PROPERTY CASE DIGESTS \\ Prof.

Eduardo Labitag
A.Y. 2013-2014

FACTS HELD DOCTRINE

CLASSIFICATION UNDER THE CIVIL CODE
PERSONAL PROPERTY.
• While not conclusive, the
characterization of the property as
chattel by appellant indicates
intention to make the character of the
Davao Sawmill Co. leased a building,
property as personal. While not conclusive, the characterization
within which it made use of several
• Porto Rican Code: “Things may be of the property as chattel by appellant
machines implanted therein. The
immovable either by their own nature indicates intention to make the character of
machineries were placed and mounted on
or by their destination or to the object the property as personal.
Davao Sawmill the foundations of the cement. Contract
to which they are applicable.” Machinery can only be designated as
v. Castillo between the parties indicate that such
• Also, machinery which is movable in immovable when placed by the owner in a
machineries would pass ownership upon
nature only becomes an immovable building and when such tends to meet the
the lessee when the lease expires. Issue in
when placed in a plant by the owner direct needs of the owner.
this case is WON such property is personal
of the property or plant.
or real.
• Law presumes that those who only
have a temporary right to the land
does not intend to immobilize such
machinery to become property of
another.
Mabalacat Sugar obtained a loan from Cu
Unjieng. Said loan secured by a first
mortgage of two parcels of land “with all its
buildings and improvements…now existing The additional machinery is considered part
and that may be constituted in the future.” of the improvements on the property that is
Additional machinery was bought to of a permanent character. The installation
increase the sugar central’s capacity. of the machinery in the sugar central Machineries that tend directly and are
Berkenkoter Green, Mabalacat’s president, asked converted it to real property; as such, they essential to the industry being carried out in
v. Cu Unijeng Berkenkotter to advance the amount for the should be deemed included in the real a property become immobilized because of
purchase of the additional machinery. He estate mortgage. The machineries have their purpose.
promised to reimburse the amount as soon become immovables by reason of the fact
he could obtain an additional loan from the that the company installed them for the use
mortgage over the new machinery. of the industry carried in the central.
Controversy over the inclusion of the new
machinery in the original load with
mortgage.
Orosa asked Lopez to invest in the theatre While it is generally true that a building is
Lopez v. Orosa
business under the name of Plaza Theatre also an immovable, enumeration of real

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 FACTS
Inc (PTI). Lopez agreed to supply the
lumber necessary for the theatre’s
construction with the assurance that Orosa
would be liable for any construction
expense incurred. Lopez then delivered the
lumber with costs amounting to P62 225
wherein P41 771 was left unpaid. PTI then
bought land on which building was built.
Orosa promised to pay Lopez by obtaining
loan by mortgaging certain PTI properties
(land and building), which however, were
already previously mortgaged to Luzon
Surety (land only) but under a different law
so such encumberance did not appear in
the 2nd mortgage. Lower Court ruled that
Orosa and PTI are jointly liable for unpaid
costs to Lopez since the latter acquired a
materialman’s lien over the building only
and not on land since land was not yet
owned by PTI when Lopez started to
deliver lumber. Lopez appealed that land
should be included.
Defendants-Appellants Vicencio and
Simeon executed a chattel mortgage over
their house in favor of Plaintiffs-Appellees
Sps. Tumalad.
The mortgage was executed to guarantee
a loan of P4,800 received from plaintiffs. It
stipulated that failure to pay the loan would
result in the property being sold at an
auction sale.
Tumalad v. Vicencio
Defendants defaulted. An auction sale was
conducted and plaintiffs were the highest
bidders.
They filed an ejectment suit against the
defendants which was decided in their
favor.
Defendants appealed to the Court of
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HELD DOCTRINE
properties lists buildings separately from
land. The building itself is an immovable
regardless of WON said structure and the
land on which it is adhered to belong to the
same owner. Further, the Civil Code
provision reveals that the law gives
preference to unregistered refectionary
credits ONLY WITH RESPECT to the real
estate upon which the work was made. So
in the instant case, the lien created
attaches merely to the immovable for the
construction of which the obligation was
incurred – lien attaches only to the
building and to no other property of the
obligors.
Is the chattel mortgage valid? YES.
• While the general rule announced by
the Court in Lopez is that “a building is
by itself an immovable property
irrespective of whether or not said
structure and the land on which it is
adhered to belong to the same owner,”
the rule admits of certain exceptions. By agreement, parties can treat property
• In the case of Manarang and Manarang that is immovable by nature as movable.
v. Ofilada, the Court stated that “it is Thus, a chattel mortgage constituted over
undeniable that the parties to a real property is valid.
contract may by agreement treat as
personal property that which by nature
would be real property,” citing
Standard Oil Company of New York v.
Jaramillo.
• Although there is no specific statement
in the mortgage contract referring to
the subject house as personal
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 FACTS
Appeals which then certified the same to
the Supreme Court.
Spouses Valino filed a bond to buy rice on
credit, which was subscribed by
Associated Insurance (surety company).
Then they executed a chattel mortgage on
their house in favor of the surety company
as counter guaranty. At the time of the
chattel mortgage the lot where the house
was erected was still registered in the
name of Phil. Realty Corp. after securing
the title to the lot, spouses Valino executed
a real estate mortgage over the house and
Associated
lot in favor of Isabel Iya to secure a debt.
Insurance v. Iya
The spouses Valino failed to satisfy their
rice credit as well as failed to reimburse the
surety company which resulted in the the
foreclosure of the chattel mortgage. The
surety company acquired the house by
virtue of public auction and filed an action
to exclude such house from the real estate
mortgage in favor of Isabel Iya. Isabel Iya
filed a case to collect on the Valinos’ debt
or foreclose on the real estate mortgage
over the house and lot.
Makati Leasing discounted and assigned
receivables to Weareaver Textile Mills,
which executed a Chattel Mortgage over
certain raw materials inventory as well as a
Makati Leasing v. machinery, an Artos Aero Dryer Stentering
Wearever Range. Because Weareaver defaulted,
Makati Leasing filed petition for
extrajudicial foreclosure of the property.
Because Weareaver failed to cede
possession to Makati Leasing, it instituted
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property, yet by ceding, selling or
transferring a property by way of
chattel mortgage defendants-
appellants could only have meant to
convey the house as chattel, or at
least, intended to treat the same as
such, so that they should not now be
allowed to make an inconsistent stand
by claiming otherwise.
The house not being personal property
cannot be the subject of a chattel
mortgage. Pursuant to Art. 415, a building
is by itself an immovable property. In view
of the absence of any specific provision to
the contrary, a building is an immovable
property irrespective of whether or not said
structure and the land on which it is
adhered to belong to the same owner. To
hold otherwise would create a situation
where a permanent fixture changes its
nature or character as the ownership of the
land changes hands.
NO, PERSONAL PROPERTY.
1. Decision is based on ruling in Tumalad
v Vicencio, which held that a house The parties to a contract may by
made of strong materials was a agreement treat as personal property that
movable for the purpose of executing a which by nature would be real, as long as
chattel mortgage thereon. no third party interests would be
2. No reason why machinery, which is prejudiced thereby.
movable in its nature and becomes
immobilized only by destination or
purpose, may not likewise be treated
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 FACTS
a Writ of Replevin over the machine.
Weareaver contends that replevin cannot
lie, as the machinery is immovable, being
attached to the ground by means of bolts
and would have to be drilled out. Was this
immovable property?
Meralco constructed steel towers in QC to
transmit electricity. The QC Assessor
declared the property for real property tax.
Board of
Court of Tax Appeals held that the steel
Assessment Appeals
towers come within the term “poles”, which
v. Meralco
are exempt from taxes; it likewise held that
the steel poles are personal property not
subject to real property tax.
Meralco installed from Batangas to Manila
2 pipeline (line of pipes connected to
pumps, valves and control devices for
conveying liquids, gases or finely divided
solids) systems consisting of cylindrical
steel pipes joined together and buried not
less than 1meter below the surface along
the shoulder of the public hway. The
portion passing through Laguna is about
Meralco Securities v. 30km long. Pipes were embedded in the
Board of soil, solidly welded together to preclude
Assessment Appeals breakage or damage and prevent leakage,
hence permanently attached to the land.
But Meralco notes that segments of
pipeline can be moved from one place to
another. Then Provincial assessor of
Laguna treated pipeline as realty and
issued tax declarations. Meralco appealed
to Central Board of Assessment Appeals
and eventually to SC via petition for
certiorari.
Meralco v. Central Meralco put up two oil storage tanks on
Board of land owned by Caltex. Tax was assessed
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HELD DOCTRINE
as such.
3. The parties to a contract may by
agreement treat as personal property
that which by nature would be real, as
long as no third party interests would
be prejudiced thereby.
4. Such decision is based on equity and
estoppel.
The steel towers are personal property
exempt from tax. The towers are “poles”.
Art. 415 par. 1 does not apply in this case
since the towers are not buildings adhered
to the soil; par. 3 does not apply either
since the towers are not attached to Classification of property.
immovable un a fixed manner; and par. 5
neither applies since the towers are not
machinery. They towers are not intended
for industry or works in the land where they
are constructed.
Pipeline is a realty under Assessment Law,
Real Property Tax Code, and Civil Code.
Article 415 par 1 and 3 of NCC may consist
of constructions of all kinds adhered to the
soil and everything attached to an
immovable in a fixed manner, in such a
way that it cannot be separated therefrom
without breaking the material. And the
pipeline conforms to such definition.
Hence, Meralco cannot claim for
exemption.
The oil storage tanks constitute taxable Improvements on land are taxable.
improvements.
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Assessment Appeals
Caltex v. Board of
Assessment Appeals
Benguet Corp. v.
Central Board of
Assessment Appeals
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FACTS
on such tanks. Meralco claims that the
tanks are not permanently attached to the
land, hence they cannot be taxed as
immovables. It argues that the tanks
“merely sit” on the foundation.
The machinery and equipment installed by
Caltex in its gas stations which were
located on leased land became subject of
assessment by the City Assessor. The
machinery and equipment included various
types of tanks, pumps, car washers, hoists,
compressors and tireflators. These are
loaned by Caltex to gas operators under a
lease agreement and are owned by Caltex
for the duration of the lease. The city
assessor classified them as taxable realty
while the city board of tax appeals
classified them as personalty. On appeal,
the Central Board of Assessors ruled that
such equipment were real property subject
to realty tax.
Benguet Corporation operated a mine in
Zambales, connected to a tailings dam.
The Provincial Assessor of Zambales
classified the dam as a taxable
improvement, requiring corporation pay
taxes of P 11, 319, 304 pesos. Benguet
appealed the assessment to the Board of
Assessment Appeals. Arguments of
Benguet Corp: NOT a taxable improvement
because (1) Dam has no separate value
independent of the mine, and is an integral
part thereof (2) Dam will benefit the local
HELD DOCTRINE
• The Real Property Tax Code provides Sec. 38 (k) of the Real Property Tax Code
that improvements on land are not defines an improvement as “a valuable
exempt from taxation. addition made to property or an
• The Court held that while the two amelioration in its condition, amounting to
storage tanks are not embedded in the more than mere repairs or replacement of
land, they may, nevertheless, be waste, costing labor or capital and
considered as improvements on the intended to enhance its value, beauty or
land, enhancing its utility and rendering utility or to adapt it for new or further
it useful to the oil industry. It is purposes.”
undeniable that the two tanks have
been installed with some degree of
permanence as receptacles for the
considerable quantities of oil needed
by Meralco for its operations.
Improvement – valuable addition made to
The equipment and machinery are subject
property or an amelioration in its condition,
to realty tax. The items mentioned are in
amounting to more than mere repairs or
the nature of improvements and machinery
replacement… intended to enhance its
of the gas station building as owned by
value… beauty, utility xxx
Caltex. They are necessary to the operation
of the gas station for without them the gas
Machinery – machines, mechanical
station would be useless. They are taxable
contrivances, instruments, appliances,
improvements and machinery within the
apparatus attached to the real estate. It
meaning of the assessment law and the
includes physical facilities, installations and
Real Property Tax Code.
appurtunement service facilities.
THE DAM IS REAL PROPERTY AND
IMPROVEMENT UNDER THE TAX CODE,
The classification of property would
BOTH SUBJECT TO REALTY TAX.
depend on the degree of permanence
• First established that it came under
intended in its structure of use.
term “Improvement” under the Tax
Code which is not really relevant here.
“Permanent”: not only that it must be used
• Tailings dam is also real property. Such
perpetually but only until the purpose to
a classification would depend on the
which principal realty is devoted has been
degree of permanence intended in its
accomplished
structure of use.
• “Permanent”: not only that it must be
used perpetually but only until the
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 FACTS HELD DOCTRINE
community by serving as irrigation facility. purpose to which principal realty is
devoted has been accomplished.
Immovable nature defined its character
as real property under Article 415.
PROPERTY OF STATE
President Ramos signed RA 7942 into law
to govern the development, utilization, and
processing of mineral resources. The law The FTAAs with WMCP are
prescribes the qualifications of contractors unconstitutional. A comparison between the
and grants them certain rights, including 1987 and 1973 Constitutions show that
timber, water and easement rights, and the service contracts (which the FTAAs are)
right to possess explosives. Before the were in fact deleted in the newer
effectivity of the law, the President entered constitution. WMCP’s contention that they
into a Financial Technical Assistance are allowed to enter into FTAAs that include
La Bugal B’laan Agreement with WMCP covering 99,287 ha management and operation of mineral State ownership and control of resources;
Tribal Association v. of land in different provinces. DENR resources contravenes Art. XII, Sec. 2, such properties form part of public domain
Ramos (Jan. 2004) Secretary Victor Ramos issued the IRR of which stipulates “The exploration, cannot be alienated.
the law. Petitioners filed an action to stop development, and utilization of natural
the implementation of RA 7942. Petitioners resources shall be under the full control and
contend that 64 out of the 100 FTAA supervision of the State.” The FTAAs
applications that have been filed are from provide beneficial ownership of State-
foreign-owned corporations. WMCP for its owned resources to corporations, which
part argues that it sold its shares to effectively leaves the State with nothing but
Sagittarius Mines, whose equity is 60% a bare title.
owned by Filipinos. Petitioners assail the
constitutionality of the FTAAs.
These were declared not unconstitutional.
According to the court, the Constitution
allows the continued use of service
contracts with foreign corporations – as
contractors who would invest in and
Petitioners filed for Prohibition and
operate and manage extractive
Mandamus to challenge the
enterprises., subject to full control and
constitutionality of RA 7942 (Phil Mining
La Bugal B’laan supervision of the state. The court also
Act) and its IRR as well as of the FTAA
Tribal Association v. concluded that in the RA, IRR, and FTAA,
dated March 1995 executed by the
Ramos (Dec. 2004) more than sufficient control and
government with Western Mining Corp Phil
supervision over mining operations is
(WMCP) in the Original Decision. Hence,
vested on the state. Therefore, there is no
this MR.
surrender of control under the FTAA BUT 2
of its provisions are defective – sections
giving the government a 60% in the net
mining revenues of WMCP from the
commencement of commercial production

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 FACTS
La Bugal B’laan
Motion for reconsideration praying for the
Tribal Association v.
reversal of the Dec. 2004 resolution.
Ramos (Feb. 2005)
The government and the CDCP (a private
company) signed a contract to reclaim
certain foreshore and offshore areas of
Manila Bay, as well as to construct the
Manila Cavite Coastal Road. Marcos
issued PD1084 and 1085 creating the
Chavez v. Public
Public Estates Authority (PEA) which took
Estates Authority
over the contract with CDCP and would
from then on own and finance the project.
Cory Aquino transferred to PEA parcels of
land reclaimed under the project, including
3 reclaimed islands called the Freedom
Islands. PEA entered into JVA with AMARI
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HELD DOCTRINE
and that which deprives the government
part or all of the said 60%..
The court rules that the real issue at hand
is the amount of discretion to be accorded
to the Executive Department, particularly
the President, in respect of negotiations
over the terms of FTAAs, particularly when
it comes to gov. share of financial benefits
from FTAAs. And the court believes that it
is not unconstitutional to allow a wide
degree of discretion to the Chief Executive,
given the nature and complexity of such
agreements, the humongous amounts of
capital and financing required for large-
scale mining operations, the complicated
technology needed, and the intricacies of
international trade, coupled with the
State’s need to maintain flexibility in its
dealings, in order to preserve and enhance
our country’s competitiveness in world
markets. But in view of the rights and
interests of all concerned, and the
greater good of the greatest number,
the court decided to GRANT THE
MOTION.
Motion denied. Mere rehash of arguments
addressed in the previous Resolution.
The JVA as amended is unconstitutional for
violating Sec.2 and 3, Art. XII of the 1987
Constitution.
Under the Constitution, all lands of public
domain belong to the state. Among the
classifications of lands of public domain,
only agricultural lands of public domain
may be alienable. Furthermore, private
corporations are prohibited from holding
alienable lands of public domain except by
lease not exceeding 25 years.
1. The provision under the JVA seeking to
Page 7 of 70
 FACTS
to develop the Freedom Islands. Senate
conducted an investigation and found that
under the JVA the PEA sought to transfer
to AMARI the reclaimed lands which were
part of lands of public domain and which
were not classified as alienable public
lands. Later, the JVA was amended to
include in the agreement an area of
submerged land yet to be reclaimed.
The parties assail the earlier decision of
Chavez v PEA, ruling that the submerged
areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable
natural resources of public domain until
classified as alienable or disposable lands
Chavez v. Public
open to disposition and declared no longer
Estates Authority
needed for public service. Outside
(Motion for
commerce of man. The relevant argument
Reconsideration)
raised by PEA in this case is that “cost of
reclaiming deeply submerged areas is
enormous, and thus participation of private
corporations are needed.”
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HELD DOCTRINE
transfer ownership of the Freedom
Isalnds to AMARI is illegal for violating
the constitutional mandate which
prohibits private corporations from
owning alienable lands of public
domain.
2. The provision seeking to transfer
ownership of submerged land still to
be reclaimed to AMARI is illegal and
void for contravening Sec.2, Art. XII of
the Constitution which prohibits the
alienation of natural resources other
than agricultural land. In its submerged
state, the land not yet reclaimed has
not been classified as alienable land of
public domain. And again, private
corporations cannot own alienable land
of public domain.
CONTENTION IS WITHOUT MERIT.
The Decision does not bar private
corporations from participating in
reclamation projects and being paid for
their services in reclaiming lands, as what
PEA contends. What the Decision
prohibits, following the explicit
constitutional mandate, is for private
corporations to acquire reclaimed lands of
the public domain.
Despite strong dissent, the Court upheld
the classification of the PEA reclaimed
Bellosillo, Dissent: I am not comfortable
lands as lands of public domain, and
with the idea of forever withholding
therefore inalienable by private
reclaimed lands as unmoving assets in our
corporations.
developmental concerns. Reclaimed lands
are lands sui generis, (as opposed to public
domain.) We cannot lump them up in one
telling swoop as lands of the public domain
without due regard, for vested rights as
well as joint executive and legislative intent
to provide otherwise.
Ynares-Santiago, Dissent: There is ample
evidence to infer legislative intent to
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 FACTS
Petitioners Usero and Samela are owners
of adjacent lots while respondents own a lot
behind those of petitioners’. Between the
lots is a low-level strip of land filled with
stagnant water and floating water lilies.
Respondents suffer flooding everything the
water rises, which prompted them to build a
wall on the strip of land. Petitioners claimed
ownership, and requested respondents to
Usero v. Court of stop their construction. Both petitioners
Appeals presented their respective TCTs that
showed the boundary of the lots. Efforts to
settle disputes failed, and petitioners filed
separate complaints against respondents.
When the case reached the RTC, the court
said that the strip of land formed part of a
creek, which is included in the public
dominion. As such, no one may claim
ownership. Hence, the consolidated
appeals.
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HELD DOCTRINE
characterize reclaimed lands as alienable
public lands. In other words, there was
never an intention to categorize reclaimed
lands as inalienable lands of the public
domain; rather they were expressly made
private property of the National
Government subject to disposition to the
person who undertook the reclamation
works.
Sandoval Gutierrez, Dissent: I dissent from
the foregoing conclusions which are based
on general laws mainly of ancient vintage.
Reclaimed lands, especially those under
the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and
Reclamation Project (MCCRRP), are
governed by PD 10849 and PD 108510
enacted in 1976 and 1977, respectively, or
more than half a century after the
enactment of the Public Lands Acts of
1919 and 1936. If several laws cannot be
harmonized, the earlier statute must yield
to the later enactment.
The Supreme Court held that the strip was
public domain. It cited the findings of the
lower courts. That there were a barangay
certification that a creek exists in the
disputed strip of land; certification from the
Second Manila Engineering District, NCR-
DPWH, that the western portion of Pilar
Village where the subject strip of land is Public dominion is intended for public use.
The respondents may build the
located is bounded by a tributary of Talon
improvements to prevent erosion to their
Creek; and photographs showing the property.
abundance of water lilies in the subject strip
of land. The fact that water lilies thrive in
that strip of land can only mean that there is
a permanent stream of water or creek
there. The Court cited Art. 420 (1) of the
New Civil Code, stating that creeks fell into
the classification in the article in “others of
similar character.”
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 FACTS
Widow of Tantoco had sued the Municipal
Council of Iloilo for P42, 966 being the
purchase price for 2 strips of land which
the municipality had appropriated for
widening of Calle J.M. Basa and Calle
Aldiguer. Tantoco secured a writ of
Tantoco v. Municipal execution on the municipality’s properties
Council because the latter lacked funds. The sheriff
attached 2 auto trucks for street sprinkling,
1 police mobile, the police stations in 3
streets and the concrete structures used as
markets. Provincial fiscal filed a motion to
annul the attachment for being illegal which
the court granted. Plaintiff appealed.
The Municipality of Zamboanga was
converted into a chartered city. Sec. 50 of
CA 39 provided that the City of
Zamboanga would acquire property owned
by the province at a price to be determined
by the Auditor General. There were 50
properties to be transferred, consisting of
schools, a hospital, the provincial, capitol,
and a leprosarium, among others.
Later, the province was divided into
Zamboanga del
Zamboanga del Norte and Zamboanga del
Norte v. City of
Sur. RA 3039 was enacted amending Sec.
Zamboanga
50 of CA 39. It states: “All buildings,
properties and assets belonging to the
former province of Zamboanga and located
within the City of Zamboanga are hereby
transferred, free of charge, in favor of the
said City of Zamboanga.”
The Province contends that the law is
unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes the
transfer of its patrimonial property without
compensation therefor.
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HELD DOCTRINE
Articles 343-344 of CC now 423-424 of
NCC divides the property of provinces and
municipalities into property for public use
and patrimonial property. Property for
public use is not within the commerce of
man if used by the public, thus not subject
to execution. The rule also applies to funds
in the hands of a public officer. Taxes due
to a municipality cannot also be seized
under execution But a property used by
municipality for quasi-private purposes
(such as stocks) maybe subject to
execution. Therefore, properties levied
upon cannot be the subject of execution
because they are public properties or
properties held by the municipality in
trust for the benefit of their inhabitants
and used for public purpose.
The law is constitutional.
• According to the law on municipal
corporations, properties devoted to
public service are deemed public.
• Following this classification, Republic
Act 3039 is valid insofar as it affects
the lots used as capitol site, school
If the property is owned by the municipality
sites and its grounds, hospital and
(municipal corporation) in its public and
leprosarium sites and the high school
governmental capacity, the property is
playground sites—a total of 24 lots—
public and Congress has absolute control
since these were held by the former
over it. But if the property is owned in its
Zamboanga province in its
private or proprietary capacity, then it is
governmental capacity and therefore
patrimonial and Congress has no absolute
are subject to the absolute control of
control. The municipality cannot be
Congress.
deprived of it without due process and
• But Republic Act 3039 cannot be
payment of just compensation.
applied to deprive Zamboanga del
Norte of its share in the value of the
rest of the 26 remaining lots which are
patrimonial properties since they are
not being utilized for distinctly
governmental purposes. (Most of these
lands were vacant.)
• Thus, for the 26 patrimonial properties,
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 FACTS
The City of Manila was declared the owner
in fee simple of a parcel of land known
from the Cadastral Survey of the City of
Manila. It sold portions of the land and a
new certificate of title was issued in favor
Salas v. Jarencio of the City for the remaining areas.
Subsequently, a law was passed declaring
the residual area of the original parcel of
land as patrimonial property which would
be sold to the occupants thereof. The
Mayor of Manila opposed.
Parcel of land in controversy was declared
an abandoned road by the City Council of
Cebu, in its Resolution 2193.
Consequently, the land was sold through
Cebu v. Bercilles public bidding, the petitioner being the
highest bidder (10.800 pesos.) He filed a
petition for the registration of the land in his
name. Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Cebu
filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds
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HELD DOCTRINE
the City must pay just compensation.
What is the nature of the land in question?
Said land belongs to the State and was
simply granted in usufruct to the City of
Manila for municipal purposes. But since
the City did not actually use said land for
any recognized public purpose and
allowed it to remain idle and unoccupied
for a long time until it was overrun by
squatters, no presumption of State grant of
ownership in favor of the City of Manila
may be acquiesced in to justify the claim
that it is its own private or patrimonial As a general rule, regardless of the source
property or classification of land in the possession
of a municipality, excepting those acquired
When it comes to property of the with its own funds in its private or
municipality which it did not acquire in its corporate capacity, such property is held in
private or corporate capacity with its own trust for the State for the benefit of its
funds, the legislature can transfer its inhabitants, whether it be for governmental
administration and disposition to an or proprietary purposes.
agency of the National Government to be
disposed of according to its discretion.
Here it did so in obedience to the
constitutional mandate of promoting social
justice to insure the wellbeing and
economic security of the people. The
Congress has dealt with the land involved
as one reserved for communal use (terreno
comunal). The act of classifying State
property calls for the exercise of wide
discretionary legislative power and it
should not be interfered with by the courts.
CITY CHARTER ENABLES CITY COUNCIL
TO DESIGNATE LAND AS ABANDONED.
THUS, BECOMES PATRIMONIAL
PROPERTY. Once the public use of a land ceases, it
Yes the City Charter enables City Council shall be considered the patrimonial
to declare any land as abandoned. property of the City.
Generally, The Council would be the best
authority to determine if such land was still
needed for public use.
Page 11 of 70
 FACTS
that PROPERTY IS PART OF THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN AND OUTSIDE THE COMMERCE
OF MAN. Respondent trial court issued an
order dismissing the petitioner’s
application for registration of title. Issues in
this case – (1) Does the City Charter allows
the City Council to designate any land as
“abandoned?” (2) Does this declaration,
should it be valid, make the land
patrimonial property of the City of Cebu?
Present controversy arose from an earlier
civil case where the current petitioner was
the defendant. The lower court ordered the
reconveyance of certain parcels of land
allegedly donated by Carlos Imperio to the
municipality, along with a money judgment.
Upon failure of petitioner to appeal the
Municipality of San
decision, respondent Judge Fernandez
Miguel v. Fernandez
issued a writ of execution of the decision.
Municipality filed motion to quash on the
grounds that a writ cannot be enforced over
public property and public funds. Motion
denied by Fernandez, stating that the
Municipal Treasurer has enough funds to
cover the money judgment.
Lots (3) in the case located in the City of
Manila formerly part of a big parcel of land
belonging to predecessors of claimant
Cabangis. From 1896, it began to wear
away because of Manila Bay waves that in
1901, lots became totally submerged and
remained in this way until 1912 when the
Government started dredging the Vitas
Government
Estuary to facilitate navigation. Due to
v. Cabangis
dredging, sand and silt from estuary was
transferred to previously submerged land
which now formed again. Cabangis
immediately took possession and had it
registered. CFI was in favour of Cabangis.
Government appealed arguing that lots
were gained from the sea by
accession/reclamation.
Celine De Guzman | Ish Guidote | Desiree Ico | Pola Lamarca | Ross Tugade
HELD DOCTRINE
Since no longer for public use, it becomes
patrimonial property which can be the
object of an ordinary contract. Article 422
of the Civil Code expressly provides that
“Property of public dominion, when no
longer intended for public use or for public
service, shall form part of the patrimonial
property of the State.
The funds are exempt from execution.
Citing jurisprudence, the Court stated that
“not only the public property but also the
taxes and public revenues of such
corporations cannot be seized under
execution against them, either in the
Public funds, which have the character of
treasury or when in transit to it”, as they are
public property, cannot be the subject of
held in trust for the people. PD 447: No
execution in a judgment.
money to be paid out of the treasury
without lawful appropriation or statutory
authority. → the payment cannot be
effected without an ordinance from the local
Sangguniang Bayan
Section 5 of Land of Waters provides that
lands reclaimed from the sea in
consequence of works constructed by the
State, or by the provinces, pueblos, or
private persons, with proper permission,
shall become the property of the party
constructing such works, unless otherwise
provided by the terms of the grant of
authority. The lots in question having
disappeared on account of the gradual
erosion due to the ebb and flow of the
tide, and having remained in such a
state until they were reclaimed from the
sea by the filling in done by the
Government, they are public land. There
was natural erosion but Cabangis fif not do
anything to prevent its destruction.
Page 12 of 70
 FACTS HELD DOCTRINE
Reclamation by the government does not
mean that property will revert back to
being private.
ACTIONS TO RECOVER POSSESSION/OWNERSHIP
Petitioners Hilario filed accion RTC PROCEEDINGS NULLIFIED.
reinvindicatoria in the RTC to recover a 1. Since the action did not involve a • Classification of action for recovery of
land they allegedly own, against question of ownership, asserting only property depends on the material
possessors Salvador. Hilario said that they possession over the land, the action is allegations therein and which are
inherited the same from their grandmother accion publiciana. controlling.
Hilario v. Salvador and Salvador contructed his house without 2. It should have been the assessed value • The jurisdiction of the court over an
consent of the Hilarios. that should’ve been taken in action involving title to or possession
Defense of Salvador: that the assessed consideration, not market value of over of land is determined by the assessed
value of the land is less than 20,000 pesos 20m. Used tax declaration. value of the said property and not the
and thus RTC has no jurisdiction over the 3. Proceedings in the RTC and judgment market value thereof.
action. It must be the MTC. deemed void. Petition dismissed.
A complaint for forcible entry must be filed
Respondents Crispulo Vasquez and his
The complaint cannot prosper. Sampayan within one year.
sister filed a forcible entry case against
Sampayan v. Court was already in possession for more than a
petitioner. Their mother was an oppositor
of Appeals year, hence, respondents should have filed Being an oppositor in a cadastral case is
in the cadastral case involving the subject
an accion publiciana. insufficient to prove prior physical
property.
possession.
The proper action is for an unlawful
detainer. A complaint for unlawful detainer
Santos is the registered owner of lands in
is sufficient if it alleges that the withholding
Davao while spouses Ayon are owners of
of the possession or the refusal to vacate is
adjacent lot who were occupying such
unlawful and MTCC has jurisdiction. In the
even before Santos bough this land. The
case, there is an allegation that
previous owner of property of Ayons built a
respondent’s occupancy on the portion of
building which straddled the lots of Ayon
his property is by virtue of his mere
and Santos, and which the Ayons use as
tolerance. Santos’ cause of action for UD
warehouse. Santos has allowed spouses to
springs from respondent’s failure to vacate
use the building but in 1996, he conveyed
Santos v. Ayon the questioned premises upon his demand.
to Ayons that he needed the entire portion
It bears stressing that possession by
of his lot. He demanded that they demolish
tolerance is lawful, but such possession
the part of the building encroaching his
becomes unlawful when the possessor by
property but spouses refused. Santos then
tolerance refuses to vacate upon demand
filed an action for Unlawful Detainer. Trial
made by the owner. A person who
Court ruled for Santos concluding that
occupies the land of another at the latter’s
respondent’s use was only by mere
tolerance or permission, without any
tolerance but CA reversed ruling that
contract between them, is necessarily
action should be accion publiciana.
bound by an implied promise that he will
vacate upon demand, failing which, a

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 FACTS HELD DOCTRINE
summary action for ejectment is the proper
remedy against him.
Petition denied. SC affirms ruling of lower
courts ordering the ejectment of
petitioners.

There is sufficient evidence showing that

Private respondent claims that she owns
lot 1227 which she inherited from her
parents, which was occupied by
petitioners. She tolerated their construction
of residential houses or other
improvements on certain portions of the lot
without rental. Subsequently, she
demanded that the petitioners vacate the
lot and remove their houses and other
improvements thereon. Petitioners refused.
The survey showed that two of the
Ganila v. Court of
petitioners occupied only marginal parts of
Appeals
the lot while the houses of 19 petitioners
were located inside the lot in question.
Respondent filed an action for unlawful
detainer.
According to petitioner: she should have
filed an action to recover possession de
jure. Respondent cannot file an unlawful
detainer action because she was never in
prior physical possession.
Mandaue Realty acquired real property
from the Sps. Ong. In turn, Ross Rica Sales
Ross Rica Sales
bought property from Mandaue Realty.
Center v. Ong
Mandaue wrote a letter to the Ongs
expressing their intent to use the property.
private respondent has a better right to
possess Lot 1227. While not a conclusive
evidence of ownership, private
respondent’s tax declaration constitutes
proof that she has a claim of title over the
lot.
Petitioners confuse the remedy of an action
for forcible entry with that of unlawful
detainer. In unlawful detainer (as in this
case), prior physical possession by the
plaintiff is not necessary. It is enough that
plaintiff has a better right of possession.
Actual, prior physical possession of a
property by a party is indispensable only in
forcible entry cases. In unlawful detainer
cases, the defendant is necessarily in prior
lawful possession of the property but his
possession eventually becomes unlawful
upon termination or expiration of his right
to possess.
In this case for ejectment, private
respondent’s allegations sufficiently
present a case of unlawful detainer. She
alleged that (1) she owns Lot 1227; (2) she
tolerated petitioners to construct their
houses thereon; (3) she withdrew her
tolerance; and (4) petitioners refused to
heed her demand to vacate the lot.
CA erred in ruling that the presence of a
contract is material to prove prior lawful
possession as to constitute an unlawful
detainer action. Since this is a proper
unlawful detainer action, MTC has
What really distinguishes an action for
unlawful detainer from a possessory action
(accion publiciana) and from a
reivindicatory action (accion reivindicatoria)
is that the first is limited to the question of
possession de facto. An unlawful detainer
suit (accion interdictal) together with
forcible entry are the two forms of an
ejectment suit that may be filed to recover
possession of real property. Aside from the
summary action of ejectment, accion
publiciana or the plenary action to recover
the right of possession and accion
reivindicatoria or the action to recover
ownership which includes recovery of
possession, make up the three kinds of
actions to judicially recover possession.
What determines the nature of an action as
well as which court has jurisdiction over it
are the allegations of the complaint and the
character of the relief sought.

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 FACTS
Respondents refused to vacate, prompting
Ross Rica to file an ejectment suit. MTC
granted the petition and issued ad order to
vacate. RTC affirmed. CA reversed, stating
that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the
case since there was no contract between
the parties, express or implied, as would
qualify an unlawful detainer case.
HELD DOCTRINE
jurisdiction. In this case, it was established
that the Ongs were indeed the former
owners of the property whose stay in the
land was due to mere toleration from the
realty company. It was also shown that
petitioners brought the action not under a
claim of ownership but only to recover
physical possession. The acknowledgment
in their pleadings of the fact of prior
ownership by respondents does not
constitute recognition of respondents’
present ownership. This is meant only to
establish one of the necessary elements for
a case of unlawful detainer, specifically the
unlawful withholding of possession.
LOWER COURT PROCEEDINGS
NULLIFIED.

Peralta-Labrador owned a Cadastral Lot in
Zambales which was separated by a
highway built by DPWH. The separated
part of the lot was then occupied by
Peralta-Labrador v.
respondent Bugarin. 2 years after the lot
Bugarin
was occupied, plaintiff filed a forcible entry
suit against Bugarin. She alleges prior
physical possession of the lot, thus makes
out a case for forcible entry.
IDENTIFY THE PROPERTY
Dr. Jesus Seriña and his wife, Enriqueta
Seriña filed a Complaint for quieting of title,
recovery of possession, and damages with
a prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory
Seriña v. Caballero
injunction against respondents Victor
Caballero and his tenants, Teodoro Donela
and Oliver Donela. They presented a deed
of sale and a tax declaration in evidence.
1. Although there was prior physical
possession as needed in forcible entry,
since the occupation was already
beyond 1 year, a summary proceeding
for forcible entry can no longer lie.
What should be instituted is an accion
publiciana or reinvindicatoria.
2. And anyway, she failed to prove that
the separated portion of the lot was
part of her title. She was the burden of
proving the same by presenting
evidence.
The complaint cannot prosper.
• Petitioners were not able to sufficiently
prove the identity of the subject land.
• The boundary owners were different.
The area of the land was different.
• Forcible entry cannot lie when the
contested physical occupation already
exceeded one year before filing of
complaint.
• Burden of proof of right to possess is
on the one who asserts his right. Ei
incumbit probotio qui dicit, non qui
negat. He who asserts, not he who
denies, must prove.
A person who claims ownership of real
property is duty­bound to clearly identify
the land being claimed, in accordance with
the title on which he anchors his right of
ownership. When the record does not
show that the land subject matter of the
action for recovery of possession has been
exactly determined, such action cannot
prosper, as in the case of petitioners. In
sum, proof of ownership coupled with
identity of the land is the basic rule.

Celine De Guzman | Ish Guidote | Desiree Ico | Pola Lamarca | Ross Tugade Page 15 of 70
 FACTS HELD DOCTRINE
PROVE HIS RIGHT OF OWNERSHIP
Felisa Montalbo inherited land from her
father which she exchanged with that of
her aunt, Andrea. After exchange, Andrea
donated half of the land to Municipality of
Taysan, Batangas to be used as school
site and gave the other to her daughter The Perezes failed to prove ownership of
Margarita later married to Nicolas land pursuant to Article 433 of NCC that
Mendoza. When Nicolas sought the actual possession raises a presumption of
transfer of the property in their names, ownership. Also, under Article 538, the
Perez had it investigated and found that present possessor is preferred in cases
the signature of the municipal secretary where the fact of possession is in question.
Perez v. Mendoza was forged. Nicolas was then convicted for The Mendozas are presently in possession
falsification of document but got acquitted of the land in the concept of owners
later for insufficiency of evidence. Perez thereof since 1927. Evidence presented by
and wife Petra Montalbo brought an action Perez spouses did not successfully rebut
for unlawful detainer in 1952 against ownership by Mendozas. Hence, the
respondent spouses alleging that land was requisite of proving ownership in making
inherited by Petra and Felisa, and that the a recovery is absent.
½ share of Felisa was sold by her husband
to them. And that land was leased to
respondents but when the lease expired,
respondents refused to vacate. Trial court
dismissed complaint.
RTC denied complaint of respondents
seeking to annul the 3 titles under the
name of the heirs of Galang on the claim
that there existed a co-ownership between
Petition granted.
Galang and his sisters who were the
ascendants of respondents. They base
In the absence of definite proof
their claim of co-ownership on an
Dizon v. Court of establishing respondents’ link/ relationship
unnotarized statement acknowledging that
Appeals to their alleged predecessors-in-interest,
there was a partition of land among the
i.e., the Galang sisters, they do not have
heirs (Galang and sisters) with respect to a
any cause of action, and the suit for
piece of land they co-inherited.
partition must necessarily fall.
CA reversed the RTC decision which found
for the respondents and which annulled the
titles.
LIMITATIONS OF THE REAL RIGHT OF OWNERSHIP
Respondents owned a 2.8-acre property The Court ruled that there was indeed Modern doctrine is that airspace extending
US v. Causby
near an airport. A dwelling house and unlawful taking. The traditional common law outward ad infinitum is NOT part of private

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 FACTS
structures for raising chicken were built on
the property. The nearby airport is being
leased by the US government for use of
various military planes. The “startling noise”
from the planes caused fright to the
chickens. Glare from the airport lights and
the glide of planes through the property
also caused disturbance to the
respondents. As a result, respondents had
to give up their chicken business and the
property itself depreciated in value.
Respondents contend that the use of the
airspace above their property constitutes
“unlawful taking” of personal property that
must be compensated by the government.
Petitioners are owners of farm lands who
filed this complaint against Meneses, an
owner of a fish pond. For more than 20
years before 1901, they allege that there
existed, in favor of the rice fields of the
plaintiff, an easement permitting water
from lands of plaintiffs to flow over land of
Meneses, to the Taliptip River. Meneses
Lunod v. Meneses
constructed a bamboo net and dam which
prevented such flow of water to the river,
therefore resulting in the flooding of the
lands of petitioners. Thus, they ask that
land of Meneses be subject of a statutory
easement permitting the flow of water to
the river and destroy obstructions placed
by Meneses.
ACCESSION DISCRETA
The deceased E. M. Bachrach owned
103,000 shares of stock of the Atok-Big
Wedge Mining Corp. The usufructuary/life
Bachrach v. Seifert
tenant and the legal heirs are both claiming
the 54,000 shares representing 50% cash
stock dividend.
Celine De Guzman | Ish Guidote | Desiree Ico | Pola Lamarca | Ross Tugade
HELD DOCTRINE
doctrine is that the owner of a property has property.
full enjoyment as owner even of the
atmosphere above the property (i.e. the
airspace and beyond). This has no place in
the modern world where navigation through
air has transformed airspace into a public
highway. To insist that the airspace above
a property is private property as well would
result in endless litigation over trespass in
one’s private airspace. However, this does
not apply in the case at bar where the use
of the air space has rendered the property
below it uninhabitable and useless to the
owners. They have been prevented from
enjoying the land. In effect, an easement
was established for use of the government.
For this, the owners must be compensated.
EASEMENT ALLOWED.
Article 552 of the Civil Code
The lands of Meneses being the lower are Lower estates must receive the waters
subject to the easement of receiving and which naturally and without the intervention
giving passage to the waters proceeding of man descend from the higher estates, as
from the higher lands and the lake of well as the stone or earth which they carry
Calalaran; this easement was not with them.
constituted by agreement between the Neither may the owner of the lower estate
interested parties; it is of a statutory nature, construct works preventing this easement,
and the law has imposed it for the common nor the one of the higher estate works
public utility in view of the difference in the increasing the burden.
altitude of the lands in the barrio of
Bambang.
Pennsylvania Rule: earnings of the
The usufructuary/life tenant Mary
corporation made prior to the death of the
McDonald Bachrach is entitled to the
testator stockholder belong to the corpus
shares. Said dividend, although paid out in
of the estate, and that is earnings, when
the form of stock, is fruit or income and
declared as dividends in whatever form,
therefore belonged to her as usufructuary
made during the lifetime of the
or life tenant.
usufructuary or life tenant are income and
belong to the usufructuary or life tenant.
Page 17 of 70
 FACTS HELD DOCTRINE
Talisay-Silay (TS) was indebted to PNB. To
Article 442 of NCC considers 3 things as
secure payment, it has induced its planters
civil fruits: rents of buildings, proceeds
to mortgage their land to bank. In
from leases of lands, and income from life
exchange, TS undertook to give its planters
annuities and other similar sources of
a bonus equal to 2% of the debt secured.
revenue. The bonus in question is income
Bachrach (creditor of Ledesma) filed a case under the article of NCC if it is derived from
against TS for the delivery of the bonus of
the land mortgaged for the benefit of the
Mariano Ledesma (a planter). But PNB filed
central. The bonus here is not civil fruit
Bachrach v. Talisay a third party claim alleging that it has a
because it beras no immediate, but only
Silay preferential right to receive any amount
a remote and accidental relation to the
which Ledesma might be entitled to TS
land mentioned, having been granted as
because such would be civil fruits of the
compensation to the risk of having
land mortgaged to the bank. Even if it
subjected one’s land to a lien in favour
turned out that the land was sold by
of the bank. The amount of the bonus is
Mariano Ledesma to Ceasar Ledesma, the
based on the total value of the debt
trial court held that Bachrach had a
preferred right to bonus of Mariano. Bank secured and not on the value of the land.
Thus, such is independent from property.
appealed.
ACCESSION CONTINUA
Bataclan has no more right to be Whatever is built, planted or sown on the
By instituting a civil action, petitioner
reimbursed and no right to retention. land of another, and the improvements or
Bernardo successfully secured possession
The defendant states that he is a repairs made thereon, belong to the owner
of land he acquired from Pasamonte. Upon
possessor in good faith and that the of the land (art. 358). Where, however, the
entering the land however, he found
amount of P2,212 to which he is entitled planter, builder, or sower has acted in
Bataclan occupying the same as he was
has not yet been paid to him. Therefore, he good faith, a conflict of rights arises
authorized by the former owners to clear
says, he has a right to retain the land in between the owners and it becomes
the land and to make improvement
accordance with the provisions of article necessary to protect the owner of the
thereon. The lower court held that
453 of the Civil Code. Pursuant to court improvements without causing injustice to
petitioner is the lawful owner of the land
order, the plaintiff expressed his desire to the owner of the land. In view of the
but respondent was a possessor in good
require the defendant to pay for the value impracticability of creating a state of
faith who was entitled to reimbursement for
Bernardo v. Bataclan of the land. The said defendant could have “forced co-ownership,” the law has
his improvements. On appeal, the court
become owner of both land and provided a just and equitable solution by
increased the value of the reimbursement
improvements and continued in giving the owner of the land the option to
and reduced the price at which the plaintiff
possession thereof. But he said he could acquire the improvements after payment of
could require the defendant to purchase
not pay and the land was sold at public the proper indemnity or to oblige the
the land in question from P300 to P200 per
auction to Toribio Teodoro. The law builder or planter to pay for the land and
hectare.
requires no more than that the owner of the the sower to pay the proper rent (Art. 361).
land should choose between indemnifying It is the owner of the land who is allowed to
Petitioner expressed his intent to demand
the owner of the improvements or requiring exercise the option because his right is
respondent to pay for the land but since
the latter to pay for the land. When he older and because, by the principle of
respondent could not pay, the land was
failed to pay for the land, the defendant accession, he is entitled to the ownership
sold at public auction to Toribio.
herein lost his right of retention. of the accessory thing.

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 FACTS
An action was instituted and resolved in the
lower court where the respondents were
adjudged as the lawful owners while
petitioners were held to be possessors in
good faith. Petitioners already built a house
and a granary in the property.
The judge in the original action ruled that
the petitioners were entitled to hold the
property until after they have been paid for
the market value of the buildings;
Ignacio v. Hilario alternatively, respondents have the option
to sell the property to the petitioners in
which case the latter must pay for
proportionate value of the residential lot.
Respondents filed for a writ of execution of
judgment, praying that petitioners should
remove the improvements and restore them
in possession. Petitioners objected, offering
to pay for the lot or as an alternative,
prayed that plaintiffs be compelled to the
property to them.
While Ernesto Lorenzo was still courting his
wife, he was told by the latter’s mother to
build a residential home in a lot in a
Paranaque subdivision now in controversy.
Sarmiento v. Agana After such construction, it was discovered
that the land was actually owned by
spouses Santos who in turn sold the same
to petitioner Sarmiento. Sarmiento filed an
ejectment suit against them.
Depra and Dumlao owned adjoining lots.
Part of Dumlao’s kitchen encroached upon
Depra’s property. The latter filed two
Depra v. Dumlao
actions, one for unlawful detainer and
another for quieting. In the first action, the
trial court held that Dumlao was a builder in
Celine De Guzman | Ish Guidote | Desiree Ico | Pola Lamarca | Ross Tugade
HELD DOCTRINE
The Court held that the applicable
provisions are Art. 361 (Art. 448 in the
NCC) and Art. 453 (Art. 546, NCC), where
there is a possessor in good faith who has
introduced necessary expenses to the
property. The owner of the improvements is
entitled to retain them until he has been
paid for the value of the improvements. On
the other hand, the owner of the land has
the option to pay for the building or to sell The remedies available to the owner in Art.
the lot and compel the builder to remove 546 (NCC) are alternative. They cannot be
the improvements from the land where it imposed at the same time against the
was erected. person whose possession has been
defeated by one who has a better title.
The Court ruled that the respondents must
choose between paying for the buildings or
to sell the lot to the petitioners and compel
them to remove the improvements.
Respondents as owners will only be entitled
to the removal (as what they prayed for) if
petitioners fail to make payment. In this
case, it was clear that petitioners were
willing to pay.
Simple application of rights of builders in
good faith in Art. 448. In this case, land
LORENZO SPOUSES BUILDERS IN GOOD
value less than building value so 3rd par. on
FAITH, THUS ENTITLED TO ART. 448 OF
allowing rentals cannot apply.
CC.
ART. 448. The owner of the land on which
• Upheld the valuations proved in the
anything has been built, sown or planted in
MTC – 25,000 as the value of the land
good faith,shall have the right to
and 40,000 as the value of the house.
appropriate as his own the works, sowing
• Thus, Sarmiento may either allow
or planting, after payment of the indemnity
purchase by Lorenzos of the land or he
provided for in articles 546 and 548, or to
may indemnify them of the amount of
oblige the one who built or planted to pay
40,000 for the house.
the price of the land, and the one who
sowed, the proper rent.
As to res judicata: the issues in the two
The owner of the land on which a builder
cases are different. Unlawful detainer 
erected a structure in good faith can either
possession, while quieting of title 
choose to appropriate it after paying its
ownership. No res judicata.
value or to sell it to the builder. He cannot
refuse to do either.
As to Dumlao’s nature as a builder: he was
Page 19 of 70
 FACTS
good faith and ordered a “forced lease”
between the two parties.
Technogas purchased a parcel of land with
all buildings and improvements from Pariz
Industries. Eduardo Uy, respondent, was
the owner of the adjoining lot. Technogas
then later discovered that portions of the
building and wall of a portion of Uy’s land,
Technogas and so it offered to buy that portion BUT
Philippines v. Court Uy refused. Parties then entered an
of Appeals agreement that Technogas will demolish
wall but it still haven’t done so, which
caused Uy to have dug a canal along
plaintiff’s wall where a portion of which
collapsed. RTC was in favour of Technogas
that Uy sell portion. CA reversed ruling that
Technogas was in bad faith.
Martin Dolorico transferred his land subject
of a homestead application to his heirs, not
to his ward herein petitioner Ortiz who was
actually in physical possession and who
had made improvements thereon.
Respondent Comintan and Zamora
acquired said land from Dolorico’s heirs by
Ortiz v. Kayanan virtue of sales applications. Petitioner Ortiz
contends that so long as the amount of
P13,632.00 representing the expenses for
clearing the land and the value of the
coconuts and fruit trees planted by him
remains unpaid, he can appropriate for his
exclusive benefit all the fruits which he may
derive from the property such as the tolls
Celine De Guzman | Ish Guidote | Desiree Ico | Pola Lamarca | Ross Tugade
HELD DOCTRINE
in good faith. Depra can either choose to
pay for the value of the kitchen or to sell
the 34 sq. m. portion to Dumlao.
Technogas as builder was not in bad
faith. When it bought the land, buildings
and other improvements were already in
existence. It is not clear who built such bet
it is assumed that it was Pariz who did so.
Article 527 of NCC presumes good faith
and since no proof exists to show that
encroachment was done in bad faith, it
should be presumed that there it was in
good faith. The good faith of Pariz
extended to Technogas. Article 448 applies
even if Technogas was not the builder but
possesses the same as buyer. As such, Uy
cannot demand removal of the wall since
this is not one of the remedies he has.
Such would be available only if he chooses
to compel the petitioner to buy the land but
the latter fails to pay the price. Since such
did not happen, the options of Uy are
limited to: appropriating portion after
payment of proper indemnity or obliging
latter to buy. Petitioner also could not
demand Uy to sell portion but it must then
pay the rent of the land.
Petitioner cannot appropriate for his own
exclusive benefit the tolls which he
collected from the property retained by
him. It was his duty under the law, after
deducting the necessary expenses for his
administration, to apply such amount
collected to the payment of the interest,
and the balance to the payment of the
principal of the obligation.
The disputed tolls, after deducting
petitioner’s expenses for administration,
belong to Quirino Comintan, owner of the
land through which the toll road passed,
further considering that the same was on
Page 20 of 70
 FACTS
collected from the road that passed
through the land, without any obligation to
apply any portion thereof to the payment of
the interest and the principal of the debt of
the respondents (reimbursement for
improvements). In other words, petitioner
does not want to offset the fruits he is
deriving from the land and the value of
reimbursement.
Petitioners are heirs of Paulina Geminiano
who executed a contract of lease of a 126
sq. m house and lot property to private
respondent Mary Nicolas in 1978. It was
established, however, that one Maria Lee
through a court decision in 1972 acquired
the property. Ownership of the land passed
from Lee to Salcedo to the spouses
Dionisio. The Dionisios executed a
quitclaim over the property over the
petitioners in 1992. During this period,
Nicolas held possession of the property as
Geminiano v. Court lessee and has built several improvements.
of Appeals On 1993, petitioners sent respondent a
notice to vacate as well as a demand to pay
rentals in arrears. Respondents refused,
prompting an unlawful detainer action from
petitioners.
Controversy revolved around the status of
respondent: was she a possessor/builder or
a lessee? Was she in good faith? Good
faith would be material in determining
whether or not respondent could be
reimbursed for the improvements built on
the property.
Jardinico purchased a parcel of land in
Pleasantville v. Court Pleasantville Subdivision from Edith
of Appeals Robillo, who had the title to Lot 9.
Subsequently, Kee purchased Lot 8 from
Celine De Guzman | Ish Guidote | Desiree Ico | Pola Lamarca | Ross Tugade
HELD
portions of the property on which petitioner
had not introduced any improvement.
It appears that no public sale has yet been
conducted by the Bureau of Lands and,
therefore, petitioner is entitled to remain in
possession thereof. This is not disputed by
respondent Eleuterio Zamora. After public
sale is had and in the event that Ortiz is not
declared the successful bidder, then he
should be reimbursed by respondent
Zamora in the corresponding amount for
the improvements on the lot.
Respondent was a lessee and not a
possessor. It was admitted that although
the petitioners’ mother was no longer the
owner when the contract of lease was
executed, Maria Lee, the adjudged owner
of the property in the earlier suit, never
sought a writ of possession. Hence,
Geminiano remained in possession of the
property. Nicolas is now estopped from
claiming that she is a possessor or builder
rather than a lessee. Hence, the provision
for building planting and sowing, specifically
Art. 448 does not apply.
The applicable provision is Art. 1678
governing lessees who introduced
improvements. However, the right of the
lessee to be indemnified under that
provision will only arise if the lessor opts to
appropriate the improvements. It was not
shown that the petitioners exercised that
option. The only right that Nicolas has is to
remove the improvements without causing
any more impairment upon the property.
KEE, IN RELYING ON ACT THE AGENT OF
PETITIONER, WAS A BUILDER IN GOOD
FAITH.
DOCTRINE
Petitioners are heirs of Paulina Geminiano
who executed a contract of lease of a 126
sq. m house and lot property to private
respondent Mary Nicolas in 1978. It was
established, however, that one Maria Lee
through a court decision in 1972 acquired
the property. Ownership of the land passed
from Lee to Salcedo to the spouses
Dionisio. The Dionisios executed a
quitclaim over the property over the
petitioners in 1992. During this period,
Nicolas held possession of the property as
lessee and has built several improvements.
On 1993, petitioners sent respondent a
notice to vacate as well as a demand to pay
rentals in arrears. Respondents refused,
prompting an unlawful detainer action from
petitioners.
Controversy revolved around the status of
respondent: was she a possessor/builder or
a lessee? Was she in good faith? Good
faith would be material in determining
whether or not respondent could be
reimbursed for the improvements built on
the property.
Good faith consists in the belief of the
builder that the land he is building on is his
and his ignorance of any defect or flaw in
his title. And as good faith is presumed,
Page 21 of 70
 FACTS
Pleasantville Subdivision, but an agent of
petitioner pointed out Lot 8 as the lot that
he owned. As a result of this
representation, Kee proceeded to build his
home and auto shop on Lot 8. Jardinico
then demanded that Kee vacate the
premises which the former owned. Kee
disclaims liability, as he merely relied on
the agent of petitioner.
Felices entered into a conditional sale with
Iriola for 4 hectares of his 800-hectare
homestead. After 5 years, the sale was to
Felices v. Iriola become absolute. Two years after the sale,
Felices tried to claim his land. Iriola wanted
the 1.7k he paid back, + P300 for the
improvements he introduced.
Pecson was the owner of a 256 sqm parcel
of land which was later sold by City
Treasurer for non-payment of real estate
taxes. Notices of sale were sent to Pecson
at his address in Sampaloc, Manila and
Sps. Tecson v. Sps. when no redemption was made, a Final Bill
Nuguid (1993) of Sales was executed in favour of
Mamerto Nepomuceno. Nepomuceno then
sold land to Spouses Nuguid for 104k.
After, Pecson then filed action to annul sale
alleging that he was notified because
address where such was sent was wrong –
Celine De Guzman | Ish Guidote | Desiree Ico | Pola Lamarca | Ross Tugade
HELD DOCTRINE
1. They were the direct cause of the error petitioner has the burden of proving bad
committed by Kee in building upon Lot faith on the part of Kee.
8.
2. Kee is not expected to be versed in
technical descriptions of property, thus
agent was supposed to have authority
in pointing out which of the lands were
Lot 8. Steps taken to protect interests
were reasonable.
3. Violations of the Contract which had
nothing to do with the identity of the
land is not enough to disprove good
faith.
Iriola cannot claim reimbursement for the
improvements he introduced.
• The sale is null and void, having been
executed within the 5-year prohibitive
period.
• Iriola acted in bad faith. Assuming
arguendo that both of them knew of
the illegality of the contract, Felices Art. 449 applies. A builder in bad faith
already demanded the land back even cannot recover indemnity for what he has
before Iriola introduced his built on the land of another.
improvements thereto.
• Thus, at the time Iriola introduced such
improvements, Felices could no longer
be regarded as having impliedly
assented to the introduction of the
improvements, putting him in good
faith.
The employees in charge of sending notice
were not blameworthy for relying on the
available tax records. Petitioner has
nobody to blame but himself for as
property owner and school teacher, he
should know that if an owner fails to pay
real estate taxes, said property will be sold
at a public auction. Worse, he introduced
improvements thereon without reporting
the same for tax purposes. As to spouses
Nuguid, they are said to be buyers in
good faith.
Page 22 of 70
 FACTS HELD DOCTRINE
he lives in Kamias, QC already. Trial court
upheld validity of sale and CA affirmed.
Pecson was owner of a commercial lot in
Parties agree that petitioner was builder in
Kamias QC on which he built a 4-door-2-
good faith of apartment on the theory that
storey apartment building. For failure to
he was still the owner of lot at time of
pay realty taxes of 12k, lot was sold at
construction. Articles 546 and Article 448
public auction by City Treasurer to
are not proper but provisions on indemnity
Nepomuceno who then sold it to Naguids.
may be applied. Since the private
Pecson challenged the validity of the
respondents have opted to appropriate the
auction sale and the RTC upheld the
apartment building, the petitioner is thus
spouses’ title but declared that the 4-door
entitled to the possession and enjoyment
2-storey apartment building was not
of the apartment building, until he is paid
included in the auction sale. By virtue of
the proper indemnity, as well as of the
the Entry of Judgment of the Decision, the
portion of the lot where the building has
Sps. Tecson v. Sps. Nuguids became the uncontested owners
been constructed. This is so because the
Nuguid (1995) of the 256-square meter commercial lot.
right to retain the improvements while the
The Nuguids moved for delivery of
corresponding indemnity is not paid
possession of the lot and the apartment
implies the tenancy or possession in fact of
building relying on Article 546. RTC ruled
the land on which it is built, planted or
that spouses should reimburse Pecson for
sown. The petitioner not having been so
his construction cost so that they be
paid, he was entitled to retain ownership of
issued writ of possession over lot and
the building and, necessarily, the income
improvements. RTC ordered Pecson to
therefrom. Case is, however, remanded for
also pay rentals for as paid by tenants of
the determination of the current market
apartment. Offsetting was allowed. The CA
value of lot and apartment since the basis
affirmed the order of payment of
of reimbursement is the current market
construction costs but rendered the issue
value of such.
of possession moot.
As earlier held, since Naguids opted to
appropriate the improvement for
themselves as early as June 1993, when
they applied for a writ of execution despite
knowledge that the auction sale did not
include the apartment building, they could
Sps. Tecson v. Sps. not benefit from the lot’s improvement,
Nuguid (2005) until they reimbursed the improver in full,
based on the current market value of the
property. The Spouses’ filing of writ of
possession on both land and building is
clearly a violation of Pecson’s right of
retention. Spouses took advantage of the
income of apartment. As such, they should

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 FACTS HELD DOCTRINE
account for such benefits – pay rent over
and above the current value of the
improvement.
ACCESSION ALLUVIUM
The Court grants the petition.
The elements of accretion are: (1) that the
deposit be gradual and imperceptible; (2)
Respondents seek to register under their that it be made through the effects of the
name 3 lots adjacent to their fishpond current of the water; and (3) that the land
claiming that said pieces of land were where accretion takes place is adjacent to
accretions to the dikes which fed their the banks of rivers.
fishpond. The trial court granted their
petition however it was opposed by the The requirement that the deposit should be
The elements of accretion are:
petitioner government. The petitioner due to the effect of the current of the river
1. That the deposit be gradual and
submits that there is no accretion to speak is indispensable. This excludes from Art.
imperceptible;
Republic v. Court of of under Article 457 of the New Civil Code 457 all deposits caused by human
2. That it be made through the effects of
Appeals because what actually happened is that the intervention. Alluvion must be the exclusive
the current of the water; and
private respondents simply transferred work of nature. In the instant case, there is
3. That the land where accretion takes
their dikes further down the river bed of the no evidence whatsoever to prove that the
place is adjacent to the banks of rivers.
Meycauayan River, and thus, if there is addition to the said property was made
accretion at all, it is man-made and gradually through the effects of the current
artificial and not the result of the gradual of the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers.
and imperceptible sedimentation by the
waters of the river. When the private respondents transferred
their dikes towards the riverbed, the dikes
were meant for reclamation purposes and
not to protect their property from the
destructive force of the waters of the river.
Action to quiet title and recover possession
filed in 1958 over land allegedly occupied
The respondents have acquired the land
by respondents Calalung without Ownership of accretion received by land
through prescription. It was clear from the
petitioners’ consent. The land involved was adjoining the river must be registered.
facts that the petitioners never bothered to
Grande v. Court of a 2 ha. accretion caused by action from the Unregistered accretions in open
register the accretion received by their land.
Appeals Cagayan River. Respondents assert that continuous, and adverse possession may
Hence, petitioners are not entitled to the
they were in peaceful occupation since be acquired through acquisitive
property or to the protection of
1933. Controversy is w/n respondents have prescription.
imprescriptibility over registered land.
acquired ownership of the alluvial property
through prescription.
The Quisumbings owned a parcel of land ACCRETIONS DUE TO LAKES BELONG • Accretion of land via lakes which are
Meneses v. Court of since 1919 in Los Banos, with the Laguna TO OWNERS OF THE LANDS contiguous to the land owned by a
Appeals de Bay as its northwestern boundary. An CONTIGUOUS TO THEM. party belongs to the owner of
additional area of 2,387 sqm accrued to • They are not foreshore lands which are contiguous land.

Celine De Guzman | Ish Guidote | Desiree Ico | Pola Lamarca | Ross Tugade Page 24 of 70
 FACTS
their property due to the action of the
waters of the Laguna de Bay, and they
registered such accretion. Subsequently,
plaintif Meneses acquired free patents over
the accretion and registered them as his
own. The Quisumbings filed for the
nullification of the titles of Meneses to the
lands. Defense of Meneses: that such
lands are foreshore lands and thus the
Quisumbings have no legal right to claim
them.
Sinforo Pascual owned land bounded on
the east by Talisay River, on the West by
Bulacan River and on the North by the
Manila Bay. About 17 hectares of formed
on the northernmost part of his land,
allegedly due to the currents of the two
rivers. Thus, he claims that this land is part
of his property, he being the riparian
owner.
Emiliano Navarro filed a fishpond
Navarro v. application covering a tract of land near the
Intermediate disputed area. Consequently, he also
Appellate Court ended up occupying part of the 17-ha.
land. Pascual sought to eject him. His
complaint was dismissed because the
land, according to the trial court, was
foreshore land and part of the public
domain.
On appeal, IAC reversed and granted
Pascual’s complaint as well as his
application for land registration. Ratio:
avulsion was caused by the action of two
rivers, not of Manila Bay.
Celine De Guzman | Ish Guidote | Desiree Ico | Pola Lamarca | Ross Tugade
HELD
strips of land that lie between high and
low water marks, and arise due to flux
and reflux of tides.
• Submersion of part of the land in
question is due to rains flowing into the
Laguna de Bay from different sources.
• Neither are they accretion by sea which
are governed by different provisions of
accretion by lake.
• Thus, the land properly belongs to the
Quisumbings.
• It was also proven that Meneses
acquired such titles in fraud, so that he
one year period which usually makes
title of land indefeasible does not apply
to this case.
AVULSION
The disputed property is foreshore land,
therefore part of the public domain.
• Spanish Law of Waters of 1866:
“Lands added to the shores by
accretions and alluvial deposits caused
by the action of the sea, form part of
the public domain. When they are no
longer washed by the waters of the sea
and are not necessary for purposes of
public utility, or for the establishment
of special industries, or for the coast-
guard service, the Government shall
declare them to be the property of the
owners of the estates adjacent thereto
and as increment thereof.”
• In this case, the land formed on the
northern portion of Pascual’s property
fronting Manila Bay. The land deposits
did not come from the Talisay or
Bulacan rivers.
DOCTRINE
• Requisites of Accretion* as a mode of
acquiring property:
1. The deposition of the soil or
sediment be gradual and
imperceptible
2. That it be the result of the action of
the waters of a river (or sea)
3. That the land where accretion
takes place is adjacent to the
banks of rivers (or sea coast)
*Although case mentioned requisites, not
applied in decision as such would include
admission of evidentiary facts.
Accretion on a sea bank (Manila Bay) is
property of the public domain.
Accretion as a mode of acquiring property
and requires the concurrence of the
following requisites:
1. That the accumulation of soil or
sediment be gradual and
imperceptible;
2. That it be the result of the action of the
waters of the river; and
3. That the land where the accretion
takes place is adjacent to the bank of
the river.
Page 25 of 70
 FACTS
Aggrieved, the heirs of Navarro brought the
action to the SC.
CHANGE OF COURSE OF RIVER
The government built a canal on land
owned by petitioner in order to improve the
flow of the Tripa de Gallina creek. Baes
was given land equivalent in size through a
Baes v. Court of Deed of Exchange of Real Property.
Appeals
After a few years, the Republic discovered
that petitioners had erected an apartment
building on a filled-up portion of the creek.
Petitoners claim that the land is theirs.
Late Judge Taccad owned a parcel of land.
Through the years, the western portion of
said land would periodically go under the
waters of Cagayan River. The submerged
portion would re-appear during the dry
season. Manalo acquired a part thereof
from daughter of Judge then later
purchased another portion thereof. When a
cadastral survey was conducted of
Manalo’s lands, a portion of the land was
left unsurveyed for it was under water
hence not included in Lot 307. The
Binalay v. Manalo
Cagayan River, running from south to
north, forks at a certain point to form 2
branches and then unites at the other end,
further north, to form a narrow strip of land,
Lot 812. Since the strip of land is directly
opposite Manalo’s lot, he claims that said
strip should belong to him by way of
accretion to the submerged part of the
property to which it is adjacent. Petitioner
Binalay who are in possession of the strip
argues it is theirs. Hence, Manlo filed a
case for forcible entry.
Celine De Guzman | Ish Guidote | Desiree Ico | Pola Lamarca | Ross Tugade
HELD DOCTRINE
If the riparian owner is entitled to
The land in question belongs to the
compensation for the damage to or loss of
government.
his property due to natural causes, there is
• Petitioners were already adequately
all the more reason to compensate him
compensated when they exchanged
when the change in the course of the river
their property for property of the same
is effected through artificial means. The
size.
loss to the petitioners of the land covered
• To allow them to acquire ownership of
by the canal was the result of a deliberate
the dried-up portion of the creek would
act on the part of the government when it
be a clear case f double compensation
sought to improve the flow of the Tripa de
and unjust enrichment at the expense
Gallina creek. It was therefore obligated to
of the State.
compensate the Baeses for their loss.
The regularly submerged portion or the
eastern bed of the river is of public
dominion. Pursuant to Article 420, Manalo
did not acquire private ownership of the
bed of eastern branch of river even if it was
included in the deeds of absolute sale
because vendors could not have validly
sold the land which is a property of public
dominion. As to issue on accretion, there
was no evidence that strip of land is an
increment of Lot of Manalo. The Court
notes that the parcels of land bought by
Manalo border on the eastern branch of the
Cagayan River. Any accretion formed by
this eastern branch which respondent
Manalo may claim must be deposited on or
attached to Lot 307. As it is, the claimed
accretion (Lot 821) lies on the bank of the
river not adjacent to Lot 307 but directly
opposite Lot 307 across the river. Further,
Lot 821 has an area of 11.91 ha and such
is sizeable to result from slow accretion to
another lot of almost equal in size.
Page 26 of 70
 FACTS HELD DOCTRINE
COMMIXTION AND CONFUSION
It is not disputed that commixtion occurred
among the cattle of the parties. The court
affirmed the trial court finding that such
Siari Valley Estate Inc. filed an action to commixtion was actuated by bad faith on
recover about 200 head of cattle that were the part of defendant Lucasan. The
driven, or wandered, from its pasture lands circumstances disclosed in this record
into the adjoining ranch of defendant show that his cowboys -and even his sons Where the goods are so mingled that they
Filemon Lucasan. Plaintiff asked for the Rafael and Vicente- rounded up and drove cannot thereafter properly be identified or
Siari Valley Estate v.
return of its animals with their offspring, or plaintiff’s cattle into his pasture; he knew divided, all the inconvenience or loss
Lucasan
for payment of those disposed of by he had plaintiff’s cattle, but refused to resulting from the confusion is thrown on
defendant, plus damages. In his answer, return them despite demands by plaintiff; the party who occasioned it.
the defendant denied having appropriated he rebranded several Siari Valley cattle with
or retained any cattle belonging to the his own brand etc.
corporation. Pursuant to the principles in the Civil Code,
“if the commingling of two things is made
in bad faith, the one responsible for it will
lose his share.”
Pablo Tiongson deposited 1,026 cavans
and 9 kilos of palay in Jose Bernabe’s
warehouse. Meanwhile, Urbano Santos
This was a situation of commixtion of
also deposited 778 cavans and 38 kilos in
movable property, since the palay
the same warehouse. The palay deposited
belonging to Santos and Tiongson could
by Tiongson and Santos were not marked
not have been distinguished. Hence, Art.
as to distinguish which ones were
381 of the Old Civil Code (now Art. 472 of
deposited by whom. Tiongson
the NCC) were applied. Each owner
subsequently filed an action before the CFI
acquired a right in the mixture proportionate
of Bulacan to recover what he deposited as
to the part belonging to him according to
Santos v. Bernabe well as a writ of attachment for Bernabe’s Rule on commixtion of movables
the value of the things mixed or
properties. The court granted the petition.
commingled. Since the total amount found
The sheriff only found 924 cavans of palay
in the warehouse was less than the
and 31 ½ kilos in the warehouse. These
combined amount of what Tiongson and
were all sold at a public auction and the
Santos deposited, the proceeds of the sale
proceeds thereof were delivered to
would have to be shared proportionally, i.e.
Tiongson. Santos intervened, claiming that
a ratio of 778 cavans (as to Santos) to
Tiongson cannot claim all of the palay
1,026 cavans (as to Tiongson).
found in the warehouse. In other words,
Santos is asking for his share in the
proceeds of the judicial sale.
QUIETING OF TITLE: PRESCRIPTION
A parcel of land was in Guinayangan Public Only prescription was discussed in the General Rule: Action for reconveyance of
Olviga v. Court of
Land Subdivision was surveyed in the case, as other issues were factual. land based on constructive or implied trust
Appeals
name of Eutiquio Pureza. Petitioners Olviga prescribes in 10 years.

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 FACTS
protested the survey as to ½ hectare.
Subsequently, Pureza filed a homestead
application for the lot, but action on the
application, Pureza transferred his rights to
respondents Glor, who have been in
possession of the land ever since.
Fraudulently, the Olvigas registered entire
parcel of land in their name in 1967. The
Glors brought an action for reconveyance
of the title to them. Defense of Olviga:
action is one for reconveyance of land
based on implied/constructive trust, thus
the same had already prescribed within 10
years of issuance of title.
HELD DOCTRINE
PRESCRIPTION ONLY ACCRUES FROM But this rule applies only when the plaintiff
TIME OF KNOWLEDGE OF TITLE. is not in possession of the property, since if
a person claiming to be the owner thereof
1. It was only in 1988 that the Glors is in actual possession of the property, the
learned of the fraudulent conveyance right to seek reconveyance, which in effect
of the title of the lands to the Olvigas. seeks to quiet title to the property, does not
prescribe.
SUCH PRESCRIPTION ONLY APPLIES
WHEN THE PLAINTIFFS ARE IN ACTUAL
POSSESSION.
2. In this case, the Olvigas were never in
actual possession of the land to which
they had titles to, and so prescription
as to the quieting of the titles never did
set in.

Francisco Donasco bought a parcel of land

from Vicente Pingol, payable in
installments. He immediately took
possession of the land. When he died, his
heirs offered to pay the balance, but Pingol
refused saying he considered the contract The action has not yet prescribed.
cancelled when their late father defaulted • While the private respondents’
on the monthly installments. complaint before the trial court was
denominated as one for specific
Action to quiet title is imprescriptible when
Pingol v. Court of Donascos filed an action for specific performance, it is in effect an action to
the plaintiff is in possession of the
Appeals performance and damages. CA ordered quiet title.
property.
Pingol to accept the payment of the • A cloud had been cast on the title of
balance. It treated the complaint as one for respondents when petitioners
quieting of title. adamantly refused to accept the tender
of payment.
Petitioner argues that the action, being
based upon a written contract, has
prescribed because it was brought 12
years after plaintiffs could have demanded
performance.
QUIETING OF TITLE: PLAINTIFF MUST RETURN BENEFITS RECEIVED FROM DEFENDANT
An action for quieting of title was filed by Lower court should have dismissed the
Titong v. Court of Petitioner Titong. He alleges that he is the petition to quiet title. The remedy of
Appeals owner of an unregistered parcel of land quieting of title is Article 476 of NCC. Had
with an area of 3.28 ha and declared for the lower court thoroughly considered the

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 FACTS HELD DOCTRINE
taxation purposes in his name. He claims complaint filed, it is outright that the
that respondents with their labourers complaint failed to allege that an
forcibly entered a portion of the land and “instrument, record, claim,
began plowing the same under pretext of encumbrance or proceeding” beclouded
ownership. Respondents denied this the plaintiff’s title over the property
allegation and averred that property was involved” pursuant to Article 476.
part of what they purchased from Petitioner merely alleged that respondents
Espinosa, the adjoining owner of the forcibly entered the portion of the land.
property. Lower court rendered a decision Through his allegations, what petitioner
in favour of respondents. CA affirmed. imagined as clouds cast on his title to the
property were private respondents’ alleged
acts of physical intrusion into his purported
property. Clearly, the acts alleged may be
considered grounds for an action for
forcible entry but definitely not one for
quieting of title. Assuming arguendo that
complaint was valid, petition should still fail
because when petitioner already sold the
portion to Espinosa, former’s rights of
ownership and possession already ceased.
ACTIONS TO QUIET TITLE ARE PROCEEDINGS QUASI IN REM
WON the title of Cristobal is valid.
NO. since it is a contract to sell, her
The spouses Portic entered into a contract ownership of the property is subject to the
to sell subject property to respondent positives suspensive condition of payment
Suits to quiet title are characterized as
Cristobal. The contract to sell provided that of the full price. Since she had not paid the
proceedings quasi in rem. Technically, they
the vendor would retain ownership to the full amount, the obligation to transfer the
are neither in rem nor in personam. In an
Sps. Portic v. property until the vender has paid full price. title in her name could not be enforceable.
action quasi in rem, an individual is named
Cristobal Cristobal registered the property under her
as defendant. However, unlike suits in rem,
name after paying the partial amount. Sps. WON the action to quiet a title has
a quasi in rem judgment is conclusive only
Portic instituted this action to quiet title. prescribed.
between the parties.
Cristobal opposed the action saying it had No. In this case, since petitioners are in
already prescribed. continuous physical possession of the
property in question, the action to quiet
title of the same is imprescriptible.
MUTUAL RESPECT AMONG CO-OWNERS
Miguel and Felina Ortiz had 3 children: Vicenta cannot claim rents from her sister’s Application of Art. 394 (now Art. 486): Each
Manuel, Vicenta (plaintiff), and Matilde and her husband’s use of the upper portion co-owner may use the thing owned in
(defendant). The spouses died and their of the house, since the latter is entitled to common, provided he does so in
Pardell v. Bartolome
son Manuel followed soon after, leaving the that as co-owner of the estate. However, accordance with the purpose for which it is
two daughters as heirs to the undivided the husband’s use of the room in the lower intended and in such a way as not to injure
property. It was alleged that Matilde had story as office space should be subject to the interest of the co- ownership or prevent

Celine De Guzman | Ish Guidote | Desiree Ico | Pola Lamarca | Ross Tugade Page 29 of 70
 FACTS HELD DOCTRINE
been collecting the fruits of the different payment of rent to Vicenta. There was no the other co-owners from using it according
properties to the detriment of Vicenta, who stipulation that the husband may use the to their rights. The purpose of the co-
was then based abroad. Among the space for free. He merely was an officious ownership may be changed by agreement,
properties is a house in Calle Escolta. It manager of the estate for the sister and the express or implied
was established that Matilde and her law does not allow him compensation as a
husband occupied the upper story of the voluntary administrator. He can only be
house, and her husband also occupied a paid for necessary expenses incurred in the
room in the lower portion as office space. course of administering the property.
Vicenta now is demanding rents from the
use of the house.
PARTNERSHIP v. CO-OWNERSHIP
The plaintiffs, consisting of 15 individuals, THE GROUP FORMED A CIVIL
pooled their money and bought a 2-peso PARTNERSHIP, AND AS SUCH THEY ARE
sweepstakes ticket, which ultimately won NOT TAX EXEMPT.
third prize consisting of 50,000 pesos.
Gatchalian went to the sweepstakes office Circumstances asserting partnership as
Gatchalian v. in behalf of the others to collect the price. opposed to community of property:
Collector Tax was then assessed upon the price, and • That they each put up capital for the
it amounted to 1,499 pesos. Plaintiffs benefit of the whole
refused to pay the tax on the ground that • That Gatchalian went to the office to
they were merely a community of property, claim prize for the entire group
and thus tax should be prorated upon them • That their intention was to equally
individually, and not as a partnership. divide the prize money
CHANCE
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
The parties owned pasture lands adjacent • Evidence shows that Lucasan was
If properties of two persons are mixed by
to each other. During the war, Lucasan impelled by bad faith in driving
chance and cannot be separated, a state
took advantage of the fact that the plaintiff’s cattle to his own land.
of co-ownership is created. Each owner
Americans fled and drove the latter’s cattle • He refused to return the same despite
acquires a right in proportion to the part
Siari Valley Estate v. to his own ranch. repeated demands.
belonging to him.
Lucasan, supra • He rebranded several of the cattle with
Siari Valley brought an action to recover his own brand.
[In this case: bad faith, so owner
the cattle taken by Lucasan. TC ordered
responsible forfeited his share. No co-
Lucasan to return to Siari Valley all the Since the commingling was done in bad
ownership created by chance.]
cattle found in his ranch. faith, Lucasan loses his share. (Art. 473,
CC)
OCCUPATION
A Moro saw from the Cawit-Cawit shores The ambergris in question was the
of Zamboanga a big bulky object in the undivided property of the plaintiffs and
Punzalan v. Boon
distance which attracted his attention. defendant Ahamad. This common
Liat
Finding that it was a big fish, he asked help ownership was acquired by occupancy
to catch the fish. There were 22 men in all, governed by Articles 609-610 of CC. There

Celine De Guzman | Ish Guidote | Desiree Ico | Pola Lamarca | Ross Tugade Page 30 of 70
 FACTS
21 of which are plaintiffs herein and the
remaining one is defendant. They found a
whale which they quartered upon reaching
shore. They found in its belly a great
quantity of ambergris, which was then
placed in 3 sacks - 2 were full and the
other half. All of them made an agreement
no one can sell it without the consent of
others. Some went to city to sell half sack
while the rest of sacks were left in the
charge of Ahamad. While others were still
away, Mr. Teck, offered Ahamad to
purchase the ambergris with a promise of
protection to Ahamad. Ahamad agreed.
The 21 others then filed action against
respondents.
Petitioner is the authorized corporation
managing the use of the common areas of
the condominium. It filed a complaint
Twin Towers against respondent for nonpayment of
Condominium condo assessments and dues. Respondent
Corporation v. Court filed a counterclaim that it had not been
of Appeals allowed by the petitioner to use facilities in
the condominium and the value of the use
of facilities should be offset from his dues.
Celine De Guzman | Ish Guidote | Desiree Ico | Pola Lamarca | Ross Tugade
HELD DOCTRINE
was an agreement between the co-owners
not to sell the amber without the consent of
all. Sales having been made without the
consent of all owners, the same have no
effect, EXCEPT as to the portion pertaining
to those who made them. Purchasers were
in bad faith, also. Defendants should then
deliver to plaintiffs the amber or in default,
to pay the value of amber of 60k.
CONDOMINIUM LAW
Section 20 of the Condominium Law states
that An assessment upon any
condominium made in accordance with a
duly registered declaration of restrictions
shall be an obligation of the owner thereof
at the time the assessment is made. . . .”
Petitioner as the condominium corporation
is expressly authorized by its Master Deed
to impose reasonable assessments on its
members to maintain the common areas
and facilities of the Condominium. There is
also no question that ALS is a member of
petitioner considering that ALS is the
registered owner of the Unit. As a member
of petitioner, ALS assumed the compulsory
obligation to share in the common
expenses of the Condominium.
The Condominium Act, petitioner’s By-
Laws and the Master Deed expressly
empower petitioner to promulgate the
house rules prescribing the sanctions of
preventing delinquents from using facilities
the Court found to be a reasonable way of
compelling them to pay.
Page 31 of 70
 FACTS HELD DOCTRINE

The records clearly show that petitioner

denied ALS and Litonjua the use of the
facilities only after ALS had defaulted on its
obligation to pay the assessments and
dues. Petitioner’s denial to ALS of the
Condominium facilities, after ALS had
defaulted, does not constitute a valid
ground on the part of ALS to refuse paying
its assessments and dues.

ALS has no right to a reduction of its

assessments and dues to the extent of its
non-use of the Condominium facilities. ALS
also cannot offset damages against its
assessments and dues because ALS is not
entitled to damages for alleged injury
arising from its own violation of its
contract. Such a breach of contract cannot
be the source of rights or the basis of a
cause of action.
WITHOUT PREVENTING THE USE OF THE OTHER CO-OWNERS
Miguel and Felina Ortiz had 3 children:
Manuel, Vicenta (plaintiff), and Matilde Vicenta cannot claim rents from her sister’s
(defendant). The spouses died and their and her husband’s use of the upper portion
son Manuel followed soon after, leaving the of the house, since the latter is entitled to Application of Art. 394 (now Art. 486): Each
two daughters as heirs to the undivided that as co-owner of the estate. However, co-owner may use the thing owned in
property. It was alleged that Matilde had the husband’s use of the room in the lower common, provided he does so in
been collecting the fruits of the different story as office space should be subject to accordance with the purpose for which it is
properties to the detriment of Vicenta, who payment of rent to Vicenta. There was no intended and in such a way as not to injure
Pardell v. Bartolome
was then based abroad. Among the stipulation that the husband may use the the interest of the co- ownership or prevent
properties is a house in Calle Escolta. It space for free. He merely was an officious the other co-owners from using it according
was established that Matilde and her manager of the estate for the sister and the to their rights. The purpose of the co-
husband occupied the upper story of the law does not allow him compensation as a ownership may be changed by agreement,
house, and her husband also occupied a voluntary administrator. He can only be express or implied
room in the lower portion as office space. paid for necessary expenses incurred in the
Vicenta now is demanding rents from the course of administering the property.
use of the house.
EACH CO-OWNER MAY BRING AN ACTION IN EJECTMENT
Spouses Maneja and respondent BORROMEO PROPERLY CLOTHED WITH Article 487 of the Civil Code, which allows
Resuena v. Court of
Borromeo owned a parcel of land in Cebu. AUTHORITY TO REMOVE THEM. any one of the co-owners to bring an
Appeals
Petitioners in this case were occupants of action in ejectment, may successfully be

Celine De Guzman | Ish Guidote | Desiree Ico | Pola Lamarca | Ross Tugade Page 32 of 70
 FACTS
the land, anent to a contract with spouses
Maneja. Borromeo says that such
occupancy was only by virtue of his
liberality. While still in possession,
Borromeo wanted to use the land in
controversy to expand facilities of his
beach resort, and thus filed an action for
ejectment of the plaintiffs Resuena et. al.
The plaintiffs refute this action saying that
they occupied the land by virtue of a verbal
agreement with the Manejas, and thus
Borromeo has no right to eject them. They
also said that should they be evicted, they
should be reimbursed the necessary
expenses of the land while they were in
possession of such.
Villaner Acabal acquired a parcel of land
from his parents. At this time, he was
married with 8 children. His wife died. He
later sold the property to his nephew
Leonardo.
Acabal v. Acabal
He claims the agreement was for a lease,
not a sale.
His co-heirs would want the sale declared
void for having been executed without their
consent.
PROTEST AGAINST ACTS OF MAJORITY WHICH ARE PREJUDICIAL TO MINORITY
Object of dispute between parties is the As there is no evidence of the contribution
Lavadia v. Cosme possession and custody of certain jewelry of the six primitive owners in the making or
manufactured in 1880 through efforts of 6 acquisition of the jewels often mentioned in
Celine De Guzman | Ish Guidote | Desiree Ico | Pola Lamarca | Ross Tugade
HELD DOCTRINE
1. Article 487 of the CC entitles any co- invoked by the respondent because, in a
owner to file an ejectment suit against sense, a co-owner is the owner and
any possessor of the land, which is possessor of the whole, and that the suit
construed to be an action in favor of for ejectment is deemed to be instituted for
the co-ownership. the benefit of all co- owners.
2. It cannot be disputed that his share
and the spouses Maneja’s share are
merely inchoate because they have not
yet been partitioned. Thus, deemed to
own the whole. Verbal contract cannot
dispute this presumption.
3. Tolerance can never be a basis of
possession in good faith, and
predicated upon implied agreement
that such occupants by tolerance
would vacate premises when such
tolerance has ceased.
4. For any cessation, transmission,
creation, modification or
extinguishments of real rights over
property to be effective, it must be in
writing.
While a co-owner has the right to freely sell
Villaner sold the land to Leonardo.
and dispose of his undivided interest,
• Failed to show that he was defrauded
nevertheless, as a co-owner, he cannot
into executing the deed of sale.
alienate the shares of his other co-
owners—nemo dat qui non habet.
The property is conjugal, thus a state of
co-ownership was created between
The proper action in cases like this is not
Villaner and his children (as heirs of his late
for the nullification of the sale or the
wife).
recovery of possession of the thing owned
• He could only dispose of the part of
in common from the third person who
the property pertaining to him, that is
substituted the co-owner or co-owners
1/2 + 1/9 = 5/9 of the land.
who alienated their shares, but the division
• Since the consent of the other co-
of the common property as if it continued
owners was not obtained, the sale is
to remain in the possession of the co-
void as to their share.
owners who possessed and administered
• Remedy is to ask for partition.
it.
Page 33 of 70
 FACTS
pious ladies in Laguna, all surnamed
Lavadia. They sent all jewelries to adorn
and decorate the Image of Our Lady of
Guadalupe, retaining for themselves the
ownership of the same. By agreement, they
entrusted the safekeeping to Pia as
depositary. Then safekeeping later on
passed on to descendents until it reached
the administration of Rosario Mendoza
who then kept it with BPI for safekeeping.
And in her capacity as administrator, she
wanted to make a formal delivery of the
jewelries to Bishop of Lipa, but the
plaintiffs, descendants of 3 of the 6,
together with one of the 6 objected and
filed a suit to retain possession and
custody.
Co-owners of a piece of land found that it
was subject of a contract of lease for 12
Melencio v. Dy Tiao years executed by their father. They
Lay challenge the validity of the lease on the
ground that the required consent of the co-
owners was not complied with.
Celine De Guzman | Ish Guidote | Desiree Ico | Pola Lamarca | Ross Tugade
HELD DOCTRINE
the same proportion, the conclusion, as
reasonable as it is - and this is supported
by a presumption of law (Art. 393, Civil
Code) is that the cost is the same and as
such the portions corresponding to the
participants of the community shall be
presumed of an equal share. Then the
conclusion of the Court is that appellees
are owners of said fourth-sixths of jewelry,
and that the appellants (descendants of the
other 2) are owners of the remaining
portion. Therefore, having decided that the
quo appellees, constituting the majority of
the primitive owners, entrusted the custody
and administration of these jewels to
Engracia Lavadia, the only survivor of
them, their decision must be respected,
because for the administration and
better enjoyment of thing owned in
common, according to article 398 of the
Civil Code or 492 of NCC, it is mandatory
that there be an agreement of the
majority of the participants.
The contract of lease is null and void. “… In
such cases it must of necessity be
recognized that the part owners
representing the greater portion of the
property held in common have no power to
lease said property for a longer period than
six years without the consent of all the co-
owners, whose proprietary rights,
expressly recognized by the law, would by
contracts of long duration be restricted or
annulled;...since the contract of lease only
produces personal obligations, and cannot
without the consent of all persons
interested or express authority from the
owner, be extended to include stipulations
which may alter its character, changing it
into a contract of partial alienation of the
property leased.”
Page 34 of 70
 FACTS HELD DOCTRINE
The decision denying the validity of the
lease made by the majority of the part
owners of the pasture land must be upheld;
to wit, that the period of duration is twelve
years and the consent of all the co-owners
has not been obtained.
Siblings Angela, Nieves, and Antonio
Tuason then owned an undivided parcel.
Nieves sold her 1/3 portion to Gregorio
Araneta Inc. The three co-owners agreed to
have the whole parcel subdivided into small
The provision is not applicable. The
lots and then sold to others. The proceeds
purpose of the provision is to forbid a co-
would later be divided among them.
owner from being obliged to remain a party
Araneta Inc. offered to finance the project
to the community. The contract in this case
and in exchange, it was to receive 50% of
precisely has for its object the dissolution of
the gross selling price of the lots and any
the community property and the co-
rents that may be collected. The remaining
ownership. In other words, the contract is Art. 494 is the prohibition on compelling co-
50% will be divided in equal portions
Tuason v. Tuason not violating the provision as they both owners to remain in the community
among the three co-owners. In short, the
have the same purpose, which is to ownership.
whole property will be sold piece-meal as
eventually dissolve the co-ownership in a
smaller lots. Sometime later, Angela wrote
profitable manner. At the time the case was
a letter to Araneta rescinding the contract
decided, about 97.5% of the property has
and asking that the property held in
already been sold and the partnership set
common be partitioned. Angela alleges that
up for the purpose of the venture was in the
her consent to the contract was vitiated and
process of being dissolved as well.
that Araneta committed various acts of
breach. Angela invokes Art. 400 of the Civil
Code (now Art. 494), which provides that
no co-owner shall be obliged to remain a
party to the community.
TO EXERCISE LEGAL REDEMPTION
Francisco Gosiengfiao owned a parcel of ART. 1620 APPLIES.
land in Tuguegarao which he mortgaged
with the Rural Bank of Tuguegarao. He • Tolentino: The fine distinction
died intestate, leaving the parcel of land to between 1088 and 1620 is that
his heirs. The loan being unpaid, the bank 1088 applies when the sale is the
Mariano v. Court of foreclosed on the property. Subsequently, hereditary right ITSELF, when 1620 Difference between application of Art. 1620
Appeals Amparo Gosiengfiao – one of the children applied when the sale consists of and Article 1088.
of Francisco, paid the bank the redemption an interest in some particular
price of the property. Thus, the land came property of the inheritance.
into her possession, and she sold the same • In this case also, it was said that
to the plaintiff Marianos. After being although the Court upheld that
apprised of the sale, Grace Gosiengfiao – actual giving or furnishing of a

Celine De Guzman | Ish Guidote | Desiree Ico | Pola Lamarca | Ross Tugade Page 35 of 70
 FACTS
another one of the children of Francisco,
laid claim on the parcel of land.
The CA, on the basis of Art. 1620, awarded
the same to the Gosiengfiao children,
saying that “a co-owner who redeems
property does not redeem the same for his
sole benefit but for the benefit of the co-
ownership.”
HELD DOCTRINE
deed of sale of the subject
property was notice of the sale, it
was not done in the case.
• It was held that Grace Gosiengfiao
instituted redemption from the first
opportunity she had. She even
tendered payment for the land.

Petitioners say that what is applicable is

Art. 1088.
Socorro can redeem the property.
Macaria died intestate, leaving behind her
• When Macaria died, her children,
children of two marriages. Among these
including David, became co-owners of
children is the late David Rosales, husband
the property. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the
of respondent Socorro.
Verdad v. Court of • When David died, his share in the right of redemption in case the shares of all
Appeals property passed on to his widow the other co-owners or of any of them, are
Petitioner purchased a lot inherited by
Socorro. sold to a third person. (Art. 1620, CC)
Macaria’s children. Upon learning of the
• Thus, she also became a co-owner.
sale, Socorro sought to redeem the
She can exercise the right of legal
undivided share of her late husband.
redemption.
TO ASK FOR PARTITION
Plaintiff, Jose Maria Ramirez brought
action against the defendants for the A physical division of the property will not
partition of a parcel of land at the cause inestimable damage to the interest
Northwestern corner of Escolta Street and of the co-owners. No evidence has been
Plaza Sta. Cruz, Manila. The lands belong introduced in support of the allegation. The
pro indiviso to both parties, 1/6 to the Court does not believe that the value of the
plaintiff and 5/6 to the defendants. property would be impaired to such an
Defendants objected to the physical extent as to warrant that the property is
partition of the property because they indivisible. There is nothing to show that,
Ramirez v. Ramirez believe that the partition is materially and after segregating plaintiff’s share, the
legally impossible and would work great buildings left on the remaining portion of
harm to the co-owners. However, the land, representing defendants’ share,
defendants Manuel Uy & sons, and Butte would be unserviceable, either for
agreed “if the partition can be done without commercial or residential purposes. The
great prejudice to the interests of the segregation of plaintiff’s share inures to
parties.” By agreement of the parties a the benefit of the defendants, as well. As
Commission was formed to determine such, they should both be made to
whether the property is susceptible of defray the incidental expenses.
partition and submit a plan if feasible as

Celine De Guzman | Ish Guidote | Desiree Ico | Pola Lamarca | Ross Tugade Page 36 of 70
 FACTS
well as to report on it. After the
commissioners submitted their individual
reports, the Court declared that plaintiff is
entitled to the segregation of his share and
directed that the property be partitioned in
accordance with the plan submitted and
that the expenses be paid proportionately
by the parties. Defendants appealed
except Butte. They alleged that a physical
division of the property will cause
inestimable damage to the interest of the
co-owners.
Petitioner Virgilio and respondent Senen
are brothers. The two brothers purchased a
house and lot in Parañaque where their
father could enjoy his remaining years.
Initially, the brothers agreed that Virgilio’s
share in the co-ownership was 2/3 while
that of Senen was 1/3. In a subsequent
memorandum they agreed that they would
have equal shares in the house and lot with
Senen assuming the remaining mortgage
obligation of the original owners with the
SSS in exchange for his possession and
enjoyment of the house together with their
father. Since Virgilio was then disqualified
Aguilar v. Court of from obtaining a loan from SSS, the
Appeals brothers agreed that the deed of sale
would be executed and the title registered
in the meantime in the name of Senen. It
was further agreed that Senen would take
care of their father and his needs since
Virgilio and his family were staying in Cebu.
After their father’s death, petitioner Virgilio
demanded from private respondent Senen
that the latter vacate the house and that
the property be sold and proceeds divided
among them.
Private respondent and his family refuse to
pay monthly rentals to petitioner from the
Celine De Guzman | Ish Guidote | Desiree Ico | Pola Lamarca | Ross Tugade
HELD
Petitioner and respondent are co-owners
of subject house and lot in equal shares;
either one of them may demand the same
of the house and lot at any time and the
other cannot object to such demand;
thereafter the proceeds of the sale shall be
divided equally according to their
respective interests.
The Court upheld the trial court decision
ordering respondent to vacate the property
so that it could be sold to third persons
and the proceeds divided between them
equally, and for respondent to pay
petitioner one-half (1/2) of P2,400.00 or the
sum of P1,200.00 as monthly rental.
However, the effectivity of the payment of
monthly rentals by respondent as co-owner
should commence only after the order to
vacate.
Since petitioner has decided to enforce his
right in court to end the co-ownership of
the house and lot and respondent has not
refuted the allegation that he has been
preventing the sale of the property by his
continued occupancy of the premises,
justice and equity demand that respondent
and his family vacate the property so that
the sale can be effected immediately.
DOCTRINE
Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that
no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in
the co ownership, and that each co-owner
may demand at any time partition of the
thing owned in common insofar as his
share is concerned. Corollary to this rule,
Art. 498 of the Code states that whenever
the thing is essentially indivisible and the
co-owners cannot agree that it be allotted
to one of them who shall indemnify the
others, it shall be sold and its proceeds
accordingly distributed. This is resorted to
(1) when the right to partition the property
is invoked by any of the co-owners but
because of the nature of the property it
cannot be subdivided or its subdivision
would prejudice the interests of the co-
owners, and (b) the co-owners are not in
agreement as to who among them shall be
allotted or assigned the entire property
upon proper reimbursement of the co-
owners.
Page 37 of 70
 FACTS
time their father died in 1975 and to vacate
the house so that it can be sold to third
persons. Petitioner alleges that
respondent’s continued stay in the
property hinders its disposal to the
prejudice of petitioner. He also claims that
he should be paid two-thirds (2/3) of the
monthly rental.
Cleopas Ape owned a land that passed on
to his wife Maria and their 11 children upon
his death. Sometime after, Generosa and
Braulio Cawit instituted an action for
specific performance against Fortunato
Ape, one of the children, for the delivery of
a portion of the land allegedly sold by
Fortunato. Fortunato and petitioners denied
the allegations, stating that there never was
a sale, but only a lease agreement.
Generosa alleges on the other hand that
they purchased the land through various
Vda. de Ape v. Court
written instruments signed by Fortunato.
of Appeals
Fortunato’s wife states that they only went
to respondent’s house to collect rents, and
what was signed was an acknowledgement
receipt for the rentals. It was alleged that
Fortunato was in fact illiterate and only
knew how to write his name. It was also
established that despite the absence of a
formal partition of the parcel of land among
Fortunato and his co-owners, there already
was an informal set-up where each of the
heirs administered their separate share of
the property.
Celine De Guzman | Ish Guidote | Desiree Ico | Pola Lamarca | Ross Tugade
HELD DOCTRINE
!!
When petitioner filed an action to compel
the sale of the property and the trial court
granted the petition and ordered the
ejectment of respondent, the co-ownership
was deemed terminated and the right to
enjoy the possession jointly also ceased.
Thereafter, the continued stay of
respondent and his family in the house
prejudiced the interest of petitioner as the
property should have been sold and the
proceeds divided equally between them.
To this extent and from then on,
respondent should be held liable for
monthly rentals until he and his family
vacate.
Relief sought by Fortunato’s wife is the
redemption of the land, pursuant to Art.
1623: The right of legal pre-emption or
redemption shall not be exercised except
within thirty days from the notice in writing
by the prospective vendor, or by the
vendor, as the case may be. The deed of
sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of
Property, unless accompanied by an
affidavit of the vendor that he has given
written notice thereof to all possible The exercise of redemption “presupposes
redemptioners. the existence of a co-ownership at the time
of the conveyance is made by the other co-
In this case, Generosa did not give any owner or co-owners.” The regime of co-
notice to Fortunato and his wife. ownership exists when ownership of an
undivided thing or right belongs to different
HOWEVER, Fortunato’s wife still cannot persons.
invoke this provision. Exercise of the right
of redemption presupposes the existence of
a co-ownership. In this case, even though
the property remained covered by one title,
the heirs already exercised separate
ownership of their respective shares.
THE COURT ALSO RULED THAT THE
SALE WAS INVALID DUE TO VITIATED
CONSENT. (ANG LABO.)
Page 38 of 70
 FACTS HELD DOCTRINE
OTHER CASES WHERE LEGAL REDEMPTION IS GIVEN
Simeon de Guzman, an American citizen,
died sometime in 1968, leaving real CATANIAG VALIDLY OWNS THE LAND.
properties in the Philippines. His forced
heirs were his widow, Helen Meyers GENERAL RULE: Non-Filipinos cannot
Guzman, David Rey Guzman. Helen acquire of hold title to private lands or to
executed a deed of quitclaim assigning to lands of the public domain, except only by
David Rey all her rights, titles and interests way of legal succession.
Right of an owner to exercise legal
in and over six parcels of land. On
redemption
February 5, 1991, David Rey Guzman sold EXCEPTION: But Jurisprudence is
Halili v. Court of said parcel of land to Emiliano Cataniag. consistent that if land is invalidly
(But actually the case mainly discusses the
Appeals Petitioners, who are owners of the transferred to an alien who subsequently
rights of Filipino citizens acquiring lands
adjoining lot, filed a complaint before RTC becomes a citizen or transfers it to a
illegally owned by aliens)
of Malolos, Bulacan. Questioning the citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is
constitutionality and validity of the two considered cured and the title of the
conveyances - between Helen Guzman transferee is rendered valid.
and David Rey Guzman, and between the
latter and Emiliano Cataniag, claiming Although technically the spouses Halili
ownership thereto based on their right of MAY exercise legal redemption, the sale is
legal redemption under Art. 1621 of the still valid as to Cataniag.
Civil Code.
The action has not yet prescribed.
Petitioner and her three sisters sold their
• 30-day redemption period starts when
1/5 share in a parcel of land to their
the co-owner receives notice of the
mother, who in turn sold it to another sister
sale from the co-owner-vendor.
of theirs, herein respondent.
• In this case, petitioner’s mother was
The Civil Code is clear. The notice must be
not the one who informed Francisco
Boiser filed a complaint demanding her given by the vendor. When the co-owner
Francisco v. Boiser but the vendee Boiser.
share in the rentals being collected by gains actual knowledge of the sale, the 30-
• The reason for the rule is that the co-
petitioner from the tenants of the building. day redemption period begins to run.
owner-vendor is the one who is in the
best position to know who his co-
In turn, Francisco sought to redeem the
owners are.
property. Boiser counters that the action
• Actual knowledge in this case started
has prescribed.
when the petitioner received summons.
INTERVENTION BY CREDITORS IN PARTITION; RESCISSION WHEN THERE IS FRAUD
A complaint for ejectment and recovery of Judgment was reversed by SC. The
a 1/5 Portion of a parcel of land, inherited Supreme Court held that the action for
from their parents by the five Espique ejectment and recovery of possession
Carvajal v. Court of
children, two of them being Evaristo and instituted by the private respondents in the
Appeals
Estefanio, was filed by the private lower court is premature, for what must
respondent spouses against petitioner, the be settled first is the action for partition;
occupant thereof. The subject parcel of and that until the partition of the estate is

Celine De Guzman | Ish Guidote | Desiree Ico | Pola Lamarca | Ross Tugade Page 39 of 70
 FACTS
land was allegedly bought by the private
respondents from Evaristo Espique while
the petitioner claimed to have bought the
same from Estefanio Espique on April 26,
1967. They also demand petitioner to pay a
monthly rental for the use of property until
surrendered to them. Both sales were
made while the petition for partition of the
land filed by Evaristo Espique was still
pending in court. Petitioner, who occupies
2/5 of the whole lot alleges that he
purchased the ½ portion of the lot he is
occupying from Estefanio Espique, and the
other ½ leased to him by one of the heirs of
Trofinia Espique. The lower court rendered
a decision which was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals, declaring the respondents the
lawful owners of the land in question and
ordering the petitioner to pay P30.00 in
monthly rentals until possession of the
property is surrendered to respondents.
Respondent Flaviano Moreto sold a piece
of land under his name but which was
acquired during his marriage to his
deceased wife to petitioners Pamplona.
After the sale, the spouses Pamplona
constructed their house on the eastern part
of lot 1496. Rafael Pamplona, son of the
petitioner, also built his house within lot
1496 about one meter from its boundary
Pamplona v. Moreto
with the adjoining lot.
Flaviano Moreto died intestate. In 1961, the
plaintiffs (heirs of Monica) demanded on
the defendants to vacate the premises
where they had their house and piggery on
the ground that Flaviano Moreto had no
right to sell the lot which he sold to
Geminiano Pamplona as the same belongs
Celine De Guzman | Ish Guidote | Desiree Ico | Pola Lamarca | Ross Tugade
HELD DOCTRINE
ordered by the CFI in the pending partition
proceeding and the share of each co-heir
is determined by metes and bounds,
neither petitioner nor respondents can
rightfully claim that what they bought is the
part in dispute. Under Article 493 of NCC,
each co-owner shall have gull ownership of
his part and of the fruits pertaining thereto,
and he may even alienate such part only.
An individual co-owner cannot
adjudicate to himself or claim title to any
definite portion of the land or thing
owned in common until its actual
partition by agreement or judicial
decree. Prior to that time all that the co-
owner has is an ideal or abstract quota or
proportionate share in the entire thing
owned in common by all the co-owners.
What a co-owner may dispose of is only
his undivided aliquot share, which shall be
limited to the portion that may be allotted
to him upon partition. Before partition, a
co-heir can only sell his successional
rights.
Whether under the facts and circumstances
duly established by the evidence, The community property of the marriage, at
petitioners are entitled to the full ownership the dissolution of this bond by the death of
of the property in litigation, or only one-half one of the spouses, ceases to belong to
of the same. the legal partnership and becomes the
property of a community, by operation of
Petitioners are entitled to the full ownership law, between the surviving spouse and the
of the property in litigation. heirs of the deceased spouse, or the
exclusive property of the widower or the
There is no dispute that the houses of the widow, if he or she be the heir of the
petitioners and their son, including the deceased spouse. Every co-owner shall
concrete piggery coral stood on the land have full ownership of his part and in the
for 9 years prior to the filing of this action. fruits and benefits derived therefrom, and
During said period, the private respondents he therefore may alienate, assign or
lived as neighbors to the petitioners- mortgage it and even substitute another
vendees, yet lifted no finger to question the person in its enjoyment, unless personal
occupation, possession and ownership of rights are in question.
the land purchased by the Pamplonas, so
Page 40 of 70
 FACTS
to the conjugal partnership of Flaviano and
his deceased wife and the latter was
already dead when the sale was executed
without the consent of the plaintiffs who
are the heirs of Monica. The defendants
claim that the sale made by Flaviano
Moreto in their favor is valid as they are
purchasers in good faith. It was found out
that there was mutual error between
Flaviano Moreto and the defendants in the
execution of the deed of sale because
while the said deed recited that the lot sold
is lot No. 1495, the real intention of the
parties is that it was a portion consisting of
781 square meters of lot No. 1496 which
was the subject matter of their sale
transaction. The trial court cancelled the
deed of registration of the Pamplonas.
Brothers Tomas and Arsenio Castro owned
pro indivisio a fishpond that they both
leased to Atienza. Tomas later died. At
some point, Arsenio wanted to cancel the
lease so he can lease the property to other
lessors. Arsenio executed a document that
Castro v. Atienza
cancelled the lease but Tomas’ widow
Felisa refused to sign. Atienza tried to
recover the rents paid in advance, but
Arsenio denies liability, invoking his co-
owner’s refusal to sign the cancellation of
lease.
Crispina Perez acquired a parcel of land
from her deceased father, which she co-
Estoque v. Pajimula owned with a sibling. On Oct. 28, she
conveyed 1/3 of the parcel of land to
plaintiff Estoque. On Oct. 29, all rights of
Celine De Guzman | Ish Guidote | Desiree Ico | Pola Lamarca | Ross Tugade
HELD DOCTRINE
that private respondents are in estoppel by
laches to claim half of the property in
dispute as null and void.
Since Flaviano Moreto was entitled to one-
half pro-indiviso of the entire land area or
1,173 sq. meters as his share, he had a
perfect legal and lawful right to dispose of
781 sq. meters of his share to the
Pamplona spouses.
There was a factual partition or termination
of the co-ownership created the moment
the co-owner as vendor pointed out its
location and even indicated the boundaries
over which the fences were to be erected
without objection, protest or complaint by
the other co-owners who even acquiesced
and tolerated such alienation, occupation
and possession, barring not only the
vendor, Flaviano Moreto, but also his heirs,
the private respondents herein from
asserting as against the vendees-
petitioners any right or title in derogation of
the deed of sale executed.
Application of Art. 493: Each co-owner
Arsenio must be liable for the refund of the shall have the full ownership of his part and
rents, notwithstanding Felisa’s refusal to of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto,
sign the cancellation of the lease. It is and he may therefore alienate, assign or
understood that Arsenio owned one-half mortgage it, and even substitute another
interest while his brother, succeeded by the person in its enjoyment, except when
wife Felisa, owned the other half. It was personal rights are involved. But the effect
thus valid for one owner to lease his half of the alienation or the mortgage, with
while other refused. The resulting respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to
relationship between lessee and the co- the portion which may be allotted to him in
owner/lessor is a partnership. the division upon the termination of the co-
ownership.
NO, SHE CANNOT REDEEM AS SHE WAS The intent of the contract should be
NEVER A CO-OWNER WITH CRISPINA. controlling. Cannot infer from the
• Deed of Sale clearly identified the 1/3 inoperation of the Deed of Sale to convey
portion of the land which Crispina parcel of land in an undivided property that
sought to convey. Nothing in the the same shall result to co-ownership.
Page 41 of 70
 FACTS
her brother, or co-owner, was transferred
to her. Thereafter, Crispina sold the
remaining 2/3 parcel of land to defendants
Pajimula. Estoque assails this, saying that
since the land conveyed to her by Crispina
on Oct. 28 could not have been a definite
share in her co-ownership with her brother,
the rights assigned to her made her a co-
owner of the land when Crispina sold the
land to the Pajimulas. Thus, this gives her
the right to redeem such property, as a co-
owner.
Respondent Rosado, his spouse, and the
other co-owners of the subject property
sold the same to petitioner Diversified
Credit.
Diversified Credit v.
Rosado Respondent refused to vacate the same
claiming it was conjugal property as he had
already constructed a house thereon. He
further claims that he neither consented to
nor subsequently ratified the sale.
Spouses Bitanga owned a land as conjugal
property. When husband died, wife
mortgaged the entire property to PNB for
P500. Such was not annotated in the OCT
but there was a power of attorney which
allowed PNB to do acts necessary in the
performance of the power granted to a
mortgagee should the mortgagor violate
the term of the mortgage. Even before
PNB v. Court of
such annotation, Rosa had already
Appeals
defaulted in her obligation with Manila
Trading Company (MTCo), so MTCo levied
upon her share in the property and it was
subsequently sold at a public auction to
MTCo as the highest bidder. MTCo later
sold it. On the other hand, PNB sold the
same land in a public auction since Rosa
failed to settle her obligation with it. PNB
was the highest bidder and it later sold the
Celine De Guzman | Ish Guidote | Desiree Ico | Pola Lamarca | Ross Tugade
HELD DOCTRINE
contract indicates that she ever
intended to sell 1/3 interest on the
property. Nothing in the contract from
which one can infer such intention
• Principle in Sales: when a person not
the owner of a thing sells or alienates
and delivers it, and later the seller or
grantor acquires title thereto, such title
passes by operation of law to the
buyer. Thus, in any case, Estoque
became owner of the land the next
day, when interest completely
transferred to Crispina.
Respondent must remove the house.
While a co-owner has the right to freely sell
• While it is not disputed that his wife
and dispose of his undivided interest, he
owns a 1/13 share, the land has yet to
has no right to sell a divided part of the real
be partitioned.
estate owned in common. [He cannot sell a
• Thus, he cannot claim title to any
defined portion of the property until after
definite portion of land.
partition.]
• Prior to partition, a co-owner has only
an ideal or abstract share in the entire
thing owned in common.
The mortgage only covers one-half. But
the mortgage was no longer subsisting.
What PNB acquired from Rosa by virtue of
the mortgage was only one-half since this
was all that Rosa had in her power to
convey, the other half was the lawful share
of the Bitangas as inheritance. But
mortgage was no longer subsisting since it
was not annotated. Therefore, as between
MTCo and PNB, it was MTCo who had a
better right since MTCo did not even have
any prior knowledge of the mortgage in
favor of PNB. Neither are the Bitangas
estopped from suing since they allegedly
signed the mortgage to PNB since not all
the heirs actually signed. Also, those who
signed did so as witnesses, not as ones
who gave their approval and conformity to
the mortgage. There was no showing that
Page 42 of 70
 FACTS HELD DOCTRINE
land to Felizardo Reyes. Bitanga heirs then they knew the contents.
filed a complaint for reconveyance of title
against PNB since they claim that
mortgage should not have been over the
entire land since they inherited from their
father a share equivalent to one-half of the
land.
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF CONDOMINUM OWNER
The contention has no merit.
Not every purchaser of a condominium unit
is a shareholder of the condominium
corporation. The Condominium Act, in
Section 5, leaves to the Master Deed the
determination of when the shareholding will
be transferred to the purchaser of a unit.

It is clear from the Master Deeds that the

Petitioner was a condominium corporation
which filed complaints for nonpayment of
assessment dues for the use of common
areas against private respondents. Private
respondents in both cases argue that every
purchaser of a condominium unit,
regardless of whether or not he has fully
Sunset View
paid the purchase price, is a “holder of a
Condominium v.
separate interest” mentioned in Section 2
Campos
of Republic Act No. 4726, otherwise known
as “The Condominium Act” and is
automatically a shareholder of the
condominium corporation. As such, the
court was not the proper and SEC had
jurisdiction over the case being an intra-
corporate dispute.
shareholding in the Condominium
Corporation is inseparable from the unit to
which it is only appurtenant, and that only
the owner of a unit is a shareholder in the
Condominium Corporation. It necessarily
follows that a purchaser of a unit who has
not paid the full purchase price thereof is
not the owner of the unit and consequently
is not a shareholder of the Condominium
Corporation. By necessary implication, the
“separate interest” in a condominium,
which entitles the holder to become
automatically a shareholder in the
condominium corporation can be no other
than ownership of a unit. The private
respondents, therefore, who have not fully
paid the purchase price of their units and
are consequently not owners of their units
are not members or shareholders of the
petitioner condominium corporation.

Inasmuch as the private respondents are

not shareholders of the petitioner
condominium corporation, the instant
cases for collection cannot be a

Celine De Guzman | Ish Guidote | Desiree Ico | Pola Lamarca | Ross Tugade Page 43 of 70
 FACTS
POSSESSION BY CO-OWNER, PRESUMED NOT ADVERSE
Fabian Correjado inherited from his father
Santos a parcel of land. Fabian died
intestate in 1919 and was survived by four
children: Julian, Zacarias, Francisco, and
Manuel. Julian occuppied and cultivated the
property until his death in 1950. Julian’s
heirs, respondents in this case, then
assumed possession of the undivided
Capitle v. De Gaban proper. In 1986, petitioners, heirs of the
three other children of Fabian who were
said to be offspring from a subsequent
marriage, filed an action for partition of the
land. They assert the legitimacy of the three
other children of Fabian as basis of their
claim of co-ownership. Petitioners now
argue that prescription and laches cannot
lie against co-owners.
CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION
Restituto Romero obtained a parcel of land 2 Requisites of the Public Land Law:
in Nueva Ecija and obtained a possessory
information over land named Parcel 1. He 1. The open, continuous, exclusive, and
sold this to Ramos who sought to have his
Ramos v. Director of title registered under the Public Land Law.
Lands
The Director of Lands opposed this on the
grounds that: (1) He had not acquired good WAS
title from Spanish Government and (2) OCCUPATION? Yes.
Such was not public agricultural land but
Celine De Guzman | Ish Guidote | Desiree Ico | Pola Lamarca | Ross Tugade
HELD DOCTRINE
controversy arising out of intra-corporate
or partnership relations which is under the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
SEC. The subject matters of the instant
cases according to the allegations of the
complaints are under the jurisdiction of the
regular courts.
While prescription cannot lie against co-
owners since a co-owner exercising
possession is holding the property in trust
for the others, this doctrine does not apply
in the case at bar. Acquisitive prescription
against petitioners had already set in.
Respondents have done positive acts of
repudiation. For instance, Julian continued
to pay taxes for the property as exclusive
owner and his children appropriated the
property in exclusion of the other heirs of The case lays out the exception for the
Fabian. The adverse possession of Julian inapplicability of prescription and laches in
and his successors-in-interest created the co-ownership.
effect of ownership by prescription. Art.
1137 applies in this case, where ownership
though uninterrupted adverse possession is
prescribes in 30 years. Due to this, the
petitioners may no longer ask for partition
since the only legal question resolved in the
case is the ownership in favor of Julian’s
heirs. Petitioners cannot claim that they
were “deprived” of enjoyment of the
property that they never “enjoyed” in the
first place.
1. Actual possession of land consists in
the manifestation of acts of dominion
over it of such a nature as a party
notorious possession and occupation would naturally exercise over his own
of such land; and property.
2. Land is public agricultural land. 2. The general rule is that the possession
and cultivation of a portion of a tract
THERE POSSESSION AND under claim of ownership of all is a
constructive possession of all, if the
remainder is not in the adverse
Page 44 of 70
 FACTS HELD
forest land. Trial Court agreed and did not 1. Although Ramos only cultivated and
award title. was in “open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and
occupation” of ¼ of the land in
question, Court applied Doctrine of
Constructive Possession.
2. See next box for doctrines.
DOCTRINE
possession of another.
3. Possession in the eyes of the law does
not mean that a man has to have his
feet on every square meter of ground
before it can be said that he is in
possession.

WAS LAND PUBLIC AGRICULTURAL

LAND? Not sure. But presumption is that it
is.

1. Court cites many definitions, both

The heirs of Bruno Cabauatan registered
25 hectares of land in 1934. In 1937, they
Director of Lands v.
tried to register 128 more hectares.
Court of Appeals
Petitioners are homesteaders who claim
rights to the 138 hectares.
statutory and jurisprudential, of the
term public agricultural land.
2. Generally, such land is agricultural if it
is proven to be more valuable as
agricultural land than forest land.
3. In the end, there are no specific
characteristics which indicate that land
is public agricultural land, must be on a
case to case basis.
4. Although the law must conserve
natural resources, presumption must
still be that the land is agricultural in
nature.
5. It is good for the country to have
majority of the lands to come under
private ownership.
6. When the claim of the citizen and
government collide, if the government
desires to demonstrate forestral nature
of land, it must present its evidence.
7. Mere formal objection of the Attorney
General, unsupported by evidence, will
not stop courts from giving title.
The registration of the 128 hectares cannot
be granted.
• Heirs of Cabauatan claim that since
they were in actual possession of the
25 hectares, they must be deemed to
have constructive possession of the

Celine De Guzman | Ish Guidote | Desiree Ico | Pola Lamarca | Ross Tugade Page 45 of 70
 FACTS HELD DOCTRINE
128 hectares.
• The rule on constructive possession
does not apply to this case because
the major portion of the disputed 128
hectares has been in the adverse
possession of homesteaders and their
heirs and is still part of the public
domain until the patents are issued.
MISTAKE UPON A DOUBTFUL OR DIFFICULT QUESTION OF LAW
The respondents are heirs of the original
owner of the land in question, Emiliana
Ambrosio who acquired said land through
the Homestead Act. They seek to recover
possession of the land and its
Was kasilag a possessor in bad faith? No.
improvements from the petitioner who
alleged that he was in possession of the
Section 433 of the Civil Code provides that
land and that he was receiving the fruits
“Every person who is unaware of any flaw
thereof by virtue of a mortgage contract,
in his title, or in the manner of its
entered into between him and the
acquisition, by which it is invalidated, shall
deceased Emiliana Ambrosio.
be deemed a possessor in good faith”; and
provides further, that “Possessors aware of
Petitioner Kasilag and deceased Emiliana
such flaw are deemed possessors in bad
entered into two contracts. The first
faith.”
contract was only for the mortgage of the
improvements on the homestead in
From the facts it can neither be deduced
Kasilag v. Roque consideration of the sumof P1000. One
nor presumed that the petitioner was
year after, Emiliana Ambrosio was unable
aware of a flaw in his title or in the manner
to pay the stipulated interests as well as
of its acquisition, aside from the prohibition
the tax on the land and its improvements.
contained in section 116 of the Homestead
For this reason, she and the petitioner
Act. It is a fact that the petitioner is not
entered into another verbal contract
conversant with the laws because he is not
whereby she conveyed to the latter the
a lawyer. In accepting the mortgage of the
possession of the land subject to certain
improvements he proceeded on the well-
conditions. By virtue of this verbal contract,
grounded belief that he was not violating
the petitioner entered upon the possession
the prohibition regarding the alienation of
of the land, gathered the products thereof,
the land.
did not collect the interest on the loan,
introduced improvements upon the land.

Respondents contend that the contract

was actually a contract of sale OF THE
LAND between Emiliana and Kasilag, and

Celine De Guzman | Ish Guidote | Desiree Ico | Pola Lamarca | Ross Tugade Page 46 of 70
 FACTS HELD DOCTRINE
therefore null and void because it was
contrary to law (the Homestead Act.)
PROPER ACTS AND LEGAL FORMALITIES
Francisco Reyes secured a loan with
petitioner bank, which increased his
outstanding debt to P226,117.38. He
mortgaged several pieces of property and The Court ruled that there was a valid
pledged to the bank personal property contract of pledge between the bank and
including a stock of merchandise stored in Reyes. Even if the goods continued to be
his warehouse. The keys to the warehouse stored in a warehouse rented by Reyes, the
were delivered to Ramon Garcia. Much validity of the pledge is not affected. The
Banco Español later, a Juan Garcia brought an action symbolic delivery of the keys to Ramon
Possession through symbolic delivery
Filipino v. Peterson against Reyes and one Agtarat for default Garcia, the depositary, signified that the
in another debt. In that action, the sheriff of parties consented to the pledge. Thus, only
Manila executed a levy on the properties in the Bank as pledgee is allowed to dispose
the warehouse. The Bank contends that it of the goods. The Bank has preference
was deprived of the goods in the over the credit of Juan Garcia, and thus the
warehouse, which were originally pledged proceeds of the sale must go to the Bank.
to it by Reyes. Thus, it argues that it has a
right to the proceeds of the auction of the
goods.
ACTS MERELY TOLERATED
PETITIONER SPOUSES ARE OCCUPANTS
IN GOOD FAITH, ALTHOUGH THEY
CANNOT FURTHER EXERCISE A RIGHT
TO OCCUPY.
Petitioner and respondent are parents and
• Although generally, occupation by
children, the former occupying a parcel of
mere tolerance shall not make
land owned by the respondents. The Tolerance indicates that the possession by
possession one in good faith, the Court
petitioners have already built their a party is something “not wholly approved
here said that due to the
residence thereon, when the respondents of” by the owners. In this case, the
circumstances of the case, it cannot be
filed an ejectment suit against them, saying possession was wholly approved of and
Macasaet v. said that possession was by mere
that their possession has been because of encouraged by the respondent, and thus
Macasaet tolerance alone.
the tolerance of their parents. Petitioners, cannot be tolerance.
• It is obvious that the land was
on the other hand, say that there was a
possessed by the petitioners out of the
verbal lease agreement over the land, and
love of the respondents and the desire
that the respondents allowed them and
for all of them to live close to each
offered them such land out of their love for
other.
their son.
• But since such situation ceased to
exist, the right of the petitioners to
occupy such lands have already
ceased as well.

Celine De Guzman | Ish Guidote | Desiree Ico | Pola Lamarca | Ross Tugade Page 47 of 70
 FACTS HELD DOCTRINE
• BUT! Such situation means that
occupation is in GOOD FAITH, which is
important in the application of BPS
provisions.
• Thus, there is not right on the part of
the petitioners to still occupy the land
but the options available to the BPS in
Art. 448 applies
ACTS BY VIOLENCE AS LONG AS POSSESSOR OBJECTS THERETO
The Nanca-Victorias Road is not a public
highway.
• Defendants are the owners of the land.
• No showing that the Government ever Possession, to constitute a fundamental
Benedicto is the owner of Hacienda asserted ownership or that it prescriptive right, must be possession
Toreno, the land occupied by the Nanca- shouldered the expenses for the under claim of title.
Victorias Road. Petitioners are the owners upkeep of the road.
Cuaycong v.
of other haciendas who regularly use the Acts of possessory character performed by
Benedicto
road to bring their sugar products to the Defendant’s possession of the land was one who holds mere tolerance of owner are
city. Defendant closed the road and not disturbed by plaintiffs’ use of the road. clearly not under “claim of title”, and such
decided to start charging toll. • Use of the road merely tolerated by the acts, no matter how long continues, do not
owner, cannot be considered adverse start running the period of prescription.
possession.
• Such acts tolerated by the possessor
do not give rise to prescription.
Respondent Mitra applied, in behalf of his She has no cause of action to annul sale
minor son, for the purchase of Lot 16 of and require that she be allowed to
PHHC Subdivision. Application was purchase the lot. As an informal settler, she
approved then made a downpayment of has no possessory rights over lot. She was
P840 which is actually 10% of the price of not prejudiced since she was bereft of any
the lot. After Mitra had paid the full price, a rights over said lot. Also, petitioner cannot
final deed was executed in his favour. The invoke PHHC’s charter of acquiring
lot in question is actually in the possession buildings to provide decent housing and
Astudillo v. PHHC
of Petitioner Astudillo as an informal settler. acquiring large estates for resale to bona
She claims that her informal settlement fide occupants. She is not a bona fide
was continuous since 1957, hence she occupant of Lot 16. The provisions of the
filed a request for cancellation of award to PHHC charter do not justify her act of
Mitra. When there was no action, she filed squatting on a government-owned lot and
petition against PHHC and Mitras then demanding that the lot be sold to her
questioning legality of sale of land. RTC because she does not yet own a residential
dismissed hence appeal to CA. lot and house.
The property in question, an unregistered Respondents may have been in possession Possession by tolerance is lawful, but this
Peran v. CFI
residential land, with an area of 1,225 of the portion they occupy prior to becomes illegal when, upon demand to

Celine De Guzman | Ish Guidote | Desiree Ico | Pola Lamarca | Ross Tugade Page 48 of 70
 FACTS HELD DOCTRINE
square meters more or less, situated at petitioner but they have not proved their vacate by the owner, the possessor refuses
Tagdon, Barcelona, Sorsogon, was title thereto, nor their right to possess to comply with such demand. A possessor
originally owned by Jose Evasco. Jose the same. No concrete evidence was by tolerance is necessarily bound by an
Evasco executed a ‘Reparticion introduced by respondents on this point. implied promise to vacate upon demand,
Extrajudicial’ whereby he partitioned his Moreover, the validity of the `Reparticion failing which a summary action for
properties among his five heirs. Subject Extrajudicial” whereby said lot was ejectment is the proper remedy against
property in this case was one of those adjudicated to Alejandro Evasco by his him.
alloted to his son, Alejandro Evasco. father Jose Evasco, had never been
Alejandro Evasco sold his property to Jose challenged. If at all, private respondents’
E. Torella who in turn, sold the land to Jose possession of their portion of the property
Enriquez Sabater. Petitioner Angel P. Peran was by mere tolerance of petitioner’s
acquired the land by purchase from Jose predecessors-in-interest, which, however,
Enriquez Sabater declaring it in his name does not vest in them a right which they
under Tax Declaration No. 7310. 7 The sale can assert against petitioner.
was duly recorded in the Register of
Deeds’ Office. Encarnacion Evasco is a A Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer
granddaughter of Jose Evasco from action must be brought within one year
another heir (not Alejandro) who at this from the unlawful deprivation or
time had erected a house on the land withholding of possession. The one-year-
acquired by Peran. Petitioner asked private period of limitation commences from the
respondents, Encarnacion Evasco and her time of demand to vacate, and when
common-law husband Ramon Espera to several demands are made, the same is
remove the same and vacate the premises. counted from the last letter of demand. The
Respondents refused. demand to vacate having been made by
petitioner in January 1979, and the
ejectment suit having been instituted on
February 8, 1979, the 2nd Municipal Circuit
Court of Bulusan-Barcelona acted well
within its jurisdiction in taking cognizance
of the case.
ACTIONS TO RECOVER POSSESSION
Sps. Yu owned a junk shop. They The Yus purchased the scrap under a sales
purchased 42 metric tons of scrap engine invoice that seemed to have been made in
blocks from Refuerzo. Said Refuerzo the ordinary course of business. The fact
The acquirer and possessor in good faith of
allegedly obtained the scrap from Marcelo that an estafa case was filed against the
a movable is entitled to be respected and
Steel Corp. through fraud/swindling. The vendor who sold the scrap to the Yus will
protected in his possession, as if he were
Yu v. Honrado public prosecutor did not find any collusion not disturb them in possession of the
the true owner thereof, until a competent
between the Yus and Refuerzo, who was movables.
court rules otherwise. (cited from Chua
charged with estafa. Controversy in this
Huai v Kapunan Jr.)
case revolves around who is now the As to the second issue, as between two
rightful possessor of the scrap: Marcelo, the innocent persons, the one who must suffer
original owner, or sps. Yu, the buyers in the consequences is the one who made the

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 FACTS HELD DOCTRINE
good faith. Alternatively, who should bear breach of trust possible. In this case, it is
the loss? Marcelo.
POSSESSION IN GOOD FAITH CONTINUES UNTIL POSSESSOR BECOMES AWARE OF WRONGFUL POSSESSION
Gregorio Ocampo died and left several
CABRAL NOT OWNER.
properties to his heirs, petitioners in this
1. The answer, which was the basis of the
case, one of which was land in
decision of the CA, was too late in the
controversy. They discovered that part of
course of the proceedings to be held
the land was occupied by Cabral, and that
binding between the parties.
she asserted that she was in open, actual,
2. Courts below found as a fact that the
adverse possession of such 50 years prior.
land is correctly registered in the name
Thus, Ocampos filed an ejectment case
of the plaintiffs.
against Cabral, prayer includes value of
3. Thus, no other conclusion but that the
harvest for time such land was in Cabral’s
Ocampos have the better right to the Good faith of possessor ceases from the
Cordero v. Cabral allegedly wrongful possession.
land. time he or she receives summons.
In the answer to the counterclaim,
ALTHOUGH CABRAL IS A POSSESSOR IN
Ocampos admitted that the possession of
GOOD FAITH, SUCH GOOD FAITH
the predecessor of Cabral (Rodriguez) was
CEASED WHEN THEY WERE SERVED
merely tolerated by Gregorio, when he was
WITH SUMMONS.
alive, because Gregorio intended to sell the
1. Thus, the fruits of the land which they
parcel of land to him. CA held this as an
received from the time the summons
“oral sale” binding upon the parties and
were instituted until present would
ruled that Cabral should be held as owner
have to be reimbursed.
of the property.
RIGHT TO LEASE THE THING
Respondent judge is directed to give due
course to the petition.
• The clause of the will establishing the
Fabie is the usufructuary of land inherited
usufruct specifically states that Fabie is
by Grey. The former instituted an action for
to perform all acts of administration—
unlawful detainer against one of the
collect the rents for herself, and to
lessees of the land, Ngo Soo. Respondent
conserve the property by making all The usufructuary, as administrator of the
Fabie v. David judge refused to give due course to the
necessary repairs and paying all the land, can lease it and choose its tenants.
petition on the ground that as a mere
taxes, special assessments, and
usufructuary, petitioner does not have the
insurance premiums thereon.
right to choose who the lessees of the land
• It would be contrary to the letter and
would be.
spirit of the will if the Court were to
uphold Grey’s contention that he is the
administrator of the property.
TO PAY FOR ANNUAL CHARGES AND TAXES ON THE FRUITS
Board of Samar is a domestic corp engaged in Samar should not pay realty tax to
Assessment Appeals mining industry. It decided to construct a alienable public lands that are leased to

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 FACTS HELD DOCTRINE
of Zamboanga del gravel road as a convenient means of it by the government. Road is an
Sur v. Samar Mining hauling its ores from the mine site to pier improvement, BUT, real tax should be paid
Company area. Since roads would traverse public by the owner of the land and not the
lands, Samar filed with the Bureau of usufructuary. Bislig case is applicable
Lands and the Bureau of Forestry, where the ownership of the road that was
miscellaneous lease applications for a road constructed by appellee belongs to the
right of way on lands under the jurisdiction government by right of accession. Also,
of said bureaus. Samar was given while the road in Bislig was constructed by
temporary permits to occupy and use such appellee therein primarily for its use and
lands, pursuant to which they built the benefit, the privilege is not exclusive, for,
Samico road finished in 1959 but lease under the lease contract entered into by
applications approved only in 1965. It then the appellee and the government, its use
received a letter assessing road as a real can also be availed of by the employees
estate which it to pay tax assessed at of the government and by the public in
around 1.2M. Samar appealed and argued general. Therefore, the road cannot be
that it is not subject to land since it is not considered as an improvement which
an improvement on the public land. belongs to apellee. Under Section 3(a) of
the Assessment Law (Com. Act 470), all
properties owned by the government,
without any distinction, are exempt from
taxation. Hence road cannot be assessed
realty tax.
EXPIRATION OF PERIOD, FULFILLMENT OF RESOLUTORY CONDITION
The parties in this case agreed to a barter The arrangement was one of usufruct. The
of their lands. Petitioner Baluran, owner of use of the term “barter” in describing the
unirrigated rice land, and Navarro, owner of agreement is not controlling since its
a residential lot, agreed to transfer material stipulations are clear enough to indicate
possession of their respective lands to the that there was no intention on the part of
other. The terms included that petitioner the signatories thereto to convey the
would have the right to construct a house ownership of their respective properties; all
on the residential lot and respondent would that was intended was to transfer the
have the right to enjoy the fruits of the rice material possession thereof. Under
Baluran v. Navarro land. The arrangement would end should condition No. 3 of the agreement, the
any of the heirs of the Navarro decide to parties retained the right to alienate their
settle in their municipality and use said respective properties which right is an
residential lot. Subsequently, the heir of element of ownership. With the material
Navarro filed a case against petitioner to possession being the only one transferred,
recover the residential lot as he had all that the parties acquired was the right of
decided to move into the municipality. usufruct which in essence is the right to
Petitioner contends that the barter enjoy the property of another. Under the
agreement validly transferred ownership of document in question, spouses Paraiso
the lot to him and the rice land to the would harvest the crop of the unirrigated

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 FACTS
respondent. In any case, petitioner
contends that the action of respondent has
prescribed.
On 1968, President Marcos issued a
Proclamation declaring 120 ha of land
belonging to the NHA as reserved property
as the site of the National Government
Center. Later issued another proclamation
NHA v. Court of
removing 7 ha from the reserve and
Appeals
granted the Manila Seedling Bank
Foundation usufructuary rights over it.
MSBF occupied the 7 ha and after
exceeded the allotted area (around 16 ha)
subject to its usufructuary rights. MSBF
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HELD DOCTRINE
riceland while the other party, Avelino
Baluran, could build a house on the
residential lot, subject to the condition, that
when any of the children of Natividad
Paraiso Obedencio, daughter of spouses
Paraiso, shall choose to reside in the
municipality and build his house on the
residential lot, Avelino Baluran shall be
obliged to return the lot to said children
“with damages to be incurred.”
The action of respondent has not
prescribed.
Usufruct may be constituted by the parties
for any period of time and under such
conditions as they may deem convenient
and beneficial subject to the provisions of
the Civil Code, Book II, Title VI on Usufruct.
The manner of terminating or extinguishing
the right of usufruct is primarily determined
by the stipulations of the parties which in
this case is the happening of the event
agreed upon. Plaintiff or respondent
Obedencio could not demand for the
recovery of possession of the residential lot
in question, not until he acquired that right
from his mother, Natividad Obedencio, and
which he did acquire when his mother
donated to him the residential lot on
October 4, 1974. After which, he lost no
time to file this action.
MSBF is entitled to conduct a survey to
determine the exact metes and bounds of
the 7 ha it holds in its usufructuary rights.
While NHA conducted its own survey, it is
the MSBF’s survey that must be followed, Rights of the usufruct contained in the title
pursuant to the law. Art. 565 states that the granting it; length of time for usufruct of
rights of the usufruct are those specified in corporations not to exceed 50 years.
the title granting the right. In thus case, the
title is the Proclamation, which states that
the determination of the 7a ha is ”by future
survey under the administration of the
Page 52 of 70
 FACTS HELD DOCTRINE
later leased a portion of the area it Foundation subject to private rights if there
occupied to stallholders, including co- be any”
respondent Bulacan Garden Corp. On The survey by MSBF shows that the stalls
1987, Pres. Aquino issued an MO revoking of BGC were well within the 7 ha. Hence,
the reserved status of 50 ha, more or less, NHA had no right to evict the latter.
out of the 120 ha of the NHA property. The
trial court cited the inaction of MSBF to
conduct a survey over which area they held While it was not proper to exceed the 7 ha
as usufruct and later denied the injunction granted to it, MSBF nevertheless still hold
filed by BGC. The NHA then demolished usufructuary rights over the property for a
BGC’s facilities. CA reversed. remaining 22 years. Art. 605 provides that
usufruct in favor of corporations should not
exceed 50 years. The usufruct was
established 28 years from the present
decision.
1. They cannot revoke such lands if
proven that such is part of the usufruct
Proclamation 481 set aside a parcel of land in favor of MSB, because usufruct has
A usufruct may be constituted for a
with an area of 120 hectares for NHA. Out not yet been extinguished. (See
specified term and under such conditions
of this area, 7 hectares were revoked by doctrine)
as the parties may deem convenient
Proc. No. 1670 in favor Manila Seedling 2. But the problem is that there are two
subject to the legal provisions on usufruct.
Bank, and MSB constituted a usufruct over conflicting surveys of the land, one
A usufructuary may lease the object held in
Bulacan Garden v. it. In exercise of its usufructuary rights, it from NHA and one from MSB.
usufruct.
Manila Seedling occupied 16 hectares and leased a portion 3. There is no doubt that Proclamation
ART. 565. The rights and obligations of the
Bank of the land to Bulacan Garden Corporation. 1670, as title constituting the usufruct,
usufructuary shall be those provided in the
Subsequently, Memorandum Order 127 gives MSB the freedom to survey such
title constituting the usufruct; in default of
revoked the reserved status of the 50 7 hectares as it wants, but the problem
such title, or in case it is deficient, the
hectares of the 120, and authorized NHA to here is that it occupied 16 hectares so
provisions contained in the two following
commercialize the area. NHA now tries to it cannot determine what part of the 16
Chapters shall be observed.
revoke such lands from MSB and BGC. should the 7 hectares be taken from.
4. Case remanded to the lower courts for
a joint survey by NHA and the MSB.
MODES OF ACQUIRING EASEMENTS
Petitioner is the owner of a mill site and a The action cannot prosper. Property does become clothed with a
hacienda. It constructed a road traversing • Petitioner constituted a voluntary public interest when used in a manner to
its property. Such road was used by the easement in favor of the community. make it of public consequence, and affect
community, including respondent who • Petitioner devoted the use of the road the community at large. When, therefore,
North Negros v.
owned a billiard hall and a tuba saloon. to a public purpose. one devotes his property to a use in which
Hidalgo
Petitioner stopped respondent from using • Thus, it is imbued with public interest the public has an interest, he, in effect,
the road, so he started passing through the and he cannot impose any exceptions grants to the public an interest in that use,
hacienda instead. Petitioner brought an that are discriminatory to a particular and must submit to be controlled by the
action for injunction to restraint respondent private individual. public for the common good, to the extent

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 FACTS HELD DOCTRINE
from passing through both the road and • The easement was without a period, of the interest he has thus created. He may
the hacienda. thus, North Negros can validly close withdraw his grant by discontinuing the
the road but cannot exclude just use; but, so long as he maintains the use,
respondent from its use. he must submit to the control.
BY TITLE—JURIDICAL ACT WHICH GIVES RISE TO THE SERVITUDE
Municipality is entitled to the inscription
in its name in the registry of property of
lot 1 of parcel 4 BUT land shall be
burdened with an easement of right of
Counsel for Municipality petitioned CFI for
way to allow passage to and from the side
registration of 6 parcels of land.
door of the Church to such extent as may
Municipality claims absolute ownership
be necessary for the transit of persons and
over the parcels by alleging that it acquired
4 wheeled vehicles. Municipal government
such by possession dating from time
of Dumangas has been in possession of
immemorial and that it occupied one of the
the lot for more than 30 years and during
parcels as a public market and the rest
this period, it performed acts of ownership.
being unoccupied. However, the
The Church never objected to or opposed
application for registration was opposed by
Dumangas v. Bishop such acts. The fact that the priests in
Director of Lands and Bishop Jaro (Roman
of Jaro charge consented to the acts of the
Catholic) on the ground that said lots
municipality shows that the church did not
exclusively belonged to Roman Catholic
consider that it had a right over the
Apostolic Church since time immemorial.
disputed portion of land it now claims. But
Municipality requested that certain parcels
the Church has acquired a right of access
of land be stricken out of its application for
through the side door by prescription.
registration. All oppositions were
From the time which elapsed since the
withdrawn except for that of the Roman
church was built, the municipality has not
Catholic Bishop of Jaro with regard to lot 1
prohibited the passage over the land.
of parcel 4.
Therefore, an easement of right of way over
said land has been acquired by
prescription, not only by the church, but
also by the public.
EXISTENCE OF AN APPARENT SIGN CONSIDERED A TITLE
Maria Florentino owned two lots. Petitioner An easement of light and view is According to Article 536, easements are
acquired the one upon which a camarin established in favor of the respondents and established by law or by will of the owners.
stood. The camarin (a warehouse) had 4 petitioner is prevented from constructing a Acquisition of easements is first by title or
windows through which light passed and two-storey establishment which would its equivalent and secondly by prescription.
was enjoyed by the respondents who destroy such easement.
Amor v. Florentino
occupied the other lot. Petitioner destroyed What acts take the place of title?
the old warehouse and started to build The easement of light and view was They are mentioned in Articles 540 and
instead a two-story house. Respondents established at the time of the death of the 541, namely, (1) a deed of recognition by
filed an action to prohibit petitioner herein original owner of both properties. At that the owner of the servient estate; (2) a final
from building higher than the original point, the requisite that there must be two judgment; and (3) an apparent sign

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 FACTS
structure and from executing any work
which would shut off the light and air that
had for many years been received through
the four windows referred to.
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HELD DOCTRINE
proprietors—one of the dominant estate between two estates, established by the
and another of the servient estate—was owner of both, which is the case of article
fulfilled, pursuant to Art. 541. 541.
Upon the establishment of an easement of
light and view, the concomitant and
concurrent easement not to build higher
(altius non tollendi) was also constituted,
because Maria Encarnacion Florentino, did
not object to the existence of the windows.
When petitioner bought the land and the
camarin thereon from Maria Encarnacion
Florentino, the burden of this easement
continued on the real property so acquired
because easements are inseparable from
the estate to which they actively or
passively pertain.
The easement has also been acquired
through respondents through prescription.
The easement involved in this case is of
two aspects: light and view and altius non
tollendi. This court in Cortes vs. Yu-Tibo,
supra, held that the easement concerned
when there is an apparent sign established
by the owner of two estates is positive.
This being so, and inasmuch as the original
heirs of Maria Florentino succeeded to
these two estates either in 1885 or in 1892
and as petitioner bought one of the lots in
1911, has elapsed without the necessity of
formal prohibition on the owner of the
servient estate. According to article 537 of
the Civil Code, continuous and apparent
easements may be acquired by
prescription for 20 years. Under sections
40 and 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
the period is 10 years.
Even if the petitioner was an innocent
purchaser for value of the lot and camarin
thereon, and that he was not bound to
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 FACTS
Plaintiffs have been in continuous and
uninterrupted use of a passage/road for
twenty years. Defendants who already
knew of such easement started
construction of a chapel in the middle of the
Ronquillo v. Roco
right of way. Plaintiffs protested, as they
could not use the right of way to go to their
homes. Plaintiffs allege that they have
acquired the easement through
prescription.
CHANGE IN WIDTH OF EASEMENT
Petitioner and respondent are owners of
adjacent estates, petitioner owning the
dominant estate and the respondent
owning the servient estate which separates
the dominant estate from the national
highway. A road traverses the servient
estate from the highway in order to provide
Encarnacion v. Heirs
access to the dominant estate. Such road
of Sagun
is 25 meters long and 1 meter wide.
Encarnacion, because his flower business
was flourishing, wanted a wider road in
order to accommodate his jeepney. But
respondent refused, saying that there was
another access 80 meters away, through a
dried riverbed.
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HELD DOCTRINE
know the existence of the easement (which
he was not because he could have inquired
from the original owner from which he
acquired the land of the significance of the
open windows) it has been held that
purchasers of lands burdened with
apparent easements do not enjoy the rights
of third persons who acquire property,
though the burden is not recorded.
BY PRESCRIPTION
Plaintiffs’ contention has no merit.
Easement of right of way cannot be
acquired through prescription. Easement of
right of way is a discontinuous easement. A
Definition of discontinuous easement and
right of way is only used in intervals (i.e.
application of prescription.
when people actually use it); when it is not
being used, the owner of the dominant
estate is undisturbed in his right of
ownership and right of exclusion.
ENCARNACION ENTITLED TO A WIDER
RIGHT OF WAY.
• The dried riverbed does not provide
access to the national highway, so
cannot satisfy right of way.
• Generally, the right of way may be
• Thus, where private property has no
demanded: (1) when there is absolutely
access to a public road, it has the right
no access to a public highway, and (2)
of eastment over adjacent servient
when, even if there is one, it is difficult
estates.
or dangerous to use or is grossly
• Art. 651 says that “the width of the
insufficient.
eastment of the right of way shall be
• Under the law, it is the needs of the
that which is sufficient for the needs of
dominant property which ultimately
the dominant estate, and may be
determine the width of the passage.
changed from time to time.”
• Thus, it is the needs of the dominant
property which determines the width of
the passage.
• Encarnacion then has the right of way
for the convenience of allowing his jeep
to pass through.
Page 56 of 70
 FACTS
NOT TO ALTER EASEMENT OR RENDER IT MORE BURDENSOME
Petitioners are owners of haciendas who
entered into individual agreements with
respondent for an easement of right of way
7 meters wide for a period of 50 years.
Such easement was to be used for a
railroad that would carry carts of sugarcane
produced by petitioners.
Petitioners likewise undertook to deliver
sugarcane to respondent by executing
Valderrama v. North milling contracts. However, when they
Negros were not able to produce the needed
amount, North Negros sourced its
sugarcane elsewhere but it still used the
railroad to transport the sugarcane to its
mill.
It is petitioners’ contention that the
continued use of the railroad for the
transport of sugarcane sourced from other
places is contrary to the terms of the
agreement.
NATURAL DRAINAGE OF WATERS
Donã Gorgonia Velasco Vda. de Ongsiako The donation cannot be unilaterally revoked
executed a donation inter vivos in favor of through a notarial deed.
her 9 children. Emilia and Ramon allegedly • It can only be done through court
Ongsiako v.
had larger shares because such shares
Ongsiako
were low lands subject to the easement of • Action already prescribed.
aqueduct.
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HELD DOCTRINE
North Negros can continue to use the
railroad for transporting sugarcane not
produced by petitioners.
• The terms of the contract are not
ambiguous. The right of way
established is not subject to the
condition that it be used only for
petitioners’ products.
• Easement is meant to benefit the
dominant estate. In this case,
respondent may cause its wagons to
pass upon the road as many times as it
may deem fit, according to the needs
of the central.
It is against the nature of the easement to
pretend that it was established in favor of
The act of transporting along the railroad
the servient estates, because it is a well-
cane other than that of the plaintiffs DOES
settled rule that things serve their owner by
NOT alter the easement or make it more
reason of ownership and not by reason of
burdensome.
easement.
• If the width were to be extended, then
it would be altered.
• If excavations or materials were
deposited outside the area of 7 meters,
then it would be more burdensome.
Further, the easement was established for
a period of 50 years, while the individual
milling contracts were only for 30 years. It
would be absurd to think that for the
remaining 20 years after the expiration of
the milling contracts, the railroad can no
longer be used because there would be no
more sugarcane coming from petitioners.
action.
• Since there was no judicial revocation,
the title to the land did not revert back
Page 57 of 70
 FACTS HELD DOCTRINE
One of the other donees, Caridad, later to the donor.
discovered that Emilia and Ramon had
constructed dikes to impede the flow of The cause of action for the violation of the
water. Thus, their mother executed a legal easement had already prescribed.
notarial deed revoking the donation with • The easement is continuous because it
respect to Emilia and Ramon. is not subject to acts of man but to
gravity.
Caridad seeks the revocation of the • Extinction due to non-user: 10 years.
donation. She alleges that the construction • In this case: dikes were built in 1937 or
of dikes violated the easement of 1938, and the action was brought only
aqueduct. Further, she claims that through in 1951, beyond the prescriptive
a fraudulent partition, she was deprived of period.
27 ha. of land.
The cause of action for the fraudulent
partition had already prescribed.
• The partition was done in 1929. The
action was filed in 1951.
EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY
Anastacia Quimen with her brothers Court ruled that the best way to make
Sotero, Sulpicio, Antonio and sister Rufina Yolanda’s properties accessible is through
inherited a piece of property. They Anastacia’s property. Further, the voluntary
subdivided it equally among themselves. easement between Yolanda and Anastacia
However, the shares of the rest of her has become a legal easement.
siblings abutted the municipal road. Lot of
Antonio was divided into 2. Yolanda, Evidence shows that the property of
Sotero’s daughter, purchased one of the 2 Yolanda is hemmed in by the estates of
shares from her uncle Antonio through others, hence she did not cause the
Administratrix Anastacia. Yolanda was isolation of her property. She offered to pay
hesitant to buy it because it had no access 200 per sqm to Anastacia as agreed upon
Quimen v. Court of to the public road. Anastacia however which the latter refused. Article 650 of
Appeals assured her that she would be given right NCC states that easements of right of
of way on her adjoining property for P200 way shall be established at the point
per square meter. She thereafter least prejudicial to the servient estate
constructed a house on the lot she bought and, insofar as consistent with this rule,
using Anastacia’s property as her where the distance from the dominant
passageway to the highway. But when estate to a public highway may be the
Yolanda finally offered to pay for the use of shortest. The criterion of least prejudice
the pathway, Anastacia refused to accept to the servient estate must prevail over
payment. Yolanda was thereafter barred the criterion of shortest distance. Hence,
from passing through her property. as between a right of way that would
demolish a store of strong materials to
Four years after her purchase of the first provide a right of way to a public highway,

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Chan v. Court of
Appeals
La Vista Association
v. Court of Appeals
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FACTS
lot, Yolanda purchased the other lot of
Antonio, BUT STILL, she needed part of
Anastacia’s property for passageway for
Sotero’s sari-sari store was obstructing the
path. Hence she filed an action praying for
a right of way through Anastacia’s
property. Trial Court dismissed complaint.
CA reversed.
Petitioner seeks to prevent private
respondent from fencing off his property,
preventing petitioner from passing through
his lot to get to the highway.
Petitioner’s lot was almost completely
surrounded by other immovables and cut
off from the highway. Her only access to
the highway was a very small opening
measuring two feet four inches wide
through the aforementioned property of
private respondent. Petitioner believed she
was entitled to a wider compulsory
easement of right of way through the said
property of private respondent.
Subject of the controversy is the existence
of a right-of-way in Mangyan Road, a
property originally belonging to the Tuasons
and traverses La Vista, Ateneo, Miriam,
and LGV. Philippine Building Corp. bought
part of the Tuason properties. PBC then
sold and assigned a portion of the property
to Ateneo. Meanwhile, the Tuasons
developed part of the property into what is
now La Vista. Ateneo informed La Vista
that it will develop part of the property into a
subdivision; however, negotiations between
La Vista ad Ateneo fell through, causing
Ateneo to sell the property to the public.
The buyer was Solidhomes, the developer
of LGV. La Vista informed Solidhomes that
HELD
and another right of way which although
longer will only require an avocado tree to
be cut down, the second alternative should
be preferred. (The problem with the
avocado tree was that Anastacia
contended that she earned a profit of P600
every year because of the tree’s fruits.
Estimating that the tree had a lifespan of 70
years, she expected a great profit from it. –
not proved though)
Petitioner is not entitled to the easement.
Petitioner has failed to prove that existence
of the elements of a compulsory right of
way. It was plaintiff who built a concrete
fence on the southern boundary of her
property to separate it from the property of
the Pineda family. Worse, during the
pendency of the case, she closed the 28-
inch clearance which she could use as a
means to reach the National Highway
without passing through the property of
defendant. Plaintiff thus failed to meet the
third requisite for the grant of an easement
of right of way. Court of Appeals also ruled
that petitioner failed to prove she made a
valid tender of the proper indemnity,
There is a voluntary easement in this case.
There is a contractual right of way between
La Vista and Solidhomes’ predecessor-in-
interest, i.e. Ateneo and the Tuasons. La
Vista repeatedly admitted of the existence
of the right of way between it and Ateneo,
specifically 7½ m right of way to each of
them. Voluntary easements can only be
extinguished mutually or by renunciation of
the owner of the dominant estate.
DOCTRINE
Requisites of a compulsory right of way:
• The estate is surrounded by other
immovables and is without adequate
outlet to a public highway;
• Proper indemnity is paid;
• The isolation is not due to the
proprietor’s own acts; and
• The right of way claimed is at a point
least prejudicial to the servient estate
and, insofar as consistent with this
rule, where the distance from the
dominant estate to a public highway
may be the shortest.
The owner of an estate may claim a legal
or compulsory right-of-way only after he
has established the existence of the ff.:
1. The estate is surrounded by other
immovable and is without adequate
outlet to a public highway;
2. After payment of proper indemnity;
3. Isolation was not due to the proprietor’s
own acts; and
4. Right-of-way claimed is appoint least
prejudicial to the servient estate and
where the distance from the dominant
estate to a public highway may be the
shortest.
Page 59 of 70
 FACTS
it does not recognize the right of way in
favor of the latter since the original
easement was only for Ateneo. La Vista
then put up concrete posts and stationed
security guards to prevent entry into LGV
by way of Mangyan Road, which traverses
La Vista.
Daniel Panganiban owns a lot which is
adjacent to the lot of the petitioners.
Behind the lot of the petitioners is the
provincial road and behind the lot of
Panganiban is the Sta. Ana river.
Vda. de Baltazar v. Panganiban filed a complaint asking for a
Court of Appeals permanent and perpetual right of way
through the property of Baltazar, which
was used before but subsequently
obscured by the Baltazars. Defense of
Baltazar was there exists two other rights
of way adjacent to Panganiban’s property.
Petitioners are the owners of a parcel of
land located behind that of respondent.
The subject matter of this case is a 1.1m
wide strip of land being used as a pathway
to and from 18th Ave., the nearest public
highway from petitioner’s property.
Respondent had her property re-surveyed
and it was only then that she discovered
Sps. De la Cruz v.
that the pathway being used by petitioners
Ramiscal
was actually part of her property. As
petitioners were operating a karaoke and
kambingan, they erected structures along
the pathway.
Respondent brought this action to compel
petitioners to demolish the structures they
erected on her land. Petitioners claim that
they are entitled to an easement of right of
Celine De Guzman | Ish Guidote | Desiree Ico | Pola Lamarca | Ross Tugade
HELD DOCTRINE
On the other hand, a voluntary easement
is created simply by will or agreement of
the parties.
For the right of way to be granted, there
are four requisites to be satisfied:
• The estate is surrounded by other
immovable and without outlet to a
public highway
• After payment of the proper indemnity
• The isolation was not due to
proprietor’s own acts (Merely bought
Four requisites of the right of way.
land from Baltazars)
• Right of way claimed is at a point least
prejudicial to servient estate (Right of
way demanded is the shortest way and
most convenient)
• In this case, all such requisites are
satisfied by Panganiban in asking for
the perpetual right of way.
There is no voluntary easement.
• Petitioners failed to prove that they had
in fact entered into an agreement with
respondent.
• In fact, counsel for the respondent
categorically informed petitioners that
his client desired that the pathway be
closed.
Neither is there a compulsory easement.
• First, there is in fact in this case an
adequate outlet from petitioner’s
property to a public highway (Boni
Serrano). The fact that 18th Ave. would
be closer and more convenient for its
tenants does not mean that petitioners
are entitled to a right of way.
• Second, no indemnity was paid to
respondents.
Page 60 of 70
 FACTS HELD DOCTRINE
way. • Third, the isolation of petitioners’
property was due to the acts of their
predecessor-in-interest. A subdivision
plan indicated that there would be an
area of the land to be used as an alley.
Instead, houses were constructed on
said area.
MIXED DONATIONS
Catalina de Reyes, a widow and
grandmother of plaintiff, was awarded a On WON the donation was simple or
60.10sqm lot which is a portion of the onerous, court ruled that it was simple.
Monserrat Estate (public land owned by Even if Lagazo’s full payment of the
the City of Manila and distributed for sale purchase price was a burden to him, such
to bona fide tenants under its land-for-the- payment was not however imposed by the
landless program). Catalina then donor as a condition for the donation. The
constructed a house on the said lot, She payments made by petitioner were merely
executed a special power of attorney in his voluntary acts. As a simple donation,
favour of her son-in-law Eduardo B. it should be governed by Arts. 734, 746 &
Español before she left for Canada 749. However, it appears that the deed of
authorizing him to execute all documents donation was not accepted by Lagazo.
necessary for the final adjudication of her During trial, he did not present any
Lagazo v. Court of
claim as awardee of the lot. Eduardo failed instrument evidencing such acceptance.
Appeals
to accomplish this so Catalina revoked the Also, there is a need for proof that a formal
authority where she executed another notice of such acceptance was received by
power of attorney in favour of Tito Lagazo the donor and noted in both the deed of
(grandson). She executed thereafter a donation and separate instrument
Deed of Donation over subject lot to embodying the acceptance. Annotation in
Lazago. The letter, however, found out that both instruments of donation and
land was in the delinquent list so he paid acceptance was not fulfilled by Lagazo.
the instalments in arrears and the Therefore, the subject lot cannot be
remaining balance. Lazago then sent a adjudicated to him. This does not
demand to defendant Cabanlit to vacate necessarily mean, however, that private
premises. Defendant refused claiming respondent is automatically the rightful
ownership by virtue of a deed of sale owner.
executed by Catalina.
IMPORTANCE OF CLASSIFICATION: VALIDITY AND REVOCATION OF DONATION
Petitioners seeks to annul the decision of The donations were valid. The requisites for a valid donation mortis
the CA which held that the donations made causa are that the donor:
Bonsato v. Court of in their favor were mortis causa donations The donations in this case were inter vivos. (1) Convey no title or ownership to the
Appeals and therefore, due to failure to comply with transferee before the death of the
the form of a will, void. Petitioners contend None of the characteristics of a donation transferor; or, what amounts to the same
that the donations were made inter vivos. mortis causa is discernible in the deeds of thing, that the transferor should retain the

Celine De Guzman | Ish Guidote | Desiree Ico | Pola Lamarca | Ross Tugade Page 61 of 70
 FACTS HELD
donation, executed by the late Domingo
Bonsato. The donor only reserved for
himself, during his lifetime, the owner’s
share of the fruits or produce, a reservation
that would be unnecessary if the ownership
of the donated property remained with the
donor. Most significant is the absence of
stipulation that the donor could revoke the
donations; on the contrary, the deeds
expressly declare them to be “irrevocable”,
a quality absolutely incompatible with the
idea of conveyances mortis causa where
revocability is of the essence of the act, to
the extent that a testator can not lawfully
waive or restrict his right of revocation.
DOCTRINE
ownership (full or naked) and control of the
property while alive, (2) That before his
death, the transfer should be revocable by
the transferor at will, ad nutum; but
revocability may be provided for indirectly
by means of a reserved power in the donor
to dispose of the properties conveyed, (3)
That the transfer should be void if the
transferor should survive the transferee.

Being donations inter vivos, the solemnities

Sps. Diego and Catalina Danlag owned six
parcles of unregistered land. They
executed three deeds of donation mortis
causa in favor of Mercedes Danlag-Pilapil,
an illegitimate daughter of Diego. After
eight years, Diego, with the consent of
Catalina, again executed a donation inter
Gestopa v. Court of vivos over the same properties to
Appeals Mercedes. The second donation contained
the conditions that 1) the donor spouses
shall continue to enjoy the fruits of the land
during their lifetime (a usufruct) and 2) the
donee cannot sell or dispose of the land
during the lifetime of the spouses.
Sometime later, the donor spouses sold the
same lands to petitioners sps. Gestopa.
required for them were those prescribed by
Article 633 of the Civil Code of 1889
(reproduced in Art. 749 of the new Code,
and it is undisputed that these were duly
complied with. As the properties involved
were conjugal, the Court of First Instance
correctly decided that the donations could
not affect the half interest inherited by the
respondents Josefa Utea, et al. from the
predeceased wife of the donor.
The donation is a valid donation inter vivos.
In determining w/n a donation is inter vivos
or mortis causa, the intention of the parties
is controlling. In this case, it was shown that
the donors intended to donate the
In determining whether or not a donation is
properties out of liberality. The donation
inter vivos or mortis causa, the intent of the
effectively transferred ownership to her.
parties is controlling. The intent that must
The condition that Mercedes cannot sell
be determined pertains to when the transfer
during their lifetime only served to protect
of ownership takes effect. In inter vivos, it is
the usufruct of the donors. It was
after the acceptance of the donation. In
established that Mercedes accepted the
mortis causa, upon the death of the donor.
donation, did not show any act of
ingratitude, and complied with all
conditions. The allegation that the donation
left the donors had no property left was not
proven. Also, the fact that the spouses

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 FACTS
The donors then executed a deed of
revocation of the donation.
Mercedes assailed the sale and the
revocation. On the other hand, donors
assers that the donation was null and void
due to undue influence from Mercedes.
Assuming arguendo it was valid, the
donation was mortis causa and hence did
not transfer the ownership yet to Mercedes.
The donation was also void for it left the
donor with no property at all.
Basilisa Commerciante executed a Deed of
Donation over a parcel of land she owns in
favor of her children, including petitioner in
this case. One of the children (Consolacion)
subsequently mortgaged the property,
Austria-Magat v.
which Basilisa redeemed (through a third
Court of Appeals
party) and subsequently, Basilia sold the
property her petitioner daughter. Other
children of Basilisa assail the sale to
Austria-Magat, and they ask for the
reconveyance of such title to them.
WHO MAY GIVE OR RECEIVE DONATIONS
Petitioner is a widower. After the death of The survivorship agreement is not a
Vitug v. Court of
his wife, he allegedly made certain donation mortis causa or inter vivos—it is
Appeals
advances to her estate consisting of estate an aleatory contract.
Celine De Guzman | Ish Guidote | Desiree Ico | Pola Lamarca | Ross Tugade
HELD DOCTRINE
executed a subsequent donation inter vivos
shows that they were well aware of the
difference and legal effects.
Since the ownership now lies with
Mercedes, the sale and revocation made by
the donors is void. The revocation,
moreover, had no legal effect since it did
not comply with the requirements of Art.
769.
1. Whether the donation is inter vivos or
mortis causa depends on whether the
donor intended to transfer ownership
THE DONATION IS INTER VIVOS, NOT
over the properties upon the execution
MORTIS CAUSA
of the deed.
• The irrevocability of the donation, a
controlling characteristic of inter vivos
2. Characteristics of Donation Mortis
donations, is obvious in the line “at
Causa:
hindi ito mababawi” in the Deed.
• That the donation would be effective
(1) It conveys no title or ownership to
only after death of Basilisa is not
the transferee before the death of
controlling, as title would still transfer
the transferor; or, what amounts to
• Another indicator of nature of donation
the same thing, that the transferor
inter vivos is the acceptance clause in
should retain the ownership (full or
the donation, because mortis cause
naked) and control of the property
need not be accepted, since such is in
while alive;
the nature of inheritance.
(2) That before his death, the transfer
Mere selling of Basilia to petitioner the land
should be revocable by the
cannot be considered as a valid act of
transferor at
will, ad nutum; but
revocation of deed of donation.
revocability may be provided for
• It must be formal under Art. 764, and
indirectly by means of a reserved
prescribed in 4 years.
power in the donor to dispose of
the properties conveyed;
Action for Reconveyance granted.
(3) That the transfer should be void if
the transferor should survive the
transferee.
Spouses cannot donate property to each
other. “Survivorship agreements,” however,
are not donations because they involve not
Page 63 of 70
 FACTS
tax, deficiency estate tax, and
“increment thereto.”
He brought this action to claim
reimbursement. He claims the funds used
were his personal funds.
It appears that the subject funds were
taken from a joint account between the
spouses with Bank of America. However,
such account was subject to a
“survivorship agreement”—it stipulated
that if one of the spouses should die, the
deposits would become the sole property
of the surviving spouse.
Trial court allowed the reimbursement. CA
reversed and held that since it was a
donation mortis causa, it is not valid
because it did not conform with the
formalities of wills.
Jose Hemedes is the father of Maxima and
Enrique. Jose executed “Donation Inter
Vivos with Resolutory Conditions” whereby
he conveyed the subject land in favor of his
third wife, Justa Kausapin. The resolutory
conditions of which are: (a) upon death or
remarriage of done, title to property shall
revert back to children or their heirs, of the
Hemedes v. Court of donor expressly designated by done in
Appeals public document conveying property to
latter or (b) in absence of such an express
designation made by the donee before her
death or remarriage contained in a public
instrument as above provided, the title to
the property shall automatically revert to
the legal heirs of the donor in common.
Pursuant to the first condition, Justa
Kausapin executed “Deed of Conveyance
Celine De Guzman | Ish Guidote | Desiree Ico | Pola Lamarca | Ross Tugade
HELD DOCTRINE
an • In a donation mortis causa, the the exclusive property of either spouse but
property donated must pertain to the conjugal property.
testator. In the case at bar, the
property subject of the agreement was While such agreements are not per se
conjugal in nature. against the law, there are instances where
• Neither is it a donation inter vivos, their operation or effects may be violative
because first, it was to take effect after of the law, such as when:
the death of one party. • It is a mere cloak to hide an inofficious
• It is also not a donation between donation;
spouses because it does not involve • It is used to transfer property in fraud
the conveyance of a spouse’s own of creditors;
(exclusive) property to the other. • It is used to defeat the legitime of a
forced heir.
Under Art. 2010 of the Civil Code, an
aleatory contract is one where one or both No such vice has been imputed and
of the parties “reciprocally bind themselves established in this case.
to give or to do something in consideration
of what the other shall give or do upon the
happening of an event which is uncertain,
or which is to occur at an indeterminate
time.”
• The contract in this case is a mere
obligation with a term, the term being
death.
The conveyance to Maxima effectively
transferred ownership over the land and
not the “Kasunduan” with Enrique. The
allegation that the “Deed of Conveyance
by Reversion” executed by Justa in favor
of Maxima is spurious is not supported
by evidence. Justa is a biased witness.
She is 80 years old, suffering from
worsening physical infirmities, and
completely dependent on Enrique for
support. Further, the invocation of Article
1332 (vitiated consent) is improper
because Justa in this case denies
knowledge of the deed and not because
her consent was vitiated. Hence, the
donation in favor of ENRIQUE is null and
void for the purported object thereof did
not exist at the time of the transfer, having
Page 64 of 70
 FACTS HELD DOCTRINE
by Reversion”, conveying the property to already been transferred to his sister.
Maxima Hemedes. Maxima then
constituted a real estate mortgage over the
property and the property was
extrajudicially foreclosed by R&B insurance
for Maxima’s failure to pay the loan she
obtained. Meanwhile, despite the earlier
conveyance by Justa to Maxima, Justa
executed a “Kasunduan” conveying the
same property to her stepson Enrique.
Enrique then sold the property to
Dominium Realty.
TIME OF ACCEPTANCE OF DONATION INTER VIVOS AND MORTIS CAUSA
The donation was simple, not onerous.
Even conceding that petitioner’s full
payment of the purchase price of the lot
might have been a burden to him, such
payment was not however imposed by the
donor as a condition for the donation. The
donor did not have any intention to burden
or charge petitioner as the donee. The
words in the deed are in fact typical of a
pure donation.
Petitioner sought to recover from
defendant-appellant a parcel of land which
Where the deed of donation fails to show
the former claims to have acquired from his A simple or pure donation is one whose
the acceptance, or where the formal notice
grandmother by donation. Private cause is pure liberality (no strings
of the acceptance, made in a separate
Lagazo v. Court of respondent, on the other hand, put up the attached), while an onerous donation is
instrument, is either not given to the donor
Appeals defense that when the alleged donation one which is subject to burdens, charges
or else not noted in the deed of donation
was executed, he had already acquired or future services equal to or more in value
and in separate acceptance, the donation
property by a Deed of Assignment from a than the thing donated.
is null and void.” Exhibit E (the deed of
transferee of plaintiff-appellee’s
donation) does not show any indication
grandmother.
that petitioner-donee accepted the gift.
During the trial, he did not present any
instrument evidencing such acceptance
despite the fact that private respondent
already raised this allegation in his
supplemental pleading to which petitioner
raised no objection.

True, the acceptance of a donation may be

made at any time during the lifetime of the

Celine De Guzman | Ish Guidote | Desiree Ico | Pola Lamarca | Ross Tugade Page 65 of 70

Sumipat v. Banga
Calicdan v. Cendaña
Celine De Guzman | Ish Guidote | Desiree Ico | Pola Lamarca | Ross Tugade
FACTS HELD DOCTRINE
donor. And granting arguendo that such
acceptance may still be admitted in
evidence on appeal, there is still need for
proof that a formal notice of such
acceptance was received by the donor and
noted in both the deed of donation and the
separate instrument embodying the
acceptance. At the very least, this last legal
requisite of annotation in both instruments
of donation and acceptance was not
fulfilled by petitioner. For this reason, the
subject lot cannot be adjudicated to him.
DONATIONS PROPTER NUPTIAS
Sps. Placida and Lauro Sumipat were the
owners of 3 parcels of land acquired during
their marriage. They had no children of their
own but Lauro sired 5 illegitimate children
with a mistress. Lauro allegedly executed a
donation in favor of the children while he
was already sick and in his deathbed.
Meanwhile, Placida, an unlettered woman, SC annulled the donation on the basis of
was made to sign the document without failure to meet the formalities of a donation.
having appraised of its contents. She later The donation was a patent nullity from the
In the absence of the formalities of the
filed an action for the declaration of nullity beginning. The Court did not pass upon the
donation, the transfer is void. It is subject to
of the contracts and recovery of the issue of the absence of consent. In this
attack at any time.
properties. The trial court noted that the case, the formality not complied with was
properties were part of the conjugal that stated in Art. 749, or the indication of
property; however, Placida failed to acceptance in a public instrument.
question the authenticity of the deed thus
making the transfer valid. The CA
meanwhile said that it was not shown that
the contents were fully explained to
Placida, who could not read, hence
annulling the titles to the extent of Placida’s
conjugal share.
RESERVATION FOR SUPPORT OF DONOR AND RELATIVES ENTITLED TO BE SUPPORTED
Sixto Calicdan owned a parcel of land 760 DONATION IS INVALID. 1. Definition and kinds of prescription.
sq.m. in area, which he left to his wife • Fermina cannot be the owner thereof,
Fermina when he died. Fermina executed a as such property was not part of the 2. Even assuming that the donation
deed of donation inter vivos to Silverio conjugal property. propter nuptias is void for failure to
Cendaña. Soledad Calicdan, a child of BUT ACTION ON LAND BARRED BY comply with formal requisites, it could
Sixto and Fermina, filed for the recovery of PRESCRIPTION still constitute a legal basis for adverse
ownership of the land. RTC found that • The Cendanas were already in the possession.
Page 66 of 70
 FACTS HELD DOCTRINE
Fermina was not the valid owner of the open, continuous and adverse
land, as the land was not part of the possession of the land for 45 years
conjugal properties of Sixto and herself, (1947 -1992)
since it was Sixto’s parents who gave the • Thus, extraordinary prescription sets in
same to him. CA said the donation is valid, as such does not require an actual or
but action has already prescribed. just title.
• Although donation is invalid, it may be
used as proof of good faith
possession.
EFFECT OF DONATION: IN GENERAL
In 1993, Dr. Felipe Roque entered into a
lease agreement with petitioner. After Dr.
Roque died, petitioner attempted to The donation of the property to Efren is
negotiate with his son, Efren. The latter binding on petitioner.
advised petitioner to “cease and desist • According to Art. 709, CC, “titles of
from attempting to enforce the contract of ownership, or other rights over
lease” it executed with his late father. immovable property, which are not
duly annotated in the Registry of
Efren filed a complaint for annulment of the Property shall not prejudice third
contract of lease. He claimed that as early persons.”
as 1978, he was already the absolute • Thus, “a person dealing with registered
owner of the property leased to petitioner, land may safely rely on the correctness
In general, a deed of donation must be
and that his father had no authority to enter of the certificate of title issued
registered with the Registry of Property
into the lease agreement because he was therefore, and he is not required to go
(Registry of Land Titles and Deeds) in order
no longer the owner of the subject land. beyond the certificate to determine the
to bind third persons.
Shopper’s Paradise condition of the property.” (Santos v.
Realty v. Roque Trial court dismissed the petition because CA)
However, actual knowledge, even without
since he failed to register the donation with • However, “where such (third) party
registration, produces the same effect (i.e.
the Registry of Property, the same cannot has knowledge of a prior existing
the third person is bound by the effects of
bind third persons. interest which is unregistered at the
the donation).
time he acquired a right thereto, his
The CA reversed and held that since at the knowledge of that prior unregistered
time petitioner entered into the lease interest would have the effect of
agreement, it knew of the donation, it was registration as regards to him.”
not a lessee in good faith. Thus, the lease (Lagandaon v. CA)
agreement was declared invalid. • As already mentioned, prior knowledge
was proven in this case. Dr. Roque had
It turns out that at the time of the execution no authority to enter into the lease
of the lease agreement, petitioner’s contract and the same was known to
representative was told that the property the petitioner.
had already been donated to Efren, but the
latter delegated the acts of administration

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 FACTS HELD DOCTRINE
to his late father.
ALIENATIONS AND MORTGAGES
Pedro Calapine was the registered owner
of a parcel of land as evidenced by OCT.
He then executed a deed entitled
Falsification of deed is a ground for
“Pagbibigay-Pala” (donacion inter vivos)
revocation but the buyers in this case
ceding ½ portion thereof to his niece Helen
were in good faith. All crimes which
Doria. Tehereafter, another deed was
offend the donor show ingratitude and are
executed ceding the entire land to Helen.
causes to revocation. Clearly, petitioner
Helem then donated part of it to a church
deleted this 1st sentence of the CC
Eduarte v. Court of and sold part to Eduarte spouses while
provision so as to be in favour of its
Appeals keeping a part to herself. Pedro then wants
contention. But the Eduarte spouses are
to revoke donation claiming that his
nd buyers in good faith and for value hence
signature in the 2 donation was a forgery
the deed of sale stands. The proper
and that Helen was unworthy of his
recourse of the donor who was prejudiced
liberality. Helen, as a defense, argued that
is to bring an action for damages against
the acts of Ingratitude referred in the CC as
the person who caused/employed fraud.
ground for revocation does not apply to
offenses against public interest, but only to
offenses against person/property of donor.
Aurora Directo, Rodolfo Noceda and Maria The Supreme Court denied the petition and
Arbizo extrajudicially settled a parcel of affirmed the decision of both the trial court
land. On the same date, Directo donated and the Court of Appeals. The Court ruled
625 square meters of her share to Noceda, that petitioner’s act of occupying the
who is her nephew being the son of her portion pertaining to private respondent
deceased sister, Carolina. Subsequently, Directo without the latter’s knowledge is an
the same parties executed another act of usurpation which is an offense
extrajudicial settlement partition of the against property of the donor and
same lot. 3/5 of the said land went to considered as an act of ingratitude of a
Arbizo while Directo and Noceda got only donee against the donor. The law does not
Noceda v. Court of one-fifth each. Sometime in 1981, Noceda require conviction of the donee, it is
Appeals constructed a house on the land donated enough that the
to him by Directo. Directo fenced the offense be proved in the action for
portion allotted to her in the extrajudicial revocation. With regard to the contention
settlement, excluding the donated lot and of petitioner Noceda that the right to
constructed thereon 3 huts. However, in enforce the revocation of the donation had
1985, Noceda removed the fence earlier already prescribed, the Court was not
constructed by Directo and occupied the 3 persuaded. The Court ruled that while the
huts and fenced the entire lot of Directo complaint for revocation was filed more
without her consent. Directo demanded than one (1) year from the alleged
from Noceda to vacate her land, but the usurpation by petitioner of private
latter refused. Directo filed a complaint for respondent’s share in the subject lot, no

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 FACTS HELD DOCTRINE
recovery of possession and competent proof was adduced by
rescission/annulment of donation, against petitioner to prove his allegation. The
Noceda before the trial court. The trial action to revoke by reason of ingratitude
court rendered a decision in favor of prescribes within one (1) year to be
Directo. The trial court ordered Noceda to counted from the time (a) the donor had
vacate and reconvey the property to knowledge of the fact; (b) provided that it
Directo. The trial court also declared the was possible for him to bring the action. It
extrajudicial settlement dated August 17, is incumbent upon petitioner to show proof
1981 valid and revoked the Deed of of the concurrence of these two condition
Donation dated June 1, 1981. in order that the one (1) year period for
bringing the action be considered to have
already prescribed. According to the Court,
no competent proof was adduced by
petitioner to prove his allegation The Court
stressed that in civil cases, the party
having the burden of proof must establish
his case by preponderance of evidence
and he who alleges a fact has the burden
of proving it and a mere allegation is not
evidence.
VIOLATION OF CONDITION: TRANSMISSIBILITY OF ACTION
CJ Yulo donated a parcel of land in Donation cannot be revoked. The very Four types of donation:
Canlubang Laguna to the Church for the reason for the breach of the requirement of 1. Pure or simple donation: cause is
purpose of putting up a home for the aged. consent for leasing the property was to plain gratuity;
One of the conditions is that the land raise money for the retirement home. The 2. Remuneratory/compensatory
cannot be leased to a third party without the lease contracts were entered into for the donation: purpose is to reward the
Yulo and Sons v. donor’s consent. The Church leased the sole purpose of pursuing the primary done for past services that do not
Roman Catholic property 3 times to different people without objective of the donation. The donation amount to a demandable debt;
Bishop of San Pablo Yulo’s consent. It was stated that the here is an onerous donation, which, 3. Conditional/modal donation: in
reason for the lease was to raise more according to Art. 733, is governed by the consideration of future services;
funds for the retirement home. Yulo filed an law on contracts. Thus, the donation cannot Onerous donation: imposes a reciprocal
action to revoke the donation for non- be rescinded because the character of the obligation/a donation made for a valuable
compliance and violation of conditions. breach does not defeat the purpose of the consideration.
donation.
RIGHT OF LESSEE TO SUSPEND PAYMENT OF RENTALS
Respondent J.C. Agricom Development The Supreme Court affirmed the Decision
Corporation, Inc. (Agricom) is the owner of of the Court of Appeals. Petitioner had not
a rubber plantation in Davao City. The been disturbed in her legal possession of
Chua Tee Dee v.
rubber plantation was leased to petitioner the property in derogation of Article 1654
Court of Appeals
Chua Tee Dee, a businesswoman doing of the New Civil Code. When the
business under the name and style of petitioner’s representative saw that a
Pioneer Enterprises (Pioneer). As Pioneer portion of the leased premises was being

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 FACTS
was unable to pay its monthly rentals,
Agricom filed a civil complaint for sum of
money, damages and attorney’s fees
against Chua Tee Dee. Petitioner asserted
that the plaintiff had no cause of action
against her. She claimed that it was
respondent which failed to comply with the
terms and conditions of the contract of
lease when it failed to settle the labor
dispute with its former employees, thus,
dragging them as respondents in an NLRC
Case; and that the respondent herein failed
to maintain her in the quiet and peaceful
possession and enjoyment of the leased
premises during the effectivity of the lease
contract, in violation of paragraphs 6 and
11 thereof. The trial court rendered
judgment dismissing the complaint and
declaring the lease contract terminated for
failure of Agricom to implement the terms
thereof. The trial court, however, on motion
for reconsideration by Agricom, ordered
petitioner Chua Tee Dee to pay rentals to
respondent Agricom. CA affirmed.
Celine De Guzman | Ish Guidote | Desiree Ico | Pola Lamarca | Ross Tugade
HELD DOCTRINE
fenced by the claimants, she had all the
right to sue the intruders who had
disturbed her physical possession as
provided for in Article 1664 of the New Civil
Code. However, the petitioner did not file
any suit against any of the claimants. Even
her branch manager testified that no action
to quiet title had been filed by the alleged
claimants. Thus, it cannot be said that the
private respondent violated paragraph 11
of the contract of lease. The Court also
upheld the appellate court in holding that
petitioner failed to prove that she suffered
any loss from the labor case that was filed
against her enterprise and her husband.
Since petitioner Chua Tee Dee failed to
prove that the private respondent Agricom
breached any of the provisions of the
contract of lease, she had no valid reason
to suspend the payment of rentals under
Art. 1658 of the Civil Code.
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