Jesuit Concept Spatium Imaginarium in Hobbes

Jesuit Concepts of Spatium Imaginarium and Thomas Hobbes's Doctrine of Space
Author(s): Cees Leijenhorst

Source: Early Science and Medicine, Vol. 1, No. 3, Jesuits and the Knowledge of Nature
(Oct., 1996), pp. 355-380
Published by: Brill
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4130253
Accessed: 29-07-2018 23:49 UTC
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JESUIT CONCEPTS OF SPA TIUM IMAGINARIUM AND
THOMAS HOBBES'S DOCTRINE OF SPACE'
CEES LEIJENHORST
University of Utrecht
1. Introduction
Historians of science and philosophy have gradually come to re-

alize that late scholastic textbooks, especially the ones composed
by Jesuits such as Pereira, Suarez, Fonseca, Toletus, Arriaga, Rubio
and the Conimbricenses, form an important background to the
seventeenth-century mechanistic philosophy of nature. Descartes,
Hobbes and Leibniz all enjoyed a formal academic training2 which
included these commentaries. Historians such as Gilson,3 Koyre,4
Freudenthal5 and more recently Grant6 Wallace,7 and Ariew,8 have
1 My thanks are due to Karl Schuhmann (Utrecht) and Roger Ariew (Virginia
Tech) for their constructive criticisms and to Steve Harris (Brandeis) for his invita-
tion to join this thematic cluster and for meticulously editing my work. This article
is a thoroughly reworked and expanded version of a paper I gave at the HOPOS-
Conference in Roanoke (VA), April 20, 1996.
2 On academic curricula in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, see L.
Brockliss, French Higher Education in the 17th and 18th Centuries (Oxford, 1987);
William T. Costello, The Scholastic Curriculum at Early Seventeenth-Century Cambridge
(Cambridge, Mass., 1958); K. Eschweiler, "Die Philosophie der Spanischen Sp5tt-
scholastik auf den Deutschen Universititen des siebzehnten Jahrhunderts,"
Spanische Forschungen der Girresgesellschaft 1 (1928), 251-325; E. Lewalter, Spanisch-
Jesuitische und Deutsch-Lutherische Metaphysik des 17. Jahrhunderts. Ein Beitrag zur Ge-
schichte der Iberisch-Deutschen Kulturbeziehungen und zur Vorgeschichte des Deutschen
Idealismus (Hamburg, 1935); J.S. Freedman, Deutsche Schulphilosophie im Reforma-
tionszeitalter (1500-1650) (Mfiinster, 1984).
3 E. Gilson, Etudes sur le R6le de la Pensee Medievale dans la Formation du Systeme
Cartesien (Paris, 1930).
4 A. Koyre, Descartes und die Scholastik (Bonn, 1923).
5 J. Freudenthal, "Spinoza und die Scholastik," in Philosophische Aufsdtze Zeller
Gewidmet (1887) (Leipzig: Zentral-Antiquariat der DDR, 1962), 85-138.
6 E. Grant, "In Defense of the Earth's Centrality and Immobility: Scholastic Re-
action to Copernicanism in the 17th Century," Transactions of the American Philo-
sophical Society 4(1984), 1-69.
7 W. Wallace, Galileo and His Sources. The Heritage of the Collegio Romano in Gali-
leo's Science (Princeton, 1984); W. Wallace, Galileo, the Jesuits and the Medieval Aristotle
(Aldershot, 1991).
8 R. Ariew, "Descartes and Scholasticism: The Intellectual Background to
Descartes' Thought," in The Cambridge Companion to Descartes, ed. J. Cottingham
(Cambridge, 1992), 58-90. See also The Rise of Modern Philosophy. The Tension be-
tween the New and Traditional Philosophies from Machiavelli to Leibniz, ed. T. Sorell
(Oxford, 1993), especially C. Mercer, "The Vitality and Importance of Early Mod-
em Aristotelianism," ibid., 67: "Early modern Aristotelianism not only shows an
? E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1996 ESM 1,3
356 CEES LEIJENHORST
demonstrated that sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Aristotel

ism in general-and the Jesuit brand in particular-was m
more than just the negative background against which these phi
sophers defined themselves as 'new' or 'modern'. The 'moder
were engaged in a debate with Aristotelianism, which they tried
refute, but from which their own philosophies also seem to
drawn an important number of arguments and concepts, al
employed to their own purposes.
All this implies that in order to gain a complete picture of me
anistic philosophy, we will have to compare it very closely to
evant late-scholastic doctrines, especially as found in the hig
influential Jesuit commentaries on Aristotle's natural philoso
and metaphysics. In this way, we will also be able to gauge the e
tent to which Aristotelianism and notably Jesuit Aristotelianism
still an important factor in seventeenth-century non- or even a
Aristotelian philosophy of nature.
In this article, I will investigate one of the key concepts o
Thomas Hobbes's (1588-1679)9 mechanistic philosophy of
ture, namely that of space. I will compare this concept with
trines of place and space as found in Jesuit textbooks. I will arg
that, although Hobbes explicitly tries to provide a substitute
the Aristotelian concept of place, his own alternative notio
space bears a strong resemblance to Jesuit concepts of spat
imaginarium.
I have restricted myself to what are generally considered to
the most important and influential Jesuit textbooks,10 viz. the o
composed by Franciscus Toletus (1532-1596),"1 the Conim
impressive vitality and resilience, it also contributes to the intellectual debat

the centre of the philosophical revolutions of the period. It was a major for
earl modern thought and one that has gone unexamined for too long."
For a general introduction on Hobbes's philosophy of nature, see the still u
surpassed F. Brandt, Thomas Hobbes' Mechanical Conception of Nature (Copenhag
London, 1928).
10 On scholastic textbooks in general, see P. Reif, "The Textbook Tradition
Natural Philosophy 1600-1650,"Journal of the History of Ideas 30 (1969), 17-3
Reif, "Natural Philosophy in Some Early Seventeenth-Century Scholastic T
books" (Ph. D. diss., St. Louis University, 1962); Ch.B. Schmitt, "The Rise of
Philosophical Textbook," in The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy
Ch.B. Schmitt, Q. Skinner and E. Kessler (Cambridge, 1988), 792-804. On J
textbooks, see Ch. Lohr, "Jesuit Aristotelianism and Sixteenth-Century Metap
ics," in Paradosis. Studies in Memory of Edwin A. Quain, ed. H.G. Fletcher II
M.B. Scholtel (New York, 1976), 203-20.
" F. Toletus, Commentaria una cum Quaestionibus in Octo Libros Aristotelis de P
sica Auscultatione (Coloniae, 1615; first edition Venetiis, 1573). See Bibliotique
THOMAS HOBBES'S DOCTRINE OF SPACE 357
censes,12 Franciscus Suarez (1548-1617),13 Petrus Fonseca

(1528-1599),14 Antonius Rubius (1548-1615)15 and Benedictus
Pereira (?1535-1610).16 These are the result of a massive effort on
the part of the Society ofJesus to provide authoritative editions of,
and commentaries on Aristotle's philosophy to be used as text-
books in the Jesuit colleges throughout the Old and New World.
The most important ones are the books produced by the
Conimbricenses, a group of Jesuit teachers at the University of
Coimbra, led by Petrus Fonseca and later by Emmanuel de Goes.
Their authoritative commentaries, which include the Greek text of
Aristotle and a new, philologically innovative Latin translation,
went through many editions (Venice, Lyons, Cologne, and Mainz)
during the first half of the seventeenth century. These textbooks
were not only read in Jesuit colleges, they were also widely used at
Protestant (Calvinist and Lutheran) universities in Northern Eu-
rope.
This article certainly does not present a full investigation of all
possible sources of Hobbes's doctrine of space. It is only a first
step towards a comprehensive account which would also have to
deal with other Jesuit and non-Jesuit scholastic commentaries on
Aristotle's philosophy. Interesting examples include the works of
the German Calvinist encyclopedists Johann Heinrich Alstedt
(1588-1638)17 and Bartholomeus Keckermann (1571-1609),18
which were widely used as textbooks throughout Northern Eu-
rope, including the British universities. In their work, we can also
find an interesting elaboration of the concept of spatium imagi-
narium, which they explicitly admit to have adopted from the
afore-mentioned Jesuit commentaries.
Compagnie de J sus, ed. A. De Baecker S.J. and C. Sommervogel (Bruxelles-Paris,

1898), vol. VIII, 64-83.
12 Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis lesu in Octos Libros Physicorum
Aristotelis Stagiritae (Lugduni, 1594 (Pars Secunda); Pars Prima Coimbra, 1572).
Sommervogel II, 1273-78.
13 F. Suarez, Disputationes Metaphysicae (Venetiis, 1605; first edition Salamanca,
1597). Sommervogel VII, 1661-87.
14 P. Fonseca, Commentariorum in Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae Libros Tomus
I-IV (Coloniae, 1615; reprint Hildesheim, 1964; first edition Salamanca, 1597).
Sommervogel III, 833-40.
15 A. Rubius, Commentarii in Octo Libros de Physico Auditu seu Auscultatione (Colo-
niae Agrippinae, 1629; first edition Matriti, 1605). Sommervogel VII, 280-4.
16 B. Pereira, De Communibus Omnium Rerum Naturalium Principiis & Affectioni
bus Libri Quindecim (Lugduni, 1588). Sommervogel VI, 499-507.
'7 Encyclopaedia (Herbornae Nassoviorum, 1630).
18 Systema Systemaum (Hanoviae, 1613 (posthumous).
I will first outline Hobbes's relation to Jesuit philosophy in

eral. I will then deal with his arguments against Aristotle's co
of place, after which I will outline Hobbes's own alternativ
trine of space as it is expounded in De Corpore (1655),19 hi
work on natural philosophy and De Motu,20 a very important
lier manuscript version of De Corpore. After an account of th
of spatium imaginarium in some Jesuit commentaries, I will in
gate the parallels between this idea and Hobbes's conce
space.
2. Hobbes and the Jesuits
Thomas Hobbes was quite familiar with Jesuit science and phi-
losophy.21 Occasionally he was even able to find some positive
words about Jesuit authors, although these seem to be confined to
their technical-scientific rather than their speculative-philosophical
work. Throughout his philosophical career, Hobbes frequently
refers to the famous edition with commentary of Euclid's Elements
19 Elementorum Philosophiae Sectio Prima De Corpore (Londini 1655). References to

Hobbes's works are given according to the Molesworth edition (London 1839;
Reprint Aalen 1966), "EW" designating the English Works and "OL" the Opera
Latina. Volume numbers are in Roman, page numbers in Arabic numerals. The fol-
lowing abbreviations are used: DCo = De Corpore (followed by the chapter in
roman and the article in arabic numerals); EL = Elements of Law; L = Leviathan.
20 The manuscript, composed in 1642-3, was formerly known as Anti-White. The
text is presented as a discussion of Thomas White's De Mundo Libri Tres, which tries
to reunite the new heliocentric cosmology and Christian religion, and which criti-
cizes Galileo from a scholastic point of view. Hobbes's discussion of White serves
mainly as a vehicle for presenting his own logic, prima philosophia or first philoso-
phy (which Hobbes defines as a discussion of the basic terms of natural philoso-
phy) and physics to the Mersenne Circle. Much of the material presented in De
Motu was taken up with only a few minor changes in De Corpore. I will make use of
the Jacquot / Jones-edition of the manuscript: Critique du "De Mundo " de Thomas
White, Introduction, texte critique et notes par Jean Jacquot et Harold Whitmore
Jones (Paris, 1973). The work will be abbreviated as DM (followed by the page
number) in view of the more adequate title De Motu. See K. Schuhmann, "Hobbes
dans les Publications de Mersenne en 1644," Bulletin Hobbes VII. Archives de
Philosophie 58 (1995), 2-7.
21 Hobbes took his M.A in 1608 at Magdalen Hall (now Hertford College),
Oxford. In his autobiography he mentions that he mainly studied Aristotelian logic
and natural philosophy, but he also states that he rejected the obsolete lore that his
teachers tried to imbue him with (OL I, xiii; OL I, lxxxvii). He seems to have taken
up reading some manuals after he had decided to develop his own philosophy. Un-
fortunately, we have very little independent information as to what textbooks he
consulted. So we have to reconstruct this by a textual-immanent analysis of the doc-
trinal parallels that exist between Hobbes's work and the then current scholastic
textbooks.
by the great Jesuit mathematician Christophorus Clavius (1538-

1612), "the most learned of the Jesuits and most diligent writer
of all ages."22 Moreover, in his English manuscript on optics, A
Minute or First Draught of the Optiques, Hobbes states that he
adopted his theory of the generation of black and white from a
treatise by "Pere Faber, A Jesuite of Lyons. I thought it so
accomodate to the rest of my cogitations in the Opticques that I
cold not butt make use thereof."23 The reference is probably to an
unknown manuscript on colour by Honore Fabri (1607-1688).24
In addition to these positive judgements of Jesuit science,
Hobbes also offers some harsh criticism. A case in point is his
rejection of Etienne Noel's arguments against the existence of a
vacuum, elaborated in his book Le Plein du Uide (1648).25 Hobbes
also makes fun of the Jesuit Antoine de La Loubere (Atonius
Lalovera) (1600-1664) who, according to Hobbes, implies that the
success of his quadrature of the circle is due to the special grace
God bestows on the Jesuit order.26
Hobbes's disapproval is particularly vehement in the case of
Jesuit metaphysics and natural philosophy. Although Hobbes's
well-known invectives against scholastic philosophy in his Leviathan
are not specifically directed against the Jesuits,27 they certainly in-
22 OL IV, 135.
23 Thomas Hobbes, A Minute or First Draught of the Optiques, ed. E. Condouris
Stroud (Ph. D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison 1983), 185.
24 Stroud, First Draught, 190. Fabri's name also appears in a few passages of a
manuscript (f 196v ff.) kept in the British Library (MS Harleian 6083), which con-
tains an excerpt of Hobbes's philosophy made by his aristocratic protector, Sir
Charles Cavendish. The passages in question seem to refer to H. Fabri's, Philo-
sophiae Tomus Primus Qui Complectitur scientiarum Methodum sex Libris explicatam: logi-
cam Analyticam duodecim Libris demonstratam & aliquot Controversias logicas, breviter
disputatas. auctore petro Mosnerio Doctore Medico. Cuncta excerpta ex praelectionibus RP.
Hon. Faiby. Soc. lesu (Lugduni, 1646). On Fabri, see Sommervogel III, 511-19.
Sommervogel contains no reference to a manuscript on colour.
25 Thomas Hobbes, The Correspondence, ed. N. Malcolm (Oxford 1994), vol. I,
165. However, a few months after this letter to Mersenne, Hobbes radically
changed his mind and became a plenist himself (Correspondence, 172). See J.
Bernhardt, "La Question du Vide Chez Hobbes," Revue d'Histoire des Sciences 46
(1993), 225-32.
26 EW I, 273 and EW VII, 320. The reference is to Antonius Lalovera, Quadra-
tura Circuli et Hyperbolae Segmentum Demonstrata, Toulouse 1651, 13ff.
27 For critical remarks on the negative role of the Jesuit order in English poli-
tics, see Behemoth or the Long Parliament, EW VI, 188-9. See also Hobbes's criticism
of Descartes, reported byJohn Aubrey, 'Brief Lives,' Chiefly of Contemporaries, between
the Years 1669 & 1696, ed. A. Clark, vol. 1 (Oxford, 1898), 367: "Mr. Hobbes was
wont to say that had Mieur Des Cartes (for whom he had a high respect) kept
himselfe to geometrie, he had been the best geometer in the world; but he could
clude them.28 There Hobbes portrays scholastic philosophy

nothing but "insignificant speech", which the Aristotelian maste
make their pupils repeat like parrots, without any comprehensio
of the metaphysical terms they use. Moreover, according to
Leviathan, the scholastics not only spoil the academic youth,
also breed religious controversy and, ultimately, civil war, by m
ing up religion and philosophy.29
In order to give an example of the way scholastics use meaning
less, absurd language, Hobbes simply quotes the title of a cha
of Suarez's Varia Opuscula Theologica.30 That Hobbes's familia
with the famous Spanish Jesuit goes beyond the knowledge
some "absurd" chapter titles is shown by the fact that Hobbes c
cizes a scholastic definition of freedom found in Suarez's magnu
opus, the Disputationes Metaphysicae.31
Both his positive comments and criticisms demonstra
Hobbes's wide-ranging familiarity with Jesuit authors in the fie
not pardon him for his writing in defence of transubstantiation, which he knew
absolutely against his opinion (conscience) and donne meerly to putt a com
ment (flatter) <on> the Jesuites."
28 See Leviathan, chs. 46 & 47, EW III, 664ff.
29 See also EW I, x: "From that time, instead of the worship of God, there
tered a thing called school divinity, walking on one foot firmly, which is the H
Scripture, but halted on the other rotten foot, which the Apostle Paul called
and might have called pernicious philosophy; for it hath raised an infinite numb
controversies in the Christian world concerning religion, and from those con
versies, wars. It is like that Empusa in the Athenian comic poet, which was take
Athens for a ghost that changed shapes, having one brazen leg, but the othe
the leg of an ass, and was sent (as was believed) by Hecate, as a sign of some
proaching evil fortune. Against this Empusa I think [xi] there cannot be invent
better exorcism, than to distinguish between the rules of religion, that is, the
of honouring God, which we have from the laws, and the rules of philosophy, t
is, the opinions of private men; and to yield what is due to religion to the
Scripture, and what is due to philosophy to natural reason." Cf. OL I, unnumb
page 4.
30 L VIII (EW III, 70). The reference is to F. Suarez, De Concursu, Motione et
Auxilio Dei, in Varia Opuscula Theologica, Moguntiae 1600, L. I, C. VI: "Causam
Primam Nihil Necessario Influere in Secundam, Ex Vi Subordinationis Essentialis
Causae Secundae ad Primam, quo Illam ad Agendum luvet". The passage in
Hobbes runs as follows: "What is the meaning of these words. The first cause does
not necessarily inflow any thing into the second, by force of the essential subordi-
nation of the second causes, by which it may help it to work? They are the transla-
tion of the title of the sixth chapter of Suarez' first book, Of the Concourse, Mo-
tion, and Help of God. When men write whole volumes of such stuff, are they not
mad, or intend to make others so."
31 See K. Schuhmann, "Le Short Tract, Premiere Oeuvre Philosophique de
Hobbes," Hobbes Studies VIII (1995), 32. For other critical remarks from Hobbes on
Suarez, see EW VI, 185; EW IV, 330; EW V, 18, 37 & 266.
of mathematics, optics, and natural philosophy. It is also clear that

he took Jesuit science and philosophy more seriously than his vig-
orous diatribes in the Leviathan may suggest. To be sure, Hobbes
tries to offer an alternative mechanistic philosophy of nature,
based on clear and unambiguous definitions, natural reason and
with explanations of natural phenomena in terms of matter and
motion rather than in terms of all kinds of mysterious Aristotelian
explanatory principles.32
Rather than just dismissing- scholastic philosophy and going his
own separate way, Hobbes tries to come up with cogent arguments
against it, in order to persuade his contemporaries, still very much
entrenched in scholasticism, to take his side. In his work, we find
many discussions of doctrines which his contemporaries will imme-
diately have recognized as being traditionally scholastic.33
Hobbes's relation to scholasticism is, however, even more com-
plex than that. For instance, in many cases Hobbes adopts scholas-
tic definitions and theorems, only to draw utterly anti-scholastic
conclusions from them.34 In general, Hobbes often takes over a
scholastic framework but fills it with a mechanistic content. Per-
haps the best example of this is the very structure of Hobbes's
Philosophia Prima, the second part of De Corpore, which partly uses
traditional scholastic notions as chapter titles. For example, the
tenth chapter "Of Power and Act" (De Potentia et Actu) expounds a
strict necessitarianism which completely discards the traditional
potency-act distinction. Even this "mechanistic content" itself, how-
32 EW I, 531: Hobbes lists all kinds of Aristotelian "mysterious notions", such as

motion "by itself, by species, by its own power, by substantial forms, by incorporeal
substances, by instinct, by antiperistasis, by antipathy, sympathy, occult quality, and
other empty words of schoolmen." Cf. OL I, 431.
33 Roger Ariew investigates a similar debate of Descartes with late scholastics,
such as Eustachius ' Sancto Paulo and Antonio Rubio. See his "Descartes and the
Late Scholastics on the Order of the Sciences," in Conversations with Aristotle, eds. C.
Blackwell and S. Kusukawa (forthcoming).
34 A case in point is his definition of universals, discussed by M. Pecharman,
"La Logique de Hobbes et la "Tradition Aristotdlicienne," Hobbes Studies VIII
(1995), 105-24. Pecharman shows that Hobbes adopts the Aristotelian definition of
the universal as that which is predicated of many things, but that he draws the ut-
terly non-Aristotelian conclusion that it is only names which can serve as universals.
See also J.P. Sommerville, Thomas Hobbes: Political Ideas in Historical Context (Lon-
don 1992), 2: "Hobbes frequently adopted or adapted familiar materials. His politi-
cal theory was not (or not only) a deductive system, but (also) a dialogue with his
contemporaries. As we shall see, one of his most characteristic techniques was to
take commonly held views, and, by introducing a few changes, employ them to
reach unfamilair conclusions."
ever, contains concepts and arguments taken from Aristo

sources to the extent that some doctrines appear to be a m
shuffling of Aristotelian elements.
A case in point is Hobbes's doctrine of imagination which
ily depends on the tradition springing from Aristotle's Parva
ralia.35 In this context, Edward Wallace draws an explicit p
between Aristotle and Hobbes:
Hobbes indeed was little else than translating Aristotle when he wrote: "All
fancies are motions within us, reliques of those made in the sense". The pic-
tures of imagination in fact are simply a result of the general law of nature
that the movement of one substance prolongs itself and gets communicated
to another. And hence it is that in the Rhetoric, Imagination is described as
weak sensation, or, in the language of Hobbes, decaying sense.36
Quite like Aristotle, Hobbes defines imagination in terms of the

propagation of motion in the soul, left behind by the perceived
object after it has dissapeared from our senses. Hobbes uses the
same kinetic analogies as Aristotle to explain this process, such as
the stone, that thrown in the water, causes motion that is propa-
gated even after the stone itself has long since disappeared to the
bottom of the pond.37
As will become clear, Hobbes doctrine of space also provides an
example of the close ties that exist between his mechanistic phi-
losophy of nature and Jesuit Aristotelianism.38 Here again, Hobbes
sets out with a critique of relevant Aristotelian doctrines.
35 See my "Motion, Monks and Golden Mountains: Campanella and Hobbes on

Perception and Cognition" Bromianae Campanelliana (forthcoming). The parallel
with the Parva Naturalia was also noted by J.L. Stocks, Aristotelianism (London
1925), 138-9.
36 E. Wallace, Aristotle's Psychology, Cambridge 1882 (reprint New York 1976),
lxxxvii.
37 See L II (EW III, 4); DM 350 and EL II, III, 1 (EW IV, 8). Cf. Aristotle, De
Insomniis 2, 459 a 23-35 and De Div. per Somn. 2, 464 a 6.
38 On Hobbes's relation to Aristotelianism, see Brandt, Thomas Hobbes' Mechani-
cal Conception; Thomas Hobbes. Court Traite des Premiers Principes. Le Short Tract on First
Principles de 1630-1631, texte, traduction et commentaire par Jean Bernhardt
(Paris, 1988); B. Wolfers, "Geschwiitzige Philosophie". Thomas Hobbes' Kritik an
Aristoteles (Wfirzburg, 1991); M. Blay, "Geneise des Couleurs et Modbles M6-
chaniques dans l'Oeuvre de Hobbes," in Thomas Hobbes. Philosophie Premiere, Theorie
de la Science et Politique, ed. Y-Ch. Zarka and J. Bernhardt (Paris, 1990), 153-168; J.
Prins, "Kepler, Hobbes and Medieval Optics," Philosophia Naturalis 24 (1987),
287-310; K. Schuhmann, "Le Vocabulaire de L'Espace", in Hobbes et son Vocabulaire.
Etudes de Lexicographie Philosophique, ed. Y-Ch. Zarka (Paris, 1992), 61-82; Schuh-
mann, "Le Short Tract."
3. Hobbes's rejection of Aristotle's concept of place
Aristotle develops his notion of place (topos) in the fourth book

of his Physics.39 On the basis of the example of water in a vase, he
concludes that the place of the water is the surrounding surface of
the vase itself. Accordingly, he defines place as the first immobile
surface-limit of a surrounding body.40 Aristotle's concept of place
is clearly a "relational" notion, as opposed to an "absolute" notio
of self-subsistent space. Since place is the limit of a surroundin
surface, it cannot exist apart from surrounding bodies. In this con
text, Aristotle discards the atomistic notion of self-subsistent void
space.41
Hobbes puts forward a number of arguments against this view.
First of all, Aristotle himself lists as one of the properties of place
the fact that place is equal to the body which is in place.42 But,
Hobbes objects, how can a two-dimensional surface or a one-di-
mensional surface-limit be equal to a solid body?43 Next, Aristotle
also claims that each natural body qua natural body is inherently
mobile. This view contradicts Aristotle's own definition of place as
the immobile surface-limit of the surrounding body. As a surface,
i.e. as an integral part of a body, place itself is inevitably mobile.44
Another absurd consequence of Aristotle's definition is that if we
move a barrel of wine to the Indies, the wine itself will not have
moved or changed place, since it is still contained by the surface-
limit of the surrounding barrel.45
To be sure, none of these arguments is really new. They can al-
ready be found in John Philoponus's Corollary on Place in his Com-
mentary on Aristotle's Physics.46 This work, though written in the
39 On Aristotle's concept of place, see K. Algra, Concepts of Space in Greek

Thought (Leiden, 1995), 121-260.
40 Phys, IV, 4, 212 a 21.
41 Phys, IV, 7, 213 b 30ff.
42 Phys, IV, 4, 211 a 2.
43 DM 120; DCo VIII, 5 (OL I, 94).
44 DM 120.
45 DM 120. In DCo VIII, 5 (OL I, 95) Hobbes expounds another version of the
same argument. If we move a body, the interior parts of that body will still be con-
tained by the surface-limit of that body itself, and consequently will not move. In
other words, although the body itself moves or changes place, its parts will remain
in the same place, which accrding to Hobbes is absurd.
46 See Philoponus, Corollaries on Place and Void, transl. D. Furley and C. Wild-
berg (London, 1991), 564, 4: "Furthermore, if place must be equal to what is in
place (this is one of the things commonly agreed about place), the surface could
sixth century, was not available in the West during the Middle A
but reappeared in Renaissance Italy.47 There it was used by anti-
istotelian philosophers, such as Bernardino Telesio (1509-1588
and notably Francesco Patrizi (1529-1597)49 who tried to defe
notion of three-dimensional, self-subsistent space against t
Aristotelians.50 The above-mentioned arguments are also lis
and discussed by the various Jesuit commentators, who try to d
fend Aristotle's doctrine of place against the attacks by ancient
modern critics alike.51 In other words, Hobbes could have dr
his arguments against Aristotle's notion of place from a variety
sources. What is interesting, however, is that Hobbes does
adopt the alternative notion of space developed by philosoph
such as Telesio, Patrizi, and Gassendi who upheld the ide
space as incorporeal extension which is self-subsistent (i.e.
stance-like).52 Rather than endorsing this definition of spa
Hobbes takes up the notion of spatium imaginarium develope
Jesuit commentaries.
4. Hobbes's concept of space
Hobbes introduces his own alternative notion of space53 with h

famous thought-experiment concerning the annihilation of
world, which we find at the very beginning of his Philosophia Pr
not be place; for how can there be a surface equal to a body?". Ibidem, 564
"Furthermore, if place must be immovable, and the surface, being the boundary
a body, is moved along with the body whose boundary it is, then it is impossibl
the surface to be place."
47 Printed in Greek in 1535 and in Latin in 1539.
48 On Telesio's concept of space, see K. Schuhmann, "Le Concept de l'Esp
chez Telesio," in Bernardino Telesio e la Cultura Napoletana, ed. R. Sirri an
Torrini (Napoli, 1992), 141-67.
49 On Patrizi's concept of space, see J. Henry, "Francesco Patrizi da Chers
Concept of Space and its Later Influence," Annals of Science 36 (1979), 549-575
50 See Francesco Patrizi, Nova de Universis Philosophia (Ferrariae, 1591), Par
(Pancosmia), Book I (De Spacio Physico), 62r. The relation between Hobbe
Patrizi is explored by K. Schuhmann, "Thomas Hobbes und Francesco Patr
Archivfilr Geschichte der Philosophie 68 (1986), 253-79.
51 See e.g. Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis lesu in Octos Libros Phy
corum Aristotelis Stagiritae (Lugduni, 1594), L. IV, C. V, Q. I, A. I, 22.
52 On Gassendi, see O. Bloch, La Philosophie de Gassendi. Nominalisme, Mati
lisme et Metaphysique (La Haye, 1971), 172-202. In general, see E. Grant, Much
about Nothing. Theories of Space and Vacuum from the Middle Ages to the Scientific Rev
tion (Cambridge, 1981).
53 For a comprehensive discussion of Hobbes's concept of space, see Sch
mann, "Vocabulaire de l'Espace,"passim.
(i.e., the second part of De Corpore).54 Hobbes supposes that one

person survives this annihilation. Although external objects are no
longer extant, this person can still have ideas, especially the funda-
mental idea of space. This is possible because prior to the annihi-
lation, the external objects have worked on us and produced our
concepts of them in us. In other words, Hobbes's fictitious annihi-
lation presupposes a causal account of perception and representa-
tion.55
According to Hobbes, all ideas, especially the paramount idea of

space (spatium imaginarium) are effects of external bodies. Bodies
cause these ideas in us by virtue of their motion which is propa-
gated through the corporeal medium (air or water) and which ul-
timately reaches our heart. There, this motion causes a reactive
movement back to the senses, a "rebound""56 directed outwards.57
This is how Hobbes explains our belief that we perceive all sorts of
things outside of us, whereas in reality sense perception is nothing
but a movement within us.
Thus, Hobbes considers our ideas or phantasmata in two ways,
either as a motion, i.e. as an accident that really inheres in our
body, or as a representation or image of external objects.58 In the
latter sense, phantasmata are fictitious entities or non-beings, which
only seem to exist. Like all other ideas, imaginary space is therefore
"nothing but a fiction and a non-being."59
Space, however, is more than just one among many ideas of ex-
ternal objects. Hobbes claims that if the person who survived the
annihilation conceives of a body that existed prior to the annihila-
tion, solely concentrating on its existing outside of us and omitting
the particular characteristics of that body, then that person has the
idea of space. Imaginary space is the image of a body tout court,60
54 DCo VII, 1 (OL I, 81).

55 See J. Barnouw, "Hobbes' Causal Account of Sensation,"Journal of the History
of Philosophy 18 (1980), 115-30. For an introduction to Hobbes's theory of vision,
see J. Prins, "Hobbes on Light and Vision," in The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes,
ed. T. Sorell (Cambridge, 1996), 129-56.
56 EL I, II, 8 (EW IV, 7). See also. L I (EW III, 2): the pressure of the object,
conveyed through the medium causes a "resistance or counter-pressure or endeav-
our of the heart, to deliver it self: which endeavour, because outward, seemeth to
be some matter without. And this seeming or fancy is that which men call sense."
57 See EL I, II (EW IV, 3ff), DM 349ff, DCo XXV (OL I, 315ff) and the tract
now called Tractatus Opticus, which was published by Mersenne in 1644 in his
Cogitata Physico-Mathematica (OL V, 217-48).
58 DCo VII, 1 (OL I, 82).
59 DM 118: "merum est figmentum et non ens."
"0 DM 117: "imago sive phantasma corporis. Corporis dico simpliciter."
or the image of a body as body, or the image of an existing t

insofar as it exists.61 Body is that which exists outside of us, i.
which exists simpliciter. The image or representation of th
teriority or existence tout cout is imaginary space.
Bodies are not only posited by reason as entities causing
idea of space, we also conceive of bodies occupying space.
bodies have a certain magnitude and certain dimensions, th
incide with a certain part of space.62 This is what Hobbe
place (locus): "place is that space which is possessed or fill
equately by some body."63 Hobbes's identification of plac
space constitutes a complete break with Aristotle who reje
notion of three-dimensional void space in favour of the not
place as a surface-limit. Moreover, the fact that Hobbes con
place to be a fictitious entity or ens rationis seems to cont
Aristotle's realism.
Nevertheless, Hobbes's notion of place shares some important
traits with the Aristotelian one.64 Like Aristotelian topos, Hobbesian
place is inherently immobile:65 whereas bodies move through
space, leave their places and acquire new ones, place itself remains
immobile. Further, place is equal to the located body, neither
smaller, nor bigger.66 Finally, place is separable from bodies, or in
other words not identical to bodies but different from them.67
Thus, Hobbes is evidently engaged in a discussion with Aristotle
and the Aristotelians, rejecting the Aristotelian notion of place
and presenting his own concept of space as a viable alternative.
61 DM 117: "imago sive phantasma corporis. Corporis dico simpliciter." DCo

VII, 2 (OL I, 83): "phantasma rei existentis, quatenus existentis."
62 DCo VIII, 1 (OL I, 90): body "non modo occupet aliquam dicti spatii partem,
sive cum ea coincidat et coextendatur."
63 EW I, 70; DCo VI, 6 (OL I, 62): "locus est spatium quod a corpore adaequate
impletur vel occupatur". See also DM 118: "Quoties autem corporis alicuius spa-
tium reale coincidet cum parte aliqua spatii imaginarii, illam partem, quacum coin-
cidit, vocamus corporis illius locum."
64 See Aristotle, Physics IV, 4, 210 b 35-211 a 3: "We assume first that place is
what contains that of which it is the place, and is no part of the thing, that the pri-
mary place of a thing is neither less nor greater than the thing; again, that place
can be left behind by the thing and is separable." See also IV, 4, 212 a 17: "place on
the other hand is rather what is motionless" (cited according to The Complete Works
of Aristotle, ed.J. Barnes (Princeton, 1984).
65 DCo VIII, 5 (OL I, 94).
66 DM 120. See also EW VII, 224: "For I conceive the dimensions of the body,
and of the place, whether the place be filled with gold or with air, to be coincident
and the same"
67 DM 128, DCo V, 13 (OL I, 56).
Hobbes makes it clear that the place of a body should not be con-
ceived in terms of the surface-limit of the surrounding body but as
a three-dimensional portion of imaginary space. As we shall see,
however, there are also some strong parallels between Hobbes's al-
ternative notion of space and the concept of spatium imaginarium,
as it was developed within the Jesuit Aristotelian tradition.
5. Jesuit concepts of spatium imaginarium
The term spatium imaginarium as such was not invented by

Hobbes but is standard scholastic vocabulary. Although the ex-
pression 'imaginary space" has its roots in Aristotle's discussion of
void space,68 the concept only gained considerable importance af-
ter the famous Condemnation of 219 philosophical articles by
Bishop Etienne Tempier in 1277.69 As a result of this condemna-
tion, philosophers laid great emphasis on God's absolute power
(potentia Dei absoluta) to do whatever is logically possible, short of
contradiction. After 1277 philosophers had to reckon with the pos-
sibility that God could create any number of worlds and that He
could move the entire cosmos rectilinearly, even if that would re-
sult in a large void space.70 Both options led scholastics to posit the
existence of an imaginary, infinite extra-cosmic void, the so-called
spatium imaginarium. From 1277 onwards most scholastics dis-
cussed the question whether and how God could be conceived to
be present in this extra-cosmic void, and indeed in the void prior
to the creation of the material universe.71 Hobbes's thought-ex-
periment of the annihilatio mundi ultimately derives from this tra-
dition in which Divine omnipotence played such a crucial role.72
What is interesting, is that the Jesuits employed the notion of
spatium imaginarium in the context of a discussion of some tradi-
tional problems connected with Aristotle's concept of place.73 The
68 See Grant, Much Ado about Nothing, 117ff.

69 On this condemnation, see R. Hissette, Enquite sur les 219 Articles Condamnis
ic Paris le 7 Mars 1277 (Louvain-Paris, 1977) andJ. Wippel, "The Condemnation of
1270 and 1277 at Paris," Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies 7 (1977), 169-
201.
70 See Grant, Much Ado about Nothing, 109.
71 See Grant, Much Ado about Nothing, 112ff.
72 The direct source of Hobbes's thought-experiment seems to be Francesco
Patrizi. See Schuhmann, "Thomas Hobbes und Francesco Patrizi," 265ff.
7" For a discussion of Jesuit views on spatium imaginarium, see Grant, Much Ado
about Nothing, 152-81.
questions concerning the immobility of place and the place of

ultimate sphere of heaven had already been extensively dis
by medieval scholastics.
As far as the first question is concerned, we can roughly dis
guish between Thomist and Scotist solutions. The Thomists
a distinction between formal and material place. Material p
the concrete surface-limit, may be mobile. In contrast, f
place, the position of a body with respect to the univers
whole or the ultimate sphere of heaven, remains immobile
Scotists rejected this solution. To account for cases such
tower which is surrounded by constantly changing pockets of
the Scotists held that the successive places of the tower, i.e. th
ferent portions of air, are distinct but equivalent with resp
local motion.74
The problem concerning the place of the ultimate spher
heaven was already discussed by Aristotle himself. Since th
mate heaven is not surrounded by another body, it does not s
to be in a place, which means it does not exist anywhere,
does not exist at all. Aristotle's solution was that the ultimate
sphere is not "in any place, if, that is, no body contains it. But the
line on which it is moved provides a place for its parts; for each is
contiguous to the next."75 Again, this solution did not settle the is-
sue, rather it provoked much more discussion.
The great Jesuit textbooks adopted various medieval scholastic
solutions for these problems, some of them siding with Scotus,
others with Aquinas. What is interesting, however, is that they also
display a distinct tendency to use the concept of imaginary space
in order to solve the problems linked with the Aristotelian notion
of place. In that sense, the Jesuits seem to be somewhat innovative
with respect to medieval commentaries. The true extent of their
innovation on this point is, however, still to be investigated.76 In
any case, the Jesuits not only discuss imaginary space in the con-
text of traditional questions-such as the one concerning God's
74 See R. Ariew, "Space," in: The Scientific Revolution: An Encyclopedia (New York,
(forthcoming) and E. Grant, "The Medieval Doctrine of Place: Some Fundamental
Problems and Solutions," in Studi sul XIV Secolo in Memoria di Anneliese Maier, ed. A.
Maierui and A. P. Bagliani (Roma, 1981), 57-79.
75 Aristotle, Physics, IV, 5, 212 b 9-11. For a discussion of this problem, see
Algra, Concepts of Space, 193.
76 Further research in this field should notably deal with notions of spatium
imaginarium employed by fourteenth- and fifteenth-century Scotists.
presence in imaginary extra-cosmic void space-but also use the

concept in the context of natural philosophyper se.
The Conimbricenses, for instance, note that there is consider-
able disagreement between Thomists and Scotists on the issue of
the immobility of place.77 But, instead of trying to decide the case
in favour of one of these views, they adopt an alternative solution
based on the concept of imaginary space. According to them, im-
aginary space is not a real entity (ens reale), because then its three
dimensions would be real too and could not give way to three-di-
mensional bodies, since three-dimensional bodies cannot coincide
without loss of material continiuity. Moreover, infinite void space
is eternal, and there can be no eternal entity besides God.78 There-
fore, spatium imaginarium is rather a non-dimensional, infinite im-
aginary void space which is extra-cosmic as well as intra-cosmic.
God created the world in this void space.
In the discussion of the problem of the immobility of place, the
Conimbricenses' commentary on Aristotle's Physics states that
place conceived as a real surface-limit inhering in a physical body
cannot be immobile. If, on the other hand, we conceive it to be
that part of imaginary space which coincides with the surface-limit
of a given body, it clearly fulfills Aristotle's requirement that place
should be immobile.79 In other words, the Conimbricenses use
imaginary space as a means of "saving" the Aristotelian concept
of place, while addressing-with varying degrees of success-the
rather serious objections raised against it.
Another interesting example of how Jesuits used imaginary
space in the context of a discussion of the concept of place is
77 Conimbricenses, L. IV, C. V, Q I, A. II, 24.

78 Conimbricenses, L. VIII, C. X, Q. II, A. IV, 518.
79 Conimbicenses, L. IV, C. V, Q. I, A. II, 24: "Sciendum igitur est (quod ad finem
libri 8 magis patebit) dari extra coelum spatium quoddam infinite patens; quod
non est aliquid reale, sed imaginarium, in quo concipere fas est puncta, lineas &
superficies in eodem imaginario intervallo permanentes, simileque spatium occu-
pari ab hoc universo corporeo, quod spatium ante mundi creationem perinde
vacabat corpore, atque vacat illa immensitas extra coelum patens. Quoniam vero
res, omnes intra hoc spatium cohibentur, potest quaelibet ambientis corporis
superficies, in qua vera loci ratio consistit, bifariam sumi, nimirum vel secundum
se, vel prout ei imaginaria illa superficies circumquaque respondet. Si priori modo
spectetur, mobilis quidem est, saltem ex accidente, ad motum corporis, cui
inhaeret; si posteriori, immobilis: quia superficies imaginaria, quae illam hinc inde
ambit, neutiquam movetur. Hoc igitur pacto intellixit Aristoteles omnem locum
immobilem esse oportere; nempe qua ratione comparatur ad superficiem illam
imaginariam motus omnis expertem."
Toletus's Commentary on Aristotle's Physics.80 First, Toletus defend

Thomistic views on the immobility of place and the ultimate
sphere of heaven. Then, he quotes the opinion of a certain "neo
tericus" which reunites all possible concepts of place and space and
solves all problems connected with these notions.81 According t
this view, we should make a distinction between extrinsic and in-
trinsic place or space. Aristotle's surface-limit is clearly extrinsi
place. On the other hand, intrinsic place or space can be con-
ceived as either imaginary or real. The magnitude or extension o
a body is really intrinsic, whereas extra-cosmic imaginary space is
imaginary intrinsic space in the sense that it is conceived to coin-
cide with a body rather than externally surrounding that body.
It is imaginary intrinsic space which Toletus employs in order to
solve the problems connected with the notion of place. First, h
uses it to solve the problem of immobility, since imaginary space i
conceived to be immobile, whereas bodies move from one place t
the other, i.e. occupy different parts of imaginary space.82 Further
he is able to solve the problem of the place of the ultimate sphere,
which cannot be in a place in the sense of surface-limit. It can,
however, be conceived to be in a place and within a part of imagi-
nary space which is intrinsic to it, i.e. with which it coincides.83
Toletus claims that this view held by the "neotericus", who is
probably none other than Toletus himself, can help us to defen
Aristotle's concept of place by claiming that Aristotle only talk
about extrinsic place.84 In other words, extrinsic place is subordi-
nate to other notions of place and space, notably that of imaginary
space, which is employed to solve the problems which were tra
ditionally put forward as arguments against Aristotle's position
80 For an interesting discussion of the "modernity" of Toletus's concept of

place and space, see J. Echarri, "Un Influjo Espafiol Desconocido en la Formacion
del Sistema Cartesiano. Dos Textos Paralelos de Toledo y Descartes sobre el
Espacio," Pensiamento 6 (1950), 291-323.
81 F. Toletus, Commentaria una cum Quaestionibus in Octo Libros Aristotelis de Phy-
sica Auscultatione (Coloniae, 1615), L. IV, C. V, Q. VIII, 123r
82 Toletus, L. IV, C. V, Q. VIII, 123r: "Quamvis haec profecto proprietas
immobilitatis loci videatur (ut illam solemus concipere) propria esse loci tantum
imaginarii, spatii videlicet imaginarii, quod imaginamur, vel extra coelum, v
etiam intra corpora, quasi quiescens semper, & immobile (ut diximus) abstra
hendo a motu, in quo succedunt alia corpora, in cuius partibus sic imaginamu
similem semper & eundem situm cum aequali distantia."
83 Toletus, L. IV, C. V, Q. VIII, 122v-123r.
84 Toletus, L. IV, C. V, Q. VIII, 123v.
Toletus adds that the "neoteric" opinion is a "very probable"

one.8
Toletus, however, also tries to show that the Aristotelian notion
of place or, for that matter, its Thomistic version, gives an answer
in its own right to the problems of immobility and the place of the
ultimate sphere of heaven. Consequently, he states that it is pos-
sible to uphold the Aristotelian concept of place as surface-limit of
the surrounding body as the only and exclusive notion of place.86
What is interesting, however, is that he does not uphold this no-
tion as the true one as opposed to the merely probable "neo-
terical" view.87 In fact, he seems to suggest that the orthodox Aris-
totelian notion of place and the unorthodox "neoteric" opinion
are equally probable.88 Thus, Toletus seems to use a strategy of
innovation which is not uncommon in the Society of Jesus. He
introduces a "modern", "probable" opinion under the guise of a
"neotericus", without overtly abandoning the more traditional inter-
pretation of Aristotle.
Interestingly, Rubius rejects the distinction between locus extrin-
secus and intrinsecus, which he ascribes to some unnamed "Mo-
derni" who thought that the immobility of place should be ac-
counted for in terms of the immobility of internal place or magni-
tude. This may very well be a concealed attack on his fellow Jesuit
Toletus.89 According to Rubio, an internal place is a contradictio in
adjecto, since according to Aristotle place is inherently extrinsic.90
On the other hand, Rubius accepts Toletus's distinction between
imaginary space and place as external surface limit and likewise
uses it in order to solve the problem of the immobility of place.
According to Rubius, the notion of place involves place as surface-
limit, place as distance to the fixed poles of the universe and place
85 Toletus, L. IV, C. V, Q. VIII, 121v: "valde probabilis."

86 Toletus, L. IV, C. V, Q. VIII, 123v: by means of the neoteric view "omnes
difficultates dissolvuntur & omnes pene opiniones conciliantur & Aristotelis prae-
terea opinio defenditur, ita ut sit locutus de loco extrinseco tantum. Quod si cui
sola Aristotelis placet opinio, liberum ei esto iudicium."
87 The article by Marcus Hellyer in the present volume also discusses some ex-
amples of Jesuit probabilistic reasoning. Jesuit censorship forced philosophers of
the Society ofJesus to defend a set of Aristotelian opinions as "true", while allowing
them to accept more innovative or unorthodox opinions as merely "probable".
8 For a comparable case, see Hellyer, "Censorship," 31.
89 On philosophical disagreement within the Jesuit Order, see the article by M.
Hellyer in the present volume.
90 Rubius, L. IV, C. V, Q. III, 350.
as part of imaginary space. Only the last two aspects can "save" the
immobility of place.91
While admitting the force of their criticisms, Toletus, the Co
nimbricenses and Rubius92 certainly did not endorse Philoponus
and Simplicus's alternative definition of space as real, self-sub
sistent incorporeal extension which exists independently of bod
ies. This alternative definition of space would be utterly at odd
with the basic tenets of the orthodox Aristotelian philosophy they
were supposed to defend. The main problem of a notion of spac
as self-subsistent three-dimensional extension is its incompatibility
with Aristotelian ontology, as laid down in the Categories. Space is
clearly quantitative extension. It cannot, however, be classified un-
der the category of quantity, since space exists by virtue of itself,
whereas accidents such as quantity inhere in substances and d
not exist per se. On the other hand, space cannot be a substance
since in that case bodies, which depend on space, would be re-
duced to quasi-accidents of space, whereas physical bodies are th
basic units of Aristotelian natural philosphy.93
91 Rubius, L. IV, C. V, Q. III, 350: "impossibile est in sola superficie consistere

ratione loci & locum esse immobilem: cum evidens sit superficiem passim variar
ergo aliquid aliud debet habere locus, ratione cuius simul cum superficie sumpti
immobilis esse potest, sed non potest excogitari aliud preter hoc respectus & eo
includere est necessarium, quorum ratione immobilem esse constat; ergo ponend
sunt. Minorem, quod eas debeat includere, sic probo: nam communis locus
omnium corporum sublunarium est coelum, sub quo continentur omnia & loc
iste immobilis est, quia immobilem, atque invariabilem dispositionem continent
precipua corpora sub eo contenta; loca autem Particularia, quasi partes sunt huiu
loci totalis & spatia imaginari partialia partes etiam totius spatii imaginarii, sub
eodem concavo caeli comprehensi, sed partes dicunt ordinem inter sese & ad
totum; ergo loca partialia sumi debent, atque distingui in ordine ad totum locum
ad totumque spatium & ad partes eius praecipuas ex quibus variatur dispositio eiu
& quia immobilitas totius praecipue ostenditur in partibus fixis, quales sunt cen
trum & Poli, propterea primus modus, dicendi asseruit includere locum respectu
distantiae ad illas, sed vere totum ipsum locum & caeteras partes secundum
proprias dispositiones respicit, totum etim spatium imaginarium & illam quidem
partem, circa quam continet respectu praesentiae; ceteras vero respectu distantia
si ergo sumptus locus pro superficie cum his respectibus immobilis est, quia nul
modo variari potest, sed quocunque variato variatur locus."
92 Rubius lists Philoponus's and Simplicius's arguments in L. IV, C. V, Q. I, 340.
93 The advocates of an absolute notion of space proposed various solutions to
the problem of the incompatibility of the concept of space and traditional Aristote
lian substance-accident ontology. The boldest step was taken by Gassendi who de
signed a new ontology in which absolute space and absolute time are categories i
their own right in addition to the two traditional categories of substance and acc
dent. See P. Gassendi, Syntagma Philosophicum. Opera Omnia, vol. I (Lugduni, 165
reprint Stuttgart-Bad Canstatt, 1964), 182a.
Therefore, rather than advocating a definition of space as real,

self-subsistent extension, the Jesuits adopted the concept of spa-
tium imaginarium which they interpreted as an imaginary, non-ex-
istent entity.94 They agree with Philoponus and Simplicius that a
concept of space can solve the problems traditionally linked with
the Aristotelian notion of place. They disagree, however, with their
claim that space should be conceived as real, self-subsistent, three-
dimensional extension. And while they retain Aristotelian place,
they interpret imaginary space as an additional concept.
Thus, the Conimbricenses explicitly reject spatium in the sense
of an ens reale, but accept it as an ens imaginarium.95 In the same
vein, Toletus calls Philoponus's concept of space a "not completely
improbable" opinion and therefore (according to the Jesuit rules
of interpretation) one that is acceptable to discuss and teach.96 On
the other hand, his arguments do not prove in any convincing way
the existence of an independent, self-subsistent space.97
In sum, we have seen how some Jesuits employed the concept of
spatium imaginarium in the context of natural philosophy. Al-
though they did so in different ways, there seems to have been one
common underlying strategy. Jesuits such as Toletus and the Co-
nimbricenses maintain some form of orthodox Aristotelianism. At
the same time, however, they incorporate potentially disruptive
elements in such a way that they do not conflict with the core con-
cepts of Aristotelian philosophy.98 In a general form, this strategy
is one of the basic features ofJesuit philosophy.99
94 See Suarez, D. LI, S. I, XII: "sed nihilominus sufficienter videtur posse

convinci illud spatium, prout condistinctum a corpore continente et contento,
revera esse nihil, quia neque est substantia, neque accidens, neque aliud creatum
aut temporale, sed aeternum."
95 Conimbricenses, L. IV, C. V, Q. I, A. II, 23.
96 Toletus, L. IV, C. V, Q. VIII, 121: "non omnino improbabile."
97 Toletus, L. IV, C. V, Q. VIII, 122v.
98 See also R. Aversa, Philosophia Metaphysicam Physicamque Complectens Quaestio-
nibus Contexta (Romae, 1625-7), Q. XXVII, S. II, 954. Aversa claims that Aristotle
rejects space only as a real, three-dimensional entity, but is not wholly opposed to
the identification of place and space: "hoc spatium [sc. imaginarium] non est quic-
quam reale et positivum, neque substantia, neque accidens, neque extensio, seu
magnitudo. Haec assertio est prorsus cert. et haec veritas est, quam fuse contra
Antiquos probare nititur Arist. Et in hoc solum sensu negavit hoc spatium, et nega-
vit locum esse spatium." Rafael Aversa (1588-1657) was a Minorite. In his textbook
he frequently discussesJesuit views.
99 See the article by Marcus Hellyer in the present volume and Ch.B. Schmitt, A
Critical Survey and Bibliography of Studies on Renaissance Aristotelianism 1958-1969
6. Hobbes's imaginary space and Jesuit notions of spatium maginarium
Hobbes was surely not interested in the theological question

concerning God's presence in extra-cosmic and pre-creational
void space. He explicitly states that the idea of extra-cosmic vo
space is devoid of sense and of no concern to natural philoso-
phy.100 However, there seem to be some striking differences b
tween the Jesuit use of spatium imaginarium in the context of natu
ral philosophy and the way Hobbes employs the concept. Firs
contradicting the Jesuits, Hobbes claims that the concept of imagi
nary space completely replaces the Aristotelian notion of place
Second, by stating that space is a non-entity, the Jesuits could re-
move it from the Aristotelian substance-accident ontology which,
as already stated, is incompatible with an "absolute" concept o
space. Hobbes, in contrast, changes this ontology itself and use
his notion of space as the paradigmatic example of an acciden
According to Hobbes, accidents are "the manner of our conce
tion of body."1'0 In other words, accidents represent bodies, and d
not inhere in them, except for magnitude and motion.102 Perhaps
the most important accident is imaginary space, the image or
representation of body qua body or body tout court.
Thus, Hobbes's concept of space seems to have an entirely dif
ferent meaning in the context of natural philosophy from th
Jesuit notion of imaginary space. A different picture emerges, how
ever, if we compare both notions of imaginary space with the con
cept of space propounded by philosophers such as Telesio, Patri
and Gassendi. Although Hobbes shares their arguments agains
Aristotle, he could not adopt their alternative notion of self-su
sistent, incorporeal space. In Hobbes's ontology substance and
bodies are identical notions. Thus, the conception of space as in
corporeal extension or even incorporeal substance is to him a self-
contradictory one.103 Therefore, though for different reason
(Padova, 1971), 131: "As more and more Aristotelian doctrines were questione
the convinced Aristotelians made slight internal modifications of the system to al-
low them to deal with objections within a quasi-Aristotelian framework".
100 EW VII, 23 and OL IV, 323.
101 EW I, 104 (DCo VIII, 2; OL I, 92: "Definiemus igitur accidens esse conci
piendi corporis modum").
102 For a discussion of the problems connected with the special status of the ac-
cidents of motion and magnitude, see J. Bernhardt: "Grandeur, Substance et Acc
dent: une Difficulte du De Corpore," in Thomas Hobbes. Philosophie Premiere, Theor
de la Science et Politique, ed. Y-Ch. Zarka andJ. Bernhard (Paris, 1990), 39-46.
103 Hobbes considered the doctrine of incorporeal substances as one of the
Hobbes takes up the same solution as did the Jesuits: he claims

that space is an imaginary, non-existent, fictitious entity.
The Jesuit and Hobbesian notions of spatium imaginarium share
some important traits. First, Hobbes's opinion that imaginary
space is an ens rationis, a fictitious entity which fully depends on
our faculty of imagination instead of on bodies is in line with
Suarez. Quite like Hobbes, Suarez states, that spatium imaginarium
is a nihil, and an ens rationis.104 Suarez explicitly rejects the opin-
ions of the Conimbricenses, Toletus and Fonseca-whom he men-
tions by name. All these fellow Jesuits claim that, although imagi-
nary space cannot be an ens rationis, it cannot be entirely fictitious
either. We conceive this space to be able to receive the material
world which was created in it. This capacity should somehow be
supported by something which is really existent.105 Fonseca, for ex-
ample, does not wish to call imaginary space a privation, since ac-
cording to the Thomistic tradition which he follows on this point,
a privation is an ens rationis. Imaginary space is rather a "pure ne-
gation" (negatio pura), a negation without a subject.106 Thus, it is
neither an ens reale nor an ensfictivum.
The background to this odd move is the opinion shared by
many Jesuit authors that imaginary space is to be identified with
God's immensity, one of the attributes traditionally assigned to
most pernicious elements of scholastic lore, though his critique does not refer to a
concept of space, but rather to scholastic doctrines of the soul and of incorporeal
"spirits". Cf. L XLIV; EW III, 615ff. and XLVI; EW III, 672ff.
104 F. Suarez, Disputationes Metaphysicae (Venetiis, 1605), D. LI, S. I, XXIII:
"itaque quatenus hoc spatium apprehenditur per modum entis positivi distincti a
corporibus, mihi videtur esse ens rationis non tamen gratis fictum opere intellectus
sicut entia impossibilia, sed sumpto fundamento ex ipsis corporibus, quatenus sua
extensione apta sunt constituere spatia realia, non solum quae nunc sunt, sed in
infinitum extra coelum...Ubi etiam annotavimus, cum corpus dicitur esse in spatio
imaginario, illud esse in sumendum esse intransitive, quia non significat esse in
alio, sed esse ibi, ubi secluso corpore nos concipimus spatium vacuum, & ideo hoc
esse ibi revera est modus realis corporis, etiamsi ipsum spatium ut vacuum vel
imaginarium nihil sit."
105 Cf. Conimbricenses, L. VIII, C. X, Q. II, A. IV, 518: "spatium hoc non esse ens
rationis, cum ab eo reipsa absque opera intellectus intra mundum corpora
recipiantur & extra mundum recipi queant, si illic a Deo creentur. Quare eius
dimensiones non iccirco imaginariae dici consuerunt, quod fictitiae sint, aut a sola
mentis notione pendeant, nec extra intellectum dentur; sed quia imaginamur illas
in spatio, proportione quadam respondentes realibus ac positivis corporum
dimensionibus." Cf. P. Fonseca, Commentariorum in Metaphysicorum Aristotelis sta-
giritae Libros Tomus I-IV (Coloniae, 1615; reprint Hildesheim 1964), L. V, C. XIII,
Q. VII, S. I, 703.
106 Fonseca, 304.
God.107 The very fact that imaginary space is associated with Go

necessarily leads to the conclusion that spatium imaginarium can
be entirely non-existent. On the other hand, as has already b
said, space cannot be real either, for then the natural conclus
would be that it would have real dimensions, which would im
that God is a corporeal entity. Jesuit Scholastics were surely
prepared to accept this conclusion, which in the seventeenth c
tury was drawn by the Cambridge Platonist Henry More. Thi
least helps explain why philosophers such as Fonseca had trou
defining the ontological status of space.
Suarez, however, is strongly opposed to the kind of "middle-no
tions" his fellow Jesuits came up with. If space is not a real enti
there is no way to avoid the conclusion that it is an ens ratio
since there is no mean between real and unreal entities.108s
fact that imaginary space is a nihil and a vacuum (vacuitas) d
not prevent bodies from filling it. On the contrary, its being m
nothingness is rather the condition for bodies to occupy it.109
By calling space a privation,110 a fictitious entity and mere no
ingness"'1 completely dependent upon our imagination, Hob
seems to side with Suarez on this point. In addition, like Suar
Hobbes claims that imaginary space is void as well, because
bodies exist in imaginary space."2
In another sense, Hobbes is closer to Toletus. Like Toletus,
Hobbes identifies place and imaginary space.11"3 For instance,
Toletus states that we can explain local motion in terms of bodies
moving from one surrounding surface-limit to another one. If we
want to stress the immobility of place, we can also speak of bodies
moving from one part of imaginary space to another, i.e. from one
107 Grant, Much Ado about Nothing, 164. This connection with God also implies
that space is uncreated and actually infinite. Hobbes, in contrast states that imagi-
nary space is only potentially infinite, since everything we imagine is necessarily fi-
nite. However, by means of our imagination we can potentially add as much space
as we wish to finite imaginary space (cf. DM 331).
108 Suarez, D. LI, S. I, XXIV: "si ens reale non est, quale ens esse potest nisi
rationis, cum inter haec non sit medium?"
109 Suarez, D. LI, S. I, XXIII.
110 DM 117.
111 DM 118: "merum est figmentum et non-ens."
112 DM 118; DCo VIII, 6 (OL I, 95).
113 See e.g. Toletus, L. IV, C. V, Q. VIII, 123r: "Haec profecto proprietas immo-
bilitatis loci videatur (ut illam solemus concipere) propria esse loci tantum ima-
ginarii, spatii videlicet imaginarii, quod imaginamur, vel extra coelum, vel etiam
intra corpora, quasi quiescens semper & immobile."
place to another, whereas imaginary space remains immobile and

ready to receive another body."4 Hobbes explains local motion in
very much the same fashion as a continual process in which one
place, i.e. one part of space, is vacated and another acquired.115
Whereas bodies move from one place to another, these places
themselves, i.e. imaginary space, remain immobile.116
Again, Toletus tries to reconcile the orthodox Aristotelian ac-
count of local motion with a non-orthodox "spatial" view of local
motion as being theoretical options that are equally viable. Obvi-
ously, Hobbes elaborates only the second option which identifies
place and imaginary space. Hobbes's definition of imaginary space
is also rather similar to Toletus's. Toletus claims that we can de-
scribe imaginary space in two ways. The first option would be to
consider it as a completely fictitous and non-existent entity.
Toletus, however, prefers to define it as a notion we arrive at by ab-
stracting from the particular aspects of singular bodies, such as
their motion, magnitudes, sites, etc. By means of this procedure,
which Toletus equates with that of mathematical abstraction, we
conceive of space as that which all bodies have in common, as the
space the world as a whole occupies."7 This way of looking at
"4 Toletus, L. IV, C. V, Q. VIII, 123r: "Moveri localiter sic etiam intelligimus, id
est, pertransire spatium illud imaginativum, vel abstractum, quod plenum est, vero
spatio alicuius corporis huius, vel alterius. ... Sic etiam dicimus, corpora moveri ad
locum ... sicut etiam imaginarium illud, vel abstractum occupat spatium, quod
antea alterum corpus occupabat, quod terminus etiam illius motus localis dici
merito potest." See also Aversa, Q. XXVII, S. II, 955: "In uno & eodem spatio pos-
sunt & solent succedere plura corpora: ut ubi nunc est homo, postea erit aer & de
omnibus valet dicere, ibi nunc est aer, ubi fuerat homo: ergo datur spatium illud
praeter corpora, capax omnium corporum, & semper in se permanens, corporibus
inter se saepius permutatis."
115 See DCo VIII, 10 (OL I, 97).
116 DCo VIII, 5 (OL I, 94): "locus immobilis est, cum enim quod movetur, a
loco ad locum ferri intelligitur, si locus movetur locus etiam a loco ad locum
transferretur, unde necesse esset ut loci locus esset, et sic infinitum, quod est perri-
diculum."
117 Toletus, L. IV, C. V, Q. VIII, 121v-122r: "Est autem notatu dignum, locum,
seu spacium imaginarium bifariam nos posse considerare. Uno modo, ut sit res
ficta omnino, & fingamus esse, quod non est; ut extra coelum, vel in vacuo, ut dixi-
mus. Altero modo, in communi abstrahendo ab hoc vel illo spacio vero singulorum
corporum, spacium in communi totius mundi, in quo modo sunt corpora, ab-
strahendo, inquam, ab hoc, vel illo corpore: & haec consideratio non est ficta, sed
vera. ... Sic ergo imaginamur ilud spacium in communi totius mundi, tanquam
quiescens, id est, abstrahendo a motu eiusdem, & a particularibus subiectis: & in
communi similiter in eo distantiam consideramus & situm in communi & singula-
rium partium eius positionem, omnia abstrahendo in communi, ut Mathematicus
figuras. ... Et hinc est quod spacium in communi omnes sic abstrahunt, quia vident
space is rather similar to Hobbes's description of imaginary spa

as the image of body as body and of the pure exteriority of bodie
without consideration of their particular features. In contrivi
the notion of space, we abstract from all particular attributes, lik
whiteness or roundness, and retain only "body", or its being
body. We are only interested in the body as being a body, i.e.
three-dimensional entity which exists outside of us.118
The strongest parallel between Hobbes's concept of space and
Jesuit notions of spatium imaginarium is the very distinction b
tween imaginary and real space itself. In this case, Hobbes expli
itly recognizes his debt to the scholastic tradition. Hobbes stat
that bodies are characterized by magnitude or three-dimension
extension. According to Hobbes, magnitude is even the essence
body as such.119 In this connection, Hobbes says that he follow
"some people" who call this magnitude which inheres in bodi
"real space" (spatium reale).120 The anonymous "people" Hobb
claims to follow can in any case be understood as a reference t
Suarez.'21 Quite like Hobbes, the Spanish Jesuit claims that rea
space inheres in bodies, and makes it possible for them to fill im-
aginary space, which unlike spatium reale does not inhere in bodie
but is purely fictitious, mere nothingness122 and nothing but
illa accidentia in communi remanere, nam quamvis mutetur spacium, hoc tame
manet spacium & aequale spacium."
118 DM 117.
119 DCo VIII, 23 (OL I, 104). See also DM 117: "Definio igitur spatium real
esse ipsam corporeitatem, sive ipsam corporis simpliciter, quatenus corporis, esse
tiam."
120 DCo VIII, 4 (OL I, 93): "Extensio corporis idem est quod magnitudo eju
sive id quod aliqui vocant spatium reale."
121 Suarez, D. LI, S. I, XXIII. We find the same distinction between imaginary
and real space in Aversa, Q. XXVII, S. II, 954. Toletus also employs this distinctio
albeit in different terms. Toletus discriminates between "locus sive spatium
intrinsecum verum" and "locus sive spatium intrinsecum imaginarium" (Se
Toletus, L. IV, C. V, Q. VIII, 121v). The first seems to be equivalent to magnitu
and quantitative extension. See Toletus, L. IV, C. V, Q. VIII, 122v: "Et ration
pleraeque Philoponi hoc ipsum spacium intrinsecum, & quantitati propriu
ostendunt, sed non separatum, ut ipse ponebat, sed in rebus ipsis inhaere
tanquam proprium earum accidens." Cf. Hobbes, DM 117, who also defines re
space as an inherent accident: "Hoc spatium igitur quod appellari potest reale in
haerens corpori, ut accidens in subiecto suo." For a comparison between Toletu
account of locus internus and Descartes's notion of corporeal extension, s
Echarri, "Influjo Espafiol," 306-7.
122 Suarez, D. LI, S. I, XXIII: "reale spatium & realem dimensionem haben
non est res distincta a corpore, quod nostro modo intelligendi replet spatium qu
de se esset vacuum & nihil."
modus concipiendi,123 a concept we develop on the basis of real

space.'24 Hobbes's distinction between "fictitious extension" and
"true extension" is also remarkably similar to Fonseca's distinction
between "fictitious or imaginary quantity" and "real quantity".125
According to Hobbes, real space does not inhere in us, but in
really existing, external bodies. Imaginary space is the image or
idea of this external space, which inheres in our imagination and
which is caused by external bodies. Thus, real space relates to im-
aginary space as a cause to its effect.'26
The relation of body to space is the same as that between a thing and our
knowledge of it. For our knowledge of existing things is that imagination,
which is produced in our sensorium by the action of things. Therefore, im-
aginary space, which is the imagination of body, is the same as our cognition
of existing body.127
This causal connection between imaginary and real space is a clear

deviation from Jesuit views on imaginary space. Suarez, for in-
stance, claims that imaginary space is not just any gratuitous ens
rationis, but has a clear and well-defined fundamentum in re,
namely, precisely in external bodies and their spatium reale.128 Un-
12" Suarez, D. LI, S. IV, XXVII: "Et hac ratione explicamus hoc ubi per ordinem
ad spatium imaginarium, non quia tale spatium aliquid sit, sed quia nos illo modo
concipiendi indigemus ad explicandum hos modos rerum et relationes vel
habitudines inde resultantes inter res alicubi existentes."
124 Suarez, D. LI, S. I, XXIV: "Itaque quatenus hoc spatium apprehenditur per
modum entis positivi distincti a corporibus, mihi videtur esse ens rationis non
tamen gratis fictum opere intellectus sicut entia impossibilia, sed sumpto funda-
mento ex ipsis corporibus, quatenus sua extensione apta sunt constituere spatia
realia."
125 See DCo VIII, 6 (OL I, 94): "locus est extensio ficta, magnitudo extensio
vera." Cf. Fonseca, L. V, C. XIII, Q. VII, S. I, 703: "Non est igitur spatium, quod &
corporibus occupatur & extra coelum infinite in omnem partem distentum est,
quantitas ulla vera & realis, sed imaginaria. Non, quia ipsum spatium ex imagina-
tione pendeat, quasi nullum sit usquam, nisi cum nos illud omnino fingimus; sed
quia spatium, quod re vera suo modo est, semperque fuit ac erit, non est vera
quantitas, sed ficta quantitas."
126 DCo VIII, 4 (OL I, 93): "Extensio corporis idem est quod magnitudo ejus,
sive id quod aliqui vocant spatium reale; magnitudo autem illa non dependet a
cogitatione nostra, sicut spatium imaginarium, hoc enim illius effectus est, magni-
tudo causa; hoc animi, illa corporis extra animum existentis accidens est."
127 DM 117 ("Corpus sit ad spatium imaginarium ut res ad rei cognitionem.
Omnis enim nostra cognitio rerum existentium est imaginatio ea, quae a rerum
actione efficitur in sensoria nostra, ideoque spatium imaginarium quod est imagi-
natio corporis, idem est quod nostra corporis existentis cognitio"). This precludes
an)y "phenomenological" interpretation of Hobbes's notion of space, such as for
example the one offered by Gary Herbert in his article "Hobbes's Phenomenology
of Space,"Journal of the History of Ideas 48 (1987), 709-17.
128 Suarez, D. LI, S. I, XXJV.
like Hobbes, however, he does not go as far as to establish a ca

link between both notions. Imaginary space depends on the im
nation, which may of course be guided but never causally d
mined by external bodies.
By interpreting the relation between spatium imaginarium
spatium reale along the lines of his causal theory of percep
Hobbes elevates the concept of space to the cornerstone o
theory of representation. Space is the paradigmatic ca
Hobbes's mechanistic and anti-Aristotelian psychology whi
plains all ideas in terms of products of matter in motion. I
sense, Hobbes's concept of space has an entirely different
than the concept of imaginary space such as we can find it in J
commentaries on Aristotle's natural philosophy.
That said, however, the way Hobbes elaborates these not
themselves is, as we have seen, remarkably similar to Jesuit i
pretations. Thus, although the concept of space has a diff
meaning in Hobbes's philosophy of nature, its substance m
seems to have been derived to a large extent from late sch
sources. Hobbes's concept of space seems to be another ex
of how he-along with other philosophers such as Desc
Leibniz, and Galileo-combines scholastic elements in a non-scho-
lastic or even anti-scholastic way.
ABSTRACT
Thomas Hobbes's doctrine of space is here considered as an example of the

Nachwirkung of Jesuit commentaries on Aristotle's natural philosophy (especially
those by Toletus, Pereira, Suarez, Fonseca and the Conimbricenses) in seven-
teenth-century mechanistic science. Hobbes's doctrine of space can be recon-
structed in terms of his intensive dialogue with late scholasticism, as represented
in the works of several important Jesuit authors. Although he presents his con-
cept of space as an alternative to the Aristotelian notion of place, there are some
remarkable similarities between Hobbes's alternative notion of space and the
concept of spatium imaginarium, found in the Jesuit commentaries. While Hobbes
adopts many scholastic elements, he employs these to his own purposes. Thus, on
the one hand, this article does not so much challenge Hobbes's "modernity", but
rather tries to put it in its proper perspective. On the other hand, it tries to show
the vitality and importance of Jesuit natural philosophy in non- or even anti-
Aristotelian contexts.

Jesuit Concept Spatium Imaginarium in Hobbes

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Jesuit Concepts of Spatium Imaginarium and Thomas Hobbes's Doctrine of Space

Author(s): Cees Leijenhorst

Historians of science and philosophy have gradually come to re-

? E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1996 ESM 1,3

demonstrated that sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Aristotel

impressive vitality and resilience, it also contributes to the intellectual debat

censes,12 Franciscus Suarez (1548-1617),13 Petrus Fonseca

Compagnie de J sus, ed. A. De Baecker S.J. and C. Sommervogel (Bruxelles-Paris,

I will first outline Hobbes's relation to Jesuit philosophy in

2. Hobbes and the Jesuits

19 Elementorum Philosophiae Sectio Prima De Corpore (Londini 1655). References to

by the great Jesuit mathematician Christophorus Clavius (1538-

clude them.28 There Hobbes portrays scholastic philosophy

of mathematics, optics, and natural philosophy. It is also clear that

32 EW I, 531: Hobbes lists all kinds of Aristotelian "mysterious notions", such as

ever, contains concepts and arguments taken from Aristo

Quite like Aristotle, Hobbes defines imagination in terms of the

35 See my "Motion, Monks and Golden Mountains: Campanella and Hobbes on

3. Hobbes's rejection of Aristotle's concept of place

Aristotle develops his notion of place (topos) in the fourth book

39 On Aristotle's concept of place, see K. Algra, Concepts of Space in Greek

4. Hobbes's concept of space

Hobbes introduces his own alternative notion of space53 with h

(i.e., the second part of De Corpore).54 Hobbes supposes that one

According to Hobbes, all ideas, especially the paramount idea of

54 DCo VII, 1 (OL I, 81).

or the image of a body as body, or the image of an existing t

61 DM 117: "imago sive phantasma corporis. Corporis dico simpliciter." DCo

5. Jesuit concepts of spatium imaginarium

The term spatium imaginarium as such was not invented by

68 See Grant, Much Ado about Nothing, 117ff.

questions concerning the immobility of place and the place of

presence in imaginary extra-cosmic void space-but also use the

77 Conimbricenses, L. IV, C. V, Q I, A. II, 24.

Toletus's Commentary on Aristotle's Physics.80 First, Toletus defend

80 For an interesting discussion of the "modernity" of Toletus's concept of

Toletus adds that the "neoteric" opinion is a "very probable"

85 Toletus, L. IV, C. V, Q. VIII, 121v: "valde probabilis."

91 Rubius, L. IV, C. V, Q. III, 350: "impossibile est in sola superficie consistere

Therefore, rather than advocating a definition of space as real,

94 See Suarez, D. LI, S. I, XII: "sed nihilominus sufficienter videtur posse

6. Hobbes's imaginary space and Jesuit notions of spatium maginarium

Hobbes was surely not interested in the theological question

Hobbes takes up the same solution as did the Jesuits: he claims

God.107 The very fact that imaginary space is associated with Go

place to another, whereas imaginary space remains immobile and

space is rather similar to Hobbes's description of imaginary spa

modus concipiendi,123 a concept we develop on the basis of real

This causal connection between imaginary and real space is a clear

like Hobbes, however, he does not go as far as to establish a ca

Thomas Hobbes's doctrine of space is here considered as an example of the

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