QUASI-LEGISLATIVE POWER
amendment of Art. 25, for this is within the scope of the exercise of his constitutionally
17. Republic vs. Drug Maker’s, Inc.
G.R. No. 190837
DOCTRINE: The only purpose of the circulars is for the FDA to administer and supervise
the implementation of the provisions of AO 67, s. 1989, including those covering the
BA/BE testing requirement, consistent with and pursuant to RA 3720.
FACTS: The DOH, thru then Secretary Alfredo R.A. Bengzon, issued Administrative
Order No. AO 67, s. 1989, entitled “Revised Rules and Regulations on Registration of
Pharmaceutical Products.” It required drug manufacturers to register certain drug and
medicine products with the FDA before they may release the same to the market for
sale. In this relation, a satisfactory bioavailability/bioequivalence (BA/BE) test is needed
for a manufacturer to secure a CPR for these products. However, the implementation of
the BA/BE testing requirement was put on hold because there was no local facility
capable of conducting the same. The issuance of the Circular No. 1, s. 1997 resumed
the FDA’s implementation of the BA/BE testing requirement with the establishment of
BA/BE testing facilities in the country. Thereafter, the FDA issued Circular No. 8, s. 1997
which provided additional implementation details concerning the BA/BE testing
requirement on drug products.
ISSUE: Who has the power to validly issue and implement Circular Nos. 1 and 8, s.
1997: Secretary of Health or FDA? Do the assailed circulars partake of administrative
rules and regulations and, as such, must comply with the requirements of prior hearing,
consultation and publication?
RULING: The FDA has sufficient authority to issue the circulars and since they would not
affect the substantive rights of the parties that they seek to govern, as they are not
administrative regulations, no prior hearing, consultation, and publication are needed for
their validity. Circular Nos. 1 and 8, s. 1997 cannot be considered as administrative
regulations because they do not: (a) implement a primary legislation by providing the
details thereof; (b) interpret, clarify, or explain existing statutory regulations under which
the FDA operates; and/or (c) ascertain the existence of certain facts or things upon
which the enforcement of RA 3720 depends. The only purpose of the circulars is for the
FDA to administer and supervise the implementation of the provisions of AO 67, s. 1989,
including those covering the BA/BE testing requirement, consistent with and pursuant to
RA 3720.
SUBMITTED BY: ABONG
19. Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI) vs. Hon. Ruben
Torres
GR No. 98472
Doctrine:
The LOI did not modify the rule-making power of the Minister of Labor and Employment
under the Labor Code; it only added another tier of review.
1 | Page
Neither can petitioners consider this additional review by the President as an
sanctioned control over the executive departments of government. Implicit in that power
of control is the President's "authority to go over, confirm, modify or reverse the action
taken by his department
secretaries."
There is no need for legislative delegation of power to the President to revoke the LOI by
way of an EO in view of our finding that LOI 1190 is a mere administrative directive, 20
hence, may be repealed, altered or modified by EO 450, and DO 9 must consequently
be upheld.
Facts:
In this Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction/Restraining Order filed 14 May
1991 petitioners Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI), Philippine
Entertainment Exporters and Promoters Association (PEEPA), and Association of
Filipino Overseas Workers, Inc. (AFOWI) pray that EO 450 be declared invalid for being
contrary to LOI 1190.
Article 25 of the Labor Code of the Philippines (P.D. 442, as amended) 5 encourages
private sector participation in recruitment and placement of workers under guidelines,
rules and regulations to be issued by the Secretary of Labor. On 20 January 1982,
President Marcos issued LOI 1190 withholding the grant of new licenses to operate
agencies for overseas employment effective 1 January 1982 except as he may
otherwise direct. 6 On 19 March 1991, President Aquino issued EO 450 lifting the ban on
new applications for licenses to operate recruitment agencies subject to guidelines and
regulations the Secretary of Labor may promulgate. 7 On 8 April 1991, respondent
Secretary of Labor and Employment promulgated Department (DO) No. 9, Series of
1991, entitled "Guidelines Implementing Executive Order No. 450."
Ordinarily, since both LOI and EO are presidential issuances, one may repeal or
otherwise alter, modify or amend the other, depending on which comes later. The case
before us appears compounded by the circumstance that the LOI in question was issued
by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos when he was clothed with legislative power,
while the EO revoking the LOI was issued by then President Corazon C. Aquino at a
time when she had already lost her law-making power after Congress convened on 27
July 1987. 3Although the EO issued by President Aquino is undoubtedly not a law but a
mere administrative issuance, the parties here debate whether the LOI issued by
President Marcos was a law or simply an administrative rule in view of his dual position
then as chief executive and as legislative authority. Petitioners contend that the LOI is a
law, hence, the EO cannot countermand it, while public respondent claims that the LOI is
only an administrative issuance which may be superseded by an EO.
ISSUE: WON the LOI by President Marcos is not considered a law therefore may be
validly repealed by EO 450
HELD:
YES. As we view it, LOI 1190 13 simply imposes a presidential review of the authority of
the Minister of Labor and Employment to grant licenses, hence, directed to him alone.
Since this is undoubtedly an administrative action, LOI 1190 should properly be treated
as an administrative issuance. Unlike Presidential Decrees which by usage have gained
acceptance as laws promulgated by the President, Letters of Instruction are presumed
to be mere administrative issuances except when the conditions set out in Garcia-
Padilla v. Enrile exist. Consequently, to be considered part of the law of the land,
petitioners must establish that LOI, 1190 was issued in response to "a grave emergency
or a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the interim Batasan Pambansa or the
regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter." The
conspicuous absence of any of these conditions fortifies the opinion that LOI 1190
cannot be any more than a mere administrative issuance.
Petitioners argue that since the repeal of Art. 25 of the Labor Code could not be done
through an administrative issuance, LOI 1190 must of necessity be a law. This reasoning
is flawed.
There is nothing in the LOI which repeals or runs counter to Art. 25 of the Labor Code,
as amended. Instead, contrary to the perception of petitioners, LOI 1190 does not
actually ban the grant of licenses nor bar the entry of new licensees since anybody could
still apply for license with the Minister of Labor and Employment, although the grant
thereof is subject to the prior authority of the President. In fact, the LOI did not modify
the rule-making power of the Minister of Labor and Employment under the Labor Code;
it only added another tier of review.
Neither can petitioners consider this additional review by the President as an
amendment of Art. 25, for this is within the scope of the exercise of his constitutionally
sanctioned control over the executive departments of government. Implicit in that power
of control is the President's "authority to go over, confirm, modify or reverse the action
taken by his department secretaries." Moreover, if we discern the intent of LOI 1190
from the manner it was enforced, the unrebutted allegation of respondent — that 319
private employment agencies secured administrative presidential approval from 1982 to
1989 16 — shows that then President Marcos merely intended to regulate, and not ban
altogether, new applications for licenses. For this reason, Marcos could not have
contemplated repealing Art. 25 of the Labor Code.
Therefore, There is no need for legislative delegation of power to the President to revoke
the LOI by way of an EO in view of our finding that LOI 1190 is a mere administrative
directive, 20 hence, may be repealed, altered or modified by EO 450, and DO 9 must
consequently be upheld.
SUBMITTED BY: ALIH
20. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 118712, 6 October
1995, 249 SCRA 149
DOCTRINE:
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The conclusive effect of administrative construction is not absolute. Action of an
administrative agency may be disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if there is
an error of law, a grave abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of a legislative enactment.
In this regard, it must be stressed that the function of promulgating rules and regulations
may be legitimately exercised only for the purpose of carrying the provisions of the law
into effect. The power of administrative agencies is thus confined to implementing the
law or putting it into effect. Corollary to this is that administrative regulations cannot
extend the law and amend a legislative enactment, for settled is the rule that
administrative regulations must be in harmony with the provisions of the law. And in case
there is a discrepancy between the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation, it
is the former that prevails.
FACTS:
Private respondents are landowners whose landholdings were acquired by the DAR and
subjected to transfer schemes to qualified beneficiaries under the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law (CARL, Republic Act No. 6657).
They argued that Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990 was issued without
jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion because it permits the opening of trust
accounts by the Landbank, in lieu of depositing in cash or bonds in an accessible bank
designated by the DAR, the compensation for the land before it is taken and the titles
are cancelled as provided under Section 16(e) of RA 6657. Private respondents also
assail the fact that the DAR and the Landbank merely "earmarked", "deposited in trust"
or "reserved" the compensation in their names as landowners despite the clear mandate
that before taking possession of the property, the compensation must be deposited in
cash or in bonds.
Petitioner DAR, however, maintained that Administrative Order No. 9 is a valid exercise
of its rule-making power pursuant to Section 49 of RA 6657. For its part, petitioner
Landbank declared that the issuance of the Certificates of Deposits was in consonance
with Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 of the Land Registration Authority where the words
"reserved/deposited" were also used.
CA declared DAR AO No. 9 null and void insofar as it provides for the opening of trust
accounts in lieu of deposits in cash or bonds.
Petitioners submit that respondent court erred in (1) declaring as null and void DAR
Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990, insofar as it provides for the opening of trust
accounts in lieu of deposit in cash or in bonds, and (2) in holding that private
respondents are entitled as a matter of right to the immediate and provisional release of
the amounts deposited in trust pending the final resolution of the cases it has filed for
just compensation.
Petitioners maintain that the word "deposit" as used in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 referred
merely to the act of depositing and in no way excluded the opening of a trust account as
a form of deposit. Thus, in opting for the opening of a trust account as the acceptable
form of deposit through Administrative Circular No. 9, petitioner DAR did not commit any
grave abuse of discretion since it merely exercised its power to promulgate rules and
regulations in implementing the declared policies of RA 6657.
ISSUE:
Whether DAR committed grave abuse of discretion when it exercised its power to
promulgate rules and regulations in implementing the declared policies of RA 6657.
RULING:
YES. Section 16(e) of RA 6657 provides as follows: [Sec. 16. Procedure for Acquisition
of Private Lands —xxx xxx xxx (e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding
payment or, in case of rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit
with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP
bonds in accordance with this Act…]
It is very explicit therefrom that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP
bonds". Nowhere does it appear nor can it be inferred that the deposit can be made in
any other form. If it were the intention to include a "trust account" among the valid modes
of deposit, that should have been made express, or at least, qualifying words ought to
have appeared from which it can be fairly deduced that a "trust account" is allowed. In
sum, there is no ambiguity in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant an expanded
construction of the term "deposit".
The conclusive effect of administrative construction is not absolute. Action of an
administrative agency may be disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if there is
an error of law, a grave abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of a legislative enactment.
In this regard, it must be stressed that the function of promulgating rules and regulations
may be legitimately exercised only for the purpose of carrying the provisions of the law
into effect. The power of administrative agencies is thus confined to implementing the
law or putting it into effect. Corollary to this is that administrative regulations cannot
extend the law and amend a legislative enactment, for settled is the rule that
administrative regulations must be in harmony with the provisions of the law. And in case
there is a discrepancy between the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation, it
is the former that prevails.
In the present suit, the DAR clearly overstepped the limits of its power to enact rules and
regulations when it issued Administrative Circular No. 9. There is no basis in allowing the
opening of a trust account in behalf of the landowner as compensation for his property
because, as heretofore discussed, Section 16(e) of RA 6657 is very specific that the
deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds".
DIGESTED BY: BERNALES, MAYBELLE
21. COMMISIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 108358 (240 SCRA 368), 20 JANUARY 1995
3 | Page
DOCTRINES:
*Tax amnesty - general pardon or intentional overlooking by the State of its authority to
impose penalties on persons otherwise guilty of evasion or violation of a revenue or tax
law; to give tax evaders who wish to relent and are willing to reform a chance to do so
and thereby become a part of the new society with a clean slate. The reason of the
promulgation of E.O. 41 is to raise government revenues by encouraging taxpayers to
declare their untaxed income and pay the tax due thereon.
*Issuances must not override, but must remain consistent and in harmony with,
the law they seek to apply and implement. Administrative rules and regulations
are intended to carry out, neither to supplant nor to modify, the law.
FACTS:
On 22 August 1986, during the period when the President of the Republic still wielded
legislative powers, Executive Order No. 41 was promulgated declaring a one-time tax
amnesty on unpaid income taxes, later amended to include estate and donor’s taxes
and taxes on business for the taxable years 1981 to 1985.
Availing itself of the amnesty, R.O.H. Auto Products filed tax amnesty returns and paid
the amnesty taxes due. Prior to this availment, CIR assessed the ROH deficiency
income and business taxes in an aggregate amount of P1,410,157.71. ROH wrote back
to state that since it had been able to avail itself of the tax amnesty, the deficiency tax
notice should forthwith be cancelled and withdrawn. The request was denied by the CIR
on the ground that Revenue Memorandum Order No. 4-87, dated February 9, 1987,
implementing Executive Order No. 41, had construed the amnesty coverage to include
only assessments issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue after the promulgation of
the executive order on 22 August 1986 and not to assessments theretofore made.
R.O.H. appealed to the Court of Appeals. Ruling for the taxpayer, the tax court said: CIR
failed to present any case or law which proves that an assessment can withstand or
negate the force and effects of a tax amnesty. This burden of proof on the R.O.H. was
created by the clear and express terms of the executive order's intention — qualified
availers of the amnesty may pay an amnesty tax in lieu of said unpaid taxes which are
forgiven (Section 2, Section 5, Executive Order No. 41, as amended). More specifically,
the plain provisions in the statute granting tax amnesty for unpaid taxes for the period
January 1, 1981 to December 31, 1985 shifted the burden of proof on CIR to show how
the issuance of an assessment before the date of the promulgation of the executive
order could have a reasonable relation with the objective periods of the amnesty, so as
to make petitioner still answerable for a tax liability which, through the statute, should
have been erased with the proper availment of the amnesty.
Additionally, the exceptions enumerated in Section 4 of Executive Order No. 41, as
amended, do not indicate any reference to an assessment or pending investigation
aside from one arising from information furnished by an informer. . . . Thus, we deem
that the rule in Revenue Memorandum Order No. 4-87 promulgating that only
assessments issued after August 21, 1986 shall be abated by the amnesty is beyond the
contemplation of Executive Order No. 41, as amended.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the added exception in Revenue Memorandum Order No. 4-87 that
further restricts the scope of tax amnesty is valid.
RULING:
NO. If, as the Commissioner argues, Executive Order No. 41 had not been intended to
include 1981-1985 tax liabilities already assessed (administratively) prior to 22 August
1986, the law could have simply so provided in its exclusionary clauses. It did not. The
conclusion is unavoidable, and it is that the executive order has been designed to be in
the nature of a general grant of tax amnesty subject only to the cases specifically
excepted by it.
The added exception urged by petitioner Commissioner based on Revenue
Memorandum Order No. 4-87, further restricting the scope of the amnesty clearly
amounts to an act of administrative legislation quite contrary to the mandate of the law
which the regulation ought to implement. The authority of the Secretary of Finance, in
conjunction with the CIR, to promulgate rules and regulations for the enforcement of
internal revenue laws cannot be controverted. Neither can it be disputed that such rules
and regulations, as well as administrative opinions and rulings, ordinarily should deserve
weight and respect by the courts. Much more fundamental than either of the above,
however, is that all such issuances must not override, but must remain consistent and in
harmony with, the law they seek to apply and implement. Administrative rules and
regulations are intended to carry out, neither to supplant nor to modify, the law.
FOR REFERENCE:
*The period of the amnesty was later extended to 05 December 1986 from 31 October
1986 by Executive Order No. 54, dated 04 November 1986, and, its coverage expanded,
under Executive Order No. 64, dated 17 November 1986, to include estate and honors
taxes and taxes on business.
*E.O. 41
Sec 1. Scope of Amnesty. — A one-time tax amnesty covering unpaid income taxes for
the years 1981 to 1985 is hereby declared.
Sec. 4. Exceptions. — The following taxpayers may not avail themselves of the amnesty
herein granted:
a) Those falling under the provisions of Executive Order Nos. 1, 2 and 14;
b) Those with income tax cases already filed in Court as of the effectivity hereof;
c) Those with criminal cases involving violations of the income tax already filed in court
as of the effectivity filed in court as of the effectivity hereof;
d) Those that have withholding tax liabilities under the National Internal Revenue Code,
as amended, insofar as the said liabilities are concerned;
e) Those with tax cases pending investigation by the Bureau of Internal Revenue as of
the effectivity hereof as a result of information furnished under Section 316 of the
National Internal Revenue Code, as amended;
f) Those with pending cases involving unexplained or unlawfully acquired wealth before
the Sandiganbayan;
4 | Page
g) Those liable under Title Seven, Chapter Three (Frauds, Illegal Exactions and
Transactions) and Chapter Four (Malversation of Public Funds and Property) of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Link to the original case:
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1995/jan1995/gr_108358_1995.html
DIGESTED BY: Ching, Anjela Lu Antonie D.
22. OPLE v TORRES
GR 127685, July 23, 1998
DOCTRINE:
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and
enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs. It enables the President
to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his
agents. To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations.
An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates
to specific aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony
with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out
the legislative policy. We reject the argument that A.O. No. 308 implements the
legislative policy of the Administrative Code of 1987. The Code is a general law and
"incorporates in a unified document the major structural, functional and procedural
principles of governance” and "embodies changes in administrative structures and
procedures designed to serve the people.”
FACTS:
Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled
"Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important
constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate,
and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy.
A.O. No. 308 was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos on December 12, 1996.
A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22,
1997 and January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition
against respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the
government agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee,
are charged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining its implementation.
Petitioner contends:
A. The establishment of a national computerized identification reference system requires
a legislative act. The issuance of A.O. No. 308 by the President of the PH, is therefore,
unconstitutional usurpation of the legislative powers of the Congress.
B. The appropriation of public funds by the President of the PH for the implementation of
A.O. No. 308 is an unconstitutional usurpation of the exclusive right if Congress to
appropriate public funds for expenditure.
C. The implementation of A.O. No. 308 insidiously lays the groundwork for a system
which will violate the Bill of Rights.
Respondents counter-argue:
A. The instant petition is not a justiciable case as would warrant a judicial review.
B. A.O. NO. 308 [1996] was issued within the Executive and Administrative powers of
the President without encroaching on the Legislative powers of Congress.
C. The funds necessary for the implementation of the identification reference system
may be sourced from the budgets of the concerned agencies.
D. A.O. NO. 308 [1996] protects an individual’s interest in privacy.
ISSUE:
1. W/N AO 308 is a law; thus, beyond the power of the President to issue
2. W/N AO 308 violates the right to privacy
RULING:
(1)
The line that delineates Legislative and Executive power is not indistinct.
Legislative power is "the authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and
repeal them.” The Constitution, as the will of the people in their original, sovereign and
unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the Congress of the Philippines. The grant
of legislative power to Congress is broad, general and comprehensive. The legislative
body possesses plenary power for all purposes of civil government. Any power, deemed
to be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless
the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere. In fine, except as limited by the Constitution,
either expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects and extends to
matters of general concern or common interest.
While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President executes the laws.
The executive power is vested in the President. It is generally defined as the power to
enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical
operation and enforcing their due observance. As head of the Executive Department, the
President is the Chief Executive. He represents the government as a whole and sees to
it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. He has
control over the executive department, bureaus and offices. This means that he has the
authority to assume directly the functions of the executive department, bureau and
office, or interfere with the discretion of its officials. Corollary to the power of control, the
President also has the duty of supervising the enforcement of laws for the maintenance
of general peace and public order. Thus, he is granted administrative power over
bureaus and offices under his control to enable him to discharge his duties effectively.
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing
orders as determined by proper governmental organs. It enables the President to fix a
uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents.
To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations.
5 | Page
Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not
appropriate to be covered by an administrative order. An administrative order is:
"Sec. 3. Administrative Orders.-- Acts of the President which relate to particular
aspects of governmental operation in pursuance of his duties as administrative head
shall be promulgated in administrative orders.”
An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific
aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the
law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the
legislative policy. We reject the argument that A.O. No. 308 implements the legislative
policy of the Administrative Code of 1987. The Code is a general law and "incorporates
in a unified document the major structural, functional and procedural principles of
governance” and "embodies changes in administrative structures and procedures
designed to serve the people.”
It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the
Administrative Code of 1987. It establishes for the first time a National Computerized
Identification Reference System. Such a System requires a delicate adjustment of
various contending state policies-- the primacy of national security, the extent of privacy
interest against dossier-gathering by government, the choice of policies, etc. Indeed, the
dissent of Mr. Justice Mendoza states that the A.O. No. 308 involves the all-important
freedom of thought. As said administrative order redefines the parameters of some basic
rights of our citizenry vis-a-vis the State as well as the line that separates the
administrative power of the President to make rules and the legislative power of
Congress, it ought to be evident that it deals with a subject that should be covered by
law.
Nor is it correct to argue as the dissenters do that A.O. No. 308 is not a law
because it confers no right, imposes no duty, affords no protection, and creates no
office. Under A.O. No. 308, a citizen cannot transact business with government agencies
delivering basic services to the people without the contemplated identification card. No
citizen will refuse to get this identification card for no one can avoid dealing with
government. It is thus clear as daylight that without the ID, a citizen will have difficulty
exercising his rights and enjoying his privileges. Given this reality, the contention that
A.O. No. 308 gives no right and imposes no duty cannot stand.
(2)
Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a
fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government
to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state interest and that it is
narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two considerations: (1) the need to
provide our citizens and foreigners with the facility to conveniently transact business with
basic service and social security providers and other government instrumentalities and
(2) the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and
misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services. It is debatable whether these
interests are compelling enough to warrant the issuance of A.O. No. 308. But what is not
arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if
implemented will put our people's right to privacy in clear and present danger.

The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which provides for a Population
Reference Number (PRN) as a "common reference number to establish a linkage
among concerned agencies" through the use of "Biometrics Technology" and "computer
application designs.” Biometry or biometrics is "the science of the application of
statistical methods to biological facts; a mathematical analysis of biological data.” The
term "biometrics" has now evolved into a broad category of technologies which provide
precise confirmation of an individual's identity through the use of the individual's own
physiological and behavioral characteristics. A physiological characteristic is a relatively
stable physical characteristic such as a fingerprint, retinal scan, hand geometry or facial
features. A behavioral characteristic is influenced by the individual's personality and
includes voice print, signature and keystroke. Most biometric identification systems use
a card or personal identification number (PIN) for initial identification. The biometric
measurement is used to verify that the individual holding the card or entering the PIN is
the legitimate owner of the card or PIN.
A.O. No. 308 should also raise our antennas for a further look will show that it does not
state whether encoding of data is limited to biological information alone for identification
purposes. In fact, the Solicitor General claims that the adoption of the Identification
Reference System will contribute to the "generation of population data for development
planning.” This is an admission that the PRN will not be used solely for identification but
for the generation of other data with remote relation to the avowed purposes of A.O. No.
308. Clearly, the indefiniteness of A.O. No. 308 can give the government the roving
authority to store and retrieve information for a purpose other than the identification of
the individual through his PRN.
The potential for misuse of the data to be gathered under A.O. No. 308 cannot be
underplayed as the dissenters do. Pursuant to said administrative order, an individual
must present his PRN everytime he deals with a government agency to avail of basic
services and security. His transactions with the government agency will necessarily be
recorded-- whether it be in the computer or in the documentary file of the agency. The
individual's file may include his transactions for loan availments, income tax returns,
statement of assets and liabilities, reimbursements for medication, hospitalization, etc.
The more frequent the use of the PRN, the better the chance of building a huge and
formidable information base through the electronic linkage of the files. The data may be
gathered for gainful and useful government purposes; but the existence of this vast
reservoir of personal information constitutes a covert invitation to misuse, a temptation
that may be too great for some of our authorities to resist.
We can even grant, arguendo, that the computer data file will be limited to the
name, address and other basic personal information about the individual. Even that
hospitable assumption will not save A.O. No. 308 from constitutional infirmity for again
said order does not tell us in clear and categorical terms how these information gathered
shall be handled. It does not provide who shall control and access the data, under what
circumstances and for what purpose. These factors are essential to safeguard the
privacy and guaranty the integrity of the information. Well to note, the computer linkage
6 | Page
gives other government agencies access to the information. Yet, there are no controls to
guard against leakage of information. When the access code of the control programs of
the particular computer system is broken, an intruder, without fear of sanction or penalty,
can make use of the data for whatever purpose, or worse, manipulate the data stored
within the system.
It is plain and we hold that A.O. No. 308 falls short of assuring that personal
information which will be gathered about our people will only be processed for
unequivocally specified purposes. The lack of proper safeguards in this regard of A.O.
No. 308 may interfere with the individual's liberty of abode and travel by enabling
authorities to track down his movement; it may also enable unscrupulous persons to
access confidential information and circumvent the right against self-incrimination; it may
pave the way for "fishing expeditions" by government authorities and evade the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures. The possibilities of abuse and misuse of
the PRN, biometrics and computer technology are accentuated when we consider that
the individual lacks control over what can be read or placed on his ID, much less verify
the correctness of the data encoded. They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of
Rights seeks to prevent.
(3)
Next, the Solicitor General urges us to validate A.O. No. 308's abridgment of
the right of privacy by using the rational relationship test. He stressed that the purposes
of A.O. No. 308 are: (1) to streamline and speed up the implementation of basic
government services, (2) eradicate fraud by avoiding duplication of services, and (3)
generate population data for development planning. He concludes that these purposes
justify the incursions into the right to privacy for the means are rationally related to the
end.
A.O. No. 308 may have been impelled by a worthy purpose, but, it cannot pass
constitutional scrutiny for it is not narrowly drawn. And we now hold that when the
integrity of a fundamental right is at stake, this court will give the challenged law,
administrative order, rule or regulation a stricter scrutiny. It will not do for the authorities
to invoke the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. Nor is it
enough for the authorities to prove that their act is not irrational for a basic right can be
diminished, if not defeated, even when the government does not act irrationally. They
must satisfactorily show the presence of compelling state interests and that the law, rule,
or regulation is narrowly drawn to preclude abuses. This approach is demanded by the
1987 Constitution whose entire matrix is designed to protect human rights and to
prevent authoritarianism. In case of doubt, the least we can do is to lean towards the
stance that will not put in danger the rights protected by the Constitution.
The petition is granted and Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National
Computerized Identification Reference System" declared null and void for being
unconstitutional.
By: Culajara, Jeserie B.
23. Manila Jockey Club Inc v CA, G.R. No. 103533, December 15, 1998
DOCTRINE:
Franchise laws are privileges conferred by the government on corporations to do that
which does not belong to the citizens of the country generally by common right. As a
rule, a franchise springs from contracts between the sovereign power and the private
corporation for purposes of individual advantage as well as public benefit. Thus, a
franchise partakes of a double nature and character. In so far as it affects or concerns
the public, it is public juris and subject to governmental control. The legislature may
prescribe the conditions and terms upon which it may be held, and the duty of grantee to
the public exercising it.
The well-entrenched principle is that the State could not be estopped by a mistake
committed by its officials or agents.Well-settled also is the rule that the erroneous
application of the law by public officers does not prevent a subsequent correct
application of the law.
FACTS:
On June 18, 1948, Congress approved Republic Act No. 309, entitled An Act to Regulate
Horse-Racing in the Philippines. This Act consolidated all existing laws and amended
inconsistent provisions relative to horse racing. It provided for the distribution of gross
receipts from the sale of betting tickets, but is silent on the allocation of so-called
breakages. Thus the practice, according to the petitioners, was to use the breakages for
the anti-bookies drive and other sales promotions activities of the horse racing clubs.
On October 23, 1992, petitioners, Manila Jockey Club, Inc. (MJCI) and Philippine Racing
Club, Inc. (PRCI), were granted franchises to operate and maintain race tracks for horse
racing in the City of Manila and the Province of Rizal by virtue of Republic Act Nos.
6631 and 6632, respectively, and allowed to hold horse races, with bets, on certain
dates.
On March 20, 1974, Presidential Decree No. 420 was issued creating the Philippine
Racing Commission (PHILRACOM), giving it exclusive jurisdiction and control over
every aspect of the conduct of horse racing, including the framing and scheduling of
races. By virtue of this power, the PHILRACOM authorized the holding of races on
Wednesdays starting on December 22, 1976.
In connection with the new schedule of races, petitioners made a joint query regarding
the ownership of breakages accumulated during Wednesday races. In response to the
query, PHILRACOM rendered its opinion in a letter dated September 20, 1978. It
declared that the breakages belonged to the racing clubs concerned.
On April 23, 1987, PHILRACOM itself addressed a query to the Office of the President
asking which agency is entitled to dispose of the proceeds of the breakages derived
from the Tuesday and Wednesday races. In a letter dated May 21, 1987, the Office of
the President, through then Deputy Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr., replied
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that the disposition of the breakages rightfully belongs to PHILRACOM, not only those
derived from the Saturday, Sunday and holiday races, but also from the Tuesday and
Wednesday races in accordance with the distribution scheme prescribed in said
Executive Orders.
Controversy arose when herein respondent PHILRACOM, sent a series of demand
letters to petitioners MJCI and PRCI, requesting its share in the breakages of mid-week-
races and proof of remittances to other legal beneficiaries as provided under the
franchise laws. On June 8, 1987, PHILRACOM sent a letter of demand to petitioners
MJCI and PRCI asking them to remit PHILRACOMs share in the breakages derived from
the Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday races
On June 16, 1987, petitioners MJCI and PRCI sought reconsideration of the May 21,
1987 opinion of then Deputy Executive Secretary Macaraig, but the same was denied by
the Office of the President in its letter dated April 11, 1988.
Petitioners assert that franchise laws should be construed to apply the distribution
scheme specifically and exclusively to the racing days enumerated in Sec. 5 of R.A.
6631, and Sec. 7 of R.A. 6632. They claim that disposition of breakages under these
laws should be limited to races conducted on all Saturdays, Sundays, and official
holidays of the year, except, on those official holidays where the law expressly provides
that no horse races are to be held, hence, there is no doubt that the breakages of
Wednesday races shall belong to the racing clubs concerned. They even advance the
view that where a statute by its terms is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not
by interpretation or construction be extended to other matters.
However, respondent PHILRACOM contends that R.A. Nos. 6631 and 6632 are laws
intended primarily to grant petitioners their respective franchises to construct, operate,
and maintain a race track for horse racing. When PHILRACOM added mid-week races,
the franchises given to the petitioners remained the same. Logically, what applies to
races authorized under Republic Act Nos. 6631 and 6632 should also apply to races
additionally authorized by PHILRACOM, namely mid-week races, because these are
general provisions which apply general rules and procedures governing the operation of
the races. Consequently, if the authorized racing days are extended, these races must
therefore be governed by the same rules and provisions generally provided therein.
ISSUE/S:
Who are the rightful beneficiaries of the breakages derived from mid-week races? This
issue also carries an ancillary question: assuming PHILRACOM is entitled to the mid-
week breakages under the law, should the petitioners remit the money from the time the
mid-week races started, or only upon the promulgation of E.O. Nos. 88 and 89?
HELD: We find petitioners position on the main issue lacking in merit and far from
persuasive.
Franchise laws are privileges conferred by the government on corporations to do that
which does not belong to the citizens of the country generally by common right. As a
rule, a franchise springs from contracts between the sovereign power and the private
corporation for purposes of individual advantage as well as public benefit. Thus, a
franchise partakes of a double nature and character. In so far as it affects or concerns
the public, it is public juris and subject to governmental control. The legislature may
prescribe the conditions and terms upon which it may be held, and the duty of grantee to
the public exercising it.
As grantees of a franchise, petitioners derive their existence from the same. Petitioners
operations are governed by all existing rules relative to horse racing provided they are
not inconsistent with each other and could be reasonably harmonized. Therefore, the
applicable laws are R.A. 309, P.D. 420 and the orders issued by PHILRACOM.
Consequently, every statute should be construed in such a way that will harmonize it
with existing laws. This principle is expressed in the legal maxim interpretare et
concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi, that is, to interpret and to do it in
such a way as to harmonize laws with laws is the best method of interpretation.
The holding of horse races on Wednesdays is in addition to the existing schedule of
races authorized by law. Since this new schedule became part of R.A. 6631 and 6632
the set of procedures in the franchise laws applicable to the conduct of horse racing
business must likewise be applicable to Wednesday or other mid-week races. A fortiori,
the granting of the mid-week races does not require another legislative act to reiterate
the manner of allocating the proceeds of betting tickets. A supplemental law becomes an
addition to the existing statutes, or a section thereof; and its effect is not to change in
any way the provisions of the latter but merely to extend the operation thereof, or give
additional power to enforce its provisions, as the case may be.
Proceeding to the subsidiary issue, the period for the remittance of breakages to the
beneficiaries should have commenced from the time PHILRACOM authorized the
holding of mid-week races because R.A. Nos. 6631 and 6632 were already in effect
then. The petitioners contend that they cannot be held retroactively liable to respondent
PHILRACOM for breakages prior to the effectivity of E.O. Nos. 88 and 89. They assert
that the real intent behind E.O. Nos. 88 and 89 was to favor the respondent
PHILRACOM anew with the benefits which formerly had accrued in favor of Philippine
Amateur Athletic Federation (PAAF). They opine that since laws operate prospectively
unless the legislator intends to give them retroactive effect, the accrual of these
breakages should start on December 16, 1986, the date of effectivity of E.O. Nos. 88
and 89. Now, even if one of the benefactors of breakages, the PAAF, as provided by
R.A. 6631 and 6632 had ceased operation, it is still not proper for the petitioners to
presume that they were entitled to PAAFs share. When the petitioners mistakenly
appropriated the breakages for themselves, they became the implied trustees for those
legally entitled to the proceeds. This is in consonance with Article 1456 of the Civil Code.
While herein petitioners Themight have relied on a prior opinion issued by an
administrative body, the well-entrenched principle is that the State could not be estopped
8 | Page
by a mistake committed by its officials or agents.Well-settled also is the rule that the
erroneous application of the law by public officers does not prevent a subsequent correct
application of the law. Although there was an initial interpretation of the law by
PHILRACOM, a court of law could not be precluded from setting that interpretation aside
if later on it is shown to be inappropriate.
Moreover, the detrimental consequences of depriving the city hospitals and other
institutions of the funds needed for rehabilitation of drug dependents and other patients
are all too obvious. It goes without saying that the allocation of breakages in favor of
said institutions is a policy decision in pursuance of social development goals worthy of
judicial approbation.
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error, the appealed decision and the
resolution of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 25251, are hereby
AFFIRMED, and the instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SJ DADAYAN
25. Walter Olsen vs. Vicente Aldanese, G.R. No. L-18740, April 28, 1922
DOCTRINES:
1. PRESUMPTION. — There is a legal presumption that any law enacted by Legislature
is valid.
2. DUTY OF COURT. — It is the duty of the court to sustain the constitutionality of a
legislative act when it can be done without violating some express provision of the
Organic Law.
3. GENERAL RULE. — As a general rule, the courts will not pas upon the
constitutionality of a law unless it is necessary to the decision.
4. LIMITATION OF POWER. — Under clause (a), section 6, of Act No. 2613, of the
Philippine Legislature, the authority of the Collector of Internal Revenue to make rules
and regulations is specified and defined to the making of rules and regulations for the
classification, marking and packing of leaf or manufactured tobacco of good quality and
the handling of it under conditions.
5. STANDARD NOT DEFINED. — The act in question does not define the standard or
the type of leaf or manufactured tobacco which may be exported to the United States, or
how or upon what basis the Collector of Internal Revenue should fix or determine the
standard.
6. POWER CONFERRED. — The authority to make rules and regulations is limited and
defined by the legislative to the making of general and local rules for the classification,
marking, packing, and the type of tobacco which may be exported to the United States,
and it is not confined or limited to tobacco produced in the provinces of Cagayan,
Isabela, Nueva Vizcaya, or any other province.
7. CANNOT DISCRIMINATE. — Neither the Collector of Internal Revenue nor the
Legislature has any power to discriminate in favor of one province against another it the
production of tobacco, or any other province.
8. TEST OF CONSTITUTIONALITY. — The constitutionality of a law is not tested by
what has been done, but it is tested by what can or may be done under the law.
FACTS: Walter Olsen (plaintiff) is a duly licensed domestic corporation with its principal
office and place of business in the city of Manila and engaged in the manufacture and
export of cigars made of tobacco grown in the Philippine Islands. The defendant, Vicente
Aldanese, is the Insular collector of Customs, and the defendant, W. Trinidad, is the
Collector of Internal Revenue of the Philippine Islands.
As grounds for its petition, Olsen alleges that, under the Tariff Act of October 3, 1913, it
had the legal right to export from the Philippine Islands into the US cigars which it
manufactured from tobacco grown in the Philippine Islands. That on February 4, 1916,
the Philippine Legislature enacted Act No. 2613 entitled "An Act to improve the methods
of production and the quality of tobacco in the Philippine and to develop the export trade
therein". It is then alleged that on March 1, 1918, the CIR promulgated Administrative
Order No. 35, known as "Tobacco Inspection Regulations." The petition then quotes
sections 1 and 8 of article 1 of the Constitution of the United States, and section 10 of
"The Jones Law," which provides as follows:
"That while this Act provides that the Philippine Government shall have the authority to
enact a Tariff Law the trade relations between the Islands and the United States shall
continue to be governed exclusively by laws of the Congress of the United States."
It is also alleged that so much of clause B of section 6 of Act No. 2613 as empowers the
CIR to establish rules defining the standard and the type of leaf and manufactured
tobacco which may be exported into the United States, and portion of section 7 of said
Act which provides: "No leaf tobacco or manufactured tobacco shall be exported from
the Philippine Islands to the United States until it shall have been in inspected by the
Collector of Internal Revenue, etc.," and all that portion of section 11 of the Act, which
requires the certificate of origin of the CIR to show that the tobacco to be exported is
standard, and that portion of section 9 of Administrative Order No. 35, which limits the
exportation into the United States of Philippine cigars to those manufactured from long
filler tobacco exclusively the product of the provinces of Cagayan, Isabela, or Nueva
Vizcaya, are unconstitutional and void.
Petitioner applied to the CIR for a certificate to the Insular Collector of Internal Revenue
for a consignment of cigars manufactured by it from tobacco grown and produced in the
Philippine Islands, and was submitted for inspection and the issuance of the proper
certificate of origin. That the consignment was packed and stamped as required by the
regulations contained in Administrative Order No. 35, and in all things and respects
complied with the requirements of the Act of Congress of October 3, 1913, and with the
Act NO. 2613 of the Philippine Legislature, after the elimination of the void portions of
Act No. 2613 and of the Administrative Order. That the Collector of Internal Revenue
wrongfully and unlawfully refused to issue such certificate of origin "on the ground that
said cigars were not manufactured of long filler tobacco produced exclusively in the
provinces of Cagayan, Isabela or Nueva Vizcaya." By reason of such refusal, the
petitioner was deprived of the right of exporting the cigars to the United States and that
the petitioner has no "other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law," and prays for a peremptory writ of mandamus.
9 | Page
An order to show cause was made by the court, and on February 6, a demurrer was filed
"on the ground that the facts stated in the said petition do not entitle the petitioner to the
relief demanded, in that —"1. Act No. 2613 and the executive regulations issued in
accordance therewith do not contravene any provision of the fundamental law of the
Philippine Islands; "2. It does not appear from the facts stated in the said petition that the
respondents unlawfully neglected the performance of an act specially enjoined upon
them by law as a duty, or unlawfully exclude the petitioner from the use and enjoyment
of a right granted by law."
The defendants [respondents] contend that the portions of Act. No. 2613 in question are
not in violation of any constitutional right or any act of Congress; that the Philippine
Legislature is empowered to enact what is known as "inspection laws;" and that they are
not in conflict with the Constitution of United States, and also that under its police power,
the Legislature has authority to enact such a law, and that it was enacted in the interest
of the public welfare and to promote an important industry, and that it was not a
delegation of legislative power.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the respondent Collector of Internal Revenue committed grave
abuse of discretion when it refused to issue such certificate on the ground that
said cigars were not manufactured of long-filler tobacco produced exclusively in
the provisions of Cagayan, Isabela
2. Whether or not Administrative Order No. 35, Section 9 (which limits the
exportation into the United States of Philippine cigars to those manufactured
from long filler tobacco exclusively the product of the provinces of Cagayan,
Isabela, or Nueva Vizcaya) is valid?
HELD:
1.No. The defendants are public officers of the Philippine Islands, and the acts of which
the petitioner complains are their official acts. The facts in this case are peculiar. Under
the provisions of Act No. 2613, the Collector of Internal Revenue of the Philippine
Islands promulgated Administrative Order No. 35, known as "Tobacco Inspections
Regulations." Such rules and regulations, having been promulgated by that officer, we
have a right to assume that he was acting under such rules and regulations when he
refused to issue the certificate of origin.
It appears from the record that the cigars in question were not long-filler cigars, and that
they were not manufactured from tobacco grown in one of the three provinces. By the
express terms and provisions of such rules and regulations promulgated by the Collector
of Internal Revenue, it was his duty to refuse petitioner's request, and decline the
certificate or origin, because the cigars tendered were not of the specified kind,
and we have a right to assume that he performed his official duty as the
understood it. After such refusal and upon such grounds, it would indeed, have been a
vain and useless thing for the Collector of Internal Revenue to his examined or
inspected the cigars. Having refused to issue the certificate of origin for the reason
above assigned, it is very apparent that a request thereafter made examine or inspect
the cigars would also have been refused.

Disposition: The motion for judgment on the pleadings is sustained, and the writ will
issue, as prayed for in the petition, without costs.
2. No, the power of the Collector of Internal Revenue is confined to the making of rules
and regulations for the classification, making, and packing of tobacco, and that such
power is further limited to what is necessary to secure leaf tobacco of good quality and
its handling under sanitary conditions. The power is further limited "to the end that leaf
tobacco be not mixed, packed, and marked as of the same quality when it is not of the
same quality when it is not of the same class and origin." Any rules or regulations which
are not within the scope of the Act are null and void. Here, the Legislature has not
defined what shall be the standard or the type of leaf or manufactured tobacco which
may be exported to the United States, or even specified how or upon what basis the
Collector of Internal Revenue should fix or determine the standard. All of that power is
delegated to the Collector of Internal Revenue. It was never intended that a standard
should be fixed which would limit the manufacture of cigars for export to certain
provinces of the Islands, or that the tobacco produced in one province should be
measured by another and different standard than the tobacco produced in any other
province. That would amount to discrimination and class legislation, which, even the
Legislature, would not have the power to enact.
By: Manda, Loren
26. Araneta v Gatmaitan, G.R. Nos. L-8895 & L-9191, 30 April 1957, 101 Phil. 328
DOCTRINE: EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY BY THE PRESIDENT DOES NOT
CONSTITUTE UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS
FACTS:
San Miguel Bay, located between the provinces of Camarines Norte and Camarines Sur,
is considered as the most important fishing area in the Pacific side of the Bicol region.
On account of the belief of sustenance fishermen that the operation of trawls
caused the depletion of the marine resources of that area, there arose a general
clamor among the majority of the inhabitants of coastal towns to prohibit the
operation of trawls in San Miguel Bay.
This move was manifested in the resolution of December 18, 1953, passed by the
Municipal Mayors' League condemning the operation of trawls as the cause of the
wanton destruction of the shrimp specie and resolving to petition the President of the
Philippines to regulate fishing in San Miguel Bay by declaring it closed for trawl fishing at
a certain period of the year. In another resolution dated March 27, 1954, the same
League of Municipal Mayors prayed the President to protect them and the fish resources
of San Miguel Bay by banning the operation of trawls therein. The Provincial Governor
also made proper representations to this effect and petitions in behalf of the non-trawl
fishermen were likewise presented to the President by social and civic organizations as
the NAMFREL (National Movement for Free Elections) and the COMPADRE (Committee
for Philippine Action in Development, Reconstruction and Education), recommending the
cancellation of the licenses of trawl operators after investigation, if such inquiry would
10 | Page
substantiate the charges that the operation of said fishing method was detrimental to the
welfare of the majority of the inhabitants.
The president then issued EO No. 22 prohibiting the use of these trawls in
response to these pleas. (Amended by EO 66 apparently in answer to a resolution
of the Provincial Board of Camarines Sur recommending the allowance of trawl
fishing during the typhoon season only. On November 2, 1954, however, Executive
Order No. 80 was issued reviving Executive Order No. 22)
A group of Otter trawl operators took the matter to the court by filing a complaint for
injunction and/or declaratory relief with preliminary injunction with the Court of First
Instance of Manila, praying that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to restrain the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director of Fisheries from
enforcing said executive order; to declare the same null and void, and for such other
relief as may be just and equitable in the premises.
The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director of Fisheries
answered the complaint alleging, among other things, that of the 18 plaintiffs only 11
were issued licenses to operate fishing boats for the year 1954 ; that the executive
orders in question were issued in accordance with law; that the encouragement by the
Bureau of Fisheries of the use of Otter trawls should not be construed to mean that the
general welfare of the public could be disregarded, and set up the affirmative defenses
that since plaintiffs question the validity of the executive orders issued by the President,
then the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director of Fisheries
were not the real parties in interest; that said executive orders do not constitute a
deprivation of property without due process of law, and therefore prayed that the
complaint be dismissed.
Lower courts rendered a decision denying the validity of EO 22.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether the President of the Philippines has authority to issue Executive Orders
Nos. 22, 66 and 80, banning the operation of trawls in San Miguel Bay, or, said in other
words, whether said Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80 were issued in accordance
with law; and
(2) Whether Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80 were valid, for the issuance thereof
was not in the exercise of legislative powers unduly delegated to the President.
RULING:
(1) YES.
Section 10(1), Article VII of the Constitution of the Philippines prescribes:
"SEC. 10(1). The President shall have control -of all the executive departments, bureaus
or offices, exercises general supervision over all local governments as may be provided
by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed."
Section 63 of the Revised Administrative Code reads as f ollows:
"SEC. 63. EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND EXECUTIVE PROCLAMATION.—Administrative
acts and commands of the President of the Philippines touching the organization or
mode of operation of the Government or rearranging or readjusting any of the districts,
divisions, parts or ports of the Philippines, and all acts and commands governing the,
general performance of duties by public 'employees or disposing of issues of general
concern shall be made in executive orders."
Regarding department organization Section 74 of the Revised Administrative Code also
provides that:
"All executive functions of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines shall be
directly under the Executive Department subject to the supervision and control of the
President of the Philippines in matters of general policy. The Departments are
established for the proper distribution of the work 01 the Executive, for the performance
of the functions expressly assigned to them by law, and in order that each branch of the
administration may have a chief responsible for its direction and policy. Each
Department Secretary shall assume the burden of, and responsibility for, all activities of
the Government under his control and supervision.
One of the executive departments is that of Agriculture and Natural Resources which by
law is placed under the direction and control of the Secretary, who exercises its functions
subject to the general supervision and control of the President of the Philippines.
Moreover, "executive orders, regulations, decrees and proclamations relative to matters
under the supervision or jurisdiction of a Department, the promulgation whereof is
expressly assigned by law to the President of the Philippines, shall as 'a general rule, be
issued upon proposition and recommendation of the respective Department" and there
can be no doubt that the promulgation of the questioned Executive Orders was upon the
proposition and recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
and that is why said Secretary, who was and is called upon to enforce said executive
Orders, was made a party defendant in one of the cases at bar .
(2) YES, IT IS VALID. As already held by this Court, the true distinction between
delegation of the power to legislate and the conferring of authority or discretion as to the
execution of the law consists in that the former necessarily involves a discretion as to
what the law shall be, while in the latter the authority or discretion as to its execution has
to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter
no valid objection can be made.
In the light of these facts it is clear to Our mind that for the protection of fry or fish eggs
and small and immature fishes, Congress intended with the promulgation of Act No.
4003, to prohibit the use of any fish net or fishing device like trawl nets that could
endanger and deplete our supply of sea food, and to that end authorized the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources to provide by regulations such restrictions as he
deemed necessary in order to preserve the aquatic resources of the land. Consequently,
when the President, in response to the clamor of the people and authorities of
Camarines Sur issued Executive Order No. 80 absolutely prohibiting fishing by means of
trawls in all waters comprised within the San Miguel Bay, he did nothing but show an
anxious regard for the welfare of the inhabitants of said coastal province and dispose of
issues of general concern which were in consonance and strict conformity with the law.
By Steph Pelausa
27. PUBLIC SCHOOLS DISTRICT SUPERVISORS ASSOCIATION v.
HON EDILBERTO DE JESUS
G.R. No. 157286, 16 June 2006
DOCTRINE:
Administrative supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of
an officer to see that their subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter
11 | Page
fails or neglects to fulfill them, the former may take such action or steps as
prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.
It must be stressed that the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the
implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to what is provided for in the legislative
enactment. The implementing rules and regulations of a law cannot extend the law or
expand its coverage, as the power to amend or repeal a statute is vested in the
legislature. It bears stressing, however, that administrative bodies are allowed under
their power of subordinate legislation to implement the broad policies laid down in a
statute by filling in the details. All that is required is that the regulation be germane to the
objectives and purposes of the law; that the regulation does not contradict but conforms
with the standards prescribed by law. Moreover, as a matter of policy, this Court accords
great respect to the decisions and/or actions of administrative authorities not only
because of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed
knowledgeability and expertise in the enforcement of laws and regulations entrusted to
their jurisdiction.The rationale for this rule relates not only to the emergence of the
multifarious needs of a modern or modernizing society and the establishment of diverse
administrative agencies for addressing and satisfying those needs; it also relates to the
accumulation of experience and growth of specialized capabilities by the administrative
agency charged with implementing a particular statute.
FACTS:
Republic Act No. 9155, otherwise known as the Governance of Basic
Education Act 2001, became a law on August 11, 2001, in accordance with Section
27(1), Article VI of the Constitution. intended to highlight shared governance in the
different levels in the DECS hierarchy and establish authority, accountability, and
responsibility for achieving higher learning outcomes. Under the law, each regional office
shall have a director, an assistant director, and an office staff for program promotion and
support, planning, administrative and fiscal services.
The office of the schools district supervisor has been retained under the law. Each
district is headed by a school district supervisor and an office staff for program
promotion. However, the responsibilities of the schools district supervisor are limited to
the following: (1) providing professional and instructional advice and support to the
school heads and teachers/facilitators of schools and learning centers in the district or
cluster thereof; (2) curricula supervision; and (3) performing such other functions as may
be assigned by proper authorities.
The schools district supervisors have no administrative, management, control or
supervisory functions over the schools and learning centers within their respective
districts. These powers were vested with the DepEd secretary instead.
Following Section 14, since the DepEd Secretary is mandated to promulgate the
implementing rules and regulations within ninety (90) days after the approval of the Act,
before the promulgation, petitioner sought the legal assistance of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) National Committee on Legal Aid to make representations for the
resolution of the administrative issue regarding the restoration of the previous powers
enjoyed by Schools District Supervisors.
Granted, DepEd issued its Implementing Rules and Regulation (IRR) which caused the
PSDSA, the national organization of about 1,800 public school district supervisors of the
DepEd, in behalf of its officers and members (petitioners) filed the instant petition for
prohibition and mandamus. Petitions seek to declare as unconstitutionality of the IRR.
Petitioners assert that under the IRR, the schools district supervisors primarily perform
staff functions and shall not exercise administrative supervision over school principals,
unless specifically authorized by the proper authorities. Thus, under the IRR, the
exercise of administrative supervision over school principals was made
discretionary and subject to the whims and caprices of the proper authorities. The
logical inference of this provision, petitioners aver, is that the administrative supervisory
powers can be withdrawn from a district supervisor without any reason at all, a provision
which has no basis in the enabling law.
Petitioners further contend that the DepEd has no authority to incorporate its plan of
downgrading the position of district supervisor, that is, from being an administrator of a
particular district office to a position performing a staff function, to exercise
administrative supervision over the school principals only when specifically authorized
by proper authorities.
Petitioners further insist that respondent Education Secretary failed to consider the fact
that R.A. No. 9155 strengthened the district office as a mid-level administrative field
office of the DepEd. The law even mandates to allow the district supervisor to have an
office staff for program promotion in the district office. Apart from the current
administrative functions inherent in the district office, DECS Service Manual 2000 vested
additional specific functions to the district offices, to provide professional and
instructional advice and support to the school heads and teachers/facilitators of schools
and learning centers in the district, as well as curricula supervision.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the IRR violates RA 9155
HELD:
No.
The provisions merely reiterate and implement the related provisions of R.A.
No. 9155. Under the law, a division superintendent has the authority and responsibility to
hire, place, and evaluate all division supervisors and district supervisors as well as all
employees in the division, both teaching and non-teaching personnel, including school
heads. A school head is a person responsible for the administrative and instructional
supervision of the schools or cluster of schools. The division superintendent, on the
other hand, supervises the operation of all public and private elementary, secondary, and
integrated schools and learning centers.
Administrative supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an
officer to see that their subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fails
or neglects to fulfill them, the former may take such action or steps as prescribed
by law to make them perform their duties.
A plain reading of the law will show that the schools district supervisors have no
administrative supervision over the school heads; their responsibility is limited to those
enumerated in Section 7(D) of R.A. No. 9155, to wit:
(1) Providing professional and instructional advice
and support to the school heads and
teachers/facilitators of schools and learning centers
in the district or cluster thereof;
12 | Page
(2) Curricula supervision; and
(3) Performing such other functions as may be
assigned by proper authorities.
Administrative supervision over school heads is not one of those responsibilities
conferred on district supervisors.
The Senate resolved to maintain the positions of district supervisors but limited their
responsibilities only to those enumerated in Section 7(D) of R.A. No. 9155 to conform to
the basic thrust and objectives of the law. Far from strengthening the office of the district
supervisors as a mid-head field office of the DepEd, the law limited the authority and
responsibility attached to such position.
Besides, Congress enumerated the duties and responsibilities of a district supervisor.
Congress would not have made specific enumerations in a statute if it had the intention
not to restrict or limit its meaning and confine its terms only to those expressly
enumerated. Courts may not, in the guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope of a
statute and include situations not provided nor intended by Congress.
by Salonga, Jessica Daphne D.
28. ROMULO, MABANTA, BUENAVENTURA, SAYOC & DE LOS ANGELES vs.
HOME DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL FUND G.R. No. 131082. June 19, 2000
DOCTRINES: Rules and regulations, which are the product of a delegated power to
create new and additional legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be within
the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative
agency. It is required that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the
law, and be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by
law.
FACTS
Pursuant to Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752, as amended by R.A. No. 7742, petitioner
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc and De Los Angeles, a law firm, was exempted
for the period 1 January to 31 December 1995 from the Pag~IBIG Fund coverage by
respondent Home Development Mutual Fund (hereafter HDMF) because of a superior
retirement plan.
On 1 September 1995, the HDMF Board of Trustees, pursuant to Section 5 of Republic
Act No. 7742, issued Board Resolution No. 1011, Series of 1995, amending and
modifying the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 7742. As amended, Section
1 of Rule VII provides that for a company to be entitled to a waiver or suspension of
Fund coverage, it must have a plan providing for both provident/ retirement and housing
benefits superior to those provided under the Pag~IBIG Fund.
Accordingly, the President and Chief Executive Officer of HDMF disapproved the
application for Waiver or Suspension of Fund Coverage of the petitioner on the ground
that the requirement that there should be both a provident retirement fund and a housing
plan is clear in the use of the phrase "and/or," and that the Rules Implementing R.A. No.
7742 did not amend nor repeal Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752 but merely implement the
law.
ARGUMENT OF THE PETITIONER:
According to the petitoner 1995 Amendment to the Rules and Regulations Implementing
Republic Act No. 7742 for being contrary to law. In support thereof, PETITIONER
contends that the subject 1995 Amendments issued by HDMF are inconsistent with the
enabling law, P.D. No. 1752, as amended by R.A. No. 7742, which merely requires as a
pre~condition for exemption from coverage the existence of either a superior provident/
retirement plan or a superior housing plan, and not the concurrence of both plans.
ISSUES:
1. WON the 1995 Amendments to the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No.
7742, specifically Section I, Rule VII on Waiver and Suspension were valid in so far as it
requires employers to have a plan providing for both provident/ retirement and housing
benefits superior to those provided under the Pag~IBIG Fund in order to apply for waiver
of suspension of fund coverage?
2. WON the 1995 Amendments to the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No.
7742, specifically Section I, Rule VII on Waiver and Suspension was a valid exercise of
subordinate legislation?
HELD:
1. NO. In the case of China Banking Corp. v. The Members of the Board of
Trustees of the HDMF. The Court held that Section 1 of Rule VII of the Amendments to
the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 7742, and HDMF Circular No. 124~B
prescribing the Revised Guidelines and Procedure for Filing Application for Waiver or
Suspension of Fund Coverage under P.D. No. 1752, as amended by R.A. No. 7742, are
null and void insofar as they require that an employer should have both a provident/
retirement plan and a housing plan superior to the benefits offered by the Fund in order
to qualify for waiver or suspension of the Fund coverage. In arriving at said conclusion,
the court ruled:
The controversy lies in the legal signification of the words "and/or." In the instant case,
the legal meaning of the words "and/or" should be taken in its ordinary signification. "The
term and/or means that the effect shall be given to both the conjunctive "and" and the
disjunctive "or"; or that one word or the other may be taken accordingly as one or the
other will best effectuate the purpose intended by the legislature as gathered from the
whole statute. The term is used to avoid a construction which by the use of the
disjunctive "or" alone will exclude the combination of several of the alternatives or by the
use of the conjunctive "and" will exclude the efficacy of any one of the alternatives
standing alone."
2. NO. It is without doubt that the HDMF Board has rule~making power as
provided in Section 5[17] of R.A. No. 7742 and Section 13[18] of P.D. No. 1752.
However, it is well~settled that rules and regulations, which are the product of a
delegated power to create new and additional legal provisions that have the effect of law,
should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the
administrative agency. It is required that the regulation be germane to the objects and
13 | Page
purposes of the law, and be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards
prescribed by law.
In the present case, when the Board of Trustees of the HDMF required in Section 1,
Rule VII of the 1995 Amendments to the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No.
7742 that employers should have both provident/retirement and housing benefits for all
its employees in order to qualify for exemption from the Fund, it effectively amended
Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752. And when the Board subsequently abolished that
exemption through the 1996 Amendments, it repealed Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752. Such
amendment and subsequent repeal of Section 19 are both invalid, as they are not within
the delegated power of the Board. The HDMF cannot, in the exercise of its rule~making
power, issue a regulation not consistent with the law it seeks to apply. Indeed,
administrative issuances must not override, supplant or modify the law, but must remain
consistent with the law they intend to carry out. Only Congress can repeal or amend the
law.
- Samaniego, Emil L
29. ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE COCONUT DESICCATORS vs. PHILIPPINE
COCONUT AUTHORITY
GR No. 110526 February 10, 1998
DOCTRINE: Any change in policy must be made by the legislative department of
the government. The regulatory system has been set up by law. It is beyond the
power of an administration agency to dismantle it.
FACTS: On November 5, 1992, seven desiccated coconut processing companies
belonging to the APCD brought suit in the Regional Trial Court to enjoin the PCA from
issuing permits to certain applicants for the establishment of new desiccated coconut
processing plants. Petitioner alleged that the issuance of licenses to the applicants
would violate PCA's Administrative Order No. 02, series of 1991, as the applicants were
seeking permits to operate in areas considered "congested" under the administrative
order. On November 6, 1992, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order and, on
November 25, 1992, a writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining the PCA from processing
and issuing licenses. Subsequently and while the case was pending in the Regional Trial
Court, the Governing Board of the PCA issued on March 24, 1993 Resolution No. 018-
93, providing for the withdrawal of the Philippine Coconut Authority from all regulation of
the coconut product processing industry. While it continues the registration of coconut
product processors, the registration would be limited to the "monitoring" of their volumes
of production and administration of quality standards. The PCA then proceeded to issue
"certificates of registration" to those wishing to operate desiccated coconut processing
plants, prompting petitioner to appeal to the Office of the President of the Philippines on
April 26, 1993 not to approve the resolution in question. Despite follow-up letters sent on
May 25 and June 2, 1993, petitioner received no reply from the Office of the President.
The "certificates of registration" issued in the meantime by the PCA has enabled a
number of new coconut mills to operate.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not PCA’s Board Resolution No. 018-93 is null and void for being an
undue exercise of legislative power by an administrative body.
2. Whether or not the PCA is authorized to renounce the power to regulate implicit in the
law creating it for that is what the resolution in question actually is.
RULING:
1. No. The resolution in question was issued by the PCA in the exercise of its rule-
making or legislative power. To be sure, the PCA is under the direct supervision of the
President of the Philippines but there is nothing in P.D. No. 232, P.D. No. 961, P.D. No.
1468 and P.D. No. 1644 defining the powers and functions of the PCA which requires
rules and regulations issued by it to be approved by the President before they become
effective.
2. No. On December 6, 1982, a phase-out of some of the existing plants was ordered by
the government after finding that "a mere freeze in the present capacity of existing plants
will not afford a viable solution to the problem considering that the total available limited
market is not adequate to support all the existing processing plants, making it imperative
to reduce the number of existing processing plants." Accordingly, it was ordered: “Sec. 1.
The Philippine Coconut Authority is hereby ordered to take such action as may be
necessary to reduce the number of existing desiccated coconut processing plants to a
level which will insure the survival of the remaining plants. The Authority is hereby
directed to determine which of the existing processing plants should be phased out and
to enter into appropriate contracts with such plants for the above purpose.” In plain
disregard of this legislative purpose, the PCA adopted on March 24, 1993 the
questioned resolution which allows not only the indiscriminate opening of new coconut
processing plants but the virtual dismantling of the regulatory infrastructure whereby,
forsaking controls theretofore placed in its keeping, the PCA limits its function to the
innocuous one of "monitoring" compliance by coconut millers with quality standards and
volumes of production. In effect, the PCA would simply be compiling statistical data on
these matters, but in case of violations of standards there would be nothing much it
would do. Instead of determining the qualifications of market players and preventing the
entry into the field of those who are unfit, the PCA now relies entirely on competition —
with all its wastefulness and inefficiency — to do the weeding out, in its naive belief in
survival of the fittest. The result can very well be a repeat of 1982 when free enterprise
degenerated into a "free-for-all," resulting in cut-throat competition, underselling, the
production of inferior products and the like, which badly affected the foreign trade
performance of the coconut industry.
Furthermore, under Article II, Section 3(a) of the Revised Coconut Code (PD No. 1468)
the role of the PCA is “to formulate and adopt a general program of development for the
coconut and other palm oil industry in all its aspects.” By limiting the purpose of
14 | Page
registration to merely monitoring volumes of production [and] administration of quality
standards” of coconut processing plants, the PCA in effect abdicates its role and leaves
it almost completely to market forces how the coconut industry will develop. In so doing,
the PCA abdicated its function of regulation and left to untrammeled competition that is
likely to resurrect the evils of cut-throat competition, underselling and overproduction
which in 1982 required the temporary closing of the field to new players in order to save
the industry.
At all events, any change in policy must be made by the legislative department of
the government. The regulatory system has been set up by law. It is beyond the
power of an administration agency to dismantle it.
PCA Resolution No. 018-93 and all certificates of registration issued under it are hereby
declared NULL and VOID for having been issued in excess of the power of the
Philippine Coconut Authority to adopt or issue.
By: Michaela Sarmiento
30. ECHEGARAY vs. SOJ
Facts:
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray y Pilo for the
crime of rape of the 10 year-old daughter of his common-law spouse. The supreme
penalty of death was to be imposed upon him. He then filed motion for recon and a
supplemental motion for recon raising constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 and the
death penalty for rape. Both were denied. Consequently, Congress changed the mode of
execution of the death penalty from electrocution to lethal injection, and passed Republic
Act No. 8177, designating death by lethal injection. Echegaray filed a Petition for
prohibition from carrying out the lethal injection against him under the grounds that it
constituted 1. cruel, degrading, or unusual punishment, 2. Being violative of due
process, 3. a violation of the Philippines’ obligations under international covenants, 4. an
undue delegation of legislative power by Congress, an unlawful exercise by respondent
Secretary of the power to legislate, and an unlawful delegation of delegated powers by
the Secretary of Justice. In his motion to amend, the petitioner added equal protection
as a ground.
The Solicitor General stated that the Supreme Court has already upheld the
constitutionality of the Death Penalty Law, and has declared that the death penalty is not
cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment; execution by lethal injection, as
authorized under R.A. No. 8177 and the questioned rules, is constitutional, lethal
injection being the most modern, more humane, more economical, safer and easier to
apply (than electrocution or the gas chamber); in addition to that, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not expressly or impliedly prohibit the
imposition of the death penalty.
Issues: 1. Is the lethal injection a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment? 2. Is it a
violation of our international treaty obligations? 3. Is it discriminatory (pertaining to sec
17)?
Held: 1. No 2. Yes 3rd. Petition denied.
1. Petitioner contends that death by lethal injection constitutes cruel, degrading and
inhuman punishment because (1) R.A. No. 8177 fails to provide for the drugs to be used
in carrying out lethal injection, the dosage for each drug to be administered, and the
procedure in administering said drug/s into the accused; (2) its implementing rules are
uncertain as to the date of the execution, time of notification, the court which will fix the
date of execution, which uncertainties cause the greatest pain and suffering for the
convict; and (3) the possibility of mistakes in administering the drugs renders lethal
injection inherently cruel. It is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death penalty per se
is not a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment. In Harden v. Director of Prisons-
“punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the
punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the
constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than
the mere extinguishment of life.” Would the lack in particularity then as to the details
involved in the execution by lethal injection render said law “cruel, degrading or
inhuman”? The Court believes not. Petitioner contends that Sec. 16 of R.A. No. 8177 is
uncertain as to which “court” will fix the time and date of execution, and the date of
execution and time of notification of the death convict. As petitioner already knows, the
“court” which designates the date of execution is the trial court which convicted the
accused. The procedure is that the “judgment is entered fifteen (15) days after its
promulgation, and 10 days thereafter, the records are remanded to the court below
including a certified copy of the judgment for execution. Neither is there any uncertainty
as to the date of execution nor the time of notification. As to the date of execution,
Section 15 of the implementing rules must be read in conjunction with the last sentence
of Section 1 of R.A. No. 8177 which provides that the death sentence shall be carried
out “not earlier than one (1) year nor later then eighteen (18) months from the time the
judgment imposing the death penalty became final and executory, without prejudice to
the exercise by the President of his executive clemency powers at all times.” Hence, the
death convict is in effect assured of eighteen (18) months from the time the judgment
imposing the death penalty became final and executor wherein he can seek executive
clemency and attend to all his temporal and spiritual affairs. Petitioner also contends that
the infliction of “wanton pain” in case of possible complications in the intravenous
injection that respondent Director is an untrained and untested person insofar as the
choice and administration of lethal injection is concerned, renders lethal injection a cruel,
degrading and inhuman punishment. This is unsubstantiated. First. Petitioner has neither
alleged nor presented evidence that lethal injection required the expertise only of
phlebotomists and not trained personnel and that the drugs to be administered are
unsafe or ineffective. Petitioner simply cites situations in the United States wherein
execution by lethal injection allegedly resulted in prolonged and agonizing death for the
convict, without any other evidence whatsoever. Second. Petitioner overlooked Section
1, third paragraph of R.A. No. 8177 which requires that all personnel involved in the
execution proceedings should be trained prior to the performance of such task. We must
presume that the public officials entrusted with the implementation of the death penalty
15 | Page
will carefully avoid inflicting cruel punishment. Third. Any infliction of pain in lethal
injection is merely incidental in carrying out the execution of death penalty and does not
fall within the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading and inhuman
punishment. “In a limited sense, anything is cruel which is calculated to give pain or
distress, and since punishment imports pain or suffering to the convict, it may be said
that all punishments are cruel. But of course the Constitution does not mean that crime,
for this reason, is to go unpunished.” The cruelty against which the Constitution protects
a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method of punishment, not the necessary
suffering involved in any method employed to extinguish life humanely.
2. Violation of international treaties? In countries which have not abolished the death
penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes in
accordance with the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime and not
contrary to the provisions of the present Covenant and to the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only be carried
out pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a competent court. The punishment was
subject to the limitation that it be imposed for the “most serious crimes”. Included with
the declaration was the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty was adopted by the
General Assembly on December 15, 1989. The Philippines neither signed nor ratified
said document.
3. Petitioner contends that Section 17 of the Implementing Rules is unconstitutional for
being discriminatory. “SEC. 17. SUSPENSION OF THE EXECUTION OF THE DEATH
SENTENCE. Execution by lethal injection shall not be inflicted upon a woman within the
three years next following the date of the sentence or while she is pregnant, nor upon
any person over seventy (70) years of age. In this latter case, the death penalty shall be
commuted to the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties provided in
Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code.” Petitioner contends that Section 17 amends the
instances when lethal injection may be suspended, without an express amendment of
Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by section 25 of R.A. No. 7659,
stating that the death sentence shall not be inflicted upon a woman while she is
pregnant or within one (1) year after delivery, nor upon any person over seventy years of
age. While Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic
Act No. 7659, suspends the implementation of the death penalty while a woman is
pregnant or within one (1) year after delivery, Section 17 of the implementing rules omits
the one (1) year period following delivery as an instance when the death sentence is
suspended, and adds a ground for suspension of sentence no longer found under Article
83 of the Revised Penal Code as amended, which is the three-year reprieve after a
woman is sentenced. This addition is, in petitioner’s view, tantamount to a gender-based
discrimination. Being an implementing rule, Section 17 must not override, but instead
remain consistent and in harmony with the law it seeks to implement
31. Lupangco vs. CA (G.R. No. 77372)
DOCTRINE:
It is an aixiom in administrative law that administrative authorities should not act
arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such
rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to the end in view. If shown
to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for which they are authorized to be
issued, then they must be held to be invalid.
FACTS:
On or about October 6, 1986, herein respondent Professional Regulation Commission
(PRC) issued Resolution No. 105 as parts of its "Additional Instructions to Examinees,"
to all those applying for admission to take the licensure examinations in accountancy:
No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like conducted
by, or shall receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or
university, or any review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or
employee of any of the aforementioned or similar institutions during the three days
immediately proceeding every examination day including examination day.
Any examinee violating this instruction shall be subject to the sanctions prescribed by
Sec. 8, Art. III of the Rules and Regulations of the Commission.
On October 16, 1986, herein petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure
examinations in accountancy schedule on October 25 and November 2 of the same
year, filed on their own behalf of all others similarly situated like them, with the Regional
Trial Court of Manila a complaint for injunction with a prayer with the issuance of a writ of
a preliminary injunction against respondent PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing the
above-mentioned resolution and to declare the same unconstitutional.
Respondent PRC filed a motion to dismiss on October 21, 1987 on the ground that the
lower court had no jurisdiction to review and to enjoin the enforcement of its resolution.
In an Order of October 21, 1987, the lower court declared that it had jurisdiction to try
the case and enjoined the respondent commission from enforcing and giving effect to
Resolution No. 105 which it found to be unconstitutional. Not satisfied therewith,
respondent PRC, on November 10, 1986, an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The
petition was granted.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Resolution No. 105 is constitutional.
HELD:
No. CA stated as basis its conclusion that PCS and RTC are co-equal branches. They
relied heavily on the case of National Electrification Administration vs. Mendoza where
the Court held that a Court of First Instance cannot interfere with the orders of SEC, the
two being a co-equal branch.
SC said the cases cited by CA are not in point. It is glaringly apparent that the reason
why the Court ruled that the Court of First Instance could not interfere with the orders of
SEC was that this was provided for by the law. Nowhere in the said cases was it held
that a Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction over all other government agencies. On
the contrary, the ruling was specifically limited to the SEC. The respondent court erred
16 | Page
when it place he SEC and PRC in the same category. There is no law providing for the
next course of action for a party who wants to question a ruling or order of the PRC.
What is clear from PD No. 223 is that PRC is attached to the Office of the President for
general direction and coordination. Well settled in our jurisprudence the view that even
acts of the Office of the President may be reviewed by the RTC. In view of the foregoing,
SC rules that RTC has jurisdiction to entertain the case and enjoin PRC from enforcing
its resolution.
As to the validity of Resolution No. 105, although the resolution has a commendable
purpose which is to preserve the integrity and purity of the licensure examinations, the
resolution is unreasonable in that an examinee cannot even attend and review class,
briefing, conference or the like or receive hand-out, review material, or any tip from any
school, college or university, or any review center. The unreasonableness is more
obvious in that one who is caught committing the prohibited acts even without ill motives
will be barred from taking future examinations.
Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the
examinees’ right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. PRC has no authority to
dictate on the reviewees as to how they should prepare themselves for the licensure
examinations specially if the steps they take are lawful.
Another evident objection to Resolution No. 105 is that it violates the academic freedom
of the schools concerned. PRC cannot interfere with the conduct of review that review
schools and centers believe would best enable their enrollees to pass the examination.
Unless the means and methods of instruction are clearly found to be inefficient,
impractical, or riddled with corruption, review schools and centers may not be stopped
from helping out their students.
The enforcement of Resolution No. 105 is not a guarantee that the alleged leakages in
the licensure examinations will be eradicated or at least minimized. What is needed to
be done by the respondent is to find out the source of such leakages and stop it right
there.
By: EG Velasco
32. G.R. No. L-59234 September 30, 1982
TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA, INC., FELICISIMO CABIGAO and ACE
TRANSPORTATION CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs.
THE BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION and THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF
LAND TRANSPORTATION, respondents.
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
On October 10, 1977, BOT issued Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 that aimed to phase
out and replace old dilapidated taxis to insure only safe comfortable units are used by
the public, to respond to complaints by metro manila residents regarding the old
dilapidated taxis, to make the commuting public more comfortable, have more
convenience and safety. 6 years is enough for taxi operators to get back cost of unit plus
profits. No car beyond 6 years can still be operated as taxi.
Taxis model 1971 were considered withdrawn on Dec 31, 1977 and applying the same
system to succeeding years by just adding one year to both dates. They had to
surrender the expired taxi’s plates to the BOT for turnover to Land Transpo Commission.
Pursuant to the above BOT circular, respondent Director of the Bureau of Land
Transportation (BLT) issued Implementing Circular No. 52, dated August 15, 1980,
instructing the Regional Director, the MV Registrars and other personnel of BLT, all
within the NCR, to implement the phasing out of the taxis and formulating a schedule of
phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and accepted for registration as public
conveyances..
On January 27, 1981, a petition filed for "Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus with
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order" was filed by the Taxicab
Operators of Metro Manila, Inc., Felicisimo Cabigao and Ace Transportation with the
BOT, docketed as Case No. 80-7553, seeking to nullify MC No. 77-42 or to stop its
implementation; to allow the registration and operation in 1981 and subsequent years of
taxicabs of model 1974, as well as those of earlier models which were phased-out,
provided that, at the time of registration, they are roadworthy and fit for operation.
Petitioners, through its President, allegedly made personal follow-ups of the case, but
was later informed that the records of the case could not be located.
On December 29, 1981, the present Petition was instituted wherein the following queries
were posed for consideration by this Court:
A. Did BOT and BLT promulgate the questioned memorandum circulars in accord with
the manner required by Presidential Decree No. 101, thereby safeguarding the
petitioners' constitutional right to procedural due process?
B. Granting, arguendo, that respondents did comply with the procedural requirements
imposed by Presidential Decree No. 101, would the implementation and enforcement of
the assailed memorandum circulars violate the petitioners' constitutional rights to.
(1) Equal protection of the law;
(2) Substantive due process; and
(3) Protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and standard?
Petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a domestic corporation
composed of taxicab operators, who are grantees of Certificates of Public Convenience
to operate taxicabs within the City of Manila and to any other place in Luzon accessible
to vehicular traffic. Petitioners Ace Transportation Corporation and Felicisimo Cabigao
are
two of the members of TOMMI, each being an operator and grantee of such certificate of
public convenience.
ISSUES:
1. WON the procedural and substantive due process rights of the taxi operators were
violated (NO)
17 | Page
2. WON their equal protection rights were violated (NO)
HELD:
Procedural and Substantive Due Process:
Presidential Decree No. 101 grants to the Board of Transportation the power
4. To fix just and reasonable standards, classification, regulations, practices,
measurements, or service to be furnished, imposed, observed, and followed by
operators of public utility motor vehicles.
Section 2 of said Decree provides procedural guidelines for said agency to follow in the
exercise of its powers:
Sec. 2. Exercise of powers. — In the exercise of the powers granted in the preceding
section, the Board shall proceed promptly along the method of legislative inquiry.
Apart from its own investigation and studies, the Board, in its discretion, may require the
cooperation and assistance of the Bureau of Transportation, the Philippine Constabulary,
particularly the Highway Patrol Group, the support agencies within the Department of
Public Works, Transportation and Communications, or any other government office or
agency that may be able to furnish useful information or data in the formulation of the
Board of any policy, plan or program in the implementation of this Decree.
The Board may also call conferences, require the submission of position papers or other
documents, information, or data by operators or other persons that may be affected by
the implementation of this Decree, or employ any other suitable means of inquiry.
PET claim that they were denied due process because they were not asked to submit
position papers or to attend conferences regarding the assailed circular.
SC held that the PD provides a wide leeway as to how the board will choose to gather
data in formulating its policy. NOT ALL OPTIONS ARE REQUIRED TO BE DONE FOR
POLICY TO BE VALID the board has the choice of which avenue to pursue in collecting
data.
PET also claim that 6 year limit was arbitrarily set à oppressive à they want each taxi
cab to be inspected regarding their condition WON it was still safe and roadworthy
despite age.
Court held that their proposed standard is not practicable and can open the door to
multiple standards and corruption
Court furthers aid that 6 years is a reasonable time based on experience and based
on cost and fair returns on the units
Court held that a uniform standard is best and fair
Equal Protection of the Law:
PET allege that the circular targets and singles out the taxi industry = violation of their
equal protection rights
Court said NO. Circs of the same kind are also being implemented in other cities like
Cebu and is also in the process of conducting the same studies and policy formulations
in other cities.
Manila was first because of the heavier traffic pressure and the more constant use of
the taxis in MM.
SUBSTANTIAL DISTINCTION à the traffic conditions in the various cities

33. DE JESUS, ET AL VS. COA
DOCTRINE: Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is,
regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not
be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued
by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their duties.
- LAURENTE
FACTS: Petitioners(De Jesus) are employees of the Local Water Utilities Administration
(LWUA). Prior to July 1, 1989, they were receiving honoraria as designated members of
the LWUA Board Secretariat and the Pre-Qualification, Bids and Awards Committee.
Upon the enactment of Republic Act No. 6758 (Rep. Act 6758), entitled "An Act
Prescribing A Revised Compensation and Position Classification System in the
Government and For Other Purposes", some allowances and compensatoons were
consolidated with the standardized salary rates of government employees. The
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued Corporate Compensation
Circular No. 10 (DBM-CCC No. 10), discontinuing without qualification effective
November 1, 1989, all allowances and fringe benefits granted on top of basic salary.
Complyinh therewith,the assigned COA Leonardo Jamoralin, as corporate auditor,
disallowed on post audit, the payment of honoraria to the herein petitioners.
Pet. Argument: 1. That the DBM Circular is repugnant to the law it seeks to implement
since RA 6758 authorizes payment of allowances and compensation not included in the
standardized salary. 2. And it is without force and effect because it was not published in
the Official Gazette; petitioners stressed.
COA Argument: 1. COA, on the other hand, pointed out that to allow honoraria without
statutory, presidential or DBM authority, as in this case, would run counter to Sec. 8,
Article IX-B of the Constitution which proscribes payment of "additional or double
compensation, unless specifically authorized by law." 2. DBM-CCC No. 10 need not be
published for it is merely an interpretative regulation of a law already published.
The Court first ruled on the 2nd argument since it is determinative of whether it should
still tackle the 1st argumet of the parties.
ISSUE: Whether DBM CCC No 10 is legally effective despite lack of publication.
HELD: NO. Following the doctrine enunciated in Tanada, publication in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines is required since
DBM-CCC No. 10 is in the nature of an administrative circular the purpose of which is to
enforce or implement an existing law. Stated differently, to be effective and enforceable,
DBM-CCC No. 10 must go through the requisite publication in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. the government officials and
employees concerned should be apprised and alerted by the publication of subject
circular in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines
18 | Page
— to the end that they be given amplest opportunity to voice out whatever opposition
they may have, and to ventilate their stance on the matter.
Note: Tanada vs. Tuvera enumerate those that need and need not be published.
Needs publication: statutes ( local or private law), presidential decree and executive
orders, charter of a city.
Need not be published are: Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in
nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the
public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of
instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be
followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.
People vs. Maceren
GR. No. L-32166
DOCTRINE: Administrative agents are clothed with rule-making powers because the
lawmaking body finds it impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate and provide for the
multifarious and complex situations that may be encountered in enforcing the law.
FACTS:
Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino and Carlito del
Rosario were charged with having violated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1. It
alleged that the five accused resorted to electro fishing in the waters of Barrio San Pablo
Norte, Sta. Cruz by using their own motor banca, equipped with motor and electrocuting
device locally known as sensored with a somewhat webbed copper wire on the tip or
other end of a bamboo pole with electric wire attachment which was attached to the
dynamo direct and with the use of these devices or equipments catches fish thru electric
current, which destroy any aquatic animals within its cuffed reach, to the detriment and
prejudice of the populace. Sec. 11 of the Fisheries Law prohibits "the use of any
obnoxious or poisonous substance" in fishing. Section 76 of the same law punishes any
person who uses an obnoxious or poisonous substance in fishing with a fine of not more
than five hundred pesos nor more than five thousand, and by imprisonment for not less
than six months or more than five years. It is noteworthy that the Fisheries Law does not
expressly punish electro fishing. Notwithstanding the silence of the law, the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon the recommendation of the Commissioner of
Fisheries, promulgated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84 (62 O.G. 1224), prohibiting
electro fishing in all Philippine waters. On June 28, 1967 the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, upon the recommendation of the Fisheries Commission, issued
Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1, amending section 2 of Administrative Order No.
84, by restricting the ban against electro fishing to fresh water fisheries (63 O.G. 9963).
Thus, the phrase "in any portion of the Philippine waters" found in section 2, was
changed by the amendatory order to read as follows: "in fresh water fisheries in the
Philippines, such as rivers, lakes, swamps, dams, irrigation canals and other bodies of
fresh water."
ISSUE:
Whether or not Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of
Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative Orders Nos. 84
and 84-1
RULING:
Yes. They exceeded their authority. The rule-making power confined to details for
regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted.
The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or
to embrace matters not covered by the statute.The Fisheries Law does not expressly
prohibit electro fishing .As electro fishing is not banned under that law. Hence,
theSecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries
are powerless to penalize it. Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing,
a penal provision to that effect could have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries
Law. Nowhere in the said law is electro fishing specifically punished. Administrative
agents are clothed with rule-making powers because the lawmaking body finds it
impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate and provide for the multifarious and
complex situations that may be encountered in enforcing the law. All that is required is
that the regulation should be germane to the defects and purposes of the law and that it
should conform to the standards that the law prescribes.
-ABONG
36. Philippine Consumers Foundation v. The Secretary of Education, Culture and
Sports
GR. No. 78385
Doctrine: The function of prescribing rates by an administrative agency may be either a
legislative or an adjudicative function. If it were a legislative function, the grant of prior
notice and hearing to the affected parties is not a requirement of due process. As
regards rates prescribed by an administrative agency in the exercise of itsquasi-judicial
function, prior notice and hearing are essential to the validity of such rates. When the
rules and/or rates laid down by an administrative agency are meant to apply to all
enterprises of a given kind throughout the country, they may partake of a legislative
character. Where the rules and the rates imposed apply exclusively to a particular party,
based upon a finding of fact, then its function is quasi-judicial in character.
Facts:
On February 21, 1987, the Task Force on Private Higher Education created by the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (hereinafter referred to as the DECS)
submitted a report entitled "Report and Recommendations on a Policy for Tuition and
Other School Fees." The DECS took note of the report of the Task Force and on the
basis of the same, the DECS, through the respondent Secretary of Education, Culture
and Sports (hereinafter referred to as the respondent Secretary), issued an Order
authorizing, inter alia, the 15% to 20% increase in school fees as recommended by the
Task Force.
The petitioner sought a reconsideration of the said Order, apparently on the ground that
the increases were too high. 2 Thereafter, the DECS issued Department Order No. 37
dated April 10, 1987 modifying its previous Order and reducing the increases to a lower
ceiling of 10% to 15%, accordingly. 3 Despite this reduction, the petitioner still opposed
the increases.
The petitioner, allegedly on the basis of the public interest, went to this Court and filed
the instant Petition for prohibition, seeking that judgment be rendered declaring the
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questioned Department Order unconstitutional. The thrust of the Petition is that the said
Department Order was issued without any legal basis. The petitioner also maintains that
the questioned Department Order was issued in violation of the due process clause of
the Constitution in asmuch as the petitioner was not given due notice and hearing before
the said Department Order was issued.
In support of the first argument, the petitioner argues that while the DECS is authorized
by law to regulate school fees in educational institutions, the power to regulate does not
always include the power to increase school fees. 5
Regarding the second argument, the petitioner maintains that students and parents are
interested parties that should be afforded an opportunity for a hearing before school fees
are increased. In sum, the petitioner stresses that the questioned Order constitutes a
denial of substantive and procedural due process of law.
ISSUE: WON DECS is vested with the power to regulate school fees and allow
increases
HELD:
Yes. In the absence of a statute stating otherwise, this power includes the power to
prescribe school fees. No other government agency has been vested with the authority
to fix school fees and as such, the power should be considered lodged with the DECS if
it is to properly and effectively discharge its functions and duties under the law.
The function of prescribing rates by an administrative agency may be either a legislative
or an adjudicative function. If it were a legislative function, the grant of prior notice and
hearing to the affected parties is not a requirement of due process. As regards rates
prescribed by an administrative agency in the exercise of itsquasi-judicial function, prior
notice and hearing are essential to the validity of such rates. When the rules and/or rates
laid down by an administrative agency are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given
kind throughout the country, they may partake of a legislative character. Where the rules
and the rates imposed apply exclusively to a particular party, based upon a finding of
fact, then its function is quasi-judicial in character.
Is Department Order No. 37 issued by the DECS in the exercise of its legislative
function? We believe so. The assailed Department Order prescribes the maximum
school fees that may be charged by all private schools in the country for schoolyear
1987 to 1988. This being so, prior notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of
its issuance.
Under the Rules of Court, it is presumed that official duty has been regularly performed.
10 In the absence of proof to the contrary, that presumption prevails. This being so, the
burden of proof is on the party assailing the regularity of official proceedings. In the case
at bar, the petitioner has not successfully disputed the presumption.
SUBMITTED BY: ALIH
37. Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. v. Department of
Finance Secretary, G.R. No. 108524, 10 November 1994, 238 SCRA 63

DOCTRINE:
Accordingly, in considering a legislative rule a court is free to make three inquiries: (i)
whether the rule is within the delegated authority of the administrative agency; (ii)
whether it is reasonable; and (iii) whether it was issued pursuant to proper procedure.
But the court is not free to substitute its judgment as to the desirability or wisdom of the
rule for the legislative body, by its delegation of administrative judgment, has committed
those questions to administrative judgments and not to judicial judgments. In the case of
an interpretative rule, the inquiry is not into the validity but into the correctness or
propriety of the rule. As a matter of power a court, when confronted with an interpretative
rule, is free to (i) give the force of law to the rule; (ii) go to the opposite extreme and
substitute its judgment; or (iii) give some intermediate degree of authoritative weight to
the interpretative rule.
FACTS:
Petitioner Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. is a domestic corporation
whose members are engaged in the buying and selling of copra in Misamis Oriental. The
petitioner alleges that prior to the issuance of Revenue Memorandum Circular 47-91,
which implemented VAT Ruling 190-90, copra was classified as agricultural food product
under $ 103(b) of the National Internal Revenue Code and, therefore, exempt from VAT
at all stages of production or distribution.
Respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued the circular in question,
classifying copra as an agricultural non-food product and declaring it "exempt from VAT
only if the sale is made by the primary producer pursuant to Section 103(a) of the Tax
Code, as amended." The reclassification had the effect of denying to the petitioner the
exemption it previously enjoyed when copra was classified as an agricultural food
product under §103(b) of the NIRC.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the circular is valid
2. Whether petitioners were denied due process because they were not heard
before the ruling was made
HELD:
1. YES. In the case at bar, we find no reason for holding that respondent Commissioner
erred in not considering copra as an "agricultural food product" within the meaning of §
103(b) of the NIRC. As the Solicitor General contends, "copra per se is not food, that is,
it is not intended for human consumption. Simply stated, nobody eats copra for food."
That previous Commissioners considered it so, is not reason for holding that the present
interpretation is wrong. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue is not bound by the ruling
of his predecessors. To the contrary, the overruling of decisions is inherent in the
interpretation of laws.
2. NO. There is a distinction in administrative law between legislative rules and
interpretative rules. There would be force in petitioner's argument if the circular in
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question were in the nature of a legislative rule. But it is not. It is a mere interpretative
rule.
The reason for this distinction is that a legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate
legislation, designed to implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof.
In the same way that laws must have the benefit of public hearing, it is generally
required that before a legislative rule is adopted there must be hearing. In this
connection, the Administrative Code of 1987 provides:
Public Participation. — If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as
practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford interested parties
the opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption of any rule.
(2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed rates
shall have been published in a newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks
before the first hearing thereon.
(3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be observed.
In addition such rule must be published. On the other hand, interpretative rules are
designed to provide guidelines to the law which the administrative agency is in charge of
enforcing.
Accordingly, in considering a legislative rule a court is free to make three inquiries: (i)
whether the rule is within the delegated authority of the administrative agency; (ii)
whether it is reasonable; and (iii) whether it was issued pursuant to proper procedure.
But the court is not free to substitute its judgment as to the desirability or wisdom of the
rule for the legislative body, by its delegation of administrative judgment, has committed
those questions to administrative judgments and not to judicial judgments. In the case of
an interpretative rule, the inquiry is not into the validity but into the correctness or
propriety of the rule. As a matter of power a court, when confronted with an interpretative
rule, is free to (i) give the force of law to the rule; (ii) go to the opposite extreme and
substitute its judgment; or (iii) give some intermediate degree of authoritative weight to
the interpretative rule.
DIGESTED BY: BERNALES, MAYBELLE
38. ANG TIBAY (represented by Toribio Teodoro) VS. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC.
G.R. NO. L-46496 (40 O.G. 7th Supp.), 7 APRIL 2010
DOCTRINE:
Administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers are unfettered by the rigidity of
certain procedural requirements, subject to the observance of fundamental and essential
requirements of due process in justiciable cases presented before them.
FACTS:
Ang Tibay is a leather company owned and operated by Teodoro Toribio. It supplies the
Philippine Army with leather soles. Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the
lay off of a number of his employees. However, the National Labor Union, Inc. (NLU)
questioned the validity of said lay off as it averred that the said employees laid off were
members of NLU while no members of National Worker’s Brotherhood (NWB) were laid
off. NLU claimed that NWB is a company dominated union and Toribio was merely
busting NLU, and that the Ang Tibay is guilty of unjust labor practice because Toribio
unjustly favored NWB, which allegedly sympathetic to the employer. Hence, NLU claims
that they were denied of due process. The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations
(CIR) where Toribio and NWB won. NLU went to the Supreme Court and prayed for new
trial, alleging that “the supposed lack of material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a
scheme adopted to systematically discharged all the members of the National Labor
Union Inc., from work” and this avernment is desired to be proved by the petitioner with
the “records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in
leather”; that “the NWB union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer union dominated
by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal”; that the exhibits
attached to the petition to prove his substantial avernments are so inaccessible to NLU
that even within the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have
obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations; and that the
documents attached to the petition “are of such far reaching importance and effect that
their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment
rendered herein.”
The petitioner Ang Tibay filed an opposition both to the motion for reconsideration of the
respondent National Labor Union, Inc.
ISSUE:
Whether or not special courts like Court of Industrial Relations should observe due
process.
RULING:
YES. By and large, after considerable discussions, Court concluded that the interest of
justice would be better served if the NLU is given opportunity to present at the hearing
the documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to
the main issue involved.
The legislation which created the Court of Industrial Relations and under which it acts is
new. The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the
parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be
granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the CIR, with instruction
that it reopen the case, receive all such evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise
proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth.
The CIR is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its
creation which is the Commonwealth Act No. 103. It is more an administrative board
than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere
receptive organ of the government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive,
acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to
it by the parties litigant, the function of the CIR, as will appear from perusal of its organic
law is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial
functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its
21 | Page
functions are far more comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire
Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy
or disputes arising between, and/ or affecting employers and employees or laborers, and
landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, and regulates the relations between them,
subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of CA 103.
The CIR is free from rigidity of certain procedural requirements, but this not mean that it
can in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental
and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an
administrative character. There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected
even in proceedings of this character:
(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one’s cause and submit
evidence in support thereof;
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) The decision must have something to support itself;
(4) The evidence must be substantial;
(5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing; or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected;
(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of
a subordinate;
(7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various Issue involved, and the
reason for the decision rendered.
Link to the original case: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1940/feb1940/gr_l-
46496_1940.html
DIGESTED BY: Ching, Anjela Lu Antonie D.
39. ACUZAR V. JOROLAN, GR NO. 177878, APRIL 7, 2010
DOCTRINE:
The settled rule is that criminal and administrative cases are separate and distinct from
each other. In criminal cases, proof beyond reasonable doubt is needed whereas in
administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence is required. Verily, administrative
cases may proceed independently of criminal proceedings. The PLEB, being the
administrative disciplinary body tasked to hear complaints against erring members of the
PNP, has jurisdiction over the case.
The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that before a party is
allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a precondition that he should have
availed of the means of administrative processes afforded to him. If a remedy is
available within the administrative machinery of the administrative agency, then this
alternative should first be utilized before resort can be made to the courts. This is to
enable such body to review and correct any mistakes without the intervention of the
court.

FACTS:
- May 2, 2000, respondent Aproniano Jorolan filed an administrative case against
petitioner before the Peoples Law Enforcement Board (PLEB) charging the latter of
Grave Misconduct for allegedly having an illicit relationship with respondents minor
daughter.
- May 11, 2000, respondent also instituted a criminal case against petitioner before the
Municipal Trial Court of New Corella for Violation of Section 5 (b), Article III of RA No.
7610, otherwise known as the Child Abuse Act.
- May 15, 2000, petitioner filed his Counter-Affidavit before the PLEB vehemently
denying all the accusations leveled against him. In support thereof, petitioner attached
the affidavit of complainants daughter, Rigma A. Jorolan, who denied having any
relationship with the petitioner or having kissed him despite knowing him to be a married
person.
- July 24, 2000, petitioner filed a motion to suspend the proceedings before the PLEB
pending resolution of the criminal case filed before the regular court. The PLEB denied
his motion for lack of merit and a hearing of the case was conducted. The PLEB also
denied petitioners motion for reconsideration on August 9, 2000 for allegedly being
dilatory.
- August 17, 2000, after due proceedings, the PLEB issued a decision finding
respondent guilty of grave misconduct.
Immediately upon receipt of the decision, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with
Prayer for Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order with the
RTC of Tagum City. Petitioner alleged that the subject decision was issued without giving
him an opportunity to be heard. He likewise averred that the respondent Board acted
without jurisdiction in proceeding with the case without the petitioner having been first
convicted in the criminal case before the regular court. Petitioner pointed out that under
the PLEB Rules of Procedure, prior conviction was required before the Board may act
on the administrative case considering that the charge was actually for violation of law,
although denominated as one (1) for grave misconduct.
- September 16, 2000, petitioner was ordered dismissed from the Philippine National
Police (PNP) by the Chief Regional Directorial Staff of the PNP, Police Regional Office
11, effective September 7, 2000.
- October 15, 2002, the trial court rendered a Decision annulling the Decision of the
PLEB.
22 | Page
- March 23, 2007, the CA rendered its Decision reversing and setting aside the trial
courts decision. The CA found merit in respondents argument that the petition for
certiorari filed by petitioner before the RTC was not the proper remedy because (1)
appeal was available and (2) the issues raised were not pure questions of law but both
questions of law and fact. According to the CA, the existence and availability of the right
of appeal proscribes resort to certiorari because one (1) of the requirements for its
availment is the absence of the remedy of appeal or any other plain, speedy or adequate
remedy. The CA ruled that petitioner should have appealed the decision of the PLEB to
the regional appellate board of the PNP before resorting to certiorari before the court.
The CA added that while it is true that there are instances where the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari may be resorted to despite the availability of an appeal, petitioner,
however, failed to demonstrate any ground to warrant immediate resort to it. Thus, it held
that the trial court erred in giving due course to the petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that petitioners resort to certiorari was not
warranted as the remedy of appeal from the decision of the PLEB was available to him.
RULING:
The SC affirm the appellate courts ruling.
A careful perusal of respondents affidavit-complaint against petitioner would
show that petitioner was charged with grave misconduct for engaging in an illicit affair
with respondents minor daughter, he being a married man, and not for violation of law,
as petitioner would like to convince this Court. Misconduct generally means wrongful,
improper or unlawful conduct, motivated by premeditated, obstinate or intentional
purpose. It usually refers to transgression of some established and definite rule of
action, where no discretion is left except what necessity may demand; it does not
necessarily imply corruption or criminal intention but implies wrongful intention and not to
mere error of judgment. On the other hand, violation of law presupposes final conviction
in court of any crime or offense penalized under the Revised Penal Code or any special
law or ordinance. The settled rule is that criminal and administrative cases are separate
and distinct from each other. In criminal cases, proof beyond reasonable doubt is
needed whereas in administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence is required.
Verily, administrative cases may proceed independently of criminal proceedings. The
PLEB, being the administrative disciplinary body tasked to hear complaints against
erring members of the PNP, has jurisdiction over the case.
It is apparent from Sec. 43(e) of RA 6975 that the remedy of appeal from the decision of
the PLEB to the Regional Appellate Board was available to petitioner. Since appeal was
available, filing a petition for certiorari was inapt. The existence and availability of the
right of appeal are antithetical to the availment of the special civil action of certiorari.
Corollarily, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that before a
party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a precondition that he should
have availed of the means of administrative processes afforded to him. If a remedy is
available within the administrative machinery of the administrative agency, then this
alternative should first be utilized before resort can be made to the courts. This is to
enable such body to review and correct any mistakes without the intervention of the
court.
Contrary to petitioners claim that he has not been afforded all the opportunity to present
his side, our own review of the records of the proceedings before the PLEB reveals
otherwise. In administrative proceedings, procedural due process has been recognized
to include the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of
proceedings which may affect a respondents legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be
heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in
ones favor, and to defend ones rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction
and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable
guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is
supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or
contained in the records or made known to the parties affected.
In the instant case, petitioner was notified of the complaint against him and in fact, he
had submitted his counter-affidavit and the affidavits of his witnesses. He attended the
hearings together with his counsel and even asked for several postponements.
Petitioner therefore cannot claim that he had been denied of due process. Due process
in an administrative context does not require trial-type proceedings similar to those in
courts of justice. Where opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or
through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due process. The requirements are
satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their
side of the controversy. In other words, it is not legally objectionable for being violative of
due process for an administrative agency to resolve a case based solely on position
papers, affidavits or documentary evidence submitted by the parties as affidavits of
witnesses may take the place of direct testimony. Here, we note that petitioner had more
than enough opportunity to present his side and adduce evidence in support of his
defense; thus, he cannot claim that his right to due process has been violated.
By: Culajara, Jeserie B.
40. UTE Paterok v Bureau of Customs and Hon. Salvador N. Mison, GR Nos.
90660-61, January 21, 1991
Doctrine:
Time and again, the Court has emphasized the imperative necessity for administrative
agencies to observe the elementary rules of due process. And no rule is better
established under the due process clause of the Constitution than that which requires
notice and opportunity to be heard before any person can be lawfully deprived of his
rights.
Facts:
On March 1986, the UTE Paterok shipped from Germany to the Philippines two (2)
containers, one with used household goods and the other with two (2) used automobiles
23 | Page
(one Bourgetti and one Mercedes Benz 450 SLC). The first container was released by
the Bureau of Customs and later on, the Bourgetti car, too. The Mercedes Benz,
however, remained under the custody of the said Bureau.
On December 1987, after earnest efforts to secure the release of the said Mercedes
Benz, the petitioner received a notice of hearing from the legal officer of the Manila
International Container Port, Bureau of Customs informing the former that seizure
proceedings were being initiated against the said Mercedes Benz for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 73 in relation to Section 2530(F) of the Tariff and Customs Code of the
Philippines (TCCP), as amended, and Central Bank Circular (CBC) 1069.
While the said case was pending, the petitioner received only on April, 1988, a letter
informing her that a decision ordering the forfeiture of her Mercedes Benz had been
rendered on December 16, 1986 by the District Collector of Customs. The petitioner
had not been informed that a separate seizure case was filed on the same Mercedes
Benz in question before the said District Collector. The petitioner later found out that on
November 13, 1986, a Notice of Hearing set on December 2, 1986, concerning the said
Mercedes Benz, was posted on the bulletin board of the Bureau of Customs at Port
Area, Manila.
The petitioner, thereafter, filed a motion for new trial before the Collector of Customs,
Port of Manila, but the latter, in an order dated May 30, 1988, denied the same, invoking
the failure of the former to appear in the said hearing despite the posting of the notice on
the bulletin board. Moreover, the Collector of Customs contended that a reopening of the
case was an exercise in futility considering that the forfeited property, a Mercedes Benz
450 SLC, had an engine displacement of more than 2800 cubic centimeters and
therefore was under the category of prohibited importation pursuant to B.P. Blg. 73.
On Septemnber 22, 1989 the respondent rendered a decision affirming the previous
order of the Collector of Customs for the Forfeiture of the Mercedes Benz in question in
favor of the government.
Issue/s:
1. WON the Bureau of Customs erred in the ruling that a notice of hearing posted
in the bulletin board is sufficient notice and failure of UTE paterok to appear
caused her declaration in default
2. WON Customs erred in ruling that their office was left with no alternative but to
forfeit the shipment as mandated by BP 73
3. WON Customs erred in ruling that a reopening of the case was an exercise in
futility and there is no point in re-opening the case
Held:
1. SC agrees with the petitioner that a notice of hearing posted on the bulletin board of
the public respondent in a forfeiture proceeding where the owner of the alleged
prohibited article is known does not constitute sufficient compliance with proper service
of notice and procedural due process.
In the present case, although there was a notice of hearing posted on the bulletin board,
the said procedure is premised on the ground that the party or owner of the property in
question is unknown. This is clear from the provisions of the TCCP relied upon by the
public respondent, namely, Sections 2304 and 2306, captioned "Notification of Unknown
Owner and "Proceedings in Case of Property Belonging to Unknown Parties,"
respectively, wherein the posting of the notice of hearing on the bulletin board is
specifically allowed.
But in the case at bar, the facts evidently show that the petitioner could not have been
unknown. The petitioner had previous transactions with the Bureau of Customs and in
fact, the latter had earlier released the first container consisting of household goods and
the Bourgetti car to the former at her address (as stated in the Bill of Lading). Moreover,
there was a similar seizure case that had been instituted by the Manila International
Container Port, docketed as S.I. No. 86-224, covering the same Mercedes Benz in
question and involving the same owner, the petitioner herein.
2 and 3. Forfeiture is a must.
Batas Pambansa Blg. 73, a law intended to promote energy conservation, provides
that:
Sec. 3. Towards the same end and to develop a more dynamic and effective program for
the rational use of energy, the following acts are hereby prohibited:
a. The importation, manufacture or assembling of gasoline-powered passenger
motor cars with engine displacement of over 2,800 cubic centimeters or
Kerbweight exceeding 1,500 kilograms, including accessories.
The petitioner claims that the said prohibition involves only "direct" and not 'indirect"
importation as when both the shipper and the consignee are one and the same person
which is the case at bar. Be that as it may, the law is clear and when it does not
make any distinction on the term "importation", we likewise must not distinguish.
"Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguiere debemus.”
Also, the petitioner invokes Sec. 2307 of the TCCP, as amended by Executive Order No.
38, dated August 6, 1986, which provides an alternative in lieu of the forfeiture of the
property in question, that is, the payment of fine or redemption of the forfeited property.
But the last paragraph of the said section, as amended, categorically states that:
Redemption of forfeited property shall not be allowed in any case where the
importation is absolutely prohibited or where the surrender of the property to the
person offering to redeem the same would be contrary to law.
24 | Page
Inasmuch as it would be contrary to law, i.e., B.P. Blg. 73, to allow the petitioner to
redeem the Mercedes Benz in question, there is therefore no alternative, as correctly
claimed by the public respondents, but to forfeit the same.
In the matter of disposing of contrabands, Section 2609(c) of the Tariff and Customs
Code specifically provides that the prerogative of the Collector of Customs is not the
release of the contraband like the Mercedes Benz in question but its sale, which
presupposes a prior custody pursuant to forfeiture and seizure proceedings as in the
case at bar.
There is nothing in the Code (Tariff and Customs Code) that authorizes the Collector to
release the contraband in favor of an importer. The Code, on the other hand, is clear that
the thing may be disposed of by sale alone "under such restrictions as will insure its use
for legitimate purposes." To be sure, the restrictions to be prescribed by the Collector
must coincide with the purpose underlying Batas Blg. 73, that is, to conserve energy.
Hence, he can not allow its use (after sale), in this case a Mercedes Benz with an
engine displacement of more than 2,800 cubic centimeters, that would set at naught that
purpose. He must make sure that the engine is changed before it is allowed to ply
Philippine soil.
- SJ DADAYAN
42. Adamson vs. Amores, 152 SCRA 237, G.R. No. L-58292, July 23, 1987
DOCTRINE: While administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions are free
from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements they are bound by law and practice
to observe the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in justiciable
cases presented before them. However, the standard of due process that must be met in
administrative tribunals allows a certain latitude as long as the element of fairness is not
ignored. Hence, there is no denial of due process where records show that hearings
were held with prior notice to adverse parties. But even in the absence of previous
notice, there is no denial of procedural due, process as long as the parties are given the
opportunity to be heard.
FACTS: In this petition for certiorari, one of two competing manufacturers of hygienic
and other related products claims that it was denied its right to procedural due process
by the Board of Investments. Since its organization on April 5, 1954, Adamson &
Adamson, Inc. has been engaged in the "manufacture, sale and exportation of
absorbent cotton wool products, surgical dressings, bandages, medicinal,
pharmaceutical products, chemicals, chemical products, sanitary towels and other
articles and commodities. Similarly, Johnson & Johnson [Philippines], Inc. was organized
on February 17, 1956 "to manufacture, import, export, buy, sell or otherwise acquire and
deal in and with, either at wholesale or retail, pharmaceutical drugs, toiletry, hygiene
products and related products of every kind, and chemical compositions of all kinds and
uses."
As it was not yet a Philippine national as defined by the Investment Incentives Act
[Republic Act No. 5186], Adamson applied for certificates of authority from the Board of
Investments in compliance with Section 4 of the Foreign Investment Act [Republic Act
No. 5455]. According to Adamson, said certificates were necessary to enable it "to
expand its business activities to areas which while within its aforealleged primary
purpose, Adamson was neither actually manufacturing nor marketing as at the effectivity
of the aforesaid two laws." After the publications and postings of notices regarding said
applications, Johnson registered its opposition thereto. On May 28, 1973 and on
November 7, 1974, the BOI granted Adamson said certificates of authority which it held
on to until it became a Philippine national on January 6, 1979. On the other hand,
Johnson has remained a foreign corporation. Sometime in 1979, after it had acquired
new machineries, Johnson commenced the manufacture and marketing of disposable
diapers. During the first quarter of 1980, it manufactured sanitary feminine tampons and
absorbent cotton. Alleging that Johnson should not be allowed to expand its business
activities "to areas in which it was not licensed and in which it was not actually engaged
as at the effectivity of Rep. Act Nos. 5186 and 5455 without first obtaining from the
Board of Investments the corresponding certificates of authority after prior publication
and posting of notices and that Johnson's expanded activities would cause Adamson not
only irreparable injury but also injustice. On March 17, 1980, Adamson filed in the BOI a
petition praying that therein respondent Johnson be "ordered not only to forthwith stop
and desist in the manufacture, distribution, and sale of its aforealleged expanded
product lines.
The BOI required Johnson to answer the petition. On May 8, 1980, Director Justiniano Y.
Ascaño of the BOI's Project Administration and Legal Department, set the petition for
hearing.
On May 9, 1980, Johnson filed its answer to the petition alleging that it did not have to
secure from the BOI a certificate of authority for the manufacture, distribution and sale of
disposable diapers, sanitary tampons and absorbent cotton because said business
activities were but a continuation of its principal business activity; that assuming that it
had expanded or developed its principal business activity, such expansion or
development was in the same line of business that it was actually and lawfully engaged
in prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 5455, and that assuming that there were
modifications in the form and quality of said products, such were mere improvements
and/or development of the same line of products which needed no prior authorization
from the BOI.
The May 14, 1980 hearing was held as scheduled. Counsel for the Petitioner, Atty.
Blanco expounded that BOI a government instrumentality has the power and authority to
issue a stop and desist order. Counsel for Respondent. Atty. de los Angeles stated that
the composition of diaper is similar to that of the sanitary napkins which Respondent has
been producing since 1971 which is made of rayon and cotton, that the product is an
improvement of the product to meet the policy of the Board. Impatient over what it
considered a delay in the resolution of its prayer for a preliminary stop and desist order,
Adamson filed a motion praying that "hearings be forthwith scheduled for the reception
of evidence for a permanent stop and desist order, as well as the parties notified thereof
and furnished with a copy of the transcript of stenographic notes and/or excerpts of the
25 | Page
preliminary hearing on 14th May 1980 and the rules of this Honorable Commission's
procedures for hearings on the merits.
Director Ascaño denied said motion and afterwards issued an order dismissing the
petition filed by Adamson against Johnson praying that the BOI issue a stop and desist
order. Adamson filed in the CFI of Manila a petition seeking judicial relief from the BOI
decision. Adamson averred that its right to be heard and to present evidence on the
merits of its prayer for a permanent stop and desist order was violated. It prayed that the
BOI's letter decision be set aside and that a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
restraining order be issued enjoining Johnson from engaging in its expanded business
activities. The lower court gave due course to the petition, issued a temporary restraining
order and set a hearing on the prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. After the said
hearing was conducted, the lower court issued an order denying Adamson's prayer for a
preliminary injunction and dissolved the temporary restraining order it had issued.
The lower court saw no extreme urgency for the issuance of a preliminary injunction,
citing Section 4, Rule IV of the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No.
5455, the lower court ruled that Johnson did not have to obtain BOI prior authorization to
engage in the questioned business activities because on September 30, 1968 [when the
said law took effect], Johnson was actually engaged in the manufacture and/or
marketing of absorbent cotton, sanitary tampons and disposable diapers and therefore
its alleged expanded business activities were in the same line of business it was
engaged in prior to the aforesaid date. The lower court found that Adamson's right to due
process was respected in the aforesaid hearing. Adamson then filed a request for
subpoena when it was allowed the introduction of new evidence. As said request was
granted by the lower court, Johnson moved to quash the subpoena on the grounds, that
it was improper and oppressive to require Director Ascaño and Governor Bautista to
testify and explain their decision of October 21, 1980.
The Court finds the Motion to Quash subpoena meritorious. Adamson claims that in
acting on the merits of the petition, the BOI violated its right to procedural due process.
Specifically, Adamson contends that its "cardinal primary rights" were violated in the BOI
proceedings and that the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction in relying on said void BOI decision and in issuing the order which
sustained the motion to quash subpoena thereby preventing it from establishing the
irregular BOI proceeding and exercising its right to examine the entire BOI records of
both companies.
ISSUE: W/N Adamson was denied of due process when the CFI adopted the decision
of the administrative agency
HELD: No. While administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers are free from
the rigidity of certain procedural requirements they are bound by law and practice to
observe the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in justiciable cases
presented before them. However, the standard of due process that must be met in
administrative tribunals allows a certain latitude as long as the element of fairness is not
ignored. Hence, there is no denial of due process where records show that
hearings were held with prior notice to adverse parties. But even in the absence of
previous notice, there is no denial of procedural due process as long as the parties are
given the opportunity to be heard.
The Court ruled that petitioner was not deprived of its right to procedural due
process in the BOI. In the first place, it was notified of the May 14, 1980 hearing. The
notice specified that the hearing was on the petition although it also stated therein with
particularity, petitioner's prayer for a stop and desist order. Necessarily, it is immaterial
that said notice was sent before Johnson filed its answer to the petition and there was
yet no joinder of issues considering that the proceeding was before an administrative
tribunal where technicalities that should be observed in a regular court may be
dispensed with.
Secondly, during the hearing, petitioner was given the opportunity to present its case,
including its prayer for a stop and desist order. Petitioner's right to procedural due
process was not violated when the hearing was conducted before a director of the BOI
and not before the members of the board themselves who decided the case. The
requirements of a fair hearing do not mandate that the actual taking of testimony or the
presentation of evidence be before the same officer who will make the decision on the
case.
Disposition: the petition for certiorari is dismissed and the lower court is ordered to
expedite the disposition of Civil Case for judicial relief. Costs against petitioner.
By: Manda, Loren
43. De la Cruz v. Abille, G.R. No 130196, 26 February 2001
DOCTRINES:
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of.
Even the issuance of an emancipation patent does not bar the landowner from retaining
the area covered thereby.
FACTS:
Herminio Abille, now deceased, had a total landholding of 13.0561 hectares, located in
Infanta, Pangasinan, comprising of 9.2903 hectares of riceland; 2.0000 hectares of
cogonland; 1.7658 hectares of coconut land and .4660 hectare of residential land. Since
1968, Balbino dela Cruz was an agricultural tenant in the riceland tilling an area of 2.84
hectares. He died on June 14, 1981. After his death, Balbino dela Cruz was,
nevertheless, issued a Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) No. 0-064711 dated October
25, 1981 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27. The certificate was entered in the
26 | Page
Registration Book of the Registry of Deeds of Pangasinan. Tax Declaration No. 3 in the
name of Herminio Abille was cancelled and Tax Declaration No. 1134 was issued in the
name of Balbino dela Cruz.
On April 3, 1987, Herminio Abille filed a petition for exemption under Operation Land
Transfer (OLT) of his landholdings alleging, among others, that he was not notified of the
coverage of his land under OLT; that he learned of its coverage only on March 25, 1987;
that prior to the issuance of the Certificate of Land Transfer No. 0-064711, DAR did not
notify him or his representative; that he has been deprived of his constitutional right to
due process. Petition was granted.
On June 29, 1992, petitioners, who are the compulsory heirs of the late Balbino dela
Cruz, filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform a petition for the issuance of
emancipation patent. The petition was referred to the Regional Director, Region I, San
Fernando, La Union, for appropriate action.
In his Comment, respondent Adjuto M. Abille, representing Herminio Abille, prayed for
the dismissal of the petition for the issuance of emancipation patent on the ground that
DAR Order dated April 19, 1989, ordering the cancellation of the Certificate of Land
Transfer of the retained area, had become final and had been implemented by the
Provincial Agrarian Officer of Pangasinan; hence, the petition had become moot and
academic.
On October 21, 1992, Regional Director Eligio P. Pacis of the Bureau of Agrarian Legal
Assistance, Region I, San Fernando, La Union, issued an Order denying the petition for
the issuance of an emancipation patent as CLT No. 0-064711 issued in favor of Balbino
dela Cruz had already been cancelled by virtue of the Order dated April 19, 1989, which
was supported by substantial evidence, and that said Order had long become final.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration praying that another Order be issued
declaring as null and void the Order dated April 19, 1989, which was issued allegedly
without giving them a day in court, hence, there was absence of due process of law,
considering that Balbino dela Cruz was already deemed owner of the subject property
as of October 21, 1972. They sought the reinstatement of CLT No. 0-064711 and the
issuance of an emancipation patent in their favor as compulsory heirs of the late Balbino
dela Cruz. The motion was denied even by the Court of Appeals.
Petitioners argued that it was incorrect for the Court of Appeals to hold that they were
accorded due process when the validity of the cancellation of Certificate of Land
Transfer No. 0-064711 was resolved in the Order dated April 19, 1989; and that their
petition for issuance of an emancipation patent is a different proceeding from the petition
filed by Herminio Abille wherein Regional Director Antonio Nuesa ordered the
cancellation of their predecessors (Balbino dela Cruz) Certificate of Land Transfer; that
in the said petition filed by Herminio Abille, they were not notified and given the
opportunity to be heard. Petitioners maintained that they were denied due process so
that the Order dated April 19, 1989 of Regional Director Nuesa cancelling the Certificate
of Land Transfer No. 0-064711 in the name of Balbino dela Cruz is null and void, and
cannot be used to deny their petition for the issuance of an emancipation patent.
Petitioners also assert that they became the owners of the lands they till as of the date
of effectivity of P.D. No. 27 on October 21, 1972; that they have religiously paid the
annual rent of the property to the late Herminio Abille, that is, continuously after October
21, 1972 until 1991 or for nineteen (19) years; that by virtue of P.D. No. 27 in relation to
the second paragraph, section 2 of Executive Order No. 228, the price of said property
had been fully paid thereby entitling them to the issuance of an emancipation patent.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners were denied due process of law
HELD: No. We agree with the Court of Appeals that although the petitioners were not
given the opportunity to be heard when Regional Director Antonio Nuesa in his Order
dated April 19, 1989 ordered the cancellation of Certificate of Land Transfer No. 0-
064711 on the retained area, nevertheless, in their petition for issuance of an
emancipation patent, petitioners were given the opportunity to be heard as they raised in
issue the validity of the cancellation of the said CLT, which was resolved by DAR
Regional Director Eligio P. Pacis in his Order dated October 21, 1992,and also in their
(petitioners) motion for reconsideration, which was treated as an appeal by the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform and resolved in his Order dated June 20, 1994. The
essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of (emphasis supplied). Further, the petition filed by landowner
Herminio Abille, which was for exemption of his property from the coverage of Operation
Land Transfer, cognizable by Region I Director Antonio M. Nuesa of the Bureau of
Agrarian Legal Assistance, did not require notice to petitioners. The subsequent Order
dated April 19, 1989 of Regional Director Nuesa denying the petition for exemption and
instead granting to Herminio Abille the right of retention of not more than seven (7)
hectares, and to select the retention area, and cancelling the Certificates of Land
Transfer issued to the tenants on the retained area, including CLT No. 0-064711,
directing the MARO of Infanta, Pangasinan to prepare Agricultural Leasehold Contracts
between the petitioner and the tenants, and directing the PARO to implement said Order,
became final even before Herminio Abille selected on July 24, 1989 the 7 hectares
retained area which includes the 2.84 hectares covered by Certificate of Land Transfer
No. 0-064711 in the name of Balbino dela Cruz. Nevertheless, petitioners were able to
question the validity of said Order (cancelling CLT No. 0-064711) in their petition for
issuance of emancipation patent, which was resolved by the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform in his Decision dated June 20, 1994. Hence, petitioners were given an
opportunity to be heard.
The landowner Herminio Abille having selected as part of his seven-hectare retention
the area tilled by Balbino de la Cruz, covered by a certificate of land transfer in his
name, the CLT was correctly cancelled.
To hold otherwise would be to deprive the owner Herminio Abille of his right of retention
and to select the portion he wanted to retain.
27 | Page
The portion tilled by Balbino de la Cruz having been chosen by the owner Herminio
Abille as part of his seven-hectare retention, petitioners as heirs of Balbino de la Cruz
are not entitled to an emancipation patent over the same. Balbino de la Cruz was
entitled to an agricultural leasehold contract to the area tilled by him and this is what
petitioners inherited.
Even the issuance of an emancipation patent does not bar the landowner from retaining
the area covered thereby. Administrative Order No. 2, series of 1994 provides:
Emancipation patents or certificates of land ownership award issued to agrarian reform
beneficiaries may be corrected and cancelled for violations of agrarian laws, rules and
regulations. This includes cases of lands which are found to be exempted/excluded from
P.D. No. 27/E.O. No. 228 of CARP coverage, or part of the landowners retained area.
- Pelausa, Steph
44. RAY PETER O. VIVO v. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORP.
G.R. No. 187854, November 12, 2013
DOCTRINE:
A right to counsel is not indispensable in an administrative proceeding
“because administrative investigations are themselves inquiries conducted only
to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measures against
erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity
of government service.”
It was held in Gonzales v. Civil Service Commission (G.R. No. 156253) that “any defect
in the observance of due process is cured by the filing of a motion for reconsideration,
and that denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked by a party who was
afforded opportunity to be heard.”
In administrative due process, “[t]he essence of due process is to be heard, and, as
applied to administrative proceedings this means a fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain one’s side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in
its strict legal sense, for in the former a formal or trial-type hearing is not always
necessary, and technical rules of procedure are not strictly applied.”
FACTS:
The petitioner Rey Peter Vivo was employed by respondent Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) on September 9, 1986, and was
PAGCOR’s Managing Head of its Gaming Department at the time of his dismissal from
office.
On February 21, 2002, he received a letter from Teresita S. Ela, the Senior Managing
Head of PAGCOR’s Human Resources Department, advising that he was being
administratively charged with gross misconduct, rumor-mongering, conduct prejudicial to
the interest of the company, and loss of trust and confidence; that he should submit a
written explanation of the charges; and that he was at the same time being placed under
preventive suspension.
On March 14, 2002, the petitioner received the summons for him to attend an
administrative inquiry, instructing him to appear before PAGCOR’s Corporate
Investigation Unit (CIU) on March 15, 2002.
At the petitioner’s request, however, the inquiry was conducted at his residence on said
date. His statement was taken in a question-and-answer format. He was also furnished
the memorandum of charges that recited the accusations against him and indicated the
acts and omissions constituting his alleged offenses. The memorandum of charges was
based on the statements of PAGCOR personnel who had personal knowledge of the
accusations against him. However, when his counsel requested to be furnished copies
of the statements, PAGCOR rejected the request on the ground that he had already
been afforded the sufficient opportunity to confront, hear, and answer the charges
against him during the administrative inquiry. The petitioner was then allowed to submit
his answer on March 26, 2002.
The Adjudication Committee summoned the petitioner to appear before it on May 8,
2002 in order to address questions regarding his case. His counsel moved for the re-
scheduling of the meeting because he would not be available on said date, but the
Adjudication Committee denied the request upon the reason that the presence of
counsel was not necessary in the proceedings. His counsel moved for the
reconsideration of the denial of the request.
With his dismissal, petitioner argues that he was denied due process by PAGCOR’s
refusal to re-schedule the Adjudication Committee meeting in order to enable his
counsel to attend the meeting with him, because the refusal constituted a violation of his
right to be represented by counsel.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner was denied of his right to due process
HELD:
No. A right to counsel is not indispensable in an administrative proceeding. In
such proceedings, a respondent has the option of engaging the services of counsel. As
such, the right to counsel is not imperative because administrative investigations
are themselves inquiries conducted only to determine whether there are facts that
merit disciplinary measures against erring public officers and employees, with the
purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service.
28 | Page
It was held in Gonzales v. Civil Service Commission (G.R. No. 156253) that “any defect
in the observance of due process is cured by the filing of a motion for reconsideration,
and that denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked by a party who was
afforded opportunity to be heard.”
Petitioner cannot claim that he was denied due process and deprived of his right
to counsel when he was assisted by a counsel during the initial stage of the
administrative proceedings. Petitioner’s counsel filed in behalf of petitioner the letter-
requests to be furnished documents, answer to memorandum of charges, the letter-
request for re-setting of the conference, and even the motion to reconsider the decision
of the Board of Directors to dismiss him from the service. The Court finds nothing legally
objectionable to PAGCOR’s denial of petitioner’s request to re-schedule the conference
because his counsel would not be able to attend.
In administrative due process, “[t]he essence of due process is to be heard, and, as
applied to administrative proceedings this means a fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain one’s side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in
its strict legal sense, for in the former a formal or trial-type hearing is not always
necessary, and technical rules of procedure are not strictly applied.”
CA correctly found that petitioner’s pleadings explicitly admitted his dismissal was
effected through board resolutions. Assuming arguendo that there was no board
resolution approving his dismissal, such absence did not render the dismissal illegal but
rather unauthorized that can be subject of ratification.
By Salonga, Jessica Daphne D.
45. GLOBE TELECOM, INC, vs. THE NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION, COMMISSIONER JOSEPH A. SANTIAGO G.R. No. 143964. July 26,
2004
DOCTRINES: 1. Every party subject to administrative regulation deserves an
opportunity to know, through reasonable regulations promulgated by the agency, of the
objective standards that have to be met (ie. objective standards on the nature of value-
added service (VAS) as provided by the law). 2) The requirements of due process
attendant to the exercise of quasi-judicial power
FACTS:
Globe filed a complaint before the NTC praying that NTC order the immediate
interconnection of Smarts and Globes GSM networks, particularly their respective SMS
or texting services pursuant to the provisions of the Philippine Telecommunication
Commission. Accordingly, the NTC issued an Order requiring SMART and Globe to
interconnect their SMS service. SMART and Globe eventually interconnected their
services. Meanwhile, in the same Order, the NTC also required Smart and Globe to
secure authority from it for providing SMS services. According to the NTC, SMS services
fall squarely within the definition of value-added service (VAS) or enhanced-service
given in NTC Memorandum Circular No. 8-9-95 (MC No. 8-9-95). Accordingly, Section
420 (f) of MC No. 8-9-95 requires PTEs (ie Smart and Globe) intending to provide value-
added services (VAS) to secure prior approval from NTC through an administrative
process. The NTC directed the parties to secure the requisite authority to provide SMS
within thirty (30) days, subject to the payment of fine in the amount of two hundred
pesos (P200.00) from the date of violation and for every day during which such violation
continues.
Globe and SMAR argued that SMS is a deregulated special feature of the telephone
network and therefore does not require the prior approval of NTC as held in earlier NTC
ruling on Islacom.[27] They also alleged that the the issue on SMS as VAS was beyond
the scope of their complaint, hence, the Order of the NTC penalizing them should they
fail to secure the required authorization from NTC for operating SMS service is void for
violating their right to administrative due process particularly prior notice and hearing.
ISSUES:
1. WON the NTC had sufficient legal basis to denominate SMS as VAS under the
Philippine Telecommunication Act and NTC MC No. 14-11-97, hence, ordering Globe
and Smart to secure prior authority from NTC in order to operate SMS? NTC MC No. 14-
11-97?
2. WON the NTC violated the rights of Globe and SMART to due process for
ordering them to secure prior authorization to operate SMS service without prior notice
and hearing?
HELD:
1. NONE. The Court held that while it usually accords great respect to the
technical findings of administrative agencies in the fields of their expertise, even if they
are infelicitously worded, a deep and cursory reading of NTC’s Order revealed that there
is no legal basis under the PTA or the memorandum circulars promulgated by the NTC
to denominate SMS as VAS. The Court explained that the assailed NTC’s Order
revealed that no deep inquiry was made as to the nature of SMS or what its provisioning
entails. In fact, the Court is unable to find how exactly does SMS fits into a nicety with
NTC M.C. No. 8-9-95, which defines enhanced services as analogous to format, media
conversion, encryption, enhanced security features, computer processing, and the like.
The NTC merely notes that SMS involves the transmission of data over [the] CMTS, a
phraseology that evinces no causal relation to the definition in M.C. No. 8-9-95. Neither
did the NTC endeavor to explain why the transmission of data necessarily classifies
SMS as a VAS. Moreover, the Court noted that the NTC had told Islacom that SMS was
a special feature, then subsequently held that it was a VAS.
Given these actions of NTC, the Court concluded that the legal basis invoked by NTC in
claiming that SMS is VAS has not been duly established. The Court reminded that
every party subject to administrative regulation deserves an opportunity to know,
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through reasonable regulations promulgated by the agency, of the objective
standards that have to be met. Such rule is integral to due process, as it protects
substantive rights. Such rule also promotes harmony within the service or
industry subject to regulation. It provides indubitable opportunities to weed out
the most frivolous conflicts with minimum hassle, and certain footing in deciding
more substantive claims.
2. YES. The assailed Order violates due process for 1) failure to sufficiently
explain the reason for the decision rendered, 2) for being unsupported by substantial
evidence, and 3) for imputing violation to, and issuing a corresponding fine on, Globe
despite the absence of due notice and hearing which would have afforded Globe the
right to present evidence on its behalf.
The Court mentioned the requirements of due process attendant to the exercise of
quasi-judicial power. Among them are the seven cardinal primary rights in justiciable
cases before administrative tribunals, as enumerated in Ang Tibay v. CIR.[73] They are
synthesized in a subsequent case, as follows:
There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this
character. The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the
party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support
thereof. Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to
adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must
consider the evidence presented. While the duty to deliberate does not impose the
obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded,
namely, that of having something to support its decision. Not only must there be some
evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be substantial. The
decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
- Samaniego, Emil L.
46. Arroyo v. Rosal Homeowners Association, Inc.
G.R. No. 175155 October 22, 2012
DOCTRINE: The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard. What the law
prohibits is not the absence of previous notice but the absolute absence thereof and the
lack of opportunity to be heard. In any case, the due process guarantee cannot be
invoked when no vested right has been acquired.
FACTS:
There is a parcel of land with an area of 19,897 square meters located in Brgy. Rosal,
Taculing, Bacolod City, formerly owned by the Philippine Commercial International Bank
(PCIB).
Petitioners were actual occupants of the subject land. They were occupants by mere
tolerance before the land was acquired by PCIB in 1989. To avoid eviction and avail the
land, occupants of the said land organized themselves and formed the RHAI.
The RHAI is a non-stock, non-profit organization and its members are mostly composed
of the occupants of the subject land.
RHAI successfully acquired the land from the PCIB through the Community Mortgage
Program (CMP). All the occupant automatically become members of RHAI.
The land was then transferred to RHAI with the help of the National Home Mortgage
Finance Corporation (NHMFC).
The NHMFC required RHAI members to sign a Lease Purchase Agreement (LPA) and
maintain the membership in the organization.
Petitioners refused to sign the LPA and failed to attend meetings. Due to their failure to
comply with the requirements, the RHAI brought up the issue to their Board of Directors.
A resolution was then enforced to evict the petitioners from the part of the land that they
were occupying. RHAI sent written letters of demand which were ignored by the
petitioners.
This prompted RHAI to file a case against the petitioners for recovery of possession.
RTC: The court ruled in favor of RHAI. The petitioners were found to be non- members
when they were expelled by the organization. This was due to their failure to comply with
the membership requirements. They have no right to remain in the land.
CA: The court affirmed the trial court’s decision. They were not denied the right to due
process. They were given the opportunity to present evidence and be heard in court,
“where opportunity to be heard either through oral argument or pleadings is accorded,
there can be no denial of procedural due process.”
ISSUE/S:
1. WON the petitioners were denied of their right to due process –
2. WON petitioners were denied their right to own the piece of land under the socialized
housing program
RULING:
1. NO.
“The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard. What the law prohibits is not
the absence of previous notice but the absolute absence thereof and the lack of
opportunity to be heard.” In this case the petitioners were given all the opportunity to be
heard and defend themselves. The RHAI did not violate their right to due process when
they were expelled and even during the court proceedings for their case, they were
given a chance to be heard. They were even represented by a proper counsel, Atty. Alan
Zamora.
“The records of this case disclose that there was a board resolution issued for the
expulsion of the erring or defaulting members of RHAI. The latter were duly informed
that they were already expelled as members of the association through notices sent to
them. These notices, however, were refused to be received by petitioners. Their
expulsion was made pursuant to the By-Laws of RHAI as shown by the testimony of
Mildred de la Peña (dela Peña), President, on cross examination by the counsel for
petitioners.”
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2. NO.
The petitioners are not actual owners of the land they claim to own. They refused to
sign and participate in activities. Their refusal was a sign of their lack of desire to legally
own the land and maintain their membership in the RHAI.
“Apparently, petitioners’ refusal to sign and submit the LPA, the most important
requirement of the NHMFC for the acquisition of the land, disqualified them as loan
beneficiaries. As such, they acquire no better rights than mere occupants of the subject
land. In any case, the due process guarantee cannot be invoked when no vested right
has been acquired. The period during which petitioners occupied the lots, no matter how
long, did not vest them with any right to claim ownership since it is a fundamental
principle of law that acts of possessory character executed by virtue of license or
tolerance of the owner, no matter how long, do not start the running of the period of
acquisitive prescription.”
By: Michaela Sarmiento
48. Office of the Ombudsman v, Manuel Valencia, G.R. No. 183890, 13 April 2011
DOCTRINE:
Dishonesty is incurred when an individual intentionally makes a false statement of any
material fact, practicing or attempting to practice any deception or fraud in order to
secure his examination, registration, appointment, or promotion. It is understood to imply
the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack
of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; the
disposition to defraud, deceive or betray. It is a malevolent act that puts serious doubt
upon oneÊs ability to perform his duties with the integrity and uprightness demanded of
a public officer or employee.
“Substantial evidence rule”. Administrative proceedings are governed by the
substantial evidence rule. Otherwise stated, a finding of guilt in an administrative case
would have to be sustained for as long as it is supported by substantial evidence that the
respondent has committed acts stated in the complaint. Substantial evidence is more
than a mere scintilla of evidence. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds equally
reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise.
FACTS:
In 1999, Valencia declared his assets and liabilities in his Statement of Assets and
Liabilities and Networth (SALN). Not satisfied that the entries made by Valencia were
reflective of his actual net worth, Guerrero, Intelligence Officer of the Department of
Finance filed a complaint/motion for subpoena duces tecum with the Ombudsman. He
alleged that Valencia maintained two (2) US dollar time deposit accounts with the Far
East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC). According to Guerrero, these huge amounts
were the actual fruits of his illegal transactions and activities of as an employee of the
Bureau of Customs.The complaint also alleged that the house and lot declared by
Valencia in his SALNs was grossly undervalued considering that the house, described
as „impressive, was erected on a parcel of land consisting of five (5) contiguous lots.
Finally, it was alleged that from the credit card billings of his Bank of the Philippine
Islands (BPI) Mastercard, it could be inferred that Valencia maintained a lavish lifestyle.
On September 30, 2004, being of the view that Valencia maintained a lavish lifestyle and
lived beyond the modest means that his salary as a government official could offer, the
Ombudsman opined that he must have derived income from unlawful sources. This,
according to the Ombudsman, constituted deception and dishonesty which warranted
his dismissal from office.
ISSUE:
Is Valencia administratively liable for dishonesty?
HELD:
No. From the above, when the statement of wealth becomes manifestly disproportionate
to an employeeÊs income or other sources of income and he fails to properly account or
explain his other sources of income, he becomes liable for Dishonesty. This is especially
true considering that when a public officer takes an oath or office, he binds himself to
faithfully perform the duties of the office and use reasonable skill and diligence, and to
act primarily for the benefit of the public. Thus, a public officer in the discharge of duties,
is to use that prudence, caution and attention which careful persons use in the
management of his affairs. It should be pointed out that the actual recital of facts of the
complaint shows that the nature and cause of the accusation hurled by Guerrero
includes the charge of Dishonesty. Well-settled is the rule that what determines the real
nature and cause of the accusation against an accused is the actual recital of facts
stated in the information or complaint and not the caption or preamble of the information
or complaint, nor the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated,
they being conclusions of law. The Court, however, sustains the finding of the CA that
there is no substantial evidence to hold Valencia liable for Dishonesty. Indeed, in
administrative proceedings, the law does not require evidence beyond reasonable doubt
or preponderance of evidence. Substantial evidence is enough. This presupposes,
however, that the evidence proferred is admissible under the rules.
By: EG Velasco
49. G.R. No. L-25018 May 26, 1969
ARSENIO PASCUAL, JR., petitioner-appellee, vs. BOARD OF MEDICAL
EXAMINERS, respondent-appellant, SALVADOR GATBONTON and ENRIQUETA
GATBONTON, intervenors-appellants.
DOCTRINE:
The reason for this constitutional guarantee, along with other rights granted an accused,
stands for a belief that while crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must be
revealed, such desirable objectives should not be accomplished according to means or
methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded the human personality. More
and more in line with the democratic creed, the deference accorded an individual even
those suspected of the most heinous crimes is given due weight. The constitutional
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foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government ... must accord to the
dignity and integrity of its citizens.
FACTS:
Petitioner Arsenio Pascual, Jr. filed an action for prohibition against the Board of Medical
Examiners. It was alleged therein that at the initial hearing of an administrative case for
alleged immorality, counsel for complainants announced that he would present as his
first witness the petitioner, who was the respondent in such malpractice charge.
Thereupon, petitioner, through counsel, made of record his objection, relying on the
constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness against himself. Petitioner then
alleged that to compel him to take the witness stand, the Board of Examiners was guilty,
at the very least, of grave abuse of discretion for failure to respect the constitutional right
against self-incrimination.
The answer of respondent Board, while admitting the facts stressed that it could call
petitioner to the witness stand and interrogate him, the right against self-incrimination
being available only when a question calling for an incriminating answer is asked of a
witness. They likewise alleged that the right against self-incrimination cannot be availed
of in an administrative hearing.
Petitioner was sustained by the lower court in his plea that he could not be compelled to
be the first witness of the complainants, he being the party proceeded against in an
administrative charge for malpractice. Hence, this appeal by respondent Board.
ISSUE:
Is compelling the petitioner to be the witness of the complainants in violation of the Self-
Incrimination Clause?
HELD:
YES. The Supreme Court held that in an administrative hearing against a medical
practitioner for alleged malpractice, respondent Board of Medical Examiners cannot,
consistently with the self-incrimination clause, compel the person proceeded against to
take the witness stand without his consent. The Court found for the petitioner in
accordance with the well-settled principle that "the accused in a criminal case may
refuse, not only to answer incriminatory questions, but, also, to take the witness stand."
If petitioner would be compelled to testify against himself, he could suffer not the
forfeiture of property but the revocation of his license as a medical practitioner. The
constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence: "The accused has a perfect
right to remain silent and his silence cannot be used as a presumption of his guilt." It is
the right of a defendant "to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take
the witness stand — with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free genuine will."
The reason for this constitutional guarantee, along with other rights granted an accused,
stands for a belief that while crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must be
revealed, such desirable objectives should not be accomplished according to means or
methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded the human personality. More
and more in line with the democratic creed, the deference accorded an individual even
those suspected of the most heinous crimes is given due weight. The constitutional
foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government ... must accord to the
dignity and integrity of its citizens.
Encinas vs. Agustin
GR. No. 187317
DOCTRINE: Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of
action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer; and
the misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, such
as willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules, which must be
established by substantial evidence.
FACTS:
Respondents were then both holding positions as Fire Officer I in Nueva Ecija. They
claim that on 11 March 2000, at around 9:00 p.m., petitioner who was then Provincial
Fire Marshall of Nueva Ecija informed them that unless they gave him five thousand
pesos (P5,000), they would be relieved from their station at Cabanatuan City and
transferred to far-flung areas. Respondent Alfredo P. Agustin (Agustin) would supposedly
be transferred to the Cuyapo Fire Station (Cuyapo), and respondent Joel S. Caubang
(Caubang) to Talugtug Fire Station (Talugtug). Fearing the reassignment, they decided to
pay petitioner. On 15 March 2000, in the house of a certain "Myrna," respondents came
up short and managed to give only two thousand pesos (P2,000), prompting petitioner to
direct them to come up with the balance within a week. When they failed to deliver the
balance, petitioner issued instructions effectively reassigning respondents Agustin and
Caubang to Cuyapo and Talugtug, respectively.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the petitioner is administratively liable for grave misconduct and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of public service
RULING:
Petitioner’s act of demanding money from respondents in exchange for their non-
reassignment constitutes grave misconduct. We have defined grave misconduct as
follows:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more
particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer; and the
misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, such as
willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules, which must be
established by substantial evidence.
Furthermore, petitioner's acts likewise constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest
of the service. In Philippine Retirement Authority v. Rupa, this Court elaborated on the
specific acts that constitute the grave offense of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service, considering that no concrete description is provided under the Civil Service
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Law and rules. The Court outlined therein following acts: misappropriation of public
funds, abandonment of office, failure to report back to work without prior notice, failure to
keep in safety public records and property, making false entries in public documents,
and falsification of court orders. hanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Applying this principle to the present case, we hold that petitioner's offense is of the
same gravity or odiousness as that of the aforementioned acts and would likewise
amount to conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
As to the imposable penalty, grave misconduct is a grave offense punishable by
dismissal even for the first offense. The penalty of dismissal includes forfeiture of
retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and perpetual disqualification from
reemployment in government service and bar from taking civil service examinations. On
the other hand, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service is likewise a grave
offense, but with a less severe penalty of suspension of six ( 6) months and one ( 1) day
to one ( 1) year for the first offense and dismissal for the second offense.
hanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Considering that petitioner was found guilty of two (2) offenses, then the penalty of
dismissal from the service-the penalty corresponding to the most serious offense-was
properly imposed.
-ABONG
52. YSMAEL JR. & CO. VS THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE
SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE DIRECTOR OF
THE BUREAU OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT and TWIN PEAKS DEVELOPMENT
AND REALTY CORPORATION
Doctrine:
It is an established doctrine in this jurisdiction that the decisions and orders of
administrative agencies have upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final
judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata. These decisions and orders
are as conclusive upon the rights of the affected parties as though the same had been
rendered by a court of general jurisdiction. The rule of res judicata thus forbids the
reopening of a matter once determined by competent authority acting within their
exclusive jurisdiction.
Facts:
On October 12, 1965, petitioner, Ysmael JR. & Co. was awarded Timber License
Agreement (TLA) No. 87 by the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources. The
TLA allowed petitioner to cut and collect timber in around 54,920 hectares in Nueva
Vizcaya.
On August 19, 1983, a memorandum was issued by the director of the Bureau of Forest
development ordering the stoppage of all logging operations in Nueva Vizcaya and
Quirino. Furthermore, the TLAs of petitioner and 9 others were cancelled. Petitioner
wrote to then president Marcos for reconsideration but to no avail.
In 1984, Twin peaks development and Filipinas Loggers were granted TLA no. 356
which covered the former area of TLA no. 87. The two entities were allegedly owned by
cronies of President Marcos.
After the 1986 revolution, petitioner sought to reinstate their TLA by filing a motion with
the Minister of Natural Resources under Minister Ernesto Maceda. It was denied on the
grounds that “A timber license was not a contract within the due process clause of the
Constitution, but only a privilege which could be withdrawn whenever public interest or
welfare so demands, and that petitioner was not discriminated against in view of the fact
that it was among ten concessionaires whose licenses were revoked in 1983. Moreover,
emphasis was made of the total ban of logging operations in the provinces of Nueva
Ecija, Nueva Vizcaya, Quirino and Ifugao imposed on April 2, 1986. Then, petitioner
sought the nullification of the TLA of twin peaks and Filipinas loggers. However, it was
also denied by the deputy executive secretary as the ministry already issued a total
logging ban in the areas covered by those particular TLAs.
On appeal to the office of the president, petitioner was again denied. Thus, this instant
petition alleging that the Ministry of Natural Resources (now DENR) acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
1. W.O.N the minister of natural resources acted with grave abuse of discretion
2. W.O.N petitioner may still avail of writ of certiorari despite lapse of time
HELD:
1. No. The refusal of public respondents herein to reverse final and executory
administrative orders does not constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
It is an established doctrine in this jurisdiction that the decisions and orders of
administrative agencies have upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final
judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata. These decisions and orders
are as conclusive upon the rights of the affected parties as though the same had been
rendered by a court of general jurisdiction. The rule of res judicata thus forbids the
reopening of a matter once determined by competent authority acting within their
exclusive jurisdiction.
Section 16 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides:
SEC. 16. The State shall protect and promote the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
While the administration grapples with the complex and multifarious problems caused by
unbridled exploitation of these resources, the judiciary will stand clear. A long line of
cases establish the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are
addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation
of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies.
For this Court recognizes the wide latitude of discretion possessed by the government in
determining the appropriate actions to be taken to preserve and manage natural
resources, and the proper parties who should enjoy the privilege of utilizing these
resources. Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal
instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest
resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that
they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not
vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and
the forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or
rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require.
Therefore, there is no grave abuse of discretion as the DENR acted within its powers.
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2. No. Although no specific time frame is fixed for the institution of a special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, the same must nevertheless
be done within a "reasonable time". The yardstick to measure the timeliness of a petition
for certiorari is the "reasonableness of the length of time that had expired from the
commission of the acts complained of up to the institution of the proceeding to annul the
same."
The failure to file the petition for certiorari within a reasonable period of time renders the
petitioner susceptible to the adverse legal consequences of laches.
Laches is defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length
of time to do that which by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done
earlier, or to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the
party entitled thereto has either abandoned it or declined to assert it. The rule is that
unreasonable delay on the part of a plaintiff in seeking to enforce an alleged right may,
depending upon the circumstances, be destructive of the right itself. Verily, the laws aid
those who are vigilant, not those who sleep upon their rights (Vigilantibus et non
dormientibus jura subveniunt).
In this case, petitioner waited for at least three years before it finally filed a petition for
certiorari with the Court attacking the validity of the assailed Bureau actions in 1983 and
1984. Thus, for the unreasonable and inexcusable delay, laches will apply.
- ACOSTA
53. National Housing Authority vs. Soledad Pascual
GR No. 158364
Doctrine: It is well-established in our jurisprudence that the decisions and orders of
administrative agencies, rendered pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority, have upon
their finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the
doctrine of res judicata. In the case at bar, since petitioners decision was seasonably
appealed by respondent, the same has not attained finality and the principle of res
judicata does not apply.
Facts:
August 3, 1959, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 2616 was enacted providing for the
expropriation of the Tatalon Estate and the sale of the lots to present bonafide
occupants.Thereafter, the National Housing Authority (NHA) was designated as
administrator of the Tatalon Estate Housing Project by virtue of Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 1261.
Petitioner NHA awarded in 1983 Lot 3, Block 12 of the Tatalon Estate Urban Bliss
Project (TEUBP), containing an area of 65 square meters, to Dolores Maranan, since
she was included in the 1958 Araneta Census List of Occupants.
Respondent Pascual however, assailed the award of the subject lot to Maranan, alleging
that she is the rightful beneficiary of the said lot being the actual occupant thereof and
for having resided in the Tatalon Estate since 1968. Pascual averred that after marrying
Aurelio Pascual in 1975, they used the subject lot for their domicile and operated a
motor shop as well and were included in the 1976 Census. However, sometime in 1983,
their house was demolished and relocated to an inner lot.
APPEAL (Office of the President) acceptance of another lot and the execution of the Conditional Deed of Sale over the lot
NHA maintained the propriety of the award of the lot to Maranan. An appeal was made where her house was transferred by petitioner over her objection cannot be taken as a
with the Office of the President. On September 29, 1987, the Public Complaints ground to disqualify her from acquiring the lot in litigation as it appears that such
Assistance and Action Center reviewed the case and recommended that respondent be acceptance was made with the condition that her right to substantiate her claim over the
awarded another front lot to settle the matter; that the award of the inner lot where she subject lot will not be forfeited.
was relocated will be cancelled and payments made shall be applied to the new lot and SUBMITTED BY: ALIH
should there be any disparity in price, a refund or additional payment will be made
accordingly.[14] However, if respondent insists on her claim on the subject lot, then she
must substantiate her claim. Further conferences were made but no settlement was
reached between the parties and no ruling was made as to the disqualification of
Maranan as an absentee awardee. Hence respondent brought the matter before the
courts for redress.

LOWER COURT’S DECISION

CA reversed the decision of the RTC which agreed with the propriety of NHA in awarding
the subject lot.
Petitioner contends that the court has no power to set aside the assailed decision since
the award attained finality and that the complainant filed by respondent before the lower
court is not the proper remedy to contest the same (Raymundo v. People’s Homesite
and Housing Corp.)

Issue: WON the court has the power to nullify and set aside the award of the subject lot
to Dolores Maranan

Held:
Yes. Respondent’s letter-complaint substantially complied with the requirements of the
law regarding administrative appeals. In the exercise of its discretion, the Office of the
President gave due course to the appeal.
It is well-established in our jurisprudence that the decisions and orders of administrative
agencies, rendered pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority, have upon their finality, the
force and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res
judicata. In the case at bar, since petitioners decision was seasonably appealed by
respondent, the same has not attained finality and the principle of res judicata does not
apply.

The Raymundo case is not applicable in the case at bar since the Complaint filed
primarily sought the nullification of the title issued in the name of Dolores Maranan and
not merely the nullification of the award made by petitioner. In a number of cases
decided by this Court, we have sustained the propriety of the action for annulment of title
and the consequent nullification of awards granted by the government in favor of
wrongful grantees who obtained said grants in violation of public policy or through
fraudulent means.

Finally, this Court sustains the ruling of the Court of Appeals that respondent is a
qualified beneficiary of the Tatalon Estate Development Project. Respondents
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