[G.R. No. 178411. June 23, 2010.
] The evidentiary records of the instant case, shows that RL 8 containing an area of
OFFICE OF THE CITY MAYOR OF PARAÑAQUE CITY, OFFICE OF THE CITY
ADMINISTRATOR OF PARAÑAQUE CITY, OFFICE OF THE CITY ENGINEER OF
PARAÑAQUE CITY, OFFICE OF THE CITY PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT
COORDINATOR, OFFICE OF THE BARANGAY CAPTAIN AND SANGGUNIANG
PAMBARANGAY OF BARANGAY VITALEZ, PARAÑAQUE CITY, TERESITA A.
GATCHALIAN, ENRICO R. ESGUERRA, ERNESTO T. PRACALE, JR., MANUEL M.
ARGOTE, CONRADO M. CANLAS, JOSEPHINE S. DAUIGOY, ALLAN L. GONZALES,
ESTER C. ASEHAN, MANUEL A. FUENTES, and MYRNA P. ROSALES, petitioners, vs.
MARIO D. EBIO AND HIS CHILDREN/HEIRS namely, ARTURO V. EBIO, EDUARDO V.
EBIO, RENATO V. EBIO, LOURDES E. MAGTANGOB, MILA V. EBIO, and ARNEL V.
EBIO, respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J p:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the January 31, 2007 Decision 1and June 8,
2007 Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 91350 allegedly
for being contrary to law and jurisprudence. The CA had reversed the Order 3 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque City, Branch 196, issued on April 29,
2005 in Civil Case No. 05-0155.
Below are the facts.
Respondents claim that they are the absolute owners of a parcel of land consisting
of 406 square meters, more or less, located at 9781 Vitalez Compound in Barangay
Vitalez, Parañaque City and covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 01027 and 01472 in
the name of respondent Mario D. Ebio. Said land was an accretion of Cut-cut
creek. Respondents assert that the original occupant and possessor of the said
parcel of land was their great grandfather, Jose Vitalez. Sometime in 1930, Jose
gave the land to his son, Pedro Vitalez. From then on, Pedro continuously and
exclusively occupied and possessed the said lot. In 1966, after executing an
affidavit declaring possession and occupancy, 4 Pedro was able to obtain a tax
declaration over the said property in his name. 5 Since then, respondents have
been religiously paying real property taxes for the said property. 6
Meanwhile, in 1961, respondent Mario Ebio married Pedro's daughter, Zenaida.
Upon Pedro's advice, the couple established their home on the said lot. In April
1964 and in October 1971, Mario Ebio secured building permits from the
Parañaque municipal office for the construction of their house within the said
compound. 7 On April 21, 1987, Pedro executed a notarized Transfer of
Rights 8 ceding his claim over the entire parcel of land in favor of Mario Ebio.
Subsequently, the tax declarations under Pedro's name were cancelled and new
ones were issued in Mario Ebio's name. 9
On March 30, 1999, the Office of the Sangguniang Barangay of Vitalez passed
Resolution No. 08, series of 1999 10 seeking assistance from the City Government
of Parañaque for the construction of an access road along Cut-cut Creek located
in the said barangay. The proposed road, projected to be eight (8) meters wide
and sixty (60) meters long, will run from Urma Drive to the main road of Vitalez
Compound 11 traversing the lot occupied by the respondents. When the city
government advised all the affected residents to vacate the said area,
respondents immediately registered their opposition thereto. As a result, the road
project was temporarily suspended. 12 aTAEHc
In January 2003, however, respondents were surprised when several officials from
the barangay and the city planning office proceeded to cut eight (8) coconut trees
planted on the said lot. Respondents filed letter-complaints before the Regional
Director of the Bureau of Lands, the Department of Interior and Local Government
and the Office of the Vice Mayor. 13 On June 29, 2003, the Sangguniang
Barangay of Vitalez held a meeting to discuss the construction of the proposed
road. In the said meeting, respondents asserted their opposition to the proposed
project and their claim of ownership over the affected property. 14 On November
14, 2003, respondents attended another meeting with officials from the city
government, but no definite agreement was reached by and among the
parties. 15
On March 28, 2005, City Administrator Noli Aldip sent a letter to the respondents
ordering them to vacate the area within the next thirty (30) days, or be physically
evicted from the said property. 16 Respondents sent a letter to the Office of the
City Administrator asserting, in sum, their claim over the subject property and
expressing intent for a further dialogue. 17 The request remained unheeded.
Threatened of being evicted, respondents went to the RTC of Parañaque City on
April 21, 2005 and applied for a writ of preliminary injunction against
petitioners. 18 In the course of the proceedings, respondents admitted before the
trial court that they have a pending application for the issuance of a sales patent
before the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). 19
On April 29, 2005, the RTC issued an Order 20 denying the petition for lack of
merit. The trial court reasoned that respondents were not able to prove
successfully that they have an established right to the property since they have
not instituted an action for confirmation of title and their application for sales
patent has not yet been granted. Additionally, they failed to implead the Republic
of the Philippines, which is an indispensable party.
Respondents moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied. 21
Aggrieved, respondents elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals. On January
31, 2007, the Court of Appeals issued its Decision in favor of the respondents.
According to the Court of Appeals —
The issue ultimately boils down to the question of ownership of the lands
adjoining Cutcut Creek particularly Road Lot No. 8 (hereinafter RL 8) and the
accreted portion beside RL 8.
1
291 square meters is owned by Guaranteed Homes, Inc. covered by TCT No. S-
62176. The same RL 8 appears to have been donated by the Guaranteed Homes
to the City Government of Parañaque on 22 March 1966 and which was accepted
by the then Mayor FLORENCIO BERNABE on 5 April 1966. There is no evidence
however, when RL 8 has been intended as a road lot.
On the other hand, the evidentiary records reveal that PEDRO VITALEZ possessed
the accreted property since 1930 per his Affidavit dated 21 March 1966 for the
purpose of declaring the said property for taxation purposes. The property then
became the subject of Tax Declaration No. 20134 beginning the year 1967 and the
real property taxes therefor had been paid for the years 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969,
1970, 1972, 1973, 1974, 1978, 1980, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001,
2002, 2003, and 2004. Sometime in 1964 and 1971, construction permits were
issued in favor of Appellant MARIO EBIO for the subject property. On 21 April
1987, PEDRO VITALEZ transferred his rights in the accreted property to MARIO
EBIO and his successors-in-interest.
Applying [Article 457 of the Civil Code considering] the foregoing documentary
evidence, it could be concluded that Guaranteed Homes is the owner of the
accreted property considering its ownership of the adjoining RL 8 to which the
accretion attached. However, this is without the application of the provisions of
the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription which is likewise applicable in the instant
case. DAEaTS
xxx xxx xxx
The subject of acquisitive prescription in the instant case is the accreted portion
which [was] duly proven by the Appellants. It is clear that since 1930, Appellants
together with their predecessor-in-interest, PEDRO VITALEZ[,] have been in
exclusive possession of the subject property and starting 1964 had introduced
improvements thereon as evidenced by their construction permits. Thus, even by
extraordinary acquisitive prescription[,] Appellants have acquired ownership of
the property in question since 1930 even if the adjoining RL 8 was subsequently
registered in the name of Guaranteed Homes. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Further, it was only in 1978 that Guaranteed Homes was able to have RL 8
registered in its name, which is almost fifty years from the time PEDRO VITALEZ
occupied the adjoining accreted property in 1930. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
We likewise note the continuous payment of real property taxes of Appellants
which bolster their right over the subject property. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
In sum, We are fully convinced and so hold that the Appellants [have] amply
proven their right over the property in question.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby GRANTED. The
challenged Order of the court a quo is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED. 22
On June 8, 2007, the appellate court denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this petition raising the following assignment of errors:
I.WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION OF THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE A RIGHT IN ESSE IS IN ACCORD WITH THE
LAW AND ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE[;]
II.WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION OF THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE SUBJECT LOT IS AVAILABLE FOR ACQUISITIVE
PRESCRIPTION IS IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND ESTABLISHED
JURISPRUDENCE[;] AND
III.WHETHER OR NOT THE STATE IS AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY TO THE COMPLAINT
. . . FILED BY RESPONDENTS IN THE LOWER COURT. 23
The issues may be narrowed down into two (2): procedurally, whether the State
is an indispensable party to respondents' action for prohibitory injunction; and
substantively, whether the character of respondents' possession and occupation
of the subject property entitles them to avail of the relief of prohibitory injunction.
The petition is without merit. EACTSH
An action for injunction is brought specifically to restrain or command the
performance of an act. 24 It is distinct from the ancillary remedy of preliminary
injunction, which cannot exist except only as part or as an incident to an
independent action or proceeding. Moreover, in an action for injunction, the
auxiliary remedy of a preliminary prohibitory or mandatory injunction may
issue. 25
In the case at bar, respondents filed an action for injunction to prevent the local
government of Parañaque City from proceeding with the construction of an access
road that will traverse through a parcel of land which they claim is owned by them
by virtue of acquisitive prescription.
Petitioners, however, argue that since the creek, being a tributary of the river, is
classified as part of the public domain, any land that may have formed along its
banks through time should also be considered as part of the public domain. And
respondents should have included the State as it is an indispensable party to the
action.
We do not agree.
It is an uncontested fact that the subject land was formed from the alluvial
deposits that have gradually settled along the banks of Cut-cut creek. This being
the case, the law that governs ownership over the accreted portion is Article 84
of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, which remains in effect, 26 in relation to
Article 457 of the Civil Code.
Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 specifically covers ownership over
alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek. It reads:
ART. 84.Accretions deposited gradually upon lands contiguous to creeks, streams,
rivers, and lakes, by accessions or sediments from the waters thereof, belong to
the owners of such lands. 27
Interestingly, Article 457 of the Civil Code states:
Art. 457.To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion
which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.
It is therefore explicit from the foregoing provisions that alluvial deposits along
the banks of a creek do not form part of the public domain as the alluvial property
automatically belongs to the owner of the estate to which it may have been
added. The only restriction provided for by law is that the owner of the adjoining
property must register the same under the Torrens system; otherwise, the alluvial
property may be subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons. 28
In contrast, properties of public dominion cannot be acquired by prescription. No
matter how long the possession of the properties has been, there can be no
prescription against the State regarding property of public domain. 29 Even a city
or municipality cannot acquire them by prescription as against the State. 30
Hence, while it is true that a creek is a property of public dominion, 31 the land
which is formed by the gradual and imperceptible accumulation of sediments
along its banks does not form part of the public domain by clear provision of law.
Moreover, an indispensable party is one whose interest in the controversy is such
that a final decree would necessarily affect his/her right, so that the court cannot
proceed without their presence. 32 In contrast, a necessary party is one whose
presence in the proceedings is necessary to adjudicate the whole controversy but
whose interest is separable such that a final decree can be made in their absence
without affecting them. 33 aTcIEH
In the instant case, the action for prohibition seeks to enjoin the city government
of Parañaque from proceeding with its implementation of the road construction
project. The State is neither a necessary nor an indispensable party to an action
where no positive act shall be required from it or where no obligation shall be
imposed upon it, such as in the case at bar. Neither would it be an indispensable
party if none of its properties shall be divested nor any of its rights infringed.
We also find that the character of possession and ownership by the respondents
over the contested land entitles them to the avails of the action.
A right in esse means a clear and unmistakable right. 34 A party seeking to avail of
an injunctive relief must prove that he or she possesses a right in esseor one that
is actual or existing. 35 It should not be contingent, abstract, or future rights, or
one which may never arise. 36
In the case at bar, respondents assert that their predecessor-in-interest, Pedro
Vitalez, had occupied and possessed the subject lot as early as 1930. In 1964,
respondent Mario Ebio secured a permit from the local government of Parañaque
for the construction of their family dwelling on the said lot. In 1966, Pedro
executed an affidavit of possession and occupancy allowing him to declare the
property in his name for taxation purposes. Curiously, it was also in 1966 when
Guaranteed Homes, Inc., the registered owner of Road Lot No. 8 (RL 8) which
adjoins the land occupied by the respondents, donated RL 8 to the local
government of Parañaque.
From these findings of fact by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, only
one conclusion can be made: that for more than thirty (30) years, neither
Guaranteed Homes, Inc. nor the local government of Parañaque in its corporate
or private capacity sought to register the accreted portion. Undoubtedly,
respondents are deemed to have acquired ownership over the subject property
through prescription. Respondents can assert such right despite the fact that they
have yet to register their title over the said lot. It must be remembered that the
purpose of land registration is not the acquisition of lands, but only the
registration of title which the applicant already possessed over the land.
Registration was never intended as a means of acquiring ownership. 37 A decree
of registration merely confirms, but does not confer, ownership. 38
Did the filing of a sales patent application by the respondents, which remains
pending before the DENR, estop them from filing an injunction suit?
We answer in the negative.
Confirmation of an imperfect title over a parcel of land may be done either
through judicial proceedings or through administrative process. In the instant
case, respondents admitted that they opted to confirm their title over the
property administratively by filing an application for sales patent.
Respondents' application for sales patent, however, should not be used to
prejudice or derogate what may be deemed as their vested right over the subject
property. The sales patent application should instead be considered as a mere
superfluity particularly since ownership over the land, which they seek to buy
from the State, is already vested upon them by virtue of acquisitive prescription.
Moreover, the State does not have any authority to convey a property through
the issuance of a grant or a patent if the land is no longer a public land. 39 cHDaEI
Nemo dat quod dat non habet. No one can give what he does not have. Such
principle is equally applicable even against a sovereign entity that is the State.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The January 31, 2007
Decision, as well as the July 8, 2007 Resolution, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 91350 are hereby AFFIRMED.
With costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
2
[G.R. No. L-39248. May 7, 1976.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DIRECTOR OF LANDS, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. HEIRS OF LUISA VILLA ABRILLE,defendant-appellant, LAND
REGISTRATION COMMISSIONER and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF DAVAO
CITY, defendants.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza and Assistant Solicitor General Octavio R.
Ramirez and Baltazar Llamas for plaintiff-appellee.
Jose R. Madrazo, Jr. for defendants-appellants.
Gregorio Bilog, Jr. for defendant Land Registration Commissioner.
SYNOPSIS
The Republic, represented by the Director of Lands, filed a Complaint for
Annulment of Certificate of Title alleging that: the subdivision of a parcel of land
owned by defendant into two lots included an excess area of 82,127 square
meters; the Land Registration Commissioner approved said petition for
subdivision and; in view of which transfer certificate of title, which included the
excess area, were issued by the Register of Deeds. The lower court rendered
judgment cancelling the new certificates of title (one of the subdivided lots having
been further subdivided and new certificates of title issued therefor) containing
the increased area and ordered the Register of Deeds to issue new ones in lieu
thereof after the increased portion had been deducted. Appealed to the Court of
Appeals, the latter certified the case to the Supreme Court since it involved purely
a question of law.
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment holding that to bring the increased
area under the operation and coverage of the Land Registration Act proceedings
for registration of the land should be filed.
DECISION
ESGUERRA, J p:
This case was originally appealed to the Court of Appeals where it was docketed
as CA-G.R. No. 47438-R. The Court of Appeals certified it to this Court for final
consideration and resolution of the pure question of law involved.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
On May 9, 1969, a Complaint for Annulment of Certificate of Title was filed by the
Republic of the Philippines. (represented by the Director of Lands), with the Court
of First Instance of Davao, Branch I, alleging, among others, the following:
"3. That defendant Commissioner of Land Registration and defendant Register of
Deeds of Davao City whose Offices are at España Extension, Quezon City and
Davao City, respectively, are included in this complaint, the first being the public
Official charged under the law with the approval of subdivision surveys of private
lands while the second is the Official vested with the authority to issue certificates
of titles, pursuant to the provisions of Act 496, as amended, otherwise known as
the Land Registration Law;
"4. That defendant Estate of Luisa Villa Abrille (now Heirs of Luisa Villa Abrille) is
the owner of a parcel of land in the City of Davao containing an area of FIVE
HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FIFTY-TWO SQUARE METERS
(525,652), more or less, under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1439 of the
Registry of Deeds of Davao City, issued in her name;
"5. That deceased Luisa Villa Abrille during her lifetime caused the subdivision of
the aforesaid parcel of land into two lots designated as Lots Nos. 379-B-2-B-1 and
379-B-2-B-2 under subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-9322 which was approved by the
Land Registration Commissioner on March 17, 1967;
"6. That under Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-69322, Lot No. 379-B-2-B-1 contains an
area of 30,100 Square Meters while Lot No. 379-B-2-B-2 contains an area of
577,679 Square Meters or a total area of 607,779 Square Meters, which is 82,127
Square Meters more than the original area covered in Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-1439 in the name of said defendant Luisa Villa Abrille;
"7. That on March 27, 1967 or ten days after the approval by the Land Registration
Commissioner, said Luisa Villa Abrille was able to secure an order from the Court
of First Instance of Davao in LRC (GLRO) Doc. No. 9969, directing the Register of
Deeds for the City of Davao and Province of Davao, to correct the area of
Certificate of Title No. T-1439 and thereafter to cancel the same and issue in lieu
thereof TCT Nos. T-18886 and T-18887;
"8. That on March 30, 1967, the Register of Deeds concerned registered Lot 379-
B-2-B-1 and issued TCT No. 18886 therefor, in the name of Luisa Villa-Abrille and
on the same date registered Lot No. 3 79-B-2-B-2 and issued TCT No. 18887 in the
name of Luisa Villa-Abrille;
"9. That the registration of Lot No. 379-B-2-B-2, which includes the
aforementioned excess area of 82,127 Square Meters, was not in accordance with
law for lack of the required notice and publication as prescribed in Act 496, as
amended, otherwise known as the Land Registration Law;
"10. That the excess or enlarged area of 82,127 Square Meters as a result of the
approval of the subdivision survey (LRC) Psd-69322 was formerly a portion of the
Davao River which dried up by reason of the change of course of the said Davao
River; hence a land belonging to the public domain; and
"11. That as a consequence thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 18887 which
covers Lot No. 379-B-2-B-2 of Subdivision Survey (LRC) Psd-69322, wherein the
excess. area of land belong to the public domain (not private land) is null and
void ab initio."
On June 10, 1969, defendant Register of Deeds of Davao City filed her answer
averring that she, "in the performance of her ministerial duty, honestly and in
good faith effected the registration of Subdivision Lot No. 379-B-2-B-1 and Lot No.
379-B-2-B-2 and the issuance of corresponding TCT No. 18886 and TCT No. 18887
therefor, respectively, in view of the approval of the Land Registration
Commissioner of Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-69322, and in view of the Order of
the Court of First Instance of Davao to correct the area in Certificate of Title No.
T-1439, to cancel the same and to issue in lieu thereof TCT Nos. T-18886 and T-
18887". LibLex
On July 2, 1969, herein defendant-appellants filed their answer admitting the
allegations contained in paragraphs 1, 3, 4,5 and 7 of the complaint. That they
admit the increase in area of the land of their predecessor but that the increase
in area of the land was acceded to and concurred in by the defendant, Land
Registration Commissioner, and the same was duly noted and approved by the
Court of First Instance of Davao; that they admit the issuance of TCT Nos. T-18886
and T-18887 out of Certificate of Title No. T-1439 in the name of their
predecessor-in-interest Luisa Villa Abrille but that TCT No. T-18886 had been
cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. T-19077 was issued in favor of Gaudencio
Consunji, and, TCT No. T-18887 had likewise been cancelled and several Transfer
Certificates of Title were issued thereunder; that the subject increase of area was
made in accordance with law and existing jurisprudence; and that Luisa Villa
Abrille, predecessor-in-interest of herein defendant-appellant, as riparian owner
was entitled under the law to claim, as she did, the increase or excess in area of
her original land as her own.
On August 12, 1969, defendant Commissioner of Land Registration prays for a
judgment on the pleadings and avers in his answer that he has no knowledge of
the subject matter of the complaint since the subdivision plan involved therein
was approved by the then Commissioner of Land Registration, Antonio Noblejas;
and that on February 19, 1968, the then Commissioner of Land Registration,
Antonio Noblejas, issued LRC Circular No. 167 directing the Register of Deeds
throughout the Philippines to, among others, deny the registration of subdivision
plans with increased or expanded areas and to withhold the issuance of the
corresponding titles, or if the plans have already been registered and the titles
issued, to recall the titles and to take appropriate steps for their cancellation.
Some private persons, as actual possessors and occupants, tried to intervene in
the case as movant-intervenors but they were denied standing in court by the trial
court in its order of August 16, 1969.
On January 6, 1970, the parties litigants submitted in court their "Agreed
Stipulation of Facts" and pray that judgment be rendered by the trial court on
their case based on their stipulation of facts. The "Agreed Stipulation of Facts" of
the parties reads as follows: Cdpr
"COME NOW the parties assisted by their respective attorneys, and unto the
Honorable Court, most respectfully submit the following stipulation of facts and
allege:
"1. That Lot 379-B-2-B was originally registered on June 28, 1916 in the Registry
Book of the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga as Vol. A-27, Page 40 under Original
Certificate of Title No. 5609, Case No. 1, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 317, in the name of
Francisco Villa Abrille Lim Juna, father of Luisa Villa Abrille;
"2. That upon the death of the original owner, the said property was inherited by
Luisa Villa Abrille and transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1439 was issued in the
name of said Luisa Villa Abrille;
"3. That subsequently, by virtue of an approved subdivision plan Psd-69322 by the
defendant, Land Registration Commissioner, Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-
18886 and 18887 were issued by the defendant, Register of Deeds of Davao, copy
of which subdivision plan is hereto attached as Annex "A", and made integral part
hereof;
"4. That Transfer Certificate of Title. No. T-18886 was subsequently concern by
virtue of deed of sale, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-19077 was issued in
the name of Gaudencio Consunji, a purchaser in good faith and for value;
"5. That the said subdivision plan Annex "A" was also approved by the Court of
First Instance of Davao, Branch IV, through an Order dated March 27, 1967, copy
of which order is hereto attached as Annex "B" and made part hereof;
"6. That the said Order Annex "B" was issued by the Court of First Instance of
Davao, Branch IV, on the strength of the Report of the defendant, Land
Registration Commissioner, copy of which report is hereto attached as Annex "C"
and made integral part hereof;
"7. That much later on, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18887 was, by virtue of
an Order of the Court of First Instance, Branch I, in Special Proceedings No. 1357,
entitled: In the Matter of the Testate Estate of Luisa Villa Abrille, approving a
project of partition cancelled, and in lieu thereof, the following Transfer
Certificates of Title were issued to the following named persons, to wit:
(a) T-20690 - Huang Siu Sin;
(b) T-20692 - Huang Siu Sin;
(c) T-20701 - Josefino Huang;
(d) T-20702 - Josefino Huang;
(e) T-20703 - Josefino Huang;
(f) T-20732 - Huang Siu Sin, et al.;
(g) T-20733 - Huang Siu Sin, et al.;
(h) T-20713 - Miguel Huang;
(i) T-20715 - Miguel Huang;
(j) T-20725 - Milagros Huang;
(k) T-20726 - Milagros Huang;
3
which certificates of title were issued on the basis of a subdivision plan LRC Psd-
71236 duly approved by the defendant, Land Registration Commissioner, copy of
which subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-71236 is hereto attached as Annex "D" and made
integral part hereof;
"8. That the parties admit that there was an increase in the area of Lot 379-B-2-B,
but the same was with the knowledge of the defendant, Land Registration
Commissioner and the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch IV;
"9. That the parties admit that no registered owner has been affected or
prejudiced in the increase in area as only Luisa Villa Abrille as the registered owner
holds property adjacent to the parcel of land in question;
"10. That the portion of land subject of the increase adjoins Lot 379-B-2-B and
abuts the Davao River;
"11. That the parcel of land subject of the increase is fully planted with coconuts,
bananas and other seasonal crops by the defendants, through their predecessor-
in-interest;
"12. That the increase in area could have taken place very long time ago as the
coconuts planted thereon had long been fruit bearing;
"13. That Transfer Certificate of Title No. 18886 does not contain any portion of
the increase in area;
"14. That of the certificates of title issued based under subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-
71236, only Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725; T-20701; T-20713; and T-
20690 contain the increase in area; while all the other certificates of title issued
under subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-71236 do not contain any increase in area;
"15. That the parties agree that the issuance of the Order Annex "B" was without
notice to the Director of Lands."
The trial court thereafter rendered its decision dated January 27, 1970, which
reads as follows:
"This is an ordinary civil action for annulment of certificate of title instituted by
the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands, against the
Estate of Luisa Abrille, represented by Huang Siu Sin, Administrator, the Land
Registration Commissioner and the Register of Deeds of the City of Davao.
Because the residue of the intestate estate of Luisa Villa Abrille had been divided
among Huang Siu Sin, Josefino Huang, Milagros Huang, Miguel Huang and lap
Tong Ha, heirs, they were directed to appear and to substitute for the intestate
estate and they did. LLphil
"The parties submitted the following stipulation of facts:
xxx xxx xxx
"The increase area of the land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 5609 of
the Register of Deeds of Davao in the name of Francisco Villa Abrille Lim Juna and
subsequently by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1439 in the name of Luisa Villa
Abrille and finally, based on subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-71236, by Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725 in the name of Milagros Huang, T-20701 in the
name of Josefino Huang, T-20713 in the name of Miguel Huang and T-20690 in
the name of Huang Siu Sin, is from 525,652 square meters to 607,779 square
meters, or 82,127 square meters.
"The remedy sought by defendant heirs of Luisa Villa Abrille in order to include
the increase in area was a petition for approval of Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-
79322 recommended by the Commissioner of Land Registration in his Report, and
for issuance of new titles under Section 44, Act 496, as amended, filed with this
Court, which was assigned to Branch IV.
"Even pursuant to Section 44 of Act 496 under which the aforesaid remedy was
sought, notice before the hearing is required. The parties admit that there was no
notice to the persons interested, including the Director of Lands, before the
petition was heard.
"Worse, the increase in area could not have been included in Transfer Certificates
of Title Nos. T-20725, T-20701, T-20713 and T-20690 even assumingarguendo that
the same belonged to the owner of the land to which it is adjacent by the simple
expediency of a petition for approval of subdivision plan and issuance of new
titles, because a subdivision of a registered land under Section 44 of Act 496 does
not authorize the inclusion of land or area not embraced in the titled or in excess
of what is stated in the title. And the approval of the Court of such subdivision
plan does not lend validity to it. The subdivision must be limited to the area stated
in the title. Neither amendment of the title under Section 112 of Act 496 would
be a valid remedy.
"The heirs of Luisa Villa Abrille, owners of the adjacent estate, might have
acquired a registrable title to the land in question but to bring it under the
operation of the Land Registration Act, a petition for registration under Act 496
should have been filed. More so when the title acquired is by continuous
possession for at least 30 years under a claim of ownership. And even assuming
that the land is an accretion, the fact that the riparian estate is registered does
not bring ipso facto effect its accretion thereto under the operation of the Land
Registration Act. No decree of registration of the land based upon final judgment
promulgated by a court of competent jurisdiction after due publication, notice
and hearing, has been issued by the Commissioner of Land Registration and
transcribed by the Register of Deeds of Davao in the registry, for the reason that
no initial or original registration proceedings have been instituted by the owner.
And the only way by which a title to the land in question can be issued for the first
time is for the Land Registration Commissioner to issue a decree of registration
based upon final judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction after
trial.
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered cancelling Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. T-20725, T-20701, T-20713 and T-20690 and directing the Register of
Deeds of Davao to issue new certificates of title in lieu thereof after the portions
consisting of 82,127 square meters, the land involved, shall have been segregated
therefrom in accordance with law."
Not satisfied with the judgment of the trial court, defendant Heirs of Luisa Villa
Abrille brought the case on appeal to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals,
however, in its Resolution dated July 22, 1974, certified the case (CA-G.R. No.
47438-R) to this Court for consideration and final disposition. cdrep
Defendant-appellant maintains that the lower court erred in holding the approval
of Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-69322 of no legal effect merely on ground of lack of
notice to interested persons, and in ordering the cancellation of Certificates of
Title Nos. T-20725, T-20701, T-20713, and T-20690. It is the contention of the
defendant-appellant that since the government agencies having to do with lands
know all the time the increase in area in subdivision plan Psd-69322, and the
government agencies concerned tolerated if not abetted the ultimate inclusion of
the involved increase in area, defendant-appellant should not be made to suffer
the effect of the allegedly wrong procedure or step taken in the approval of the
aforementioned subdivision plan. Besides, defendant-appellant claims that it is
their honest belief that the legal remedy taken by them in seeking the approval of
their subdivision plan concern was well within the law, particularly the provision
of Section 44 of Act 496, as amended.
Plaintiff-appellee, on the other hand, maintains that the approval of the
subdivision plan, with the increase in area, by the defendant-appellant Land
Registration Commission does not lend validity to the said subdivision plan; and
that the issuance of the four transfer certificates of title (Nos. T-20725, T-20701,
T-20713 and T-20690) over the increased area in question is improper and invalid
notwithstanding the conformity of the Land Registration Commissioner and the
subsequent order of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch IV, approving the
subdivision plan concerned, as the required giving of notice to all parties
interested in defendant-appellant's petition for approval of subdivision plan was
not at all followed.
Before Us, therefore, for consideration and final resolution, in order to arrive at
judicious disposition of the case at bar, is whether or not the lower court erred in
ordering the cancellation of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725, T-20701,
T-20713 and T-20690 which cover the increased area in question totalling 82,127
square meters.
After a careful and thorough deliberation of the matter in controversy, We are of
the opinion and so hold that the lower court acted correctly in ordering the
cancellation of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725, T-20701, T-20713 and
T-20690 which admittedly covered the increased area of 82,127 square meters
under Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-71236 (and formerly under Psd-69322) for the
City of Davao.
Certainly, the step taken by defendant-appellant in petitioning the court for the
approval of their Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-69322 and then Psd-71236 to include
the questioned increased area of 82,127 square meters is, to say the least,
unwarranted and irregular. This is so for the increased area in question, which is
not a registered land but formerly a river bed, is so big as to give allowance for a
mere mistake in area of the original registration of the tracts of land of the
defendant-appellant formerly belonging to and registered in the name of their
grandfather, Francisco Villa Abrille Lim Juna. In order to bring this increase in area,
which the parties admitted to have been a former river bed of the Davao River,
under the operation and coverage of the Land Registration Law, Act 496,
proceedings in registrations of land title should have been filed instead of an
ordinary approval of subdivision plan.
It should be remembered that recourse under Section 44 of Act 496, which the
predecessor-in-interest (Luisa Villa Abrille) of the herein defendant-appellant
took, is good only insofar as it covers previously registered lands. In the instant
case, part of the tracts of land, particularly the area of 82,127 square meter, has
not yet been brought under the operation of the Torrens System. Worse still, the
approval of Subdivision Plans (LRC) Psd-09322 and Psd-71236 was without notice
to all parties in interest, more particularly the Director of Lands. For an applicant
to have his imperfect or incomplete title or claim to a land to be originally
registered under Act 496, the following requisites should all be satisfied: LLpr
1. Survey of land by the Bureau of Lands or a duly licensed private surveyor;
2. Filing of application for registration by the applicant;
3. Setting of the date for the initial hearing of the application by the Court;
4. Transmittal of the application and the date of initial hearing together with all
the documents or other evidences attached thereto by the Clerk of Court to the
Land Registration Commission;
5. Publication of a notice of the filing of the application and date and place of the
hearing in the Official Gazette;
6. Service of notice upon continuous owners, occupants and those known to have
interests in the property by the sheriff;
7. Filing of answer to the application by any person whether named in the notice
or not;
8. Hearing of the case by the Court;
9. Promulgation of judgment by the Court;
10. Issuance of the decree by the Court declaring the decision final and instructing
the Land Registration Commission to issue a decree of confirmation and
registration;
11. Entry of the decree of registration in the Land Registration Commission;
4
12. Sending of copy of the decree of registration to the corresponding Register of
Deeds; and
13. Transcription of the decree of registration in the registration book and the
issuance of the owners duplicate original certificate of title to the applicant by the
Register of Deeds, upon payment of the prescribed fees.
Hence, with the foregoing requisites not having been complied with, the lower
court committed no error in its appealed decision dated January 27, 1970.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed in toto.
No special pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. L-17652. June 30, 1962.]
IGNACIO GRANDE, ET AL., petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DOMINGO
CALALUNG and ESTEBAN CALALUNG, respondents.
Bartolome Guirao and Antonio M. Orara for petitioners.
Gonzales & Fernandez for respondent.
DECISION
BARRERA, J p:
This is an appeal taken by petitioners Ignacio, Eulogia, Alfonso, Eulalia, and Sofia
Grande, from the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA-G. R. No. 25169-R)
reversing that of the Court of First Instance of Isabela (Civil Case No. 1171), and
dismissing petitioners' action against respondents Domingo and Esteban
Calalung, to quiet title to and recover possession of a parcel of land allegedly
occupied by the latter without petitioners' consent.
The facts of the case, which are undisputed, briefly are: Petitioners are the owners
of a parcel of land, with an area of 3.5032 hectares, located at barrio Ragan,
municipality of Magsaysay (formerly Tumauini), province of Isabela, by
inheritance from their deceased mother Patricia Angui (who inherited it from her
parents Isidro Angui and Ana Lopez, in whose name said land appears registered,
as shown by Original Certificate of Title No. 2982, issued on June 9, 1934). Said
property is identified as Lot No. 1, Plan PSU-83342. When it was surveyed for
purposes of registration sometime in 1930, its northeastern boundary was the
Cagayan River (the same boundary stated in the (title). Since then, and for many
years thereafter, a gradual accretion on the northeastern side took place, by
action of the current of the Cagayan River, so much so, that by 1958, the bank
thereof had receded to a distance of about 105 meters from its original site, and
an alluvial deposit of 19,964 square meters (1.9964 hectares), more or less, had
been added to the registered area (Exh. C-1).
On January 25, 1958, petitioners instituted the present action in the Court of First
Instance of Isabela against respondents, to quiet title to said portion (19,964
square meters) formed by accretion, alleging in their complaint (docketed as Civil
Case No. 1171) that they and their predecessors-in-interest, were formerly in
peaceful and continuous possession thereof, until September, 1948, when
respondents entered upon the land under claim of ownership. Petitioners also
asked for damages corresponding to the value of the fruits of the land as well as
attorney's fees and costs. In their answer (dated February 18, 1958), respondents
claim ownership in themselves, asserting that they have been in continuous,
open, and undisturbed possession of said portion, since prior to the year 1933 to
the present.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Isabela, on May 4, 1959, rendered a
decision adjudging the ownership of the portion in question to petitioners, and
ordering respondents to vacate the premises and deliver possession thereof to
petitioners, and to pay to the latter P250.00 as damages and costs. Said decision,
in part, reads:
"It is admitted by the parties that the land involved in this action was formed by
the gradual deposit of alluvium brought about by the action of the Cagayan River,
a navigable river. We are inclined to believe that the accretion was formed on the
northeastern side of the land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 2982 after
the survey of the registered land in 1931, because the surveyors found out that
the northeastern boundary of the land surveyed by them was the Cagayan River,
and not the land in question. Which is indicative of the fact that the accretion has
not yet started or began in 1931. And, as declared by Pedro Laman, defendants'
witness and the boundary owner on the northwest of the registered land of the
plaintiffs, the accretion was a little more than one hectare, including the stony
portion, in 1940 or 1941. Therefore, the declarations of the defendant Domingo
Calalung and his witness, Vicente C. Bacani, to the effect that the land in question
was formed by accretion since 1933 do not only contradict the testimony of
defendants' witness Pedro Laman, but could not overthrow the incontestable fact
that the accretion with an area of 4 hectares, more or less, was formed in 1948,
reason for which, it was only declared in that same year for taxation purposes by
the defendants under Tax Dec. No. 257 (Exh. '2') when they entered upon the
land. We could not give credence to defendants' assertion that Tax Dec. No. 257
(Exh. '2') cancelled Tax Dec. No. 28226 (Exh. '1'), because Exh. "2" says that 'tax
under this declaration begins with the year 1948. But, the fact that defendants
declared the land for taxation purposes since 1948, does not mean that they
become the owner of the land by mere occupancy, for it is a new provision of the
New Civil Code that ownership of a piece of land cannot be acquired by
occupation (Art. 714, New Civil Code). The land in question being an accretion to
the mother or registered land of the plaintiffs, the accretion belongs to the
plaintiffs (Art. 457, New Civil Code; Art. 366, Old Civil Code). Assuming, arguendo,
that the accretion has been occupied by the defendants since 1948, or earlier, is
of no moment, because the law does not require any act of possession on the part
of the owner of the riparian owner, from the moment the deposit becomes
manifest (Roxas vs. Tuason, 9 Phil. 408; Cortez vs. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567).
Further, no act of appropriation on the part of the riparian owner is necessary, in
order to acquire ownership of the alluvial formation, as the law does not require
the same (3 Manresa, C.C., pp. 321-326).
"This brings us now to the determination of whether the defendants, granting that
they have been in possession of the alluvium since 1948, could have acquired the
property by prescription. Assuming that they occupied the land in September,
1948, but considering that the action was commenced on January 25, 1958, they
have not been in possession of the land for ten (10) years; hence, they could not
have acquired the land by ordinary prescription (Arts. 1134 and 1138, New Civil
Code). Moreover, as the alluvium is, by law, part and parcel of the registered
property, the same may be considered as registered property, within the meaning
of Section 46 of Act No. 496; and, therefore, it could not be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession by another person."
Unsatisfied, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which rendered, on
September 14, 1960, the decision adverted to at the beginning of this opinion,
partly stating:
"That the area in controversy has been formed through a gradual process of
alluvion, which started in the early thirties, is a fact conclusively established by
the evidence for both parties. By law, therefore, unless some superior title has
supervened, it should properly belong to the riparian owners, specifically in
accordance with the rule of natural accession in Article 366 of the old Civil Code
(now Article 457), which provides that 'to the owner of lands adjoining the banks
of rivers, belongs the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of
the current of the water.' The defendants, however, contend that they have
acquired ownership through prescription. This contention poses the real issue in
this case. The Court a quo, has resolved it in favor of the plaintiffs, on two grounds:
First, since by accession, the land in question pertains to the original estate, and
since in this instance the original estate is registered, the accretion, consequently,
falls within the purview of Section 46 of Act No. 496, which states that 'no title to
registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession'; and, second, the adverse possession of the
defendant began only in the month of September, 1948, or less than the 10-year
period required for prescription before the present action was instituted.
"As a legal proposition, the first ground relied upon by the trial court, is not quite
correct. An accretion to registered land, while declared by specific provision of
the Civil Code to belong to the owner of the land as a natural accession thereof,
does not ipso jure become entitled to the protection of the rule of
imprescriptibility of title established by the Land Registration Act. Such protection
does not extend beyond the area given and described in the certificate. To hold
otherwise, would be productive of confusion. It would virtually deprive the title,
and the technical description of the land given therein, of their character of
conclusiveness as to the identity and area of the land that is registered. Just as the
Supreme Court, albeit in a negative manner, has stated that registration does not
protect the riparian owner against the erosion of the area of his land through
gradual changes in the course of the adjoining stream (Payatas Estate
Development Co. vs. Tuason, 53 Phil. 55), so registration does not entitle him to
all the rights conferred by the Land Registration Act, in so far as the area added
by accretion is concerned. What rights he has, are declared not by said Act, but
by the provisions of the Civil Code on accession; and these provisions do not
preclude acquisition of the additional area by another person through
prescription. This Court has held as much in the case of Galindez, et al. vs. Baguisa,
et al., CA-G. R. No. 19249-R, July 17, 1959.
"We now proposed to review the second ground relied upon by the trial court,
regarding the length of time that the defendants have been in possession.
Domingo Calalung testified that he occupied the land in question for the first time
in 1934, not in 1948 as claimed by the plaintiffs. The area under occupancy
gradually increased as the years went by. In 1946, he declared the land for
purposes of taxation (Exhibit 1). This tax declaration was superseded in 1948 by
another (Exhibit 2), after the name of the municipality wherein it is located was
changed from Tumauini to Magsaysay. Calalung's testimony is corroborated by
two witnesses, both owners of properties nearby. Pedro Laman, 72 years of age,
who was Municipal president of Tumauini for three terms, said that the land in
question adjoins his own on the south, and that since 1940 or 1941, he has always
known it to be in the peaceful possession of the defendants. Vicente C. Bacani
testified to the same effect, although, he said that the defendants' possession
started sometime in 1933 or 1934. The area thereof, he said, was then less than
one hectare.
"We find the testimony of the said witnesses entitled to much greater weight and
credence than that of the plaintiff Pedro Grande and his lone witness, Laureana
Rodriguez. The first stated that the defendants occupied the land in question only
in 1948; that he called the latter's attention to the fact that the land was his, but
the defendants, in turn, claimed that they were the owners; that the plaintiffs did
not file an action until 1958, because it was only then that they were able to obtain
the certificate of title from the surveyor, Domingo Parlan; and that they never
declared the land in question for taxation purposes or paid the taxes thereon.
Pedro Grande admitted that the defendants had the said land surveyed in April,
1958, and that he tried to stop it, not because he claimed the accretion for himself
and his co-plaintiffs, but because the survey included a portion of the property
covered by their title. This last fact is conceded by the defendants who,
accordingly, relinquished their possession to the part thus included, containing an
area of some 458 square meters.
5
"The oral evidence for the defendants concerning the period of their possession
— from 1933 to 1958 — is not only preponderant in itself, but is, moreover,
supported by the fact that it is they and not the plaintiffs who declared the
disputed property for taxation, and by the additional circumstance that if the
plaintiffs had really been in prior possession and were deprived thereof in 1948,
they would have immediately taken steps to recover the same. The excuse they
gave for not doing so, namely, that they did not receive their copy of the
certificate of title to their property until 1958 for lack of funds to pay the fees of
the surveyor Domingo Parlan, is too flimsy to merit any serious consideration. The
payment of the surveyor's fees had nothing to do with their right to obtain a copy
of the certificate. Besides, it was not necessary for them to have it in their hands,
in order to file an action to recover the land which was legally theirs by accession
and of which, as they allege, they had been illegally deprived by the defendants.
We are convinced, upon consideration of the evidence, that the latter, were really
in possession since 1934, immediately after the process of alluvion started, and
that the plaintiffs woke up to their rights only when they received their copy of
the title in 1958. By then, however, prescription had already supervened in favor
of the defendants."
It is this decision of the Court of Appeals which petitioners seek to be reviewed by
us.
The sole issue for resolution in this case is whether respondents have acquired
the alluvial property in question through prescription.
There can be no dispute that both under Article 457 of the new Civil Code and
Article 366 of the old, petitioners are the lawful owners of said alluvial property,
as they are the registered owners of the land to which it adjoins. The question is
whether the accretion becomes automatically registered land just because the lot
which receives it is covered by a Torrens title thereby making the alluvial property
imprescriptible. We agree with the Court of Appeals that it does not, just as an
unregistered land purchased by the registered owner of the adjoining land does
not, by extension, become ipso factoregistered land. Ownership of a piece of land
is one thing, and registration under the Torrens system of that ownership is quite
another. Ownership over the accretion received by the land adjoining a river is
governed by the Civil Code. Imprescriptibility of registered land is provided in the
registration law. Registration under the Land Registration and Cadastral Acts does
not vest or give title to the land, but merely confirms and thereafter protects the
title already possessed by the owner, making it imprescriptible by occupation of
third parties. But to obtain this protection, the land must be placed under the
operation of the registration laws wherein certain judicial procedures have been
provided. The fact remains, however, that petitioners never sought registration
of said alluvial property (which was formed sometime after petitioners' property
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 2982 was registered on June 9, 1934)
up to the time they instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of
Isabela in 1958. The increment, therefore, never became registered property, and
hence is not entitled or subject to the protection of imprescriptibility enjoyed by
registered property under the Torrens system. Consequently, it was subject to
acquisition through prescription by third persons.
The next issue is, did respondents acquire said alluvial property through
acquisitive prescription? This is a question which requires determination of facts:
physical possession and dates or duration of such possession. The Court of
Appeals, after analyzing the evidence, found that respondents-appellees were in
possession of the alluvial lot since 1933 or 1934, openly, continuously and
adversely, under a claim of ownership up to the filing of the action in 1958. This
finding of the existence of these facts, arrived at by the Court of Appeals after an
examination of the evidence presented by the parties, is conclusive as to them
and can not be reviewed by us.
The law on prescription applicable to the case is that provided in Act 190 and not
the provisions of the Civil Code, since the possession started in 1933 or 1934 when
the pertinent articles of the Old Civil Code were not in force and before the
effectivity of the New Civil Code in 1950. Hence, the conclusion of the Court of
Appeals that the respondents acquired the alluvial lot in question by acquisitive
prescription is in accordance with law.
The decision of the Court of Appeals under review is hereby affirmed, with costs
against the petitions. So ordered.
[G.R. No. L-12958. May 30, 1960.]
FAUSTINO IGNACIO, applicant and appellant, vs. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS and
LAUREANO VALERIANO, oppositors and appellees.
MONTEMAYOR, J p:
Faustino Ignacio is appealing the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
dismissing his application for the registration of a parcel of land.
On January 25, 1950, Ignacio filed an application for the registration of a parcel of
land (mangrove), situated in barrio Gasac, Navotas, Rizal, with an area of 37,877
square meters. Later, he amended his application by alleging among others that
he owned the parcel applied for by right of accretion. To the application, the
Director of Lands, Laureano Valeriano and Domingo Gutierrez filed oppositions.
Gutierrez later withdrew his opposition. The Director of Lands claimed the parcel
applied for as a portion of the public domain, for the reason that neither the
applicant nor his predecessor- in-interest possessed sufficient title thereto, not
having acquired it either by composition title from the Spanish government or by
possessory information title under the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, and
that he had not possessed the same openly, continuously and adversely under
a bona fide claim of ownership since July 26, 1894. In his turn, Valeriano alleged
that he was holding the land by virtue of a permit granted him by the Bureau of
Fisheries, issued on January 13, 1947, and approved by the President.
It is not disputed that the land applied for adjoins a parcel owned by the applicant
which he had acquired from the Government by virtue of a free patent title in
1936. It has also been established that the parcel in question was formed by
accretion and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the Manila Bay which
borders it on the southwest. Applicant Ignacio claims that he had occupied the
land since 1935, planting it with api-api trees, and that his possession thereof had
been continuous, adverse and public for a period of twenty years until said
possession was disturbed by oppositor Valeriano.
On the other hand, the Director of Lands sought to prove that the parcel is
foreshore land, covered by the ebb and flow of the tide and, therefore, formed
part of the public domain.
After hearing, the trial court dismissed the application, holding that the parcel
formed part of the public domain. In his appeal, Ignacio assigns the following
errors:
"I. The lower court erred in holding that the land in question, altho an accretion
to the land of the applicant-appellant, does not belong to him but forms part of
the public domain.
"II. Granting that the land in question forms part of the public domain, the lower
court nevertheless erred in not declaring the same to be the property of the
applicant-appellant, the said land not being necessary for any public use or
purpose and in not ordering at the same time its registration in the name of
applicant-appellant in the present registration proceedings.
"III. The lower court erred in not holding that the land in question now belongs to
the applicant-appellant by virtue of acquisitive prescription, the said land having
ceased to be of the public domain and became the private or patrimonial property
of the State.
"IV. The lower court erred in not holding that the oppositor Director of Lands is
now in estoppel from claiming the land in question as a land of the public
domain."
Appellant contends that the parcel belongs to him by the law of accretion, having
been formed by gradual deposit by action of the Manila Bay, and he cites Article
457 of the New Civil Code (Article 366, Old Civil Code), which provides that:
"To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which
they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters."
The article cited is clearly inapplicable because it refers to accretion or deposits
on the banks of rivers, while the accretion in the present case was caused by
action of the Manila Bay.
Appellant next contends that Articles 1, 4 and 5 of the Law of Waters are not
applicable because they refer to accretions formed by the sea, and that Manila
Bay cannot be considered as a sea. We find said contention untenable. A bay is a
part of the sea, being a mere indentation of the same:
"Bay. — An opening into the land where the water is shut in on all sides except at
the entrance; an inlet of the sea; an arm of the sea, distinct from a river, a bending
or curbing of the shore of the sea or of a lake." 7 C.J. 1013-1014 (Cited in Francisco,
Philippine Law of Waters and Water Rights p. 6)
Moreover, this Tribunal has in some cases applied the Law of Waters on Lands
bordering Manila Bay. (See the cases of Ker & Co. vs. Cauden, 6 Phil., 732,
involving a parcel of land bounded on the sides by Manila Bay, where it was held
that such land formed by the action of the sea is property of the State;
Francisco vs. Government of P.I., 28 Phil., 505, involving a land claimed by a
private person and subject to the ebb and flow of the tides of the Manila Bay).
Then the applicant argues that granting that the land in question formed part of
the public domain, having been gained from the sea, the trial court should have
declared the same no longer necessary for any public use or purpose, and
therefore, became disposable and available for private ownership. Article 4 of the
Law of Waters of 1866 reads thus:
"ART. 4. Lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by
the action of the sea, form part of the public domain. When they are no longer
washed by the waters of the sea and are not necessary for purposes of public
utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or for the coastguard service,
the Government shall declare them to be the property of the owners of the
estates adjacent thereto and as increment thereof."
Interpreting Article 4 of the Law of Waters of 1866, in the case of
Natividad vs. Director of Lands, (CA) 37 Off. Gaz., 2905, it was there held that:
"Article 4 of the Law of Waters of 1866 provides that when a portion of the shore
is no longer washed by the waters of the sea and is not necessary for purposes of
public utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or for coastguard
service, the government shall declare it to be the property of the owners of the
estates adjacent thereto and as an increment thereof. We believe that only the
executive and possibly the legislative departments have the authority and the
power to make the declaration that any land so gained by the sea, is not necessary
for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or for
coast-guard service. If no such declaration has been made by said departments,
the lot in question forms part of the public domain." (Natividad vs. Director of
Lands, supra.)
The reason for this pronouncement, according to this Tribunal in the case of
Vicente Joven y Monteverde vs. Director of Lands, 93 Phil., 134, (cited in Velayo's
Digest, Vol. I, p. 52).
". . . is undoubtedly that the courts are neither primarily called upon, nor indeed
in a position to determine whether any public land are to be used for the purposes
specified in Article 4 of the Law of Waters."
6
Consequently, until a formal declaration on the part of the Government, through
the executive department or the Legislature, to the effect that the land in
question is no longer needed for coast guard service, for public use or for special
industries, they continue to be part of the public domain, not available for private
appropriation or ownership.
Appellant next contends that he had acquired the parcel in question through
acquisitive prescription, having possessed the same for over ten years. In answer,
suffice it to say that land of the public domain is not subject to ordinary
prescription. In the case of Insular Government vs. Aldecoa & Co., 19 Phil., 505,
this Court said:
"The occupation or material possession of any land formed upon the shore by
accretion, without previous permission from the proper authorities, although the
occupant may have held the same as owner for seventeen years and constructed
a wharf on the land, is illegal and is a mere detainer, inasmuch as such land is
outside of the sphere of commerce; it pertains to the national domain; it is
intended for public uses and for the benefit of those who live nearby."
We deem it unnecessary to discuss the other points raised in the appeal.
In view of the foregoing, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed, with costs.
[G.R. No. 68166. February 12, 1997.]
HEIRS OF EMILIANO NAVARRO, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
AND HEIRS OF SINFOROSO PASCUAL, respondents.
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J p:
Unique is the legal question visited upon the claim of an applicant in a Land
Registration case by oppositors thereto, the Government and a Government
lessee, involving as it does ownership of land formed by alluvium.
The applicant owns the property immediately adjoining the land sought to be
registered. His registered property is bounded on the east by the Talisay River, on
the west by the Bulacan River, and on the north by the Manila Bay. The Talisay
River and the Bulacan River flow down towards the Manila Bay and act as
boundaries of the applicant's registered land on the east and on the west.
The land sought to be registered was formed at the northern tip of the applicant's
land. Applicant's registered property is bounded on the north by the Manila Bay.
The issue: May the land sought to be registered be deemed an accretion in the
sense that it naturally accrues in favor of the riparian owner or should the land be
considered as foreshore land?
Before us is a petition for review of: (1) the decision 1 and (2) two subsequent
resolutions 2 of the Intermediate Appellate Court 3 (now the Court of Appeals) in
Land Registration Case No. N-84, 4 the application over which was filed by private
respondents' predecessor-in-interest, Sinforoso Pascual, now deceased, before
the Court of First Instance 5 (now the Regional Trial Court) of Balanga, Bataan.
There is no dispute as to the following facts:
On October 3, 1946, Sinforoso Pascual, now deceased, filed an application for
foreshore lease covering a tract of foreshore land in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan,
having an area of approximately seventeen (17) hectares. This application was
denied on January 15, 1953. So was his motion for reconsideration.
Subsequently, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, also now deceased, Emiliano
Navarro, filed a fishpond application with the Bureau of Fisheries covering twenty
five (25) hectares of foreshore land also in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan. Initially, such
application was denied by the Director of Fisheries on the ground that the
property formed part of the public domain. Upon motion for reconsideration, the
Director of Fisheries, on May 27, 1988, gave due course to his application but only
to the extent of seven (7) hectares of the property as may be certified by the
Bureau of Forestry as suitable for fishpond purposes.
The Municipal Council of Balanga, Bataan, had opposed Emiliano Navarro's
application. Aggrieved by the decision of the Director of Fisheries, it appealed to
the Secretary of Natural Resources who, however, affirmed the grant. The then
Executive Secretary, acting in behalf of the President of the Philippines, similarly
affirmed the grant.
On the other hand, sometime in the early part of 1960, Sinforoso Pascual filed an
application to register and confirm his title to a parcel of land, situated in Sibocon,
Balanga, Bataan, described in Plan Psu-175181 and said to have an area of
146,611 square meters. Pascual claimed that this land is an accretion to his
property, situated in Barrio Puerto Rivas, Balanga, Bataan, and covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 6830. It is bounded on the eastern side by the Talisay River,
on the western side by the Bulacan River, and on the northern side by the Manila
Bay. The Talisay River as well as the Bulacan River flow downstream and meet at
the Manila Bay thereby depositing sand and silt on Pascual's property resulting in
an accretion thereon. Sinforoso Pascual claimed the accretion as the riparian
owner.
On March 25, 1960, the Director of Lands, represented by the Assistant Solicitor
General, filed an opposition thereto stating that neither Pascual nor his
predecessors-in-interest possessed sufficient title to the subject property, the
same being a portion of the public domain and, therefore, it belongs to the
Republic of the Philippines. The Director of Forestry, through the Provincial Fiscal,
similarly opposed Pascual's application for the same reason as that advanced by
the Director of Lands. Later on, however, the Director of Lands withdrew his
opposition. The Director of Forestry become the sole oppositor.
On June 2, 1960, the court a quo issued an order of general default excepting the
Director of Lands and the Director of Forestry. lexlib
Upon motion of Emiliano Navarro, however, the order of general default was
lifted and, on February 13, 1961, Navarro thereupon filed an opposition to
Pascual's application. Navarro claimed that the land sought to be registered has
always been part of the public domain, it being a part of the foreshore of Manila
Bay; that he was a lessee and in possession of a part of the subject property by
virtue of a fishpond permit issued by the Bureau of Fisheries and confirmed by the
Office of the President; and that he had already converted the area covered by
the lease into a fishpond.
During the pendency of the land registration case, that is, on November 6, 1960,
Sinforoso Pascual filed a complaint for ejectment against Emiliano Navarro, one
Marcelo Lopez and their privies, alleged by Pascual to have unlawfully claimed
and possessed, through stealth, force and strategy, a portion of the subject
property covered by Plan Psu-175181. The defendants in the case were alleged to
have built a provisional dike thereon: thus they have thereby deprived Pascual of
the premises sought to be registered. This, notwithstanding repeated demands
for defendants to vacate the property.
The case was decided adversely against Pascual. Thus, Pascual appealed to the
Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Balanga, Bataan, the appeal
having been docketed as Civil Case No. 2873. Because of the similarity of the
parties and the subject matter, the appealed case for ejectment was consolidated
with the land registration case and was jointly tried by the court a quo.
During the pendency of the trial of the consolidated cases, Emiliano Navarro died
on November 1, 1961 and was substituted by his heirs, the herein petitioners.
Subsequently, on August 26, 1962, Pascual died and was substituted by his heirs,
the herein private respondents.
On November 10, 1975, the court a quo rendered judgment finding the subject
property to be foreshore land and, being a part of the public domain, it cannot be
the subject of land registration proceedings.
The decision's dispositive portion reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered:
(1) Dismissing plaintiff [private respondent] Sinforoso Pascual's complaint for
ejectment in Civil Case No. 2873;
(2) Denying the application of Sinforoso Pascual for land registration over the land
in question; and
(3) Directing said Sinforoso Pascual, through his heirs, as plaintiff in Civil Case No.
2873 and as applicant in Land Registration Case No. N-84 to pay costs in both
instances." 6
The heirs of Pascual appealed and, before the respondent appellate court,
assigned the following errors:
"1. The lower court erred in not finding the land in question as an accretion by the
action of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers to the land admittedly owned by
applicants-appellants [private respondents].
2. The lower court erred in holding that the land in question is foreshore land.
3.. The lower court erred in not ordering the registration of the and is controversy
in favor of applicants-appellants [private respondents].
4. The lower court erred in not finding that the applicants-appellants [private
respondents] are entitled to eject the oppositor-appellee [petitioners]." 7
On appeal, the respondent court reversed the findings of the court a quo and
granted the petition for registration of the subject property but excluding
therefrom fifty (50) meters from corner 2 towards corner 1; and fifty meters (50)
meters from corner 5 towards corner 6 of the Psu-175181.
The respondent appellate court explained the reversal in this wise:
"The paramount issue to be resolved in this appeal as set forth by the parties in
their respective briefs is — whether or not the land sought to be registered is
accretion or foreshore land, or, whether or not said land was formed by the action
of the two rivers of Talisay and Bulacan or by the action of the Manila Bay. If
formed by the action of the Talisay and Bulacan rivers, the subject land is
accretion but if formed by the action of the Manila Bay then it is foreshore land.
xxx xxx xxx
It is undisputed that applicants-appellants [private respondents] owned the land
immediately adjoining the land sought to be registered. Their property which is
covered by OCT No. 6830 is bounded on the east by the Talisay River, on the west
by the Bulacan River, and on the north by the Manila Bay. The Talisay and Bulacan
rivers come from inland flowing downstream towards the Manila Bay. In other
words, between the Talisay River and the Bulacan River is the property of
applicants with both rivers acting as the boundary to said land and the flow of
both rivers meeting and emptying into the Manila Bay. The subject land was
formed at the tip or apex of appellants' [private respondents'] land adding thereto
the land now sought to be registered.
This makes this case quite unique because while it is undisputed that the subject
land is immediately attached to appellants' [private respondents'] land and forms
the tip thereof, at the same time, said land immediately faces the Manila Bay
which is part of the sea. We can understand therefore the confusion this case
might have caused the lower court, faced as it was with the uneasy problem of
deciding whether or not the subject land was formed by the action of the two
rivers or by the action of the sea. Since the subject land is found at the shore of
the Manila Bay facing appellants' [private respondents'] land, it would be quite
easy to conclude that it is foreshore and therefore part of the patrimonial
property of the State as the lower court did in fact rule . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
7
It is however undisputed that [private respondents'] land lies between these two
rivers and it is precisely appellants' [private respondents'] land which acts as a
barricade preventing these two rivers to meet. Thus, since the flow of the two is
downwards to the Manila Bay the sediments of sand and silt are deposited at their
mouths.
It is, therefore, difficult to see how the Manila Bay could have been the cause of
the deposit thereat for in the natural course of things, the waves of the sea eat
the land on the shore, as they suge [sic] inland. It would not therefore add
anything to the land but instead subtract from it due to the action of the waves
and the wind. It is then more logical to believe that the two rivers flowing towards
the bay emptied their cargo of sand, silt and clay at their mouths, thus causing
[private respondents'] land to accumulate therein
However, our distinguished colleage [sic], Mr. Justice Serrano, do [sic] not seem
to accept this theory and stated that the subject land arose only when . . . Pascual
planted 'palapat' and 'bakawan' trees thereat to serve as a boundary or strainer.
But we do not see how this act of planting trees by Pascual would explain how the
land mass came into being. Much less will it prove that the same came from the
sea. Following Mr. Justice Serrano's argument that it were the few trees that acted
as strainers or blocks, then the land that grew would have stopped at the place
where the said trees were planted. But this is not so because the land mass went
far beyond the boundary, or where the trees were planted.
On the other hand, the picture-exhibits of [private respondents'] clearly show that
the land that accumulated beyond the so-called boundary, as well as the entire
area being applied for is dry land, above sea level, and bearing innumerable trees
. . . . The existence of vegetation on the land could only confirm that the soil
thereat came from inland rather than from the sea, for what could the sea bring
to the shore but sand, pebbles, stones, rocks and corrals? On the other hand, the
two rivers would be bringing soil on their downward flow which they brought
along from the eroded mountains, the lands along their path, and dumped them
all on the northern portion of appellants' [private respondents'] land.
In view of the foregoing, we have to deviate from the lower court's finding. While
it is true that the subject land is found at the shore of the Manila Bay fronting
appellants' [private respondents'] land, said land is not foreshore but an accretion
from the action of the Talisay and Bulacan rivers. In fact, this is exactly what the
Bureau of Lands found out, as shown in the following report of the Acting
Provincial Officer, Jesus M. Orozco, to wit:
'Upon ocular inspection of the land subject of this registration made on June 11,
1960, it was found out that the said land is . . . sandwitched [sic] by two big rivers
. . . These two rivers bring down considerable amount of soil and sediments during
floods every year thus raising the soil of the land adjoining the private property of
the applicant [private respondents']. About four-fifth [sic] of the area applied for
is now dry land whereon are planted palapat trees thickly growing thereon. It is
the natural action of these two rivers that has caused the formation of said land .
. . subject of this registration case. It has been formed, therefore, by accretion.
And having been formed by accretion, the said land may be considered the private
property of the riparian owner who is the applicant [private respondents'] . . . .
In view of the above, the opposition hereto filed by the government should be
withdrawn, except for the portion recommended by the land investigator in his
report dated May 2, 1960, to be excluded and considered foreshore. . . .'
Because of this report, no less than the Solicitor General representing the Bureau
of Lands withdrew his opposition dated March 25, 1960, and limited 'the same to
the northern portion of the land applied for, compromising a strip 50 meters wide
along the Manila Bay, which should be declared public land as part of the
foreshore' . . . . 8
Pursuant to the aforecited decision, the respondent appellate court ordered the
issuance of the corresponding decree of registration in the name of private
respondents and the reversion to private respondents of the possession of the
portion of the subject property included in Navarro's fishpond permit.
On December 20, 1978, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the
aforecited decision. The Director of Forestry also moved for the reconsideration
of the same decision. Both motions were opposed by private respondents on
January 27, 1979.
On November 21, 1980, respondent appellate court promulgated a resolution
denying the motion for reconsideration filed by the Director of Forestry. It,
however, modified its decision, to read, viz:
"(3). Ordering private oppositors Heirs of Emiliano Navarro to vacate that portion
included in their fishpond permit covered by Plan Psu-175181 and hand over
possession of said portion to applicants-appellants, if the said portion is not within
the strip of land fifty (50) meters wide along Manila Bay on the northern portion
of the land subject of the registration proceedings and which area is more
particularly referred to as fifty (50) meters from corner 2 towards corner 1; and
fifty (50) meters from corner 5 towards corner 6 of Plan Psu-175181 . . ." 9
On December 15, 1980, we granted the Solicitor General, acting as counsel for the
Director of Forestry, an extension of time within which to file in this court, a
petition for review of the decision dated November 29, 1978 of the respondent
appellate court and of the aforecited resolution dated November 21, 1980.
Thereafter, the Solicitor General, in behalf of the Director of Forestry, filed a
petition for review entitled, "The Director of Forestry vs. the Court of
Appeals." 10 We, however, denied the same in a minute resolution dated July 20,
1981, such petition having been prematurely filed at a time when the Court of
Appeals was yet to resolve petitioners' pending motion to set aside the resolution
dated November 21, 1980.
On October 9, 1981, respondent appellate court denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration of the decision dated November 29, 1978.
On October 17, 1981, respondent appellate court made an entry of judgment
stating that the decision dated November 29, 1978 had become final and
executory as against herein petitioners as oppositors in L.R.C. Case No. N-84 and
Civil Case No. 2873 of the Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court) of
Balanga, Bataan.
On October 26, 1981, a second motion for reconsideration of the decision dated
November 29, 1978 was filed by petitioners' new counsel.
On March 26, 1982, respondent appellate court issued a resolution granting
petitioners' request for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration.
On July 13, 1984, after hearing, respondent appellate court denied petitioners'
second motion for reconsideration on the ground that the same was filed out of
time, citing Rule 52, Section 1 of the Rules of Court which provides that a motion
for reconsideration shall be made ex-parte and filed within fifteen (15) days from
the notice of the final order or judgment.
Hence this petition where the respondent appellate court is imputed to have
palpably erred in appreciating the facts of the case and to have gravely misapplied
statutory and case law relating to accretion, specifically, Article 457 of the Civil
Code.
We find no merit in the petition.
The disputed property was brought forth by both the withdrawal of the waters of
Manila Bay and the accretion formed on the exposed foreshore land by the action
of the sea which brought soil and sand sediments in turn trapped by the palapat
and bakawan trees planted thereon by petitioner Sulpicio Pascual in 1948.
Anchoring their claim of ownership on Article 457 of the Civil Code, petitioners
vigorously argue that the disputed 14-hectare land is an accretion caused by the
joint action of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers which run their course on the eastern
and western boundaries, respectively, of petitioners' own tract of land.
Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under said Article 457, requires the
concurrence of the following requisites: (1) that the accumulation of soil or
sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of
the waters of the river; and (3) that the land where the accretion takes place is
adjacent to the bank of the river. 11 Accretion is the process whereby the soil is
deposited, while alluvium is the soil deposited on the estate fronting the river
bank 12 ; the owner of such estate is called the riparian owner. Riparian owners
are, strictly speaking, distinct from littoral owners, the latter being owners of
lands bordering the shore of the sea or lake or other tidal waters. 13 The alluvium,
by mandate of Article 457 of the Civil Code, is automatically owned by the riparian
owner from the moment the soil deposit can be seen 14 but is not automatically
registered property, hence, subject to acquisition through prescription by third
persons. 15
Petitioners' claim of ownership over the disputed property under the principle of
accretion, is misplaced.
First, the title of petitioners' own tract of land reveals its northeastern boundary
to be Manila Bay. Petitioners' land, therefore, used to adjoin, border or front the
Manila Bay and not any of the two rivers whose torrential action, petitioners
insist, is to account for the accretion on their land. In fact, one of the petitioners,
Sulpicio Pascual, testified in open court that the waves of Manila Bay used to hit
the disputed land being part of the bay's foreshore but, after he had planted
palapat and bakawan trees thereon in 1948, the land began to rise. 16
Moreover, there is no dispute as to the location of: (a) the disputed land; (b)
petitioners' own tract of land; (c) the Manila Bay; and, (d) the Talisay and Bulacan
Rivers. Petitioners' own land lies between the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers; in front
of their land on the northern side lies now the disputed land where before 1948,
there lay the Manila Bay. If the accretion were to be attributed to the action of
either or both of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers, the alluvium should have been
deposited on either or both of the eastern and western boundaries of petitioners'
own tract of land, not on the northern portion thereof which is adjacent to the
Manila Bay. Clearly lacking, thus, is the third requisite of accretion, which is, that
the alluvium is deposited on the portion of claimant's land which is adjacent to
the river bank.
Second, there is no dispute as to the fact that petitioners' own tract of land adjoins
the Manila Bay. Manila Bay is obviously not a river, and jurisprudence is already
settled as to what kind of body of water the Manila Bay is. It is to be remembered
that we held that:
"Appellant next contends that . . . Manila Bay cannot be considered as a sea. We
find said contention untenable. A bay is part of the sea, being a mere indentation
of the same:
'Bay. — An opening into the land where the water is shut in on all sides except at
the entrance; an inlet of the sea; an arm of the sea, distinct from a river, a bending
or curbing of the shore of the sea or of a lake.' 7 C.J. 1013-1014." 17
The disputed land, thus, is an accretion not on a river bank but on a sea bank, or
on what used to be the foreshore of Manila Bay which adjoined petitioners' own
tract of land on the northern side. As such, the applicable law is not Article 457 of
the Civil Code but Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866.
The process by which the disputed land was formed, is not difficult to discern from
the facts of the case. As the trial court correctly observed:
"A perusal of the survey plan . . . of the land subject matter of these cases shows
that on the eastern side, the property is bounded by Talisay River, on the western
side by Bulacan River, on the southern side by Lot 1436 and on the northern side
by Manila Bay. It is not correct to state that the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers meet a
8
certain portion because the two rivers both flow towards Manila Bay. The Talisay
River is straight while the Bulacan River is a little bit meandering and there is no
portion where the two rivers meet before they end up at Manila Bay. The land
which is adjacent to the property belonging to Pascual cannot be considered an
accretion caused by the action of the two rivers].
Applicant Pascual . . . has not presented proofs to convince the Court that the land
he has applied for registration is the result of the settling down on his registered
land of soil, earth or other deposits so as to be rightfully be considered as an
accretion [caused by the action of the two rivers]. Said Art. 457 finds no
applicability where the accretion must have been caused by action of the bay." 18
The conclusion formed by the trial court on the basis of the foregoing observation
is that the disputed land is part of the foreshore of Manila Bay and therefore, part
of the public domain. The respondent appellate court, however, perceived the
fact that petitioners' own land lies between the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers, to be
basis to conclude that the disputed land must be an accretion formed by the
action of the two rivers because petitioners' own land acted as a barricade
preventing the two rivers to meet and that the current of the two rivers carried
sediments of sand and silt downwards to the Manila Bay which accumulated
somehow to a 14-hectare land. These conclusions, however, are fatally
incongruous in the light of the one undisputed critical fact: the accretion was
deposited, not on either the eastern or western portion of petitioners' land where
a river each runs, but on the northern portion of petitioners' land which adjoins
the Manila Bay. Worse, such conclusions are further eroded of their practical logic
and consonance with natural experience in the light of Sulpicio Pascual's
admission as to having planted palapat and bakawan trees on the northern
boundary of their own land. In amplification of this, plainly more reasonable and
valid are Justice Mariano Serrano's observations in his dissenting opinion when he
stated that:
"As appellants' (titled) land . . . acts as a barricade that prevents the two rivers to
meet, and considering the wide expanse of the boundary between said land and
the Manila Bay, measuring some 593.00 meters . . . it is believed rather farfetched
for the land in question to have been formed through 'sediments of sand and salt
[sic] . . . deposited at their [rivers'] mouths.' Moreover, if 'since the flow of the
two rivers is downwards to the Manila Bay the sediments of sand and silt are
deposited at their mouths,' why then would the alleged cargo of sand, silt and clay
accumulate at the northern portion of appellants' titled land facing Manila Bay
instead of merely at the mouths and banks of these two rivers? That being the
case, the accretion formed at said portion of appellants' titled [land] was not
caused by the current of the two rivers but by the action of the sea (Manila Bay)
into which the rivers empty.
The conclusion . . . is not supported by any reference to the evidence which, on
the contrary, shows that the disputed land was formed by the action of the sea.
Thus, no less than Sulpicio Pascual, one of the heirs of the original applicant,
testified on cross-examination that the land in dispute was part of the shore and
it was only in 1948 that he noticed that the land was beginning to get higher after
he had planted trees thereon in 1948. . . . cdasia
. . . it is established that before 1948 sea water from the Manila Bay at high tide
could reach as far as the dike of appellants' fishpond within their titled property,
which dike now separates this titled property from the land in question. Even in
1948 when appellants had already planted palapat and bakawan trees in the land
involved, inasmuch as these trees were yet small, the waves of the sea could still
reach the dike. This must be so because in . . . the survey plan of the titled property
approved in 1918, said titled land was bounded on the north by Manila Bay. So
Manila Bay was adjacent to it on the north. It was only after the planting of the
aforesaid trees in 1948 that the land in question began to rise or to get higher in
elevation.
The trees planted by appellants in 1948 became a sort of strainer of the sea water
and at the same time a kind of block to the strained sediments from being carried
back to the sea by the very waves that brought them to the former shore at the
end of the dike, which must have caused the shoreline to recede and dry up
eventually raising the former shore leading to the formation of the land in
question." 19
In other words, the combined and interactive effect of the planting of palapat and
bakawan trees, the withdrawal of the waters of Manila Bay eventually resulting in
the drying up of its former foreshore, and the regular torrential action of the
waters of Manila Bay, is the formation of the disputed land on the northern
boundary of petitioners' own tract of land.
The disputed property is an accretion on a sea bank, Manila Bay being an inlet or
an arm of the sea; as such, the disputed property is, under Article 4 of the Spanish
Law of Waters of 1866, part of the public domain
At the outset, there is a need to distinguish between Manila Bay and Laguna de
Bay.
While we held in the case of Ignacio v. Director of Lands and Valeriano 20 that
Manila Bay is considered a sea for purposes of determining which law on accretion
is to be applied in multifarious situations, we have ruled differently insofar as
accretions on lands adjoining the Laguna de Bay are concerned.
In the cases of Government of the P.I. v. Colegio de San Jose 21 , Republic v. Court
of Appeals 22 , Republic v. Alagad 23 , and Meneses v. Court of Appeals 24, we
categorically ruled that Laguna de Bay is a lake the accretion on which, by the
mandate of Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, belongs to the owner
of the land contiguous thereto.
The instant controversy, however, brings a situation calling for the application of
Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, the disputed land being an
accretion on the foreshore of Manila Bay which is, for all legal purposes,
considered a sea.
Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866 provides as follows:
"Lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the
action of the sea, form part of the public domain. When they are no longer
washed by the waters of the sea and are not necessary for purposes of public
utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or for the coast-guard
service, the Government shall declare them to be the property of the owners of
the estates adjacent thereto and as increment thereof."
In the light of the aforecited vintage but still valid law, unequivocal is the public
nature of the disputed land in this controversy, the same being an accretion on a
sea bank which, for all legal purposes, the foreshore of Manila Bay is. As part of
the public domain, the herein disputed land is intended for public uses, and "so
long as the land in litigation belongs to the national domain and is reserved for
public uses, it is not capable of being appropriated by any private person, except
through express authorization granted in due form by a competent
authority." 25 Only the executive and possibly the legislative departments have
the right and the power to make the declaration that the lands so gained by action
of the sea is no longer necessary for purposes of public utility or for the cause of
establishment of special industries or for coast guard services. 26 Petitioners
utterly fail to show that either the executive or legislative department has already
declared the disputed land as qualified, under Article 4 of the Spanish Law of
Waters of 1866, to be the property of petitioners as owners of the estates
adjacent thereto.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review is hereby DENIED and DISMISSED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 162037. August 7, 2006.]
HEIRS OF ENRIQUE DIAZ, Represented by AURORA T. DIAZ, petitioner, vs. ELINOR
A. VIRATA, In her capacity as the Administratrix of the Estate of ANTENOR
VIRATA, respondent.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J p:
The instant case involves a protracted controversy which has seen the demise of
the patriarchs of two conflicting families, and is now being pursued by their
respective heirs.
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari, petitioners Heirs of Enrique Diaz,
represented by Aurora T. Diaz, seek the reversal of the Decision 1 and
Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 72907, dated 27 August
2003 and 4 February 2004, respectively, which affirmed with modification the
Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 22, Imus, Cavite, in Civil Case
No. 1399-96, dated 25 May 2001.
The Antecedents
On 13 September 1996, respondent Elinor Virata, in her capacity as Administratrix
of the Estate of Antenor Virata (Antenor), filed with the RTC a Complaint 4 with
Application for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction
against Enrique Diaz (Enrique), John Doe, Richard Doe, and all others taking rights
or title under him, praying for the declaration of the validity of Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCTs) No.
4983, 5 4984, 6 4985, 7 4986,8 5027, 9 5028, 10 5029, 11 5030, 12 5031, 13 503
2, 14 and 5033, 15 all issued in the name of Antenor S. Virata (Antenor) and
registered with the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Cavite. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 1399-96.
In her Complaint, respondent averred, inter alia, that: sometime in 1959, the
deceased Antenor purchased from Miguela Crisologo, in good faith and for
consideration, two parcels of land located in Palico, Imus, Cavite, covered by TCTs
No. (T-3855) RT-2633 and NO. (T-11171) RT-1228, and registered with the Registry
of Deeds of Cavite; 16 by virtue of the sale, the specified titles were cancelled, and
in its place were issued TCTs No. 517 and No. 518, likewise, in the name of
Antenor; 17 the two lots covered by the aforementioned titles were thereafter
subdivided by Antenor into several lots, and titles were issued thereon in
Antenor's favor, viz: TCTs No. 4983, 4984, 4985, 4986, 5027, 5028, 5029, 5030,
5031, 5032, and 5033; 18 and that sometime in March 1992, Enrique filed a claim
with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), alleging that
he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in continuous possession of the
same lots owned by Antenor. Respondent further proffered that the claim of
Enrique over the subject properties created a cloud which may be prejudicial to
the titles issued in the name of Antenor, and now managed by his Estate.
In support of her application for restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary
injunction, respondent alleged, inter alia, that: Enrique had fenced the subject
properties and had constructed a driveway thereon; despite respondent's
demand to desist from fencing the properties and using the same as driveway,
Enrique persisted in his occupation of the subject properties; and respondent will
suffer irreparable injury by the continued occupation, use, and construction of the
driveway traversing the subject properties.
In sum, respondent prayed that Enrique be ordered to pay jointly and severally
with the other defendants (herein petitioners), reasonable rental for the use of
the subject properties from the time the suit before the DENR was filed in April
1992, moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and cost of suit. 19
On 23 October 1996, Enrique filed his Answer with Counter-Claim, 20 and
asserted, among others, that he filed with the DENR a protest action to enforce
his valid and legitimate rights over the subject properties. 21 He denied
9
respondent's allegation that the subject properties were purchased by
Antenor.22 Moreover, he interposed that his ancestors and predecessors-in-
interest had been in actual and continuous possession of the subject properties
since time immemorial. 23 In opposition to respondent's application for
preliminary injunction, Enrique argued that the driveway and the fence are within
the boundaries of the lots exclusively owned by him and his heirs, and covered by
TCTs No. T-304191 and No. T-66120, respectively. aTHASC
By way of special and affirmative defense, Enrique averred that the subject
properties, since time immemorial, was publicly recognized as their family's
ancestral land; 24 that their actual and peaceful occupation over the subject
property was uninterrupted until sometime in 1962, when Antenor claimed a
portion of the same, on the ground that he purchased said portion from one
Miguela Crisologo, who acquired the same from a certain Simeon Marcial;25 and
that both Miguela Crisologo and Simeon Marcial recognized and respected his
ownership over the subject properties. 26
Enrique contended further that the legal battle between the parties commenced
when respondent filed an action for recovery of possession of the subject
property with the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cavite, docketed as Civil
Case No. N-501 entitled, "Antenor Virata v. Fortunata Diaz." However, in 1969,
during the pendency of the said civil case, Antenor died. Following the
development, the CFI ordered for the substitution of party-plaintiff, but the heirs
of Antenor, including herein respondent, failed to comply therewith. By reason of
their non-compliance, the CFI rendered an Order, 27 dated 6 October 1969,
dismissing the case. 28
Further, Enrique raised the argument of laches and res judicata in his favor. Anent
the claim of laches, Enrique posited that for a period of almost 27 years after the
dismissal of Civil Case No. N-501, the heirs of Antenor were silent, while he was in
actual and continuous possession of the subject properties in the character and
concept of an owner, until again, his peaceful possession is being disturbed by the
present suit. It is the contention of Enrique that respondent's failure or neglect
for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to assert her right, created a
presumption that she had abandoned or declined to assert said right. In raising
the ground of res judicata, Enrique posited that the instant suit, while clothed to
appear as an action for quieting of title, partakes the nature of an action for a
recovery of possession. According to Enrique, there is res judicata as the present
action and Civil Case No. N-501 involve similar parties, subject matter, and cause
of action. 29
Consequently, Enrique sought for the dismissal of the Complaint, and prayed that
respondent be ordered to pay attorney's fees, including moral, exemplary and
actual damages. 30
On 15 November 1996, the RTC issued an Order 31 allowing respondent to survey
the property subject matter of the case. In answer thereto, Enrique filed a
Motion 32 dated 15 November 1996, praying that the survey be conducted in the
presence of his representative, which was accordingly granted by the court a
quo. 33
A relocation survey was conducted on 3, 6, 7, 10, and 13 of January 1997 34 by
Geodetic Engineer Severino Raymundo, who testified in open court that the
driveway was outside Antenor's property line. 35 Thus, respondent sought a
withdrawal of their application for preliminary injunction, which was granted by
the court a quo in the Order 36 dated 13 February 1997. Respondent's motion to
file an appropriate pleading was similarly granted by the court without objection
from Enrique. 37
Subsequent thereto, respondent filed an Amended Complaint 38 dated 19
February 1997, deleting from the original Complaint, the allegations in support of
the application for restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
Further, respondent alleged anew that: she discovered that Enrique had fenced
the subject properties; and constructed therein one concrete house of about 30
square meters, more or less; the unauthorized construction was done despite
Enrique's full knowledge of the invalidity of his claim; and despite demand to
desist from fencing the subject properties, Diaz refused to take heed of the same
and continued to usurp the subject properties under a feigned claim of right. 39
Thus, respondent sought the following additional reliefs, to wit: (1) an order
directing Enrique, his representatives, or any other person claiming right, title, or
interest from him, to vacate the subject properties and/or to voluntarily surrender
possession thereof to respondent; and (2) the removal and demolition of the
barbed wire fence, concrete fence, concrete house, and other improvements
Enrique had erected thereon. 40
Holding that the merits of the case would be served by the Amended Complaint,
and finding that Enrique and his co-defendants would not be prejudiced by the
allowance thereof, the court a quo admitted the same, in the Order of 22 May
1997. 41 The same Order gave Enrique, ten (10) days from receipt thereof within
which to file a new Answer. However, no new Answer was filed by Enrique within
the time provided for.
On 5 August 1997, respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion, 42 stating
therein that for the failure of Enrique to file an Answer to the Amended Complaint
within the period provided for under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, 43 the
previous Answer shall stand as the Amended Answer; hence, the issues having
been joined, the case is ripe for pre-trial. Acting on the respondent's Motion and
Manifestation, the court a quo set the case for pre-trial. 44Following thus,
respondent filed her Pre-trial Brief, 45 dated 8 September 1997. On 11 September
1997, Enrique filed a Motion for Leave to File Amended Answer with Counter-
Claim, 46 alleging, inter alia, that: he had deemed convenient to adopt the
Answer previously filed, as the same had already substantially confronted the
issues in the Amended Complaint; however, he discovered a certification issued
by the Register of Deeds of Cavite, signifying that TCT No (T-11171) RT-1228, in
the name of Miguela Crisologo, appeared to have been reconstituted but there
existed no record in the Primary Entry Book of said Registry, relative to such
administrative reconstitution, which is a vital defect, affecting not only the validity
of the reconstitution of Miguela Crisologo's title but also Antenor's title, which
was derived therefrom; and said certification is being sought to be adopted as
part of his defense. An Opposition 47 to the foregoing Motion was filed by
respondent, contending in the main, that the allegation therein as to the absence
in the records of the administrative reconstitution of TCT No. (T-11171) RT-1228,
constituted a collateral attack on the validity of the title, as well as other titles
emanating therefrom, which cannot be allowed in the instant proceedings.
After an exchange of pleadings between the parties, the court a quo rendered an
Order, 48 dated 14 January 1998, denying Enrique's Motion for Leave to File
Amended Answer, ratiocinating that Enrique's allegation of the absence of any
record in the Primary Entry Book of the Register of Deeds of Cavite, relative to the
reconstitution of TCT No. (T-11171) RT-1228, is a collateral attack to the decree of
registration and the certificate of title which had long been issued in favor of
Antenor. The validity of a certificate of title can be attacked only in an action
expressly filed for the purpose. 49
On 27 February 1998, Enrique filed his Pre-Trial Brief but failed to appear before
the court a quo for the pre-trial proceedings set on 4 June 1998. 50 On 16 April
1998, the court a quo rendered an Order, 51 declaring Enrique and his co-
defendants in default for their failure to appear in the pre-trial despite notice. On
further motion of respondent's counsel, the case was referred to the Branch Clerk
of Court for the ex-parte reception of evidence. Enrique filed a Motion for
Reconsideration 52 praying for the lifting of the order declaring him in default.
Finding the same to be satisfactory, the court a quogranted reconsideration in its
Order 53 dated 20 April 1998.
In the Pre-Trial Order, dated 4 June 1998, the definition of issues were
determined, viz.:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT PLAINTIFF'S TITLE[S] ARE VALID AND WERE THE ONLY ONES
ISSUED OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES;
II.
WHETHER OR NOT PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER POSSESSION OF SAID
PROPERTIES;
III.
WHETHER OR NOT PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO CLAIM DAMAGES;
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PRESENT ACTION IS BARRED BY RES JUDICATA;
V.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PRESENT ACTION IS BARRED BY LACHES; AND
VI.
WHETHER OR NOT DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO CLAIM DAMAGES. 54
Trial thereafter ensued. Following respondent's offer of exhibits, and at the time
when Enrique was scheduled to present evidence, he filed a Motion to
Dismiss 55 dated 13 October 1998, assailing the jurisdiction of the court a quo to
entertain the action. Enrique submitted that as the suit is in the nature of recovery
of possession and quieting of title, the issues of ownership and possession cannot
be resolved without determining the correctness of the technical description of
the plans, and the bona fide occupants of the subject properties. It was further
contended that as the subject properties originated from friar estate, the sole
body which can determine the rights and interest of the parties is the DENR. An
Opposition 56 thereto was filed by respondent, maintaining that the court a
quo has the competence to hear and resolve the case. Respondent, likewise,
asserted that the subject properties having been titled in the name of Antenor on
22 October 1959, the same are deemed no longer part of the public domain.
On 12 February 1999, the trial court promulgated an Order 57 denying Enrique's
Motion to Dismiss, and setting the hearing dates for the presentation of his
evidence. According to the court a quo, Enrique and his co-defendants were no
longer in a position to challenge the jurisdiction and authority of the court, after
having actively participated in the proceedings therein, and repeatedly asking
reliefs therefrom. It further opined that Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 mandates that
questions in the nature of ownership and possession belong exclusively to the
RTC.
Aggrieved, Enrique and his co-defendants sought relief from the Order of 12
February 1999 via a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the Court of
Appeals, and docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 51602. 58 They interposed therein that
the court a quo lacked jurisdiction to entertain the issues raised in Civil Case No.
1399-96; hence, the denial by the trial court of their Motion to Dismiss constituted
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. A writ of
preliminary injunction was similarly sought to enjoin and restrain the court a
quo from further conducting any proceeding thereon.
On 28 February 2000, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision 59 dismissing the
Petition for Certiorari, and affirming the RTC's Order of 12 February 1999. The
appellate court ratiocinated that Enrique's Motion to Dismiss cannot be granted
for to do so would countenance dilatory motions, such motion having been filed
only after Enrique filed his Answer to the Complaint. The Court of Appeals equally
took cognizance of the fact that Enrique and his co-defendants had actively
participated in the proceedings a quo, and had repeatedly sought reliefs
therefrom.
10
In the interim, or specifically, on 14 October 1999, Enrique died. On 9 March 2000,
respondent filed an Omnibus Motion 60 with the RTC, praying that she be allowed
to procure the appointment of an executor or administrator for the Estate of the
deceased Enrique, and thereafter, that the case be set for hearing.
Thus, on 24 March 2000, the court a quo ordered petitioners (Enrique's heirs and
co-defendants) to file the necessary pleading for substitution of party; otherwise,
it will grant respondent's request for the appointment of an
executor/administrator for Enrique's Estate. 61 Following respondent's
Manifestation and Motion to submit the case for resolution, the court a
quo rendered a subsequent Order 62 dated 25 September 2000, granting
petitioners ten days from receipt therefrom, to file their Comment to
respondent's Motion.
On 14 November 2000, for petitioners' failure to comply with the Orders of the
court a quo, dated 24 March 2000 and 25 September 2000, and in consideration
of the fact that the case had been pending for an unreasonable length of time,
the RTC ordered the case submitted for decision based on the evidence adduced
by the respondent. HSCATc
The Ruling of the RTC
On 25 May 2001, the RTC promulgated a Decision in favor of respondent.
Hereunder is the pertinent disquisition of the court a quo, in support of its
conclusion, thus:
Evidence for the plaintiff shows that Antenor Virata purchased from one Miguela
Crisologo in 1959 two (2) parcels of land located at Palico, Imus, Cavite and
covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-3855 (Exhibit "P") and T-
11171 (Exhibit "Q"). Antenor bought these properties after Epifanio Victa, then
employed by Virata as a liason officer, reported to him that the titles to the said
properties were clean and that no encumbrance nor liens had been annotated on
its face. Antenor made installment payments for the subject properties beginning
on 5 August 1959 (Exhibit "R"); then on 20 August 1959 (Exhibit "S"); 3 September
1959 (Exhibit "T"); 3 September 1959 (Exhibit "U") and 22 September 1959
(Exhibit "V"). After having fully paid for the properties, TCT Nos. T-3855 and T-
11171 in the name of Crisologo were cancelled and TCT Nos. T-517 (Exhibit "W")
and T-518 (Exhibit "X") were issued to Antenor.
Antenor continued to plant rice on the properties before the same were
subdivided in 1963. As a result of said subdivision, TCT Nos. T-4983, T-4984, T-
4985, T-4986, T-5027, T-5028, T-5029, T-5030, T-5031, T-5032 and T-5033
(Exhibits "A" to "J"), all in the name of Antenor were issued. After Antenor died in
1969, his niece Elinor Virata was appointed on 4 May 1982 by the then Court of
First Instance of Cavite City as administratrix of his estate (Exhibit "Y").
On 13 February 1997, Severino Raymundo testified in Court that he was the
surveyor commissioned to conduct a joint relocation survey to determine the
exact metes and bounds of the titles in dispute. Present during the survey were
defendant Diaz' (sic) representative, his surveyor, some police officers and the
lawyer of Antenor (tsn, February 13, 1997, p. 15). Making use of the certified true
copies of the titles and the survey plan dated 27 September to 30 September 1960
in the name of Antenor (Exhibit "L"), as well as the title of Diaz, Raymundo
attested that the relocation survey shows that a portion of an existing wall and a
concrete structure are encroaching upon the property of Antenor (tsn, February
13, 1997, p. 10).
xxx xxx xxx
During the hearing of this case on 4 March 1999, defendants, thru counsel,
manifested that they shall be presenting a surveyor who will testify that upon
verification, lot 4705 occupied by them is within the property they own and that
they are not occupying the lot belonging to the plaintiff. Despite said
manifestation, however, defendants failed to present the said surveyor. 63
The decretal portion thereof pronounces thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding
appropriate Antenor Virata's titles over the properties located at Palico, Imus,
Cavite embraced in and covered by TCT Nos. T-4983, T-4984, T-4985, T-4986, T-
5027, T-5028, T-5029, T-5030, T-5031, T-5032 and T-5033 issued in 1962 and
declaring said titles as the only official titles covering the lots described therein
and declaring further defendant Diaz' (sic) claim as void and his possession of
portions of said properties illegal.
Accordingly, defendant's representative or any other claiming right, title or
interest from defendant Enrique Diaz are hereby ordered to vacate the properties
and/or to voluntarily surrender possession thereof to plaintiff.
Furthermore, defendants are ordered to pay plaintiff the following:
1. P5,000.00 per month as reasonable rental for the use of the subject properties
computed from the date this case was filed on 13 September 1996 until they
actually vacate the same;
2. P30,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
Cost of suit.
Defendant's representative and any other claiming right, title or interest from
defendant Enrique Diaz are also directed to remove or demolish the barbed wire
fence, concrete fence, the concrete house and other improvements that have
been erected on the properties registered in the name of Antenor Virata. 64
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Before the appellate court, petitioners asseverated that they were denied their
defense in assailing the validity of the subject titles when the court a quodenied
the allowance of their Amended Answer. Secondly, they challenged the judgment
of the RTC on the ground that res judicata and laches had set in to bar the instant
action. They similarly assailed the award of attorney's fees in favor of respondent.
The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners' reliance on a certification issued by
the Register of Deeds of Cavite attesting that there existed no records relative to
the administrative reconstitution of the title of Miguela Crisologo, from whom
Antenor bought the subject properties, constitutes an indirect attack on these
titles. It underscored that if petitioners believed that respondent's titles were
spurious, they should have filed appropriate proceedings therefor. Moreover, the
Court of Appeals held that res judicata cannot be appreciated notwithstanding
the previous action (Civil Case No. N-501) instituted by Antenor for recovery of
possession of the subject properties. It emphasized that the case was dismissed
on 16 October 1969 for failure of the heirs of Antenor to substitute him in said
litigation. However, the judgment which dismissed the action was not an
adjudication on the merits. Thus, the dismissal of Civil Case No. N-501 was a
dismissal without prejudice, which did not determine the rights or liabilities of the
parties thereto. Moreover, the appellate court held that res judicata cannot be
interposed to bar the determination of a subsequent case if the first and second
cases involve different causes of action or subject matter and seek different
reliefs, which is true of Civil Case No. N-501 and the instant case. 65
Anent the issue of laches, the appellate court ruled that laches could not apply to
registered land covered by the Torrens system. According to the Court of Appeals,
the properties in controversy are titled in the name of Antenor and, as the
registered owner, he had the right to demand the return of the properties at any
time as the possession of petitioners was unauthorized. 66
Finally, ruling on the propriety of the award of attorney's fees in respondent's
favor, the appellate court pronounced that the same must be disallowed on
appeal. It rationalized that the trial court's decision was bereft of any findings of
fact and law to justify the award of attorney's fees. No circumstance was shown
to warrant the grant thereof. 67
Meanwhile, on 9 July 2002, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution 68 denying
respondent's Motion for Execution pending appeal and petitioners' Motion to
Suspend Proceedings for lack of merit.
The Court of Appeals, in the assailed Decision of 27 August 2003, affirmed with
modification the judgment of the RTC deleting the award of attorney's fees in
favor of respondent. The dispositive portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DISMISSED for utter lack
of merit and the assailed Decision dated May 25, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court
of Imus[,] Cavite in Civil Case No. 1399-96 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. The award of attorney's fees in favor of appellee is deleted. No
pronouncement as to costs. 69
Undeterred, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration 70 of the 27 August
2003 Decision of the Court of Appeals, which was denied by the same court in the
Resolution of 4 February 2004.
The Issues
Forthwith, petitioners filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the
following grounds, to wit:
I.
THAT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION
OF THE TRIAL COURT DECLARING THE SUBJECT LAND TITLES IN THE NAME OF
ANTENOR VIRATA AS VALID; [AND]
II.
THAT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION
OF THE TRIAL COURT IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE INSTITUTION OF THE
PRESENT ACTION CONSTITUTE (sic) RES JUDICATA. 71
In addition, petitioners raised the ground that it took respondent 27 years to
institute the instant action from the time Civil Case No. N-501 was dismissed.
The Ruling of the Court
For a full adjudication of the case before us, we shall first resolve the validity of
respondent's title; and, if in the affirmative, determine whether respondent's
right to recover the property is barred by res judicata and laches.
A. Respondent was able to satisfy the requisites of the law for the filing of an
action to quiet title.
An action for quieting of title is a remedy which may be availed of only when by
reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding, which
appears valid but is, in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable or unenforceable, a cloud
is thereby cast on the complainant's title to real property or any interest therein.
Article 476 of the Civil Code provides:
Article 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest
therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding
which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective,
voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be
brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to
real property or any interest therein.
Further, Article 477 72 of the same Code mandates that in an action to quiet title,
the party bringing the action must have a legal or, at least, an equitable title 73 to
the real property subject of the action and that the alleged cloud 74 on his title
must be shown to be in fact invalid. Verily, for an action to quiet title to prosper,
two indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant
has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the
action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting
11
cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite
its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. 75
First. The determination of the circumstances leading to Antenor's acquisition of
the subject properties is a factual matter.
The court a quo found that in 1959, Antenor purchased from Miguela Crisologo
two parcels of land located at Palico, Imus, Cavite, and covered by TCTs No. T-
3855 and No. T-11171. Antenor paid for the aforesaid properties in installment,
and after having fully paid for the same, TCTs No. T-3855 and No. T-11171 in the
name of Miguela Crisologo were cancelled, and TCTs No. T-517 and No. T-518
were issued to Antenor. In 1963, the properties were subdivided and, therefrom,
TCTs No. T-4983, T-4984, T-4985, T-4986, T-5027, T-5028, T-5029, T-5030, T-5031,
T-5032 and T-5033, all in the name of Antenor were issued. On 4 May 1982,
respondent was appointed administratrix of the Estate of Antenor.
On appeal, such findings of facts were not disturbed by the appellate court.
Nothing is more settled than the rule that where, as in the case herein, the
findings of fact of the trial court are affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the same
are final and conclusive upon this Court. 76 Indeed, the Supreme Court is not a
trier of facts. None of the exceptions 77 to this rule appears to be present in the
case at bar, and so should we apply the rule with force.
Second. Antero's certificates of title, as found by the trial court and sustained by
the appellate court, were issued as early as 22 October 1959. Time and again, we
have upheld the fundamental principle in land registration that a certificate of
title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the
property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. It becomes the best
proof of ownership of a parcel of land. 78 The validity of Antero's titles were
upheld by the court a quo and the Court of Appeals and were not found to be
tainted with any defect. Even as Enrique possessed certificates of title over certain
portions of the subject properties, these were issued only on 7 March 1973 and 6
March 1991. On this matter, we do not find basis to digress from the ruling
articulated by the Court of Appeals, to wit:
Well-established is the principle that the person holding a prior certificate is
entitled to the land as against a person who relies on a subsequent certificate.
This rule refers to the date of the certificate of title. Absent any muniment of title
issued prior to 1959 in favor of appellants [Enrique, et al.] which could prove their
ownership over the contested lots, this Court is left with no other alternative but
to declare appellants' claim over the properties as void. 79
B. A collateral attack on respondent's title over the disputed properties cannot be
allowed.
By express provision of Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, a certificate of
title cannot be subject to a collateral attack, thus:
SEC. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. — A certificate of title shall not
be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except
in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
When is an action a direct attack and when is it collateral? This Court made a
distinction, to wit:
An action is deemed an attack on a title when the object of the action or
proceeding is to nullify the title, and thus challenge the judgment pursuant to
which the title was decreed. The attack is direct when the object of the action is
to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand,
the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief,
an attack on the judgment is nevertheless made as an incident thereof. 80
In the case at bar, petitioners sought to file an Amended Answer, attacking the
validity of Antenor's title. Therein, it was alleged that Enrique discovered a
certification issued by the Register of Deeds of Cavite which purports to signify
that there was no valid reconstitution of Antenor's title. Otherwise stated, they
sought to assert that the aforesaid certification shows that TCT No (T-11171) RT-
1228, in the name of Miguela Crisologo, appeared to have been reconstituted;
however, no record in the Primary Entry Book of said Registry, relative to such
administrative reconstitution can be found. As submitted, petitioners maintained
that the lack of record is a vital defect, not only to the validity of the reconstitution
of Miguela Crisologo's title but also to Antenor's title, which was derived
therefrom.
However, the propriety of the court a quo's disallowance of petitioner's Amended
Answer is no longer the subject of the instant Petition, the same having reached
finality. Indeed, after the denial by the court a quo of Enrique's Motion to File
Amended Answer, he filed his Pre-Trial Brief on 27 February 1998. There was no
attempt on the part of petitioners to assail the interlocutory Order of 14 January
1998, denying Enrique's Motion for Leave to File Amended Answer. At this stage,
petitioners can no longer impugn the said Order.
C. The Decision of the CFI of Cavite in Civil Case No. N-501 does not constitute res
judicata.
Res judicata exists when the following elements are present:
(a) the former judgment must be final;
(b) the court which rendered judgment had jurisdiction over the parties and the
subject matter;
(c) it must be a judgment on the merits;
(d) and there must be between the first and second actions identity of parties,
subject matter, and cause of action. 81 (Emphasis supplied.)
Civil Case No. N-501 was dismissed without prejudice by the CFI of Cavite on 16
October 1969. The same cannot be deemed a judgment on the merits. A judgment
on the merits is one rendered after a determination of which party is right, as
distinguished from a judgment rendered upon some preliminary or formal or
merely technical point. 82 The dismissal of the case without prejudice indicates
the absence of a decision on the merits and leaves the parties free to litigate the
matter in a subsequent action as though the dismissed action had not been
commenced. In other words, the discontinuance of a case not on the merits does
not bar another action on the same subject matter. 83
D. Laches has not set in to bar respondent from recovering possession of the
subject properties.
At first instance, petitioners asserted that it took respondent a period of 27 years
to institute the instant action since the dismissal of Civil Case No. N-501.
Otherwise stated, petitioners seek reliance on the equitable doctrine of laches.
Laches is defined as the failure to assert a right for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it has either abandoned or declined to assert it. This equitable defense is
based upon grounds of public policy, which requires the discouragement of stale
claims for the peace of society. 84 Indeed, while it is true that a Torrens Title is
indefeasible and imprescriptible, the registered landowner may lose his right to
recover the possession of his registered property by reason of
laches. 85 However, In the case at bar, laches cannot be appreciated in
petitioners' favor.
The Court of Appeals said that respondent could not be faulted for having
instituted the action several years after the dismissal of a case commenced by
Antenor himself because it was only in 1982 that the administratrix for his Estate
was appointed, and respondent allowed petitioners to peacefully vacate the
premises. Moreover, the appellate court said that laches cannot lie against
respondent on the ground that petitioners cannot feign ignorance of the
possibility of respondent's action for quieting of title because from the time of the
dismissal of the case for recovery of possession in 1969, they knew that another
action would be instituted by respondent since the dismissal of the prior case was
without prejudice to the filing of a subsequent action.
We agree.
For laches to apply, it must be shown that there was lack of knowledge or notice
on the part of the defendant that complainant would assert the right in which he
bases his suit. 86 Petitioners cannot be said to be without knowledge of
respondent's claims over the subject properties as even prior to 1969, Antenor
filed Civil Case N-501, an action for recovery of possession against Enrique. On 16
October 1969, the CFI of Cavite dismissed the case without prejudice to the filing
of a subsequent action. The dismissal without prejudice was adequate to apprise
petitioners that an action to assert respondent's rights was forthcoming.
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 72907, dated 27 August 2003 and 4 February
2004 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. CADHcI
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 154415. July 28, 2005.]
GASPAR CALACALA, BALTAZAR CALACALA, MELCHOR CALACALA, SOLOMON
CALACALA, FELICIDAD CALACALA, PETRONILA CALACALA and SALOME
CALACALA, petitioners, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the
Solicitor General, and SHERIFF JUAN C. MARQUEZ, respondents.
DECISION
GARCIA, J p:
In this appeal by way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, petitioners urge us to annul and set aside the resolution dated 31
October 2001 and the order dated 2 July 2002 of the Regional Trial Court at
Rosales, Pangasinan which respectively dismissed petitioners' complaint in Civil
Case No. 1239-R and denied their motion for reconsideration.
The material facts are not at all disputed:
The spouses Camilo Calacala and Conchita Calacala, predecessors-in-interest of
the herein petitioners, are the registered owners of a parcel of land situated at
Barangay Balincanaway, Rosales, Pangasinan and covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. T-21204 of the Registry of Deeds of Pangasinan.
To secure the provisional release of an accused in a criminal case then pending
before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Pangasinan, the spouses offered
their aforementioned parcel of land as a property bond in said case. For failure of
the accused to appear at his scheduled arraignment on 4 November 1981, the CFI
ordered the bond forfeited in favor, of the government, and, following the
bondman's failure to produce in court the body of the accused, rendered
judgment against the bond in the amount of P3,500.00. Thereafter, the court
issued a Writ of Execution 1 directing the provincial sheriff to effect a levy on the
subject parcel of land and to sell the same at a public auction to satisfy the amount
of the bond. In compliance with the writ, the deputy provincial sheriff issued on
26 July 1982 a Notice of Levy 2 addressed to the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan
who, on 19 August 1982, caused the annotation thereof on TCT No. T-21204 as
Entry No. 83188.
Not long thereafter, a public auction of the subject parcel of land was held on 24
September 1982, at which respondent Republic submitted its bid for P3,500,
which is the amount of the judgment on the bond. Hence, on that same day, a
Sheriff's Certificate of Sale 3 was issued in favor of the Republic as the winning
bidder. HSaIDc
On 5 October 1982, the same Certificate of Sale was registered and annotated on
TCT No. T-21204 as Entry No. 83793, thereby giving the spouses Calacala a period
12
of one (1) year therefrom within which to redeem their property. Unfortunately,
they never did up to the time of their respective deaths on 13 January 1988 and
8 January 1994.
Claiming ownership of the same land as legal heirs of the deceased spouses,
petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court at Rosales, Pangasinan a
complaint 4 for Quieting of Title and Cancellation of Encumbrance on TCT No. T-
21204 against respondents Republic and Sheriff Juan C. Marquez. In their
complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 1239-R and raffled to Branch 53 of the court,
petitioners prayed, inter alia, for the cancellation of Entries No. 83188 and 83793
on TCT No. T-21204 or the declaration of said entries as null and void.
To the complaint, respondent Republic interposed a Motion to
Dismiss 5 grounded on the (1) complaint's failure to state a cause of action and
(2) prescription of petitioners' right to redeem. aTCADc
In their Opposition, 6 petitioners contend that when respondent Republic moved
to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, it thereby
hypothetically admitted all the allegations therein, specifically the averment that
despite the lapse of nineteen (19) years, respondent did not secure the necessary
Certificate of Final Sale and Writ of Possession and failed to execute an Affidavit
of Consolidation of Ownership. Petitioners thus submit that the Republic's rights
over the land in question had either prescribed, been abandoned or waived. They
add that by filing a motion to dismiss, respondent Republic likewise admitted the
allegation in the same complaint that petitioners and their predecessors-in-
interest have been in continuous possession of the subject land and paying the
realty taxes thereon. CaAIES
In the herein assailed resolution 7 dated 31 October 2001, the trial court granted
the Republic's motion to dismiss and accordingly dismissed petitioners'
complaint. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration but their motion was denied
by the same court in its equally challenged order 8 of 2 July 2002.
Hence, petitioners' present recourse, it being their contentions that —
I.
THE INSTANT COMPLAINT FOR QUIETING OF TITLE AND CANCELLATION OF
ENCUMBRANCE ON TCT NO. T-21204, FILED BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT, REGIONAL
[sic] TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 53, ROSALES, PANGASINAN WAS THE PROPER
REMEDY.
II.
THE COMPLAINT STATES SUFFICIENT CAUSE OF ACTION.
III.
THE CASE FOR QUIETING OF TITLE HAS NOT PRESCRIBED.
IV.
AND THE RESPONDENT REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES HAS NOT PERFECTED ITS
TITLE TO THE LAND IN QUESTION.
In the main, it is petitioners' submission that their complaint a quo sufficiently
states a cause of action because they are still the owners of the subject parcel of
land despite their failure to redeem it within the 1-year redemption period. They
premise their argument on the Republic's failure to secure the Certificate of Final
Sale, execute an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and obtain a writ of
possession over the same property within ten (10) years from the registration of
the Certificate of Sale on 5 October 1982. Prescinding therefrom, they thus argue
that the Republic's right over the property in question has already prescribed or
has been abandoned and waived, citing, in support thereof, Article 1142 of the
Civil Code. In short, it is petitioners' thesis that respondent Republic failed to
perfect its title.
On the other hand, it is respondent's posture that its rights and title as owner of
the same property are already perfected by the mere failure of petitioners and/or
their predecessors-in-interest to redeem the same within one (1) year from the
registration/annotation of the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale on TCT No. T-21204, in
accordance with Section 33, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
As we see it, the only question which commends itself for our resolution is
whether the trial court's dismissal of petitioners' complaint for Quieting of
Title was proper. It thus behooves us to determine if, in the first place, petitioners
have a cause of action in their complaint.
We rule for respondent Republic.
To begin with, it bears emphasis that an action for quieting of title is essentially a
common law remedy grounded on equity. As we held in Baricuatro, Jr. vs. CA: 9
Regarding the nature of the action filed before the trial court, quieting of title is a
common law remedy for the removal of any cloud upon or doubt or uncertainty
with respect to title to real property. Originating in equity jurisprudence, its
purpose is to secure '. . . an adjudication that a claim of title to or an interest in
property, adverse to that of the complainant, is invalid, so that the complainant
and those claiming under him may be forever afterward free from any danger of
hostile claim.' In an action for quieting of title, the competent court is tasked to
determine the respective rights of the complainant and other claimants, '. . . not
only to place things in their proper place, to make the one who has no rights to
said immovable respect and not disturb the other, but also for the benefit of both,
so that he who has the right would see every cloud of doubt over the property
dissipated, and he could afterwards without fear introduce the improvements he
may desire, to use, and even to abuse the property as he deems best . . . (Italics
supplied).
Under Article 476 of the New Civil Code, the remedy may be availed of only when,
by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding, which
appears valid but is, in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable or unenforceable, a cloud
is thereby casts on the complainant's title to real property or any interest therein.
The codal provision reads:
Article 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest
therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding
which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective,
voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be
brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title. ADECcI
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to
real property or any interest therein.
In turn, Article 477 of the same Code identifies the party who may bring an action
to quiet title, thus:
Article 477. The plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in the
real property which is the subject-matter of the action. He need not be in
possession of said property.
It can thus be seen that for an action for quieting of title to prosper, the plaintiff
must first have a legal, or, at least, an equitable title on the real property subject
of the action and that the alleged cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact
invalid. So it is that in Robles, et al. vs. CA, 10 we ruled:
It is essential for the plaintiff or complainant to have a legal title or an equitable
title to or interest in the real property which is the subject matter of the action.
Also, the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding that is being alleged as a cloud
on plaintiff's title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite
its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. cADEHI
Verily, for an action to quiet title to prosper, two (2) indispensable requisites must
concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to
or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be
shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of
validity or legal efficacy.
Unfortunately, the foregoing requisites are wanting in this case.
To start with, petitioners base their claim of legal title not on the strength of any
independent writing in their favor but simply and solely on respondent Republic's
failure to secure the Certificate of Final Sale, execute an Affidavit of Consolidation
of Ownership and obtain a writ of possession over the property in dispute within
ten (10) years from the registration of the Certificate of Sale.
Petitioners' reliance on the foregoing shortcomings or inactions of respondent
Republic cannot stand.
For one, it bears stressing that petitioners' predecessors-in-interest lost whatever
right they had over land in question from the very moment they failed to redeem
it during the 1-year period of redemption. Certainly, the Republic's failure to
execute the acts referred to by the petitioners within ten (10) years from the
registration of the Certificate of Sale cannot, in any way, operate to restore
whatever rights petitioners' predecessors-in-interest had over the same. For sure,
petitioners have yet to cite any provision of law or rule of jurisprudence, and we
are not aware of any, to the effect that the failure of a buyer in a foreclosure sale
to secure a Certificate of Final Sale, execute an Affidavit of Consolidation of
Ownership and obtain a writ of possession over the property thus acquired, within
ten (10) years from the registration of the Certificate of Sale will operate to bring
ownership back to him whose property has been previously foreclosed and sold.
As correctly observed by the trial court, the Republic's failure to do anything
within ten (10) years or more following the registration of the Sheriff's Certificate
of Sale cannot give rise to a presumption that it has thereby waived or abandoned
its right of ownership or that it has prescribed, "for prescription does not lie
against the government", nor could it "be bound or estopped by the negligence
or mistakes of its officials and employees". TcDAHS
Quite the contrary, Section 33, 11 Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
explicitly provides that "[u]pon the expiration of the right of redemption, the
purchaser or redemptioner shall be substituted to and acquire all the rights, title,
interest and claim of the judgment obligor to the property as of the time of the
levy".
Concededly, the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure was yet inexistent when the facts
of this case transpired. Even then, the application thereof to this case is justified
by our pronouncement in Lascano vs. Universal Steel Smelting Co., Inc., et
al., 12 to wit:
Procedural laws are construed to be applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage, and are deemed retroactive in that
sense and to that extent. As a general rule, the retroactive application of
procedural laws cannot be considered violative of any personal rights because no
vested right may attach to nor arise therefrom.
Moreover, with the rule that the expiration of the 1-year redemption period
forecloses the obligor's right to redeem and that the sale thereby becomes
absolute, the issuance thereafter of a final deed of sale is at best a mere formality
and mere confirmation of the title that is already vested in the purchaser. As this
Court has said in Manuel vs. Philippine National Bank, et al.: 13
Note must be taken of the fact that under the Rules of Court the expiration of that
one-year period forecloses the owner's right to redeem, thus making the sheriff's
sale absolute. The issuance thereafter of a final deed of sale becomes a mere
formality, an act merely confirmatory of the title that is already in the purchaser
and constituting official evidence of that fact. (Emphasis supplied)
With the reality that petitioners are not holders of any legal title over the property
subject of this case and are bereft of any equitable claim thereon, the very first
13
requisite of an action to quiet title, i.e., that the plaintiff or complainant has a legal
or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject matter of the action,
is miserably wanting in this case.
For another, and worse, petitioners never put in issue, as in fact they admit in
their pleadings, the validity of the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale duly registered on 5
October 1982. On this score, the second requisite of an action to quiet title,
namely, that the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding alleged to cast cloud
on a plaintiffs title is in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima
facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy, is likewise absent herein.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed resolution and order
of the trial court AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 123509. March 14, 2000.]
LUCIO ROBLES, EMETERIA ROBLES, ALUDIA ROBLES and EMILIO
ROBLES, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, Spouses VIRGILIO SANTOS and BABY
RUTH CRUZ, RURAL BANK OF CARDONA, Inc., HILARIO ROBLES, ALBERTO PALAD
JR. in his capacity as Director of Lands, and JOSE MAULEON in his capacity as
District Land Officer of the Bureau of Lands, respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioners inherited the disputed property from their father, Silvino Robles,
whose predecessor has been occupying the same since 1916. Allegedly, the
payment of taxes thereof was entrusted to their co-heir, respondent Hilario. In
1962, however, the tax declaration of the land was transferred to Exequiel
Bellena, father-in-law of Hilario; later, transferred to Antipolo Rural Bank, and
then, to the name of Hilario and wife Andrea, who mortgaged the same to the
Cardona Rural Bank. The property was eventually foreclosed, transferred to the
Bank's name and sold to respondent spouses Santos. Petitioners, who discovered
the mortgage, attempted but failed to redeem the property while respondent
spouses Santos took possession of the same and were able to secure Free Patent
in their names.
Evidently, there was no valid transfer of the disputed property from the heirs of
Silvino to Exequiel in 1962. Thus, the property still belong to the heirs of the late
Silvino and the mortgage executed by Hilario to the Rural Bank of Cardona was
made in his capacity as mere co-owner thereof. The Rural Bank of Cardona, Inc. is
considered a mortgagee in bad faith as it did not fully ascertain the title of Hilario
and thus failed to observe due diligence. Hence, as what was mortgaged was only
the undivided share of Hilario, respondent spouses Santos can only acquire the
same. The free patent granted to the spouses Santos was void as the disputed
land has already become a private land as petitioners are claiming ownership
thereof based on their possession of the land in the concept of owners for more
than 30 years. It has become beyond the authority of the Director of Lands.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J p:
To be entitled to the remedy of quieting of title, petitioners must show that they
have title to the real property at issue, and that some deed or proceeding
beclouds its validity or efficacy. Buyers of unregistered real property, especially
banks, must exert due diligence in ascertaining the titles of mortgagors and
sellers, lest some innocent parties be prejudiced. Failure to observe such diligence
may amount to bad faith and may result in the nullity of the mortgage, as well as
of the subsequent foreclosure and/or auction sale. Unless the co-ownership is
clearly repudiated, a co-owner cannot, by prescription, acquire title to the shares
of the other co-owners. cdrep
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45, assailing the June 15, 1995
Decision and the January 15, 1996 Resolution of the Court of Appeals 1 (CA) in CA-
GR CV No. 34213. 2 In its Decision, the CA ruled: 3
"WHEREFORE, the trial court's June 17, 1991 decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE,
and in lieu thereof a new one is hereby entered ordering the dismissal of the
plaintiffs-appellees['] second amended complaint."
Earlier, the trial court had disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Declaring free patent Title No. IV-1-010021 issued by the Bureau of Lands as
null and void;
2. Ordering the defendant spouses Vergel Santos and Ruth Santos to deliver the
property subject of this case to the plaintiff; and
3. Declaring the heirs of Silvino Robles as the absolute owner of the land in
controversy."
The January 15, 1996 CA Resolution denied petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration. cdphil
The Facts
The present Petition is rooted in a case for quieting of title before the Regional
Trial Court of Morong, Rizal, filed on March 14, 1988, 4 by Petitioners Lucio
Robles, Emeteria Robles, Aludia Robles and Emilio Robles. The facts were narrated
by the trial court in this wise:
"There seems to be no dispute that Leon Robles primitively owned the land
situated in Kay Taga, Lagundi, Morong, Rizal with an area of 9,985 square meters.
He occupied the same openly and adversely. He also declared the same in his
name for taxation purposes as early as 1916 covered by Tax Declaration No. 17865
(Exh. "I") and paid the corresponding taxes thereon (Exh. "B"). When Leon Robles
died, his son Silvino Robles inherited the land, who took possession of the land,
declared it in his name for taxation purposes and paid the taxes thereon.
"Upon the death of Silvino Robles in 1942, his widow Maria de la Cruz and his
children inherited the property. They took adverse possession of said property
and paid taxes thereon. The task of cultivat[ing] the land was assigned to plaintiff
Lucio Robles who planted trees and other crops. He also built a nipa hut on the
land. The plaintiffs entrusted the payment of the land taxes to their co-heir and
half-brother, Hilario Robles.
"In 1962, for unknown reasons, the tax declaration of the parcel of land in the
name of Silvino Robles was canceled and transferred to one Exequiel Ballena (Exh.
"19"), father of Andrea Robles who is the wife of defendant Hilario Robles.
Thereafter, Exequiel Ballena secured a loan from the Antipolo Rural Bank, using
the tax declaration as security. Somehow, the tax declaration was transferred [to]
the name of Antipolo Rural Bank (Exh. "17") and later on, was transferred [to] the
name of defendant Hilario Robles and his wife (Exh. "16").
"In 1996, Andrea Robles secured a loan from the Cardona Rural Bank, Inc., using
the tax declaration as security. Andrea Robles testified without contradiction that
somebody else, not her husband Hilario Robles, signed the loan papers because
Hilario Robles was working in Marinduque at that time as a carpenter.
"For failure to pay the mortgage debt, foreclosure proceedings were had and
defendant Rural Bank emerged as the highest bidder during the auction sale in
October 1968.
"The spouses Hilario Robles failed to redeem the property and so the tax
declaration was transferred in the name of defendant Rural Bank. On September
25, 1987, defendant Rural Bank sold the same to the Spouses Vergel Santos and
Ruth Santos. cdrep
"In September 1987, plaintiff discovered the mortgage and attempted to redeem
the property, but was unsuccessful. On May 10, 1988, defendant spouses Santos
took possession of the property in question and was able to secure Free Patent
No. IV-1-010021 in their names." 5
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals summarized the facts of the case as
follows:
"The instant action for quieting of title concerns the parcel of land bounded and
more particularly described as follows:
"A parcel of land located at Kay Taga, Lagundi, Morong, Rizal. Bounded [i]n the
north by the property of Venancio Ablay y Simeon Ablay; [i]n the east by the
property of Veronica Tulak y Dionisio Ablay; [i]n the south by the property of
Simeon Ablay y Dionisio Ablay; and [i]n the west by the property of Dionisio Ablay
y Simeon Ablay, with an area of 9,985 square meters, more or less, assessed in
the year 1935 at P60.00 under Tax Declaration No. 23219.'
"As the heirs of Silvino Robles who, likewise inherited the above-described parcel
from Leon Robles, the siblings Lucio, Emeteria, Aludia and Emilio, all surnamed
Robles, commenced the instant suit with the filing of their March 14, 1988
complaint against Spouses Virgilio and Ruth Santos, as well as the Rural Bank of
Cardona, Inc. Contending that they had been in possession of the land since 1942,
the plaintiff alleged, among other matters, that it was only in September of 1987
that they came to know of the foreclosure of the real estate mortgage constituted
thereon by the half-brother, Hilario Robles, in favor of defendant Rural Bank; and
that they likewise learned upon further inquiry, that the latter had already sold
the self-same parcel in favor of the Santos spouses (pp. 1-3, orig. rec.). Twice
amended to implead Hilario Robles (pp. 76-80, orig. rec) and, upon subsequent
discovery of the issuance of Free Patent No. IV-I-010021 in favor of the defendant
spouses, the Director of Lands and the District Land Officer of the Bureau of Lands
as parties-defendants (pp. 117-121, orig. rec). The plaintiffs' complaint sought the
following reliefs on the theory that the encumbrance of their half-brother,
constituted on the land, as well as all proceedings taken subsequent thereto, were
null and void, to wit:
Wherefore, it is respectfully prayed that (a) a preliminary mandatory injunction
be issued forthwith restoring plaintiffs to their possession of said parcel of land;
(b) an order be issued annulling said Free Patent No. IV-I-010021 in the name of
defendants spouses Vergel Santos and Ruth C. Santos, the deed of sale
aforementioned and any tax declaration which have been issued in the name of
defendants; and (c) ordering defendants jointly and severally, to pay plaintiffs the
sum of P10,000.00 as attorney's fees. cda
"Plaintiffs pray for other relief as [may be] just and equitable under the premises."
(pp. 120-121, orig. rec.)
xxx xxx xxx'
"With the termination of the pre-trial stage upon the parties-litigants' agreement
(p. 203, orig. rec.) the trial court proceeded to try the case on the merits. It
thereafter rendered the challenged June 17, 1991 decision upon the following
findings and conclusions:
"The real estate mortgage allegedly executed by Hilario Robles is not valid
because his signature in the mortgage deed was forged. This fact, which remains
unrebutted, was admitted by Andrea Robles.
'Inasmuch as the real estate mortgage executed allegedly by Hilario Robles in
favor of the defendant Cardona Rural Bank, Inc. was not valid, it stands to reason
that the foreclosure proceedings therein were likewise not valid. Therefore, the
defendant bank did not acquire any right arising out of the foreclosure
proceedings. Consequently, defendant bank could not have transferred any right
to the spouses Santos.
14
'The fact that the land was covered by a free patent will not help the defendant
Santos any.
'There can be no question that the subject [property was held] in the concept of
owner by Leon Robles since 1916. Likewise, his successor-in-interest, Silvino
Robles, his wife Maria de la Cruz and the plaintiffs occupied the property openly,
continuously and exclusively until they were ousted from their possession in 1988
by the spouses Vergel and Ruth Santos.
'Under the circumstances, therefore, and considering that 'open, exclusive and
undisputed possession of alienable public lands for the period prescribed by law
(30 years), creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the
requisite period, ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other action, ceases
to be public land and becomes private property. Possession of public land . . .
which is [of] the character and duration prescribed by the statute is the equivalent
of an express grant from the State, considering the dictum of the statute itself[:];
'The possessor . . . shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title . . . .' No proof is admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption[,] and
confirmation proceedings would be a little more than a formality, at the most
limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required
character and length of time. Registration thereunder would not confer title, but
simply recognize a title already vested. (Cruz v. IAC, G.R. No. 75042, November 29,
1988) The land in question has become private land. cdll
'Consequently, the issuance of [a] free patent title to the Spouses Vergel Santos
and Ruth C. Santos is not valid because at the time the property subject of this
case was already private land, the Bureau of Lands having no jurisdiction to
dispose of the same.' (pp. 257-259, orig. rec.)'
"Dissatisfied with the foregoing decision, the Santos spouses and the defendant
Rural Bank jointly filed their July 6, 1991 Notice of Appeal (p. 260, orig. rec.) . . .
." 6
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In reversing the trial court, the Court of Appeals held that petitioners no longer
had any title to the subject property at the time they instituted the Complaint for
quieting of title. The CA ratiocinated as follows:
"As correctly urged by the appellants, the plaintiff-appellees no longer had any
title to the property at the time of the institution of the instant complaint. (pp.
25-27, rec.) The latter's claim of continuous possession notwithstanding (pp. 3-5,
TSN, July 5, 1990; p. 12, TSN, July 12, 1990), the aforesaid loss of title is amply
evidenced by the subsequent declaration of the subject realty for taxation
purposes not only in the name of Exequiel Ballena (Exhibits "1" and "2", pp. 23-
24, orig. rec.) but also in the name of the Rural Bank of Antipolo (Exhibit 17, vol.
II, orig. rec.). On the theory that tax declarations can be evincive of the transfer of
a parcel of land or a portion thereof (Gacos v. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 214),
the court a quo clearly erred in simply brushing aside the apparent transfers
[which] the land in litigation had undergone. Whether legal or equitable, it cannot,
under the circumstances, be gainsaid that the plaintiff-appellees no longer had
any title to speak of when Exequiel Ballena executed the November 7, 1966 Deed
of Absolute Sale transferring the land in favor of the spouses Hilario and Andrea
Robles (Exhibit "3", p. 25, orig. rec.)
"Even on the theory that the plaintiffs-appellees and their half-brother, Hilario
Robles, are co-owners of the land left behind by their common father, Silvino
Robles, such title would still be effectively discounted by what could well serve as
the latter's acts of repudiation of the co-ownership, i.e., his possession (p. 22, TSN,
November 15, 1990) and declaration thereof for taxation purposes in his own
name (Exhibit "4", p. 26, orig. rec.). In view of the plaintiffs-appellees' inaction for
more than twenty (20) years from the time the subject realty was transferred in
favor of Hilario Robles, the appellants correctly maintain that prescription had
already set in. While it may be readily conceded that an action to quiet title to
property in the possession of the plaintiff is imprescriptible (Almanza vs.
Arguelles, 156 SCRA 718; Coronel vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 155 SCRA
270; Caragay-Layno vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 718; Charon Enterprises vs.
Court of Appeals, 124 SCRA 784; Faja vs. Court of Appeals, 75 SCRA 441; Burton
vs. Gabar, 55 SCRA 4999), it equally bears emphasis that a co-owner or, for that
matter, the said co-owner[']s successors-in-interest who occupy the community
property other than as co-owner[s] can claim prescription as against the other co-
owners (De Guzman vs. Austria, 148 SCRA 75; Ramos vs. Ramos, 45 Phil.
362;Africa vs. Africa, 42 Phil. 902; Bargayo vs. Camumot, 40 Phil. 857; De Castro
vs. Echarri, 20 Phil. 23). If only in this latter sense, the appellants correctly argue
that the plaintiffs-appellees have lost their cause of action by prescription. cdtai
"Over and above the foregoing considerations, the court a quo gravely erred in
invalidating the real estate mortgage constituted on the land solely on the basis
of Andrea Robles' testimony that her husband's signature thereon was forged (p.
257, orig. rec.),
xxx xxx xxx
"In according to the foregoing testimony . . . credibility which, while admittedly
unrebutted, was altogether uncorroborated, the trial court lost sight of the fact
that the assailed deed of real estate mortgage (Exhibit "5", Vol. II, orig. rec.) is a
public document, the acknowledgment of which is a prima facieevidence of its
due execution (Chua vs. Court of Appeals, 206 SCRA 339). As such, it retains the
presumption of validity in the absence of a full, clear and convincing evidence to
overcome such presumption (Agdeppa vs. Ibe, 220 SCRA 584).
"The foregoing principles take even more greater [sic] when it is, moreover, borne
in mind that Hilario Robles made the following admissions in his March 8, 1989
answer, viz:
'3. The complaint filed against herein answering defendant has no legal basis
considering that as the lawful owner of the subject real property, defendant
Hilario Robles has the right to mortgage the said real property and could dispose
the same in whatever manner he wishe[s] to do." (p. 96, orig. rec.)
"Appropriately underscored by the appellants, the foregoing admission is binding
against Hilario [Robles]. Judicial admissions, verbal or written, made by the parties
in the pleadings or in the course of the trial or other proceedings in the same case
are conclusive, no evidence being required to prove the same. They cannot be
contradicted unless shown to have been made through [a] palpable mistake or
[unless] no such admission was actually made (Philippine American General
Insurance, Inc. vs. Sweet Lines, Inc., 212 SCRA 194).
"It does not help the plaintiffs-appellees' cause any that, aside from complying
with the requirements for the foreclosure of the subject real estate mortgage
(Exhibits "6", "7", "8" and "10", Volume II[)], the appellant Rural Bank had not only
relented to the mortgagor's request to postpone the (Exhibit "g", Vol. II, orig. rec.)
but had likewise granted the latter's request for an extension of the redemption
period therefor (Exhibits "11" and "12", pp. 35-36, orig. rec.). Without going into
minute detail in discussing the Santos spouses' rights as purchasers for value and
in good faith (Exhibit "21", Vol. II, orig. rec.), the mortgagor and the plaintiffs'-
appellees cannot now be heard to challenge the validity of the sale of the land
after admittedly failing to redeem the same within the extension the appellant
Rural Bank granted (pp. 10-11, TSN, November 15, 1990).
"Being dependent on the supposed invalidity of the constitution and foreclosure
of the subject real estate mortgage, the plaintiffs-appellees' attack upon . . . Free
Patent No. IV-I must necessarily fail. The trial court, therefore, misread, and
ignored the evidence o[n] record, to come up with erroneous conclusion." cdasia
Contending that such ruling was contrary to law and jurisprudence, Petitioners
Lucio, Emeteria, Aludia and Emilio — all surnamed Robles — filed this Petition for
Review. 7
The Assigned Error
Petitioners ascribe the following error to the respondent court:
"Respondent Court of Appeals grievously erred in ruling that with the transfers of
the tax declaration over the parcel of land in question from Silvino Robles to
Exequiel Ballena, then to the Rural Bank of Antipolo, then to Respondent Hilario
Robles, then to Respondent Rural Bank of Cardona Inc., and then finally to
Respondent Spouses Santos, petitioners, who by themselves and their
predecessors in interest have been in open, actual and adverse possession of said
parcel of land since 1916 up to their forced removal therefrom in 1988, have lost
their title to said property by prescription to their half-brother, Respondent
Hilario Robles, and then finally, to Respondent Spouses Santos." 8
For a better understanding of the case, the above issue will be broken down into
three points: first, the nature of the remedy of quieting of title; second, the
validity of the real estate mortgage; and third, the efficacy of the free patent
granted to the Santos spouses.
First Issue:
Quieting of Title
Article 476 of the Civil Code provides:
"Whenever there is cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by
reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is
apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable
or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought
to remove such cloud or to quiet title.
"An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to
real property or any interest therein."
Based on the above definition, an action to quiet title is a common-law remedy
for the removal of any cloud or doubt or uncertainty on the title to real
property. 9 It is essential for the plaintiff or complainant to have a legal or an
equitable title to or interest in the real property which is the subject matter of the
action. 10 Also, the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding that is being alleged
as a cloud on plaintiff's title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative
despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. 11
That there is an instrument or a document which, on its face, is valid and
efficacious is clear in the present case. Petitioners allege that their title as owners
and possessors of the disputed property is clouded by the tax declaration and,
subsequently, the free patent thereto granted to Spouses Vergel and Ruth Santos.
The more important question to be resolved, however, is whether the petitioners
have the appropriate title that will entitle them to avail themselves of the remedy
of quieting of title. prcd
Petitioners anchor their claim to the disputed property on their continued and
open occupation and possession as owners thereof. They allege that they
inherited it from their father, Silvino, who in turn had inherited it from his father,
Leon. They maintain that after their father's death, they agreed among
themselves that Petitioner Lucio Robles would be tending and cultivating it for
everyone, and that their half-brother Hilario would be paying the land taxes.
Petitioners insist that they were not aware that from 1962 until 1987, the subject
property had been declared in the names of Exequiel Ballena, the Rural Bank of
Antipolo, Hilario Robles, the Rural Bank of Cardona, Inc., and finally, Spouses
Vergel and Ruth Santos. Maintaining that, as co-owners of the subject property,
they did not agree to the real estate mortgage constituted on it, petitioners insist
that their shares therein should not have been prejudiced by Hilario's actions.
On the other hand, Private Respondents Vergel and Ruth Santos trace their claim
to the subject property to Exequiel Ballena, who had purportedly sold it to Hilario
15
and Andrea Robles. According to private respondents, the Robles spouses then
mortgaged it to the Rural Bank of Cardona, Inc. — not as co-owners but as
absolute owners — in order to secure an agricultural loan worth P2,000. Upon
their failure to pay their indebtedness, the mortgage was foreclosed and the
property sold to the bank as the highest bidder. Thereafter, private respondents
purchased the property from the bank.
Undisputed is the fact that the land had previously been occupied by Leon and
later by Silvino Robles, petitioners' predecessors-in-interest, as evidenced by the
different tax declarations issued in their names. Also undisputed is the fact that
the petitioners continued occupying and possessing the land from the death of
Silvino in 1942 until they were allegedly ousted therefrom in 1988. In 1962, the
subject property was declared in the name of Exequiel for taxation purposes. On
September 30, 1965, it was again declared in the same name; on October 28,
1965, in the name of the Rural Bank of Antipolo; on November 7, 1966, in the
name of Hilario and Andrea; and thereafter, in the name of the Rural Bank of
Cardona and, finally, in the name of the Santos spouses. cdll
Ostensibly, the Court of Appeals failed to consider irregularities in the
transactions involving the disputed property. First, while it was declared in the
name of Exequiel in 1962, there was no instrument or deed of conveyance
evidencing its transfer from the heirs of Silvino to him. This fact is important,
considering that the petitioners are alleging continued possession of the
property. Second, Exequiel was the father-in-law of Hilario, to whom petitioners
had entrusted the payment of the land taxes. Third, considering that the subject
property had been mortgaged by Exequiel to the Rural Bank of Antipolo, and that
it was foreclosed and in fact declared in the bank's name in 1965, why was he able
to sell it to Spouses Hilario and Andrea in 1966? Lastly, inasmuch as it was
an unregistered parcel of land, the Rural Bank of Cardona, Inc., did not observe
due diligence in determining Hilario's title thereto.
The failure to show the indubitable title of Exequiel to the property in question is
vital to the resolution of the present Petition. It was from him that Hilario had
allegedly derived his title thereto as owner, an allegation which thereby enabled
him to mortgage it to the Rural Bank of Cardona. The occupation and the
possession thereof by the petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest until
1962 was not disputed, and Exequiel's acquisition of the said property by
prescription was not alleged. Thus, the deed of conveyance purportedly
evidencing the transfer of ownership and possession from the heirs of Silvino to
Exequiel should have been presented as the best proof of that transfer. No such
document was presented, however.
Therefore, there is merit to the contention of the petitioners that Hilario
mortgaged the disputed property to the Rural Bank of Cardona in his capacity as
a mere co-owner thereof. Clearly, the said transaction did not divest them of title
to the property at the time of the institution of the Complaint for quieting of title.
Contrary to the disquisition of the Court of Appeals, Hilario effected no clear and
evident repudiation of the co-ownership. It is a fundamental principle that a co-
owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent
any clear repudiation of the co-ownership. In order that the title may prescribe in
favor of a co-owner, the following requisites must concur: (1) the co-owner has
performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the other
co-owners; (2) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the
other co-owners; and (3) the evidence thereof is clear and convincing. 12
In the present case, Hilario did not have possession of the subject property;
neither did he exclude the petitioners from the use and the enjoyment thereof,
as they had indisputably shared in its fruits. 13 Likewise, his act of entering into a
mortgage contract with the bank cannot be construed to be a repudiation of the
co-ownership. As absolute owner of his undivided interest in the land, he had the
right to alienate his share, as he in fact did. 14Neither should his payment of land
taxes in his name, as agreed upon by the co-owners, be construed as a repudiation
of the co-ownership. The assertion that the declaration of ownership was
tantamount to repudiation was belied by the continued occupation and
possession of the disputed property by the petitioners as owners. cdll
Second Issue:
Validity of the Real Estate Mortgage
In a real estate mortgage contract, it is essential that the mortgagor be the
absolute owner of the property to be mortgaged; otherwise, the mortgage is
void. 15 In the present case, it is apparent that Hilario Robles was not the absolute
owner of the entire subject property; and that the Rural Bank of Cardona, Inc., in
not fully ascertaining his title thereto, failed to observe due diligence and, as such,
was a mortgagee in bad faith.
First, the bank was utterly remiss in its duty to establish who the true owners and
possessors of the subject property were. It acted with precipitate haste in
approving the Robles spouses' loan application, as well as the real estate
mortgage covering the disputed parcel of land. 16 Had it been more circumspect
and assiduous, it would have discovered that the said property was in fact being
occupied by the petitioners, who were tending and cultivating it.
Second, the bank should not have relied solely on the Deed of Sale purportedly
showing that the ownership of the disputed property had been transferred from
Exequiel Ballena to the Robles spouses, or that it had subsequently been declared
in the name of Hilario. Because it was dealing withunregistered land, and the
circumstances surrounding the transaction between Hilario and his father-in-
law Exequiel were suspicious, the bank should have exerted more effort to fully
determine the title of the Robleses. Rural Bank of Compostela v. Court of
Appeals 17 invalidated a real estate mortgage after a finding that the bank had
not been in good faith. The Court explained: "The rule that persons dealing with
registered lands can rely solely on the certificate of title does not apply to banks."
In Tomas v. Tomas, the Court held:
". . . . Banks, indeed, should exercise more care and prudence in dealing even with
registered lands, than private individuals, for their business is one affected with
public interest, keeping in trust money belonging to their depositors, which they
should guard against loss by not committing any act of negligence which amounts
to lack of good faith by which they would be denied the protective mantle of land
registration statute, Act 496, extended only to purchasers for value and in good
faith, as well as to mortgagees of the same character and description. . . . ." 18
Lastly, the Court likewise finds it unusual that, notwithstanding the bank's
insistence that it had become the owner of the subject property and had paid the
land taxes thereon, the petitioners continued occupying it and harvesting the
fruits therefrom. 19
Considering that Hilario can be deemed to have mortgaged the disputed property
not as absolute owner but only as a co-owner, he can be adjudged to have
disposed to the Rural Bank of Cardona, Inc., only his undivided share therein. The
said bank, being the immediate predecessor of the Santos spouses, was a
mortgagee in bad faith. Thus, justice and equity mandate the entitlement of the
Santos spouses, who merely stepped into the shoes of the bank, only to what
legally pertains to the latter — Hilario's share in the disputed property. LLjur
Third Issue:
Efficacy of Free Patent Grant
Petitioners repeatedly insist that the disputed property belongs to them
by private ownership and, as such, it could not have been awarded to the Santos
spouses by free patent. They allege that they possessed it in the concept of
owners — openly, peacefully, publicly and continuously as early as 1916 until they
were forcibly ousted therefrom in 1988. They likewise contend that they
cultivated it and harvested its fruits. Lucio Robles testified:
"xxx xxx xxx
Q By the way, why do you know this parcel of land?
A Because before my father died, he showed me all the documents.
Q Before the death of your father, who was the owner of this parcel of land?
A My father, sir.
Q How did your father acquire this parcel of land?
A My father knew that it [was] by inheritance, sir.
Q From whom?
A From his father, Leon Robles, sir.
Q And do you know also [from] whom Leon Robles acquired this land?
A It was inherited from his father, sir.
Q What is the nature of this parcel of land?
A It's an agricultural land, sir.
Q Now, at the time of the death of your father, this land was planted with what
crops?
A Mango trees, santol trees, and I was the one who planted those trees, sir.
Q When did you plant those trees?
A Before the death of my father, sir.
Q Now, after the death of your father, who cultivated this parcel of land?
A I took charge of the land after the death of my father, sir.
Q Up to when?
A Up to the present, sir, after this case was already filed." 20
The preceding claim is an assertion that the subject property is private land. The
petitioners do not concede, and the records do not show, that it was ever an
alienable land of the public domain. They allege private ownership thereof, as
evidenced by their testimonies and the tax declarations issued in the names of
their predecessors-in-interest. It must be noted that while their claim was not
corroborated by other witnesses, it was not controverted by the other parties,
either. prcd
Carlos Dolores insisted that the Rural Bank of Cardona, Inc., of which he was the
manager, had acquired and possessed the subject property. He did not, however,
give any reason why the petitioners had continued occupying it, even as he
admitted on the stand that he had visited it twice. 21
In the light of their open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the land, petitioners are "deemed to have acquired, by operation
of law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate
of title being issued." 22 The land was "segregated from the public domain."
Accordingly, the director of lands had no authority to issue a free patent thereto
in favor of another person. Verily, jurisprudence holds that a free patent covering
private land is null and void. 23
Worth quoting is the disquisition of the Court in Agne v. Director of Lands, 24 in
which it held that a riparian owner presently in possession had a better right over
an abandoned river bed than had a registered owner by virtue of a free patent.
"Under the provisions of Act 2874 pursuant to which the title of private
respondents' predecessor-in-interest was issued, the President of the
Philippines, or his alter ego, the Director of Lands, has no authority to grant a free
patent for land that has ceased to be a public land and has passed to private
ownership and a title so issued is null and void. The nullity arises, not from fraud
or deceit, but from the fact that the land is not under the jurisdiction of the Bureau
of Lands. The jurisdiction of the Director of Lands is limited only to public lands
16
and does not cover lands publicly owned. The purpose of the Legislature in
adopting the former Public Land Act, Act No. 2874, was and is to limit its
application to lands of the public domain, and lands held in private ownership are
not included therein and are not affected in any manner whatsoever thereby.
Land held in freehold or fee title, or of private ownership, constitutes no part of
the public domain, and cannot possibly come within the purview of said act 2874,
inasmuch as the 'subject' of such freehold or private land is not embraced in any
manner in the title of the Act and the same is excluded from the provisions of the
text thereof.
"We reiterate that private ownership of land is not affected by the issuance of the
free patent over the same land because the Public Land Act applies only to lands
of the public domain. Only public land may be disposed of by the Director of Lands.
Since as early as 1920, the land in dispute was already under the private
ownership of herein petitioners and no longer a part of the lands of the public
domain, the same could not have been the subject matter of a free patent. The
patentee and his successors-in-interest acquired no right or title to said land.
Necessarily, Free Patent No. 23263 issued to Herminigildo Agpoon is null and void
and the subsequent titles issued pursuant thereto cannot become final and
indefeasible. Hence we ruled in Director of Lands v. Sicsican, et al., that if at the
time the free patents were issued in 1953 the land covered therein were already
private property of another and, therefore, not part of the disposable land of the
public domain, then applicants patentees acquired no right or title to the land.
"Now, a certificate of title fraudulently secured is null and void ab initio if the
fraud consisted in misrepresenting that the land is part of the public domain,
although it is not. As earlier stated, the nullity arises, not from the fraud or deceit,
but from the fact that the land is not under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands.
Being null and void, the free patent granted and the subsequent titles produce no
legal effect whatsoever. Quod nullum est, nullum producit effectum.
"A free patent which purports to convey land to which the government did not
have any title at the time of its issuance does not vest any title in the patentee as
against the true owner. The Court has previously held that the Land Registration
Act and the Cadastral Act do not give anybody who resorts to the provisions
thereof a better title than what he really and lawfully has.
xxx xxx xxx
"We have, therefore, to arrive at the unavoidable conclusion that the title of
herein petitioners over the land in dispute is superior to the title of the registered
owner which is a total nullity. The long and continued possession of petitioners
under a valid claim of title cannot be defeated by the claim of a registered owner
whose title is defective from the beginning."
The Santos spouses argue that petitioners do not have the requisite personality
to question the free patent granted them, inasmuch as "it is a well-settled rule
that actions to nullify free patents should be filed by the Office of the Solicitor
General at the behest of the Director of Lands." 25
Private respondents' reliance on this doctrine is misplaced. Indeed, the Court held
in Peltan Development, Inc. v. Court of Appeals 26 that only the solicitor general
could file an action for the cancellation of a free patent. Ruling that the private
respondents, who were applicants for a free patent, were not the proper parties
in an action to cancel the transfer certificates covering the parcel of land that was
the subject of their application, the Court ratiocinated thus:
"The Court also holds that private respondents are not the proper parties to
initiate the present suit. The complaint, praying as it did for the cancellation of
the transfer certificates of title of petitioners on the ground that they were
derived from a "spurious" OCT No. 4216, assailed in effect the validity of said title.
While private respondents did not pray for the reversion of the land to the
government, we agree with the petitioners that the prayer in the complaint will
have the same result of reverting the land to the government under the Regalian
Doctrine. Gabila v. Barinaga 27 ruled that only the government is entitled to this
relief. . . . ."
Because the cancellation of the free patent as prayed for by the private
respondents in Peltan would revert the property in question to the public domain,
the ultimate beneficiary would be the government, which can be represented by
the solicitor general only. Therefore, the real party-in-interest is the government,
not the private respondents. LibLex
This ruling does not, however, apply to the present case. While the private
respondents in Peltan recognized that the disputed property was part of the
public domain when they applied for free patent, 28 herein petitioners asserted
and proved private ownership over the disputed parcel of land by virtue of their
open, continued and exclusive possession thereof since 1916.
Neither does the present case call for the reversion of the disputed property to
the State. By asking for the nullification of the free patent granted to the Santos
spouses, the petitioners are claiming the property which, they contend, rightfully
belongs to them.
Indeed, the same issue was resolved by this Court in Heirs of Marciano Nagano
v. Court of Appeals. 29 In that case, the trial court dismissed a Complaint seeking
the declaration of nullity of an Original Certificate of Title issued pursuant to a free
patent, reasoning that the action should have been instituted by the solicitor
general. In reversing the trial court, the Supreme Court held:
"It is settled that a Free Patent issued over private land is null and void, and
produces no legal effect whatsoever. Quod nullum est, nullum producit effectum.
Moreover, private respondents' claim of open, peaceful, continuous and adverse
possession of the 2,250 square meter portion since 1920, and its illegal inclusion
in the Free Patent of petitioners and in their original certificate of title, gave
private respondents a cause of action for quieting of title which is
imprescriptible."
In any event, the Office of the Solicitor General was afforded an opportunity to
express its position in these proceedings. But it manifested that it would not file
a memorandum, because "this case involves purely private interests." 30
The foregoing considered, we sustain the contention of petitioners that the free
patent granted to the Santos spouses is void. It is apparent that they are claiming
ownership of the disputed property on the basis of their possession thereof in the
concept of owners — openly, peacefully, publicly, continuously and adversely
since 1916. Because they and their predecessors-in-interest have occupied,
possessed and cultivated it as owners for more than thirty years, 31 only one
conclusion can be drawn — it has become private land and is therefore beyond
the authority of the director of lands. LibLex
Epilogue
We recognize that both the petitioners and the Santos spouses fell victim to the
dubious transaction between Spouses Hilario and Andrea Robles and the Rural
Bank of Cardona, Inc. However, justice and equity mandate that we declare
Petitioners Lucio, Emerita, Aludia and Emilio Robles to have the requisite title
essential to their suit for quieting of title. Considering the circumstances peculiar
to this complicated problem, the Court finds this conclusion the logical and just
solution.
The claim that petitioners were guilty of laches in not asserting their rights as
owners of the property should be viewed in the light of the fact that they thought
their brother was paying the requisite taxes for them, and more important, the
fact that they continued cultivating it and harvesting and gaining from its fruits.
From another viewpoint, it can even be said that it was the Rural Bank of Cardona,
Inc., which was guilty of laches because, granting that it had acquired the subject
property legally, it failed to enforce its rights as owner. It was oblivious to the
petitioners' continued occupation, cultivation and possession thereof.
Considering that they had possessed the property in good faith for more than ten
years, it can even be argued that they thus regained it by acquisitive prescription.
In any case, laches is a remedy in equity, and considering the circumstances in this
case, the petitioners cannot be held guilty of it.
In sum, the real estate mortgage contract covering the disputed property — a
contract executed between Spouses Hilario and Andrea on the one hand and the
Rural Bank of Cardona, Inc., on the other — is hereby declared null and void
insofar as it prejudiced the shares of Petitioners Lucio, Emerita, Aludia and Emilio
Robles; it is valid as to Hilario Robles' share therein. Consequently, the sale of the
subject property to the Santos spouses is valid insofar as it pertained to his share
only. Likewise declared null and void is Free Patent No. IV-1-010021 issued by the
Bureau of Lands covering the subject property. LLphil
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Except as modified by the last paragraph of this Decision, the trial
court's Decision is REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. L-38745. August 6, 1975.]
LUCIA TAN, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ARADOR VALDEHUEZA and REDICULO
VALDEHUEZA, defendants-appellants.
SYNOPSIS
Plaintiff filed an action for declaration of ownership and recovery of possession of
a parcel of land and for consolidation of ownership of two portions of another
land. The subject matter of the first cause of action was acquired by plaintiff in a
public auction. The Deed of Absolute Sale was executed in her favor after
defendant Arador Valdehueza had failed to redeem the same within the one-year
period prescribed by law. By reason thereof, plaintiff applied for an injunction
(Civil Case 2002) to prevent defendant from entering the premises which,
injunction, however, was dismissed, for failure to prosecute.
With respect to the second cause of action, defendants executed two Pacto de
Retro Deeds of Sale (one registered and one unregistered) in favor of plaintiff, but
the defendant did not vacate the premises and continued paying the taxes
thereon.
The trial court declared the plaintiff as absolute owner on the land and ordered
the dispossession of defendant under the first cause of action; and under the
second cause of action, considered the registered Pacto De Retro Deed of Sale as
a mortgage and the unregistered deed "as a simple loan, secured by the property
sold under pacto de retro thus, ordering defendant to pay with interest.
Defendant appealed on the ground that there was resjudicata in the first cause of
action, and that in the second cause of action the transaction were simple loan.
The Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not apply in the first cause of
action since Civil Case 2002 was for injunction involving only possession while the
instant case seeks "to remove any doubt or cloud of plaintiff's ownership with
prayer for declaration of ownership and recovery of possession;" and that under
the second cause of action, the contracts are presumed to be equitable mortgages
under Art 1602 of the New Civil Code, whether registered or not, there being no
third parties involve. However, imposition of interest was held to be without legal
basis for not having been expressly stipulated in writing.
Thus modified decision affirmed in all other respects.
DECISION
CASTRO, J p:
17
This appeal was certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals as involving
questions purely of law.
The decision a quo was rendered by the Court of First Instance of Misamis
Occidental (Branch I) in an action instituted by the plaintiff-appellee Lucia Tan
against the defendants-appellants Arador Valdehueza and Rediculo Valdehueza
(docketed as civil case 2574) for (a) declaration of ownership and recovery of
possession of the parcel of land described in the first cause of action of the
complaint, and (b) consolidation of ownership of two portions of another parcel
of (unregistered) land described in the second cause of action of the complaint,
purportedly sold to the plaintiff in two separate deeds ofpacto de retro.
After the issues were joined, the parties submitted the following stipulation of
facts:
"1. That parties admit the legal capacity of plaintiff to sue; that defendants herein,
Arador, Rediculo, Pacita, Concepcion and Rosario, all surnamed Valdehueza, are
brothers and sisters; that the answer filed by Arador and Rediculo stand as the
answer of Pacita, Concepcion and Rosario.
"2. That the parties admit the identity of the land in the first cause of action.
"3. That the parcel of land described in the first cause of action was the subject
matter of the public auction sale held on May 6, 1955 at the Capitol Building in
Oroquieta, Misamis Occidental, wherein the plaintiff was the highest bidder and
as such a Certificate of Sale was executed by MR. VICENTE D. ROA who was then
the Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff in favor of LUCIA TAN the herein plaintiff. Due to
the failure of defendant Arador Valdehueza to redeem the said land within the
period of one year as being provided by law, MR. VICENTE D. ROA who was then
the Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff executed an ABSOLUTE DEED OF SALE in favor of
the plaintiff LUCIA TAN.
"A copy of the NOTICE OF SHERIFF'S SALE is hereby marked as 'Annex A', the
CERTIFICATE OF SALE is marked as 'Annex B' and the ABSOLUTE DEED OF SALE is
hereby marked as "Annex C" and all of which are made as integral Parts of this
stipulation of facts.
"4. That the party-plaintiff is the same plaintiff in Civil Case No. 2002; that the
parties defendants Arador, Rediculo and Pacita, all Valdehueza were the same
parties-defendants in the same said Civil Case No. 2002; the complaint in Civil
Case No. 2002 to be marked as Exhibit 1; the answer as Exhibit 2 and the order
dated May 22, 1963 as Exhibit 3, and said exhibits are made integral part of this
stipulation.
"5. That defendants ARADOR VALDEHUEZA and REDICULO VALDEHUEZA have
executed two documents of DEED OF PACTO DE RETRO SALE in favor of the
plaintiff herein, LUCIA TAN of two portions of a parcel of land which is described
in the second cause of action with the total amount of ONE THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED PESOS (P1,500.00), Philippine Currency, copies of said documents are
marked as "Annex D" and "Annex E", respectively and made as integral parts of
this stipulation of facts.
"6. That from the execution of the Deed of Sale with right to repurchase
mentioned in the second cause of action, defendants Arador Valdehueza and
Rediculo Valdehueza remained in the possession of the land; that land taxes to
the said land were paid by the same said defendants."
Civil case 2002 referred to in stipulation of fact no. 4 was a complaint for
injunction filed by Tan on July 24, 1957 against the Valdehuezas, to enjoin them
"from entering the abovedescribed parcel of land and gathering the nuts therein
. . ." This complaint and the counterclaim were subsequently dismissed for failure
of the parties "to seek for the immediate trial thereof, thus evincing lack of
interest on their part to proceed with the case." 1
The Deed of Pacto de Retro referred to in stipulation of fact no. 5 as "Annex D"
(dated August 5, 1955) was not registered in the Registry of Deeds, while the Deed
of Pacto de Retro referred to as "Annex E" (dated March 15, 1955) was registered.
On the basis of the stipulation of facts and the annexes, the trial court rendered
judgment as follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff:
"1. Declaring Lucia Tan the absolute owner of the property described in the first
cause of action of the amended complaint; and ordering the herein defendants
not to encroach and molest her in the exercise of her proprietary rights; and, from
which property they must be dispossessed;
"2. Ordering the defendants, Arador Valdehueza and Rediculo Valdehueza, jointly
and severally to pay to the plaintiff, Lucia Tan, on Annex 'E' the amount of P1,200,
with legal interest of 6% as of August 15, 1966, within 90 days to be deposited
with the Office of the Clerk of Court within 90 days from the date of service of this
decision, and that in default of such payment, the property shall be sold in
accordance with the Rules of Court for the release of the mortgage debt, plus
costs;
"3. And as regards the land covered by deed of pacto de retro annex 'D', the herein
defendants Arador Valdehueza and Rediculo Valdehueza are hereby ordered to
pay the plaintiff the amount of P300 with legal interest of 6% from August 15,
1966, the said land serving as guaranty of the said amount of payment;
"4. Sentencing the defendants Arador Valdehueza and Rediculo Valdehueza to
pay jointly and severally to the herein plaintiff Lucia Tan the amount of 1,000.00
as attorney's fees; and
"5. To pay the costs of the proceedings."
The Valdehuezas appealed, assigning the following errors:
"That the lower court erred in failing to adjudge on the first cause of action that
there exists res judicata; and
"That the lower court erred in making a finding on the second cause of action that
the transactions between the parties were simple loan, instead, it should be
declared as equitable mortgage."
We affirm in part and modify in part.
1 . Relying on Section 3 of Rule 17 of the Rules of Court which pertinently provides
that a dismissal for failure to prosecute "shall have the effect of an adjudication
upon the merits," the Valdehuezas submit that the dismissal of civil case 2002
operated, upon the principle of res judicata, as a bar to the first cause of action in
civil case 2574. We rule that this contention is untenable as the causes of action
in the two cases are not identical. Case 2002 was for injunction against the entry
into and the gathering of nuts from the land, while case 2574 seeks to "remove
any doubt or cloud of the plaintiff's ownership . . ." (Amended complaint, Rec. on
App., p. 27), with a prayer for declaration of ownership and recovery of
possession.
Applying the test of absence of inconsistency between prior and subsequent
judgments, 2 we hold that the failure of Tan, in case 2002, to secure an injunction
against the Valdehuezas to prevent them from entering the land and gathering
nuts is not inconsistent with her being adjudged, in case 2574, as owner of the
land with right to recover possession thereof. Case 2002 involved only the
possession of the land and the fruits thereof, while case 2574 involves ownership
of the land, with possession as a mere attribute of ownership. The judgment in
the first case could not and did not encompass the judgment in the second,
although the second judgment would encompass the first. Moreover, the new
Civil Code provides that suitors in actions to quiet title "need not be in possession
of said property." 3
2 . The trial court treated the registered deed of pacto de retro as an equitable
mortgage but considered the unregistered deed of pacto de retro "as a mere case
of simple loan, secured by the property thus sold under pacto de retro," on the
ground that no suit lies to foreclose an unregistered mortgage. It would appear
that the trial judge had not updated himself on law and jurisprudence; he cited,
in support of his ruling, article 1875 of the old Civil Code and decisions of this
Court circa 1910 and 1912.
Under article 1875 of the Civil Code of 1889, registration was a necessary requisite
for the validity of a mortgage even as between the parties, but under article 2125
of the new Civil Code (in effect since August 30, 1950), this is no longer so. 4
"If the instrument is not recorded, the mortgage is nonetheless binding between
the parties." (Article 2125, 2nd sentence)
The Valdehuezas having remained in possession of the land and the realty taxes
having been paid by them, the contracts which purported to be pacto de
retro transactions are presumed to be equitable mortgages, 5 whether registered
or not, there being no third parties involved.
3 . The Valdehuezas claim that their answer to the complaint of the plaintiff
affirmed that they remained in possession of the land and gave the proceeds of
the harvest to the plaintiff; it is thus argued that they would suffer double
prejudice if they are to pay legal interest on the amounts stated in the pacto de
retro contracts, as the lower court has directed, and that therefore the court
should have ordered evidence to be adduced on the harvest.
The record does not support this claim, Nowhere in the original and the amended
complaints is an allegation of delivery to the plaintiff of the harvest from the land
involved in the second cause of action. Hence, the defendants' answer had none
to affirm.
In submitting their stipulation of facts, the parties prayed "for its approval
and maybe made the basis of the decision of this Honorable Court." (emphasis
supplied) This, the court did. It cannot therefore he faulted for not receiving
evidence on who profited from the harvest.
4. The imposition of legal interest on the amounts subject of the equitable
mortgages, P1,200 and P300, respectively, is without legal basis, for, "No interest
shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing." (Article 1956, new
Civil Code) Furthermore, the plaintiff did not pray for such interest; her thesis was
a consolidation of ownership, which was properly rejected, the contracts being
equitable mortgages.
With the definitive resolution of the rights of the parties as discussed above, we
find it needless to pass upon the plaintiff's petition for receivership. Should the
circumstances so warrant, she may address the said petition to the court a quo.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo is hereby modified, as follows: (a) the
amounts of P1,200 and P300 mentioned in Annexes E and D shall bear interest at
six percent per annum from the finality of this decision; and (b) the parcel of land
covered by Annex D shall be treated in the same manner as that covered by Annex
E, should the defendants fail to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P300 within 90 days
from the finality of this decision. In all other respects the judgment is affirmed.
No costs.
[G.R. No. 102909. September 6, 1993.]
SPOUSES VICENTE and LOURDES PINGOL, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS and HEIRS OF FRANCISCO N. DONASCO, namely: MELINDA D. PELAYO,
MARIETTA D. SINGSON, MYRNA D. CUEVAS, NATIVIDAD D. PELAYO, YOLANDA D.
CACERES and MARY DONASCO, respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J p:
An action denominated as one for specific performance and damages was brought
by the private respondents against the petitioners before the Regional Trial Court
18
(RTC) of Caloocan City which, after due trial, rendered a decision in favor of the
petitioners. On appeal, the respondent Court reversed the trial court's decision.
It is from this judgment that the petitioners have appealed to this Court by way of
a petition for review on certiorari.
The material facts of this case are simple and undisputed.
Petitioner Vicente Pingol is the owner of Lot No. 3223 of the Cadastral Survey of
Caloocan, with an area of 549 square meters, located at Bagong Barrio, Caloocan
City and more particularly described in Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 7435
of the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City. On 17 February 1969, he executed a
"DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE OF ONE-HALF (1/2) [OF] AN UNDIVIDED PORTION OF A
PARCEL OF LAND" in favor of Francisco N. Donasco which was acknowledged
before a notary public. The parcel of land referred to therein is Lot No. 3223 and
the pertinent portions of the document read as follows:
"That for and in consideration of the sum of TWENTY THOUSAND AND FIVE
HUNDRED THIRTY (P20,530.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, the VENDOR hereby
these presents SELL, CONVEY AND CONVEY by way of Absolute Sale the one-half
(1/2) portion, equivalent to Two Hundred Seventy Four and point Fifty (274.50)
square meters, to the VENDEE, the above-mentioned property, his heirs, assigns
and successors-in-interest;
That the VENDOR hereby confesses and acknowledges the receipt of TWO
THOUSAND (P2,000.00) PESOS from VENDEE as advanced (sic) and partial
payment to the above-cited consideration of the Sale herein mentioned, leaving
therefor a balance of Eighteen Thousand and Five Hundred Thirty (P18,530) Pesos
to be paid in several equal installments within a period of six (6) years, beginning
January, 1970;
That after computing the above-mentioned equal installments, the VENDEE
agrees and undertakes to pay unto the VENDOR a monthly amount equivalent to
Two Hundred Fifty Seven (sic) and Thirty Six Centavos (P257.36) within a period
of Seventy One (71) months and on the Seven Two [sic] (72) month, the amount
of (P257.44) as the last and final installment thereof;
That the VENDEE agrees that in case of default in the payment of the installments
due the same shall earn a legal rate of interest, and to which the VENDOR likewise
agrees;
That the VENDEE undertakes to pay unto the VENDOR the herein monthly
installment within the first five (5) days of each month and the same shall be made
available and to be paid at the residence of the VENDOR, payment to be made
either directly to the VENDOR, his wife or his authorized representative or factor;
That in case of partition of the above-described property between herein VENDOR
and VENDEE, the same shall be divided into two (2) equal parts, the VENDOR gets
the corner facing J. De Jesus and Malolos Avenue and the VENDEE shall get the
portion with fifteen (15) meters frontage facing J. De Jesus Street only." 1
Pursuant to the contract, Donasco paid P2,000.00 to Pingol. The one-half portion,
designated as Lot No. 3223-A, was then segregated from the mother lot, and the
parties prepared a subdivision plan (Exhibit "C") which was approved by the Land
Registration Commission. 2
Francisco Donasco immediately took possession of the subject lot and
constructed a house thereon. In January 1970, he started paying the monthly
installments but was able to pay only up to 1972.
On 13 July 1984, Francisco Donasco died. At the time of his demise, he had paid
P8,369.00, plus the P2,000.00 advance payment, leaving a balance of P10,161.00
on the contract price. 3 Lot No. 3223-A remained in the possession of Donasco's
heirs.
On 19 October 1988, the heirs of Francisco Donasco filed an action for "Specific
Performance and Damages, with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction" against
the spouses Vicente and Lourdes Pingol (petitioners herein) before the RTC of
Caloocan City. The action was docketed as Civil Case No. 13572 and raffled off to
Branch 125 of the said court.
In their complaint, 4 the plaintiffs (private respondents herein) averred that after
the death of their father, they offered to pay the balance of P10,161.00 plus the
stipulated legal rate of interest thereon to Vicente Pingol but the latter rebuffed
their offer and has "been demanding for a bigger and unreasonable amount, in
complete variance to what is lawfully due and payable." They stated that they had
"exerted earnest efforts to forge or reach an amicable and peaceful settlement
with the defendants" for the payment of the property in question but to no avail.
They further alleged that the defendants were committing "acts of forcible entry
and encroachment" upon their land and asked that a writ of preliminary
injunction be issued to restrain the defendants from the acts complained of.
Plaintiffs then prayed that the defendants be ordered, inter alia:
"a. . . . to accept the amount of P10,161.00, more or less, plus the stipulated legal
rate of interest due thereon, as full and complete payment of the balance for the
agreed price/consideration on the one-half (1/2) portion of the parcel of land . . .;
[and]
b. . . . to execute the final deed of sale on the one-half (1/2) portion of the lot . . .
in accordance with the partition reflected in the survey and subdivision plan, . .
." 5
In their answer with counterclaim, 6 defendants admitted the execution of the
aforementioned deed of sale, the segregation of the portion sold and the
preparation and approval of the subdivision plan, but set up the following special
and affirmative defenses: (1) the plaintiffs' cause of action had already prescribed;
(2) the deed of sale embodied a conditional contract of sale "as the consideration
is to be paid on installment basis within a period of six years beginning January,
1970"; (3) the subdivision plan was prepared on the assumption that Francisco
Donasco would be able to comply with his obligation; (4) when Francisco died, he
had not fully paid the total consideration agreed upon; and (5) considering the
breach by Francisco of his contractual obligation way back in 1976, the sale was
deemed to have been cancelled and the continuous occupancy of Francisco after
1976 and by his heirs thereafter was by mere tolerance of Vicente Pingol. They
then asked that the plaintiffs be ordered to vacate the premises and to pay them
attorney's fees and a reasonable compensation for the use of the land.
In their Reply and Answer to Counterclaim, 7 the plaintiffs pointed out that there
is no provision in the deed of sale for its cancellation in case of default in the
payment of the monthly installments and invoked Article 1592 of the New Civil
Code. They specifically denied the allegations in the counterclaim.
The issues having been joined, the case was then tried on the merits.
On 22 January 1990, the trial court rendered a decision 8 dismissing the complaint
and ordering the plaintiffs to pay the defendants P350.00 as reasonable monthly
rental for the use of the premises from the filing of the complaint, P10,000.00 by
way of attorney's fees, and the costs of the suit. It held that: (1) the deed of
absolute sale in question, marked and offered in evidence as Exhibit "A," is
a contract to sell, not a contract of sale, since Vicente Pingol had no intention to
part with the ownership of the lot unless the full amount of the agreed price had
been paid; (2) the contract was deemed to have been cancelled from the moment
the late father of the plaintiffs defaulted in the payment of the monthly
installments; (3) title and ownership over the lot did not pass to Francisco Donasco
and his heirs since the contract to sell was never consummated; and (5)
assuming, arguendo, that the plaintiffs have a cause of action for specific
performance, such action had already prescribed since the complaint was filed
only on 19 October 1988 or more than ten years from the time that they could
have lawfully demanded performance. 9
Plaintiffs elevated the case to the Court of Appeals where the appeal was
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 25967. On 12 November 1991, the said court
rendered a decision 10 reversing the appealed decision and decreeing as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
another one is rendered:
(1) Ordering appellee-vendor Vicente Pingol to accept the sum of P10,161.00, plus
the legal interest due thereon from the date of institution of this action on
October 19, 1988;
(2) Upholding the validity of the 'DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE OF ONE-HALF (1/2) (of)
AN UNDIVIDED PORTION OF A PARCEL OF LAND' (Exh. A), and by virtue and on the
strength of which declaring the 'Heirs of the Deceased Francisco N. Domingo' as
the owners of the 274.50 sq. m. land, denominated as Lot 3223-A, (LRC) Psd-
146255 under the technical description (exh. D) and reflected in the Plan of
Subdivision Survey which was approved By Commissioner of Land Registration on
August 13, 1971 (exh. C), representing one-half portion [of] lot 3223, situated at
the corner of Malolos Avenue and G. de Jesus St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City,
and covered by TCT No. 7435 of the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City (exh. B);
and
(3) Ordering the defendants-appellees to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED." 11
The Court of Appeals ruled that the deed of sale in question reveals the clear
intention of Vicente Pingol to part with the ownership of the one-half portion of
the land by way of an absolute sale; that the failure to fully pay the agreed price
was not a ground for the cancellation of the sale; and that the plaintiffs' action is
imprescriptible since it is akin to an action to quiet title to property in one's
possession. 12
Dissatisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeals, the defendants, hereinafter
referred to as the petitioners, filed this petition for certiorari on 9 January 1992.
Plaintiffs, hereinafter referred to as the private respondents, filed their comment
thereto on 10 September 1992 to which the petitioners filed a reply on 11
November 1992. We gave due course to the petition and required the parties to
submit their respective memoranda, 13 which they subsequently complied with.
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred:
"I
IN HOLDING THAT THE DOCUMENT (EXHIBIT "A") DENOMINATED AS 'ABSOLUTE
DEED OF SALE OF ONE-HALF (1/2) OF AN UNDIVIDED PORTION OF A PARCEL OF
LAND' IS AN ABSOLUTE DEED OF SALE SUFFICIENT TO CONFER OWNERSHIP ON
THE VENDEE AND HIS SUCCESSORS-IN-INTEREST, DESPITE THE FACT THAT BY ITS
TERMS AND CONDITIONS, LIKE THE PRICE BEING PAYABLE ON INSTALLMENTS
WITHIN A FIXED PERIOD, THE SAME IS A CONDITIONAL DEED OF SALE.
II
IN HOLDING THAT NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE VENDEE FAILED TO
COMPLY WITH THE TERMS OF THE CONTRACT (EXHIBIT "A") SPECIFICALLY TO
COMPLETE THE PAYMENT OF THE CONSIDERATION ON THE DATE STIPULATED IN
THE CONTRACT WHICH WAS SUPPOSED TO BE INJANUARY 1976, COMPLETE
PAYMENT THEREOF CAN STILL BE ENFORCED IN AN ACTION INSTITUTED BY THE
HEIRS OF THE VENDEE FILED ON OCTOBER 19, 1988 OR A PERIOD OF MORE THAN
TWELVE (12) YEARS FROM THE TIME COMPLETE PAYMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN
MADE;
III
IN HOLDING THAT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' ACTION IS ONE WHICH IS AN
OFFER TO COMPLETE THE PAYMENT LEFT UNPAID BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS'
FATHER WHICH DOES NOT PRESCRIBE;
IV
19
IN HOLDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' CAUSE OF ACTION HAS NOT
PRESCRIBED." 14
The decisive issue in this case is whether Exhibit "A" embodies a contract of sale
or a contract to sell. The distinction between the two is important for in a contract
of sale, the title passes to the vendee upon the delivery of the thing sold, whereas
in a contract to sell, by agreement, ownership is reserved in the vendor and is not
to pass until the full payment of the price. In a contract of sale, the vendor has
lost and cannot recover ownership until and unless the contract is resolved or
rescinded, whereas in a contract to sell, title is retained by the vendor until the
full payment of the price, such payment being a positive suspensive condition,
failure of which is not a breach but an event that prevented the obligation of the
vendor to convey title from becoming effective. 15
A perusal of Exhibit "A" leads to no other conclusion than that it embodies
a contract of sale. The plain and clear tenor of the "DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE OF
ONE-HALF (1/2) [OF] AN UNDIVIDED PORTION OF A PARCEL OF LAND" is that "the
VENDOR hereby . . . SELL, CONVEY AND CONVEY by way of Absolute Sale the one-
half (1/2) portion . . . to the VENDEE . . . his heirs, assigns and successors-in-
interest." That the vendor, petitioner Vicente Pingol, had that clear intention was
further evidenced by his failure to reserve his title thereto until the full payment
of the price.
In Dignos vs. Court of Appeals, 16 we held that a deed of sale is absolute in nature
although denominated as a "Deed of Conditional Sale" where there is no
stipulation in the deed that title to the property sold is reserved in the seller until
the full payment of the price, nor is there a stipulation giving the vendor the right
to unilaterally resolve the contract the moment the buyer fails to pay within a
fixed period. Exhibit "A" contains neither stipulation. What is merely stated
therein is that "the VENDEE agrees that in case of default in the payment of the
installments due the same shall earn a legal rate of interest, and to which the
VENDOR likewise agrees."
Furthermore, as found by the Court of Appeals, the acts of the parties,
contemporaneous and subsequent to the contract, clearly show that an absolute
deed of sale was intended by the parties and not a contract to sell:
"[P]ursuant to the deed, the vendor delivered actual and constructive possession
of the property to the vendee, who occupied and took such possession,
constructed a building thereon, had the property surveyed and subdivided and a
plan of the property was prepared and submitted to the Land Registration
Commission which approved it preparatory to segregating the same and
obtaining the corresponding TCT in his name. Since the sale, appellee
continuously possessed and occupied the property as owner up to his death on
July 13, 1984 and his heirs, after his death, continued the occupancy and
possession of the property up to the present. Those contemporaneous and
subsequent events are demonstrative acts that the vendor since the sale
recognized the vendee as the absolute owner of the property sold. All those
attributes of ownership are admitted by defendants in their answer, specifically
in paragraphs 7 and 9 of their special and affirmative defenses." 17
The contract here being one of absolute sale, the ownership of the subject lot was
transferred to the buyer upon the actual and constructive delivery thereof. The
constructive delivery of the subject lot was made upon the execution of the deed
of sale 18 while the actual delivery was effected when the private respondents
took possession of and constructed a house on Lot No. 3223-A.
The delivery of the object of the contract divested the vendor of the ownership
over the same and he cannot recover the title unless the contract is resolved or
rescinded pursuant to Article 1592 of the New Civil Code which provides that:
"In the sale of immovable property, even though it may have been stipulated that
upon failure to pay the price at the time agreed upon the rescission of the contract
shall of right take place, the vendee may pay, even after the expiration of the
period, as long as no demand for rescission of the contract has been made upon
him either judicially or by a notarial act. After the demand, the court may not
grant him a new term."
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals did not find that a notarial or judicial
rescission of the contract had been made. Although Vicente Pingol asserts that he
had declared to Francisco Donasco that he was cancelling the contract, he did not
prove that his demand for rescission was made either judicially or by a notarial
act.
Petitioners fault the respondent Court for holding that the action of the
petitioners is not barred by the statute of limitations. They argue that the private
respondents' action, being based upon a written contract, has prescribed since it
was brought only in 1988 or more than ten years from the time when the latter
could have lawfully demanded performance. 19
We disagree.
Although the private respondents' complaint before the trial court was
denominated as one for specific performance, it is in effect an action to quiet title.
In this regard, the following excerpt from Bucton vs. Gabar 20 is apropos:
"The real and ultimate basis of petitioners' action is their ownership of one-half
of the lot coupled with their possession thereof, which entitles them to a
conveyance of the property. In Sapto, et al. v. Fabiana [103 Phil. 683, 686-87
(1958)], this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, explained that under
the circumstances no enforcement of the contract is needed, since the delivery of
possession of the land sold had consummated the sale and transferred title to the
purchaser, and that, actually, the action for conveyance is one to quiet title, i.e.,
to remove the cloud upon the appellee's ownership by the refusal of the
appellants to recognize the sale made by their predecessors."
That a cloud has been cast on the title of the private respondents is indubitable.
Despite the fact that the title had been transferred to them by the execution of
the deed of sale and the delivery of the object of the contract, the petitioners
adamantly refused to accept the tender of payment by the private respondents
and steadfastly insisted that their obligation to transfer title had been rendered
ineffective.
A vendee in an oral contract to convey land who had made part payment thereof,
entered upon the land and had made valuable improvements thereon, is entitled
to bring suit to clear his title against the vendor who had refused to transfer the
title to him. It is not necessary that the vendee has an absolute title, an equitable
title being sufficient to clothe him with personality to bring an action to quiet
title. 21
Prescription thus cannot be invoked against the private respondents for it is
aphoristic that an action to quiet title to property in one's possession is
imprescriptible. 22 The rationale for this rule has been aptly stated thus:
"The owner of real property who is in possession thereof may wait until his
possession is invaded or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his
right. A person claiming title to real property, but not in possession thereof, must
act affirmatively and within the time provided by the statute. Possession is a
continuing right as is the right to defend such possession. So it has been
determined that an owner of real property in possession has a continuing right to
invoke a court of equity to remove a cloud that is a continuing menace to his title.
Such a menace is compared to a continuing nuisance or trespass which is treated
as successive nuisances or trespasses, not barred by statute until continued
without interruption for a length of time sufficient to affect a change of title as a
matter of law." 23
Private respondents shall, however, be liable to pay the legal rate of interest on
the unpaid balance of the purchase price from the date of default or on 6 January
1976, when the entire balance should have been paid, pursuant to the provision
in the deed of sale.
WHEREFORE, except as above modified, the Decision appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED. As modified, the interest on the unpaid balance of P10,161.00, at the
legal rate, shall be computed from 6 January 1976. Upon the payment by the
private respondents to the petitioners of the said amount and the interest
thereon, the latter are ordered to deliver Transfer Certificate of Title No. 7435 to
the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City who shall cancel the same and issue two
new transfer certificates of title in lieu thereof, one of which shall be in the name
of the herein private respondents covering Lot No. 3223-A and the other in the
name of the petitioners covering the remainder of the lot.

SO ORDERED.

27 July 2016 class

Property

20