Shii Preaching in West Africa The Dakar Sermons of Lebanese

British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies
ISSN: 1353-0194 (Print) 1469-3542 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cbjm20
Shiʿi preaching in West Africa: the Dakar sermons

of Lebanese Shaykh al-Zayn
Mara A. Leichtman & Abdullah Alrebh
To cite this article: Mara A. Leichtman & Abdullah Alrebh (2017): Shiʿi preaching in West Africa:
the Dakar sermons of Lebanese Shaykh al-Zayn, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, DOI:
10.1080/13530194.2017.1387418
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2017.1387418
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Download by: [Gothenburg University Library] Date: 29 October 2017, At: 15:47
British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 2017
https://doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2017.1387418
Shiʿi preaching in West Africa: the Dakar sermons of Lebanese

Shaykh al-Zayn
Mara A. Leichtmana and Abdullah Alrebhb
a
Department of Anthropology, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI, USA; bDepartment of Sociology,
Grand Valley State University, Allendale, MI, USA
Downloaded by [Gothenburg University Library] at 15:47 29 October 2017
ABSTRACT
While there has been much emphasis on new types of media for the
dissemination of Islamic ideas, this article focuses on the conventional
Friday khuṭba. Lebanese Shaykh al-Zayn was trained in Najaf, Iraq and
was sent by Musa al-Sadr to serve the Lebanese diasporic business
community in Senegal. Estranged from the religious politics of the
homeland and traditional centres of Shiʿi learning, Lebanese in
Senegal depended on Shaykh al-Zayn to teach them about Shiʿi Islam.
The Islamic Social Institute he built was the first Shiʿi institution in all of
West Africa. Shaykh al-Zayn quickly gained a following of both Sunni
and Shiʿi Muslims, Arabs as well as Africans. This article focuses on the
shaykh’s discursive strategies for addressing his unique following. At
times his Friday sermons stressed the particularities of Shiʿi Islamic
practice, but more often he highlighted a universal Islam in an effort
to appeal to Senegal’s Sunni Muslim majority. In analysing khutbas
given in 2003 during the beginning of the U.S.-led war in Iraq, we pay
particular attention to the Lebanese shaykh’s engagement with global
politics and how his messages were translated for a community in
West Africa detached from the Middle East.
Throughout Islamic history, sermons (khuṭbas) have been central to religious identification,
social reformation and political mobilization. In the modern era they were used by nationalist
movements during anti-colonial struggles, by postcolonial states for legitimating modern-
ization and development and by contemporary Islamic opposition movements to organize
political efforts.1 A ‘re-citation’ of the Qurʾan through which Islamic revelations are extended
and renewed, the Friday sermon’s task is to elicit and orient the emotions of its audience,
moving them towards pious comportment and moral action.2 A preacher (khaṭīb) must shake
his listeners from their states of lassitude, stillness and fatigue; edify them in knowledge of
Islamic doctrine, teachings and beliefs; and weave Qurʾanic narratives into their lived
CONTACT Mara A. Leichtman maral@msu.edu

1
See Mamoun Fandy, Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Dissent (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999); Patrick D. Gaffney, The
Prophet’s Pulpit: Islamic Preaching in Contemporary Egypt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994); Charles Hirschkind,
The Ethical Soundscape: Cassette Sermons and Islamic Counterpublics (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006).
2
Abdulkader Tayob, Islam in South Africa: Mosques, Imams, and Sermons (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1999), p. 2.
© 2017 British Society for Middle Eastern Studies
2 M. A. LEICHTMAN AND A. ALREBH
experiences, highlighting contemporary solutions to problems.3 Considered ‘culture brokers’

by Richard Antoun, preachers facilitate local religious customs while promoting a greater
degree of conformity towards Islamic practice, which is articulated alongside community
needs.4 As Abdulkader Tayob has highlighted, Friday sermons cannot be separated from the
leaders who produce them or from the mosques within which they are produced, both of
which are products and creators of religious discourse that is grounded in particular local
histories.5
This article examines the Friday prayer sermons of Lebanese Shaykh ʿAbdul Munʿam
al-Zayn, who established the Islamic Social Institute in Dakar in 1978. As the founder of the
first Shiʿi institution in predominantly Sunni Muslim Senegal, which includes a centrally
located mosque in Dakar, Shaykh al-Zayn quickly gained a following of both Sunni and Shiʿi
Muslims, Arabs as well as Africans. Shiʿi clerics in Africa have not received much scholarly
attention. Present-day ʿulamaʾ in Senegal have similarly been understudied, although his-
torians have examined the writings and influence of past West African Sufi religious figures.6
Building on Mara Leichtman’s previous scholarship on Senegal’s Lebanese community, this
article offers a detailed analysis of the sermons of one contemporary expatriate Shiʿi cleric
in a West African context.7 In so doing it pushes scholarship on Shiʿi transnationalism beyond
a focus within the Middle East to investigate connections between the Middle East and
Africa.8
In particular, we examine Shaykh al-Zayn’s Qurʾanic exegesis in relation to contemporary
politics during the beginning of the U.S.-led war in Iraq. Mara Leichtman happened to be in
Senegal during the build-up to and beginning of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq launched by
President George W. Bush on 19 March 2003, a significant event that affected Shiʿa (among
other groups) around the world, arguably leading to a heightening of sectarian Sunni–Shiʿi
tensions globally. We analyse 15 khutbas given by al-Zayn from 28 March 2003 to 2 January
2004, and recorded, with his permission, by Leichtman from the loudspeaker of the women’s
3
Charles Hirschkind, ‘The Ethics of Listening: Cassette-Sermon Audition in Contemporary Egypt’, American Ethnologist, 28(3)
(2001), pp. 623–649, here pp. 630–631.
4
Richard T. Antoun, Muslim Preacher in the Modern World: A Jordanian Case Study in Comparative Perspective (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989).
5
Tayob, Islam in South Africa.
6
For example, on Amadou Bamba see Cheikh Anta Babou, Fighting the Greater Jihad: Amadu Bamba and the Founding
of the Muridiyya of Senegal, 1853–1913 (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2007); John Glover, Sufism and Jihad in Modern
Senegal: The Murid Order (Rochester, N.Y.: University of Rochester Press, 2007); Cheikh Guèye, Touba: La capitale des
Mourides (Paris: Karthala, 2002). On Ibrahim Niasse see Rüdiger Seesemann, The Divine Flood: Ibrahim Niasse and the
Roots of a Twentieth-Century Sufi Revival (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); Zachary Valentine Wright, Living
Knowledge in West African Islam: The Sufi Community of Ibrahim Niasse (Leiden: Brill, 2015). On al-Hajj Umar Tall see
David Robinson, The Holy War of Umar Tal: The Western Sudan in the Mid-Nineteenth Century (Oxford: Clarendon, 1985);
John Ralph Willis, In the Path of Allah: The Passion of al-Hajj ‘Umar (New York: Frank Cass, 1989).
7
Mara Leichtman has been conducting fieldwork in Senegal since 2000 with regular return visits to the country and meetings
with Shaykh al-Zayn. Abdullah Alrebh has never been to Senegal, but his experience with Shiʿi sermons in Saudi Arabia
and in the Shiʿi diaspora in Michigan provides a fresh comparative perspective to this analysis. He undertook the translations
of al-Zayn’s sermons and their contextualization within the wider Shiʿi preaching paradigm here.
8
On Shiʿi transnationalism see H. E. Chehabi (ed.), Distant Relations: Iran and Lebanon in the Last 500 Years (London: Centre
for Lebanese Studies and I.B. Tauris, 2006); Laurence Louër, Transnational Shia Politics: Religious and Political Networks
in the Gulf (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008); Sabrina Mervin (ed.), Les mondes chiites et l’Iran (Paris: Éditions
Karthala et Institut français du Proche Orient, 2007); Paulo G. Pinto, ‘Pilgrimage, Commodities, and Religious Objectification:
The Making of Transnational Shiism between Iran and Syria’, Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle
East, 27(1) (2007), pp. 109–125; Roschanack Shaery-Eisenlohr, Shiʿite Lebanon: Transnational Religion and the Making
of National Identities (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008).
BRITISH JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES 3
section of his mosque, where she attended Friday prayer.9 We focus on how the shaykh
selectively situated himself in—or removed himself from—specific global debates regarding
‘the Middle East’ and ‘Africa’.10 We explore in particular the shaykh’s discursive strategies for
addressing his Lebanese diasporic following in West Africa.11 At times he stressed the par-
ticularities of Shiʿi practice, but he also strategically highlighted a more universal Islam in an
effort to minimize Sunni–Shiʿi differences. Al-Zayn thus chose to be a non-confrontational
public Muslim leader. This case study of how a peripheral immigrant Shiʿi shaykh in a Sunni
majoritarian West African country adapted his discourse to address a mixed audience pro-
vides hope that coexistence is possible despite the increase in sectarianism in the Middle
East and globally.
Interestingly, Shaykh al-Zayn did not employ the technology of mass media, trusting that
the khutbas given in his mosque and not recorded for cassette distribution remained influ-
ential and attracted a satisfactory audience.12 Al-Zayn, in fact, has never used an e-mail
account for communication, preferring instead telephone and fax.13 This article thus uses
the framework of an older literature, Antoun’s classic account of a Muslim preacher in Jordan.
We follow only the first two perspectives outlined by Antoun, that of the text (sermon) and
of the linker and interpreter (preacher).14 Limiting the scope of this article enables us to pay
particular attention to al-Zayn’s engagement with global politics and how his messages were
translated for a community in West Africa detached from the Middle East. Many second-,
third- and now fourth-generation Lebanese in Senegal have never visited Lebanon. Estranged
from the religious politics of the homeland and traditional centres of Shiʿi learning, Lebanese
in Senegal depended on al-Zayn to teach them about Shiʿi Islam. Indeed, in 2003, when the
sermons were recorded, al-Zayn was the only Lebanese Shiʿi shaykh in Senegal.15
9
2003 sermons were from 28 March, 4 April, 11 April, 18 April, 13 June, 20 June, 27 June, 31 October, 7 November, 14 November,
21 November, 28 November, 5 December and 12 December; this selection also includes a sermon from 2 January 2004.
The dates reflect when al-Zayn was in town (he travelled frequently to Lebanon and France, among other locations) and
also when Mara Leichtman was in Dakar and able to record his sermons. Leichtman did not attend Friday prayer when she
knew Shaykh al-Zayn would be absent, replaced by either a young shaykh from Lebanon who spent several years in Senegal
or the Lebanese director of the Arabic Language Institute.
10
On exegesis see Michael M. J. Fischer and Mehdi Abedi, Debating Muslims: Cultural Dialogues in Postmodernity and
Tradition (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990).
11
Shaykh al-Zayn has also been influential among Senegalese Muslims. These relations, while also important in understanding
the context of his sermons, fall outside the scope of this article. On Shaykh al-Zayn’s influence among Senegalese Shiʿa see
Mara A. Leichtman, Shiʿi Cosmopolitanisms in Africa: Lebanese Migration and Religious Conversion in Senegal
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2015).
12
This article, therefore, does not focus on new types of media for the dissemination of Islamic ideas or the fragmentation of
authority this can bring. For recent scholarship on this topic see Dale F. Eickelman and Jon W. Anderson, New Media in the
Muslim World: The Emerging Public Sphere (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003[1999]); Birgit Meyer and Annelies
Moors (eds.), Religion, Media, and the Public Sphere (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006); Dorothea E. Schulz,
Muslims and New Media in West Africa: Pathways to God (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012). We would also
like to acknowledge that recent trends in the literature have focused on listeners of sermons, the social production of prayer
rituals, and the embodiment of Islamic ethics and moral selfhood. See e.g. Lara Deeb, An Enchanted Modern: Gender and
Public Piety in Shiʿi Lebanon (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006); Hirschkind, ‘The Ethics of Listening’; Saba
Mahmood, Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005);
Adeline Masquelier, Women and Islamic Revival in a West African Town (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009);
David Parkin and Stephen C. Headley (eds.), Islamic Prayer across the Indian Ocean: Inside and Outside the Mosque
(Richmond, UK: Curzon, 2000); Gregory M. Simon, ‘The Soul Freed of Cares? Islamic Prayer, Subjectivity, and the Contradictions
of Moral Selfhood in Minangkabau, Indonesia’, American Ethnologist, 36(2) (2009), pp. 258–275.
13
A young shaykh from Lebanon has recently arrived in Senegal to assist al-Zayn with his religious work. He launched the
first website for Dakar’s Islamic Social Institute in 2016 and has an active Facebook account that publicizes activities.
14
Antoun, Muslim Preacher, 5. Other perspectives include cognitive system, social structure, and folk or bottom-up.
15
Today al-Zayn is dedicating more of his time to research and writing and is more frequently absent from Senegal. There are
presently three Lebanese Shiʿi shaykhs and one Lebanese Sunni shaykh in Dakar, with an Iranian Shiʿi school and a variety
of Senegalese-led Shiʿi organizations. See Leichtman, Shiʿi Cosmopolitanisms.
Further, we examine Shaykh al-Zayn’s sermons within the distinct context of a Lebanese
Shiʿi Muslim diaspora living as a religious, racial and ethnic minority in a Sunni majoritarian
West African country. Very much aware of local, regional and international developments,
al-Zayn addressed considerations relevant to the transnational communities he served while
avoiding involvement in sensitive matters of Senegalese, or even wider African, politics.
Indeed, he rarely mentioned Senegal at all; his sermons were usually devoid of any sense of
the Dakar context and could have been given to any Muslim community in the Middle East
or elsewhere in the diaspora.16 He maintained instead a focus, in those of his sermons which
did address politics, on the Middle East and countries whose governments have no authority
over his freedom of speech. And while the sermons immediately following the beginning
of the U.S. invasion of Iraq were most reflective of Middle Eastern politics, at other times
during this period sermons addressed religious themes without linking them to current
events anywhere.
Given the importance of the invasion of Iraq for the region and for Shiʿa more broadly—
and that al-Zayn was trained in the Iraqi ḥawzas—we expected more of his sermons to
specifically address these issues. We were therefore surprised to discover that only 5 of the
15 sermons analysed during this period focused on contemporary politics, 3 of those on the
war in Iraq and 2 others on Palestine. We focus in particular on these sermons concerning
the war in Iraq or the occupation of Palestine, exploring the shaykh’s application of Qurʾanic
verses to contemporary politics and his use of conspiracy theories. Shaykh al-Zayn con-
demned the invasion of Iraq, while mostly avoiding any direct mention of Saddam Hussein
and without positioning himself alongside pervasive attitudes of leading Shiʿi ayatollahs
towards the invasion. We therefore analyse his more political sermons as a way of under-
standing how a Lebanese religious leader in the diaspora addressed through the forum of
the Friday khutba an event that would come to transform the Middle East—while avoiding
sensitive political topics that could ignite tensions with Senegal’s Sunni majority.
The Lebanese shaykh did not praise Senegalese political leaders in his 2003 khutbas, as
is common for praise singers in Senegal. But he did frequently refer in admiration to Shiʿi
leadership in Iraq or Lebanon or in critique to political leadership in Iraq, Israel or the West
(broadly speaking). He minimized direct criticism of Senegal’s ally, the United States, well
aware that Senegalese authorities regularly monitored his religious sermons. Yet a deploy-
ment of conspiracy theories enabled him to indirectly suggest that the United States and
its Western allies were responsible for certain crises in the Middle East. Finally, he continued
to raise awareness of the Palestinian cause (in particular during the beginning of the Iraq
war and the escalation of other humanitarian crises in the Middle East), thus strategically
aligning himself with a Middle Eastern human rights issue that has taken on a universalistic
cast in the wider Muslim world, and one furthermore with which Senegalese have historically,
actively and prominently engaged.
16
The shaykh’s only acknowledgement of being in a diaspora community in Africa in the sermons we review was one recom-
mendation that those in his congregation literate in Arabic or French read the book written by Ahmad Sekou Touré, former
President of Guinea, Islam for the People’s Benefit (Press Office, African Democratic Revolution, no. 100, Conakry, Republic
of Guinea, 1977). Lebanese avoid openly critiquing the Senegalese government and regularly express their loyalty to their
adopted country. See Mara A. Leichtman, ‘Migration, War, and the Making of a Transnational Lebanese Shiʿi Community in
Senegal’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 42(2) (2010), pp. 269–290. In contrast, on sermons preached in
migrant communities that do engage with local politics, see Tayob, Islam in South Africa; Pnina Werbner, ‘The Making of
Muslim Dissent: Hybridized Discourses, Lay Preachers, and Radical Rhetoric among British Pakistanis’, American Ethnologist,
23(1) (1996), pp. 102–122.
In the Shiʿi transnational context in West Africa, the need to coexist with—and even to
draw in—both Lebanese and Senegalese Sunni Muslims shaped not only the messages of
al-Zayn’s sermons, but also how he structured the inclusivity of his Shiʿi institute in Dakar.
Subtle changes made by the shaykh to distinctively Shiʿi ceremonial traditions seem sug-
gestive of this Sunni Muslim majority context, as we will describe. Further, Shaykh al-Zayn
preached his sermons in the most de-localized and de-particularized (Islamic) register pos-
sible, that of ‘classical’ Arabic (fuṣḥā).
Al-Zayn had, then, to perform a delicate balancing act. He explicitly worked to minimize
Sunni–Shiʿi difference in these ways against the backdrop of a combination of interwoven
factors: the trans-regional and cross-sectarian nature of his religious training; Senegal’s local
Sunni-majority context; the turbulent sectarian politics of the Middle East, in particular dur-
ing the U.S.-led war in Iraq; and the prestige of the shaykh’s predecessors and teachers,
including Musa al-Sadr (1928–1978) and Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr (1935–1980). We use the
medium of al-Zayn’s sermons to unravel these various factors and his responses to them. In
so doing we provide an account of one Shiʿi shaykh’s efforts to address a changing world at
a particular historical moment in a West African context quite different from the responses
by shaykhs in the Middle East or even in the Western diaspora.
A biography of Shaykh ʿAbdul Munʿam al-Zayn17

ʿAbdul Munʿam al-Zayn was born in 1945 to ‘Ali al-Zayn, a Shiʿi shaykh, and Fatima Karim, a
Sunni Muslim, in a small town in the south of Lebanon between Tyre and Bint Jbeil.18 When
he was two years old, his family moved to Qamatiyya, a Shiʿi Muslim village neighbouring a
Christian community. His father taught him Qurʾan before he began formal schooling at age
six. ʿAbdul Munʿam studied in two primary schools: one secular and one Maronite Catholic,
Madrasat al-Qamatiyya and Madrasat al-Nahda. After receiving his primary school degree in
1956 he moved to Beirut where he attended a branch of the prestigious Sunni Muslim al-Azhar
University of Cairo. He graduated in 1961 after being trained according to Hanafi tradition,
Sunni Islam’s most widespread jurisprudential school.19 With a cosmopolitan and interfaith
educational background from secular, Catholic and Sunni Muslim institutions, al-Zayn then
began his formal Shiʿi education.
Traditionally, a religious scholar should ideally be trained in one or more Shiʿi holy cities,
such as Najaf in Iraq, or Qom in Iran. Until the repression of Saddam Hussein’s rule, Lebanese
Shiʿa long saw Arabic-speaking Najaf as the most prestigious such destination.20 ʿAbdul
Munʿam’s father had studied in Lebanon, but he wished for his son the opportunity for a
more glorious education. In 1961 ʿAbdul Munʿam moved to Iraq where he attended the
ḥawza, Shiʿi seminary, in Najaf until 1969. There he studied Qurʾan and Hadith (prophetic
traditions), as well as fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence), theology, logic, philosophy, Qurʾanic com-
mentaries, and medicine.
17
Biography compiled from Mara Leichtman’s interviews with Shaykh al-Zayn. See Leichtman, Shiʿi Cosmopolitanisms,
chapter 3, for additional details.
18
Having consulted with Sabrina Mervin, we would say that ʿaving Munʿam al-Zayn does not appear to be directly related to
the influential al-Zayn family of Nabatiyya, Lebanon.
19
A Senegalese Sunni Muslim leader once remarked to Leichtman that it was precisely this training which allowed al-Zayn
to succeed in Senegal.
20
As Saddam Hussein severely oppressed Iraqi Shiʿa in the 1980s and 1990s, many aspiring scholars went to Iran instead, or
remained in Lebanon for their clerical studies. As the situation begins to improve for Shiʿa in Iraq following Husseinʿs fall,
more students are now choosing Najaf for their religious studies.
Shiʿi Islam follows a hierarchy of clerical leadership based on superiority of learning. The
mujtahids (those with the power of legal reasoning—ijtihād) became the religious elite with
the right to issue fatwas. A mujtahid may rise to the rank of a marjaʿ al-taqlīd, or reference
point for lay emulation.21 Ayatollah Sayyid Muhsin al-Hakim (1889–1970) was the leading
marjaʿ in Najaf when al-Zayn began his studies there. His successor, and the marjaʿ under
whom al-Zayn studied, along with other ʿulamaʾ, was Ayatollah Sayyid Abu al-Qasim al-Khuʾi
(1899–1992). When al-Khuʾi, Iraq’s foremost Shiʿi authority, died in 1992, his pupil Ayatollah
Sayyid ʿAli al-Sistani became Najaf’s leading marjaʿ, and Shaykh al-Zayn currently serves as
his wakīl (authorized representative). The shaykh is thus connected to an influential line of
clerical networks, associated with the traditional centres of religious authority in Iraq rather
than the competing revolutionary networks of Iran.
In 1969, Shaykh al-Zayn was sent at age 25 to lead the Lebanese Shiʿi community of Dakar.
Two years earlier, the inspirational Iranian-Lebanese cleric Sayyid Musa al-Sadr had travelled
throughout Africa to gain support from the Lebanese diaspora for his Movement of the
Deprived (Harakat al-Mahrumin), the core base of the Amal movement, which fought for
economic and political equality for Lebanon’s underprivileged Shiʿa.22 Representatives of the
Lebanese community in Dakar, the oldest Lebanese community in Africa, asked him to estab-
lish Africa’s first Shiʿi religious centre. Later these representatives travelled to Lebanon to
remind Musa al-Sadr of their need for a Shiʿi leader. In turn al-Sadr journeyed to Najaf to find
the right man for the job. There he met ʿAbdul Munʿam, whose family he had known previ-
ously, and convinced him to go to Dakar. Al-Zayn’s arrival in Senegal was thus inextricably
linked to the charismatic al-Sadr’s visit. Yet, to avoid being labelled as part of any political-Is-
lamic current, al-Zayn has been careful to assert his independence from Lebanon’s Higher
Islamic Shiʿa Council and the other political institutions to which al-Sadr was connected.
There are presently roughly 20,000–25,000 Lebanese in Senegal. While Senegal is a major-
ity Sunni Muslim country, 95 per cent of the Lebanese community today is Shiʿi, with a small
Christian population and an insignificant Sunni Muslim presence.23 Lebanese migrants first
arrived in West Africa as the result of a colonial fluke. As early as the 1880s, and especially
during the 1920s, emigrants left Lebanon for Marseilles, the transportation hub of the time.
They planned to continue on to the United States or South America, where there had been
previous Lebanese immigration, but their ships docked at Dakar. French colonial adminis-
trators convinced them to stay in West Africa to work as intermediaries in the peanut trade
between French in the cities and Senegalese peasants in rural areas. The Lebanese eventually
became a powerful business community, yet remained a vulnerable minority in Senegal.
Becoming socially and politically invisible was key to their economic success. Clandestine
patron–client relationships suited the Lebanese, whose economic actions depended on
such collaboration, as well as Senegalese politicians, who benefited from Lebanese financial
support but preferred not to publicize it. Lebanese sensed that change was under way well
21
Moojan Momen, An Introduction to Shiʿi Islam: The History and Doctrines of Twelver Shiʿism (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 1985); Linda S. Walbridge (ed.), The Most Learned of the Shiʿa: The Institution of the Marja’ Taqlid (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2001).
22
Majid Halawi, A Lebanon Defied: Musa al-Sadr and the Shiʿa Community (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992); Augustus
Richard Norton, Amal and the Shiʿa: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987); Norton,
‘Musa al-Sadr’, in Ali Rahnema (ed.), Pioneers of Islamic Revival (London: Zed Books, 1994), pp. 184–207.
23
The first generation of Lebanese immigrants to Senegal was approximately 45 per cent Christian and 55 per cent Muslim.
Demographics changed over time due to a variety of factors, including a higher rate of reproduction for Muslim families,
and a greater likelihood that Lebanese Christians would send their children to Europe, North America or Australia for
university, from which they might not return to Muslim-majority Senegal.
before independence and established good relations with Senegal’s nationalist parties. When
Senegal became independent on 20 June 1960, some of these Lebanese were ‘rewarded’ by
receiving Senegalese citizenship, and the community as a whole was assured of continued
protection.24
Lebanese settlement in Senegal was first patterned by temporary migration, with the
intention of returning to Lebanon to retire and reinstate children in the country of origin.
But economic opportunities kept many Lebanese in Africa, and later conflict in Lebanon
made return effectively impossible. Lebanese pride themselves on having contributed to
the development of Senegal and refer to themselves as pioneers of the land. They see them-
selves as Senegalese yet distinct from the Senegalese and as Lebanese but not like those in
Lebanon. Their shops range from small grocers to importers of European fabric and clothing,
household items, shoes, furniture and electronics. They own numerous fast-food restaurants
and finer French-style bakeries and cafes that include Lebanese specialities. Responding to
the changing Senegalese economy and increased competition in retail, the second and third
generations have begun to move into industry and the professions, dominating the plastic,
paper and cosmetics sectors and even holding a share in the African textile-manufacturing
industry. Among the Lebanese of Senegal are also doctors, lawyers, dentists, pharmacists,
tailors and mechanics. Those who can afford to visit Lebanon quickly realize that the social
status and standard of living they have secured for themselves in Dakar could never be
reproduced in Beirut.25
Shaykh al-Zayn brought formal Islamic education to the Lebanese community of Senegal,
teaching Qurʾan, Hadith and Shiʿi fiqh. The shaykh has written several books on Islam that he
sells to the community, written in Arabic and translated or transliterated into French for the
many Lebanese in Senegal illiterate in Arabic. Subjects range from a collection of prayers to
two volumes on the family of the Prophet, a book on Islamic law and doctrine, and more
specialized books on the meaning of Ramadan and the history of Karbala, where Imam Husayn
was martyred. Many Muslims in Senegal attend al-Zayn’s sermons because they respect him
as a man of knowledge, and members of his congregation are encouraged to write anony-
mous questions about religious practice that are given to the shaykh and publicly addressed.
Al-Zayn’s ability to inspire and hold his audience with powerful messages, impassioned tones
and dramatic pauses leaves a lasting impression. He attracts Lebanese youth in Senegal and
many successful businessmen. Those least likely to attend his lectures and follow his religious
guidance are the Lebanese community’s Western-educated professionals. Turnout at Friday
prayer in 2003 was considerably more sparse when al-Zayn was out of town and replaced by
the Lebanese director of the Arabic Language Institute or a Senegalese shaykh.
In 1973 al-Zayn was able to buy the first piece of land of what would become in 1978 the
Institution Islamique Sociale. In an initial interview with Leichtman, the shaykh emphasized
that the Institute was an Islamic, not Shiʿi, institution. The Arabic language (as the language
of the Qurʾan) and the Qurʾan, he argued, were neither Sunni nor Shiʿi, but Muslim. The
shaykh also highlighted that Shiʿa are followers of the Prophet’s family and stressed similar-
ities between Sunni and Shiʿi Islam, which share fundamental principles of Islam: belief in
24
Said Boumedouha, ‘The Lebanese in Senegal: A History of the Relationship between an Immigrant Community and its
French and African Rulers’ (PhD thesis, Centre of West African Studies, University of Birmingham, 1987); Leichtman, Shiʿi
Cosmopolitanisms.
25
Mara A. Leichtman, ‘The Legacy of Transnational Lives: Beyond the First Generation of Lebanese in Senegal’, Ethnic and
Racial Studies, 28(4) (2005), pp. 663–686.
monotheism, the divine authority of the Qurʾan, the prophethood of Muhammad, obligatory
prayer five times daily, the Ramadan fast and pilgrimage to Mecca. Such discourse avoids
tensions between the shaykh, the government and the wider Senegalese population.
Whereas ʿAbdul Munʿam al-Zayn is a Shiʿi shaykh, the institute’s vice president in 2003 was
a Lebanese Sunni Muslim, and the shaykh addressed Sunnis in the community, Arabs as well
as Africans, as ‘our Sunni brothers’. Accordingly, in his Friday sermons, he always addressed
himself and his audience as Muslims, not Shiʿi Muslims, and regularly reminded his congre-
gation that all Muslims are brothers. As we will demonstrate, he also praised certain historical
Sunni figures and never tried to provoke Sunnis, even though the majority of his audience
is Shiʿi.
Yet this discourse, in acknowledging a difference between Sunni and Shiʿi Islam, recognizes
the existence of historical tensions. Long before the arrival of al-Zayn in Senegal, French efforts
to divide and conquer the colony resulted in laws that segregated Lebanese Muslims (and
Christians) from Senegalese Muslims, in an attempt to curb the spread of pan-Islamism and
anti-colonial sentiments.26 French colonial policy forbade Lebanese from praying in Senegalese
mosques and attending Senegalese madrasas, integrated French and Arabic/Islamic schools
and culminated in a French-led campaign against the Lebanese in the 1930s. After Senegalese
independence in 1960, some Lebanese began to pray in Senegalese mosques, but many
Lebanese continued to face accusations that they did not ‘integrate’, which was partially a
result of the Lebanese ghetto established by the French in Dakar Plateau.27 Shaykh al-Zayn’s
mosque was built in the centre of the Lebanese residential and business area, which is now
becoming more dispersed. Yet from its beginning, many Sunnis, including Senegalese,
Moroccans, Mauritanians, Algerians and Lebanese, among others, attended Friday prayer
along with the Lebanese Shiʿi community. This reflected Shaykh al-Zayn’s influence and was
also because his khutbas were conducted entirely in fuṣḥā, classical Arabic.
The shaykh explained his use of fushā during the Friday sermons as a religious necessity,
yet this strategic use of formal Arabic also fit his goal of being a public Muslim authority and
welcoming a general Arabic-speaking audience to his mosque by not framing himself exclu-
sively as a Lebanese or Shiʿi cleric. Many other Senegalese mosques provide sermons in
Wolof or other Senegalese languages mixed with Arabic, even if Senegal’s Islamic elite are
often fluent in classical Arabic. Many Lebanese in Senegal are themselves illiterate in Arabic,
and speak French, Wolof (and/or other Senegalese languages) and the Lebanese Arabic
dialect.28 It is the latter that al-Zayn thus uses at functions catering specifically to the Lebanese
community (such as official embassy events) or during Shiʿi religious events (such as the
commemoration of ‘Ashura), but not for his Friday sermons.
Al-Zayn’s religious activities and influence spread beyond Senegal. He has strong ties to
Lebanon, most famously exemplified by his role in negotiating the French hostage crisis in
the 1980s. Abdou Diouf, past-president of Senegal, personally called upon al-Zayn to help
free French hostages taken by Hizbullah in Lebanon. From April 1987 until May 1988 he
26
French officials developed policies in the early twentieth century that considered what they labelled Islam noir to be inferior
to Arab Islam and therefore less threatening to French interests in West Africa.
27
See Leichtman, Shiʿi Cosmopolitanisms, chapters 1 and 2, for a more detailed discussion of this period. Likewise, Leichtman
was regularly told, by both Muslim and Christian Lebanese interlocutors, that ‘there are no problems between Muslims
and Christians in Senegal’. This was likely a response to assumptions about Western (and other) perceptions of rampant
sectarianism in Lebanon.
28
Al-Zayn himself prefers to speak Arabic—he understands some French and learned English in high school but has not
learned Wolof.
travelled between Paris, Beirut and Tehran, voicing conditions for the release of hostages,
such as freeing Lebanese and Iranian prisoners in France.29 Despite his involvement, al-Zayn
insisted that he did not have any political affiliations in Lebanon.30 He also denied earlier
accusations in Senegal that he was connected to Iran.31 He therefore strives to portray himself
as an independent shaykh, one following ‘people’s Islam’, in Antoun’s terms.32
Al-Zayn also obtained a Sunni title for his Shiʿi leadership, raising his local status to become
equal (in name) to leaders of Senegal’s Sufi orders. In Senegal, the title Caliph continues to
be passed down from father to son in Sufi maraboutic families. The Lebanese shaykh wanted
to be recognized as the leader of Senegal’s Shiʿa and in 2002 accepted the title Caliph Ahl
al-Bayt (Caliph of the Family of the Prophet, the Shiʿa), even though ‘Caliph’ has traditionally
been used for Sunni Muslim leaders. The shaykh proudly uses this title, which he claimed
was given to him by the heads of Senegal’s Sufi orders. Having presented these various
examples of ecumenicalism in al-Zayn’s educational background, which are also apparent

in his work at the Islamic Social Institute in Dakar, we turn now to examining his sermons.
Friday prayer
Friday prayer at the Islamic Institute in Dakar begins with the ādhān (call to prayer), which
follows the Twelver Shiʿi tradition of adding the line ashhadu anna ʿAliyyan walī Allāh (I testify
that ‘Ali is the vicegerent of God). A majority of Twelver Shiʿi authorities consider it mustaḥabb
(recommended) not wājib (obligatory) to recite this line twice after the third line of the ādhān,
ashhadu anna Muḥammadan rasūl Allāh (I testify that Muhammad is the Prophet of God).33
The ādhān also includes another Shiʿi line, ḥayya ʿalā khayr al-ʿamal (the time for the best
of deeds has come).34 The khutba precedes prayer and is divided into two sections. The
opening includes obligatory formulas praising God, praying upon the Prophet and stating
the shahāda, testimony to the unity of God and Muhammad as His messenger. Shiʿi clergy
usually list the names of the 12 Shiʿi Imams following the name of the Prophet Muhammad
at the beginning of the khutba (saying, ‘and we pray upon the Imams of Muslims…’), but
al-Zayn eliminates this mustaḥabb tradition from the weekly prayer. This, we argue, reflects
his efforts to welcome both Sunni and Shiʿi Muslims in his mosque by opening with a more
universally Islamic introductory prayer despite the more classically Shiʿi ādhān.
It is required, and common, to give two khutbas in both Sunni and Shiʿi Friday prayer
ceremonies in the Middle East. If the preacher has only one topic of focus (like al-Zayn), he
might give a short but complete second sermon in order to fulfil the duty of having two
29
See Pierre Péan, Manipulations Africaines (Paris: Plon, 2001); Magnus Ranstorp, Hizb’Allah in Lebanon: The Politics of the
Western Hostage Crisis (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1997). Al-Jazeera also interviewed al-Zayn on 12 December 2004
about his role in the hostage crisis, among other topics. http://www.aljazeera.net/programs/privatevisit/2004/
12/12/‫ونشاطاته‬-‫حياته‬-‫الزين‬-‫المنعم‬-‫عبد‬.
30
Because of al-Zayn’s strong relationship with Musa al-Sadr, it was presumed by some Lebanese in Senegal that he may have
had ties to Amal, which began as the military wing of al-Sadr’s Movement of the Deprived. Al-Sadr was also the first head
of Lebanon’s Higher Islamic Shiʿa Council, with which al-Zayn claims no affiliation. This article focuses on al-Zayn’s 2003
discourse. Later, in response to the 2006 Lebanon war, he began to speak out publicly in support of Hizbullah (Leichtman,
‘Migration, War’; Leichtman, Shiʿi Cosmopolitanisms). A Hizbullah poster can today be found decorating a public Islamic
library he established located near his institute.
31
See Moussa Sy, ‘L’Iran se positionne’, Le Témoin, 3 Août 1993, p. 8.
32
Antoun, Muslim Preacher.
33
See Al-Sayyid ʿAli al-Husayni al-Sistani, Al-Masaʾil al-Muntakhaba: Al-ʿIbadat wa-l-Muʿamalat (Qom: Maktab Samahat
al-Sayyid Ayatollah al-ʿUzma al-Sayyid al-Sistani, 1422 H [2001]), pp. 102–103.
34
Ibid., p. 121.
sermons.35 The khatib or preacher is expected to recite verses from the Qurʾan during the
first khutba, to end with invocations to God (duʿā), and to pray on behalf of the faithful,
finishing with a short chapter of the Qurʾan (often Sura 103, al-ʿAsr). Concluding with this
short sura is, however, a Shiʿi requirement; Sunni Muslims do not have this rule for the khutba.
There is thus some tension here with the wider Sunni-majority context within which Shaykh
al-Zayn is operating. This reflects his struggle over how to adapt his institute to cater to the
needs of the Lebanese Shiʿi community who requested a religious leader from Musa al-Sadr,
while also remaining inclusive of Sunni Muslims and cautiously sidestepping Senegal’s con-
tentious history of French colonial policies aimed at controlling Islam and segregating
Lebanese from Senegalese.
The messages in al-Zayn’s khutbas also at times reflect the demands of his Shiʿi identity,
although he often spoke of Shiʿi leaders non-denominationally as ‘Muslims’, again presum-
ably to minimize Sunni–Shiʿi tensions. For example, his sermon on 13 June focused on
encouraging Shiʿa to improve their situation by developing strong states or political parties,
although he recounted the story of al-Mukhtar’s revolt against the Umayyads rather than
present-day history.36 Other sermons were less specifically Shiʿi: on piety, generosity, giving
charity and paying religious taxes (20 June and 28 November);37 on hypocrites who act
publicly as good Muslims but are immoral in their private lives (31 October—during
Ramadan);38 and on the historical importance of Khadija, the Prophet’s first wife (7 November).
Other sermons discussed assassinations in Islamic history and misunderstanding religion
(14 November—also during Ramadan, described later in this article); controlling hatred and
anger through piety and asking for forgiveness (5 December); insulting others (12 December);
and God’s rules which compel Muslim behaviour (2 January 2004).39
For us, the primary indication that he was lecturing to a diaspora community living among
a Sunni majoritarian population was in his subtle departure from Shiʿi tradition in occasionally
praising Sunni leaders. In the 14 November 2003 khutba, he discussed Imam ʿAli’s assassi-
nation in the same manner as that of other Muslim rulers (in addition to ʿAli’s son Hasan, he
35
Khutbas have limited wājib requirements, which include praising Allah and his Prophet, reciting a short Qurʾanic sura and
reminding the congregation of the importance of piety. The preacher therefore has the freedom to adjust the two khutbas
according to the needs of his message and lecturing style. Ibid., p. 102.
36
Al-Mukhtar (622–687 C.E.) was a controversial early Islamic figure based in Kufa, Iraq, who led a failed rebellion against the
Umayyad Caliphs in vengeance for the death of Imam Husayn at the Battle of Karbala.
37
When al-Zayn first arrived in Senegal, the Lebanese community was not accustomed to paying religious taxes, money he
needed in order to finance his religious work in Senegal. His sermons thus attempted to convince them otherwise, for
example by comparing those who do not pay religious taxes to those who do not trust God. Although al-Zayn spoke
generally here about paying religious taxes, which could be applicable to both Sunnis and Shiʿa, he receives and spends
the khums, the Shiʿi Islamic tax of one fifth of all income, under the supervision of Ayatollah al-Sistani. Half of the khums
is allocated for general charity spending, such as religious education and supporting the poor. Al-Sistani gives al-Zayn
religious legitimacy to spend this money in Senegal as he sees fit. The other half goes to al-Sistani. Not all Lebanese in
Senegal pay the khums.
38
It is surprising that while al-Zayn passionately discussed the war in Iraq in the sermons immediately following President
George W. Bush’s 19 March 2003 invasion of Iraq, contemporary examples of justice and injustice were conspicuously absent
from his sermons during the first Ramadan of the Iraq war. The shaykh briefly mentioned one encounter he had while
attending a conference in the United States along with other Islamic scholars from different religious traditions. He ques-
tioned one Arab scholar on why he did not talk to or advise the government in his (unnamed) country, where there was
so much injustice. The scholar replied, citing a Hadith, that we must obey the ruler even if he is unjust. Al-Zayn publicly
admonished this man, commenting that he thought this Hadith was a theoretical idea until he talked with this scholar, a
university professor and shaykh whom he accused of teaching the legitimacy of injustice.
39
This sermon joined the outcry throughout the Muslim world in response to French laws banning religious clothing in
schools, targeting in particular Muslim women who wear the hijab. Al-Zayn announced that he would write a letter to
French President Jacques Chirac.
mentioned Sunni Caliphs ʿUmar and ʿUthman and Umayyad leaders Muʿawiyya II and ʿUmar
ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAziz).40 On 28 November, he also recounted a story praising ʿUthman ibn ʿAffan,
the third Sunni Caliph, for spending his wealth in the way of God in order to help the poor
and the Muslim army. ʿUthman is generally considered by Shiʿa to have been the most corrupt
Caliph, whose power led to the expansion of the Umayyad dynasty throughout the Muslim
world. The Umayyads were responsible for the fateful Battle of Karbala, which led to the
death of Imam Husayn, his family and his adherents. We argue that the inclusion of this story,
unusual for a Shiʿi shaykh, reflects al-Zayn’s attempts to honour Sunni Muslims in his con-
gregation. We turn now to analyse his sermons that focus on the Iraq war and the occupation
of Palestine.
The Iraq war

Al-Zayn’s strongest political opinions were revealed following the 19 March 2003 U.S.-led
invasion in Iraq. Why did Shaykh al-Zayn condemn the invasion of Iraq, which favoured the
Shiʿi majority long oppressed by Saddam Hussein? In his sermons, he referred to Saddam’s
oppression of Shiʿi scholars but otherwise avoided mentioning Saddam directly and did not
cite attitudes of Shiʿi marjaʿs towards the invasion (despite his role as Ayatollah al-Sistani’s
representative). He likewise did not position himself within any of the multiple pervasive
Shiʿi debates surrounding the war in Iraq.41 He thus adopted an attitude of pan-Arab and
pan-Islamic nationalism in mostly ignoring the harsh situation for Iraqis under Saddam’s
regime. Al-Zayn thus distinguished himself from other diaspora Shiʿi clerics, including certain
clerics in the United States who publicly supported the George W. Bush administration, the
invasion of Iraq and the end of Saddam Hussein’s regime, under which Iraqi Shiʿa faced severe
repression and executions.42 We argue that simultaneously criticizing the United States and
Saddam Hussein enabled the Lebanese shaykh to appeal to both Sunni and Shiʿi followers,
or at least not to repel the former, while reinforcing his stated position against violence.
The first recording we have following the start of the war was al-Zayn’s 28 March sermon.43
He began with the Hadith ‘Deeds are considered by intentions’.44 He admonished the com-
munity for abandoning religious tasks (prayer, paying religious taxes, promoting virtue and
preventing vice) and highlighted the responsibility of religious scholars and educated people
with a good command of Arabic to teach others the best interpretation of the holy texts. He
corrected a common misunderstanding of this Hadith—that good intentions are a substitute
40
There are multiple stories about the death of ʿUmar ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAziz. One version suggests that he was poisoned by his
servant who received a bribe from certain Umayyads upset over his reforms. One of the best sources that report this story
is Abu al-Faraj ibn al-Jawzi, Sirat wa-Manaqib ʿUmar ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Khalifa al-Zahid (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya,
1985), pp. 316–318.
41
For example, some Shiʿa, including Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hizbullah, announced their opposition to the invasion,
advocating instead for Iraqis to hold a national dialogue bringing together Saddam’s regime and its opposition. Other
prominent Shiʿa, such as Sayyid ʿAbd al-Majid al-Khuʾi, son of Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Abu al-Qasim al-Khuʾi, supported
the U.S.-led operation. Al-Khuʾi came to Iraq in April 2003, where he was assassinated. The followers of Muqtada al-Sadr,
leader of the anti-American Al-Mahdi army, seen by some Iraqis as a symbol of resistance to foreign occupation of Iraq,
were suspected to be behind this assassination. Shiʿa thus had various attitudes towards the invasion of Iraq.
42
See, for example, Imam Hassan Qazwini, American Crescent: A Muslim Cleric on the Power of His Faith, the Struggle
Against Prejudice, and the Future of Islam and America (New York: Random House, 2007).
43
We do not have a recording of the 21 March sermon. Shaykh al-Zayn was supposed to travel to Lebanon that week, following
the commemoration of Ashura, which ended on 14 March, but he cancelled his trip because of the war. Mara Leichtman,
however, did not attend Friday prayer on the 21st because she was ill.
44
On this Hadith see Research Division, 100 Ahâdith about Islamic Manners (Riyadh: Maktaba Dar-us-Salam, 2003), pp.
16–17.
for good deeds—in reinforcing that good intentions must be followed by good deeds in
order to have religious merit, otherwise this is considered riyāʾ (insincerity).
Al-Zayn then applied this religious lesson to war, first examining the 27 battles of the
Prophet Muhammad, all of which were defensive battles as the Prophet was sent by God to
find a way for peace before fighting. The shaykh considered the Prophet’s wars to be legit-
imate. He then turned to contemporary Middle East politics and the Iraq war as an example
of an illegitimate and unjustified war. This war, he stated, would enable Western powers to
gain control of the world, dominate the oil industry and ensure the security of Israel from
its neighbours. Al-Zayn avoided naming names or offering concrete factual information, but
alluded to the scandal of Halliburton being rewarded with $7 billion of no-bid oil and infra-
structure contracts in Iraq and the implication of U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney, who once
led the energy company.
The shaykh continued to outline his political views, preaching that unfortunately powerful
rulers do not behave in rational ways, but this action goes beyond rationality, ignorance and
injustice—he called this terrorism. He questioned who should be afraid of whom: America
or Arabs, asking whether Arabs owned missiles that enabled them to attack America. He
suggested that Iraq’s missiles were not able to reach beyond 150 km, meaning Saddam
Hussein could not even attack Najaf from Baghdad. He appealed to his congregation to
follow the news and recommended that those literate in Arabic or French read the book by
Thierry Meyssan entitled 9/11: The Big Lie.45 He highlighted that this French author draws on
Western—mostly American—sources, not Arab sources. He then summarized the conspiracy
theory that the World Trade Center was destroyed by explosives, not airplanes, and offered
to lend this book to anyone interested in reading it and reviewing the sources cited by this
author from the Internet. Al-Zayn cited this Western author in an effort to bring in sources
beyond Muslim authors to back up his argument. Offering to share the book as evidence of
the shaykh’s claims increased his credibility.
He concluded by thanking God for sending a messenger to teach and educate us in
morality in order to avoid destroying others over trivial concerns. He stated that American
and British political leaders lacked the moral authority to prevent them from attacking oth-
ers—instead they abided by the law of the jungle, but injustice does not legitimate injustice.
He recited the Qurʾanic verse: ‘O you who believe! Stand out firmly for God as just witnesses;
and let not the enmity and hatred of others make you avoid justice. Be just: that is nearer to
piety; and fear God. Verily, God is well acquainted with what you do’ (5/8).46 He added that
he did not defend Iraqi rulers, but had great sympathy for the poor Iraqi people who greatly
suffered from the economic blockade that forbade them from obtaining arms, food and
medicine while others stole their oil wealth for 15 years. He praised in particular the brave
Iraqis (Shiʿa) who stood close to Imam ‘Ali’s shrine and fought to defeat the greatest power
in history (the United States). Blaming Western administrations, he ended his sermon by
reiterating that Muslims did not ‘invent’ 9/11. While some Muslim rulers practised injustice
against both Muslims and non-Muslims, Islam itself does not condone injustice, he said. His
final duʿa in the second khutba prayed for Muslims to gain victory over their enemies and
for security for Muslims everywhere, including in Africa and Asia.
Thierry Meyssan, 9/11: The Big Lie (London: Carnot Publishing, 2002).
45
46
Translations of Qurʾanic verses are adapted from this website: http://qurancomplex.gov.sa/Quran/Targama/Targama.
asp?L=arb&Page=108.
Al-Zayn used a different strategy to appeal to all members of his congregation in his 4
April 2003 khutba. In this sermon he did not question the legitimacy of the U.S.-led invasion
in Iraq, but suggested that Muslims themselves shouldered some of the responsibility for
the war. He began with Sura 110 (Al-Nasr):
When there comes the Help of Allah (to you, O Muhammad against your enemies) and the
conquest (of Mecca). And you see that the people enter Allah’s religion (Islam) in crowds. So
glorify the Praises of your Lord, and ask His Forgiveness. Verily, He is the One Who accepts the
repentance and Who forgives.
This sermon focused on God’s promise to the Prophet after the conquest of Mecca by the
Muslim army in 629 C.E. The promise of victory was based on the conditional relationship
between God—the promiser—and his believers—the promised. Al-Zayn cited another
Qurʾanic verse (47/7): ‘O you who believe! If you help (in the cause of ) Allah, He will help you,
and make your foothold firm.’ Al-Zayn outlined the play on the Arabic word al-naṣr (meaning
both ‘help’ and ‘victory’), where Muslims must provide their own naṣr (help) in all aspects of
their lives before they can expect the naṣr (help for victory) from God.
He turned to the historical story of al-Hajjaj ibn Yusuf al-Thaqafi (661–714), a controversial
Umayyad ruler known for his unjust and bloody governing style. The shaykh focused on a
battle where this tyrant’s army, comprising 2000 soldiers, was expected to win against 40
Kharijite men, yet the minority defeated the majority. Al-Zayn explained this miracle by
returning to the Qurʾanic verse where Kharijite faith and their surrender to God led to His
promise of victory.47
Al-Zayn then made the jump from 1400 years ago to today, when a new ‘colonizer’ attacked
Islam. He first referred to the Palestinian defeat by Jews who arrived as immigrants and today
‘control’ the Middle East. He attributed the success of this ‘foreign’ power to Muslims losing
their belief in God. Next, he turned to the war in Iraq, questioning how Muslims could blame
the British, Americans, Jews (meaning Israelis) or anybody else who overpowers them, while
they did not search for the roots of this conflict in their own weakness. He came back to the
Qurʾanic verse ‘If you help (in the cause of) Allah, He will help you and make your foothold firm’
and chided Arabs for importing ‘infidel beliefs’ from Britain and America that were incompatible
with Islam, also linking this to the story of al-Hajjaj. He lamented the ills of modern society,
where the veil and prayer had been transformed into signs of underdevelopment and terror.
Al-Zayn concluded with the crisis Arabs face today in Iraq, quoting a Lebanese proverb,
‘The one who is swallowing a razor can neither pass it nor expel it.’ He then cited with outrage
a statement by the Iraqi Minister of Media, ‘the black turban is still dirty as it is an agent to
the British and Americans’, which suggested that Shiʿi clergy and their masters the marjaʿs
were agents of the West. He countered this statement by asserting that Saddam Hussein’s
regime caused the crisis in Iraq by murdering millions of people between the Iran–Iraq war,
the Kuwait war and the ‘hunger war’. He clarified his position—that he was not justifying
American actions. He predicted that American rule over Iraq would not be more merciful
than that of Saddam, and in such a case God would punish people for their sins. Yet he also
expressed the sentiment that God would not help those who insulted clergy to gain victory.
Thus al-Zayn’s stance is one of neutrality towards Shiʿa in blaming Saddam’s regime for
provoking the American-led invasion of Iraq. In so doing he neither supports the invasion
nor puts all the blame on Americans. This was also in line with his position as the wakil of
Ayatollah al-Sistani, who likewise had no clearly stated opinions on the invasion at that time.
47
Nevertheless, most Muslims reject the Kharijites due to their radical beliefs and actions.
Al-Zayn thus suggested that Muslims were responsible for the ills that befell them—
through allowing petrodollars to go to America. He cited examples of Arab princes who
wasted their money gambling in Las Vegas and Europe and ‘sultan’s preachers’, clergy who
issued fatwas that strengthened the power of corrupt rulers. According to the shaykh, the
individual was in need of a self-revolution in order to embrace pure beliefs and abandon
internal conflicts and fighting against other Muslims. He ended with a duʿa calling for victory
over enemies and asking God to strengthen their faith and provide guidance in order to
apply His orders and avoid His prohibitions. Al-Zayn thus linked personal piety with religious
victory, as individual Muslims are all members of the Umma.
We will discuss one final sermon here, from 11 April 2003, which best illustrates al-Zayn’s
style and command of knowledge, authority and charisma. Unlike the previous two sermons,
the shaykh’s focus here was on the Shiʿi scholars. He began, after the usual Islamic supplica-
tions, as follows:
Oppressive regimes meet their end even if this is at the hands of other oppressors. In Baghdad,
on this same day, the martyrdom occurred of the Eminent Imam, Pure Martyr, Sayyid Muhammad
Baqir al-Sadr (may God have mercy upon him). The issue of assassinating our scholars, whether
by the current oppressive regime or by another regime in thisworld, has been an ongoing issue
from times of old.48
Continuing his sermon, al-Zayn explained that Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr was a great Shiʿi
scholar in Najaf and talked about his intellectual accomplishments. He highlighted one of
the many crimes of Saddam Hussein’s administration, that of imprisoning al-Sadr for pro-
testing the regime’s tampering with his 1959 book Falsafatuna (Our Philosophy) in order to
omit its Islamic ideology and turn it into the philosophical basis for the Iraqi Ba’th Party.49
Al-Zayn then compared this event to one in the Qurʾan: Moses and his brother Aaron
came before Pharaoh and asked him not to require the Egyptian people to worship him
since he was a human being and not a god. Pharaoh could have killed the two men, but
instead summoned his advisors who agreed to call an assembly of magicians to test the
truth of Moses and Aaron’s claims. When they found that Moses’ stick was indeed touched
by a miracle from God, they prostrated and declared faith in God. Moses and Aaron lived.
Such a comparison established the actions of Saddam Hussein, a Muslim, to be worse than
those of the enemies of Muslims who did not dare to kill God’s envoy.50
The sermon portrayed al-Zayn’s personal relationship with the celebrated al-Sadr as one
of master and disciple and talked of his teacher’s grand ideas of building an Islamic university
to reform the ḥawzas, the religious seminaries of Iraq, and modernize Islam:
We live today in an era that is both amazing and remarkable; it is a highlyadvanced era. It is not
an era of backwardness so that we are satisfied with giving and receiving instruction on matters
relating only to ritual cleanliness and uncleanliness or valid and invalid business transactions. No,
we are now wrestling with philosophies, highly advanced civilizations and formidable scientific
progress. We cannot present Islam in the simple old form. Of course this does not mean we are
saying that we should bring a new Islam. No, Islam remains as it is, but we must understand it
in the new style… Islam is not a religion of ritual worship only, mosques only, pilgrimage only
48
Ebraima K. M. Saidy translated this sermon.
49
Al-Sadr was apparently assassinated on orders from Saddam Hussein in 1980 for refusing to issue a fatwa declaring the
Baʿth to be a legitimate Islamic party. See Chibli Mallat, The Renewal of Islamic Law: Muhammad Baqer as-Sadr, Najaf
and the Shiʿi International (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
50
We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this analysis.
or fasting only. Islam is a religion, a way of life, a system that is complete and comprehensive,
beginning at the mosque and ending at the manufacturing plant.51
The shaykh ended his sermon by tying his message to Lebanon. He recalled the loss of
another famous Shiʿi scholar, Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr’s paternal cousin Musa al-Sadr, also
part of al-Zayn’s own story, being the one who first sent him to Senegal in 1969, before
disappearing in Libya in 1978.
He concluded with a prayer asking God to alter this pitiful current condition of ours and
to compensate us for the many great scholars we have lost by giving us other scholars in the
future. These future scholars will achieve the hopes lost with the murder of their predecessors.
This panegyric of the clergy highlighted their authority—and, by association, that of Shaykh
al-Zayn—as social and political guides of Shiʿi Muslims as deputies of Imam al-Mahdi, the
twelfth Shiʿi Imam believed to be in occultation. This positive depiction of the clergy also
contrasted with the accusations he countered the previous week that Shiʿi clerics were dirty
and in cahoots with the West. Al-Zayn asked God to return security, peace and tranquillity
to Iraq and to all Muslim countries. In linking Islamic history and scriptures to the present,
and mixing the sacred with the secular, al-Zayn’s powerful khutba educated Lebanese in
Senegal about their past and the scholarly traditions of Shiʿi Islam while preaching a reformist
view of Islam, calling for the religion to be applied to the modern day and age.
The 11 April 2003 sermon was al-Zayn’s harshest critique of Saddam Hussein, while he
was also outspoken regarding his opinion on the Iraq war in the two previous sermons in
the weeks immediately following the invasion, as we have seen. This third sermon was also
the most grounded in specific Shiʿi themes, although his 18 April sermon focused on ziyāra
(visiting holy shrines). Here he mentioned the increased importance of this act particularly
with the demise of Saddam Hussein’s regime (Saddam had prevented Shiʿa from visiting
Shiʿi holy sites in Iraq), but this was his only brief linkage of this religiously meritorious act
to contemporary politics. Taken together, these three sermons show how al-Zayn, in different
ways, clearly linked religious lessons with his political position, painting Western forces a
dark black in contrast to the pure white of all Muslims, Sunni and Shiʿi alike. In these sermons,
he avoided mentioning Saddam Hussein directly and gave Western authors of conspiracy
theories much credibility. In so doing he emphasized Muslim solidarity regardless of religious
sect, at times praising Shiʿi scholars who were also his mentors, while in other sermons
praising Sunni leaders as well, so as to not show too much Shiʿi favouritism.
We must also address al-Zayn’s use of conspiracy theories. The Lebanese shaykh is cer-
tainly not the only preacher to associate social disorder with the secular West, the source of
bidʿa (destructive innovations),52 and examples from elsewhere show how preachers might
use conspiracy theories as a way of attracting a passionate audience and consolidating their
position.53 But Sanders and West suggest other reasons for taking such conspiracy discourse
51
Acknowledging that there are many businessmen in Senegal (Arab and African), he used the manufacturing plant as an
example for how Muslims can adapt Islamic morality to local business practices, an oft-repeated theme.
52
In contrast, see Gaffney, The Prophet’s Pulpit, chap. 6, for a very different analysis of America in an Egyptian sermon during
the period of President Sadat’s peace agreement with Israel.
53
Fandy, Saudi Arabia, chap. 7, explores a shift in sermon discourse in Saudi Arabia from Islamic revolutionary rhetoric in
favour of a broader agenda of democratization and human rights, grounded in abuses by the Saudi regime. He argues that
a Sunni opposition leader lost his local power base when he adopted a global discourse of new liberal economics and
human rights, and in response adapted to a more xenophobic discourse characterized by anti-American and anti-Jewish
rhetoric in an effort to reclaim his audience. The Shiʿi shaykh he examined was more successful in balancing the local and
global and weaving democratic and pluralistic discourse into local Shiʿi narratives without distancing himself from Western
thought.
seriously, as a way of exploring our complex world of multiple modernities, while also prob-
lematizing assumed dichotomies between tradition and modernity, local and global, and
the West and the rest. They argue that despite all the talk of ‘transparency’, a term synony-
mous with ‘good governance’ in the post-Cold War period and suggesting trust, openness
and fairness, the world is not becoming more transparent.54 In response, conspiracy theories
express profound suspicions of power, and al-Zayn’s references to such theories enable him
to question the actions of Western powers.
This is an uncomfortable topic in an ever-heightening anti-Islamic climate in the West.
Sanders and West discuss challenges for anthropologists examining belief systems that one
doubts or disagrees with. This does not mean that difficult topics should be avoided or
ignored. Instead, they push for what can be learned from conspiracy theories about the
varied social experiences of power in our globalizing world. Rather than simply resist power,
certain people, such as al-Zayn, ‘seek to reveal and to steer the hidden forces that they believe
animate their world…’55
Focusing on conspiracy theories that implicate the Western powers is a position that both
Sunnis and Shiʿa could agree with in Senegal, at a time when Middle Eastern politics threat-
ened to become more sectarian. This tactic also enabled al-Zayn to shift the focus of his
sermons away from the need to address the possible implications of Shiʿi opposition figures
in encouraging the U.S.-led Iraqi invasion. Yet he strategically avoided names and concrete
details in order to sidestep directly criticizing Senegal’s alliance with the United States.
Similarly, his insinuation that lack of faith and unity within the Muslim community-at-large
was partially to blame for the state of the Middle East today was, we deduce, another strategy
to unify Muslims in his congregation—and beyond. The shaykh held each individual Muslim
responsible for his or her own actions and called for both Sunnis and Shiʿa to unite as believ-
ers and not to be divided by internal or external politics. In sum, al-Zayn used his knowledge
of history, theology, jurisprudence and current events to enhance his delivery of religious
messages in his efforts to link Muslims in Africa to contemporary issues in the Middle East
that concern the Muslim umma at large, inclusive of Senegal. That is still more the case for
his treatment of another contentious Middle Eastern issue, the occupation of Palestine.
The liberation of Palestine

Two of al-Zayn’s sermons in this sample of recordings focused on the liberation of Palestine
(27 June and 21 November 2003).56 Throughout the Muslim world the Palestinian struggle
has been a symbol of Muslim solidarity.57 Most recently, however, Palestine as a topic has
become less prominent in Arab media and preaching, replaced with Iraq and the latest
54
Todd Sanders and Harry G. West, ‘Power Revealed and Concealed in the New World Order’, in Harry G. West and Todd Sanders
(eds.), Transparency and Conspiracy: Ethnographies of Suspicion in the New World Order (Durham, NC: Duke University
Press, 2003), pp. 1–37. Mara Leichtman is grateful to Katrien Pype for referring her to the literature on conspiracy
theories.
55
Sanders and West, ‘Power Revealed and Concealed’, p. 16.
56
Leichtman was travelling in late April and early June and al-Zayn spent the month of May in Lebanon, hence the gap in
dates between April and June during the first few months of the war.
57
On Hizbullah’s appropriation of Palestinian symbolic capital see Laleh Khalili, ‘“Standing with My Brother”: Hizbullah,
Palestinians, and the Limits of Solidarity’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 49(2) (2007), pp. 276–303.
regional challenges.58 Nevertheless, Senegalese have long advocated for Palestinian rights.
Senegal was among the first African countries to recognize Palestine, offering a Palestinian
embassy with all fees paid. Palestine Liberation Organization (P.L.O.) Chairman Yasser Arafat’s
first visit to Africa was to Senegal in the late 1970s. Since 1975, Senegal has been a member
of the United Nations Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian
People. Most recently and controversially, on 23 December 2016, Senegal voted in favour
of the United Nations Security Council resolution stating that Israeli settlements on Palestinian
territory occupied since 1967, including East Jerusalem, have ‘no legal validity’ and demand-
ing a halt to ‘all Israeli settlement activities’. This resulted in Israel cutting aid to Senegal and
recalling its ambassador from Dakar. Lebanon, of course, borders the Israeli–Palestinian
conflict, was the base for the P.L.O. headquarters in the 1970s and is home to many Palestinian
refugees. Al-Zayn’s choice of Palestine as a topic for his sermons was thus another theme on
which Sunnis and Shiʿa agree and remains a Middle Eastern conflict close to the hearts of
Senegalese Muslims as well as many Arabs. In choosing to discuss the topic of Palestine in
his sermons that took place during the period leading up to the war in Iraq, he also avoided
directly addressing American military activities in Iraq and Afghanistan (or, increasingly, in
Senegal), and therefore directly critiquing the allies of his host country Senegal.
In both sermons on Palestine al-Zayn cited the Hadith: ‘You should not undertake a special
journey to visit any place other than the three Mosques: the Sacred Mosque of Mecca, my
mosque [the Prophet’s mosque in Medina], and al-Aqsa Mosque of Jerusalem.’ Many Shiʿa
do not recognize this Hadith, doubting its genuine origins, in particular due to its use in
preventing visitation of the holy shrines of Shiʿi Imams. Al-Zayn’s use—twice—of this Hadith
to introduce the topic of Palestine and al-Aqsa mosque to his congregation might be reflec-
tive of his interreligious education and his stature as an unchallenged shaykh presiding over
a community, remote from the Middle East, where he is considered to be the most knowl-
edgeable Shiʿi authority. This is likely another intentional tactic to cater to a mixed Sunni
and Shiʿi congregation. However, he might have also used this Hadith to point to the impor-
tance of al-Aqsa, regardless of whether the shaykh believed in its accuracy.
His 27 June 2003 sermon focused on the thirty-fourth anniversary of the 1969 arson attack
on Jerusalem’s al-Aqsa mosque.59 Al-Zayn highlighted the sacred status of the mosque and
suggested that Muslims should care about this particular mosque more than the many other
mistreated mosques around the world because of its symbolism of a land usurped in 1948.
Great powers supported this unjust situation whereas weak countries were powerless to
change it. He made a comparison to the Kaʿba in Mecca, which was also exposed to crimes
by Muslim rulers, but was immediately rebuilt. In contrast, the al-Aqsa mosque was not
rebuilt and represented for the shaykh a contemporary issue where Muslims were humiliated
but failed to act. He admonished Muslims for doing nothing to defend the mosque, and
even rebuked Senegalese Muslims for forgetting about this event after only a few days of
limited discussion (he had newly arrived in Senegal in 1969).
58
See Shibley Telhami, ‘Does the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict Still Matter?: Analyzing Arab Public Perceptions’, Analysis Paper
Number 17 (Washington, D.C.: The Saban Center for Middle East Policy, The Brookings Institution, June 2008), https://www.
brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/06_middle_east_telhami.pdf; John Bell, ‘Israel-Palestine: Is it Even Relevant
Anymore?’ Aljazeera, 2 March 2015, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/03/israel-palestine-relevant-any-
more-150302072026022.html.
59
The fire was started by an Australian tourist who belonged to an evangelical Christian sect called the Worldwide Church of
God. He hoped that by burning down the mosque he would hasten the Second Coming of Jesus, making way for the
rebuilding of the Jewish Temple on the Temple Mount.
In a theme repeated from his sermon on Iraq, al-Zayn considered Muslims who did not
care about one another as tearing apart the Umma. In his 27 June sermon, he called upon
Muslims to become more aware of their problems and to end their suffering. He declared
Islam to be more than a religion of rituals and stressed that Muslims should improve their
morals alongside praying and fasting. Citing Gandhi who liberated his country through
words, he asked Muslims to change their attitudes, unite and face those who desecrate their
sanctities. He clarified that he was not referring to taking up arms, but promoted the econ-
omy as the best means to fight without violence, which did not require governmental action.
For al-Zayn, economic boycott can be transformed into a peaceful religious mission—he
does not support terrorism or war. Economic boycott is also a form of political activism that
avoids antagonizing Senegalese authorities while uniting Muslims in Senegal through pro-
posing an everyday act that can make a difference.
The shaykh used the last Friday of Ramadan, established as the global day of al-Quds
(Jerusalem) by the Islamic Revolution in Iran, to return once again to the topic of Palestine
on 21 November 2003. He mentioned that this day was established in the hope that Muslims
throughout the world would take action to defend the holy city of al-Quds, which they lost.
This sermon contained similar themes as the previous one, criticizing Muslim rulers for fight-
ing one another instead of working together to regain the cities and mosques that were lost
(he gave an example of the Iberian peninsula). Again, he highlighted the uniqueness of
Jerusalem for Muslims.
Al-Zayn also returned to economics as a theme. He called contemporary globalization
nothing more than ‘economic enslavement’, whereas the ‘true globalization’ would arrive
when Imam al-Mahdi would meet Isa (Jesus) in al-Quds to establish the Divine State, where
justice and Islam would rule and visas and passports would no longer be needed. He chided
the Muslim majority for not caring about religion—not even praying—and likewise being
unconcerned with the holy issue of Palestine. He accused a religious Muslim minority of
thinking about al-Quds in the same manner in which they watch a television series—occa-
sionally they would cry, but this was not what they should do. They should take action and
reclaim Jerusalem from the Jews (referring indiscriminately to Israelis as Jews). ‘Muslims are
1.5 billion people,’ al-Zayn declared. ‘Why do they not pressure the United States in order to
force Israel to leave al-Quds?’ Again, he mentioned economic boycott as a serious threat and
a means by which to accomplish this. ‘If al-Quds does not stay alive in Muslim minds, Muslims
should consider themselves a dead Umma which has no right to talk about such issues.’
Al-Zayn then turned briefly to discuss the war in Iraq—without naming Iraq. ‘Today, the
world takes action through America for Weapons of Mass Destruction. They use this as an
excuse to attack other nations. Even for the potential intention to have W.M.D. Intention!
Even God would not judge us for intention, but America does!’ He stated that Israel owned
300 nuclear missiles and bombs, and there were 22 Arab countries that Israel could easily
destroy with their W.M.D., yet the world saw this and did nothing. He cited bomb attacks in
Turkey against Israeli and British interests, which Bin Laden was likely behind. He described
a conspiracy involving Jews in Turkey who publicly converted to Islam 400 years ago while
retaining Judaism in private. They built mosques and cemeteries that on the surface appeared
Muslim but faced Jerusalem and not Mecca. He accused them of having the goal of stealing
Palestine, claiming to be powerful Turkish Muslims while remaining Jews who supported
Israel. According to al-Zayn, this explained the strong relationship between Turkey and Israel.
He concluded with a prayer for Muslims to gain the awareness and the right emotions to
reclaim al-Quds. Again, al-Zayn appealed to all in his congregation through the combined
rhetoric of conspiracy theories and Muslims uniting as a religiously moral and politically
conscious while non-violent Umma.
In demonizing the Jews—as well as the United States and the West—he used an ‘us’ versus
‘them’ rhetoric, dividing the world in all sermons analysed between Muslims and non-Mus-
lims, believers and non-believers, true Muslims and false or corrupt Muslims, Arab Muslims
and Turks, with binary divisions growing smaller or wider depending on the conflict and
actors. Gaffney, in his analysis of Egyptian sermons, describes the ‘us’ as signalling ‘all the
richness of familiar, complex social relationships, spanning generations and incorporating
a broad spectrum of particular persons, whereas the “they” is depersonalized and flat by
comparison’.60 Gaffney also points out varying specificities of the ‘them’ in some of the ser-
mons he examines. The preacher as judge assails superpowers as simply ‘America’ or ‘Europe’,
but gets more specific when surveying the Arab world, citing leaders or their offices by name,
a tendency evident in al-Zayn’s sermons.61
Discussion
Al-Zayn thus secured his position as a non-confrontational public Muslim leader by chan-
nelling social and political statements into religious idioms and by grounding his Dakar
sermons in the Middle East, and not in Senegal. He drew upon his cross-sectarian and
Lebanese and Iraqi religious training as well as the prestige of his predecessors and teachers
(Musa al-Sadr and Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr). Al-Zayn watched events in the Middle East
from outside the region. He favoured Islamic solidarity regardless of sectarian affiliation from
a diasporic perspective, in which he enhanced his Arab and Islamic identity by highlighting
non-Muslim involvement in the area (Israel, the United States and Europe). This was also
apparent in his occasional praise of Sunni leaders and labelling Shiʿi authorities in an unspec-
ified manner as Islamic scholars. The sermons analysed in this article are also examples of
the shaykh’s blaming Muslim society for their attitudes towards the Umma. Holding all
Muslims—at least partially—responsible for the state of the world was another technique
for avoiding the blame game in which he would have to more directly target either Sunni
or Shiʿi leaders or Senegal’s Western allies. Al-Zayn was thus able to highlight his expertise
in and connections throughout the Middle East in a manner that addressed the Lebanese
Shiʿi community he was brought to Dakar to serve while remaining inclusive of local Arab
and African Sunni Muslims and wary of historical and sectarian tensions. In addition to
shaping the rhetoric of his sermons to minimize conflict, al-Zayn built the Islamic Institute
in Dakar and adapted Friday prayer rituals to be inclusive of both Sunni and Shiʿi Muslims,
evident in his careful labelling of the institution as Islamic. In this way, al-Zayn’s success in
Senegal was due to his skill in knowing when to highlight universal Islam over a more par-
ticular Shiʿi leaning.
Al-Zayn also used Western authors of conspiracy theories as credible sources to justify
his political views and to prove the correctness of his position, above and beyond the writings
of Shiʿi scholars. This could be understood as intentional simplification, effective in reaching
members of his congregation who were less educated, illiterate and who did not follow the
Gaffney, The Prophet’s Pulpit, p. 246.

60
61
Ibid., p. 248. The ‘us’/‘them’ rhetoric was also used by Bin Laden, whose xenophobia excluded the other from the realm of
humanity. See Fandy, Saudi Arabia, chap. 6.
international news, and might therefore be more willing to believe such stories. Yet when
al-Zayn cited literature in his sermons, he recommended these books to those who could
read Arabic or French, clearly recognizing that not all in his congregation of predominately
Lebanese businessmen had such an education. At the same time, however, the shaykh sug-
gested to those who were educated—and less likely to uncritically accept his interpreta-
tions—that they turn to these sources that back up the shaykh’s position. This was a targeted
effort to consolidate his leadership and expertise, to ‘re-enforce established convictions
forcefully among a community of believers so that they remain dominant and unquestion-
able’.62 His goal was not to ‘make people think’ by challenging listeners to re-evaluate their
own preconceptions and actions as individuals through critical self-evaluation or in an effort
to create a reciprocal response or turn Friday prayer into a dialogue.63 This was instead an
exercise in authority through unity, bringing together those of different denominations,
generations and levels of education in his congregation around themes on which all could
agree.
Yet the selection of sermons analysed in this article is indicative of a particular historical
moment—post-September 11 and the early stages of the Iraq war. Since these sermons
were recorded, the ever-changing Sunni–Shiʿi relationship has been characterized by dis-
courses about the ‘Shiʿi crescent’ in the Middle East, Iran and Saudi Arabia’s power politics
in the ‘sectarian Gulf’, and the involvement of Hizbullah and the Gulf states in the Syrian civil
war.64 Al-Zayn is also facing increasing competition for Shiʿi Islamic authority in Senegal from
Senegalese Shiʿa who desire indigenous Senegalese, not foreign Arab, leadership of their
community. Senegalese Shiʿi organizations are multiplying, and some are led by Senegalese
shaykhs trained in Iran who are accredited wakils for Ayatollah Khamenei.65 While al-Zayn
remains a spiritual leader of Lebanese Shiʿa, but is no longer the only Lebanese Shiʿi shaykh
in town, Lebanese Sunnis, considerably smaller in number, have recently opened their own
mosque, led by a Sunni shaykh who arrived in Dakar from Lebanon in 2012.66 Regionally in
West Africa, Senegal has enhanced its precautionary security measures in response to the
2012 conflict in neighbouring northern Mali and the 2015–2016 attacks claimed by al-Qaeda
in the Islamic Maghreb in Mali, Burkina Faso and Ivory Coast. Ibrahim al-Zakzaky, the leader
of Nigeria’s Shiʿi movement and a proponent of the Iranian revolutionary model, was shot
and detained in December 2015, with dozens (if not hundreds, depending on reports) of his
followers massacred by the Nigerian army. Shiʿa in Senegal are very much aware of these
changing circumstances as Senegal is slowly becoming more sectarian and nationalist, and
more controlled, which could lead to less openness to religious diversity in the future.
Preachers today will continue to employ new and creative ways to address shifting local and
global contexts in their Friday sermons.
62
Kai Kresse, ‘“Making People Think”: The Ramadan Lectures of Sheikh Abdilahi Nassir in Mombasa (1419 A.H.)’, in Scott S.
Reese (ed.), The Transmission of Learning in Islamic Africa (Leiden: Brill, 2004), p. 242.
63
See ibid., and David Parkin, ‘Inside and Outside the Mosque: A Master Trope’, in David Parkin and Stephen C. Headley (eds.),
Islamic Prayer across the Indian Ocean: Inside and Outside the Mosque (Richmond, U.K.: Curzon, 2000), pp. 1–22.
64
See Toby Matthiesen, Sectarian Gulf: Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the Arab Spring That Wasn’t (Stanford, CA: Stanford
Briefs, 2013).
65
See Mara A. Leichtman, ‘Revolution, Modernity and (Trans)National Shiʿi Islam: Rethinking Religious Conversion in Senegal’,
Journal of Religion in Africa, 39(3) (2009), pp. 319–351; Leichtman, Shiʿi Cosmopolitanisms.
66
This Lebanese Sunni mosque was built by a woman in memory of her son who died in a car accident.
Acknowledgements
This article would not have been possible without Shaykh al-Zayn’s openness to Mara Leichtman’s
research and his granting her permission to record these sermons. Mara Leichtman is grateful to
Morgan Clarke and Mirjam Künkler for organizing the ‘De-Centering Shiʿism’ workshop held at Princeton
University from 3–5 October 2013, and for putting together this special issue. This article benefit-
ted from the critique of all workshop participants and from two anonymous BJMES reviewers. Mara
Leichtman also expresses a note of appreciation to Felicitas Becker, who first encouraged her to analyse
these sermons. An earlier version of this paper was presented at a workshop on ‘Religion, Media and
Marginality in Africa since 1800’, held at the School of Oriental and African Studies in London, 23–24
March 2013, organized by Felicitas Becker and Joel Cabrita. Unless otherwise noted, Abdullah Alrebh
translated and summarized in English the recordings of the Arabic sermons. Abdullah Alrebh expresses
a note of appreciation to John A. Dowell and Fred Barton for all their encouragement and suggestions.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

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British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies

ISSN: 1353-0194 (Print) 1469-3542 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cbjm20

Shiʿi preaching in West Africa: the Dakar sermons

Mara A. Leichtman & Abdullah Alrebh

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2017.1387418

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Shiʿi preaching in West Africa: the Dakar sermons of Lebanese

CONTACT Mara A. Leichtman maral@msu.edu

experiences, highlighting contemporary solutions to problems.3 Considered ‘culture brokers’

A biography of Shaykh ʿAbdul Munʿam al-Zayn17

examples of ecumenicalism in al-Zayn’s educational background, which are also apparent

The Iraq war

The liberation of Palestine

Gaffney, The Prophet’s Pulpit, p. 246.

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