Civil Procedure Cases 1

Sante v. Claravall

Petitioners: Irene and Reynaldo Sante

Respondents: Hon. Edilberto T. Claravall, Presidig Judge of Branch 60, RTC of
Baguio City, and Vita N. Kalashian

Facts:

April 5, 2004: Respondent filed before the RTC of Baguio City a complaint for
damages against petitioners. Respondent alleged that Petitioner Irene Sante uttered
words in the police station of Natividad, Pangasinan which implied that she had
sex with Bert, her bodyguard which is a suspect in the killing of petitioners close
relative. Petitioner also allegedly went around Natividad telling people that she
is protecting and cuddling the suspects in the aforesaid killing. Thus, respondent
prayed that petitioners be held liable to pay moral damages in the amount of
P300,000.00; P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; P50,000.00 attorneys fees; P20,000.00
litigation expenses; and costs of suit.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss, contending that it was the MTCC that had
jurisdiction for the amount of the claim for moral damages was not more than the
jurisdictional amount of P300,000, and the claim for exemplary damages should be
excluded in computing the total claim.

June 24, 2004: RTC denied the motion to dismiss, holding that the total claim of
respondent amounted to P420,000. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.

July 7 and 19, 2004: RTC denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

July 14, 2004: Respondent and her husband filed an amended complaint, increasing
the claim for moral damages from P300K to P1M.

August 2, 2004: Petitioners appealed, filing a petition for certiorari (GR SP No.
85465) and prohibition before the CA. In response to the increase in the claim,
they also filed a motion to dismiss in the RTC.

September 17, 2004: RTC denied their motion. Petitioners filed again a petition for
certiorari and prohibition in CA (GR SP No. 87563), claiming the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the amendment of the complaint.

January 23, 2006: (85465) CA 7th division found grave abuse on the part of RTC
Baguio, civil case of respondent for damages is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

January 31, 2006: (87563) CA affirmed the Sept. 17 order of RTC denying
petitioner’s motion to dismiss, holding that the total or aggregate amount demanded
in the complaint constitutes the basis of jurisdiction. Unable to accept the
decision, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the SC.

ISSUES:
0. Whether or not the RTC acquire jurisdiction over the case
0. Whether or not the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion in allowing the
amendment of the complaint

RULING:
(1) Yes. Sec. 19(8) of BP 129, as amended by Sec. 5 of RA 7691 provides that RTC
shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all other cases in which the
demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation
expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds Three
hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where
the demand, exclusive of the abovementioned items exceeds Two hundred thousand
pesos (P400,000.00). The the second adjustment from P200,000.00 to P300,000.00
became effective on February 22, 2004. Hence, at the time of the filing of the
complaint on April 5, 2004, the MTCCs jurisdictional amount has been adjusted to
P300,000.00.

Furthermore, Administrative Circular No. 09-94 provides that in cases where the
claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the
amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the
court. It is clear, based on the allegations of the complaint, that respondents
main action is for damages. Hence, the other forms of damages being claimed by
respondent, e.g., exemplary damages, attorneys fees and litigation expenses, are
not merely incidental to or consequences of the main action but constitute the
primary relief prayed for in the complaint.

Considering that the total amount of damages claimed was P420,000.00, the Court of
Appeals was correct in ruling that the RTC had jurisdiction over the case.

(2) No. While it is a basic jurisprudential principle that an amendment cannot be

allowed when the court has no jurisdiction over the original complaint and the
purpose of the amendment is to confer jurisdiction on the court, here, the RTC
clearly still had jurisdiction over the original complaint and amendment of the
complaint was then still a matter of right. (The petition for certiorari filed by
petitioners before the CA was pending).

—————

Sebastian v. Ng

Petitioner: Michael Sebastian

Respondent: Annabel Lagmay Ng, represented by her attorney-in-fact, Angelita Lagmay

FACTS:

1997: Respondent, acting as a representative and atty-in-fact of her daughter

Annabel, filed a complaint before the Brgy. Justice of Siclong, Laur, Nueva Ecija.
She claimed that the petitioner and her daughter was once sweethearts, they agreed
to jointly invest their financial resources to buy a truck. She alleged that while
Annabel was working in Hongkong, Annabel sent Michael the amount of P350,000.00 to
purchase the truck. However, after Annabel and Michael's relationship has ended,
Michael allegedly refused to return the money to Annabel.

July 9, 1997: Parties entered into an amicable settlement, evidenced by a document

denominated as “kasunduan” wherein Michael agreed to pay Annabel the amount of
P250,000. Kasunduan was not repudiated within 10 days from the settlement, in
accordance with the Katarungang Pambarangay Law. When Michael failed to honor the
kasunduan, Angelita brought the matter back to the Barangay, but the Barangay
Captain failed to enforce the kasunduan, and instead, issued a Certification to
File Action.

Jan 15, 1999: Respondent filed with the MCTC a motion for execution of the
kasunduan. Michael moved for its dismissal, alleging that respondent violated Sec.
15, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure

Jan 17, 2000: MCTC rendered a decision in favor of respondent. Petitioner filed an
appeal with the RTC, arguing that MCTC committed grave abuse of discretion in
prematurely deciding the case.

Nov. 13, 2000: RTC upheld the MCTC decision. It held that petitioner failed to
assail the validity of the kasunduan, or to adduce any evidence to dispute
respondent’s claims or the applicability of the Implementing Rules and Regulations
of R.A. No. 7160. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that:
(1) an amicable settlement or arbitration award can be enforced by the Lupon within
six (6) months from date of settlement or after the lapse of six (6) months, by
ordinary civil action in the appropriate City or Municipal Trial Court and not by a
mere Motion for execution; and;
(2) the MCTC does not have jurisdiction over the case since the amount of
P250,000.00 (as the subject matter of the kasunduan) is in excess of MCTC's
jurisdictional amount of P200,000.00.

March 13, 2001: RTC granted petitioner’s MR, that there is merit in the
jurisdictional issue he raised. Respondent moved for the reconsideration of the
order, but was denied, hence she filed a petition for review with the CA.

March 31, 2004: CA reversed RTC decision, holding that the "appropriate local trial
court" stated in Section 2, Rule VII of the Implementing Rules of R.A. No. 7160
refers to the municipal trial courts. Thus, contrary to petitioner's contention,
the MCTC has jurisdiction to enforce any settlement or arbitration award,
regardless of the amount involved. The CA also ruled that petitioner's failure to
repudiate the kasunduan in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the
Implementing Rules of R.A. No. 7160, rendered the kasunduan final. Hence, Michael
can no longer assail the kasunduan on the ground of forgery.

July 15, 2004: Petitioner moved to reconsider, but was denied. Hence he filed a
petition for review on certiorari with the SC arguing that the kasunduan cannot be
given the force and effect of a final judgment because it did not conform to the
provisions of the Katarungang Pambarangay and claims that the agreement forged
between him and respondent was fictitious and simuated. Michael additionally claims
that the kasunduan is merely in the nature of a private document. He also
reiterates that since the amount of P250,000.00 - the subject matter of the
kasunduan - is in excess of MCTC's jurisdictional amount of P200,000.00, the
kasunduan is beyond the MCTC's jurisdiction to hear and to resolve. Accordingly,
the proceedings in the Barangay are all nullity.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the MCTC has the authority and jurisdiction to execute the
kasunduan regardless of the amount involved;
(2) Whether or not the kasunduan could be given the force and effect of a final
judgment
(3) Whether or not the kasunduan can be enforced.

RULING:
(2)&(3) Yes to both. A simple reading of Section 417 of the Local Government Code
readily discloses the two-tiered mode of enforcement of an amicable settlement. An
amicable settlement or arbitration award that is not repudiated within a period
often (10) days from the settlement may be enforced by: first, execution by the
Lupon within six (6) months from the date of the settlement; or second, by an
action in the appropriate city or municipal trial court if more than six (6) months
from the date of settlement has already elapsed.

Under the first mode of enforcement, the execution of an amicable settlement could
be done on mere motion of the party entitled thereto before the Punong Barangay.
The second mode of enforcement, on the other hand, is judicial in nature and could
only be resorted to through the institution of an action in a regular form before
the proper City/Municipal Trial Court. It is obvious that respondent chose the
seccond mode, by filing a motion. But what respondent has filed was a motion for
execution, rather than a petition or complaint for execution. However, it shows
that it contains the material requirements of an initiatory action. It is well-
settled that what are controlling in determining the nature of the pleading are the
allegations in the body and not the caption. Hence the court rules in the
affirmative.

Furthermore, the kasunduan has the force and effect of a final judgment; under
Section 416 of the Local Government Code, the amicable settlement and arbitration
award shall have the force and effect of a final judgment of a court upon the
expiration often (10) days from the date of its execution and Section 14, Rule VI
of the Katarungang Pambarangay Implementing Rules states that the party's failure
to repudiate the settlement within the period often (10) days shall be deemed a
waiver of the right to challenge the settlement on the ground that his/her consent
was vitiated by fraud, violence or intimidation. In the present case, the records
reveal that Michael never repudiated the kasunduan within the period prescribed by
the law. Hence, the CA correctly ruled that the kasunduan has the force and effect
of a final judgment that is ripe for execution.

(1) Yes. Section 417 of the Local Government Code clearly and unequivocally speaks
of the "appropriate city or municipal court" as the forum for the execution of the
settlement or arbitration award issued by the Lupon. Notably, in expressly
conferring authority over these courts, Section 417 made no distinction with
respect to the amount involved or the nature of the issue involved.

Thus, there can be no question that the law's intendment was to grant jurisdiction
over the enforcement of settlement/arbitration awards to the city or municipal
courts regardless of the amount. A basic principle of interpretation is that words
must be given their literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation
where the words of a statute are clear, plain and free from ambiguity.

—————

Barrido v. Nonato

Petitioner: Marietta N. Barrido

Respondent: Leonardo V. Nonato

Facts: In the course of the marriage of respondent and petitioner, they were able
to acquire a property situated in Bacolod City, consisting of a house and lot.

March 15, 1996: Their marriage was declared void on the ground of psychological
incapacity. Respondent asked petitioner for partition, but the latter refused.

January 29, 2003: Respondent filed a compaint for partition before the MTCC of
Bacolod. Petitioner argued that the subject property had already ben sold to their
children and moved for the dismissal of the complaint because the MTCC lacked
jurisdiction, the partition case being an action incapable of pecuniary estimation.

Sept 17, 2003: Bacolod MTCC rendeed a decision, applying Art. 129 of FC,
adjudicating the property to the defendant Marietta Nonato, the spouse with whom
the majority of the common children choose to remain.

July 21 2004: RTC reversed the ruling of the MTCC, holding that MTCC made a
reversible error in adjudication the subject property to petitioner, that it must
be equitably partition of the house and lot.

Nov 16, 2006: CA affirmed the RTC Decision. It held that since the property’s
assessed valie was only P8,080, it clearly fell within the MTCC’s jurisdiction.
Also, RTC erred in relying on Art. 129 of the FC, instead of Art. 147. Hence,
petitioner filed a petition for review questioning the decision of the CA.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not CA erred in holding that the MTCC had jurisdiction to try the
case (CivPro)
(2) Whether or not the lot is conjugal after being sold to their children
(3) Whether or not Art. 129 of the FC has no application in the present case.

RULING:
(1) Yes. Sec. 33 of BP 129 provides that MTCCs has exclusive original jurisdiction
in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or
any interest therein where the assessed value of the propertyor interest therein
does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro
Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00)
exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation
expenses and costs.

Here, the subject property’s assessed value was merely ₱8,080.00, an amount which
certainly does not exceed the required limit of ₱20,000.00 for civil actions
outside Metro Manila tofall within the jurisdiction of the MTCC. Therefore, the
lower court correctly took cognizance of the instant case.

(2) Yes. Aside from the title to the property still being registered in the names
of the former spouses, said document of sale does not bear a notarization of a
notary public. It must be noted that without the notarial seal, a document remains
to be private and cannot be converted into a public document, making it
inadmissible in evidence unless properly authenticated. Unfortunately, Barrido
failed to prove its due execution and authenticity. In fact, she merely annexed
said Deed of Sale to her position paper. Therefore, the subject property remains to
be owned in common by Nonato and Barrido, which should be divided in accordance
with the rules on co-ownership.

(3) Yes. Art. 147 of the FC applies to the union of parties who are legally
capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose
marriage is declared void under Art. 36 of the FC. Under this property regime,
property acquired during marriage is prima facie presumed to have been obtained
through the couple’s joint efforts and governed by the rules of co-ownership. Thus,
the propertie should be partitioned on the basis of co-ownership.

—————

Brgy. San Roque v. Pastor

Petitioner: Barangay San Roque, Talisay, Cebu

Respondents: Heirs of Francisco Pastor

FACTS: Petitioner filed before the MTC a complaint to expropriate a property of the
respondents.

April 8, 1997: MTC dismissed the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction,
reasoning that the principal cause of action is the exercise of such power or
right. The fact that the action involves real property is merely incidental hecnce
an action for eminent domain is therefore within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not with this Court.

The RTC also dismissed the Complaint when filed before it, holding that an action
for eminent domain affected title to real property; hence, the value of the
property to be expropriated would determine whether the case should be filed before
the MTC or the RTC. Concluding that the action should have been filed before the
MTC since the value of the subject property was less than P20,000. It appeared from
the current tax declaration of the land involved that its assessed value is only
P1,740.
Furthermore, the instant action for eminent domain or condemnation of real property
is a real action affecting title to or possession of real property, hence, it is
the assessed value of the property involved which determines the jurisdiction of
the court. This was pronounced by retired Justice Jose Y. Feria.

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed directly to this Court, raising a pure question of

law. Respondents, on the other hand, contend that the Complaint for Eminent Domain
affects the title to or possession of real property. Thus, they argue that the case
should have been brought before the MTC, pursuant to BP 129 as amended by Section 3
(3) of RA 7691.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC and not the MTC has jurisdiction over expropriaton
suits.

RULING: Yes. An expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Test to

determine whether one is incapable of pecuniary estimation:

Where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money,
or where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the
principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the
subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are
cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance. The rationale of the rule is
plainly that the second class cases, besides the determination of damages, demand
an inquiry into other factors which the law has deemed to be more within the
competence of courts of first instance.

An expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of a sum of money, rather, it
deals with the exercise by the government of its authority and right to take
private property for public use. Expropriation proceedings have two phases:

The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to
exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the
context of the facts involved in the suit, while the second phase of the eminent
domain action is concerned with the determination by the court of the just
compensation for the property sought to be taken.

It should be stressed that the primary consideration in an expropriation suit is

whether the government or any of its instrumentalities has complied with the
requisites for the taking of private property. Hence, the courts determine the
authority of the government entity, the necessity of the expropriation, and the
observance of due process. In the main, the subject of an expropriation suit is the
governments exercise of eminent domain, a matter that is incapable of pecuniary
estimation.

True, the value of the property to be expropriated is estimated in monetary terms,

for the court is duty-bound to determine the just compensation for it. This,
however, is merely incidental to the expropriation suit. Indeed, that amount is
determined only after the court is satisfied with the propriety of the
expropriation.

In addition, jurisprudence dictates that condemnation proceedings are within the

jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance. The 1997 amendments to the Rules of Court
were not intended to change these jurisprudential precendents.

Lastly, Justice Feria sought merely to distinguish between real and personal
actions. His discussion on this point pertained to the nature of actions, not to
the jurisdiction of courts. In fact, in his pre-bar lectures, he emphasizes that
jurisdiction over eminent domain cases is still within the RTCs under the 1997
Rules.

Again, the question in the present suit is whether the government may expropriate
private property under the given set of circumstances. The government does not
dispute respondents title to or possession of the same. Indeed, it is not a
question of who has a better title or right, for the government does not even claim
that it has a title to the property. It merely asserts its inherent sovereign power
to "appropriate and control individual property for the public benefit, as the
public necessity, convenience or welfare may demand.

—————

Gonzales v. GJH Land

Petitioners: Manuel Luis C. Gonzales and Francis Martin D. Gonzales

Respondents: GJH Land, Inc.

FACTS:
Aug 4, 2011: Petitioners filed a complaint for “Injunction with prayer for Issuance
of Status Quo Order, Three (3) and Twenty (20)-Day Temporary Restraining Orders,
and Writ of Preliminary Injunction with Damages” against respondents before the RTC
of Muntinlupa City seeking to enjoin the sale of S.J. Land, Inc.'s shares which
they purportedly bought from S.J. Global, Inc. on February 1, 2010. Essentially,
petitioners alleged that the subscriptions for the said shares were already paid by
them in full in the books of S.J. Land, Inc., but were nonetheless offered for sale
on July 29, 2011 to the corporation's stockholders,8 hence, their plea for
injunction.
The case was raffled to Branch 276, which is not a Special Commercial Court.

August 2011: Said branch issued a TRO and later an order granting the application
for a writ of preliminary injunction. Respondents then filed a motion to dismiss on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, pointing out that the
case involves an intra-corporate dispute and should, thus, be heard by the
designated Special Commercial Court of Muntinlupa City.

April 17, 2012: Branch 276 granted the motion to dismiss filed by respondents. It
found that the case involves an intra-corporate dispute that is within the original
and exclusive jurisdiction of the RTCs designated as Special Commercial Courts. It
pointed out that the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256 (Branch 256) was
specifically designated by the Court as the Special Commercial Court.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the raffle was beyond
their control, they should not be made to suffer the consequences of the wrong
assignment of the case, especially after paying the filing fees in the amount of
P235,825.00 that would be for naught if the dismissal is upheld. They further
maintained that the RTC has jurisdiction over intra-corporate disputes under
Republic Act No. (RA) 8799, but since the Court selected specific branches to hear
and decide such suits, the case must, at most, be transferred or raffled off to the
proper branch.

July 9, 2012: Branch 276 denied the motion for reconsideration, providing that it
has no authority or power to order the transfer of the case to the proper Special
Commercial Court, citing Calleja v. Panday.

ISSUE: Whether or not Branch 276 of the RTC of Muntinlupa erred in dismissing the
case for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.

RULING: Yes.
Applying the relationship test and the nature of the controversy test, the suit
between the parties is clearly rooted in the existence of an intra-corporate
relationship and pertains to the enforcement of their correlative rights and
obligations under the Corporation Code and the internal and intra-corporate
regulatory rules of the corporation, hence, intra-corporate, which should be heard
by the designated Special Commercial Court as provided under A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC25
dated June 17, 2003 in relation to Item 5.2, Section 5 of RA 8799.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law, whereas a

court's exercise of jurisdiction, unless provided by the law itself, is governed by
the Rules of Court or by the orders issued from time to time by the Court.
Furthermore, jurisprudence has laid down that the matter of whether the RTC
resolves an issue in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited
jurisdiction as a special court is only a matter of procedure and has nothing to do
with the question of jurisdiction.

RA 8799: Jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Sec. 5, PD No. 902-A was transferred
from SEC to the RTC, being courts of general jurisdiction. Sec 5.2 states that “The
Commission's jurisdiction over all cases enumerated under Section 5 of Presidential
Decree No. 902-A is hereby transferred to the Courts of general jurisdiction or the
appropriate Regional Trial Court: Provided, that the Supreme Court in the exercise
of its authority may designate the Regional Trial Court branches that shall
exercise jurisdiction over the cases”

Regional Trial Courts as courts of general jurisdiction: stems from Sec. 19(6),
Chapter II of BP 129 which provides that RTC shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all civil cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court,
tribunal, person or body exercising jurisdiction or any court, tribunal, person or
body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.

A.M. 03-03-03-SC: consolidated commercial SEC courts and the intellectual property
courts in one RTC branch in a particular locality, the Special Commercial Court, to
streamline the court structure and to promote expediency.

The designation of Special Commercial Courts was merely intended as a procedural

tool to expedite the resolution of commercial cases in line with the court's
exercise of jurisdiction. This designation was not made by statute but only by an
internal Supreme Court rule. The designation of Special Commercial Courts is, to
stress, merely an incident related to the court's exercise of jurisdiction, which,
as first discussed, is distinct from the concept of jurisdiction over the subject
matter. The RTC's general jurisdiction over ordinary civil cases is therefore not
abdicated by an internal rule streamlining court procedure.

Such designation has nothing to do with the statutory conferment of jurisdiction to

all RTCs under RA 8799 since in the first place, the Court cannot enlarge,
diminish, or dictate when jurisdiction shall be removed, given that the power to
define, prescribe, and apportion jurisdiction is, as a general rule, a matter of
legislative prerogative.

Here, petitioners filed a commercial case, i.e., an intra-corporate dispute, with

the Office of the Clerk of Court in the RTC of Muntinlupa City, which is the
official station of the designated Special Commercial Court, in accordance with
A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC. It is, therefore, from the time of such filing that RTC of
Muntinlupa acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter, but wrongfully raffled to
a regular branch.

This error may have been caused by a reliance on the complaint's caption, i.e.,
"Civil Case for Injunction with prayer for Status Quo Order, TRO and Damages,"
which, however, contradicts and more importantly, cannot prevail over its actual
allegations in the body that clearly make out an intra-corporate dispute. To avert
any future confusion, the Court requires henceforth, that all initiatory pleadings
state the action's nature both in its caption and the body.

The Calleja case raised by the RTC involved two different RTCs, whereas the instant
case only involves one RTC, hence it was improper for the RTC to rely on the
Calleja ruling.

The transfer of the present intra-corporate dispute from Branch 276 to Branch 256
of the same RTC of Muntinlupa City is consistent with jurisprudence and will
further the purposes stated in A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC of attaining a speedy and
efficient administration of justice.

Hence, the petition is granted, the civil case is referred to the executive judge
of the RTC of Muntinlupa for re-docketing as a commercial case and assigning said
case to Branch 256, the sole designated Special Commercial Court in the RTC of
Muntinlupa City.

Guidelines:
1. If a commercial case filed before the proper RTC is wrongly raffled to its
regular branch, the proper courses of action are as follows:
1.1 If the RTC has only one branch designated as a Special Commercial Court, then
the case shall be referred to the Executive Judge for re-docketing as a commercial
case, and thereafter, assigned to the sole special branch (Ruling of the Court in
thisc case);

1.2 If the RTC has multiple branches designated as Special Commercial Courts, then
the case shall be referred to the Executive Judge for re-docketing as a commercial
case, and thereafter, raffled off among those special branches; and

1.3 If the RTC has no internal branch designated as a Special Commercial Court,
then the case shall be referred to the nearest RTC with a designated Special
Commercial Court branch within the judicial region. Upon referral, the RTC to which
the case was referred to should re- docket the case as a commercial case, and then:
(a) if the said RTC has only one branch designated as a Special Commercial Court,
assign the case to the sole special branch; or (b) if the said RTC has multiple
branches designated as Special Commercial Courts, raffle off the case among those
special branches.

2. If an ordinary civil case filed before the proper RTC is wrongly raffled to its
branch designated as a Special Commercial Court, then the case shall be referred to
the Executive Judge for re-docketing as an ordinary civil case. Thereafter, it
shall be raffled off to all courts of the same RTC (including its designated
special branches which, by statute, are equally capable of exercising general
jurisdiction same as regular branches), as provided for under existing rules.

3. All transfer/raffle of cases is subject to the payment of the appropriate docket

fees in case of any difference. On the other hand, all docket fees already paid
shall be duly credited, and any excess, refunded.

4. Finally, to avert any future confusion, the Court requires that all initiatory
pleadings state the action's nature both in its caption and body. Otherwise, the
initiatory pleading may, upon motion or by order of the court motu proprio, be
dismissed without prejudice to its re-filing after due rectification. This last
procedural rule is prospective in application.

5. All existing rules inconsistent with the foregoing are deemed superseded.