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The Origins of the Austrian Military Frontier in Croatia and the Alleged Treaty of 22 December
1522
Author(s): Gunther E. Rothenberg
Source: The Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 38, No. 91 (Jun., 1960), pp. 493-498
Published by: the Modern Humanities Research Association and University College London,
School of Slavonic and East European Studies
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The Origins of the Austrian
Military Frontier in Croatia and
the Alleged Treaty of 22December
I522
GUNTHER E. ROTHENBERG
FOR over 350 years, from 1522 to i88I, the Habsburgs maintained
a military zone, the Militdrgrenze, Konfin,or VojnaKrajina,along the
southern border of Croatia. The original purpose of this organisation
had been a defensive screen against Turkish incursions, but already
in the middle of the i8th century an Austrian general observed that
it was 'not only a rampart against the Turks, but also a restraint
upon the rebellious tendencies of the Hungarian nobility'.' On this
border the Habsburg military bureaucracy became the supreme
authority and the influence of the Hungarian-Croatian crown was
virtually eliminated. Over the centuries the special military status
of the settlers,the Grenzer or Grani6ari,
created a 'proverbialHabsburg
patriotism, perhaps the only real one which the Habsburg were
capable of fomenting in their realm'.2
The organisation was one of the most successfulin the Habsburg
empire; but although there exist some studies of its development in
the i8th and igth centuries, its origins and early history have not
been given proper emphasis.3 In I892 Alfons Huber, then dean of
Austrian historians, stated that 'an adequate account of the origins
of the Militdrgrenzeremains to be written';4 and in fact, serious
mistakes about the military frontier still exist in the histories of it.
It is the purpose of this paper to clear up one such misconception.
Writers generally have maintained that the Militdrgrenzehad its
origin in a treaty concluded on 22 December I 522 between Lewis II
of Hungary and his brother-in-law,ArchdukeFerdinand I of Austria,
under which Ferdinand assumed responsibility for the defence of
certain fortressesin Croatia.5 One author at least claimed to have
1 Duke Joseph Friedrich zu
Sachsen-Hildburghausen, 1737. His report on the military
frontier printed in SpomeniciHrvatskeKrajine, edited by Radoslav LopaWi6,vol. XX of
MonumentaSpectantiaHistoriamSlavorumMeridionalium,Zagreb, I885, p. 351.
2 Oscar JAszi, The Dissolutionof the HabsburgMonarchy,Chicago, 1929, p. 57.
3 Among others, Franz Vanicek, Spezialgeschichte derMilitargrenze,4 vols., Vienna, I875;
Johann M. Schwicker, Geschichteder osterreichischen Militiirgrenze,Vienna, I883; Josef
Hostinek, Die K. K. Militdr-Grenze,Vienna, i86i; P. Boppe, La Croatiemilitaire, Paris,
1goo; Milan Turkovic, Geschichteder ehemaligencroatisch-slavonischen Militdr-Grenze,Sulak,
1936.
4 Alfons Huber, Geschichtecsterreichs,5 vols., Gotha, vol. IV, pp. 370-I.
i885-96,
'First mentioned by Johann C. V. Engel, Staatskundeund Geschichtevon Dalmatien,
Croatien,und Slavonien,Halle, 1798, p. 566. Again mentioned by Carl B. Hietzinger,

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494 THE SLAVONIC REVIEW
located the document in the Kriegsarchiv in Vienna; but it has been
impossible to sustain his assertion and a search in the archives
revealed neither the original nor a copy.6 None the less, the existence
of such a treaty was uncritically accepted by numerous historians
in the i gth century,7 and was still regarded as a fact in the 1930S.8
Recently a well received book by an Austrian military authority,
Rudolf Kiszling, has repeated this mistake. 'The origins of the Konfin',
writes Kiszling, 'go back to the treaty of 22 December I 522 between
Ferdinand and his brother-in-law, Lewis II.'9 As we shall see, the
introduction of Austrian forces into Croatia occurred several months
before this date; no such treaty actually existed and the military
operations were undertaken at the request of the Croatian nobility
and for the defence of Ferdinand'sAustrian possessions.
There the Turkish threat had been a cause for concern for well
over a century. The Serbian disaster at Kossovo and the gradual
absorption of Bosnia into the Ottoman empire during the I5th
century brought the Turks within striking distance of the southern
border regions of the Holy Roman empire. Raiders first appeared
before Mottling (Mettika) in Carniola in I408, and other incursions
into Carniola, Carinthia, and Styria followed. After I463 they
practically became yearly occurrences.10 For several decades it
appeared as if the Hungarian-Croatian kingdom might serve as an
effective barrier against the Turks, but after the death of Matthias
Corvinus in I490 the realm fell apart and no effective resistance
could be offered. But in the next thirty years the Ottoman empire was
torn by internal conflict and distracted by wars with Venice and its
eastern neighbours, so that despite an intermittent state of war no
serious offensive against Hungary-Croatia was undertaken. In 1521
this situation changed. Suleiman, the new sultan, was able to direct
Statistik der Militargrenzedes osterreichischen
Kaiserthums,3 vols., Vienna, I8I6-23, vol. I,
p. I6. Emile Picot, Les Serbesde Hongrie,Prague, 1873, p. 47, stated that Lewis II 'aban-
donna AL l'empereur [sic] Ferdinand . . . Senj, Klisa, Krupa, Lika, Jajce, et plusieurs
autres places de la frontiierecroate'.
6 Vanicek, op. cit., pp. 5-6; but Dr W. Kraus, director of the archive, writes: 'despite
a most intensive search . . . no such document has been discovered' (letter to author,
5 November 1958).
7Among others, Schwicker, op. cit., p. 8; Hermann I. Bidermann, Geschichteder
dsterreichischenGesamtstaatsidee,2 vols., Innsbruck, I867-89, vol. I, p. 48; S. Rutar,
SlovenskedeZelein ustanovitevvojalkeKrajineza FerdinandaI, Ljubljana, 1883, p. 3.
8 Rupert v. Schumacher, Des ReichesHofzaun. Geschichteder deutschenMilitargrenzeim
Suidosten, Darmstadt, I940, p. 23.
" Die Kroaten.Der Schicksalsweg einesSiidslawenvolkes,
Graz-Cologne, 1956, p. 26. Review
by E. C. Helmreich, AmericanHistoricalReview, 1957, vol. LXII, pp. 9I2-13.
10 The literature on the Turkish incursions is voluminous. A good general account in
Leopold Kupelwieser, Die Kampfe Ungarns mit den Osmanenbis zur Schlachtbei MoUAcs,
Vienna, I889, passim; MS. material in the archives of the Jugoslavenska Akademija
Znanosti i Umjetnosti, Zagreb, Historical Division, II.b.38, III.d.65. Cf. the somewhat
outdated works by Franz v. Krones, 'Die Einfalle der Osmanen in die Steiermark'
(Mitteilungendes HistorischenVereinsfur Steiermark,I859-62, vols. IX-XI, pp. 179-205,
207-64, 203-48) and August Dimitz, GeschichteKrains, 4 vols., Laibach, i874-6, vol. I,
pp. 279 etpassim.

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AUSTRIAN MILITARY FRONTIER IN CROATIA 495
his main army north again, and in August Belgrade, the major
Hungarian border fortress,fell before his attack. At the same time
Turkish attackswere renewed along the whole front and in the spring
of I 52i, and again in I522, Croatia, Carniola, and Styria suffered
from marauders.11
Ferdinand, who had only recently been entrusted by his brother,
Charles V, with the government of the Austrian duchies (Worms,
28 April I52I and Brussels, 7 February I522), was confronted with
the demands of his new subjects for protection. The estates of the
three duchies of Inner-Austria-Carniola, Carinthia, and Styria-
proposed the establishment of a fortified line across Croatia; the
region between the Una and Kulpa rivers was to be garrisonedwith
Austrian troops and strong defences were to be built at Fiume and
Mottling. 12
The Croatian nobles supported this proposal and on 22 March
1522 Count ChristopherFrankopan, 'on behalf of the counts and the
nobility of Croatia' requestedFerdinand to send troopsand to furnish
war material.'3 Already his Austrian military representatives,Hans
von Reichenberg and Georg von Herberstein, were trying to enlist
the assistance of the diet of the empire for the projected under-
taking.' Although Croatia lay outside the boundariesof the empire,
the diet voted a levy of 3,ooo foot for three months. Furthermeasures,
if necessary, were to be decided by a special commission which was
to sit in Vienna after the diet adjourned.'5
Without waiting for the imperial forces Ferdinand at once under-
took extensive military preparationsin Austria. Officerswere sent to
the Croatian border to make a first-handappraisalof the situation.'6
Supplies were accumulated, transport requisitioned, and a force of
mercenaries mustered into service.'7 At first the command was
offered to Georg von Herberstein,but when he refused Count Niklas
Salm was appointed instead.'8
Towards the end of June the Austrians were in the field and on
3 July I522 Salm reported that Turkish attacks against Krupa and
11 Reports in Codex DiplomaticusPartium Regno Hungariae Adnexarum,vol. XXXI of
MonumentaHungariaeHistorica, ISt series, Budapest, 1903, pp. 45-61.
12 Kupelwieser, Kdmpfe Ungarns, p. 208; R. Lopagic, 'Prilozi za povijest Hrvatske
krajine' (VjesnikZemaljskogArhiva, Zagreb, 1905, vol. VII, p. 85), and resolutions of the
estates, Laibach, 3 I March 1522, CodexDiplomaticus,pp. 52-4.
13 Agreement of 22 March 1522, Brussels, in CodexDiplomaticusComitumde Frange-
panibus, vol. XXXVIII of MonumentaHungariae Historica, Ist series, Budapest, 1913,
Pp. 341-6.
14 Akademie der Wissenschaften, Munchen, Deutsche Reichstagsakten-Jtungere Reihe,
Gotha, I901, vol. III, p. 75.
I Ibid.,p. I2 I. 16 Codex
Diplomaticus,pp. 38-46.
17
An extended discussion, somewhat outdated, can be found in Karl Oberleitner,
'Osterreichs Finanzen und Kriegswesen unter Ferdinand I' (Archivfur die Kundetster-
reichischerGeschichte,i86o, vol. XXII, pp. 61-75, 2II-31). The relevant documents are
in CodexDiplomaticus, pp. 6I-I2I.
18 Ibid., p. 140.

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496 THE SLAVONIC REVIEW

Wihitsch (Bihac), the key positions on the Una, had been repelled.
At the same time, however, he urgently requested additional troops
and explained that the arrival of the imperial levy did not constitute
a reinforcement. The imperial forces refused to place themselves
under his orders and, as Salm noted with some exasperation, 'did
nothing but to sit around and eat up rations'.'9 Moreover, the diet
had failed to provide for their pay and provisions, so that they
became a drain on the Austrian supplies.20 None the less, Salm'sforce
had stabilised the military situation, and by the autumn of I522
military experts thought major Turkish irruptionsinto Carniola and
Styria unlikely.21
But another major Turkish offensive was anticipated for the
coming spring, and Ferdinand considered the financial and military
resourcesof his possessionsinadequate to meet the threat. It was a
matter for the empire, and to this end he went in person before the
diet of Nuremberg to argue for assistanceagainst the Turks.22Once
again, his request was supported by the papal legate and by separate
Hungarian and Croatian delegations. 23After debating over a month
the diet resolved on 22 December 1522 to maintain a force of 4,000
foot for a six months' period at Odenburg (Sopron) in northern
Hungary. A Hungarian request for cavalry was refused, but the diet
did promise to send twenty master-gunners as well as supplies of
powder and shot. 24 It would appear as if this 'Reply given by the
estates to the Hungarian envoys regarding their request for aid'
has been mistakenly identified as a treaty between Lewis II and
Ferdinand I regarding garrisonsin Croatia.
As a matter of fact the transaction of 22 December did not apply
to Croatia; on the contrary the Croatian delegation, led by Count
Bernhardt Frankopan, made an impassioned plea for the provision
of support to their country. Over a month later, on 9 February I523,
the diet passed a separate resolution extending aid to Croatia. No
additional troops were to be provided, but detachments from the
main body were to man a number of castles and forts there.25
The great Turkish offensive, expected for the summer of I 523,
failed to materialise, but the numerous irregular forces maintained
19 Salm to Ferdinand, Rain, 22 June, and 3 July 1522, ibid.,pp. 156-7, I82-7.
20 Ferdinand to Charles V, Linz, 22 September I522, in Die Korrespondenz
FerdinandsI,
edited by Wilhelm Bauer, vol. XI of Verdientlichungen der Kommission
fir neuereGeschichte
Csterreichs,Vienna, I908, p. 17. (Cited hereafter as Korrespondenz.)
21 Report from Hans Helfenberg, Buda, 23 September 1522, Codex Diplomaticus,
pp. 204-5.
22 Ferdinand to Charles V, Nuremberg, 5 November 1522, Korrespondenz, pp. 30-3.
23 p. 45.
Reichstagsakten,
24 'Antworten die von den Standen den ungarischen Gesandten auf ihre Bitte um
Hilfe erteilt wurden' (ibid., pp. 346-52). The original in Haus- Hof-und Staatsarchiv,
Vienna, Mainzer Erzkanzler Archiv, Reichstagsakten, fasc. 4b, fol. 786-go.
25 'Die Stande an die Grafen und Herren Kroatiens' (ibid., fol. 217).

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AUSTRIAN MILITARY FRONTIER IN CROATIA 497
by the Ottoman border lords continued to harry Croatia and
Carniola for the next three years.26Meanwhile Ferdinand found the
maintenance of his military establishment in Croatia exceedingly
difficult. The mercenariespromised by the empire failed to arrive.27
On the contrary, men and equipment had to be diverted to help in
the imperial campaign in Italy. 28 The estates of the Austrian duchies
were reluctant to carry the heavy financial burden alone,29and the
great magnates in Croatia became restive and on several occasions
plotted to turn the country over to the Turks.30 But Ferdinand
gradually consolidated his position. There was established a network
of castles, fortified villages, blockhouses,watch-towers and obstacles,
covering the major routes through the Croatian uplands. When part
of the Landsknecht garrisonshad to be withdrawn, Christian refugees
from the Turkish occupied Balkan areas, Uscocsor Wallachsas they
were then called, were taken into service.3' Arms and ammunition
were distributed to arm certain trusted Croatian nobles.32
The military and administrative necessities of continual border
warfare brought a decline in the authority of the Hungarian crown
and of its representative in Croatia, the banus,and an increase in
the authority of the Austrian commandant, the Feldhauptmann.
Habsburg influence was becoming paramount in the country, and
even before the battle of Mohacs (29 August I526) decided the fate
of their nominal suzerain, Lewis II, the Croatian nobility requested
Ferdinand to take them under his formal protection.33
It is not clear whether this had been Ferdinand's ultimate inten-
tion. It is certain that he had expected a continued Hungarian
contribution to the defence of Croatia and had only reluctantly
shouldered the entire responsibility.34Still, there was a reward.
26 Korrespondenz, pp. 130-I, I 74, 236-7.
27 See the letters in Korrespondenz, pp. 58, 63-7, et passim.
28 Ferdinand to Charles V, Stuttgart, io June I524, and the memorandum, Innsbruck,
2 April 1525 (ibid., pp. I38-41, I57-8)-
29 Ferdinand to Charles V, Spires, 25 May I526 (ibid., pp. 387-8).
30 Intelligence report, 5 January 1524, in Codex Diplomaticus,pp. 336-7. The most
famous conspiracy was that of Christopher Frankopan, reported by Ferdinand to Charles
V, Innsbruck, 14 March I525, Korrespondenz, p. 275. Cf. Vilmos Frakn6i, Ungarnvor der
Schlachtbei Mohacs, I524-1526, Budapest, x886, pp. I35-8.
31 Documents cited in Hermann I. Bidermann, 'Zur Ansiedlung und Verwaltungs-
geschichte der krainer Uskoken im XVI Jahrhundert' (Archivfur Heimatskundevon Franz
Schumi,I882, I887, vols. I, II, pp. 129-54, 170-207). The term Uscocis of Serbian origin
and means escapee. It was of no special ethnographic significance at that period, but
was used with others, such as pribeg or predawetz, to identify Christian refugees from
Serbia and Bosnia. Cf. Karl v. Czoernig, Ethnographie der Osterreichischen
Monarchie,3 vols.,
Vienna, I857, vol. II, p. I68; and for a recent account see A. Ivi6, MigraciyeSrba u
HrvatskuXVI, XVII i XVIII stolj6ca,Subotica, 1923, pp. 3-37.
32 CodexDiplomaticus,pp. 234-5, 284, 563.
33 For such negotiations in 1525 see CodexDiplomaticus pp. 493-9; for negotiations
of May-June I526 see Acta HabsburgicaRegni CroatiaeDalmatiae Slavoniae vol. XXXV
of MonumentaSpectantiaHistoriamSlavorumMeridionalium,Zagreb, I914, pp. I-I5.
34 See Ferdinand to Lewis, Nuremberg, 6 December 1523, and Tubingen, 26 March
1526, Korrespondenz, pp. 79-8o, 375.

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498 THE SLAVONIC REVIEW

When the turbulent and inefficient Hungarian-Croatianrealm col-


lapsed after Mohacs, Ferdinand's position in Croatia enabled him
to advance his claim to the Croatian throne without encountering
the determined national opposition which prevailed in Hungary.
The estates of Croatia, asserting their right to act independently of
Hungary, elected the archdukeas king of Croatia on I January I527,
with the significant proviso that he and his successorswould always
keep adequate forcesin the country as a defence against the Turks.35
Of course, in January I527, neither Ferdinand nor the Croatian
estates could foresee that the gradual evolution of the military pro-
tection promised in the act of accession would lead to the establish-
ment of a military zone in which the appointed Habsburg officials
would supersede the Croatian as well as the Hungarian authorities
and in which the military colonists would mount guard not only
against Turkish raids but also against the separatist aspirations of
the Croatian and Hungarian nobility. However, it can be asserted
that the origins of the Militargrenzeare to be found not in the
mythical treaty between Ferdinand I and Lewis II but in the
military arrangements initially undertaken for the defence of the
Austrian duchies and in the agreements made in 1523 and I527
with the Croatian estates.
S5 Documents in Acta Comitalia Regni CroatiaeDalmatiae Slavoniae, vol. XXXIII of
MonumentaSpectantiaSlavorumMeridionalium,Zagreb, I914, pp. 57-64.

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