Land Titles and Deeds

Reference: Property Registration Decree and Related Laws: Land Titles and Deeds by Oswaldo D. Agcaoili

I. TORRENS SYSTEM IN GENERAL

a. PD 1529 (Property Registration Decree): General Principles and Purpose
Alba vs. Cruz, 17 Phil 49 (1910)
Legarda vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590 (1915)
Capitol Subdivision, Inc. vs Province of Negros Occidental, 117 Phil. 59 (1963)
Republic vs Umali, 253 Phil. 732 (1989)
Pino vs CA, 275 Phil 483 (1991)
Tan vs Phil Banking, 407 Phil. 591 (2001)
Casimiro Devt. Corp vs Mateo 670 Phil. 311 (2011)

Grey Alba vs Dela Cruz, 17 Phil 61; GR No. 5246, September 16, 1910
(Land Titles and Deeds – Registration under the Torrens system is a proceeding in rem)

Facts: Petitioner heirs sought the registration of two parcels of agricultural land and the court entered a
decree directing the registration in favor of the petitioners, as co-owners subject to the usufructuary
rights if the widower of the petitioner’s sister. Respondent tenant filed a motion for the revision of the
case upon the ground that he is the absolute owner of the disputed lands, having inherited them from
his father, who had a state grant for the same.

Issue: WON modification of the decree as to exclude said land will prosper.

Held: No, the main principle of registration is to make registered titles indefeasible. Upon the
presentation in court if an application for the registration of the title to lands, the theory under the
Torrens system is that all occupants, adjoining owners, adverse claimants, and other interested persons
are notified of the proceedings, and have a right to appear in opposition to such application. In other
words, the proceeding is against the world.

A proceeding is in rem when the object of the action is to bar indifferently all who might be minded to
make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established, and if anyone in the world has
a right to be heard on the strength of alleging facts which, if true, show an inconsistent interest.

Legarda vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590 (1915)

(Land Titles and Deeds – Purpose of the Torrens System of Registration)

Facts: A stone wall stands between the adjoining lot of Legarda and Saleeby. The said wall and the strip
of land where it stands is registered in the Torrens system under the name of Legarda in 1906. Six years
after the decree of registration is released in favor of Legarda, Saleeby applied for registration of his lot
under the Torrens system in 1912, and the decree issued in favor of the latter included the stone wall
and the strip of land where it stands.

Issue: Who should be the owner of a land and its improvement which has been registered under the
name of two persons?
Held: For the issue involved, The Land Registration Act (Act 496) affords no remedy. However, it can be
construed that where two certificates purports to include the same registered land, the holder of the
earlier one continues to hold title and will prevail.

The real purpose of the Torrens system of registration, is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to
any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at the time of registration, in
the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, once a title is
registered the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or
sitting in the “mirador de su casa,” to avoid the possibility of losing his land.

The law guarantees the title of the registered owner once it has entered into the Torrens system.

Capitol Subdivision, Inc. vs Province of Negros Occidental, 117 Phil. 59 (1963)

FACTS: Lot 378, which is the subject matter of this case, is part of Hacienda Madalagan, registered under
the name of Agustin Amenabar and Pilar Amenabar, covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 1776
issued in the name of the aforementioned in 1916.

Sometime in 1920, the Amenabars sold the aforementioned Hacienda to Jose Benares for the purchase
price of P300,000, payable in instalments. In 1924, the Original Certificate of Title issued in the name of
the Amenabars was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, Benares obtained a Transfer Certificate of Title under
his name.

Meanwhile, in 1921, Benares mortgaged the Hacienda including Lot 378 to Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co.
And then later in 1926, he again mortgaged the Hacienda, including said Lot 378, on the Philippine
National Bank, subject to the first mortgage held by the Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co.

These transactions were duly recorded in the office of the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental.

The mortgage in favor of the Bank was subsequently foreclosed and the Bank acquired the Hacienda,
including Lot 378, as purchaser at the foreclosure sale.

Accordingly, the TCT in the name of Benares was cancelled and another TCT was issued in the name of
the Bank.

In 1935, the Bank agreed to sell the Hacienda to the son of Jose Benares, Carlos Benares, for the sum of
P400,000, payable in annual installments, subject to the condition that the title will remain with the Bank
until full payment.

Thereafter, Carlos Benares transferred his rights, under his contract with the Bank, to plaintiff herein,
which completed the payment of the installments due to the Bank in 1949.

Hence, the Bank executed the corresponding deed of absolute sale to the plaintiff and a transfer
certificate of title covering Lot 378 was issued.

It should be noted that, despite the acquisition of the Hacienda in 1934 by the Bank, the latter did not
take possession of the property for Jose Benares claimed to be entitled to retain it under an alleged right
of lease.
For this reason, the deed of promise to sell, executed by the Bank in favour of Carlos P. Benares, contained
a caveat emptor stipulation.

When, upon the execution of the deed of absolute sale 1949, plaintiff took steps to take possession the
Hacienda and it was discovered that Lot 378 was the land occupied by the Provincial Hospital of Negros
Occidental. Immediately thereafter, plaintiff made representations with or on October 4, 1949, plaintiff
made representations with the proper officials to clarify the status of said occupation. Not being satisfied
with the explanations given by said officials, it brought the present action on June 10, 1950.

In its answer, defendant maintained that it had acquired the lot in question in the year 1924-1925 through
expropriation proceedings and that it took possession of the lost and began the construction of the
provincial hospital thereon. They further claimed that for some reason beyond their comprehension, title
was never transferred in its name and it was placed in its name only for assessment purposes.

And that defendant acted in bad faith in purchasing the lot knowing that the provincial hospital was
situated there and that he did not declare such property for assessment purposes only until 1950.

ISSUE: Whether or not defendant herein had acquired the lot in question in the aforementioned
expropriation proceedings.

HELD: The Court held that defendant was not able to sufficiently prove that they have acquired the legal
title over Lot 378. Several circumstances indicate that the expropriation had not been consummated.

First, there, the entries in the docket pertaining to the expropriation case refer only to its filing and the
publication in the newspaper of the notices. Second, there was an absence of a deed of assignment and
of a TCT in favour of the Province as regards Lot 378. Third, the property was mortgaged to Bacolod-
Murcia Milling Co. Lot 378 could not have been expropriated without the intervention of the Milling Co.
And yet, the latter was not made a party in the expropriation proceedings. And fourth, a second
mortgage was constituted in favour of the Back, which would not have accepted the mortgage had Lot
378 not belonged to the mortgagor. Neither could said lot have been expropriated without the Bank’s
knowledge and participation.

Furthermore, in the deed executed by the Bank promising to sell the Hacienda Mandalagan to Carlos
Benares, it was explicitly stated that some particular lots had been expropriated by the Provincial
Government of Negros Occidental, thus indicating, by necessary implication, that Lot 378 had not been
expropriated.

Republic vs Umali, 253 Phil. 732 (1989)

The Torrens system was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the most effective
measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim
of ownership is established and recognized. If a person purchases a piece of land on the assurance
that the seller’s title thereto is valid, he should not run the risk of being told later that his
acquisition was ineffectual after all. This would not only be unfair to him. What is worse is that if
this were permitted, public confidence in the system would be eroded and land transactions
would have to be attended by complicated and not necessarily conclusive investigations and proof
 of ownership. The further consequence would be that land conflicts could even be more
numerous and complex than they are now and possibly more abrasive if not even violent.

Pino vs CA, 275 Phil 483 (1991)

The main purpose of the Torrens System is to avoid possible conflicts of title to real estate and to
facilitate transactions relative thereto by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of a
Torrens Certificate of Title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further, except when the
party concerned had actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that should impel a reasonably
cautious man to make such further inquiry.

Thus, where innocent third parties relying on the correctness of the certificate thus issued,
acquire rights over the property, the court cannot disregard such rights. He is protected.

Tan vs Phil Banking, 407 Phil. 591 (2001)

Casimiro Devt. Corp vs Mateo 670 Phil. 311 (2011)

b. Constitutional Principle

b.1 Regalian Doctrine

Republic vs CA and Dela Rosa, 243 Phil. 381 (1988)

Chavez vs Public Estates Authority, 433 Phil. 506 (2002)
Aranda vs Republic, 671 Phil. 651 (2011)

A. Concept and Effects

All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. (Sec. 2, Article
XII, Constitution)

Republic of the Philippines, Benguet & Atok vs Court of Appeals & Dela Rosa G.R. No.L-43938 April 15,1988

FACTS:

The case is about a parcel of land whose ownership is disputed by four parties: the dela Rosas, Benguet Consolidated Inc
(BCI), Atok Corp, and the Bureau of Forestry Development (BFD).

In 1965, Jose de la Rosa on his and on his three children’s behalf, applied to register a parcel of land divided into 9 lots in
Benguet. According to the children, they acquired the land by virtue of prescription. As evidence they produced tax
declarations and realty tax receipts.

Benguet Consolidated Inc (BCI) opposed their application, claiming that half the lots were covered by mineral claim sold
to it in 1934. Since 1934, BCI had been in actual, continuous and exclusive possession of the land in concept of owner. As
evidence BCI presented geological mappings, payment of taxes, and construction on the land. Atok Corp’s claim is similar
to BCI, that a mineral claim covering the lots had been sold to it in 1931. Their evidence is similar to BCI: construction and
tax payments.

The BFD also objected, saying that the land was covered by the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve (CCFR) under Proc. No.
217, dated 1929. As it was forest land, it was not subject to alienation as stated in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.
In the end, the CA affirmed the BFD’s rights on the surface of the land, while reaffirming the rights to the underground to
both BCI and Atok. In other words, the CA ruled that the surface was to be agricultural on the surface, and mineral
underneath.

ISSUE: Who has the best claim over the land? BCI and Atok Corp WON land can be agricultural and mineral at the same
time. NO

HELD: BCI and Atok have vested rights over the land. The Court found that the mineral claims sold to both BCI and Atok
have been perfected prior to the approval of the 1935 Constitution. The court had earlier declared the legal effects of a
valid mineral claim: it segregates the area from the public domain and confers to the locator the beneficial ownership pf
the claim. As of 1935, they were removed from the public domain and had become private properties of BCI and Atok.
Even if the land was included in the CCFR, it did not impair the rights vested in both mining companies. The claim of the
dela Rosas were utterly disregarded for weak evidence, and even so, they could not have acquired the land through
prescription as the same had already been converted to mineral land.

Land cannot be half agri and half mineral. The SC said the classification of land must be categorical. In this case, while the
land was intiailly classified as forest land, it ceased to be so and became completely mineral when the mining claims were
perfected. Even if the surface was being tilled, it is still to be considered mineral land.

Jura regalia. The SC discussed jura regalia in Sections 3-6 of Commonwealth Act No. 137. The Regalian doctrine is intended
for the benefit of the State, and not of private persons. Example, if a person is the owner of agricultural land and minerals
are discovered underneath, his ownership pf the land does not give him the right to extract or utilize the minerals without
the permission of the State, to which the minerals belong. To further expound, once minerals are discovered in the land,
the State can discontinue the surface tilling so as to not impede the mining undertaken therein.

POLICY: The classification of land must be categorical, it cannot be half and half. The perfection of mining claims convert
land to mineral land even if they were previously classified as forest land.

Aranda v. Republic (August 24, 2011)

Under the Regalian doctrine which is embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution,
all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to ownership
of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State,
it remains part of the inalienable public domain. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence
must be established that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.

To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must
establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a
legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the Government that the
lands applied for are alienable and disposable.

Chavez v. Public Estates Authority

Under Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, private parties could reclaim from the sea
only with “proper permission” from the State. Private parties could own the reclaimed land only if not
“otherwise provided by the terms of the grant of authority.” This clearly meant that no one could reclaim
from the sea without permission from the State because the sea is property of public dominion. It also
meant that the State could grant or withhold ownership of the reclaimed land because any reclaimed
land, like the sea from which it emerged, belonged to the State. Thus, a private person reclaiming from
 the sea without permission from the State could not acquire ownership of the reclaimed land which would
remain property of public dominion like the sea it replaced. Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866
adopted the time-honored principle of land ownership that “all lands that were not acquired from the
government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain.”

Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters must be read together with laws subsequently enacted on
the disposition of public lands. In particular, CA No. 141 requires that lands of the public domain must
first be classified as alienable or disposable before the government can alienate them.

The Amended JVA covers not only the Freedom Islands, but also an additional 592.15 hectares
which are still submerged and forming part of Manila Bay. There is no legislative or Presidential act
classifying these submerged areas as alienable or disposable lands of the public domain open to
disposition. These submerged areas are not covered by any patent or certificate of title. There can be no
dispute that these submerged areas form part of the public domain, and in their present state are
inalienable and outside the commerce of man. Until reclaimed from the sea, these submerged areas are,
under the Constitution, “waters x x x owned by the State,” forming part of the public domain and
consequently inalienable. Only when actually reclaimed from the sea can these submerged areas be
classified as public agricultural lands, which under the Constitution are the only natural resources that the
State may alienate. Once reclaimed and transformed into public agricultural lands, the government may
then officially classify these lands as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition. Thereafter, the
government may declare these lands no longer needed for public service. Only then can these reclaimed
lands be considered alienable or disposable lands of the public domain and within the commerce of man.

2. Native Title and Time Immemorial Possession

Native Title - refers to pre-conquest rights to lands and domains which, as far back as memory reaches, have been
held under a claim of private ownership by ICCs/IPs, have never been public lands and are thus indisputably
presumed to have been held that way since before the Spanish Conquest; (Sec. 3(l), IPRA)

Time Immemorial - refers to a period of time when as far back as memory can go, certain ICCs/IPs are known to
have occupied, possessed in the concept of owner, and utilized a defined territory devolved to them, by operation
of customary law or inherited from their ancestors, in accordance with their customs and traditions. (Sec. 3(p),
IPRA)

c. Properties of the Certificate of Title

c.1 Preparation of Decree and Certificate of Title

P.D. 1529. SECTION 39. Preparation of Decree and Certificate of Title. — After the judgment directing the registration of
title to land has become final, the court shall, within fifteen days from entry of judgment, issue an order directing the
Commissioner to issue the corresponding decree of registration and certificate of title. The clerk of court shall send, within
fifteen days from entry of judgment, certified copies of the judgment and of the order of the court directing the
Commissioner to issue the corresponding decree of registration and certificate of title, and a certificate stating that the
decision has not been amended, reconsidered, nor appealed, and has become final. Thereupon, the Commissioner shall
cause to be prepared the decree of registration as well as the original and duplicate of the corresponding original
certificate of title. The original certificate of title shall be a true copy of the decree of registration. The decree of
registration shall be signed by the Commissioner, entered and filed in the Land Registration Commission. The original of
the original certificate of title shall also be signed by the Commissioner and shall be sent, together with the owner's
duplicate certificate, to the Register of Deeds of the city or province where the property is situated for entry in his
registration book.
 Reyes vs Raval Reyes, 124 Phil. 521 (1966)
National Grains Authority vs IAC, 241 Phil 391 (1988)
Cajayon vs Spouses Batuyong, G.R. No. 517 Phil. 648 (2006)
Sps. Valenzuela vs Sps. Mano, 638 Phil 648 (2010)

Reyes v. Raval Reyes

The registered owner of the land has a more preferential right to the possession of the owner’s
duplicate than one whose name does not appear in the certificate of title and yet has to establish his right
to the possession thereto.

National Grains v. IAC

Persons dealing with property covered by a Torrens certificate of title are not required to go beyond what
appears on the face of the title. When there is nothing on the certificate of title to indiciate any cloud or
vice in the ownership of the property, or any encumbrance thereon, the purchaser is not required to
explore further than what the Torrens upon its face indicates in quest for any hidden defect or inchoate
right that may subsequently defeat his right thereto.

Cajuyon v. Batuyong

Petitioners are not builders in good faith. Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he
is building on is his and his ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title. In the instant case, when the
verification survey report came to petitioner’s knowledge their good faith ceased. The survey report is a
professional’s field confirmation of petitioner’s encroachment of respondent’s titled property.

It is doctrinal in land registration that the possession of titled property adverse to the registered owner is
necessarily tainted with bad faith. Thus, proceeding with the construction works on the disputed lot
despite knowledge of respondent’s ownership put petitioners in bad faith.

Spouses Valenzuela v. Spouses Mano

A person, whose certificate of title included by mistake or oversight land owned by another, does not
become owner of such land by virtue of the certificate alone. The Torrens System is intended to guarantee
the integrity and conclusiveness of the certificate of registration but it not intended to perpetrate fraud
against the real owner of the land. The certificate of title cannot be used to protect a usurper from the
true owner.

Title to the property merely confirms and registers ownership.

c.2 Indefeasibility

After the lapse of one year from the entry of the decree of registration, said the decree of registration and the certificate
of title issued shall become incontrovertible. (Sec 32, P.D. 1529)

Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co. vs Dumyung, 232 Phil. 444 (1979)

Heirs of Maximo Labanon vs Heirs of Constancio Labanon, 556 Phil. 750 (2004)
Caraan vs CA, 511 Phil 162 (2005)
Republic vs Guerrero, 520 Phil. 296 (2006)

Lepanto Consolidated v. Dumyung

 A certificate of title is void when it covers property of the public domain classified as forest or timber and
mineral lands. Any title issued on non-disposable lots even in the hands of alleged innocent purchaser for
value, shall be cancelled.

Heirs of Maximo Labanon v. Heirs of Constancio Labanon

The principle of indefeasibility does not totally deprive a party of any remedy to recover the property
fraudulently registered in the name of another. Section 32, PD1529 merely precludes the reopening of
the registration proceedings for titles covered by the Torrens System, but does not foreclose other
remedies for the reconveyance of the property to its rightful owner.

The remedy of the land owner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another’s
name is, after one year form the date of the decree, not to set aside the decree, but, respecting the decree
as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, to bring an ordinary action for reconveyance or, if the
property has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, for damages.

An unrepudiated express trust, as proved by the Deed of Assignment and the Affidavit, does not prescribe.

Hence, the patent and the title issued thereon are void.

Caraan v. CA

A certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in favor of the registered
owner.

In an action for recovery of possession, the defense of the possessor that the plaintiff’s certificate of title
is void is a collateral attack which is prohibited under PD 1529.

Thus, the defense of prescription of Caraan cannot stand against the Certificate of Title of Cosme because
under section 47, PD 1529, no title to registered land in derogation of the title of the registered owner
shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.

Republic v. Guerrero

A petition for review of the decree of registration must be filed within one year from the date of entry of
the decree. And in case of public lands, the one-year period commences from the date of issuance of the
patent by the Government.

Here, the sales patent was issued on 1982 and this action to amend the certificate was filed only in 1989.
Moreover, an administrative claim, although filed within the 1-year prescriptive period, does not serve to
toll the 1-year period.

A petition for review of the decree of registration refers to a review of the decree of registration in the
Regular Courts and not in the Bureau of Lands.

c.3 Prescription

No title to registered land in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession. (Sec. 47, P.D. 1529)

Javier vs Concepcion, 182 Phil. 554 (1979)

The defense of prescription of the cause of action for recovery of possession by the registered owner is
without merit. The established rule is that one cannot acquire title to a registered land by prescription or
adverse possession.
 Laches is likewise not available because there are no intervening rights of third persons which may be
affected or prejudiced by a decision ordering the return of the lots. Hence, the equitable defense of laches
will not apply against the registered owners.

c.4 Collateral Attack

Halili vs CIR, 326 Phil 982 (1996)

Madrid vs Spouses Martinez 612 Phil. 920 (2009)

Green Acres Holdings Inc. vs. Cabral, 710 Phil. 235 (2013)

A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a
direct proceeding in accordance with law. (Sec. 48, P.D. 1529)

Madrid v. Bonifacio

Accion Publiciana, also known as accion plenaria de posesion, is an ordinary civil proceeding to
determine the better right of possession of realty independent of title. It refers to an ejectment suit filed
after the expiry of one year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of
possession of the realty.

The objective of the plaintiffs in an accion publiciana is to recover possession only, and not
ownership. However, where the question of ownership is raised, the courts may pass upon the issue to
determine who has the better right of possession. Such determination is merely provisional and not
conclusive on the question of ownership.

Here, both parties claim ownership of the property. Petitioners through oral sale and respondents
as represented by a TCT in their names.

More weight is given to the TCT because it is evidence of indefeasible title to property. The title
holder is entitled to all the attributes of ownership, including possession.

The petitioner-defendants attack on the validity of respondent-plaintiffs title, by claiming that

fraud attended its acquisition, is a [prohibited] collateral attack on the title. It is an attack incidental to the
quest to defend their possession of the properties in an accion publiciana not in a direct action whose
main objective is to impugn the validity of the judgment granting the title.

Halili v. CIR

Here, the union seeks to recover the property from the buyer of the land [MMPCI]. The objective
of such claim is to nullify the title of the buyer to the property, which thereby challenges the judgment
pursuant to which the title was decreed. This is apparently a collateral attack which is not permitted under
the principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens Title. A Torrens Title cannot be collaterally attacked. Hence,
whether or not petitioners have the right to claim ownership of the property is beyond the province of
the instant proceeding.

Here, the action came from the NLRC.