ombudsman. In that case, the
Court held that giving prosecutorial powers to the Ombudsman is in accordance with
the Constitution as paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI provides that the Ombudsman
shall “exercise such other functions or duties as may be provided by law.” The
constitutionality of Section 3 of R.A. No. 6770, which subsumed the OSP under the Office
of the Ombudsman, was likewise upheld by the Court in Acop.
More recently, in Office of the Ombudsman v. Valera, the Court declared that
the OSP is “merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may only act
under the supervision and control, and upon authority of the Ombudsman” and ruled
that under R.A. No. 6770, the power to preventively suspend is lodged only with the
Ombudsman and Deputy Ombudsman. The Court's ruling in Acop that the authority of
the Ombudsman to prosecute based on R.A. No. 6770 was authorized by the
Constitution was also made the foundation for the decision in Perez v. Sandiganbayan,
where it was held that the power to prosecute carries with it the power to authorize the
filing of informations, which power had not been delegated to the OSP. It is, therefore,
beyond cavil that under the Constitution, Congress was not proscribed from legislating
the grant of additional powers to the Ombudsman or placing the OSP under the Office
of the Ombudsman.
Presidential ad Hoc Fact Finding Committee v. Desierto - Jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman
Facts: President Fidel Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13 creating the
Presidential Ad-Hoc Fact Finding Committee on Behest Loans. Orlando S. Salvador, in
his capacity as PCGG consultant, executed three separate Sworn Statements stating that
among the loan accounts referred by the Assets Privatization Trust to the Committee for
investigation, report and recommendation are those of the following corporations: P.R.
Garcia and Sons Development and Investment Corporation (PRGS), Golden River Mining
Corporation (Golden River), and Filipinas Carbon and Mining Corporation (Filcarbon).
On different occasions, these three companies obtained loans from the Development
Bank of the Philippines (PRGS and Golden River), and the National Investment
Development Corporation (Filcarbon), amounting to tens of millions of pesos for various
purposes in a period spanning from 1967 to 1982. Filcarbon’s loan in particular was
favorably recommended by the President of the Philippine National Bank. Salvador
alleged that, based on the evidence submitted to the Committee, these three
corporations did not have sufficient collaterals for the loans they obtained, except with
respect to the loans obtained by Golden River in 1975 and 1977. Salvador also alleged
that the above-mentioned corporations did not have adequate capital to ensure not only
the viability of their operations but also their ability to repay all their loans. Accordingly,
the Committee found the loan accounts of the above-mentioned three corporations as
behest loans. The Committee submitted its report to President Ramos who instructed
then PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo, sitting as the Committee's ex-officio
Chairman, to file the necessary charges against the DBP Chairman and members of the
Board of Directors, the former PNB President and former NIDC General Manager,
together with the respective stockholders/officers of the three corporations. Salvador’s
Sworn Statements were used by the Committee as its bases in filing separate complaints
with the Office of the Ombudsman against herein private respondents for alleged
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Complaints were filed against the aforementioned parties in the Office of the
Ombudsman but upon the recommendation of the Evaluation and Preliminary
Investigation Bureau, complaints against the respondents were dismissed. The
Ombudsman ruled that, except with respect to the two loan transactions entered into
by Golden River in 1982, all the offenses alleged by the Committee as having been
committed by herein respondents had already prescribed under the provisions of Section
11 of R.A. No. 3019. As to the two 1982 transactions of Golden River, the Ombudsman
found that, contrary to the claims of the Commission, the loan accounts obtained by the
said corporation have sufficient collaterals. The subsequent Motion for Reconsideration
was likewise denied.
Issue: Whether or not the Ombudsman was empowered to dismiss the complaint motu
propio, without requiring the respondents to file their counter-affidavit or conducting
preliminary investigation?
Ruling: Yes. The Court has consistently held that the Ombudsman has discretion to
determine whether a criminal case, given its facts and circumstances, should be filed or
not. It is basically his call. He may dismiss the complaint forthwith should he find it to
be insufficient in form and substance or, should he find it otherwise, to continue with
the inquiry; or he may proceed with the investigation if, in his view, the complaint is in
due and proper form and substance. Quite relevant is the Court's ruling in Espinosa v.
Office of the Ombudsman and reiterated in the case of The Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-
Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Hon. Desierto, to wit:
The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers is vested in
the Office of the Ombudsman. To insulate the Office from outside
pressure and improper influence, the Constitution as well as R.A.
6770 has endowed it with a wide latitude of investigatory and
prosecutory powers virtually free from legislative, executive or
judicial intervention. This court consistently refrains from interfering
with the exercise of its powers, and respects the initiative and
independence inherent in the Ombudsman who, ‘beholden to no one,
acts as the champion of the people and the preserver of the integrity
of the public service.’
As a rule, the Court shall not unduly interfere in the Ombudsman’s exercise of his
investigatory and prosecutory powers, as provided in the Constitution, without good and
compelling reasons to indicate otherwise. The basis for this rule was provided in the
case of Ocampo IV v. Ombudsman where the Court held as follows:
The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and
prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the
Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions
of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions
assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the
Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in
much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped if
they would be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the
part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to
file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private
complainant.
It is quite clear under Section 2(a), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman, that it may dismiss a complaint outright for want of palpable merit. At that
point, the Ombudsman does not have to conduct a preliminary investigation upon receipt
of a complaint. Should the investigating officer find the complaint devoid of merit, then
he may recommend its outright dismissal. The Ombudsman has discretion to determine
whether a preliminary investigation is proper. It is only when the Ombudsman opts not
to dismiss the complaint outright for lack of palpable merit would the Ombudsman be
expected to require the respondents to file their counter-affidavit and petitioner, its
reply.
Castro v. Deloria - Jurisdiction of the Ombudsman
FACTS: Castro was charged by the Ombudsman before the RTC with Malversation of
public funds. The information alleged that Castro was a revenue officer of the BIR who
misappropriated 556K+ of collections. Castro pleaded NOT GUILTY on arraignment. On
Aug 31, 2001, Castro filed a Motion to Quash on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and
lack of authority of the Ombudsman to conduct the preliminary investigation and file the
Information since it failed t to allege her salary grade -- a material fact upon which
depends the jurisdiction of the RTC. Citing Uy v. Sandiganbayan, petitioner further
argued that as she was a public employee with salary grade 27, the case filed against
her was cognizable by the RTC and may be investigated and prosecuted only by the
public prosecutor, and not by the Ombudsman whose prosecutorial power was limited
to cases cognizable by theSandiganbayan.
The RTC denied & held that the (1) jurisdiction of the RTC over the case did not depend
on the salary grade, but on the penalty imposable upon the latter for the offense
charged. It also (2) sustained the prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman since in the
cited case the court later overturned their decision in a clarificatory resolution. Finally,
it said that the (3) Motion to Quash was contrary to Sec. 1, Rule 117, for it was filed
after Castro pleaded not guilty under the Information.
Castro contends that the prevailing jurisprudence from Aug 9, 1999 til May 20, 2001
was that the Ombudsman had no prosecutorial powers over cases cognizable by the RT
and since the investigation and prosecution against Castro was conducted by the
Ombudsman beginning April 26, 2000, then the August 9, 1999 Decision in Uy was
applicable, notwithstanding that the decision was set aside in the March 20, 2001
Resolution. So, the Information that was filed against petitioner was void for at that time
the Ombudsman had no investigatory and prosecutorial powers over the case.
Castro filed an MR which was denied so filed a petition for certiorari w/ CA also
dismissed. Filed 65 with SC.
ISSUES: 1. W/N the Ombudsman had the authority to file the information in light of
the ruling in the First "Uy vs. Sandiganbayan" case, which declared that the prosecutorial
powers of the Ombudsman is limited to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.
2. W/N the clarificatory Resolution in the Uy vs. Sandiganbayan case can be made
applicable to the Castro, without violating the constitutional provision on ex-post facto
laws and denial of the accused to due process.
RULING: YES to BOTH.
In the case of Office of the Ombudsman v. Enoc, similar grounds were raised and the
SC held that the Ombudsman has powers to prosecute not only graft cases within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but also those cognizable by the regular courts. It
held:
The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary
and unqualified. It pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or employee
when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The law
does not make a distinction between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those
cognizable by regular courts. It has been held that the clause "any illegal act or omission
of any public official" is broad enough to embrace any crime committed by a public
officer or employee.
The reference made by RA 6770 to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, particularly
in Section 15(1) giving the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan, and Section 11(4) granting the Special Prosecutor the power to
conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan, should not be construed as confining the scope of the investigatory
and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to such cases.
Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman should not be equated with
the limited authority of the Special Prosecutor under Section 11 of RA 6770. The Office
of the Special Prosecutor is merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and
may only act under the supervision and control and upon authority of the Ombudsman.
Its power to conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute is limited to criminal
cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Certainly, the lawmakers did not
intend to confine the investigatory and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to these
types of cases. The Ombudsman is mandated by law to act on all complaints against
officers and employees of the government and to enforce their administrative, civil and
criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants. To carry out this duty, the
law allows him to utilize the personnel of his office and/or designate any fiscal, state
prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as special investigator or
prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain cases. Those
designated or deputized to assist him work under his supervision and control. The law
likewise allows him to direct the Special prosecutor to prosecute cases outside the
Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction in accordance with Section 11(4c) of RA 6770.
In the case of Office of Ombudsman v. Hon. Breva, court held that the March 20, 2001
Resolution, that the Ombudsman has prosecutorial powers in cases cognizable by the
RTC, extends even to criminal information filed or pending at the time when its August
9, 1999 Decision was the operative ruling on the issue.
Antonino v. Desierto - Review of the Decisions of the Ombudsman
FACTS Petitioner filed a verified complaint-affidavit before the Ombudsman against the
respondents for violation of Paragraphs (e), (g) and (j), Section 3 of RA No. 3019 and
for malversation of public funds or property through falsification of public documents.
This concerns the alleged conspiracy involving respondents to cheat and defraud the
city government of General Santos through the illegal disposition of Lot X of the
Magsaysay Park in violation of law and its charter.
The Ombudsman issued a resolution dismissing the charges against the respondents.
Petitioner filed MR which was denied by the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman held that
since the criminal Informations were already filed and the cases were already pending
before the Sandiganbayan and the regular courts of General Santos City, the
Ombudsman had lost jurisdiction over the said case. Petitioner filed this Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65.
ISSUE: w/n the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack
or in excess of jurisdiction in the exercise of his prosecutor functions, by dismissing the
charges against the respondents.
HELD: NO
1. Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989) provides:
SEC. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. — (1) All provisionary
orders of the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and
executory.
A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or
decision of the Office of the Ombudsman must be filed within five (5)
days after receipt of written notice and shall be entertained only on
any of the following grounds:
(1) New evidence has been discovered which materially
affects the order, directive or decision;
(2) Errors of law or irregularities have been committed
prejudicial to the interest of the movant. The motion for
reconsideration shall be resolved within three (3) days from filing:
Provided, That only one motion for reconsideration shall be
entertained.
Petitioner failed to establish that her MR was indeed filed on time, and thus,
failed to refute the assertion of the respondents based on the aforementioned
Certification that petitioner was personally served a copy of the assailed Resolution.
There are a number of instances when rules of procedure are relaxed in the interest of
justice. However, in this case, petitioner did not proffer any explanation at all for the
late filing of the MR. We find no justification why the Ombudsman entertained the
motion for reconsideration, when, at the time of the filing of the motion for
reconsideration the assailed Resolution was already final.

2. (relevant topic)
Under Sections 12 and 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, and pursuant to R.A. No.
6770, the Ombudsman has the power to investigate and prosecute any act or omission
of a public officer or employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper or inefficient. Well-settled is the rule that this Court will not ordinarily
interfere with the Ombudsman's exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory
powers without good and compelling reasons that indicate otherwise. A
contrary rule would encourage innumerable petitions seeking dismissal of
investigatory proceedings conducted by the Ombudsman, which would
grievously hamper the functions of the office and the courts, in much the
same way that courts would be swamped by a deluge of cases if they have to
review the exercise of discretion on the part of public prosecutors each time
they decide to file an information or dismiss a complaint by a private
complainant.
Of course, this rule is not absolute. The aggrieved party may file a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court when the finding of the Ombudsman is
tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. This
Court laid down the following exceptions to the rule:
(2) The said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the
performance of his or her official duties, or in relation to his or her public
functions;
(3) That he or she causes undue injury to any party, whether the
government or a private party;
(4) Such undue injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference to such parties; and
(5) That the public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable neglect.
As found by the Ombudsman and based on the records, there is no showing of
evident bad faith and/or gross negligence in the respective acts of the respondents.
Finally, petitioner speaks of conspiracy among the respondents and those indicted.
However, as found by the Ombudsman, such conspiracy alleged in the complaint was
not supported by ample evidence. Conspiracy must be proved by direct evidence or by
proof of the overt acts of the accused, before, during and after the commission of the
crime charged indicative of a common design. This, the petitioner sadly failed to
establish.

1. When necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of

the accused;
2. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression
or multiplicity of actions;
3. When there is a prejudicial question that is sub judice;
4. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;
5. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;
6. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
7. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
8. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;
9. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for
vengeance;
10. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a
motion to quash on that ground has been denied.

Grave abuse of discretion exists where a power is exercised in an arbitrary,

capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility so
patent and gross as to amount to evasion of positive duty or virtual refusal to perform
a duty enjoined by, or in contemplation of law. The alleged grave abuse of discretion
imputed to the Ombudsman is found wanting in this case. Thus, this Court finds no
reason to deviate from the general rule.

3.
Moreover, the elements of the offense, essential for the conviction of an accused under
Section 3(e), R. A. No. 3019, are as follows:

(1) The accused is a public officer or a private person charged in

conspiracy with the former;
Sesbreno v. Aglulub – Procedure before the Ombudsman
FACTS: This case involves a complaint filed by Sesbreño (Complainant) against MTC
Judge Aglugub (Respondent) for Gross Ignorance of the Law, Neglect of Duty and
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service relative to a criminal case (entitled
People v. Enrique Marcelino, et al.). In the said criminal case, Complainant filed three
(3) separate complaints against Marcelino, Nuñez, Tabazon, and Carunungan who are
all from the Traffic Management Unit of San Pedro, Laguna. The criminal complaint was
for Falsification, Grave Threats and Usurpation of Authority. The three (3) cases were
assigned to respondent judge’s branch and subsequently consolidated for disposition.
In a Consolidated Resolution, only the charge of Usurpation was set for arraignment,
the rest of the charges having been dismissed. Thereafter, Complainant made a
manifestation that the complaint also charged the defendants with violation of RA No.
10 accompanied by a prayer for the issuance of warrants of arrests against the
defendants. Respondent judge found no probable cause and dismissed the charge for
violation of R.A. 10. She also denied complainant’s prayer for the issuance of warrants
of arrest against the accused and ordered the records forwarded to the Provincial
Prosecutor’s Office (PPO) for review. The PPO affirmed respondent’s order and
remanded the case to the court for further proceedings on the sole charge of Usurpation
of Authority. During the hearing of the case on February 14, 2004, Tabazon, Carunungan
and Nuñez did not appear. Atty. Sesbreño, however, did not move for the issuance of
warrants of arrest against them. Neither did he object to the cancellation of the
scheduled hearing.
ISSUES
1. Did Respondent err in not conducting a preliminary investigation for the charge
of Usurpation of Authority?
2. Did Respondent err in not issuing warrants of arrest for failure of the accused
to appear during trial?
3. Did Respondent err in issuing her Order dismissing the complaint for violation
of R.A. 10?
4. Did Respondent err in transmitting the records of the case to the PPO
instead of the Office of the Ombudsman?
HELD:
1. No. A preliminary investigation is required before the filing of a complaint or
information for an offense where the penalty prescribed by law is at least four (4)
years, two (2) months and one (1) day without regard to the fine. Thus, a
preliminary investigation is not required nor was one conducted for the charge of
violation of Art. 177 of the Revised Penal Code which is punishable by prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods or from six (6) months and one
(1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months.
2. No. There is nothing in the Rules of Criminal Procedure which requires a judge to
issue a warrant of arrest for the non-appearance of the accused during the trial.
Hence, its issuance rests on the sound discretion of the presiding judge. More so in
this case, the private prosecutor did not move for the issuance of such warrant.
3. No. Respondent concedes that due to oversight, she failed to rule on the charge of
violation of R.A. 10 in her initial Resolution. Nonetheless, she asserts in
her Comment With Motion To Dismiss Administrative Complaint that she conducted
a preliminary investigation for the charge of violation of R.A. 10 and dismissed the
charge after taking into consideration the affidavits and evidence presented.
Complainant does not dispute the fact that indeed a preliminary investigation was
conducted for this charge. Thus, when respondent judge dismissed the complaint
for violation of R.A. 10, she merely did so to correct an oversight. It was the
dismissal of the charge for violation of R.A. 10 that was elevated to the PPO for
review. It was imprudent, however, for respondent judge to transmit the entire
records of the case to the PPO knowing that the charge for Usurpation of Authority
was included in the records of the case. Respondent judge should have ensured
that at least one complete set of the records remained in her sala so that the
prosecution for Usurpation of Authority would not be held up. Injudicious though
her actuation was, Respondent judge was not motivated by an evil intent to delay
the case.
4. No. This issue is answered by Administrative Order No. 8 entitled Clarifying and
Modifying Certain Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman, which provides "that all
prosecutors are now deputized Ombudsman prosecutors." Moreover, "[R]esolutions
in Ombudsman cases against public officers and employees prepared by a
deputized assistant prosecutor shall be submitted to the Provincial or City
Prosecutor concerned who shall, in turn, forward the same to the Deputy
Ombudsman of the area with his recommendation for the approval or disapproval
thereof.”
Thus, Respondent did not err and was, in fact, merely acting in accordance with
law when she forwarded the case for violation of R.A. 10 to the PPO. The fact that
the PPO remanded the case to the court for further proceedings instead of
forwarding the same to the Deputy Ombudsman as required by Administrative
Order No. 8 is quite another matter. In any event, respondent judge should have
taken the necessary steps to remedy the lapse in order to preclude delay in the
disposition of the case.
Complaint dismissed for lack of merit. Respondent was nonetheless admonished to
be more circumspect in the performance of her duties in the future.
Punzalan v. Dela Pena – Power of the SOJ over Prosecutors
FACTS: Punzalan and the Plata families were neighbors. On Aug. 13, 1997, Dela Peña,
a house boarder of the Platas, was in front of a store near their house when the group
of Rainier Punzalan, Randall Punzalan, Ricky Eugenio, Jose Gregorio, Alex “Toto” Ofrin,
and others arrived. Eugenio shouted at Dela Peña, “Hoy, kalbo, saan mo binili ang
sumbrero mo?” Dela Peña replied, “Kalbo nga ako, ay pinagtatawanan pa ninyo ako.”
Irked by the response, Gregorio slapped Dela Peña while Rainier punched him in the
mouth. The group then ganged up on him. Somebody shouted, “Yariin na ‘yan!”
Thereafter, Ofrin kicked Dela Peña and tried to stab him with a balisong but missed.
While Dela Peña was fleeing, he met Robert Cagara, the Platas’ family driver,
who was carrying a gun. He grabbed the gun and pointed it to the group chasing him
to scare them. Michael Plata, who was nearby, intervened and tried to wrestle the gun
away from Dela Peña. The gun accidentally went off and hit Rainier Punzalan on the
thigh. The group ran after them and when they got to the Platas’ house, shouted,
“Lumabas kayo d’yan, putang ina ninyo! Papatayin namin kayo!”
Rainier Punzalan filed a criminal complaint against Michael Plata for Attempted
Homicide and against Robert Cagara for Illegal Possession of Firearm.
In turn, Plata, Cagara and Dela Peña filed several counter-charges for grave
oral defamation, grave threats, robbery, malicious mischief and slight physical injuries
against the Punzalans, including one for Attempted Murder filed by Dela Peña against
Rainier and Randall Punzalan and fourteen others and one for Grave Threats filed by
Dela Peña against Ofrin.
In their counter-affidavit, the Punzalans argued that the charges against them
were fabricated in order to dissuade them from testifying in the Attempted Homicide
and Illegal Possession of Firearm cases instituted by Rainier against Plata and Cagara,
respectively.
Cagara also filed a complaint for Grave Oral Defamation against Rosalinda
Punzalan, mother of Rainier, alleging that on October 16, 1997 at the Office of the
Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City, Rosalinda approached him, and within hearing distance
of other people, told him, “Hoy Robert, magkanong ibinigay ng mga Plata sa iyo sa
pagtestigo? Dodoblehin ko at ipapasok pa kita ng trabaho.” In her defense, Rosalinda
denied having uttered the alleged defamatory statements.
On July 28, 1998, the Assistant City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City dismissed
the complaint for Grave Oral Defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan, holding that
Cagara failed to show that the alleged defamatory statements would cast dishonor,
discredit or contempt upon him. He also found that the statements were uttered by
Rosalinda in a state of distress and were not actionable. The charge of Attempted Murder
against Rainier, Randall and 14 others was also dismissed because complainant Dela
Peña’s claim that he accidentally shot Rainier forms part of the defense of Michael Plata
in the Attempted Homicide case previously filed by Rainier against the latter.
Dela Peña and Cagara separately appealed to the DOJ. On March 23, 2000,
then Justice Secretary Artemio Tuquero issued a Resolution modifying the July 28, 1998
Joint Resolution of the Assistant City Prosecutor.
Petitioners, Rosalinda, Rainier and Randall Punzalan, together with their co-
respondents, filed separate MR. On June 6, 2000, the Secretary of Justice set
aside the March 23, 2000 Resolution and directed the withdrawal of the
Informations against the movants, Punzalan et al. (Reason: Oral Defamation
case should be dismissed because the alleged defamatory statements were uttered
without malice as Rosalinda was then in a state of shock and anger. Anent the
Attempted Homicide case filed by Dela Peña against Rainier, the Secretary held that the
allegations in support thereof should first be threshed out in the trial of the Attempted
Homicide case filed by Rainier against Michael Plata. He added that Dela Peña failed to
prove that Rainier, Randall and his companions intended to kill him.)
Respondents’ MR was denied. Hence, they filed a petition for certiorari with the
CA, which reversed June 6, 2000 Resolution where Secretary of Justice directed
the withdrawal of informations for slight oral defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan and
attempted homicide against the respondents.
Petitioners’ MR was denied. Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in setting aside the resolutions of the Secretary of Justice –
YES
HELD/RATIO:
YES. The Secretary of Justice did not commit grave abuse of discretion to justify
interference by the Courts.
A petition for certiorari is the proper remedy when any tribunal, board, or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law.
We now resolve whether the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of
discretion in his Resolutions dated June 6, 2000 and October 11, 2000. Under the
Revised Administrative Code, the Secretary of Justice exercises the power of direct
control and supervision over the decisions or resolutions of the prosecutors. “Supervision
and control” includes the authority to act directly whenever a specific function is
entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; to direct the performance of duty; and
to approve, revise or modify acts and decision of subordinate officials or units.
In the case of People v. Peralta, we reiterated the rule that the right to
prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide range of discretion – the discretion of
whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a variety of
factors which are best appreciated by prosecutors.
 In the case of Hegerty v. Court of Appeals, we declared that: A public In the case at bar, therefore, the Secretary of Justice did not commit grave abuse
prosecutor, by the nature of his office, is under no compulsion to file a criminal of discretion contrary to the finding of the CA. It is well-settled in the recent case
information where no clear legal justification has been shown, and no sufficient evidence of Samson, et al. v. Guingona that the Court will not interfere in the conduct of
of guilt nor prima facie case has been presented by the petitioner. preliminary investigations or reinvestigations and leave to the investigating
prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the exercise of determination of what
We need only to stress that the determination of probable cause during a constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish probable cause for the filing of
preliminary investigation or reinvestigation is recognized as an executive function information against an offender. Moreover, his findings are not subject to review
exclusively of the prosecutor. An investigating prosecutor is under no obligation to file unless shown to have been made with grave abuse.
a criminal action where he is not convinced that he has the quantum of evidence at
hand to support the averments. Prosecuting officers have equally the duty not to
prosecute when after investigation or reinvestigation they are convinced that the
evidence adduced was not sufficient to establish a prima facie case. Thus, the
determination of the persons to be prosecuted rests primarily with the prosecutor who
is vested with discretion in the discharge of this function.

Thus, the question of whether or not to dismiss a complaint is within the

purview of the functions of the prosecutor and, ultimately, that of the Secretary of
Justice.

The reasons of the Secretary of Justice in directing the City Prosecutor to

withdraw the informations for slight oral defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan and for
attempted homicide against the other respondents other than Rosalinda Punzalan is
determinative of whether or not he committed grave abuse of discretion.

First, in the charge of slight oral defamation, the records show that the
defamatory remarks were uttered within the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Mandaluyong City. The CA in its Decision stated the settled rule that the assessment of
the credibility of witnesses is best left to the trial court in view of its opportunity to
observe the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses on the stand. The City Prosecutor,
the proper officer at the time of the occurrence of the incident, is the best person to
observe the demeanor and conduct of the parties and their witnesses and determine
probable cause whether the alleged defamatory utterances were made within the
hearing distance of third parties. The investigating prosecutor found that no sufficient
evidence existed. The Secretary of Justice in his Resolution affirmed the decision of the
City Prosecutor.

As to the charge of attempted homicide against the herein petitioners other

than Rosalinda Punzalan, the Secretary of Justice resolved to dismiss the complaint
because it was in the nature of a countercharge. The DOJ in a Resolution had already
directed that Dela Peña be likewise investigated for the charge of attempted homicide
in connection with the shooting incident that occurred on August 13, 1997 making him
a party to the case filed by Rainier Punzalan. This resulted in the resolution of the
Secretary of Justice that the complaint of Dela Peña should be threshed out in the
proceedings relevant to the shooting incident that resulted in the serious injury of Rainier
Punzalan.